12
Rebuilding the Party

Since Mao's death, the CCP has taken a series of measures designed to restore its credibility and legitimacy. As noted, it has rehabilitated the victims of past purges, reversed some past decisions, and upgraded the quality of the cadre corps. More important, it has critically appraised its past record in "The Resolution on Historical Questions."^[1] The party's willingness publicly to "correct its own mistakes," however, proved to be insufficient to regain the people's confidence. By the time the regime started the party rectification in 1984, the CCP was still so demoralized, factionalized, and confused that "the crisis in faith" had to be publicly discussed.^[2] Because of disenchantment and alienation, the ordinary Chinese person was apathetic and cynical, while the courageous openly declared their intention to "cut ties" (juejiao ) with the party.^[3] The intensive ideological education, careful screening, and reregistration of each party member in the three-year rectification campaign from 1984 to 1986 did not improve the party's organizational capability. When Deng Xiaoping wanted to suppress the student movement in 1989, he realized that the military, not the party, was the only reliable instrument for such purposes.

This chapter analyzes, first, the existing structure of the party membership; second, the new recruitment policy; third, the party's effort to revitalize itself through the rectification campaign; and, last, the basic dilemma facing the Leninist Party as it tries to lead China to economic development while maintaining its Leninist tradition.

[1] For the document, see Beijing Ribao , 6 June 1980, 10–39.

[2] Wenhui Bao , 13 June 1980; Beijing Ribao , 31 January 1980.

[3] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 1, 1984, 18; Zhengdang yu Jiandang , 16 April 1986, 26.

Characteristics of Party Members

As of 1985, the Chinese Communist Party had about 42 million members in 2.57 million branches.^[4] Organized by geography and function, party branches exist in every locality and functional unit, except in places (such as government ministries) where the party core group (dangzu ) exercises leadership. Most of them are male, and the percentage of females ranged from 13.5 percent in Sichuan province to 12 percent nationwide.^[5]

Distribution

As table 49 demonstrates, most party members are peasants: 17.77 million (45.5 percent). Despite the impressive statistics they are still underrepresented: only 0.4 percent of the total peasant population are party members. In contrast, 8.8 percent of all Chinese workers are party members. The membership rate in the military is quite high; if one assumes that the total PLA strength is 4.2 million, almost of half of all those in uniform are party members. If one

[4] Nongmin Ribao , 4 December 1985.

[5] Renmin Ribao , 1 December 1983; Sichuan Ribao , 30 June 1984.

takes into account the difference between enlisted men and officers, it is very likely that almost all officers are party members.

About 9.9 million party members (25.5 percent) are unaccounted for. In all probability, the remaining group consists of party members among cadres. If so, the membership rate among administrative cadres (12 million) is 83 percent. This estimate approximates Zhao Ziyang's report that 69 percent of all cadres in the state organs are party members and that the rate of membership is much higher among the leading cadres of the state organs.^[6] Inner Mongolia reports that all provincial-level leading cadres, all mayors and deputy mayors (except for two) in twelve municipalities, and all magistrates and deputy magistrates (except for two) in 100 counties are party members. Among directors and deputy directors of the approximately 100 bureaus that are directly under provincial supervision, only fourteen are nonparty members, and nine of these are newly retired.^[7]

The percentage of party members among specialists is reportedly 3.09 million (7.8 percent), which constitutes only 13 percent of all specialists (26 million in the 1982 census). Another source reports that about 23 percent of 10.18 million functional cadres were members in 1983.^[8] At 23 percent, the party membership rate is higher than in other occupational groups, but much lower than among administrative cadres.

Distribution of party members among the functional areas varies from sector to sector.^[9] The membership rate is higher in the industrial sector, for instance, than in educational institutions. Membership among high school and middle school teachers is only 8 percent, whereas it ranges from 25 to 40 percent in industrial enterprises.

In individual enterprises, the membership rate varies greatly from factory to factory. On the whole, the rate is higher in heavy industry than in light industry. For instance, only 4.1 percent of workers in the Shanghai Seventeenth Textile Factory are party

[6] Renmin Ribao , 17 March 1989.

[7] Shijian , no. 6, 1982, 8–10.

[8] In 1981, the total number of those who were specialized technical people (zhuanye jishu ganbu ) was 8.35 million, 1.85 million (22.2 percent) of whom were party members. Zhongong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai Zhishifenzi Zhong Fazhan Dangyuan Gongzuo (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1985), 65.

[9] Gongchandangyuan , nos. 11–12, 1985, 22.

members, whereas almost 66 percent of workers in the Sea Transportation Companyare reportedly members (see table 50). The low level of party membership in the textile factory can be attributed to the fact that the majority of workers in this sector are female—a group with a low rate of membership. The second lowest rate was found in the Shanghai Department Store—also composed of female workers. Within each factory, the membership rate of management is almost three times higher than that of workers, and the difference appears to be growing. In the Anshan Steel Mill (dangang ) and in the Daqing Oilfield, two of every three management cadres are party members.

Table 51 reflects the changing emphasis in the regime's recruitment policy. The rate of membership among production workers reached its highest point (26 percent) in 1978, probably reflecting the Gang of Four's leftist recruitment policy, whereas the rate in 1981 dropped substantially to 17.9 percent. The current party membership rate among production workers is likely to be lower than the indicated figure. The percentage of technical personnel has been rising steadily, thus indicating that the Gang of Four's anti-intellectual policy did not affect a technocrat's chance to join the party. What is most striking is the fluctuation of party membership among management personnel. Undoubtedly due to the leftist policy of the CR, the percentage among them reached the lowest point (43.5 percent) in 1978, but it increased to 67.2 percent by 1981. At the moment, it is likely that the percentage has increased among management cadres, as well as among technical cadres. It is worth noting that the ratio of party membership to management personnel has been consistently higher than that of any other category.

Among intellectuals, the membership rate varies depending on the age group. For instance, 48 percent of older intellectuals (those who graduated from college before 1949) are party members, whereas only 20 percent of those who graduated from college between 1950 and 1966 are members in Shanghai.^[10] Twenty-five percent of those who graduated from college after 1978 are members. Two factors account for this variation. First, age is closely related to professional ranking. In the past few years, the regime has endea-

[10] Zhongong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai , 183.

vored to recruit famous intellectuals—many of whom are old—for obvious propaganda purposes. The second factor is the recruitment policy at any given moment. The relaxed policy toward intellectuals up to 1957 explains the high proportion of older intellectuals.

The distribution of party members among college students varies from college to college and from year to year (see table 52). Before the CR, the membership rate was rising steadily through 1958 (9.7 percent) but then it gradually dropped. In 1980, the percentage of party members among the 1.28 million college students was 3.8; after graduation of classes that had entered college in 1977 and 1978, the percentage dropped to 1.9 percent in 1982.^[11] The membership increase to 2.5 percent in 1983 was largely due to students in special training classes, which included many party-

[11] Ibid., 67.

member cadres.^[12] In 1983, the membership rate among students of Shanghai's three universities and Tianjin's seven colleges was less than 1 percent, ironically less than the rate during the KMT era.^[13]

The most striking feature in the distribution of party members by province is that the membership rate does not vary much (see table 53). Available figures for the 1980s vary from 2.2 percent in Guizhou to 7.9 percent in Beijing. The average rate is about 3.5 percent to 3.9 percent. The high membership rate in Beijing is understandable because it is the capital where all high-ranking cadres live. High membership rates in Shanghai (6.3 percent), Tianjin (5.7 percent), and Liaoning (5.5 percent) indicate that they bear a significant correlation with the degree of industrialization. The rather high rate in Yunnan (7.7 percent) and Qinghai (4.4 percent) is probably due to the presence of a large number of military personnel. The rather even distribution of party membership

[12] Jiefang Ribao , 29 September 1984.

[13] Zhonggong Zongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai .

(table continued on next page)

(table continued from previous page)

(table continued on next page)

(table continued from previous page)

among the provinces implies that a centralized control mechanism coordinates recruitment in different areas.

Age

The age of party members is not available, but it is fair to assume that as a whole they are much older than the population. According to an official source, 26 percent were below the age of twenty-five in 1950, but the same age group constituted only 2.25 percent in 1983, and in some areas (e.g., Zhunhua county in Hebei province) the percentage is as low as 1.3. But by 1984 the proportion increased to 3.2 percent because of the stepped-up effort to recruit young people.^[14]

As of 1981, ony 6.8 percent of 39 million party members had

[14] Ibid., 89.

joined the party before 1949—2.65 million including 10,000 senior members (ones who had joined during the great revolutionary period and 300,000 who had joined during the anti-Japanese war). Fifteen million (38.6 percent) joined the party between 1949 and 1966. The CR generation comprises 16 million (40.6 percent), and those who joined after the Gang of Four total 5.64 million.^[15] Since it is fair to assume that most members joined when they were young (in their mid-twenties), the distribution by generation indicates that the average age was very old, even in 1981. For instance, the average age of those who joined before 1949 was over sixty-five. Those who joined between 1949 and 1966 were sixty-five to forty-five. Those who joined during the CR were forty-five to thirty-five.

Table 54 demonstrates young people's apathy toward joining the party. Among workers who were employed after the Gang of Four, only 3.6 percent are activists, whereas the rate goes up to 12.2 percent for those who began work before the CR. Among technical cadres, the percentage of activists rose from 8.1 percent during the CR to 15.1 percent in the post-Mao era. This may be because young technical cadres see membership as a way to enhance their career potential, whereas young workers have less incentive to join the party. Young peasants are less interested in joining the party than their urban counterparts, despite the official effort to recruit them.^[16] Among 2,926 party members in the three counties of Jiangsu, only sixty-three are under twenty-five (0.15 percent of the age group). Another village (xiang ) has a total of 2,877 people in the age group eighteen to twenty-three. Among them only twenty-five have applied for membership (0.83 percent).^[17] Only 0.8 percent of the rural population are nonmember activists; the official goal is to raise the figure to 3 percent.^[18]

Educational Level

The overall educational level of party members is rather low. Only 4 percent have a college-level education (see table 55). The majority

[15] Renmin Ribao , 30 June 1986. For young workers' political attitude, see Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo yanjiu , no. 3, 1984, 20.

[16] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai , 35.

[17] Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun , July 1985, 7–8.

[18] Gongchandangyuan , no. 12, 1985, 10–14.

of members have only a primary school education (42.2 percent), and about 10.1 percent are illiterate. Three or four out of every ten college graduates are party members. One surprise in table 55 is that more primary school graduates (9.4 percent) are represented than junior high school graduates (8.8 percent). Based on this information, the table identifies the regime's past recruitment policy of emphasizing class background and political contribution. The national average appears to approximate the provincial situation quite closely. For instance, party members with a college-level education are 5 percent in Liaoning and 3.2 percent in Guangdong.^[19] In Heilongjiang, party members who have a primary school education or who are illiterate comprise 41 percent of the total membership.^[20] The overall educational level of the CCP members in 1985 is similar to that of the Soviet Communist Party in

[19] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai .

[20] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 5, September 1985, 12–13.

1937, when 24 percent of its members had less than four years of education, 45 percent had four to seven years, 12 percent had twelve years, and about 7 percent had sixteen years.^[21]

The educational level of rural party members appears to be worse than the national average.^[22] Among 230,000 rural party leaders in Hubei, those who are illiterate or have a primary school education constitute 63 percent. About 20 percent of the rural branches do not have any members with a junior high school education. Particularly low is the educational level of the first and second secretaries in rural areas.^[23] Among party members in three villages, there are about twenty-four with a college-level education (0.81 percent), about forty-nine (1.6 percent) who attended a specialized middle school, and about 343 (12 percent) who attended senior and junior high school.^[24] Of fifty-three party committee members in Xiangying village, all are illiterate, except for seven with a primary school education.

In addition to a low educational level, the age structure of rural party leaders is dismal. In Hubei province 40 percent of its rural members are over forty-six, and 30 percent of secretaries in branches are sixty or older.^[25] Of eleven secretaries in branches, only two are under thirty, three have a middle school education, and four are illiterate.^[26]

Having joined the party during the land reform era, collectivization, and the Great Leap Forward, most rural members are accustomed only to class struggle and "blind commands, cutting everything with one knife, and issuing administrative orders." They lack the education to understand the new official policy.^[27] As a result, "rural leaders are not capable of leading the rural economy with commodity production. A new group of leaders is needed."^[28]

[21] Jerry Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), 28.

[22] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang , 1 January 1986.

[23] Among the basic-level party leaders in Hebei, about 63 percent have a primary school education or are illiterate, and about 20 percent had a junior high school education. Hebei Xuekan , no. 2, 1986, 8.

[24] Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun , July 1985, 7–8.

[25] Renmin Ribao , 11 December 1984.

[26] Zhibu Shenghuo (Beijing), December 1984, 50–51.

[27] Ibid.; Hebei Xuekan , January 1985, 108–10.

[28] Hubei Xuekan , January 1985, 100–110.

New Recruitment Policy

It is a widely accepted axiom in the social sciences that the membership characteristics of an organization largely determine its goals, and at the same time any drastic change in organizational goals requires personnel turnover.^[29] Even a Leninist party is no exception to this rule: it has to maintain a certain congruence between its ideological outlook and the interests of its members. In the past, the Maoists' emphasis on class background in cadre and party member recruitment reinforced the CCP's revolutionary goals. Drawn largely from the lowest rung of society, the party members supported Mao's notion of permanent revolution.

With the CCP assuming economic reconstruction as its main task, it became obvious even to such conservative leaders as Chen Yun, not to mention more reform-minded ones such as the late Hu Yaobang, that the party was ill-equipped for the new tasks and needed to readjust "all recruitment work to that direction."^[30] The majority of party members are too old, too wrapped in Maoist ideology, and too low in educational level. Nonetheless, it is not feasible for the party to expel those members with little education and to recruit new members in large numbers as the Gang of Four did.^[31] Therefore, the party has decided on "selective recruitment" to improve the quality of membership over a long period. Its overall plan is to recruit approximately 2 million specialists by 1990 by admitting about 300,000 to 400,000 every year. In this way a higher percentage of party members will have received a college or specialized middle school education.^[32]

It was not an easy task for the CCP to change the criteria for membership recruitment in operation for such a long time. As noted, the practice of emphasizing class background and political loyalty started from the very foundation of the CCP and continued—except for a brief period during the second united front—even after 1949, giving weight to increasingly narrowly defined political criteria. Most current CCP members owe their membership to political qualifications. In order to switch from political loyalty to ability, the regime had first to replace the old cadres in

[29] Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

[30] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai , 47–57.

[31] Ibid., 34.

[32] Ibid., 76.

the organizational departments at the various levels with reform-minded young ones, because only party members have the authority to recommend new members. Every year the central organizational department has held national conferences on organizational work, issuing instructions concerning the recruitment of a specific group. It issued a "Report on Strengthening the Recruitment of Intellectuals" in 1982 and an "Opinion Regarding the Strengthening of the Work of Recruiting College Students" in 1983.^[33] In 1984, the center instructed local party committees to resolve the difficulties intellectuals faced in joining the party. After central conferences, each province convenes its own meeting to transmit and explain the specific organizational task of the year.^[34]

Recruitment planning appears to work in the same way as economic planning. Every year the central organizational department develops a recruitment plan on the basis of activist lists prepared by the lower levels. The plan is broken down and sent to the next level, which in turn assigns a specific quota to individual units. Although "the plan developed in this way can be reliable," it has its share of problems.^[35] Once a quota is assigned to each party organization, the unit feels compelled to meet the assigned quota regardless of whether or not there are qualified candidates. On the other hand, once the quota is filled, even deserving candidates cannot be admitted. Therefore, some party leaders want to abolish this method, but it seems unlikely that the regime will give up its control over broad quantitative targets.^[36]

The party has also gradually changed its recruitment criteria, shifting its emphasis from political to functional abilities. Although not officially admitted, in order to join the party it is now required for cadres and workers to have a senior high school education and for soldiers and peasants to have a junior high school education. Exceptions are allowed for minority candidates and those who live in mountainous areas, but as a rule the illiterate are not recruited, and secretaries of rural party branches must have a junior high school education.^[37]

At the same time, the regime has been relaxing its political

[33] Ibid., pp. 63–178; Neimong Ri Bao , 10 March 1983.

[34] Neimong Ribao , 10 March 1983.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 6, 1984, 39.

[37] Gongchandang (Liaoning), no. 12, 1985, 12–14.

requirements. The previous practice of looking at family background, social relations, and historical records to ascertain a person's political attitude is now discouraged or eliminated. Instead, commitment to the Four Modernizations and support of the official policy are stressed. "Anything that brings luck to the people and that contributes to the development of productive forces" is accepted as socialism. The CCP has removed some of the old regulations that specifically barred such types of people from joining the party as former members of the People's Livelihood Party (Minshengdang) and the KMT Youth Corps.^[38] However, "those with strong religious feelings" are still disqualified. Even those who made mistakes during the CR can join the party if "they have made sincere self-criticisms and their performance since the third plenum is good."

Beneficiaries of the new policy are the young and educated groups, which largely overlap. The party has also stepped up recruitment of the most underrepresented groups, namely, "females, minorities, workers in the first line of production, and staff in industry, finance, and trade." Another group with educated manpower are returnees among overseas Chinese. Although there are about 2 million returnees with about 20 million family members, only a small fraction of them are party members because of previous discrimination.^[39]

The regime's effort to recruit intellectuals and young people frequently encounters subtle opposition from party leaders, particularly at the middle and basic levels, where old members who were poor peasants are still entrenched. "Not yet freed from the ossified thinking of the leftists" or from their old habit "of looking at seniority, natural age, date of filing an application, date of participating in work, and ranking of technical titles to determine a candidate's qualifications," they regard young people as "only expert but not red," "arrogant," "detached from the masses," "seeking the bourgeois life-style," and "immature and unstable." They continue to believe that intellectuals, being "outsiders [and] the target of reform, can be used but not trusted," and that "if they are recruited, the party will change its characteristics." Others feel that

[38] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai , 235.

[39] Ibid., 109–12.

admitting them is similar to "adding wings to tigers," who will threaten the old party members' vested interests and their "iron chairs." Some are more straightforward: "You [intellectuals] have culture, and I have a party ticket; you have knowledge, and I have seniority; you know your affairs, but as far as your joining the party is concerned, I will lead you." Frequently cited reasons for rejecting the intellectuals' applications are that they are "arrogant" or "their social relations are complicated."^[40]

Resistance to the new policy is rather subtle. When old party members are pressured to admit the young and educated, they take the "three nos" posture: not taking notice of the application, not cultivating activists, and not helping the applicants. Others embarrass the party by publicly declaring that "from now on, anyone without a junior high school education cannot be recruited." This raises the question of what to do with peasants and workers who are politically qualified but lack the educational requirements.^[41] The muted official answer states that the party has room for both peasants and intellectuals. This explanation does not assuage the resentment of peasant and worker party members. "The 'stinking ninth category' now smells fragrant, and the 'all-purpose cadres' stink; those with literary training now smell fragrant as do those below forty while the worker-peasant cadres encounter disaster."

The party responded to resistance from lower levels by strengthening its supervision of the work of recruiting intellectuals. Party committees at various levels are instructed to prepare a list of intellectuals applying for membership. Control over the list follows the ranking of the applicants: the provincial authorities supervise the recruitment of high-ranking intellectuals—those above associate professor, associate researcher, and deputy medical doctor; the district authorities are responsbile for the middle-ranking ones—lecturers, assistant researchers, engineers, and head physicians (zhuzhi yishi ); and first-class party organs at the county level manage the applications of low-level intellectuals. In addition, party committees frequently dispatch inspection teams to check the work

[40] Renmin Ribao , 27 June 1984; 17 April 1985. Some cultural units in Gansu recruited intellectuals for the first time in thirty years. Renmin Ribao , 17 August 1980.

[41] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 16, 1985, 41.

of recruiting intellectuals at subordinate units. In February 1984, the Sichuan provincial authority organized about 8,000 cadres into 2,000 inspection teams and sent the teams to the basic levels to check the implementation of recruitment policies. In order to encourage intellectuals to apply for membership, one county party organ in Sichuan even wrote individual letters, urging intellectuals to join. Xinfeng district of Raoping county dispatched twelve teams to search for the right candidates for membership.^[42]

The regime's endeavors appear to have produced some positive results. In the five years between 1978 and 1983, slightly more than half a million specialists were recruited. The percentage of intellectuals among new recruits has steadily risen: 8 percent in 1979, 19 percent in 1980, 21 percent in 1981, 24 percent in 1982, 37 percent in 1983, and about 40 percent in 1984. In 1984 alone 1.4 million "advanced elements," one-third of whom were "labor models, advanced staff, outstanding teachers, pacesetters in the New Long March, and three-good students," were admitted. Those with a college-level education numbered 230,000 (17 percent), a figure almost equivalent to all college graduates in that particular year (only about 10 percent of all college graduates lack membership). Forty-five percent of the new members have specialized middle school or high school educations.^[43] About 50 percent of the 1 million recruited in 1985 are considered intellectuals.

The recruitment rate of intellectuals in provinces parallels the national trend. Henan reports that about 21 percent of its intellectuals are members, and Guizhou brags that it has recruited more intellectuals in the five years between 1978 and 1983 than in the past thirty years since 1949.^[44] According to various reports, more than half the recruits in various units are young or middle-aged.^[45] Most of the young people were recruited through the CYL, which reportedly sent 590,000 of its members to the party in 1984.^[46]

Recruitment of intellectuals has taken place mostly in business units that failed to admit them in the past, often rejecting their

[42] Shantou Ribao , 22 May 1985.

[43] Renmin Ribao , 25 September 1985.

[44] Sichuan Ribao , 27 June 1984; Hangzhou Shifan Xuebao , 15 January 1985.

[45] For instance, Beijing reported that one-third of these 1984 recruits were under twenty-eight, and about 50 percent of them were younger than thirty-five. Xuanchuan Shouce (Beijing), no. 13, 1985, 3–4.

[46] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 13, 1985, 38.

applications repeatedly. One professor, who had reportedly submitted his application forty-one times, and a dancer, who had gone through the process forty-three times, have now been admitted.^[47] Apparently, many old and middle-aged intellectuals have taken advantage of the new policy. Among intellectuals, those in the natural sciences are more eagerly sought after than those in the social sciences and humanities. In 1984 Beijing accepted the largest number of scientists, engineers, and technicians ever recruited in one year, a figure equivalent to "one-third of all new recruits in the central organs in the past several years."^[48]

In many places the newly admitted are readily promoted to cadre positions. One province reports that 39 percent of the newly admitted intellectuals (10, 942) have been assigned to leadership positions at the district, municipality, county, and village levels. Liaoning province has appointed "scientists, veteran teachers, engineers, technicians, and medical health workers" to positions as division and section chiefs of the provincial government.^[49] By March 1983, among 12,862 high-ranking intellectuals, 4,088 (31 percent) assumed leadership positions in seventy-nine units at the central level.

In rural areas, the party has eagerly courted young and educated groups, which it had formerly neglected for being "ideologically immature and politically unreliable."^[50] Since the young and educated constitute the largest portion of specialized households, it is not surprising that many of them are being admitted into the party. Jilin county reports that 59 percent of its new members come from specialized households,^[51] which probably expect to protect their political liabilities by joining the party.^[52]

Initially, the regime justified active recruitment of specialized households and "10,000 yuan households" (yiwan hu ) on the

[47] A county immunizaton station reportedly recruited only one person since its establishment. In some university departments not one single person was recruited into the party in the past twenty-four years, and only one person was accepted between 1960 to 1983. Renmin Ribao , 1 December 1984; Hangzhou Shifan Xuebao , 15 January 1985, 15-20.

[48] Xuanchuan Shouce , no. 13, 1985, 3–4.

[49] Daily Report , 16 January 1979, 13.

[50] Hebei Xuekan , no. 1, 1985, 108–10.

[51] Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun , 5 July 1985.

[52] Lilun Yuekan , no. 8, 1985, 56–58.

grounds that they were "the most advanced elements." "Advanced youth and specialized households are the outstanding elements among the peasants, and they are a new type of peasants with a pioneering spirit. They have culture and knowledge, are ideologically sensitive and less conservative, and have the creativity necessary for forming a socialist rural area with Chinese characteristics." By recruiting them into the party and promoting them to rural leadership positions, one county increased the number of specialized households from 8,000 to 32,000.

The regime appears, however, to have had second thoughts about specialized households.^[53] "Admitting the advanced elements of specialized households is acceptable. But one should take a careful attitude toward this action, seeking truth from facts. Their admission should not be avoided, and [we] also should not be passive about admitting them." The current policy is to accept only those specialized households meeting political qualifications, which include: (1) a willingness to struggle to realize the great ideals of communism and the general line of the party at the moment, (2) the ability to lead the masses to get rich together, and (3) the potential to contribute to the state and collectives.^[54]

This cautious approach reflects the reluctance on the part of old party members, who believe that "admitting that kind of person encourages individuals to get rich."^[55] Many old party members still insist that "enlightened party members will not get rich, and rich party members are not enlightened."^[56] At the same time the regime apparently has been putting increasing pressure on party members to help others to become rich or to move jointly toward wealth. Now rural party members are portrayed as a "basic skeleton" (zhuxin gu ) or "a bridge" for the masses to become rich. Party members who became rich in the rural areas are urged to "sign contracts" to help one or two poor households.^[57]

Meanwhile, the regime's effort to promote the young and educated to rural leadership positions continues. Now village secre-

[53] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 11, 1984, 19.

[54] Gongchandangyuan , no. 17, 1985, 31; Lilun Yuekan , no. 12, 1985, 40–41.

[55] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 7, 1983, 22; Zhibu Shenghuo (Beijing), no. 7, 1985, 52–53.

[56] Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun , 16 November 1985.

[57] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 13, 1983, 27.

taries are required to have at least a primary school education, and the majority of branch members should be young. Town party committees are required to have at least one person with a college education, and those with a senior high school education should constitute a majority in party branches. The rural branches are instructed to select "reserve cadres" from among party members who are below thirty-five years of age and who have a junior high school education.

Since there are not many qualified persons among old party members in terms of age and level of education, newly admitted young members are quickly promoted to leadership positions.^[58] Through this method, one county was able to lower the average age of its branch members from forty-five to thirty-seven, increasing the numbers of those with a college or senior and junior high school education to 63 percent and the proportion of specialized households to 30 percent of the entire leadership. Today, the expectation for anyone who joins the party to become a cadre is so great that members without cadre positions are ridiculed as the members with low status (baiding dangyuan ).^[59]

Although the regime's effort to upgrade the quality of rural party members is necessary, it also creates new problems. The recruitment and promotion of economically successful peasants polarizes rural members along generational lines. Many old members remain in poor households.^[60] "They have deep feelings about the party, their sense of discipline is strong, and their desire to play a positive role is great." But because of their advanced age, low educational level, and lack of specific skills, they have difficulty in understanding the commodity economy and in leading the people to become rich. Some party members endeavor to enrich themselves by "abusing their offices, occupying property belonging to collectives, and misusing public funds," while neglecting their responsibilities or wishing to withdraw from the party. "Such situations exist in every place." In turn, the masses say that "we do not respect such party members and cadres, even though they got rich."^[61]

[58] Daily Report , 16 January 1979, 13.

[59] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 6, 1984, 24.

[60] Ibid., no. 15, 1985, 11.

[61] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang , 16 January 1986.

Although they have "enthusiasm and are courageous in pioneering," the newly recruited and promoted have their share of problems as well. Lacking "the party spirit and the party's work style" and practical experience in rural work, they neglect ideological work and command instead of educate and persuade. Few of them are simply incompetent. The regime promises to resolve these problems by training "reserve cadres."^[62]

Rectification

While trying to improve the overall quality of its members by admitting only educated people, the CCP carried out party rectification from 1984 to 1986 in order to achieve "ideological unity," to strengthen party discipline, and to purify its organization.^[63] During the rectification the qualifications of each party member were reviewed on the basis of one's attitude in studying party documents and in making self-criticism, with those failing the test being expelled.

The method used in the rectification was an organizational approach, an extremely realistic and pragmatic method largely designed to ensure tight control over the process by the top leaders. Hu Yaobang publicized the plan for a party rectification at the Twelfth Party Congress (held in September 1982), but rectification actually started one year later when reorganization of the ruling structure as well as personnel changes almost up to the county levels were completed. The CCP prepared a careful plan for the campaign by carrying out the rectification in a selected unit to create models (dianxing ) and by collecting information on basic problems of party life and appropriate methods to be used nationally. For instance, the Heilongjiang provincial party committee prepared a very detailed report entitled "Reference Materials on the Experimental Party Rectification Work."^[64] On the basis of information and recommendations forwarded by provincial authorities, the second plenum of the Twelfth Central Commit-

[62] Hubei Ribao , 4 November 1985.

[63] For this decision, see Renmin Ribao , 13 October 1983.

[64] "Zhengdang Shidian Cankao Cailiao," Dangde Shenghuo (Heilongjiang), no. 14, 25 July 1983.

tee (held on 11 October 1983) adopted "The Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Party Consolidation."^[65]

The center produced a set of documents with specified goals, targets, processes, and criteria in unprecedented detail. In addition, party rectification leading groups were set up at all different levels with the Central Commission Guiding Party Consolidation at the top.^[66] Authorized to issue special instructions, the commission issued numerous notices on specific problems as they occurred in the process, which drew the attention of party members to the particular experiences it deemed worthy.^[67]

The concrete sequences stipulated by the decision were also based on an organizational approach. "It will proceed from the central level to grass-root organizations, from the top downward, stage by stage in groups. Rectification of the party organization of each unit will start with the leadership body at the top level."^[68] After rectifying themselves, the leadership bodies supervised the process at the next level, thus ensuring that the entire process of rectification was conducted in an orderly fashion. Moreover, the rectification was first carried out in central government organs, the leading bodies of the provinces, and large units of the PLA (which included 380,000 members in 159 units). Only after completing the rectification in the first batch at the end of 1984 did the regime move to the second batch (which included district- and county-level party organs as well as business and enterprise organs of that level, with a total party membership of about 13.5 million).^[69] The last group to undergo rectification consisted of rural party members at the level below the county. The entire process was officially completed in the spring of 1987.^[70]

In addition, the CCP also relied heavily on work teams in order to ensure organizational supervision. Since dispatching the teams had generated intense controversies during the CR, the regime tried to define their authority in such a way that they would not

[65] Renmin Ribao , 13 October 1983.

[66] For its members, see ibid.

[67] Gongchandangyuan , no. 24, 1985, 4–66; no. 7, 1985, 4–5; no. 10, 1985, 4–5.

[68] Renmin Ribao , 13 October 1983.

[69] Ibid., 23 December 1984.

[70] Gongchandangyuan , no. 12, 1985, 10–14.

push aside the existing leadership but would act as an effective watchdog for the center. Although described as liaison offices, which would report directly to the Central Commission on the local situation and transmit instructions from the upper echelon to the lower units, the work teams were at the same time held responsible for "meticulously implementing official policies" and not compromising with the existing leadership on "matters of principle."^[71] Moreover, the head and deputy head of the work teams, or ordinary members designated by them, were authorized to attend the meetings of the existing leadership.^[72] Work team members were carefully selected from "old cadres with long experience in party affairs" or "those who understood the rectification." Selection of the head and deputy head of the work teams had to be approved by higher authorities, and all members of the teams were given intensive training, sometimes lasting eight days.^[73] In addition, the party organization at a higher level was specifically instructed to supervise the rectification work of its subordinate units. To perform this supervisory function properly, the higher-level leadership had to inform subordinate organizations of the progress of the rectification in its own unit. No rectification work could be completed without the careful checking and explicit approval of the higher authority.^[74]

All party units uniformly followed the concrete steps laid down by the central authority. First, party members spent ten to twenty days reading the relevant materials—including The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping , some of Mao's writings, a collection of important documents published since the third plenum, and A Must for Party Members .^[75] For this study—intended to raise members' understanding of "their responsibility, the party's new tasks, and the new policy line"—members were divided into several groups according to their level of education. For instance, in the ministry of chemical engineering the group with a college education read a million characters, averaging 7,000 characters per hour, whereas

[71] Renmin Ribao , 12 December 1983; "Zhengdang Shidian Cankao Cailiao," 20, 23; Renmin Ribao , 23 December 1983.

[72] Renmin Ribao , 12 December 1983.

[73] "Zhengdang Shidian Cankao Cailiao," 19–20; Renmin Ribao , 23 December 1983.

[74] Renmin Ribao , 13 October 1983.

[75] Ibid., 10 October 1983; 14 October 1983, 24 October 1983.

the group with a lower education studied materials containing 200,000 characters. Party committees also organized and trained people to read and explain the materials to illiterate party members. Despite the massive energy and time spent studying these materials, many units apparently conducted the study "perfunctorily."

The second stage was "comparing and checking," in which each party member examined his own ideology, past record, and present performance against the standards specified in the official documents.^[76] All participants made self-criticisms and submitted their writings to the party committee for collective discussion and approval. First party secretaries at all levels were to set an example by participating in the meeting of the party core as an individual member, by making thorough self-criticisms, and by assuming responsibility for their units' work. Self-criticisms were not limited to one's ideology, degree of compliance with official policies, or adherence to party regulations. They also touched upon corruption, bad work habits, bureaucratism, or any other irregularity resented by the masses.^[77] When a leading cadre's self-criticism—which was often prepared with the help of work teams—was approved, it was reported at the membership meeting at that level, as well as to the leadership group at the next level.^[78] This measure was to ensure that superior and subordinate units would supervise each other to prevent perfunctory performances.

Although the rectification was basically an internal matter, party leaders had to solicit the opinions of nonparty members, using such methods as the exchange of opinions, opinion polls, and heart-to-heart discussions.^[79] However, the regime repeatedly stressed that the mass mobilization methods of the CR—allowing the masses to expose cadres' mistakes, to write accusatory letters, to exchange experiences across unit boundaries—should be avoided. In order to underscore the fact that the rectification was not a political campaign like the CR where the leaders and upper-level organizations made many arbitrary decisions affecting indi-

[76] "Zhengdang Shidian Cankao Cailiao," 31; Sichuan Ribao , 11 August 1984.

[77] For self-criticisms of the government ministers, see Renmin Ribao , 16 March 1984.

[78] Sichuan Ribao , 12 March 1984.

[79] Renmin Ribao , 2 November 1983.

viduals, the regime promised not to use the "four methods," while observing the "four principles." The party would not (1) grab pigtails, (2) put hats on the accused, (3) beat with a stick, or (4) put materials in personnel dossiers. The principles allowed the accused to (1) defend himself, (2) explain the specific circumstances of the incident investigated, (3) reserve his own opinion, and (4) change his own view.^[80]

The last stage of the rectification was registration.^[81] The party could make one of four decisions regarding each individual member: (1) to register, (2) to postpone registration, (3) to persuade individual members to voluntarily withdraw from the party, or (4) to expel. Each party member had to evaluate his own qualifications for membership, specifying his strengths and weaknesses after having a heart-to-heart talk with a party representative. Those who passed the test pledged "unconditionally to carry out a party member's obligations" and were sworn in at the designated registration place.

The regime insists that no fixed quota for those to be purged was sent down to the lower level.^[82] Only two categories of people were to be expelled: the "three types of people" and those members with serious economic, ideological, organizational, and work style problems. For those unwilling to reapply for membership, party committees were instructed to use neither force nor persuasion. When a negative decision was made about a member, the person was allowed to defend himself and to appeal his case to higher authorities, who promised to handle such cases with special care.^[83] The names of party members whose registrations were postponed or refused were submitted to party organs at the next higher level for approval.

Despite the tight supervision by a higher authority, the overall result of the rectification appears to be disappointing. The party summarized the net results by saying that there was "some interference, some mistakes, some achievement, and some progress." However, the Chinese people used a cryptic but more cynical phrase to sum up the results: "The results of three and a half

[80] Hong Qi , no. 13, 1984.

[81] Renmin Ribao , 13 October 1983; 20 November 1984.

[82] Peng Xueshi, Wang Hongfu, and Lu Xianfu, eds., Xin Shiqi Zhengdang Jianghua (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1984), 94.

[83] Ibid., 92.

years of rectification is neither salty, nor bland. After the rain, the ground is wet, but the wind blows away the fog. Mr. Hu trembled at the strength of the leftist wind, and confusion changed the reform plans. Wine and sex are added to wealth. When will a real improvement come?"^[84]

In retrospect, it seems that from the beginning the party's effort to rebuild itself through ideological education of its members was unrealistic. In order to achieve "ideological unity," the CCP had to have a coherent ideology that clearly defined its role in leading China to economic development, while justifying economic reforms in terms of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. However, it was impossible for the party to formulate a well-defined and coherent ideology that would justify the various reform measures that it initiated out of practical necessity, while preserving whatever it regarded as the core value of socialism.

Moreover, the party had could not insulate itself from the impact of rapid change in the society that reform engendered. The prerequisites of economic development compel the regime to relinquish some of its authority over economic and administrative matters and to manage cadres according to task-oriented criteria rather than political ones. As the regime encourages individual Chinese to become rich ahead of others, career opportunities outside the bureaucratic structures of the party-state open up. Consequently, party membership becomes less attractive than before, even for career advantages within the party-state apparatus. Nonetheless, the ruling Leninist Party deems it necessary to rebuild itself in such a way that it can insulate itself from the undesirable influences of society, while making it effective in leading China to achieve the Four Modernizations.

Top party leaders disagreed among themselves over the extent to which ideological orthodoxy should be sacrificed for the sake of reform. This dilemma was crystallized over the concrete question of which should be the main objective of the rectification: ideological purity of the Leninist Party or facilitating reforms. The conservatives viewed the rectification as a means to maintain the Leninist Party's ideological orthodoxy, whereas the reformers saw it as a means to facilitate the reforms.

[84] Jing Bao , July 1987, 76–78.

The Party's Dilemma: Ideology

Ideology has played a more crucial role in China than in any other political community. In traditional China, Confucianism, the official ideology, provided the basis for consensus among the political elites with regard to basic standards of right and wrong and acceptable and unacceptable behavior. In so doing, throughout most of Chinese history, Confucian official ideology performed an integrative function by keeping the diverse groups and localities together within a unified political community. This success in Confucianism's integrative function led the Chinese ruling elites to believe that the most effective way to rule China was to develop an official ideology. Apparently, it also created a psychological need in the Chinese people for a comprehensive ideology.

The functional importance of an official ideology and some specific ideas of Confucianism (such as emphasizing man's rationality, looking at human actions in totality, and regarding education as a means of raising human potential) persisted in the CCP's mode of thinking. The fact that China lacked an "industrial proletariat" made it more necessary for the CCP to stress a correct ideology to proletarianize the peasants. Thus, from the beginning, the CCP accepted Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology which defined and offered a concrete strategy for its political goals, but not a deterministic "law of social development." Mao's emphasis on the creative application of the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" contained the seed for the ideas of his "politics in command."

Mao pushed the traditional tendency of stressing human will to an extreme during his last years, further radicalizing the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism. Mao's thought as the official ideology was extremely radical in the following ways. First, the content—exemplified by the notion of permanent revolution—was more radical than the original doctrine of Marxism-Leninism because it rejected its materialistism and deterministism by stressing human will over the material foundation of society. Second, Mao's thought became the highest authority, often totally disregarding the functional necessities of party organization and society. Third, because Mao was the sole guardian and interpreter of the radicalized official ideology, he and his followers could exploit the official ideology for their own partisan political interests. Fourth, the official ideology was frequently translated directly into official pro-

grams and policies, leaving little room for any concrete policy to depart from the official ideology or to accommodate the practical needs of society; in other words, there was a smaller gap between theory and practice. Fifth, the domain of the official ideology was comprehensive, leaving no human action outside its control. Last, the radicalized official ideology was uniformly imposed on everyone, often backed by the ruthless coercive power of the state and the masses.

When the victims of Mao's purge returned, they initially tried to liberate people's thinking from "the ossified leftist view" by advancing the slogan of "practice is the sole criterion of the truth." It was quite effective in dislodging Mao's thought from the position of official ideology and discrediting the Maoists, including "the two whatevers" faction. But it could not offer a basis for developing a new official ideology acceptable to the Communist leaders, who had not given up their claim to Marxism-Leninism. As popular demands challenged the party, Deng Xiaoping laid down the four principles (Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, and the leadership of the party) as the core values of the party-state. The specific contents of the principles, however, are so ambiguous that they have given party leaders the freedom to crack down on anything they deem unsocialistic. The principle was effective as a control mechanism for the top leaders, but not as the basis for forming a new ideological consensus.

Meanwhile, the regime has been carrying out reforms not out of any ideological motivation but from the practical necessity of economic development. Although such development undoubtedly reflects the aspirations of the Chinese people, as a Communist party, the party must justify the goal of economic development in Marxist terms. But the party has so far been unable to do so except for the simplistic view of "scientific socialism" or "the primary stage of socialism."

Consequently, the main objective and focus of the rectification changed during the campaign. At its initial stage, the regime underscored the need to correct "all erroneous 'left' and 'right' tendencies."^[85] While advocating what amounted to a "struggle on

[85] Ibid.

two fronts," the regime viewed the party rectification and reforms as two separate matters because the rectification was essentially an internal affair, whereas reform was the concern of the state.^[86] However, when the campaign against spiritual pollution, which had been designed to criticize the notion that the early Marxist theories of humanism and alienation could be applied to socialist China, came to an abrupt end in 1984, references to the danger of "right tendencies" disappeared from the official news media, and the emphasis of rectification shifted from the abstract notion of ideological unity to the resolution of such concrete problems as corruption and other issues that most concerned the masses.^[87] The new official formula urged party members to carry out the "rectification on one hand and reform on the other."^[88] At the same time, official criticism of the "left" tendency and the CR were stepped up. All party members were urged to spend a fixed period of time repudiating the CR.

By the time that Premier Zhao Ziyang made a long report on structural reform at the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress, the distinction between rectification and reform had completely disappeared, and the original objective of achieving ideological unity was subordinated to the goals of reform. The reformers invented the phrase "ideologies to guide the functional work" (yewu zhidao sixiang ) in order to stress a functionally oriented perspective and to encourage local leaders to carry out reforms without being constrained by the official ideology. The difference between "ideology" as used in the previous official documents and "ideologies to guide the functional work," although very subtle, was profound. "Ideology" refers to political ideology, comprehensive in applicability, and socialist in content. In contrast, the meaning of "ideologies to guide the functional work" is closer to the notion of "laws and rules" inherent in each functional area, for example, economic laws and rules. In this sense, the term refers to the functional expertise of each functional field rather than a general com-

[86] "Zhengdang Shidian Cankao Cailiao"; Renmin Ribao , 6 December 1983; 12 December 1983.

[87] For the antispiritual pollution campaign, see Thomas B. Gold, "Just in Time! China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," Asian Survey 24(9) (September 1984); Renmin Ribao , 21 December 1983; 1 April 1984.

[88] Renmin Ribao , 1 March 1984.

mitment to socialist ideology. Any inherent ambiguity in the term was later further clarified. It was officially declared that the "correctness of ideologies to guide the functional work" would be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the general task and goal of the party, that is, economic development. By the time some ministries were ready to make a final report on party rectification, the implementation of reforms rather than the unity of ideology became the main criterion for judging achievements of the rectification. For instance, the ministry of coal was evaluated in terms of whether its decisions corresponded with the new tasks of economic development and reforming economic structure.^[89]

Furthermore, the reformers publicly argued that the main objective of the rectification was to facilitate the reforms. Hu Qili declared:

Party rectification is intended to ensure and promote reforms. There can be no doubt whatsoever about this major goal. Apart from reforms, which are the main task of the party-state, the rectification has no other realistic goals or meaning. . . . Without party rectification, which will remove obstacles in ideology, work style, discipline, and organizations, reform proposals, regardless of how good they are, cannot be carried out smoothly and can even produce confusion as a result of distortions and changes.^[90]

If the reformers were prepared to sacrifice ideological orthodoxy, the conservatives were not ready to give up the idea of unifying party members on the basis of a well-defined official ideology. They saw official ideology and reform as completely different matters, more often in conflict with each other than in harmony. In Bo Yibo's view, the rectification of the first batch achieved substantial positive results in correcting the "ideologies to guide the functional work," but no tangible improvement "in the area of unifying the ideology ." Later he publicly repudiated the reformers' view:

Correcting ideologies to guide functional workers is an important aspect of unifying the [official] ideology, and this point is proven correct by practice. . . . [However] when we summarized the results of the first batch of the rectification, [we discovered] that the formula raises some problems. Some units promoted only "the correction of

[89] Ibid., 25 June 1984.

[90] Ibid., 15 July 1985.

the ideologies guiding the functional work," while neglecting other objectives of the rectification.^[91]

Reformers and conservatives agreed that cadre corruption—which was widespread—was a serious problem, deserving attention in the rectification campaign. But they disagreed over what should be considered corruption, how to explain its sudden rise, and how to deal with it. Such conservatives as Bo Yibo and Chen Yun tended broadly to define "unhealthy trends" to include all the undesirable consequences of reforms (including inflation). They also traced "unhealthy practices" to the policy of reform and opening up China to the outside world. In their view, reforms gave rise to the "capitalist philosophy that 'if one does not promote self-interest the sky and earth will collapse,' " and it allowed the Chinese people to "think of money in everything they do in the guise of 'invigorating' and 'reforming.' " By contrast, the reformers tended to define corruption narrowly. To the conservatives the only remedy was to reassert the socialist ideology. Bo Yibo explained: "In some localities and units, . . . leading bodies and party-member cadres have forgotten the Communist Party's lofty ideal of waging a lifelong struggle for the socialist and Communist cause, and for the party's fundamental goal of wholeheartedly serving the people." He prescribed the strengthening of political and ideological work by upholding the four principles and criticizing the "lefitst" as well as the "rightist" views.^[92]

Probably, the issues of reform and rectification were heatedly debated in top-level party meetings. Later, Bo Yibo quoted Hu Yaobang as having said that "only talking about functional work, but not talking about political ideology, will not work."^[93] Meanwhile, as cadre corruption became more pervasive, the original ambitious goal of achieving ideological unity was diluted to combating the "new, unhealthy trends" that structural reforms produced.

Although the conservatives are wrong in believing that cadre corruption can be rectified through ideological education, they are right in tracing corruption to the structural conditions of society. In

[91] Hong Qi , no. 20, 1985, 3–7.

[92] Renmin Ribao , 15 July 1985. For Chen Yun's view, see Hong Qi , no. 19, 1985, 35–37, 40–44.

[93] Hong Qi , no. 20, 1985, 3–7.

the present Chinese economic system, which is neither a free market nor a state-controlled economy, with dual price structures, some party members are in the position of enjoying access to decision-makers, as well as to the resources, capital, and information necessary to get ahead in the market. Official policy encourages party members to lead the masses in becoming rich. Party members, however, are more interested in enriching themselves.^[94] The classic phrase, "being the first to assume responsibility but the last to enjoy the benefits," is often evoked to remind party members of their duties. However, its effectiveness is doubtful in present-day China where "seeking money in everything" is the prevalent mood.^[95]

Nonetheless, the regime continues to urge party members to promote "the revolutionary spirit of serving the people wholeheartedly" and not to "seek personal gain by taking advantage of one's power and position." The incentives the party promises to its members continue to be based on old revolutionary values that have no practical relevance to the social values that the party is trying to establish. The statement, "Our party has no particular interest of its own other than the interests of the working class and the masses of the people," does not resolve the dilemma. As an ideological statement, it completely disregards the fact that the Communist Party as a corporate entity is supposed to have its revolutionary interests defined by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought. Moreover, as a collective composed of concrete individuals, the party has a tendency to develop its own organizational interests.

Consequently, the party is losing its attractiveness to the people, particularly to the young.^[96] As its control diminishes over economic resources, the areas subject to political decisions, and revolutionary idealism in the official ideology, the party is left without much that can attract new members. In fact, some members even want to withdraw from the party in order to concentrate on their careers in society. This disillusionment makes it difficult for the party to maintain strict discipline among its own members.

[94] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1987, 36–39.

[95] Xuexi Yuekan , July 1985, 12–13.

[96] For low-level membership in factories, see Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo Yanjiu , no. 7, 1985, 5–6.

The problems are particularly serious in rural areas where the rural responsibility system has changed the basic rules of the game. Many rural members now engage in more profitable sideline businesses, for examples, hauling cargo, manufacturing, and specialized farming. Hubei reports that one-third of its 1.5 million party members are pursuing new forms of economic activity, which require them to travel outside their residential areas.^[97] As a result, when branches convene meetings, usually less that half the members attend. Those members who skillfully exploit the new opportunities are usually young and capable and with the "most progressive ideology." They form what the party regards as "the backbone of rural party organizations."^[98] They are, however, reluctant to serve as party cadres because they can earn more money in society. For instance, five members of a village party committee resigned from their posts to engage in a sideline business that pays four or five times more than cadre positions. In a survey one-third of Hebei rural cadres thought that being a cadre entailed a loss of income.

While failing to offer a comprehensive official ideology, the regime encourages low-level cadres to continue their ideological work. Yet because of its close association with the Gang of Four and the declining relevance of ideology to daily life, the propaganda apparatus within the party is so demoralized that no one wants to do ideological work. They complain that they cannot work "with an empty mouth" when all their other powers are taken away.^[99] Moreover, there is one supreme irony at the moment: the propaganda workers find themselves preaching the very ideas they had condemned in the past as capitalist ideology.

In the past we talked about "politics in command" and propagated that "first, big and second, public" [yi da er gong ] was socialism; presently distribution according to labor and dispersed management is said to be socialism; in the past the three freedoms and the one guarantee [san zi yi bao ] was criticized as capitalism. Now assigning a contract to each family is said to be socialism. Each view has its own logic, but each is confusing to the people.^[100]

[97] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang , 10 January 1986.

[98] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 2, 1983, 29–30.

[99] Renmin Ribao , 6 October 1984.

[100] "First, big and second, public" refers to the belief that the bigger the size of a commune and the more it owns, the more socialist it is. "The three freedoms and the one guarantee" refers to the policy of permitting the expansion of private plots, free markets, and sideline enterprises, and fixing quotas by individual households. Dangde Shenghuo , no. 16, 1985, 41.

The regime insists that the focus of ideological work is to educate the people about the necessity of reform. Ordinary Chinese people do not need an ideological education on reform because they know what they want, and if they are left alone, they will follow the reforms' direction. The group of people that really needs an ideological education are the party cadres, who dedicated their entire life to building the Maoist version of socialism and whose vested interests are tied to the existing system.

To summarize, unable to develop a coherent ideology, the party leadership tended to emphasize an organizational principle in order to deal with the increasing uncertainty that economic reforms created. This principle justifies a given official policy not in terms of the official ideology, but in terms of the structural legitimacy of the decision-making body and its due processes. Thus, according to the organizational principle, the official ideology is whatever the party decides it to be through the established decision-making procedures. In order to ensure their reform policy, the reformers are recruiting into key leadership positions a group of people whose ability and interests coincide with economic development.

As far as the official ideology is concerned, the following trends are discernable. First, the vocabulary used in the official media has been changing from Marxist categories of "class struggle, revolution, and socialism" to such traditional Chinese phrases as "lofty idealism" and "purpose" (zhongzhi ), which appeal to nationalism, patriotism, and self-imposed noblesse oblige.^[101] Second, as the sources of official ideology diversify, different political groups vie with one another to present their views as the official ideology. Official recognition that each area of society has to be regulated autonomously according to its specific laws and rules has already laid down a foundation for ideological diversity. Third, the existing official ideology is losing its immediate relevancy to the regime's specific programs and policies; the gap between theory and practice is widening. Last, the party's ability to rely on ideological sym-

[101] Renmin Ribao , 1 January 1985.

bols to recruit the members needed for new tasks and to keep the party as a whole disciplined and committed to Marxism-Leninism is diminishing. Eventually, the party has to come out with more tangible incentives—in terms of power and prestige—to make itself attractive to the better-educated section of the Chinese population.