5
Japan Moves South
July-December 1941

The demand for mineral raw materials by the so-called "have-not" nations has now become one of the major threats to world peace. . . . A realistic view of the international minerals situation . . . seems to indicate that sooner or later war may have to be fought collectively by the "have" nations if they are to preserve their material . . . positions. . . . The democratic Powers possess the might necessary to uphold their interpretation of the right. Are they willing to use it?
Charles K. Leith, U.S. government
minerals consultant, April 1938

Although the policy deliberations of Japan's leaders were a tightly held secret, Roosevelt administration officials guessed rightly that their foes' next moves would bode ill for Western interests in Southeast Asia, starting with French Indochina.^[1]

The military intelligence agencies of the United States and Britain in fact produced remarkably accurate evaluations. On July 3, for example, the Navy Department notified its attaché in London, "The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out, however the

Chief of Naval Operations holds the opinion that Japan activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, army and air bases in Indo-China." The Navy pointed out that the Japanese government had ordered all Japanese shipping back into the Pacific and was requisitioning merchant ships.^[2] The United States also knew that the Japanese Army had suddenly called up over a million men and that the government had begun censoring the mails.^[3]

The U.S. naval attaché in London passed this news to the British chiefs of staff, who agreed with the general conclusions reached by the Navy Department. They believed Japan's program to be:

a. to seize Indo China, naval and air bases for which shipping and military forces are held ready;

b. for the expansion southward, to take advantage of any opportunity that arises;

c. for the present, to take no military action against the Soviet [Union].^[4]

In the Foreign Office, one analyst warned that if this scenario came to pass and Southeast Asia were overrun, "both we and the States would probably run out of rubber in under a year, if we pooled all available supplies." He also noted that England had exported from Malaya so much tin to the U.S. stockpile that "there would appear to be only 2 months reserves in this country of tin, and 2 months of concentrates. In consequence, America will have to look, at any rate for the next year, almost entirely to the danger zone [Southeast Asia] to fulfill her requirements."^[5]

State Department experts shared exactly the same concern. Willys Peck, back in the State Department after serving as ambassador to China, asserted, "A Japanese attempt to conquer Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, even if not successful, would inevitably cut off supplies vital to the United States of rubber, tin and other commodities." In line with the previous judgments of Hull, Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Currie, Peck argued, "It is more than ever urgent that China's resistance to

Japan shall be intensified, to the end that more and more of Japan's armed striking force shall be immobilized and dissipated in the 'China Incident.' " By "dragging Japan into deeper and deeper involvement in the China hostilities," he proposed, "the United States can work powerfully toward the achievement of some of her principal objectives, among them the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East, the preservation of our rubber and tin supplies, the safeguarding of the Philippine Islands, the aiding of Russia against Germany, and the aiding of Britain."^[6]

The United States soon received confirmation of what Japan had in mind from a highly reliable source. A cryptographic intelligence breakthrough, code-named MAGIC, allowed the United States to break the Japanese "Purple" cipher used for top-level diplomatic correspondence between the Japanese government and its embassies. On July 8, the State Department began receiving deciphered intercepts of Japanese messages outlining the official policy. One message from Tokyo to Berlin declared: "1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-Prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change. 2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-preservation."^[7]

Later that day Matsuoka sent a diplomatic circular to Nomura containing more bad news for the United States: "Preparations for southward advance shall be reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed. . . . In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be Japan shall act in accordance with the three-Power pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed."^[8]

Washington could not know from MAGIC that interservice rivalries within Japan still precluded an absolutely final deci-

sion over how far, and even whether, to press the southward advance.^[9] But by July 12, the United States had learned from its intercepts of new Japanese demands on the French for military bases in Indochina.^[10] Three days later U.S. officials knew for sure that Japan was demanding that the French cede two great ports—Saigon and Camranh Bay—along with eight air bases scattered through southern Indochina and Cambodia. Confirmations of this intelligence soon arrived from Grew and other conventional sources. If the French did not accept the ultimatums, Japanese troops were prepared to take the country by force.^[11]

U.S. leaders naturally saw Japan's encroachments on Indochina as merely the first steps in an accelerated program of expansion southward to a vital area, "the producers of which are of special importance to the United States and many other nations," as Hull put it in a talk with Hamilton on July 18.^[12] Hull pointed out that Japan's objective in acquiring bases in southern Indochina was not to defend itself against encirclement by the Western powers but was "preliminary to going south." This judgment was hardly speculation anymore. After all, a Japanese dispatch only four days earlier had declared in blunt language: "After the occupation of French Indochina, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. . . . [W]e will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us."^[13]

More bad news came in on July 17, when the old Konoe government was dissolved and a new, even harder-line cabinet was formed under the prince's leadership. "Japan's cabinet switch dashes Roosevelt's June hope that 'moderates' would get control," reported the Wall Street Journal . "Dutch East Indies, not Siberia, is the 'ominous' spot, State Department thinks."^[14]

Acting Secretary Welles met with the Japanese minister of embassy on July 21 to discuss the Indochina situation. Welles conveyed the administration's extreme concern over Japan's ultimatum to the French and asked what Japan's next step would

be. The Japanese official denied any knowledge of plans to occupy Indochina but nonetheless asked what effect such a move would have on the negotiations. Welles said further conversations between the United States and Japan would, in his view, be "completely illogical" if Japan continued to aggress against the countries around it. Hull agreed that the only way for Japan to demonstrate its desire for peace would be to "desist from any reported plans to go ahead with the acquisition of military and naval bases in French Indochina."^[15]

Mere words did not deter Tokyo. Japanese troops began to occupy southern Indochina on July 21. As Hull put it, Japan had finally succeeded in taking "possession of the whole of France's strategic province, pointing like a pudgy thumb toward the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies."^[16] Two days later, Japan's Foreign Office sent out a cable, decoded by MAGIC, reporting on a new propaganda campaign in Indochina to "facilitate lightning action whenever it becomes necessary and to ultimately oust US and UK from SEA." The cable cautioned, however, that duplicity was the order of the day. "We must not . . . give the impression that we intend to make further military penetrations to the south."^[17]

The same day, Welles called Hull for instructions on how to receive Nomura, who had requested an interview. The secretary of state replied that Japan's occupation of the French colony "looked like Japan's last step before jumping off for a full-scale attack in the Southwest Pacific." He instructed Welles to continue negotiations with the Japanese ambassador no further, and Welles informed Nomura of the secretary's decision the same day.^[18]

Tired, distraught, betrayed, and angry, Hull probably felt the talks served no useful function. In his view, Nomura would simply continue to feed the administration lies about Japan's intentions, whereas the United States might, during the course of discussions, inadvertently reveal important intelligence that would aid Japan in its expansionist policy. By breaking off the negotiations, the United States served notice on Japan that it would fight to protect its interests lying in Japan's path.

Hull's drastic step proved just how great was his assessment of the threat from Japan's occupation of southern Indochina. Official State Department historians later summed up the significance of Japan's thrust: "By this further expansion in southern Indochina Japan virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes."^[19] Japan now "threatened essential supplies of American defense materials from the South Pacific," another department history observed.^[20] From here until December 7, the United States worked not so much for a hopeless peace as to prevent a complete collapse of its position in the Pacific.^[21]

The British government had similar concerns as it sized up the changing military picture in the South Seas. On July 23, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden expressed "grave concern" that Japan's new foothold in Indochina would be "potential daggers aimed at Singapore, Britain's Far Eastern fort, and her tin and rubber producing ally, the Netherlands East Indies."^[22] Hull and Welles met the same day to discuss the implications of Japan's most recent act of aggression. Both concluded that any U.S. reaction must be based on the assumption "that by its actions and preparations Japan may be taking one more vital and next to the final step in occupying all the South Seas area." Hull defined the central issue as the potential loss of "trade routes of supreme importance to the United States controlling such products as rubber, tin, and other commodities. This was of vital concern to the United States."^[23]

The next day Welles handed the press a statement observing that Japan was giving "clear indication" of its desire to expand by force into Southeast Asia, using the excellent bases, ports, and airfields provided by the French for a Japanese invasion force. These developments, he said, "tend to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber which are necessary for the normal economy of this country and the consumption of our defense program. . . . The Government and people of this country fully realize that such developments bear directly upon the vital problems of our na-

tional security."^[24] Numerous newspapers ran columns and editorials emphasizing the danger to U.S. raw material lifelines posed by Japan's military encroachments.^[25]

That afternoon, Roosevelt informed Ambassador Nomura that "this new move by Japan in Indochina created an exceedingly serious problem for the United States." Addressing Japan's propaganda claims that its security was at stake in Indochina, the president proposed to neutralize the colony if Japan would withdraw its troops. He would get China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to promise not to disturb the status quo in Indochina, so no power would threaten it or Japan. Roosevelt also assured Nomura that Japan would have ready access to vital raw materials if it accepted those conditions and stopped menacing Southeast Asia. Roosevelt had nothing to lose: If Japan agreed, the pressure would be off U.S. interests in the region; if not, the refusal would expose the bankruptcy of Japan's position.^[26] However, Nomura failed to report the offer to Tokyo until it was too late,^[27] and Japan continued to consolidate its position in Indochina. Grew angrily condemned this escalation,^[28] but Japan's troops kept moving.

In near desperation, Roosevelt finally played the economic card. On July 25, he announced the freezing of all Japanese assets within the United States and the licensing of all U.S. trade with Japan. The New York Times interpreted the action as "virtually severing trade ties with the empire" and said it dealt Japan "the most drastic blow short of actual war." On July 26 Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 8832, actually implementing this decision. Roosevelt had declared economic war in the face of an almost certain decision by Japan to pursue its course of southward expansion.^[29]

The governments of Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries followed suit almost immediately by instituting similar freeze orders against Japanese funds. The Dutch reacted more hesitantly, but on July 28 they extended export controls over all goods shipped to Japan from the Indies and threatened to impose a total embargo unless Japan showed more restraint.^[30] Thus did the Western powers counter the military

threat with severe, potentially crippling economic sanctions against Japan's own sources of raw materials.

The U.S. freeze order did not automatically cut off all shipments of oil to Japan. The State and Treasury departments theoretically could still approve such exports, and Roosevelt perhaps envisioned that they would do so on occasion. The practical effect of Roosevelt's sweeping order, however, was to completely disrupt all trade between the two countries. On August 1 the administration announced that all fuel exports would be subjected to a rigid licensing system, a move widely interpreted as a simple embargo. Indeed, as the days went by and lower-level bureaucrats issued no licenses, U.S. policy became abundantly clear—no oil for Japan. Neither Roosevelt nor Hull stepped in to reopen the door to trade.^[31]

The Decision to Embargo Japan

The embargo, so long in coming, was not so much a gamble as an act of desperation. Without oil, government officials knew, Japan might accelerate its military timetable and seize the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies. By late July, however, the administration believed an attack was coming sooner or later anyway. Tough sanctions might make Japan think twice; if not, they still could weaken Japan enough to give the United States a military edge.

The agonizing debate over sanctions contrasted the consensus over national interests with the sharp division over how best to safeguard them. The State Department's official diplomatic history of the period observes that from 1938 to 1940, the United States government actively considered but finally held back from imposing any serious economic sanctions on Japan, lest it provoke "retaliatory action of a character likely to lead to this country's becoming involved in war."^[32] The administration envisioned the war as starting with an attack not on Pearl Harbor, nor even necessarily on the Philippines, but on the rich European colonies of Southeast Asia.

The supreme importance of keeping Japan out of the region led officials to resist a powerful groundswell of public opinion

that opposed on moral grounds the sale of war-related goods to Japan. On August 29, 1939, for example, 82 percent of people with an opinion favored a total U.S. embargo on war materials, a category that would have included oil and gasoline.^[33]

On April 15, 1940, the day Japanese Foreign Minister Arita delivered his implied threat to the Netherlands East Indies, Secretary Hull and Assistant Secretary Long examined the various alternatives open to the United States to prevent Japan from entering the Indies. They considered, but rejected as foolhardy, the idea of sending the U.S. fleet to Singapore or to Java. The other major possibility was a general embargo on Japan. This, too, they rejected as carrying the risk of unacceptable retaliation against the Netherlands East Indies. "If we put an embargo on Japan and they occupied those islands," both men agreed, "they could place an embargo on tin and rubber against us."^[34] The key issue, as always, was Southeast Asia and its resources, not China and its plight.

In the summer of 1940, with Japan inching southward, the issue of an embargo arose again. Hard-liners such as Stimson, Knox, and Morgenthau urged the president to block all war materials normally shipped to Japan. They hoped such vigorous action would stop Japan dead in its tracks, giving the United States more political leverage in the Far East. The State Department, represented at the time by Acting Secretary Welles, fiercely opposed the suggestion on the grounds that it might provoke Japan to accelerate its southward thrust, pushing the United States into a war it was not ready to fight. Roosevelt listened to the voices of caution and withheld his economic weapon.^[35] Shortly after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, Roosevelt again faced pleas from Stimson, Morgenthau, and Ickes for an embargo, and again he declined to "force [Japan] into a military expedition against the Dutch East Indies."^[36]

Hull and Long again brought up the subject of embargoing Japan on November 7, 1940; as before, both agreed that extreme economic sanctions were infeasible. "If we shut off oil from Japan it would force her to go to the Dutch East Indies, because she had to have oil," Long wrote. "Consequently, it becomes a matter of policy for us to continue to sell oil to Japan

and to sell her other things."^[37] Roosevelt continued to follow the State Department on this issue. He received flack not only from Morgenthau and Ickes but from his wife as well. After the administration tightened its trade restrictions against Japan following the Tripartite Pact, Eleanor wrote her husband asking why it was necessary to continue appeasing Japan by allowing it to buy U.S. petroleum products. He replied to her on November 13: "The real answer which you cannot use is that if we forbid oil shipments to Japan, Japan . . . may be driven by actual necessity to a descent on the Dutch East Indies. At this writing, we all regard such action on our part as an encouragement to the spread of war in the Far East."^[38]

The issue became hot again in June 1941, when a serious oil shortage began developing on the East Coast. The public could not understand why the United States continued to ship oil to Japan while Americans ran short. Within the administration, Harold Ickes mounted an offensive to win from Roosevelt a pledge to embargo all petroleum exports to Japan. Time and again the president refused to budge. On July 1, for example, Roosevelt informed Ickes that Japanese leaders were locked in an internal struggle over whether to advance to the north, advance to the south, or wait it out and "be more friendly with us." No one knew what the decision would be, Roosevelt continued, "but, as you know, it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep peace in the Pacific. I simply have not got enough Navy to go round—and every little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the Atlantic." Roosevelt assumed the United States would eventually have to fight if Japan seized Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies.^[39]

The intelligence that Japan was planning new expansion to the south forced the administration to reappraise its stand on the embargo. On July 10, Sumner Welles, with instructions from Roosevelt, informed British Ambassador Halifax that if Japan moved further to "conquer or to acquire alien territories in the Far East, the government of the United States would immediately impose various embargoes, both economic and financial, which measures have been under consideration for some time past.^[40]

Hornbeck, usually the hard-liner, still opposed a total embargo, however. He proposed that the Navy display its ships more prominently and that trade restrictions be imposed but not on petroleum and iron ore, the two most important items. "Action with regard to either or both of the commodities, if taken now, would have a tendency to prejudice Japan's choice between moving, if and when, northward or southward," he explained. "We certainly do not want to encourage Japan to choose, as between the two, to go southward rather than northward."^[41]

Military officials aired similar concerns. In a letter sent to Roosevelt by Stark on July 19, Admiral Turner wrote: "An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by Japan on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies and possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific. If war in the Pacific is to be accepted by the United States, actions leading up to it should, if practicable, be postponed until Japan is engaged in war in Siberia."^[42] But Hull, hearing the same argument from Far Eastern division chief Hamilton, said the chances of influencing Japan to go north were remote. He believed Japan's attention "was centered southward and that any action Japan might take against Siberia would be only after the collapse of Soviet resistance, should that occur, when Japan would simply pick up the pieces preparatory to embarking on a southward movement."^[43] In order to "deter Japan and to place obstacles in the way of Japan's program of conquest," he proposed giving large credits to China and France to aid their resistance to the Japanese and urged the imposition of "economic, financial and other restrictions upon Japan"—in other words, all measures short of war.^[44]

The gravity of the crisis prompted Roosevelt himself to warn Nomura that relations between the United States and Japan were unraveling fast. As he told the ambassador on July 24:

The average American citizen could not understand why his Government was permitting Japan to be furnished with oil in order that such oil might be utilized by Japan in carrying on her purposes of aggression. The President said that if Japan attempted to seize oil supplies by force in the

Netherlands East Indies the Dutch would, without the shadow of a doubt, resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, war would then result between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own policy of assisting Great Britain an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result. It was with all of these facts in mind, the President said, that notwithstanding the bitter criticism . . . the President up to now had permitted oil to be shipped by Japan from the United States.^[45]

The two nations were now on collision course, as if playing a game of chicken. Colonel Iwakuro, the influential Japanese Army officer, warned against a freeze of Japanese assets during a conversation with Joseph Ballantine on July 25. If such measures were invoked, he declared flatly, "Japan would have no alternative but sooner or later to go south to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in order to obtain essential supplies."^[46]

The time had come for the administration to take its case to the public. Roosevelt first broached it in a series of "informal remarks" on July 24 to the Volunteer Participation Committee, which he hoped would "enlighten the average citizen." To all those Americans puzzled and angry that the United States continued to ship petroleum to Japan while curtailing consumption at home, Roosevelt explained in his condescending tone:

All right. Now the answer is a very simple one. There is a world war going on, and has been for some time—nearly two years. One of our efforts, from the very beginning, was to prevent the spread of that world war in certain areas where it hadn't started. One of those areas is a place called the Pacific Ocean—one of the largest areas of the earth. There happened to be a place in the South Pacific where we had to get a lot of things—rubber, tin, and so forth and so on—down in the Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, and Indochina. . . .

And now here is a nation called Japan. Whether they had at that time aggressive purposes to enlarge their empire southward, they didn't have any oil of their own up in the north. Now, if we cut the oil off, they probably would

have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war.

Therefore, there was—you might call—a method in letting this oil go to Japan, with the hope—and it has worked for two years—of keeping war out of the South Pacific for our own good, for the good of the defense of Great Britain, and the freedom of the seas.^[47]

The logic of Roosevelt's explanation made clear that he would not have ordered the freeze the next day except for the fact that Japan's preparations for a southward thrust were by now considered a fait accompli. The southward advance was underway, even without the instigation of U.S. economic pressure; the logic of caution now gave way to the logic of sanctions.^[48]

The White House's fears that the severing of economic ties might prompt Tokyo simply to accelerate its aggression were soon realized, however. On July 31, Nomura received from Tokyo a telegram, deciphered by the United States, that defined the Japanese position. With economic relations between Japan and the Anglo-American bloc of nations "gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer," the Japanese Empire "to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas." This in turn meant breaking "asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement, which is being woven under the guidance of and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep."^[49]

The implications of the crisis were as clear to policymakers as they were deadly. From his vantage point in Tokyo, Grew best captured the frightening sense of fatalism that now gripped the two countries: "We and the British, who also seem to have done with so-called appeasement, immediately met the move into Indochina with retaliatory steps, and Japan responded in kind. The vicious circle of reprisals and counter-reprisals is on. . . . Unless radical surprises occur in the world, it is difficult to see how the momentum of this downgrade

movement in our relation can be arrested nor how far it will go. The obvious conclusion is eventual war."^[50]

The Strategy of Delay

The tragic events of July 1941 all but sealed the fate of the United States and Japan, setting the stage for Pearl Harbor. Yet for more than four months after Japan's seizure of southern Indochina the two nations remained at peace. They resumed their negotiations, seemingly searching for an alternative to war. But the talks brought only stalemate and despair rather than reconciliation of their incompatible interests. As both adversaries talked, their armies and navies used the last days of peace to prepare for war.

On the Japanese side, the prospect of bringing the "China Incident" to an unfavorable conclusion, after so many years of struggle and national sacrifice, was intolerable even to civilian leaders. Ultimately there was no budging, either, from the goal of dragging Southeast Asia into Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Nothing, meanwhile, led the Roosevelt administration to question its fundamental proposition that the United States and Britain could not afford to lose the raw material wealth and sea lanes of Southeast Asia—not even the knowledge that defense of those interests was leading rapidly to war. After the events in July, and with their secret intelligence gleaned from MAGIC, U.S. policymakers and diplomats were not about to accept any Japanese promises of peaceful intent or willingness to respect the status quo in the South Seas. Hull later claimed that as early as 1933 he adopted the guiding axiom that "Japan had no intention whatever of abiding by treaties but would regulate her conduct by the opportunities of the moment." Certainly nothing that happened in the fall of 1941 caused him to doubt that principle.^[51]

Military intelligence estimates in the final months before Pearl Harbor painted a grim picture of continuing Japanese preparations for further conquests to the south, especially

against Thailand, whose loss would undermine the position of British Malaya.^[52] Armed with these reports and his own experience, Hull, as Stimson put it, "made up his mind that we have reached the end of any possible appeasement with Japan and that there is nothing further that can be done with that country except by a firm policy and, he expected, force itself." A few days later the secretary of state was "asking searching questions . . . of the Navy what they'll do next in case any of these issues that he has been handling brings up an impasse and the necessity of force."^[53] In conversation with Welles, Hull suggested the question was not if but when. "Nothing will stop them except force," he declared on August 2.^[54]

The administration's conviction that a Japanese attack on Southeast Asia was only a matter of time would alone have made any serious and lasting agreement between the two countries nearly impossible, given Tokyo's territorial ambitions. But as if to clinch the matter, China began looming as an insurmountable obstacle to a settlement. Far from acting out of a sentimental attachment to China, as some historians have claimed, the administration refused to compromise over China precisely because more fundamental interests in Southeast Asia would be jeopardized if China's collapse freed a million Japanese troops for aggression elsewhere.

Washington's strategy of aiding China hinged on the hope that Japan's military strength would be dissipated on Asia's vast mainland rather than set loose on Southeast Asia. Had sentiment for China's plight, regard for principle, or even concern over the "Open Door" in China dominated the administration's perception of the national interest, it would never have fought public opinion and delayed the embargo against Japan so long. Instead, U.S. leaders used China cynically as a web in which to tangle Japanese forces and keep them from more vital regions.

This policy, however, ultimately backed the United States into a corner. To guarantee Washington's support, all the Chiang regime had to do was threaten to collapse. Chiang Kai-shek had built up a well-placed lobby within the United States to plead for more aid and resist any compromise over China's future.

Through friends in the Treasury Department and through Owen Lattimore and Lauchlin Currie, Chiang passed along his pleas for material assistance and political support, suggesting always that China's morale and military resistance were near collapse.^[55] And should anyone in Washington forget China's part in the grand strategy, Hornbeck was always on hand to remind them that "far and away the least expensive" insurance against having to fight Japan was "giving aid of the right sort in adequate amounts and with effective promptness to China. . . . If we fail in this and do have to fight Japan, we will have ourselves to blame."^[56]

With so little to negotiate about and so thick an atmosphere of distrust in Washington, why did Hull agree to a whole new round of negotiations with the Japanese ambassador? Ever the diplomat, he could not rule out the possibility that the U.S. embargo would make Japan come to its senses. More realistically, the secretary hoped to delay war until rearmament at home and in the Philippines could be completed. "The point is how long we can maneuver the situation until the military matter in Europe is brought to a conclusion" he told Welles. "I just don't want us to take for granted a single word they say, but appear to do so, to whatever extent it may satisfy our purpose to delay further action by them."^[57] Japan also needed time to complete its military buildup. By August 5 it had stationed 40,000 troops in Indochina.^[58] However, further consolidation of its position would take time, so Tokyo returned to the negotiations.

To reopen the conversations with Hull, Japan seized the opportunity opened by Roosevelt's proposal for neutralizing Indochina. On August 6, Nomura returned with the Japanese government's long-awaited response. But rather than addressing the proposal directly—which would risk laying bare the expansive aims of Japan's foreign and military policy—Nomura presented a counterproposal providing for a removal of Japanese troops from Indochina only after a satisfactory settlement of the "China Incident," a recognition by the United States of the "special status of Japan in French Indo-China even after the

withdrawal of Japanese troops from that area," the suspension of all U.S. military activity in the Southwestern Pacific (including the Philippines), and an implied requirement that the United States cease aiding China if it refused to negotiate with Japan. Finally, the United States would have to remove trade restrictions against Japan.^[59]

Individually and collectively, these points were nonstarters, and Hull told Nomura so. In effect, Japan was asking the United States to reverse the freeze order but otherwise accept the status quo, including the threatening Japanese military presence in Indochina. As Hull noted immediately, "from Indochina [Japan] could menace the Philippines and the British and Dutch Far Eastern possessions," whereas the United States could do nothing to stop them.^[60]

Welles informed the British undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, Lord Cadogan (who was lobbying the administration to warn Japan that further advances southward could lead to war with the United States), that the White House found Japan's latest offer totally unacceptable. If Japan continued to try and dominate the Pacific, war with the United States would be inevitable. Nevertheless, the administration would continue the diplomatic charade because "it was wiser, if only to obtain delay, to utilize this counter proposal as a means of prolonging the conversations between the two Governments of Japan and the United States in order to put off a show-down (if such was inevitable) until the time that such a show-down was from our standpoint more propitious." Welles said he hoped the British government, rather than issuing an ultimatum to Japan or provoking war, would follow the policy of the United States, "namely, the dragging out of conversations on this latest Japanese proposal to the utmost without the slightest relaxation of the military or economic measures which had been taken."^[61]

So the United States carried on with the conversations. Secretary Hull met with Nomura on August 8 to deliver the official U.S. response to the new Japanese initiative. He told the ambassador that the proposal was clearly unacceptable and "lack-

ing in responsiveness to the suggestion made by the President." Hull objected to Japan's unwillingness to "neutralize" Indochina and told Nomura that serious peace negotiations could begin only if "the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina or establishing bases there with its military and naval forces or, in case such steps had already actually been begun, would withdraw such forces."^[62]

Meeting Hull again on August 16, Nomura this time argued that Japan needed to control Indochina in order to obtain necessary foodstuffs. Hull countered by pointing out that Japan could obtain all the rice it needed in the world market. The secretary declared that Japan's feverish building of military bases in southern Indochina, far from helping to secure adequate supplies of rice, "would mean about the last step prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area." Without spelling out the consequences, he said, "this Government could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially if it should be carried forward to any further extent."^[63]

Only this last point, not the basic assessment of U.S. interests in the region, aroused debate. Roosevelt had just returned from the Atlantic Conference, where Churchill had impressed upon him the need to gain time to complete the complex preparations for defense against Japan in the Southeast Asia. The president decided to continue delaying Japan with negotiations rather than prematurely issuing threats.^[64]

On August 17, with Hull attending, Roosevelt met with Nomura to discuss the ambassador's request that negotiations be resumed on a formal basis. The president opened by deploring Japan's policy of expansion. Nomura then announced some startling news: Prince Konoe, Japan's premier, so sincerely desired a peace settlement with the United States that he would meet with Roosevelt personally to discuss and if possible resolve the differences pushing Japan and the United States toward war. Roosevelt, clearly taken by surprise, did not bite. The offer would take time to digest. Instead, he simply continued on his theme, expressing his administration's unalterable opposition to Japan's foreign policy. The United States would re-

sume normal discussions if Japan indicated its desire to follow a more peaceful policy, Roosevelt promised. But if Japan continued on its current course, his administration would be "compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States."^[65]

On the morning of August 28, Hull took Nomura in to see the president. The ambassador delivered two messages from his government. The first was a direct communication from Konoe urging that the two leaders meet for a summit conference as soon as possible so that the two countries could reach a settlement. This time Roosevelt expressed immediate interest in the proposal and suggested a three- or four-day meeting with the Japanese premier. The second message Nomura carried seemed less hopeful, however. Although the Japanese government announced its peaceful intentions regarding the Pacific, it would withdraw troops from Indochina only when "the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia." Japan further offered not to use military force against any neighboring country "without provocation," a slippery phrase that could only irritate the State Department.^[66]

Although Roosevelt seemed genuinely interested in Konoe's proposal for a face-to-face summit, which Grew called "unprecedented in Japanese history," Hull examined the plan with a suspicious eye. No doubt he saw some merit in Hornbeck's suggestion that the proposal be given favorable consideration "only if the Japanese authorities give evidence, by suspension of offensive military operations, of a desire to have and to maintain peace."^[67] His attitude was probably stiffened even more by an intelligence summary sent by Stimson of Japan's furious military preparations. "It was another example of Japanese duplicity," Stimson observed in his diary. "They are trying now to get up a conference between the Japanese Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt on a most engaging program of peace while at the same time they are carrying on negotiations with their Ambassadors throughout the world showing that on its face this is a pure blind and that they have

already made up their minds to a policy of going south through Indo-China and Thailand. The invitation to the President is merely a blind to try to keep us from taking definite action."^[68]

Hull was in no hurry to accept Konoe's offer. He believed that if the two governments did not decide beforehand on certain basic principles, the conference would end in failure. That in turn might exacerbate tensions, frustrate further negotiations, and lead all the faster to war. During a meeting with Nomura on the evening of August 28, Hull suggested that the basic differences separating the countries be explored and an agreement in principle be worked out before the meeting began.^[69]

Nomura replied that only the issue of Japanese troops would present a problem. He suggested that the United States bend its efforts toward bringing the Chinese and Japanese governments together for peace negotiations. But even this point stirred Hull's objections, lest China sense a sellout and quit resisting. "We should be involved in this matter through Japan's requesting us to exercise our good offices," he replied. "In order to exercise such good offices we need to have the confidence and friendship of the Chinese Government before and after. We can't propose that the Chinese negotiate with Japan until we know what Japan's basic terms are. You can imagine what a difficult situation would arise if, after a meeting between Prince Konoye and the President, an explosion should occur in China over dissatisfaction with the results of the meeting."

Hull leveled with the ambassador. "We can't afford to have the Chinese think we are ignoring their interests in going ahead with any arrangements," he said truthfully. "It is our idea to help the Japanese establish friendship on a solid basis."^[70]

As State Department experts reviewed the proposal for a Roosevelt-Konoe summit meeting, their objections mounted. First, Hull and others believed that if Japan failed to agree to basic points before the conference, no explicit settlement would result, only general statements of each side's peaceful intents, which Japan would bend to its own purposes. "Moreover," the secretary argued, "she could then say she had the President's endorsement of her actions."^[71]

Hull believed further that the militaristic ruling groups in Japan could stifle any residual hope that Konoe might accept a settlement agreeable to the United States. His suspicions came to the fore again. "We knew that Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous," he recalled later. "We asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses." These views were not just made up for the benefit of postwar audiences. In early October, Stimson recorded Hull's agreement that "no promises of the Japs based on words would be worth anything."^[72]

An even more telling point within the State Department was Konoe's own record. Under his premiership Japan had invaded China in 1937, bombed the U.S. ship Panay , and signed the Tripartite Pact in 1940.^[73] If allowed to meet with Roosevelt, Konoe would gain prestige, strengthening the militarists. "If we seek merely to gain time," came the inevitable Hornbeck analysis, "we should, presumably, not wish at the same time to enhance unnecessarily the prestige of Konoye and that group."^[74]

Finally, the State Department worried that "the very holding of the meeting between the President and Konoe, following so soon after the Atlantic Conference, would cause China grave uneasiness, unless an agreement had already been reached that would protect China's sovereignty."^[75] Such a meeting, Horn-beck agreed, "would unquestionably have a decidedly adverse effect on Chinese morale which is China's greatest weapon." For similar reasons, "an agreement would weaken Dutch morale in the Netherlands East Indies and would thus facilitate Japan's other major aim—penetration and eventual domination of those vastly wealthy islands." Other members of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs agreed with Hornbeck's analysis.^[76]

So did Stimson. Armed with a military intelligence estimate proposing that the United States obtain major concessions from Japan before holding a summit conference, he wrote: "Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them strongly. I believe, however, that during the next three months while we are re-arming the Philippines great care must be exer-

cised to avoid an explosion by the Japanese army. Put concretely this means that while I approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President and [the Japanese Prime Minister]. I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally important relations with China."^[77]

To forestall any weakening of China's morale, Hull took pains to reassure the Chiang regime. He met with Ambassador Hu Shih on September 4 to discuss briefly the state of Japanese-U.S. negotiations, and through Clarence Gauss, the U.S. ambassador, Hull informed the Chinese government that in the administration's talks with Japan, "no consideration had been or would be given to any arrangement permitting the continuance of aggression in China."^[78]

The State Department methodically recorded all of its objections to a summit without some prior agreement on principles, but Japan pressed on in the hope of keeping the United States out of war. Already feeling the pinch of the embargo, Japanese leaders agreed at a September 3 conference to pursue their negotiations until late October and then prepare for war if no agreement were reached.^[79]

The Japanese ambassador, reflecting Tokyo's hope that Roosevelt and Konoe might yet meet, submitted to Hull a new set of proposals on September 6. Among other points, Japan promised not to undertake "any military advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan." The United States, for its part, would be required to suspend its defensive preparations in the South Pacific and to cut off aid to British and Dutch positions in the area. Both Japan and the United States would suspend their freeze orders, and the United States would have to cut off its aid to China.^[80] These were, in fact, Japan's minimum demands.^[81]

But they were no more acceptable to Washington than ever. The State Department took particular note of the qualification

in Japan's terms, "without any justifiable reason." It also noted that Japan "still evaded the President's suggestion that she withdraw her troops from Indo-China in exchange for neutralization of that colony."^[82] Hull's "primary consideration," he told the British chargé, was still "delaying the possible expansion movements of Japan—which I have had in my mind since last spring."^[83] This policy of delay, however frustrating, was giving the U.S. military time to fortify its positions in the South Seas.^[84]

But China, the linchpin of this strategy, was still shaky. English-language radio broadcasts from China, transcribed and distributed within the State Department, warned against a sellout of China or a relaxation of the embargo and expressed alarm over the outcome of U.S.-Japanese negotiations.^[85] On September 10 the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Quo Tai-chi, called upon Ambassador Gauss to report that news of the negotiations had "given rise to considerable uneasiness on the part of the general Chinese public." Although they appreciated U.S. aid, "they were apt to be easily discouraged by suggestions that they are not receiving wholehearted support from the United States." Any agreement reached behind China's back, he warned, would inevitably work to China's disadvantage.^[86]

Lauchlin Currie went straight to President Roosevelt to protest any accord with Japan that would allow it to remain in China. Unless the United States could guarantee the territorial integrity of China, Currie argued, the result "would do irreparable damage to the good will we have built up in China . . . and would largely nullify the effect of lend-lease aid to China."^[87]

Gauss reinforced this message with his nightmarish report of "a strong undercurrent, even in [Chinese] Government circles, tending toward the view that continued resistance to Japan might not be in the best interests of China, that China might not now fare so badly in negotiations with a Japan anxious to be rid of the 'China Incident' in order to engage in adventures elsewhere, and that ultimately, in any circumstances, China and Japan must arrive at some common understanding in the Far East." Any U.S.-Japan detente that addressed only

Southeast Asia would lead to a strengthening of the peace camp in China, he warned.^[88]

State Department officials took this suggestion of blackmail seriously.^[89] The cumulative effect off all of these warnings from China was to reinforce the tactical linkage of China to Southeast Asia. China's interests could not be shrugged off. Joseph Ballantine summed up the consensus in the State Department that if a summit conference merely discussed the two nations' differences without reaching an accord, the appearance would remain "that some kind of secret agreement or understanding [had] been reached." The psychological blow would have "a far-reaching and immediate effect in China detrimental to the interests of the forces opposing aggression."^[90] Only Grew, who saw hope of at least temporarily preventing a Japanese assault on Anglo-American interests in Southeast Asia and whose vantage point made him less receptive to Chinese concerns, still saw merit in a meeting with Konoe.

Evidence of further Japanese military preparations and demands for bases in southern Indochina was accumulating almost daily throughout late September and October, giving U.S. diplomats even more reason to believe that negotiations were unlikely to prevent a conflict.^[91] With such concerns in mind, Hull delivered on October 2 the first substantive U.S. response to the Japanese peace offer of September 6. His reply to Nomura reflected weariness as well as pessimism and disappointment over the toughening of Japan's peace terms. Though not ruling out a future meeting between Konoe and Roosevelt, the secretary now rejected a fundamental Japanese demand to station troops in China indefinitely. He asked for "a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina" to make known "Japan's peaceful intentions and Japan's desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area."^[92] As Nomura later cabled his government, the negotiations had reached a "deadlock."^[93]

Indeed they had. Japanese leaders were beginning to suspect that they had merely been strung along for weeks by a U.S. ad-

ministration eager to buy time.^[94] The State Department, for its part, remained uncompromising in its hostility to Japanese aspirations on the Asian continent and in Southeast Asia.^[95]

The hardening of the U.S. negotiating position, specifically Roosevelt's refusal to meet Konoe on Japan's terms, contributed to the downfall of the Konoe government on October 16 and its replacement the next day with the even more militant cabinet of War Minister Tojo Hideki. Japanese newspapers said the country would expect the new premier "to pursue the Chinese War to victory and to establish Japan's Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere."^[96] Although most U.S. leaders did not believe Tojo would break off the negotiations immediately, they could not fail to recognize the growing militancy of the Japanese leadership. Some officials argued that nothing fundamental had really changed, but they were as pessimistic as the rest. An October 17 War Department analysis, which went to Harry Hopkins in the White House, downplayed the significance of Japanese cabinet changes and asserted, "Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties."^[97] Stimson was so sure that war was only a short matter of time that he began considering how to blame it on Japan by maneuvering her into making "the first bad move."^[98]

As expected, the new Tojo cabinet was no more inclined than the last to seek peace on terms amenable to the United States. "Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands," the Tokyo government wired Nomura, in a dispatch read by the State Department through MAGIC. "We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views."^[99]

The honorable Nomura knew the United States would not reconsider. He could see no end in sight but war. He understood that his final days as ambassador would be used for de-

ception and not for peace and begged to be relieved of his post: "I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. . . . There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. . . . I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan."^[100]

Administration officials read this pitiful plea to the Tojo government on October 23, the day after it was sent; the impression Nomura's cable made was powerful. But Tokyo refused Nomura's request the next day.^[101]

The Final Negotiations

Japanese leaders had previously agreed to fight by late October if all peace efforts with the United States failed. But a last-minute intervention by the emperor forced Tojo to delay plans for war and extend the negotiations. Japan's militant rulers resolved firmly to give the United States only a brief respite, however, lest Washington drag its feet at the expense of Japan's imperial ambitions.^[102] On November 2, Tokyo explained to Nomura that it would reach a final policy decision on November 5. "This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave."^[103]

Another message from Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori to Nomura two days later sounded even more desperate: "[Th]is is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense ef-

fect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die."^[104]

Grew confirmed, in a cable of November 3, that Japanese leaders were willing to plunge their nation into "a suicidal struggle with the United States" if they found no other way to achieve their objectives. "Action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States," he concluded gravely, "may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness."^[105]

Japanese leaders held an Imperial Conference on November 5 to formally approve a final negotiating program. The Tojo cabinet decided to present the Roosevelt administration with its last two proposals—Plans A and B. Plan A's provisions differed little from previous Japanese drafts, but Plan B was a modus vivendi to be offered in the hope that the United States and Japan might yet step back from the brink of war. "Proposal B is not an excuse for war," Premier Tojo told one official. "I am praying to the Gods that somehow we will be able to get an agreement with the United States with this proposal."^[106]

Through MAGIC, U.S. leaders read the terms of the drafts as they were sent out to Nomura. The United States learned not only of Japan's negotiating position but of its "absolutely immovable" deadline for peace as well: November 25. Japan would fight if this date passed without a peace agreement, U.S. officials had every reason to believe.^[107] Faced with this threat of war, the nation's leaders scrutinized the new proposals in the hope of finding some basis for delay, even if not common ground for a lasting agreement.

The major terms of Plan A included the principle of commercial equality in the Pacific (provided it were adopted in all other parts of the world), retention of the Tripartite Pact with slight modifications, and Japanese agreements to withdraw from China two years after the establishment of peace in that country. Japan would keep troops in Indochina until peace reigned in East Asia and would not evacuate troops from northern China and Mongolia for twenty-five years. The United States, for its part, would be bound to persuade Chiang Kaishek to negotiate with Japan or cut off his aid.^[108]

Plan A, like earlier Japanese proposals, persuaded no one in the administration. With Japanese troops massing in southern Indochina and on the border of Thailand, the plan's lack of guarantees stood out in bold relief. Hornbeck had recently prepared yet another exhaustive recitation of the evidence of Japan's total unreliability. "In the light of the foregoing record of the continual expansion of stated policies and of assurances withdrawn or contradicted by subsequent statements and actions," read one such memorandum, "any expectation by the Japanese Government that the United States should rely upon further assurances is somewhat surprising."^[109] If Japan wanted peace, it would first have to prove its intentions not with words but by withdrawing from Indochina.

The problem of China posed almost as much difficulty. Japan's demand that the United States stop "interfering" with its efforts to bring about peace with China amounted to a demand that it suspend all military aid.^[110] The administration could not agree without risking the collapse of its major Asian ally. Since late October Chiang had stepped up his urgent pleas for help, predicting an imminent Japanese attack on Yunnan and Kunming through Indochina, cutting off China's line of communication with the United States and Britain. In a telegram to Roosevelt on November 2 the generalissimo warned: "Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely one objective of Japan's war of aggression on China but is a first and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike." If Japan succeeded in this new military venture, Chiang continued, "the morale of the Chinese army and the Chinese people will be shaken to its foundation," and "for the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible."^[111] If China were knocked out of the war, no area of the Pacific would be safe from Japan's armies—least of all Southeast Asia.^[112]

On the evening of November 7, Ambassador Nomura handed Hull the penultimate Japanese peace offer, Plan A. Hull

barely looked at the document, having seen its basic text before with the aid of MAGIC. He managed only a distracting remark to the effect that Japan could gain the moral leadership of Asia by voluntarily withdrawing its troops from occupied territories. Nomura promised to think about it.^[113]

The ambassador next met with Roosevelt as well as Hull on November 10, still promoting his government's first offer. He read a long explanation of Plan A, obviously much impressed by the deadline imposed upon him by Tojo. Roosevelt said little, displaying no great sense of urgency. He emphasized once again his wish that Japan would "pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses."^[114] Plan A truly was "dead before its was delivered."^[115]

Only one hope for peace remained—Plan B. Nomura was caught now between an intransigent U.S. administration and equally intransigent superiors in Tokyo who were demanding that he hasten the talks. "You see how short the time is," they told the ambassador; "therefore do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further."^[116] To make sure that nothing would go wrong, the Japanese government sent Kurusu Saburo, an experienced diplomat, to the United States to help Nomura present the plan. Kurusu hardly helped win the administration's confidence, however; he had been Japan's ambassador to Germany when the Tripartite Pact was signed. "Kurusu seemed to me the antithesis of Nomura," Hull wrote later. "Neither his appearance nor his attitude commanded confidence or respect. I felt from the start that he was deceitful."^[117]

Bound by his orders, Nomura presented his government's final proposal to Secretary Hull on November 20. Its terms read:

1. Both the Government of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China

or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area. In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Government of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.^[118]

The last point, of course, meant the United States would have to cease aiding Chiang. When Hull objected, Kurusu immediately asked how the United States could reconcile its public stand in favor of peace "with continued assistance to Chiang Kai-shek, which actually hinders peace."^[119] Instructions from Tokyo a few days later reaffirmed this stance: "[O]ur demand for a cessation of aid to CHIANG . . . is a most essential condition."^[120] Not even a return to the pre-July status quo would satisfy Tokyo.^[121] Japan's offer to withdraw from southern Indochina was a false enticement, therefore. Hull could not let Japan completely off the hook in China and lift the embargo without jeopardizing the whole strategy of tying Japan down on the Asian mainland.

Hull was also inclined to assume the worst even about Japan's proposal to evacuate southern Indochina. He termed it "meaningless" because "they could have brought those troops back to southern Indochina within a day or two, and furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they might

continue to send there." As a result, Japan would still have "threatened the security of the countries to the south and menaced vital trade routes."^[122]

Hull explained these problems to Nomura and Kurusu on November 22. He told the diplomats that he had been discussing with various other governments the possibility of relaxing the freeze order against Japan if Tokyo would present concrete evidence of its peaceful intentions. He said everyone he talked to shared the same misgivings about Japan's southward plans, especially in light of the chauvinistic statements aired daily in the semiofficial Japanese press. Kurusu asked what sort of steps Japan would have to take to satisfy the United States. Japan, replied the secretary, must withdraw all its troops from Indochina, not just those from the southern half of the colony. Any forces left in Indochina could be moved south overnight—"therefore this would not relieve the apprehensions of neighboring countries. The British, for example, would not be able to move one warship away from Singapore."

Ambassador Nomura protested that Japan's real interest was simply to bring the China Incident to a satisfactory conclusion, after which it would move troops out of the French colony. Hull emphasized again that he could not consider this, that if Japan really wanted a peaceful settlement it "should get out of Indochina." Hull mentioned China only to say the United States would continue to aid the Chiang regime but that he did not want to block progress by "injecting the China matter in the proposal."^[123] Plan B, like Plan A before it, died in the secretary's hands. It died above all over the question of Southeast Asia.^[124]

By rejecting the Tojo government's last offer, the United States knew it would almost certainly have to fight in the Pacific. Japan now went ahead at full speed to prepare for war. But administration officials still hoped for a few more months of peace to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and the European colonies. Stimson had come up with a plan to defend the South China Sea with B-26 bombers based in the Philippines, but preparations would take time—of which there was now precious little.^[125]

To delay Japan, Roosevelt came up with a draft modus vivendi of his own, with which the United States could live better than Japan's Plan B.^[126] It offered no solution to the China Incident but focused rather on preventing a Japanese attack on Southeast Asia. It read:

Six Months

1). U.S. to resume economic relations—some oil and rice now—more later.

2). Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchuria border or any other place south (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).

3). Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact if U.S. gets into European war.

4). U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S. take no part in their conversations.

Later on Pacific agreements.^[127]

The State and Treasury departments also worked on truce plans that could temporarily stabilize conditions in the Far East while fortification of the Philippines continued apace. Even if Japan rejected such a new offer, Hull reasoned, it might be encouraged to continue with the negotiations.^[128]

Roosevelt's modus vivendi went through several drafts. The final version was completed on November 25. In return for an end to the full U.S. embargo on Japan, the proposal would require Japan to remove all troops from southern Indochina and all but a token force of 25,000 from the north. With respect to China, the proposal said only that the United States "would not look with disfavor upon the inauguration of conversations" between China and Japan to bring about a peace settlement.^[129] The State Department also attached to the plan a ten-point, long-term peace proposal. It called for a multilateral nonaggression pact among Japan, the European powers and their colonies in Southeast Asia, Thailand, China, and the United States; required those governments and colonies to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and help guarantee the Open

Door to the colony; and demanded that Japan withdraw all military forces from Indochina and China.^[130] In effect, this document asked Japan to surrender all of its gains since 1931 throughout Asia.

The ten-point plan was needlessly, almost provocatively harsh and probably not meant for negotiation as much as it was a statement of policy for the record. But the modus vivendi showed promise. U.S. military leaders, who sought any excuse to delay a conflict they were not yet ready for, embraced it. Said Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow: "The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives—the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important."^[131]

On November 22, Hull gave copies of Plan B and a preliminary draft of the U.S. proposal to representatives of Britain, Australia, China, and the Netherlands. "Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador," Hull noted. The latter complained that U.S. draft plan contained no provision preventing further Japanese attacks on China.^[132]

The U.S. modus vivendi, unlike Japan's various proposals, at least did not make matters worse for China. But the Chiang regime was not about to ease up on the administration now. It rounded up its lobbyists to shoot down the proposal before the Japanese ever laid eyes on it. First Chiang contacted Ambassador Hu Shih to express his fierce objections "to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China."^[133] The next day, November 25, Hu Shih called on Secretary Hull to discuss the U.S. modus vivendi. The secretary said the United States' intent was not to dump China but rather to keep Japan interested in negotiating by trying a new avenue to peace. China would benefit from a reduction of troop levels in Indochina. Furthermore, Hull pointed out, Chiang missed the significance of the U.S. pro-

posal, "the fact that our proposal would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area, including Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and also the United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes."^[134] The generalissimo, however, had not overlooked those facts; his last-minute intervention was calculated precisely to prevent those interests from distracting Washington's attention from China's plight.

Pleas from China continued to pour into the State Department and White House. Chiang telegrammed T. V. Soong on November 25 asking him to approach Stimson and Knox immediately to play China's trump card the threat of collapse:

Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax the economic blockade and the freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propagandists have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but nonetheless definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing order could not be considered.^[135]

As if this barrage from China were not enough, Britain began expressing reservations about the final U.S. draft. On November 25 the British embassy proposed that the United States require the withdrawal from Indochina of all Japanese land, sea, and air forces, "in addition to satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Southern Pacific and Russia." The British also felt the modus vivendi should require Japan to halt temporarily further military campaigns in China in order to ease the psychological blow to China of an agreement between the United States and Japan. Of course, Japan would never agree to such terms, but the Australian and Netherlands governments sided with the British in insisting that the plan be modified.

The coup de grace came in a telegram directly from Churchill, received at the White House early in the morning of November 26, stressing the importance of looking after China's interests. Britain had no special interest in China per se, but like the United States it counted on China's continued resistance as a drag on further Japanese aggression. Churchill said he certainly did not want an additional war but could not ignore China. "If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously increase," he wrote. "We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese will govern your action."^[136]

Hull was worn down by the steady barrage of "objections, arguments and pleas" from China and "especially impressed" by the last-minute communication from the British prime minister.^[137] "The slight prospect of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi therefore did not warrant the risks involved in proceeding with it," Hull recalled later, "especially the risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of disintegration in China."^[138] In despair, Hull talked to President Roosevelt on November 26. Although he deplored the "utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi " on the part of the other governments, Hull suggested that it be dropped in the face of such opposition. He recommended instead that the administration present Japan only

with the harsh ten-point note, formerly intended only as a supplement to the truce plan.^[139]

Roosevelt quickly agreed to scrap the modus vivendi he had originated. Only that morning Stimson had informed him of new Japanese troop movements from Shanghai to Indochina. Roosevelt "fairly blew up—jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen [the news] and that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce—an entire withdrawal (from China)—they would be sending this expedition down there to Indo-China."^[140]

Without any practical proposals to explore and with Japan on the move, Hull simply handed Nomura the ten-point note on November 26. The document was marked "Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment." Its demand for the total capitulation of Japan reflected rather than caused the breakdown of negotiations. Hull himself had no illusions that the Japanese would accept, for they had seen and rejected milder proposals before. Rather, he offered it for the historical record.^[141] For all intents and purposes, the two countries' efforts for a lasting peace had long since ended. As reports of an imminent Japanese thrust against Thailand, the Philippines, or the Netherlands East Indies began to stream in, Secretary Hull told Stimson, "I have washed my hands of it, and the situation is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy."^[142]

The United States was going to war.