5
Taxation and Fiscal Administration

Traditionally, local lords apportioned and collected the revenue needed to run the affairs of the Mountain and pay the neighboring governors who represented the central government. Under Mehmed Ali's rule (1832–1840) attempts were made to centralize taxation, but they were interrupted by war in the area and fell short of changing the traditional arrangements. During the dual-districts regime (1841–1860), the total annual tax burden of the mountaineers was fixed at 1,750,000 piasters. But the chronic land disputes and the political confusion and administrative instability that marked most of this period prevented the proper collection and distribution of the taxes.^[1]

A large portion of the taxes was left in arrears. After establishment of the mutasarrifiyya , some of this tax debt was erased from the accounts in order to facilitate the settlement of land disputes. The debt still amounted to 13.5 million piasters. Only 4 million piasters of this sum was collected, and the rest was waived.^[2] Clearly, then, the average net total tax paid by the Lebanese during the dual-districts period did not exceed 1.3 million piasters a year. The fiscal problems of the dual-districts period indicated that any government in Mount Lebanon could hardly have managed its fiscal tasks without a properly centralized control apparatus coupled with tighter enforcement. Inevitably, however, the movement toward that objective had to begin amidst a decentralized social structure, and overcome the resistance of a population keenly attached to local and communal autonomy. The interaction between these opposing forces operated as one of the major dynamics shaping the Lebanese polity and society during the mutasarrifiyya period. The constitutional framework within which the interaction took place was determined by the Règlement .

Taxation Under the Règlement

According to the Règlement , the governor was responsible for the collection of taxes and administration of finances, while the Administrative Council was to distribute the tax burden among the population and supervise the administration of finances (1861 and 1864: arts. 1 and 2). Article 16 of the original (1861) version of the Règlement limited taxation to 1,750,000 piasters, but it could be increased to 3.5 million piasters when circumstances permitted. The tax revenue was to be devoted primarily to the costs of administration and public services in Mount Lebanon. If a budgetary surplus did occur, it would be transferred to the Imperial Treasury. On the other hand, if expenditures strictly necessary for the regular administration of Mount Lebanon exceeded the revenue from taxation, the Imperial Treasury would provide the difference. The Sublime Porte would not pay for the costs of public works and other extraordinary expenditures to which it did not acquiesce beforehand.^[3]

A codicil incorporated into the Règlement ten days after the signing of the original protocol stipulated that taxation could be raised above 3.5 million piasters provided the governor, the Sublime Porte, and the Administrative Council all agreed on the necessity. Since this codicil became a cause of continuous dispute between the related parties, it is worth quoting in full:

The sum of [3.5 million piasters] mentioned in article 16 of the Règlement of June 9, 1861, does not constitute an absolute upper limit. While, on the one hand, it is appropriate to wait for extinction of the crisis brought about by recent events before taxation in Mount Lebanon is raised to the aforementioned sum, on the other, when the increase in expenses entailed by the new organization and reforms is added to existing revenue, the taxation will have to exceed even [3.5 million piasters]. It is clear that taxation can be raised above [3.5 million piasters] only by permission of the Sublime Porte, and with the consent of the majority of the local Administrative Council. Furthermore, the governor must resort to this possibility with utmost caution, and must always and before all else work for a true balance between receipts and ordinary expenses.^[4]

When the Règlement was revised and a new protocol was signed between the Ottoman government and the five major European powers in 1864, the codicil was retained. Subsequent protocols between the Porte and the European powers concerning the affairs of Mount Lebanon likewise reaffirmed the codicil. The revised Règlement of 1864 also retained the original stipulation concerning fiscal matters, while clarifying a point

which apparently had led to some confusion: the behâliklar , or al-bikâlîk i.e., the revenues of the imperial properties, were to be independent of the fixed tax; these would be paid into Mount Lebanon's treasury on behalf of the Imperial Treasury (art. 15).^[5] Although not expressed in writing, a consensus emerged among the interested parties to set taxation at the level of 3.5 million piasters, soon after initiation of the new regime. These stipulations and decisions established the basic principles which guided financial affairs throughout the mutasarrifiyya period. Accordingly, the main sources of revenue were the fixed tax and the revenue from the imperial properties.

Basic Sources of Revenue

1.   The Fixed Tax

The fixed tax was divided into two categories: (a) military service payment (bedel-i askerî ), or the head tax (rasm al-a'nâq ), which was popularly referred to as the farîda , "sacred obligation"; and (b) property tax (emlâk verqisi ) on land and rental income. The total fixed tax of 3.5 million piasters was divided between these two items, as explained below.

(a) Military service tax. On the basis of a "rather superficial" population census, completion of which, nevertheless, took until 1869,^[6] the number of males over 15 years old was established at 99,834. An annual tax of 8.75 piasters was imposed on each, for a total of 873,547.5 piasters. The village headmen (who also served as justices of the peace) were responsible for equitable distribution of the tax burden for each unit of settlement. In later years the population increased, its regional distribution changed, and a significant number of people emigrated from Mount Lebanon to work abroad or in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Despite this, a new census was taken only in the fiscal year 1913–14—and even after the new census, the tax burden for each unit of settlement remained unchanged, as determined by the earlier census. To avoid disturbing the delicate balance that had been established in Mount Lebanon between different communities, it was simply assumed that the population movements and increase left relative ratios unaltered (see Tables 1 and 2).^[7]

(b) Property tax. Davud Pasha initiated a "rather simplistic and rudimentary" survey to measure and assess the value of the cultivated land and income-yielding buildings (musaqqafât ). According to that survey, which was completed in 1869, a total value of 125,069.17 dirhems was assessed. An annual tax of 21 piasters per dirhem was imposed, thus reaching a total of 2,626,452.5 piasters.^[8]

Foreign observers as well as the Ottoman administrators agreed that distribution of the total burden of the property tax among different regions was not exactly fair. A memorandum from the grand vizier's office to Governor Vasa Pasha in 1888 inquired about a suggestion made by "experts" on Lebanese affairs: If a more accurate survey were undertaken to reassess property, it might be possible, without altering the current tax ratio of 21 piasters per dirhem , both to increase the total tax revenue by about 40 percent and to assure its fairer distribution. Vasa's response makes it clear that the British Embassy had raised the issue. Vasa admitted that at the time of the survey some cultivable land was either too minimally assessed or not assessed at all, due to the importunities of the Maronite clergy, particularly in the northern parts of the Mountain. His own tours of inspection clearly indicated that if the property tax paid in the north was raised to the level paid in the south, and if the tax was extended to land which had either been concealed at the time of the survey or opened to cultivation since then, the total property tax revenue would increase by even more than 40 percent.

Undertaking a new land survey, however, would hardly have helped the mutasarrifiyya's finances, unless the fixed limit of taxation at 3.5 million piasters was raised. According to Vasa, at best the British hoped to correct the unfair tax burden of the Druzes, most of whom lived in the south. Otherwise, the British well knew that raising the level of taxation would meet the opposition of the Maronite Church, with the backing of the French, and the Mountain would once more be plunged into turmoil. In fact, the Church and the French would create havoc even over redistribution of the property tax as it currently stood. Vasa held that it would be wiser to spare the expenses of a new land survey until a more opportune moment when the land-tax revenue could at once be raised and the inequalities involved in its distribution corrected.^[9]

That moment never came, and the government never undertook another land survey in Mount Lebanon. Taxation remained fixed at 3.5 million piasters: 873,547.5 piasters for military service payment, or head tax, and 2,626,452.5 piasters for property tax, which were collected on the basis of the population count and land survey conducted from 1861 to 1869. The extra sum of 2,400 piasters that resulted from the fractional accounts was included in the muhmalât budget, the nature of which is discussed below.^[10]

Occasional problems that emerged in the collection of the fixed tax were resolved without much difficulty, except for the case of Muaissara village. Muaissara's share in the tax burden evolved into a protracted issue. Muaissara was a small area of olive and fruit groves right at the out-

skirts of Tripoli. Most of its inhabitants were Muslims, while the owners of some gardens commuted from Tripoli. At the time of the formation of the mutasarrifiyya , Muaissara was attached to the district of Kura. Historically, Kura had not been a part of Mount Lebanon, but it was annexed to the mutasarrifiyya in 1861 in view of the predominance of Greek Orthodox Christians among its population. On the basis of this logic behind Kura's annexation and Muaissara's close relations with Tripoli, the Ottomans in 1871 claimed that Muaissara had been inadvertently incorporated into Mount Lebanon. They put it back under the jurisdiction of Tripoli, which was at the time a district of the Province of Damascus. The guarantor powers, particularly France, considered the Ottoman decision a breach of Mount Lebanon's territorial integrity, and used the issue to bring pressure on the Porte and the governor as it suited their purposes. In accordance with the vicissitudes of Ottoman—French diplomatic relations, Muaissara kept changing hands between Tripoli and Mount Lebanon. For the Lebanese themselves, the real issue was the impact of Muaissara's separation on the fixed tax of the Mountain. For a while, Muaissara's meager share of 59,140 piasters in the fixed tax was paid to Mount Lebanon out of the treasury of Tripoli. Later on, an attempt was made to distribute the sum evenly among other parts of the Mountain; this was aborted by the combined objections of the guarantor powers and the Administrative Council. Ultimately, the village was left under the jurisdiction of Tripoli while the total fixed tax of Mount Lebanon was reduced to 3,440,860 piasters; that is, the regular 3.5 million piasters minus Muaissara's share.^[11]

2.   Revenue of Imperial Properties

The "imperial properties" (emlâk-i hümâyûn ) in Mount Lebanon were the other source of revenue specifically mentioned in the Règlement . These were certain groves, land, and buildings which were privately used by individuals in return for a payment of some form of rent to the government. This source of revenue, popularly called al-bikâlîk (hence, behâlik ) dated back to the amirate days, when the amir customarily collected a certain portion of the produce of specific groves and pieces of land for his "privy kitchen," but on behalf of the imperial government.^[12] In fact, the term al-bikâlîk (from the Turkish word bey , for amir or military governor, used in its Arabic version bik ) of the Règlement is reminiscent of its origin in the "imperial properties."^[13]

Since the rights of usufruct over these properties had fallen into turmoil in the final years of the amirate regime and during the dual-districts period, settlement of the government revenue due from them became an

important issue in the early years of the mutasarrifiyya .^[14] After an assessment of the trees, land, and buildings, a total taxable value of 7,300 dirhems was reached. A significant effort was made to distribute this taxable amount equitably among the specific pieces of property, in keeping with general practice in similar cases throughout the Empire. Still, the confusion resulting from variations in traditional claims to usufruct precluded a coherent policy concerning the "imperial properties."

For example, certain olive groves, water mills, and rentable buildings were considered to be under full government proprietorship. Their proceeds and profits were farmed out on an annual basis. The sale and transfer of usufruct rights on a contractual (sukûk ) basis were acknowledged in the case of certain other groves, from which the government's share in the profits was determined by either the number of trees or the type of produce. As for those government lands deforested for purposes of cultivation, the customary practice of paying the government one-seventh of the crop was retained, except for some fields leased for a fixed annual sum. The government's share in the wood cut from woodlands and forests also differed from one area to another in terms of its amount as well as methods of collection. It was not possible to eliminate these inconsistencies until after enactment of the law for the administration of forests and agriculture and its application in Mount Lebanon, along with other Ottoman provinces, in 1915–17.

The revenue of the "imperial properties," which was collected according to such a complex set of principles, methods, and customs, did not exceed 383,000 piasters in the fiscal year of 1867–68; 365,000 in 1882–83; and 455,000 in 1913–14.^[15] Although this revenue was collected on behalf of the Imperial Treasury, in accordance with the Règlement , only the written accounts reached Istanbul, and the actual proceeds were promptly deposited in the treasury of the mutasarrifiyya and spent in Mount Lebanon, to the last penny.

Additional Sources of Revenue

1.  Financial Subsidy

The fixed tax and the proceeds of "imperial properties," the mutasarrifiyya 's regular sources of revenue, hardly ever sufficed to meet its expenses. Until about 1875–76, the budgetary deficits were regularly made good by money transferred from the treasuries of the adjoining provinces or from Istanbul. Without this assistance, or "subsidy" (i'âne ), as it was called, the establishment of an effective administration in Mount Lebanon would have been out of the question. It is worth looking more closely into the nature of this subsidy as far as available data permit.

Detailed information on the exact amount and sources of the annual subsidy rendered to the mutasarrifiyya is not yet available to researchers. It is clear, however, that the expenses of building and maintaining a regular law enforcement force at the time of Davud Pasha (1861–1868) were paid out of the revenue of the Province of Damascus. Most of this subsidy came from the customs revenue of Beirut, which was part of the Province of Damascus from 1864 to 1887. For the fiscal year 1867–68 alone, an aid of 2.25 million piasters was allotted for Mount Lebanon. Furthermore, the central government undertook to pay a significant portion of the indemnity owed by the "wrongdoers" of the civil war of 1860 (who were mainly Druze) to the "wronged" (who were mainly Maronite).^[16]

Similar aid continued to flow into Mount Lebanon during Franko Pasha's governorship (1868–1873). A document dated August 1869 indicates that the customs office in Beirut was expected to appropriate an annual sum of 750,000 piasters for the Mountain. In June 1870 this appropriation was raised to an annual sum of 2,225,000 piasters, to be paid in monthly installments. Other documents show that, despite the subsidy, the mutasarrifiyya ran into a deficit of 180,000 piasters which was met by the central government. The year after, aid of 2,225,000 piasters was again rendered to the mutasarrifiyya . Since the customs office in Beirut was able to pay only 1.5 million piasters of this sum, it became necessary to transfer funds from other sources.^[17] Franko used the aid to improve the law enforcement organization that was being formed and for the construction of public works.^[18]

From 1870 onward, the Porte began to advise the governors to balance the budget.^[19] Not much could be done in that direction, however, for the Porte also authorized the governors to build public schools and an industrial arts school to "compensate for the harmful effects of the foreign schools" in Mount Lebanon. In the first year of Rüstem Pasha's governorship (1873–1883), the Imperial Treasury transferred 2 million piasters to the mutasarrifiyya to cover its deficit.^[20] The remaining years of Rüstem Pasha's term coincided with one of the most troubled periods of Ottoman history. Between 1874 and 1876, natural disasters and internal confusion coupled with the enormous burden of overdue debts dragged the government into insolvency, while a protracted diplomatic crisis led to the disastrous war of 1877 with Russia. The peace negotiations, settlement of the immigrants from lost territories, the effort to restore Ottoman financial credibility, and many other problems resulting from the war overwhelmed the government well into 1882. In fact, the Ottoman State never fully recovered, financially or politically, from those troubled years.

Under the circumstances, aid to Mount Lebanon was bound to be interrupted and, eventually, discontinued. From 1877 to 1881, the central government was unable to pay the 2.1 million piasters of subsidy it had promised to the mutasarrifiyya . In the following two years the government again failed to fulfill its promise to cover the mutasarrifiyya 's deficit of 852,000 piasters from the revenue of Ankara and Adana. Meanwhile the Porte continued to put pressure on the governor to balance his budget. Since Rüstem's efforts to raise taxation were nullified by the Administrative Council's opposition, he cut down on expenditures and resorted to forceful measures to collect the tax arrears from 1873 to 1878, which had reached about 900,000 piasters. By the first and second years of Vasa Pasha's governorship (1883–1892), the annual deficit was cut down to 553,700 and 305,100 piasters, respectively. The Porte agreed to pay the mutasarrifiyya 858,800 piasters to cover the deficit of these two years, but on the absolute condition that the mutasarrifiyya never again incur a deficit.^[21] In the following years, the Porte no longer provided financial assistance to the mutasarrifiyya except for insignificant amounts or under unusual circumstances, such as the 1.2 million piasters allocated to cover the pay raises to Lebanese security corps in 1913–14.^[22]

Already, however, a considerable amount of "subsidy" had been rendered to Mount Lebanon, particularly in the first two, formative, decades of the mutasarrifiyya . This fund was largely used in forming a centralized law enforcement agency, which was organized along military lines to maintain security and order in Mount Lebanon. The subsidy also facilitated the construction of public works and greatly reduced the burden of indemnities on a politically significant segment of the population. The tax debt acquittals can also be considered a form of subsidy. In addition to waiving the 9.5 million piasters of tax arrears carried over from the dual-districts period, the Ottomans forwent 3.2 million piasters of tax arrears that had accumulated between 1861 and 1872.^[23]

From the Ottoman point of view, the subsidization of the Lebanese was an act of benevolence directed toward removing local tension and founding a peaceful order and effective administration in the area. The Lebanese, especially the Maronite community, hardly shared the Ottoman view. They saw subsidization as an obligation imposed on the Ottoman government by the international conventions that ratified the Règlement .^[24] The Administrative Council generally supported the governors' efforts to improve the quality of administration in Mount Lebanon. For a long time, however, the members of the Council expected this to be done at the expense of the neighboring provinces or the Imperial Treasury. They referred to article 15 in the Règlement (article 16 in its 1861 version) to hold

the Treasury responsible for the deficit related to current administrative expenditures, but they did not want to hear about the codicil that called for a tax increase.

A reasonable argument sometimes raised to justify this position was that the customs duties on Lebanese imports and exports, and the port fees paid by Lebanese travelers—whose numbers steadily increased from about 1885 onward—accrued not to Mount Lebanon's treasury but to the Beirut branch of the Imperial Treasury.^[25] Indeed, the Beirut customs revenue had been the single most important source of the subsidies made to Mount Lebanon earlier. Having put 20–30 percent of its total revenue under the service of the foreign-controlled Debt Administration from 1882 onward, however, the Ottoman government was hardly able to raise the funds to cover even its basic operations. As for the port fees, there can be little doubt that Lebanese travelers paid high official and semi-official fees. A good portion of these fees went to the French company which ran the docks, and the rest was spent locally. Under the circumstances, the governors of Mount Lebanon, unable to increase the fixed tax because of local opposition, and no longer able to get assistance from Istanbul, had to find other ways to meet the growing expenses of the mutasarrifiyya . Once Istanbul determinedly refused to subsidize the Lebanese budget, the governors and members of the Administrative Council found themselves obliged to reach a reconciliation over creating new sources of revenue to avoid impairment of the administration. The muhmalât budget developed in response to that need.

2.  The Muhmalât Budget

Muhmalât (or sometimes mahmûlât ) was a term used to refer to a number of duties and taxes collected independent of the Imperial Treasury. Vasa Pasha compared them to municipality fees which were locally levied and spent entirely on local public needs.^[26] Isma'il Haqqi described the muhmalât as duties the accounts of which were kept separately from the regular accounts of the mutasarrifiyya and, unlike the latter, not subjected to inspection by the Finance Ministry in Istanbul. The imposition as well as utilization of the muhmalât were determined by the Administrative Council.^[27] Clearly, the muhmalât dues constituted a source of revenue, control of which was "abandoned" to the local population.

The muhmalât budget was initiated as early as Franko's governorship. Before establishment of the mutasarrifiyya , it was customary in Mount Lebanon to collect a bazaar tax from people who brought goods (mainly grain) for sale in the local markets. It was also customary to levy a tax on sheep and goats. Franko persuaded the Administrative Council to reacti-

vate these charges, with the condition that the consequent revenue was to be deducted from the earlier tax arrears and used solely for construction of roads in the Mountain.^[28] In time, as the regular expenditures of the mutasarrifiyya steadily increased and subsidizing of its budget came to an end, the muhmalât fees developed into an important source of revenue. In 1886–87 they amounted to about 1,200,000 piasters.^[29] More detailed figures are available for 1913–14, when the muhmalât budget amounted to 3,123,000 piasters: 1,670,000 piasters from about twenty different fees and duties, 953,000 piasters from road construction charges, and about 500,000 piasters from the muhmalât arrears of past years.^[30] A closer look at the development of the major muhmalât items sheds light on the history of the mutasarrifiyya .

(a) Sheep and goat tax.

This oldest muhmalât item corresponded to the agnâm resmi which was universally applied in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The tax per head of sheep or goats in Mount Lebanon, however, was lower than the rates elsewhere. Consequently, sheepherders in the neighboring provinces secretly moved part of their herds over into Mount Lebanon at times of annual counting, to reduce their tax burden. To prevent the losses suffered by the Treasury from such fraud, an imperial decree was issued to raise the tax rate in the Mountain to the level applied in adjoining provinces from March 1896. The data at hand, however, make it clear that the decree was not enforced, because the Administrative Council dodged it in view of Lebanese interests.^[31]

In 1913 the annual sheep and goat tax rates in the Mountain were still 2.5 and 2 piasters, respectively. In addition, a head tax of 15 piasters was levied on each liable nomadic Bedouin and Gypsy wandering into Mount Lebanon. These two taxes were farmed out by the Administrative Council and brought an annual revenue of 268,000 piasters to the muhmalât budget.^[32] Originally, revenue from the sheep and goat tax was devoted to the construction and maintenance of roads. In due time, it became necessary to invent new duties specifically to keep up the road construction work.

(b) Road charges and vehicle tax.

A striking feature of the mutasarrifiyya period is the importance attributed to transportation. Aside from the Beirut-Damascus and Beirut-Muzairib railways, which were built and run by foreign capital,^[33] the Mountain's roadways were increased from less than 40 kilometers in 1860 to 1,144 kilometers in 1914. In addition to the macadamized highways that connected the major towns to one another and to the coast, secondary roads were constructed to connect the villages to the highways. If one takes the geographical peculiarities of Mount Lebanon into consideration, the difficulties and high costs involved in building

and maintaining roads and bridges will be better appreciated. Despite the difficulties, an effort was made under the leadership of the governors to construct a network of roads which played a vital role in the administrative unification and economic prosperity of Mount Lebanon.^[34]

At first, the roads were built or repaired mainly through financial assistance provided by the Porte. It soon became apparent that in order to keep up the work, a special fund had to be created. The muhmalât revenue originated as a partial response to that need, and under Vasa Pasha new sources of revenue were added to it for the same purpose. He introduced the practice of making the beneficiaries share proportionately in the costs of construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. Each settlement traversed by a road under construction was expected to contribute 20–80 piasters per tax-paying resident, depending on the costs involved. Those who lacked the means could work on the roads for a small wage.^[35] Once a road was built, annual maintenance costs were likewise levied on the beneficiaries. In due time the money thus collected from the people for the specific purpose of road and bridge construction acquired regularity and began to be called rub' al-majîdî (that is, one-fourth of a silver Ottoman coin worth 20 piasters). Unlike regular annual taxes, the rub' al-majîdî might be collected several times a year, depending on the need in a specific area.^[36]

All issues concerning the rub' al-majîdî were settled by the Administrative Council, in consultation with the local administrators and leaders when necessary. Sometimes heated debates and a deadlock occurred in the Council over the need for or distribution of the costs of a proposed road. In the resolution of such problems, the governor and occasionally the Porte played a conciliatory role, with the utmost concern not to jeopardize this source of revenue which was seen as crucial for the good government of Mount Lebanon. To start with, Vasa Pasha had to overcome the stiff opposition of the Maronite community, led by the Church and backed by the French, to building a road along the coast in 1884-85.^[37] Muzaffer Pasha, on the other hand, had to deal with the Druze opposition when, early in 1906, he increased the rub' al-majîdî from 284,000 to 507,000 piasters a year. The Porte acknowledged the urgent need for repair work and new roads, but instructed the governor to postpone the decision until the Druze were conciliated.^[38] Despite the difficulties encountered, revenue from the rub' al-majîdî rose to 953,000 piasters by 1913–14,^[39] indicating that recognition of the importance of transportation for the well-being of the Lebanese had prevailed over parochial interests.

Still another source of revenue devoted to the maintenance of roads was the vehicle tax. In 1913–14 it brought more than 228,000 piasters to the muhmalât treasury.^[40] Along with the sheep and goat tax, the vehicle tax

was annually farmed out to the highest bidders through the Administrative Council. Only during the First World War years was a special government agency finally established to collect and administer such funds. Until then, the role that the Council played in tax-farming as well as awarding public construction projects continued to enhance the power and influence of its members.

(c) Mahsûl fee.

Members of the leading landed notable families tended to prefer appointment as a district head to positions in the central organs of the mutasarrifiyya . As district heads they could more effectively perpetuate their vested local interests and influence. Furthermore, in their capacity as executors of court decisions they could collect a 2.5 percent "produce" (mahsûl ) fee over all debt settlements and other matters involving money or value which were concluded through their offices.^[41] Eventually bailiffs attached to the courts began to collect the mahsûl fee, which brought an annual sum of 83,000 piasters to the muhmalât budget in 1913–14.^[42]

(d) The stamp tax and similar revenue.

The mutasarrifiyya had its own official gazette. Litigants had to pay a fee for publication of judicial decrees in this gazette. Subscription to the gazette also brought an income. In addition, authorization of contracts for the sale and transfer of immovables, copies of decisions by the Administrative Council and other official documents, and the endorsement of foreign proxies and similar papers were also subject to fees. Yet another source of income was the sale of official blank papers embossed with stamped seals to be used in commercial and legal transactions. Revenue that accrued to the muhmalât treasury from such sources was about 140,000 piasters in 1913.^[43]

These fees and stamp duties were inspired by Ottoman practice and introduced gradually in Mount Lebanon. Concerned over standardizing legal and commercial transactions in the Empire, the Porte and the governors endeavored to implement the relevant legislation (such as the regulations for contracts, stamps, and stamped legal documents, and the law for the stamp tax) in Mount Lebanon from the early 1870s onward. These regulations would entail only a meager pecuniary burden on the Lebanese. Still, the Administrative Council held back from cooperating with the central government in extending this legislation to Mount Lebanon. Explicitly, the Council suspected that such a practice might set a precedent for future tax increases, and considered it a breach of the privileges granted to the Lebanese.^[44] It was precisely along these lines that the Council appealed to Istanbul to halt application of the 1875 regulations for stamped legal documents in Mount Lebanon. In response, the grand vizier argued that this legislation was enacted to regularize transactions and to

protect the holder of a right, not to secure revenue for the Treasury. He added:

The Sublime State bequeaths and relinquishes large sums to the Mountain to perpetuate the improvement of its public order and works. Now, if the pleas for exemption from such trivial duties are complied with, and a [simultaneous] decision is reached to terminate the subsidy, to let Mount Lebanon henceforth settle its expenditures with its own revenue and make ends meet, its inhabitants will then indeed become afflicted with actual poverty.^[45]

Assured of the support of the French consul general in Beirut, the Administrative Council remained adamant and persevered in its uncooperative attitude. The Porte compromised, obliging the Lebanese to comply with Ottoman formalities and regulations in legal and commercial transactions only outside Mount Lebanon. As interactions between the Mountain and other parts of the Empire intensified over the years, the Lebanese willy-nilly learned to conform to Ottoman regulations, but only so far as necessary. Within Mount Lebanon itself, the local government was left free to put out its own official gazette, issue its own official blank forms, and charge its own ratification fees in accordance with regulations set by the Administrative Council. Revenue from these sources accrued to the muhmalât budget.^[46] Efforts undertaken in 1903 by Muzaffer Pasha and a group of councillors to regulate legal and commercial transactions not only helped standardize transactions, but also boosted the revenue from them. As expected, these efforts met with significant resistance, because they involved tax increases. Nevertheless, with due concessions to opponents, and given the neutral, if not supportive, position adopted by the French consul general in Beirut at this juncture, the governor was able to add a few items that remained permanently in the muhmalât budget.^[47] The shift in the French position concerning tax increases appears to have been inspired more by conjunctural considerations than a genuine concern over the interests of the Lebanese. This impression is corroborated by the French position on the tax for workplaces.

(e) Tax on workplaces.

Under pressure to balance the budget, Vasa Pasha contemplated collecting taxes from foreigners and non-Lebanese who acquired workplaces and property in Mount Lebanon. Instantly, the French opposed Vasa's plan. They claimed that the amount of taxation and its pattern of distribution in Mount Lebanon were already fixed, and could under no circumstances be increased or altered. Vasa thought differently:

The privileges benevolently granted specifically to the Lebanese people by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan . . . cannot be interpreted as including the foreigners and non-Lebanese residing in Mount Leb-

anon. Furthermore, while a special privilege is granted to the Lebanese, allowing them to pay a fixed tax out of compassion for their evident destitution and other problems, the foreigners are reckoned to be more privileged, for no dues are collected from the revenue-yielding property at their disposal. On the one hand, this situation harms the Imperial Treasury, and is therefore totally inappropriate. On the other hand, a considerable amount of land in Mount Lebanon gradually falls under the possession of the foreigners, so that the Lebanese will inevitably find themselves obliged to work as cultivators and workers for these non-taxpaying foreigners, instigating a politically intolerable development.^[48]

Vasa's early efforts to maneuver around France's diplomatic pressure against the projected levy bore no fruit. He could not win the support of the Council's majority, and the Porte preferred not to push the issue.^[49] Vasa concentrated on obtaining support from among the ranks of influential Maronite leaders. He also lobbied intensively to affect the outcome of the partial elections to the Council in 1885. By November 1886 he had persuaded the Council to pass a tax on silk factories owned by non-Lebanese, including foreigners. At first the Porte upheld the decision. When the French ambassador to Istanbul officially protested against the tax as contravening the Règlement , and demanded its invalidation, the Porte asked Vasa to drop the issue.^[50] Vasa's pleas to the contrary and his persuasive legal arguments, based on the codicil appended to the Règlement of 1861, were in vain.^[51]

In this incident, the French had disregarded the validity of Vasa's position, "because of the degree of direct French investment in Lebanese silk production, and because the ultimate destination of much of the silk was France."^[52] In 1907, French interests weighed differently. Involved in sensitive negotiations with the Porte over acquiring new concessions to build railroads and to undertake other investments in Syria and Anatolia, the French let Governor Yusuf Pasha have a free hand in Lebanon.^[53] He forced the Administrative Council to consent to a new tax on all workplaces, by which 2 percent of the annual profits of textile and flour mills, shops, inns, restaurants, and similar workplaces was to be collected. A special commission would count the taxable workplaces and assess their earnings every five years. Later on the tax rate was raised to 2.5 percent, but apparently it was not rigorously applied. In 1913–14, it brought only 22,000 piasters to the muhmalât treasury, while a tax on gambling houses alone, which began to be levied that year, produced more than 32,000 piasters.^[54]

(f) Tobacco and salt annuities.

All production and sale of salt in the Ottoman Empire were under government monopoly until 1881. In view of Mount Lebanon's privileged status, however, the monopoly did not ap-

ply there. After 1881, the salt monopoly was taken over by the foreign-controlled Public Debt Administration, and from then on the Mountain's exemption turned into an issue. The Lebanese used to smuggle salt into the neighboring provinces. To stop this illicit trade, the Public Debt Administration put pressure on the Porte for extension of the monopoly to cover Mount Lebanon. The French were caught in a dilemma between their interests in the Debt Administration and in Mount Lebanon. The governors usually sided with the Council, and delayed settlement of the issue until 1909. At that date, all salt production and sale in Mount Lebanon were put under the monopoly of the Public Debt Administration. It was held that Mount Lebanon's privileges were confined to those explicitly specified in the Règlement . Since the Règlement did not explicitly mention the seashores of Mount Lebanon in defining its borders, salt from the sea ought to be put under the monopoly.^[55] This was done until 1913–14, when Governor Ohannes Pasha persuaded the interested parties to lift the monopoly in return for levying a tax of 25 percent on salt sales in Mount Lebanon. This measure checked smuggling to a certain extent and, more important, brought a revenue of 467,000 piasters to the muhmalât treasury.^[56]

A similar problem arose with the tobacco trade. Tobacco sales elsewhere in the Empire were subject to a consumption tax which did not apply in Mount Lebanon. Ottoman efforts to control the smuggling of tobacco grown in the Mountain by levying a similar tax did not impress the European powers until after 1883. In that year, the right of monopoly over internal and external tobacco trade in the Ottoman Empire was handed to the Régie, a private company formed by several foreign banks in collaboration with the Debt Administration. In due time the Régie turned into a massive organization jealous of its monopolistic privileges, and thus eager to curb contraband trade in tobacco. As a consequence of the pressure it exerted, Governor Naum Pasha signed a six-year agreement with the Régie in 1892 to control smuggling. According to the agreement, which was renewed in later years with minor revisions, tobacco production and sales would be left free in Mount Lebanon. The local government and the Régie would cooperate, however, in controlling tobacco exports from and imports to Mount Lebanon. In return, the Régie would pay the muhmalât treasury a small fixed annuity and a share of the profits from Lebanese tobacco imports and exports.

This agreement did not cover the trade in hookah tobacco (tömbeki ), since that was the monopoly of another foreign private company working in cooperation with the Debt Administration. In order to curtail Lebanese contraband trade in hookah tobacco as well, a similar agreement was

signed between the company and governor Naum Pasha in 1897. This agreement was renewed, with much better terms for the Lebanese government, in 1902, under Muzaffer Pasha, as already discussed. In accordance with these agreements, the hookah tobacco monopoly paid the muhmalât treasury an average annuity of 90,000 piasters between 1897 and 1902, and at least 180,000 piasters between 1902 and 1914. The annuity which the tobacco Régie paid the muhmalât treasury in 1913 was 720,000 piasters.^[57]

Clearly, the tobacco agreements provided the mutasarrifiyya with a handsome revenue, although they hurt the smuggling business from which many Lebanese must have benefited. The Council could not and probably did not want to oppose these agreements, since they represented a joint action between the Porte and the European powers. Nevertheless, the agreements reveal that by then Mount Lebanon's privileged status had begun to verge on administrative autonomy. The agreements were examined and approved in advance by the State Council, Finance Ministry, and the Council of Ministers in Istanbul, but they were actually contracted and signed by the governor as head of Mount Lebanon's administration. Similarly, it went unquestioned that the anticipated income would accrue to the muhmalât treasury.

(g) Other muhmalât revenue.

There were also other, minor, muhmalât items. The oldest muhmalât revenue, the bazaar tax, gradually disappeared from the accounts as it was taken over by the municipalities upon their establishment. Another old item, the fees on gun and hunting permits, brought 45,700 piasters in 1913. The annuity collected from the French company which ran the Beirut-Muzairib Railway amounted to only 15,000 piasters. Also, the sum that resulted from the fractional accounts of the regular revenues, and the income from administrative fines and the sale of identity forms (about 10,000 piasters altogether, in 1913) were credited to the muhmalât budget.^[58]

3.  Taxes in Between Imperial and Local Accounts

All taxes, duties, and fees that were collected from the Lebanese were spent in Mount Lebanon. Yet the distinction between the muhmalât and Imperial Treasury accounts was carefully maintained. Furthermore, the muhmalât revenue spent on administrative expenditures was marked as credit to the Imperial Treasury, because the Council held that the Porte was obliged to cover the deficit in current expenditures, whereas the muhmalât duties were in principle levied to cover the cost of specific public projects.^[59] However, there were muhmalât fees charged for government

services which, according to the Porte, were intrinsically related to the overall authority structure of the Ottoman Empire. Particularly after the 1908 Revolution, the Porte became sensitive to keeping these revenue items, namely, the passport and court fees, on the Imperial Treasury accounts, to assert the Ottoman rights of sovereignty in Mount Lebanon.

(a) Court fees.

Early in the history of the mutasarrifiyya , only a nominal fee was charged in law cases brought to the courts. The revenue was kept under the accounts of the Imperial Treasury. During Vasa's governorship, the court fees were both raised and extended to criminal cases, as part of the efforts to balance the budget. In return, this fee was put under the muhmalât accounts. After 1908 it was moved back to the imperial accounts, although with the stipulation that this important revenue item (658,000 piasters in 1913) would continue to be spent in Mount Lebanon.^[60]

(b) Passport and travel permit fees.

In the Ottoman Empire, identity cards, and sometimes travel permits called mürûr tezkeresi (laissez passer ), were used for internal travel, and passports for external travel. During the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), acquisition of a passport became a privilege reserved essentially for people with a well-established business or position in society and considered unlikely to get involved in political opposition abroad against the Ottoman regime. As discussed earlier, this was also a period when an ever-increasing number of Lebanese wanted to go abroad to work. Acquisition of internal travel permits, supposedly to travel to Palestine for pilgrimage or to other parts of the Empire on business or for work, emerged early on as one of the major methods used by the Lebanese to circumvent official restrictions against external travel.

The Ottoman authorities at first overlooked this practice, and around 1892 accepted de facto a travel permit issued by the administration of Mount Lebanon as a passport of sorts, provided the traveler had a guarantor post a security bond against expenses the central government might incur to return the person home from abroad. Even though their travel privileges were liberalized through a special imperial decree in December 1899, the travel permit remained the basic document with which Lebanese traveled abroad until about 1910–11. In fact, when the central government briefly lifted the obligation to hold a passport for traveling abroad from about 1910 to 1914, the Administrative Council insisted that Mount Lebanon be exempted from the rule, evidently in a desire to keep the handsome revenue that accrued to its treasury from the issuance of travel permits and passports. Despite complaints from individuals and conse-

quent warnings from the Porte about the need to abide by the laws of the Empire, the local government of Mount Lebanon seems to have had its way, on the condition that it issue regular passports.^[61]

Early in the history of the mutasarrifiyya , revenue from the small number of passports was not only considered an imperial revenue but was in fact sent to Istanbul. Revenue from the travel permits, however, was considered part of the muhmalât budget. Since the travel permits were treated as de facto passports until 1910–11, the regular passport fee of 100 piasters was collected from each applicant. In addition, the applicant had to pay a fee of 20 piasters for registration of the required security bond. In the wake of the 1908 Revolution, Istanbul insisted that revenue from travel permit and passport fees be shifted to the imperial accounts. Nevertheless, this revenue, which amounted to 222,000 piasters in the 1913–14 budget, continued to be spent in Mount Lebanon. Revenue from the security bond registration fee, which remained in the muhmalât budget, amounted to 44,400 piasters in 1913–14.^[62] After 1908, the authorities in Istanbul evidently attached a symbolic significance to court fees and passport issuance in order to stress the integrity of the Ottoman legal system and assert the central government's rights of sovereignty over all parts of the Empire. In Mount Lebanon, however, the desire for additional autonomy had become stronger than ever, not least among the members of the Administrative Council. This discrepancy between the will of the central government and that of the Lebanese political leadership became manifest in the negotiations over Mount Lebanon's budget for the fiscal year 1913–14, which were further complicated by the mutiny of the Lebanese security corps demanding a pay raise.

The 1913–14 Budget, Mutiny, and Fiscal Autonomy

In diplomatic talks leading to the protocol of December 1912, the guarantor powers and the Porte acknowledged the need for reformation of Mount Lebanon's finances and its security corps. The diplomats agreed on few specific solutions to financial problems, however. They postponed the crucial issue of raising the level of taxation until their next meeting at the end of the new governor's five-year term. Meanwhile, the new governor, Ohannes Pasha, should undertake a cadastral survey and a population count, study the Mountain's taxation problems, and prepare suggestions for tax reform. The protocol also gave formal recognition to, and thus reinforced, the participation of the Administrative Council in preparing the Mountain's budget. In another provision, the protocol called for enlargement of the security corps into a force of 1,200, along with its reformation under the direction of a qualified officer. The costs of this reorga-

nization should be defrayed in a way to cause the least possible burden on the Imperial Treasury. A formal explanatory note which the Ottoman Foreign Ministry dispatched to the related embassies, before final ratification of the protocol, emphasized that the costs of reorganization would be paid out of Mount Lebanon's local revenue.^[63]

Still struggling with the disastrous effects of the Italian and Balkan wars, the Ottoman government was unable to attend to Mount Lebanon's fiscal problems. Ohannes Pasha was expected to rush the cadastral and population surveys, to persuade the Administrative Council to raise the level of taxation accordingly, and to undertake the necessary reforms with the funds thus raised. In Mount Lebanon, however, Ohannes soon realized that the Administrative Council had its own interpretation of the 1912 protocol. First, the councillors had no intention of either rushing or financing a cadastral survey. According to Ohannes, the land-tax burden was unevenly distributed in Mount Lebanon, but since the main beneficiaries of this situation were "large landowners which included the monasteries and prominent Lebanese," the Administrative Council and senior local officials were unsupportive of a cadastral survey. Unable to rely on the local government, Ohannes made arrangements, pending the Porte's approval, to contract a private engineering bureau in Beirut for an approximate survey to be completed in three years at a reasonable cost. Ohannes wanted the central government to defray this cost, but he assured the Porte that, once the survey was done, the Council would duly agree to raise the level of the land tax and see to its equitable redistribution.^[64] He probably hoped the European powers would bring pressure on the councillors to effect this. Otherwise, his argument makes little sense in view of the Council's intransigence not only on the issue of the cadastral survey but also on the urgent problem of the budgetary deficit, which negotiations for the fiscal year of 1913–14 placed in the limelight.

The preliminary budget prepared by the councillors for 1913–14 indicated an enormous deficit, which they expected the Porte to cover. Ohannes, "with great difficulty," persuaded them to cut the deficit to 2,682,000 piasters, still a large sum. This deficit comprised the administrative expenditures hitherto paid out of the muhmalât revenue, the estimated cost of the planned reorganization of the security corps, salaries for new positions deemed necessary, and finally, pay raises for all government employees, including the security corps, "as a precautionary measure against the corruptive influence of the rapidly rising costs of living"^[65]

The Administrative Council was clearly resolved to make the most of its rights, as reinforced by the recent protocol. Hitherto, the Council's participation in preparation of the budget had steadily increased in conjunc-

tion with the growing importance of the muhmalât revenue. Its role in defining expenditures, however, was confined to those defrayed from the muhmalât budget, and was otherwise consultative and supervisory. The 1912 protocol allowed the Council to have a say in all expenditures. Combined with article 15 of the Règlement and the related codicil, this revision enabled the Council to adapt a peculiar stance on financial matters. It held that while article 15 obliged the central government to pay for expenditures exceeding the revenue from taxation but necessary for regular administration of the Mountain, the codicil allowed the Council to veto the attempts to raise the level of taxation just as the 1912 protocol permitted it to determine the necessary expenditures. In other words, the Council now thought it could increase administrative expenditures indefinitely without allowing a simultaneous increase in taxation, and hold the Porte responsible to cover the consequent deficit. This was the logic behind the Council's budget proposal for 1913–14 and its insistence on restricting the muhmalât revenue to specific public projects, as opposed to current expenditures.^[66]

Ohannes considered the Council's position and demands as being not only "immoderate" but also "inconsiderate of the current difficulties of the central government," and hence "incompatible with civic-mindedness (hamiyyet )." Since he deemed the Council's cooperation essential for the good administration of Mount Lebanon, however, he entreated the Porte to subsidize the extra expenditures necessary to improve the situation of the security force. He requested an annual subsidy of about 1.2 million piasters for a number of years, until completion of the cadastral survey enabled the local government to raise the level of taxation. This sum would help give the security corps a long-overdue pay raise of about 20 percent, while also increasing their number from 930 to 1,000 for the time being, as opposed to the 1,200 stipulated in the protocol. Ohannes held that a compassionate response from the Porte to his request would be in accord with the commitment of the Ottoman government to maintain peace and order in Mount Lebanon and would also help convince the Council to moderate its position.^[67]

Just as the Porte forwarded the Council's proposal and the governor's comments to the Finance Ministry for an evaluation, there was a new development in Mount Lebanon. Early on the morning of 20 April 1913, many of the security forces—or gendarmes, as they are called in Ottoman documents—who were on duty in northern districts began to abandon their posts.^[68] With their arms, they gathered together to march to Ba'bda, the seat of the mutasarrifiyya . A Druze sergeant, Sheikh Tawfiq Tali', led the movement, along with Wadi' 'Abud, a Maronite sergeant-major who

joined the mutineers in Batrun. Many other gendarmes joined the mutineers along the course of their march, as they chanted songs and slogans demanding justice but otherwise retained military discipline. The mutineers spent the night of April 21 in Junia, resting, except for Tawfiq and Wadi', who met with a lawyer to draft a petition on the grievances of the gendarmerie. The petition emphasized the inadequacy and irregularity of payments and social benefits, such as paid annual and sick leaves and retirement compensation. It also aired complaints which exhibited a remarkable professional concern over the ability of the gendarmerie to fulfill its duties effectively. Toward this end the petition demanded training in military and legal matters, promotion on the basis of achievement and competence, and redefinition of the relations between the security force and administrative and judicial officials, with due respect and concern for its autonomy, integrity, internal hierarchy, and public prestige. Finally, the petition demanded an amnesty for all participants in the demonstrations, for theirs was "neither a strike nor an insubordination, but simply a just request to their father, the governor, for an end to their embarrassing inability to feed their families and fulfill their duties honorably." If their requests were not honored, the governor should accept their regretful resignations from service.

With this petition in hand, the mutineers resumed their march the next day. Habib Sa'ad, the deputy chairman of the Council, together with a Druze councillor and the governor's aide-de-camp, met the mutineers on the Nahr al-Kalb Bridge and tried to persuade them to return to their posts after entrusting their mission to a small delegation. His efforts were in vain. The march continued. On the outskirts of Ba'bda, members of the gendarmerie band joined the mutineers. As had been typically the case throughout this incident, the rank-and-file musicians politely ignored their officers' orders and answered the call of their mutinous friends. The mutineers, well over 200 by now, marched into Ba'bda in military order, complete with band. They halted in formation in the courtyard of the government palace and saluted the sultan and the governor with three cheers. Ohannes came out, delivered a speech expressing his compassion for them, and promised them an immediate settlement of their just requests. Once the governor withdrew to his office to discuss the matter with the councillors and a delegation of the mutineers, however, the soldiers in the courtyard began to shout slogans against the Council. In a brief moment of excitement, some demonstrators even entered the Council's regular meeting room and broke a few glasses and inkstands.

The gendarmes suspected that the Council's politicking over budgetary issues would continue to delay a correction of their grievances. Their pe-

tition suggests that they felt that the administrative officials exhibited indifference and even disrespect toward the security force and its problems. Other evidence indicates that the financial position of rank-and-file gendarmes had visibly deteriorated from about 1911 to 1913; this was the period during which the Administrative Council had been in effective charge of the Mountain. Despite the sharp increase in prices during these two years, the total annual sum spent on gendarmerie salaries had declined from about 3 million piasters to 2.4 million. Withholding the subsidy made to gendarmerie salaries out of the muhmalât budget appears to have been the main cause of this decline.^[69] Capricious salary cuts in lieu of disciplinary punishment, irregularities in salary payments, and privileged treatment of the protégés of the councillors and other senior officials had also embittered the rank and file, who now nourished little hope of the Council's willingness to attend to their problems. Surprised and frightened by the demonstrations, the Council was more than willing to appease the gendarmes. It agreed to raise their salaries by about 55 percent, almost double the rate requested by the mutineers. The Council also agreed to put the muhmalât funds at the service of the governor for immediate payment of the new salaries. Ohannes put the finishing touch to these measures by pledging his word not to take disciplinary action against the mutineers.

The gendarmes were pleased. They spent the night in tranquility. Next day, however, some of them came together under Wadi' 'Abud's leadership to hold demonstrations with renewed excitement and strikingly new slogans. The demonstrators threatened to seize the customs and post and telegram offices if failure of the central government to subsidize the Mountain's budget should entail such depletion of local funds as to lead to discontinuation of the promised pay increases. Habib Sa'ad and a few other councillors rushed to the governor to urge him to call in the regular troops from Beirut to quell the demonstrators. After brief hesitation, Ohannes refused, deciding that a confrontation between the regular troops and the Lebanese gendarmerie might have serious repercussions, and also suspecting that the councillors were exaggerating the situation. Indeed, the demonstrations quickly subsided, thanks to the efforts of the gendarmerie officers. Ohannes once again promised not to prosecute the demonstrators. Nevertheless, Wadi', the sole ringleader of the last incident, disappeared, and did not return to his post until he was given assurances by the French Consulate and the Maronite Patriarchate.^[70]

Ohannes was convinced that, although the original mutiny had started spontaneously, "certain circles which bore ill will against Ottoman sovereignty in the area" had set to work to take advantage of the discontent

among the gendarmes. Subsidization of the Lebanese budget had now become urgent to thwart the influence of these circles. Ohannes begged the Porte to grant his pending request for allocating at least 1.2 million piasters for three to four years, until a lasting solution could be found to the Mountain's budgetary problems. He also asked the Porte to send capable officers to inquire into the causes of the recent mutiny, to prevent its recurrence.^[71] Grand Vizier Mahmud Sevket Pasha, a prominent Unionist general, was impressed with neither Ohannes' argument for financial assistance nor the way he had handled the mutiny:

. . . you ask us to allot a large sum to alleviate the needs of the gendarmerie. Their appeasement prior to an inquiry into the mutiny and without taking disciplinary action against the instigators will only encourage similar [unruly] behavior, as your excellency [should] well know. The preoccupation of the Porte with such problems in these critical days cannot be deemed appropriate.^[72]

Mahmud Sevket Pasha still put the Lebanese issue on the agenda of the Cabinet, which found the monetary requests of both the Administrative Council and Ohannes grossly exaggerated and unreasonable. Taking into consideration the great discrepancy between the overall tax burden of the Lebanese and that of other Ottoman subjects, the Cabinet demanded that the Council either yield to an increase in the fixed tax level commensurate with the increasing costs of administration, or else that it agree to meet these costs out of the muhmalât revenue, to be buttressed by additional fees if need be. The Cabinet did not rule out, however, the possibility of some financial assistance, should the inspectors dispatched to Mount Lebanon, in compliance with Ohannes' request, recommend it.^[73]

The Administrative Council responded to the Cabinet's decision vehemently, basically insisting on its position as described above, that the muhmalât revenue should be devoted to the construction and maintenance of public works, and that covering the necessary additional administrative expenditures was a responsibility of the central government in accordance with the Règlement . The Council added interesting details to elaborate its position. Mount Lebanon was a rocky terrain with poor agricultural prospects. The depression in silk prices had significantly reduced the major source of income for Lebanese, namely, silk cocoon production. Tobacco cultivation, once another important source of income, had become virtually extinct, due to competition from the tobacco monopolies. As conditions in Mount Lebanon drove an ever-increasing number of its inhabitants to distant lands in search of a living, even collection of the

existing taxes and duties from the people who remained behind became a formidable task.

Given these circumstances, the Council argued, the Lebanese could not be asked to pay higher taxes. A cadastral survey might help depict certain lands which hitherto had escaped taxation and thus somewhat raise the total revenue, but the established rates of taxation ought to remain unaltered. The Council admitted that the overall tax burden in Mount Lebanon was less than in other parts of the Empire, but argued that the central government should take into consideration the large sums Lebanese paid every year to the Ottoman customs and the post and telegram offices, and to various relief campaigns launched by the Porte. Besides, the Lebanese abroad generated commercial opportunities beneficial to the Ottoman State, while the reliable tranquility and loyalty of the people of Mount Lebanon enabled the Porte to run it at a lower cost than other provinces. In short, according to the Council, Lebanese needed and deserved the financial assistance requested from the Sublime Porte.^[74]

The Council's argument about the inability of Lebanese to pay higher taxes was exaggerated. Contemporary evidence suggests that Lebanese were better off than their neighbors, mainly due to the lower taxes they paid and the remittances sent to Lebanon from abroad. The Lebanese economy enjoyed favorable terms of trade and a consequent cash inflow that could be tapped to improve public services and works.^[75] The two inspectors sent from Istanbul returned with similar impressions. They stated that Lebanese could afford and therefore should pay additional taxes if they wanted a better administration. The head tax could be increased, and reasonable taxes could be levied on cocoon and olive production without an adverse effect on the economy. Profitable businesses, such as silk factories and hotels, could definitely pay a much higher property tax than the ridiculously meager sums they paid at the time. The inspectors were convinced that the Council's insistence on a subsidy was a purely political move, intended to take advantage of the Porte's difficulties in order to elicit additional concessions such as autonomous customs and postal services. If a subsidy were to be paid to Mount Lebanon, this should be done only to strengthen the governor's position vis-à-vis the Council. The inspectors thought that Ohannes lacked the strong personality his position required, but they did not question his loyalty to the Ottoman State.^[76]

Ohannes himself was reluctant to characterize the Council as having a conspiratorial attitude toward the central government, as was suggested by the inspectors. He urged the Porte to understand the pressures operating on the councillors. There was much agitation in the area against the

Ottoman government. "Francophiles" were the main source of this agitation. They tried to make the people believe that the Istanbul government had over the years accumulated a huge debt to Lebanese by obliging them to shoulder administrative costs beyond their due. The agitators wanted to build a political case out of their claims, with the intention of trading off the supposed debt against Istanbul's consent to the extension of Mount Lebanon's borders and autonomy. This agitation, Ohannes observed, made the councillors reluctant to let the muhmalât revenue be used for routine administrative and public security expenditures, and encouraged some of them to hope that they could at least oblige the Porte to put the customs in Mount Lebanon under the jurisdiction of the local government.

Ohannes viewed the deepening breach between the Council and the Porte anxiously, for this situation rendered the Lebanese even more vulnerable to foreign and especially French influence. He was particularly concerned over maintaining the gendarmes' loyalty to Ottoman sovereignty. He criticized the Council for its reluctance to admit that the only way to truly solve the Mountain's budgetary problems was to overhaul and streamline its tax system and buttress it with sufficient tax increases. He believed he could convince the Council of this necessity, if the Porte provided him with some assistance as tangible evidence of the indubitable benevolence of the Sultanate toward its Lebanese subjects, and until the dust and commotion created by the mutiny and the Balkan wars settled.^[77] The Ottoman Cabinet did at length decide to send Ohannes 1.2 million piasters but only for the fiscal year of 1913–14. In future years, the mutasarrifiyya was expected to reassess the land and other property in Mount Lebanon to raise the level of taxes, and to balance its budget.^[78]

The Council had failed to wrest from Istanbul the financial control of Lebanese ports. To open these ports to international navigation and then bring them under the jurisdiction of local government had been primary objectives of the Council's liberal leadership for some time, as indicated in Chapter 3. The 1912 protocol had recognized the former claim, but not the latter. By simultaneously enlarging the Council's authority on financial matters, however, the protocol had provided the councillors with an opportunity to bargain for the latter objective as well. The customs revenue from Lebanese ports did not amount to a significant sum in 1913,^[79] but apparently the councillors hoped it would grow in time at the expense of Beirut's revenue. The idea of incorporating Beirut itself within the jurisdiction of the mutasarrifiyya , with due assistance from France, was also entertained by some Lebanese. Ohannes' defense of the Council, however, suggests that the majority of the councillors did not consider this a viable option in 1913.

Indeed, with the centrist Unionists in firm control of the party and the governmental apparatus in Istanbul, and the Ottoman State drifting into the German camp as the war drums began to beat in Europe, the future of the mutasarrifiyya regime loomed uncertain, and cooperation with France extremely risky. Could the Lebanese be mobilized to endure a protracted struggle against Istanbul, which the drive for an enlarged Lebanon, or even a more autonomous Mount Lebanon, would call for? Contemporary Ottoman documents suggest that the Administrative Council could lead such a movement.^[80] They also indicate, however, the flaws in the Council's leadership. Most significantly, the councillors had neglected to cultivate the support of the Lebanese gendarmerie, as the 1913 mutiny demonstrated. Also, the budgetary debates of the same year indicate that the councillors tended to overlook the inequalities in distribution of the tax burden in favor of the holders of large properties, including religious establishments. Although it is difficult to tell to what extent this situation undermined the councillors' influence in a political environment clearly dominated by patron–client relations, one can presume that the councillors would have to address the problem in a political struggle that called for mass support. At least some of the councillors appear to have grasped the importance of winning the support of the gendarmes, and the need for adjustments in distribution of the tax burden, in order to strengthen the Council's influence.^[81] But whatever the individual councillors' thoughts on the problems revealed by the 1913 incidents, there was little time left to give them effect.

Upon the entry of the Ottoman State into the First World War, Mount Lebanon found itself in the clutches of martial law. Military authorities stripped both the Council and the governor of much of their powers. Confiscation of food supplies and burden animals for military purposes, combined with the cessation of remittances from abroad and other wartime difficulties, led to large-scale destitution in the Mountain.^[82] The war proved devastating elsewhere in the Empire as well. But for the Lebanese, the continuous hardships brought upon them by wartime orders emanating from Istanbul and from Damascus, the regional military headquarters, contrasted sharply with the fiscal privileges and relatively low level of taxation they had come to enjoy over the last half-century under the mutasarrifiyya regime.

From 1861 onward, procurement of the financial resources necessary to cover the high costs of building an effective administration in Mount Lebanon emerged as a crucial problem for its governors. The regular revenue of the mutasarrifiyya was limited to about 4 million piasters, 3.5 million

from the fixed tax and the rest from imperial properties and other sources. This sum barely sufficed to cover the current administrative expenditures. In order to establish a viable administration that could effectively maintain peace and order in Mount Lebanon, however, a number of costly initial investments had to be undertaken. Particularly urgent were the construction of posts and garrisons for security and law enforcement, some all-weather roads for the prompt movement of troops and commodities, and similar public works.

In the first two and a half decades, these extraordinary expenditures were met by subsidies from the central government to the mutasarrifiyya . From about the late 1870s on, the Porte was no longer able to subsidize Mount Lebanon's budget. The search for a way to close the consequent deficits led to a protracted conflict between the governors and the Administrative Council. The Règlement had provided the Council with the right of consent over financial affairs, including tax increases. The Council was an elected body of the representatives of different districts and communities in Mount Lebanon. At the beginning, it reflected the deep regional and sectarian animosities existing among the Lebanese rather than functioning as an assembly representing general interests. In time, the pressure put on the Council by the governors to increase taxation worked as a force that brought the councillors closer together.

In appreciation of the ability of the Council to block new taxation, successive governors tried conciliatory solutions to the irritating budgetary problems. The muhmalât treasury (or budget) grew out of these attempts. It enabled the Council to have control over taxation beyond that specified in the Règlement . Simultaneously, the administration acquired an additional resource to continue to improve conditions in Mount Lebanon. A working relationship was thus established between the governor and the Council, although the tension was never dispelled. Whenever the finances of the mutasarrifiyya were strained, the Council tended to insist on the Porte's financial assistance for a solution, the governor on raising the level of fixed taxation. Both sides based themselves on the Règlement , but the ultimate solution was usually found—if at all—in creating a new muhmalât item or raising the rates of the old ones. In this ongoing struggle between the governor, as the agent of the Porte, and the Council, as the representative of the collective interests of Lebanese, the European powers—particularly France—played a crucial role. Threatened by French ambitions in the area, the Porte advocated a basically conciliatory attitude toward the Council. The Council counted on French support—but since French interests did not always suit the Lebanese in general, it often responded favorably to conciliatory overtures by the governors.

The Council took advantage of its position to increase its control over fiscal matters. Various councillors abused their powers for self-enrichment, and in general the Council tended to overlook the inequalities in the distribution of the tax burden, as well as in the benefits that accrued from government expenditures. Nevertheless, the participation of its locally elected representatives in financial decisions proved by and large beneficial to the people of Mount Lebanon. The councillors used their powers to keep taxes as low as possible, thus forcing the administration to economize—even if counterproductively at times. Where their resistance failed, they at least ensured that all the revenue extracted from the Lebanese was spent in Mount Lebanon, on the improvement of public services and works. In the meantime, there emerged a characteristic system of financial administration which further distinguished Mount Lebanon from its vicinity and buttressed its autonomy.