GEMA and the Change-the-Constitution Movement

The fragmentation of KANU was evident, first, in the growing visibility of GEMA, the champion of Kiambu interests, and comparable communal organizations in Kenyan politics. With the conclusion of the J.M. affair, the organizational resources of GEMA might have appeared less important to the Family and its efforts to secure influence over policy. After all, the major contender for GEMA's power had been removed from the political scene. That was not the case, however. The Rift Valley period had witnessed increasing restriction of political space. As quasi-cultural organizations, ethnic welfare societies fell less clearly within the State House's sphere of concern than political meetings. The provincial administration and security forces left ethnic welfare societies alone, at least for the time being. GEMA thus retained its raison d'être, inasmuch as it could shelter continued political activity where other organizational forms could not.

The second half of 1975 also saw the first effects of a boom in coffee prices. Earnings were concentrated in the coffee-growing country of Central Province, but most particularly in Kiambu, benefiting the personal bank accounts of many of those allied with the Family—and, of course, the treasury of GEMA, which became an even more powerful

vehicle for political activity in consequence. Using these funds and others it had accumulated, the Family faction within KANU's conservative wing moved rapidly to strengthen its political ties in the Rift through land-trading schemes. The GEMA leader Kahika Kimani chaired several land-buying companies with claims in Nakuru District, and these provided the necessary platform. It was from Kahika Kimani's base in the Ngwataniro Companies that Mbiyu Koinange, James Gichuru, and Njoroge Mungai launched yet another effort to seize control over access to the policy process.

In its bid to control resources and policy making, the GEMA group had three options. The first and second of these entailed voting a new president out of office, either by electing someone else to the presidency of the party or by campaigning for a vote of no confidence in Parliament. Neither of these stratagems appeared especially promising. The element of surprise would have to play a major role to prevent Kenyatta's likely successor from marshaling a counterattack, but the need to bargain for support would make that impossible. News of coalition-building efforts would surely leak.

Alternatively, it would be possible to install another Kiambu leader as president, or someone acceptable to the group, by persuading Kenyatta to reshuffle his cabinet and move Moi out of the vice presidency. This Kenyatta did not do—an indication of the disagreement he must have had with Family members, who, it is alleged, did in fact propose such a solution.^[1]

The third option was to seek to change the constitutional provisions for succession. These read:

Chapter II, Part I, Section 6

(1) If the office of President becomes vacant by reason of the death or resignation of the President, or by reason of his ceasing to hold office by virtue of Section 10 or Section 12 of this Constitution (qv) an election of a President shall be held within the period of ninety days immediately following the occurrence of that vacancy, and shall be held in a manner prescribed by Section 5 (5) of this Constitution (qv).

(2) While the office of the President is vacant as afore said, the functions of that office shall be exercised—

(a) by the Vice-President; or

(b) if there is no Vice-President, or if the Vice-President considers that he is for any reason unable to discharge the functions of the office of President, by such Minister as may be appointed by the Cabinet."

By changing the constitution to prevent the immediate assumption of power by the vice president, who could, it was feared, use the ninety-

day preparation period to rig the elections in his favor, it might be possible to block the formation of a Moi government.

GEMA's plan called for a change in the wording of the constitution. Instead of the temporary appointment of the vice president as acting president for a ninety-day period, in the event of the president's death, the speaker of the National Assembly would take over. The GEMA group apparently thought it could secure the speaker's position, or that Njoroge Mungai, the MP for Dagoretti, a former foreign minister,^[2] would win enough votes to be elected president if Moi could be blocked from using the administration to his electoral advantage.

The first steps toward building support for a bid to change the constitution took place in the last month of 1975 and the first half of 1976. The GEMA-backed group pursued a strategy similar to the one it had used in 1974–75, trying to consolidate Kikuyu support while winning Luo and Kamba participation in an alliance. Although KANU's early success over KADU had depended on cooperation between Luo politicians led by Tom Mboya and Kikuyu politicians under Kenyatta, the former partnership between the political elite of the two groups had suffered from Mboya's assassination, allegedly at the hands of Kikuyu, and the proscription of Oginga Odinga's KPU. Ironically, it was the Odinga group, known for its willingness to flaunt Soviet contacts and anti-capitalist points of view, to which the Family business elite now looked for support. Although Odinga's political views departed strongly from those of the Kiambu group, precluding alliance on grounds of common perceptions or style, the Luo politicians agreed to lend support to the movement. The actual provisions of the deal remain obscure, although there is speculation that a combination of financial resources and agreement to modify or terminate the state's detention policies might have captured Odinga's interest.^[3] Odinga is alleged to have believed that Attorney General Charles Njonjo, a Moi ally, was behind his detention in 1969 and the continuing refusal to clear his further participation. Although formerly an outspoken enemy of the Kikuyu elite, Odinga suddenly appeared as an honored guest at the wedding of Mbiyu Koinange's daughter. Peter Muigai Kenyatta, the president's son, received similarly cordial treatment when he visited Bondo, Odinga's home, as a guest of honor at a harambee function that included Odinga.^[4] The GEMA leader James Gichuru also met with Odinga on a special trip to Nyanza District.

Consolidating Central Province support consumed much of the group's time during the first half of 1976. Gichuru had not been the only

member of the Family to encounter troubles in the 1974 election. In some constituencies, Family members had barely held onto their seats. Near Nairobi, in Juja, home to many Luo and Kalenjin migrant workers, Peter Muigai Kenyatta, an outspoken opponent of J. M. Kariuki, had won by fewer than 200 votes, despite the family name and relationship. In Nyeri, the group's candidates faced strong opposition from the followers of J.M.'s ally Waweru Kanja. The Murang'a leader Julius Gikonyo Kiano was in Moi's camp too; GEMA could not automatically carry any of the Kikuyu districts of Central Province.

Throughout the period, GEMA sponsored numerous harambee meetings, at which not only the familiar Family faces but also Peter Muigai Kenyatta and Ngengi Muigai, the president's nephew, appeared. The group waged a struggle for control of the local KANU branches, potentially important bases for generating votes, which were then holding elections.

The Family's supporters clashed with members of the Moi faction. So intense were the rivalries that the provincial commissioner for Central Province, Simeon Nyachae, held meetings of reconciliation in Murang'a and in mid August suspended all KANU branch elections in Kirinyaga.^[5] Similarly, confrontations between supporters of different factions at Nairobi KANU rallies led the provincial commissioner for Nairobi to adopt the practice of personally reviewing and licensing every KANU meeting in the area. Commenting on the campaign, the Nairobi leader Charles Rubia, a former ally of the Rift Valley opposition, said:

You know, Kanu being the only political party in our country, people will claim to be Kanu followers when they really are not observing the rules and regulations of the party. It is common knowledge that people will group together especially at the time of an election and really gang-up. This political ganging up is not something new entirely, but what I condemned is any ganging up against other people and employing thugs to harass political opponents.^[6]

Maina Wanjigi, who had played a similar role earlier during the Rift Valley "rebellion," followed suit.

According to press reports, in September 1976, the Family constituted what was later called the Change-the-Constitution Movement. Kahika Kimani, the GEMA leader and Ngwataniro land company chief, was the main speaker at the first public meeting of the Change-the-Constitution group. The purpose of the meeting was to float the proposal that the rules of succession be modified. Over 20 members of Parliament attended, including the former KPU leader and Odinga ally

Achieng Oneko.^[7] The group must have assessed the response as largely favorable, because on October 3, the call for amendment of the constitution was repeated by Kimani at a fund-raiser near Limuru, in Kiambu District.

The reaction of the Moi group came quickly. The Mombasa politician Shariff Nassir was first to condemn Kimani's move, followed by the Masai leader Stanley Oloitipitip, who obtained the signatures of 98 MPs opposed to the amendment. The petition suggested that the Moi coalition held a slim majority of the 158 elected members and 12 appointed members of Parliament. It also contradicted Kimani's claim that his group could muster 80 percent of the votes in the Assembly on behalf of the change in the constitution.

Two days later Attorney General Charles Njonjo issued a simple, official-sounding warning: "It is a criminal offence for any person to encompass, imagine, devise, or intend the death or deposition of the President." The editorial page of the Nation picked up the theme the next day, chastised Kimani, and pointed to a GEMA effort to disrupt the country. The Standard took GEMA's side, however, noting that Njonjo had signed the statement himself, and that the absence of the presidential imprimatur indicated that the announcement was but another volley in the war between the two groups of ministers. Kenyatta himself made no pronouncement. Officials in the provincial administration were quite perplexed about their responsibilities in choosing whether to license meetings of either group. Provincial commissioners separately traveled to see the president and seek guidance in making these new decisions.

One more time, however, GEMA sought to assert the primacy of the Family in the political party and to suggest, by extension, that its effort to change the constitution was totally consonant with the interests of the party and with the intentions expressed at the nation's founding. Kahika Kimani sponsored a large meeting in Meru that attracted thousands of GEMA members. "We are the defenders of this constitution," Kimani told the crowd. "During the J. M. Kariuki affair when the nation faced a crisis we were the people who spoke for the Government because we have the interests of this country at heart."^[8] Identifying GEMA with the KANU nationalist cause, he continued:

We do not want people attacking GEMA and KANU. We do not want KANU to attack GEMA or GEMA to attack KANU. . . . We want all of us to remain under one party. KANU is the Government and GEMA is under them just like young chicks under the wings. KANU should not be opposed

by GEMA at Meru. . . . And KANU should not oppose GEMA. For it was GEMA which was instrumental in laying the foundation of the KANU Government. So if I may ask: Are these unions not the same thing?

Attacking Attorney General Njonjo in particular, Mungai sought to advance the candidacy of Minister of Defence Gichuru, a senior GEMA official:

We elected Gichuru as chairman of Kanu, and when our leader came from Lodwar,^[9] James Gichuru vacated the chairmanship for Kenyatta. . . . Were it other people they would have dug a grave in which to inter Kenyatta. These are the same people who are now claiming that Gichuru is not a genuine supporter of Kenyatta.

The meeting put an end to the bid to change the constitution. The group misread or intentionally failed to heed Kenyatta's wishes. On the day after the meeting, the president moved against GEMA and supported the Njonjo warning with a simple statement reported in the government press: "The Government reiterated its earlier statement by the Attorney General." With those words, Njonjo's warning acquired the presidential imprimatur it had lacked. Unity became the watchword. In a short speech Kenyatta gave a week later, the word unity appeared over thirty times. "I want to stress that what is vital in our nation is unity," he told a crowd at Uhuru Park in Nairobi. "Unity has more value than anything else."^[10]

Again the Family had failed in its effort to use GEMA as a vehicle for guaranteeing continued influence. The bid to place the party under the control of Family members in the government collapsed in the face of division between members of the Kikuyu elite and Kenyatta's own disapproval of the organization's disproportionate claims. The continued strength of other groups from food-exporting regions of the country within the Office of the President may also have been influential. The western regions of Kenya and the north central part of the Rift Valley produced substantial quantities of maize. Dissatisfaction in those areas could easily cause problems with the country's food supply.

GEMA's prominent role signaled the beginning of a new era in Kenyan politics, in which the effects of the single-party state on civil society became increasingly apparent. Absent ability to convene even small-group political discussions without a license, politicians looked to the reinvigoration of cultural organizations, principally welfare societies, as vehicles for participation and communication. GEMA's flamboyance would rapidly draw other ethnic welfare associations into politics, but

the root cause of the sudden proliferation of such societies in the mid 1970s was much deeper. Restrictions on political association between citizens with common economic interests forced those interests to adopt new guises where they could do so. Because most of the country's commercial elite hailed from Central Province, GEMA could claim to act as an organization bent on cultural preservation, while at the same time advancing a distinct set of economic interests. The extent of GEMA's avowed ambitions led other groups to revive the welfare associations that had lain dormant since the colonial period. The pressures these groups generated would shortly bring about the demise of the old KANU nationalism GEMA favored and the rise of KADU-style federalism within the KANU shell.

The changes would also make the Family's political ambitions much more difficult to realize as well. Once parliamentary groupings began to lose their corporate character and rise and fall on their ability to assemble the ad hoc support of welfare associations, it became much more difficult to mount a sustained bid for control of the Office of the President, or the state. Those difficulties made themselves felt in the second event of the transition period—the abortive elections for national posts in KANU.