Chapter 8
The Emergence of Yoshida Shigeru

The most important political action Japan took after its surrender was to elect a new lower house on April 10, 1946. The FEC, worried that an early election would "give a decisive advantage to the reactionary parties," asked MacArthur if he shared this concern. He countered that "the new Diet will be the most truly responsive body to the will of the people that has ever served Japan and will provide the basis for a much more representative cabinet."^[1]

Because the Allies had agreed at Potsdam that Japan would consist of the four main islands, with minor islands to be determined later, it became necessary to define Japan's territory for electoral purposes. After consulting Washington, SCAP issued an order on January 29, 1946, that for electoral purposes Japan would exclude the Bonin Islands and the Ryukyu Islands to the south and the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, and Shikotan Island to the north. The denial of Japanese administrative rights in these areas, even with the caveat that this action was not definitive, seemed to weaken Japan's chances of getting them back. Korea was also separated from Japan by MacArthur's order but remained under his supervision for U.S. military purposes until American forces were withdrawn in 1949.^[2]

As the election neared, it was evident that the dominant political figure was Hatoyama Ichiro, the founder of the Liberal Party, who had a mixed record of cooperation with nationalist elements in the prewar period. Yoshida Shigeru was not a candidate and no doubt anticipated that his short spell as a cabinet minister was about to end. The socialists

seemed to promise real change, but their leader, Katayama Tetsu, was an unknown quantity dealing with a turbulent and divided party. The Communist Party had several active and popular leaders, notably the intellectual Nosaka Sanzo, who returned to Japan in January 1946 after a long exile in China, where he had worked with communist leaders, and the dynamic Tokuda Kyuichi, who had spent seventeen years in prison. Then as now the Communist Party was more unified in its policies than the other large parties. Most Japanese, however, remained highly suspicious of communism and the Soviet shadow.

More than 3,000 candidates ran for the 466 seats in the House of Representatives. The electorate of 37 million voters, consisting of all adult men and women, was far larger than in any previous election. Voter turnout was high, with 73 percent of those eligible voting. It was a fair and orderly election. Hatoyama's Liberal Party, which won 140 seats, received a distinct plurality. The Progressive Party won 93 seats; the Socialists, 92; and the small People's Cooperative Party, 14. The Communists won 5 seats, with 3.8 percent of the votes.

The right-of-center parties had thus obtained 246 seats, more than 50 percent of the total. Most of the independents and minor party figures were also conservative, making the final result a distinctly conservative victory. Thirty-nine women were elected, the record for Japan's entire postwar period. Some said that so many women were elected because voters, who could vote for three candidates, gave them a "courtesy vote" as the second or third choice on their ballots. Three hundred seventy-five members of the new house were elected for the first time. The results seemed in an indirect way to affirm support for the new constitution because the communists, who provided the only vocal opposition to the charter, did very poorly. On April 25 MacArthur issued a lengthy press statement asserting that democracy had registered "a healthy forward advance." He said nothing about the constitution.^[3]

The two most dramatic political events of the entire occupation—the purge of Hatoyama and the emergence of Yoshida—occurred in the aftermath of the elections. Widely recognized as Japan's most skilled politician, Hatoyama came out of the election as the leading candidate for prime minister. Sixty-three years old, he was an affable man who was on good terms with all political groups in postwar Japan except the communists. Although his record had been screened and cleared by the Japanese before the election, he soon became the target of intense press interest and suspicion.

On election day the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) of SCAP asked Japanese officials to provide more details about Hatoyama's prewar activities, in particular his 1933 order as education minister dismissing a Kyoto University professor accused of "leftist leanings" and his authorship of The Face of the World , a report by Hatoyama on a trip to Europe in 1938 that made several favorable allusions to Hitler, Mussolini, and the way the Nazis controlled the labor movement in Germany. CIS intimated to the Japanese that if they did not take action on Hatoyama, the occupation would issue an order that would cause them to "lose face."^[4] Hatoyama's confidence was not shaken. His friend Yoshida, who had had some experience dealing with SCAP purge orders, advised him that an explanation about his book might end the matter.

The Japanese began to get nervous, however, and the cabinet decided to seek SCAP approval for Hatoyama's nomination as prime minister. When informal soundings did not work, Yoshida wrote a letter to MacArthur on May 4 stating that Shidehara intended to "recommend to the Throne that Mr. Hatoyama be empowered to form a new cabinet." Whitney replied at once that a directive had already been issued covering this subject. SCAPIN 919, a two-page order, directed the Japanese government to purge Hatoyama because the supreme commander found that he was an "undesirable person" who had "denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime." The order cited a number of specific actions.^[5]

Yoshida later wrote in his memoirs that the purge of Hatoyama "came as a complete surprise to me." Actually he was aware weeks before the purge that Hatoyama was suspect. Yoshida surmised that officials in the Foreign Office were conniving with SCAP officers to bring about Hatoyama's downfall. Yoshida used this opportunity to banish a promising young diplomat, Sone Eki, to a central liaison post in remote Kyushu. Sone, one of the most talented and liberal men in the Japanese government, later resigned and became an important member of the Japan Socialist Party and the Diet. Yoshida did not stop at this one action; he used what became known as the "Yoshida purge" to transfer or demote officials he did not like, especially young diplomats.^[6]

Yoshida and Hatoyama had known each other well for years. Even before he was purged, Hatoyama thought that if something untoward happened to him, Yoshida could take his place. After receiving the purge order, Hatoyama approached Yoshida about the prime ministership. Yoshida consulted with his family, in particular his father-in-

law, Count Makino, and his daughter, Aso Kazuko, all of whom strongly counseled him to stay out of politics. As his daughter said, he did not have the temperament, the money, or the skill at speech making necessary for a politician. His old friend Shirasu told him he would be "a damned fool" to take the job. Yoshida turned Hatoyama down, saying there were other more suitable candidates.^[7]

The political scene was in turmoil. The liberals were paralyzed by a leadership crisis. The second party, the Progressives, were discredited by Shidehara's ineptness as prime minister and all but shattered by purge losses. The third-ranking party, the Socialists, made a bid for power but lacked the strength and finesse to build a coalition. The crisis was compounded by mass disorders in Tokyo that had begun in early April before the election. Thousands of demonstrators marched through the streets demanding food and calling for the departure of the already resigned Shidehara cabinet.^[8] SCAP dispatched armored cars and jeeps to help disperse the demonstrators.

Shidehara turned again to Yoshida and by a combination of persuasion and trickery got him to accept political office. Yoshida said in his memoirs that "the ending of the political deadlock and stabilization of the situation became an urgent necessity" in view of reports that "Japan had been submerged under a sea of red flags." Yoshida's friends and relatives were taken aback. His dose friend and physician, Dr. Takemi Taro, asked if he was confident he could do the job. Yoshida is reported to have replied, in words that became famous in Japan, "History shows that there can be defeat in war and victory in diplomacy." These words reflected more than anything Yoshida's determination and confidence. According to his daughter, Yoshida felt there was a job to be done and that he could do it better than anyone else.^[9]

At a May 13 meeting with Hatoyama, Yoshida agreed to take over leadership of the Liberal Party on three conditions. First, he would not collect money for the party. Second, he would make all government personnel selections. Third, he could resign whenever he wanted. The two seemed to be in agreement on those conditions. Hatoyama later asserted there was a fourth condition—that Yoshida would give up the post of party president whenever Hatoyama or other leaders in the party asked him to quit. This is hardly a condition that Yoshida would have wanted, but at that time he might have been willing to accept it.^[10] Hatoyama remained a power behind the scenes throughout the occupation, despite SCAP's interdiction of political activity by purgees. Neither Yoshida nor Hatoyama could have had any idea in 1946 how long

the occupation would last or that Yoshida would turn into a resourceful, successful politician who wanted to keep his job.

On May 15 after the deal with Hatoyama had been cut, Yoshida, ever the punctilious diplomat, sent a note to MacArthur saying that Shidehara would propose him to the throne as prime minister and asking for the general's approval. MacArthur penciled a note on Yoshi-da's letter, as he often did on incoming mail, saying, "No objection from SCAP. Best of luck. MacA."^[11] In accordance with the old constitutional procedures, which were still in effect, Yoshida received an imperial order on May 16 to form a cabinet. He formally joined the Liberal Party in May 1946 and became chairman of its executive committee. He was elected party president four months later.

Although new to power and politics, Yoshida was a shrewd observer and quick learner. He realized that as prime minister the key to success was to get along well with MacArthur. For Yoshida and most Japanese MacArthur was the voice of the United States and the Allied powers— an impression MacArthur wanted to convey. In time Yoshida grew confident of his ability to deal with the general and learned that SCAP was a loosely organized headquarters, that MacArthur delegated freely, and that SCAP staff sections often disagreed. The one person who really counted was the man at the top. This, too, was a viewpoint that MacArthur encouraged.^[12] Yoshida came to feel little need to yield on every occasion to MacArthur's subordinates. He even took issue with Whitney and the powerful GS, but he was well aware they had MacArthur's ear and confidence. Yoshida won few bouts, but he kept trying. He also came to relish the art of maneuvering within the loose SCAP setup to get around GS.

The new prime minister's first job was to form a cabinet. He had observed this operation many times as a diplomatic official, and in 1936 he had helped his friend and fellow diplomat Hirota Koki form a government. Yoshida decided to keep the Foreign Office portfolio himself, as he did in all four of his cabinets during the occupation, so that he could personally deal with the occupation forces.^[13] Some said he kept the Foreign Office portfolio so that he could continue to live in the stately residence reserved at that time for the foreign minister, the Aso-ka mansion in Shiba. He had a taste for luxury—nice places to live, good food, expensive cigars, a British sedan, and French brandy—and he was well enough off to pay for these things out of his own pocket.

After some initial soundings, Yoshida concluded that a democratic government should seek to carry out the will of a majority of the elec-

torate but would not be workable if it tried to encompass the views of many disparate elements. He therefore rejected a coalition with the Socialists. This policy has guided the Liberal Party and its successor, the Liberal Democratic Party, for more than forty years. No doubt Yoshida was motivated even more by his strong suspicion of the left wing of the Socialist Party.

Most of Yoshida's choices for the cabinet were conservatives, including Ishibashi Tanzan, editor of the Oriental Economist , as finance minister and Tanaka Kotaro, a professor of law at Tokyo University and a Catholic, as minister of education. Neither was a career politician. Cabinet ministers in Japan, except in the unusual situation right after the war, have almost invariably been career politicians who deal with only a few matters of high policy, notably the budget, and leave most of the decisionmaking to subordinates in the bureaucracy.

Finding a minister of agriculture was Yoshida's hardest task. Nobody wanted the job because the food shortage was the most critical problem Japan faced in the months after the surrender. Rice on the black market was fifteen times the official price. The situation was so desperate that the emperor offered to sell some of his imperial treasures to obtain money for purchase of food abroad. Hearing of this, MacArthur asserted that it was his responsibility to obtain food and that the emperor should keep his jewels.^[14]

The food crisis led to great disorder in the streets of Tokyo and to demonstrations against the government. "Give us rice!" became a rallying cry. Riots broke out around the Diet building, and across the street demonstrators attacked the prime minister's official residence. The crisis peaked during a demonstration on May 19 known as "Food May Day" in which 250,000 demonstrators marched around the imperial plaza. Led by Tokuda, they forced their way into the palace demanding to see the emperor. They broke into the kitchen, ostensibly to see if any luxury items were stored there, and presented a petition detailing their grievances to an official of the imperial household. The police finally took charge of the situation.^[15]

Left-wingers were quick to seize the initiative in the chaotic conditions of postwar Japan. They were often the most experienced and dynamic people in mass movements and labor activities. They thought they had the support of the occupation and of the Allied powers. Indeed, many of them looked upon the occupation forces as a "liberation army" that would join with them in casting out the forces of reaction and liberating the masses. Yoshida wrote in his memoirs that if the

farmers had made common cause with the city crowds in May 1946, the situation would have been serious for the government. He added, however, that the thorough land reform program then getting under way was an important remedy for unrest in the countryside.^[16]

Yoshida had trouble filling the cabinet agriculture portfolio. To add to his burdens, the emperor telephoned Yoshida every evening to ask when he would have a cabinet. Yoshida could only reply, "I am trying." The third man Yoshida approached, Wada Hiroo, a well-known agricultural economist and career official in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, accepted the offer after five days of discussions with Yoshida. Although Wada had a record of left-wing activities that aroused considerable suspicion, Yoshida stuck with him, even rejecting Hatoyama's critical advice.^[17]

On May 23 Yoshida was at last able to form a cabinet. An editorial in Asahi on that day asserted that the Yoshida cabinet was like the Shidehara cabinet and that little could be expected of it in advancing Japan's democratic revolution. Mark Gayn of the Chicago Sun lampooned Shidehara and Yoshida as "Tweedledum-san" and "Tweedle-dee-san."^[18]

SCAP did not stand aside during the food crisis. Early in 1946 General MacArthur recommended to Washington that 2.6 million tons of food in rice equivalents be sent to Japan to fill deficiencies and establish a reserve for emergencies. Opposition arose in the FEC to any action that would seem to give Japan better treatment than that received by other needy Asian nations, many of which had suffered at Japan's hands in the war. The commission decided on April 25 that Japan should not receive preferential treatment except for "imports essential immediately for the safety of the occupation forces." On this basis food could be sent to Japan.^[19]

In March and April 1946 the United States provided Japan with 155,000 tons of cereal. In May 1946 former president Herbert Hoover led a food mission to Japan as part of a worldwide survey requested by President Truman. General MacArthur reported to Hoover on May 6 that the food situation in Japan was the worst in thirty years. The general dramatized the situation with a favorite simile: "Japan can only be considered a vast concentration camp under the control of the Allies and foreclosed from all avenues of commerce and trade." Hoover recommended that 870,000 tons of food be sent to Japan. Between May and September 1946, about 600,000 tons of rice equivalents were exported from the United States; this proved to be adequate to stave

off the food crisis. By the summer of 1946 one-quarter of the food being consumed by the Japanese came from Allied sources, including U.S. Army reserve supplies in Japan. SCAP historians estimated that American food aid to Japan in 1946 saved 11 million Japanese from starvation.^[20]

Japan's food problem remained serious for several years. But domestic rice production did begin to improve markedly. Fishing fleets increased in size, and SCAP enlarged their zone of operations in waters off Japan. With the approval of the U.S. government and in spite of much unhappiness in Allied circles, MacArthur authorized a pelagic whaling expedition to Antarctica in 1946, marking the beginning of Japan's intensive whaling activities in the postwar era. By 1948 the food crisis was over. During the postwar years the United States brought in 3.8 million tons of foodstuffs at a cost of $500 million.^[21] U.S. aid, especially food in the early years, had much to do with the receptive Japanese attitude toward the occupation; the carrot was more potent than the stick.

In later years Japanese writers claimed that Yoshida delayed forming his cabinet in May 1946 to put pressure on MacArthur to bring in food. Yoshida reportedly told his associates that when the Americans saw a sea of red flags all over Japan, they would send Japan food. The general is supposed to have called Yoshida to his office in the Dai Ichi building on May 21 and said that "so long as I am Supreme Commander, I will not allow one Japanese to die of starvation."^[22] This naturally elated Yoshida, who told Wada that Yoshida's one condition for forming a. cabinet had been met. This account may well contain several kernels of truth, although nothing in U.S. records substantiates it.

MacArthur was not intimidated by the food demonstrators. On May 20, the day after the huge demonstration in the imperial plaza, he issued a tough statement that "the growing tendency toward mass violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organized leadership, presents a grave menace." If this continued, "I shall be forced to take the necessary steps to control and remedy such a deplorable situation."^[23] His statement was the first sign during the occupation of a strong line against left-wing agitation and violence. It came as a shock to the radicals, who had looked for sympathy from the "liberation army."

Yoshida's next test as prime minister was to navigate the new constitution through the Diet without significant change, as MacArthur and Whitney expected him to do. Although only a "gist" of the new constitution had been made public, the supreme commander said that

"the April election was what I had wanted—a true plebiscite." According to a Japanese study, however, the constitution was only a minor issue in the election, with voters and candidates far more concerned about issues such as food, clothing, and shelter.

The full text of the draft constitution was made public on April 17, 1946, and submitted to the soon-to-expire Privy Council as the first step in obtaining government approval. The Japanese had proposed, and the Americans had agreed, that the new constitution should be written in ordinary Japanese, not in the formal style normally used in legal documents. This has become the standard practice in Japan. To help get the constitution through the Diet, Yoshida appointed a special minister, Kanamori Tokujiro. They spent much of the summer of 1946 answering parliamentary questions by the Privy Council and the two houses of the Diet, which set up special committees to examine the issues. The constitution was finally approved on October 29, 1946, after 109 days of wide-ranging debate.^[24]

The new status of the emperor was the biggest issue in the Diet. Questions elicited a variety of responses. Yoshida agreed with a questioner on June 25 that "the emperor and his subjects are one," that they are "one family." The new prime minister went on, "The national structure of Japan has not been changed by the new constitution." This seemed to mean that the emperor and the people possessed sovereignty together, an interpretation smacking of the old kokutai , where the Japanese people were thought to be one great family with the emperor at its head. Yoshida's view was widely challenged by, among others, President Nambara of Tokyo University, who had just been appointed to the upper house (the House of Peers) to strengthen liberal elements there. Nambara and others argued that the constitution clearly meant that sovereignty resided in the people.^[25] Concepts such as "sovereignty in the people" were evidently confusing to many Japanese, and the idea of one big happy Japanese family was not about to disappear quickly.

The no-war clause came in for much scrutiny. On June 29, in one of the few dramatic interpellations of the entire constitutional debate, Communist leader Nosaka asked Yoshida if Japan should not limit its renunciation only to wars of aggression because war for defense was justifiable. Nosaka added that the causes of war—plutocracy, reactionary politics, feudal land control, bureaucratism—should be uprooted. Nosaka and other questioners shared the view that Japan should join a world federation before it agreed to outlaw war. Many in the Diet seemed to believe in the desirability of abolishing war, but they were

concerned about renunciation by Japan alone. Yoshida replied to Nosa-ka that nations often used the cloak of "defense" to justify war of any sort; by outlawing war in any situation, including war for defense, the new constitution would prohibit this kind of subterfuge.^[26]

The issue, however, remained one in which the Diet showed considerable independence. Ashida Hitoshi, a former diplomat, lawyer, and politician, was chairman of the lower house subcommittee that studied the draft constitution intensively during the summer. His subcommittee proposed a subtle amendment to Article 9 designed to stress Japan's new devotion to international peace.^[27]

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes with other nations.
For the above purpose, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Minister of State Kanamori, who handled constitutional amendments on behalf of the prime minister, evidently thought up this amendment and drafted its wording. The key changes were the introductory phrases inserted at the start of each paragraph, which seemed to limit Japan's renunciation only to war as a means of settling international disputes; war for other sovereign purposes, such as self-defense, would not be prohibited. This change proved to be a Pandora's box. When Ashida proposed it to Kades, he approved it although he realized it meant Japan could use its forces for defense and for purposes other than settling international disputes. Others in GS and many Japanese shared this view, which is now the standard interpretation of amended Article 9. The interpretation is strengthened by general agreement among legal experts that the "right of belligerency" inserted in the constitution at MacArthur's behest is virtually meaningless in international law.^[28] But nothing in Ashida's records, including his detailed diary, throws light on what he had in mind or exactly what his role was.

The Ashida/Kanamori amendment was easily the most far-reaching of any in the constitutional debate of 1946. As interpreted by successive Japanese governments, it spawned a new international concept of a conventional military force that could be used only for defense of the nation's territory but could not have "offensive" weapons and could not engage in collective defense measures, except perhaps inside its own territory. The United States never formally agreed with these limited

interpretations of Article 9, and while recognizing that determining defense policy is Japan's prerogative, the United States has constantly and often vigorously urged Japan to expand greatly its defense power and liberalize its interpretations of Article 9.

A significant amendment with idealistic overtones proposed by the Socialist Party was approved as part of Artide 25 of the constitution: "All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living." This clause has been cited to justify various pieces of progressive legislation.^[29]

Japanese legal experts also used the Diet consideration of the draft constitution to amend several provisions along lines more in keeping with conservative Japanese practice. The most notable was the elimination of earlier SCAP language providing that "aliens shall be entitled to equal protection of the law" and prohibiting any discrimination in social relations on account of "national origin." As amended, the constitution provided in Articles 10 and 14 that the conditions for nationality and guarantee of equal protection applied only to kokumin , or persons of Japanese nationality. Significant protections for aliens, in particular Korean and Chinese minorities, were thus eliminated. One could say, however, that this process of "Japanizing" the constitution, as one Japanese authority called it, facilitated its acceptance by the Japanese people and countered fears that SCAP applied undue pressure.^[30]

GS followed the Diet proceedings closely and sometimes challenged the Japanese on legal interpretations or translation points. The issue of sovereignty gave GS particular concern. Whitney sent MacArthur a memorandum in July complaining about Kanamori's explanation that the constitution would bring no change in kokutai . Whitney's staff was upset that Japanese interpretations of this sort would undermine the new charter. While acknowledging MacArthur's "view that much weasel-worded explanation is offered to persuade the two-thirds majority required" for adoption of the constitution, Whitney was concerned that "the will of the people will be constantly subjugated to the mystic concept of the 'national polity.'" The file copy of this memorandum bears the notation "Read by CINC. No comment." Nevertheless, GS raised the issue of sovereignty with Yoshida, and they quickly agreed on a precise statement in the preamble that "sovereignty rests with the people."^[31]

The occupation authorities satisfied themselves that the new constitution could legally be considered as an amendment to the old one,

thus ensuring legitimacy and preserving continuity from one to the other. In an extensive memorandum on this point, Alfred Oppler, GS's German-born expert on constitutional law, concluded that the emperor possessed unlimited power to initiate constitutional amendments and sanction revisions. Oppler believed that acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration committed Japan to alter its national structure along lines consistent with the declaration.^[32]

The FEC watched the proceedings in Tokyo intently. It had already tilted with MacArthur over its prerogative to pass on the final draft. On May 13, 1946, it decided that the method of adopting the constitution should show that it "affirmatively expresses the free will of the Japanese people." It took heavy pressure from State and Defense to win MacArthur's consent to carry out this directire, which he did on June 21, 1946, in the form of a press release incorporating the words of the FEC policy without, however, making any attribution.^[33] The general showed he was sullen in his attitude toward the FEC but not mutinous.

The FEC made a significant substantive decision on July 2, 1946, when it approved a statement of basic principles that closely followed the U.S. policy paper, SWNCC-228, "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System." Its key provisions for inclusion in the constitution were that sovereign power reside in the people and that a majority of the cabinet members, including the prime minister, be members of the Diet. These changes were inserted in the draft. The FEC policy asserted that "retention of the emperor institution in its present form is not considered consistent with the foregoing general objectives" and enumerated the safeguards that the Japanese would have to apply if they decided to retain the emperor institution. The FEC went along with MacArthur's opposition to releasing this decision to the press on the ground that "the voluntary character of the work now in progress would instantly become clothed with the taint of Allied force."^[34]

The next FEC action, decided on September 25, 1946, reaffirmed that all members of the cabinet should be civilians. It took this action at the urging of the Chinese representative that this position be reaffirmed in light of the adoption of the Ashida amendment to Article 9. MacArthur and the Japanese were unhappy about this decision, which they thought unnecessary because Japan planned to abolish its military. forces. But on the theory that Article 9 might be amended later to permit the establishment of armed forces, the FEC amendment was duly implemented. A new Japanese word for "civilians," bunmin , was invented to capture the right nuance.^[35] No reference to the crime of

treason was included in the draft charter because Japan would have no armed forces and presumably no national secrets to protect.

The final decision by the commission on constitutional issues, on October 17, 1946, specified that between one and two years after the constitution went into effect "the situation with respect to the new constitution should be reviewed by the Diet" and the FEC. MacArthur again opposed publicity, which "would result not only in the collapse of the constitution but would give rise to serious deterioration in the whole Japanese situation."^[36] He informed Yoshida of this decision in January 1947.

Neither the Japanese nor the FEC ever formally reviewed the constitution. Yoshida said later that SCAP had suggested in the summer of 1948 that the Japanese government should review the constitution, but his government had no desire to do so.^[37] The FEC decision formally advising the Japanese that they could review the constitution and even amend it may have mitigated some of the feeling of pressure in Japan. The Diet debate plus FEC interventions resulted in amendment of the preamble and twenty-five articles, the addition of four articles, and the deletion of one, a total of thirty-one changes, beyond a number of minor alterations in wording.^[38]

The enactment of the constitution was Yoshida's greatest achievement during his first term in office. Whatever his initial doubts, he loyally supported the American-made charter. He recognized that "international circumstances" dictated change for his nation. But beyond that he came to believe that new ideas and new institutions could be good for Japan. His advocacy, aided Kanamori and Ashida, erased many of the doubts and frictions that MacArthur and GS had created by their strong-arm methods earlier in the year. The successful launching of the constitution owed much to Yoshida's adroitness.

On October 7 the lower house passed the constitutional revision bill by 342 to 5. The five opponents were all Communists. In the upper house a voice vote was overwhelmingly in favor, with only a few votes of no. The bill thus easily won the required two-thirds vote in favor. The Privy Council mandated its own extinction by approving the bill on October 29 at a session attended by the emperor.^[39]

Only a few days later, on November 3, the constitution was promulgated by the emperor at a large ceremony held in the House of Peers. Both the emperor and the prime minister made statements. According to the emperor, the constitution would enable the nation to establish the "basis of national reconstruction in the universal principles of man-

kind." Yoshida said, "This constitution is indeed one which has been decided by the will of the Japanese people, seeking the reconstruction of their nation on the basis of democratic principles. Moreover, we feel unbounded pride and responsibility in leading the world by our renunciation of war."^[40]

The choice, suggested by Yoshida to MacArthur, of November 3 as the day for promulgation of the constitution was curious because this was the birthday of Emperor Meiji and had been a national holiday for some time. Some in SCAP thought that a day so revered in the old Japan was a poor choice for adoption of a democratic constitution. MacArthur, however, went along with Yoshida's suggestion.

On May 2, 1947, the general wrote the prime minister, "To mark this historic ascendancy of democratic freedom....I believe it particularly appropriate that from henceforth the Japanese national flag be restored to the people of Japan for unrestricted display." Although the flag was not in Japanese eyes the hallowed symbol it was for Americans, this was a welcome gesture.^[41]

On only one occasion since the end of the occupation has the new constitution received searching scrutiny, and that turned out to be not very serious. In 1956 the Diet enacted a bill to set up a commission of distinguished people to recommend possible changes in the 1947 charter. Socialists and leftist parties refused to take part, making dear they thought the operation was a conservative device to undermine the constitution. The commission, consisting of thirty-eight persons including one woman, filed its report in 1964.^[42]

Neither MacArthur nor Yoshida appeared in person, but both filed statements regarding the origins of the constitution. In a letter of December 5, 1958, the general asserted:

A new charter was immediately imperative if the structure of Japanese self-government was to be sustained. The choice was alien military government or autonomous civil government. The pressure for the former by many of the Allied nations was intense, accompanied by many drastic concepts designed to fracture the Japanese nation .... The preservation of the emperor system was my fixed purpose. It was inherent and integral to Japanese political and cultural survival. The vicious efforts to destroy the person of the emperor and thereby abolish the system became one of the most dangerous menaces that threatened the successful rehabilitation of the nation....The suggestion to put an article in the constitution outlawing war was made by Prime Minister Shidehara....Nothing in Article 9 prevents any and all necessary steps necessary for preservation of the safety of the nation. I stated this at the time of the adoption of the constitution.^[43]

This letter illustrated the general's propensity for sweeping statements, historical reinterpretation, and prediction of dire consequences if his views were not accepted.

In a letter dated December 17, 1957, Yoshida said he had believed quick approval of the constitution would help expedite action by the Allies on a peace treaty.^[44] He thought that the no-war clause was MacArthur's idea but that Shidehara probably agreed with it. Yoshida observed that MacArthur had almost religious views about the evils of war. Yoshida stressed that the Diet had been free to discuss the draft charter and make amendments. He noted that occupation authorities had also suggested that the Japanese try the new constitution, see how it worked, and change it if experience showed it was not suitable. Yoshida concluded that from the vantage point of 1957 he saw no reason to change the constitution, even in the respects that had been most discussed, such as Article 9 or the family system.

As part of the final report, twenty-nine members of the commission signed a memorandum concluding in a guarded way that the constitution might not have been adopted on the basis of the free will of the people. As they put it, "In essence, it is clear that the constitution of Japan is the product of a lost war and that it was enacted under the very special circumstances of a military occupation as well as in the very center of the chaotic environment of the people's lives.... It is not too much to say that Japan's future was decided in reality by the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration."^[45] Commission member Nakasone Yasuhiro, then a conservative Diet member from the Liberal Democratic Party, who was a Diet freshman from the Democratic Party in 1947, commented in the report that the liberals and the progressives had agreed to the constitution in 1947 "with deep regret." (Nakasone was prime minister of Japan from 1982 to 1987.)

A majority of the members of the commission favored revision of the constitution in a number of respects, especially Article 9. But the commission made no specific recommendations for change, and the government took no action on the report. In 1985 the Nakasone cabinet did consider some minor modifications in the constitution, but there was little public interest or support. Japanese do not look upon laws and the constitution as having the same fixed and binding quality that Westerners see, and accordingly they do not seem to feel any urgency to amend the constitution, even to correct an apparent contradiction,^[46] as in the case of Article 9 and the existence of military force labeled a "self-defense force."

The 1947 constitution, for all the haste and pressure surrounding its birth, now enjoys almost general acceptance in Japan. It is one of the monuments of the MacArthur-Yoshida era. When the new emperor made his first speech to the nation on January 9, 1989, he pledged to uphold the constitution. His reign had already been designated Heisei, meaning "the achieving of peace."^[47]