Granada

For Spanish Christians the Ottoman Turks were a relatively new arrival in the Mediterranean arena of religion and politics. Their main theater of operations lying in the East, the Turks were an unfamiliar foe whose aggressive expansion filled the Spanish with dread, each Turkish conquest conjuring up images of atrocity and horror.^[27] It is not surprising that this "Turkophobia" sparked rumors of a Mudejar revolt in the Ottomans' favor. In contrast, the Spanish were well acquainted with the Muslims of Granada. For centuries the rulers of Granada, the Maghrib, Castile, and Aragon had engaged in a bewildering complexity of alliances as a means of maintaining an uneasy balance of power. The permeable Granadan frontier had seen the regular passage of both raiding parties and merchants. In Granada there lay little of mystery and

even less to fear. The union of Castile and Aragon deprived the Nasrids of the surest means of ensuring their state's survival, the ability to play off one Christian kingdom against the other.^[28] Cognizant of the fact that the Nasrids were on the defensive, Fernando did not trouble himself over the possibility of an invasion from Granada with an attendant Mudejar rising. This scenario was more characteristic of thirteenth-century than of late fifteenth-century conditions. Only when an Ottoman offensive threatened to overtake western Europe, thereby enhancing the offensive capacity of western Islam, did Fernando give serious consideration to the implications of the Mudejars' ambivalent loyalty. Otherwise, Mudejar dissidence and shadowy allegiance to Granada was little more than one of the accustomed nuisances of frontier life, a thorn in the side perhaps, but not a threat to the state.

The initial years of Fernando's reign were characterized by a continuation of the traditional contacts between Granada and the Crown of Aragon. Until the crusade began in earnest, Valencian merchants, both Christian and Muslim, plied the short-distance maritime trade between the ports of Valencia and Almería. As late as October 1482, the bailiff general and the jurates of Valencia were requesting that the qa'id^[*] (alcayt ) of Almería treat Valencian merchants with favor.^[29] Having recently concluded a pact with the qa'id of Almería and the sultan of Granada, the jurates of Valencia corresponded with Almerian officials and with the sultan himself regarding the affairs of Valencian merchants. In one case, the jurates sought the release of the merchant Perot Miquel, whom the Almerian authorities had unjustly arrested on account of the debts of another Christian merchant.^[30] Mudejars from various morerías continued the trade with Almería that had been monopolized by the Valencian merchant families Ripoll, Bellvis, Xupio, Benxarnit, and Razbayda until the sack of Valencia's morería in 1455. Other Mudejars travelled there to collect the inheritances of deceased relatives or to study Arabic.^[31] Likewise, business drew to Valencia Granadan Muslims such as Abdalla Çalema of Almería, who returned to Valencia, his former home, as an agent of Almería's qa'id and to settle accounts with his own creditors.^[32] The outbreak of war understandably necessitated the restriction of movement between Granada and Valencia, thereby disrupting the flow of trade.

While Muslim and Christian merchants resided comfortably in each other's cities under official protection, both sides engaged in the desultory frontier warfare of the lightning raid and the taking of booty and captives. Although the kingdom of Valencia was not contiguous with the sultanate of Granada, Muslim raiders found that the intervening kingdom of Murcia, mountainous and sparsely populated, provided little impediment to their incursions.^[33] On account of their relatively ex-

posed position, Orihuela, Elche, and Alicante had formed, in 1399, a Hermandad (Brotherhood) with the Mudejar aljamas of the area. Because the Mudejars were known to act as spies for the Granadan almugavers (raiders), one clause of the charter of the Hermandad demanded that the aljamas pay the ransom of any Christian captured by the Muslims. The Christians were to do the same for any captive Mudejar whom the neighboring Castilians might carry off. The Hermandad had dissolved by 1407, so that the Catholic Monarchs found themselves confronted with the same frontier problem. Thus, in 1483 Isabel was compelled to command that action be taken against those Mudejars of Murcia who were bearing arms and abetting Granadan enemies by hiding them in their homes.^[34]

The Granadan Muslims who were able to infiltrate Murcia encountered little hindrance to their entry into Valencia. In September 1481, Fernando felt obliged to act decisively on the matter. He deplored the fact that Muslims were secretly entering the kingdom from Granada and perpetrating many crimes against the persons and property of Christians travelling on the kingdom's roads. The king was aware of Mudejar collusion with the enemy, pointing out that the almugavers were making themselves inconspicuous in the kingdom's large morerías by mixing in with and thereby increasing their populations. Fernando sought to remedy the problem by more tightly controlling the kingdom's roads. Any Muslim seen traveling by unaccustomed routes was to be seized and brought before the bailiff general for judgment. Fernando was particularly interested in the prosecution of the guides (adelils ), presumably Mudejars, captured in the company of enemy Muslims. They were to be handed over to royal officials and punished in exemplary fashion.^[35] These measures would affect only those Mudejars clearly working with the almugavers as spies and guides. Entire morerías , the majority of whose inhabitants probably turned a blind eye to the comings and goings of the Granadan visitors, would escape chastisement. Two years later the kingdom still had its share of Granadan infiltrators. Consequently, Fernando reissued the above orders.^[36]

It may be that this state of affairs was partly responsible for the royal proclamation made in the city of Valencia in 1481. So that they might be easily distinguished from the Christians, the Jews and Muslims were to wear special symbols—blue garments, beards, and tonsures in the case of the latter.^[37] In 1486 Fernando explicitly cited the Mudejars' failure to wear symbols as being a factor which enabled them, incognito, to assault and kidnap Christians. However, the addition of Muslim sexual relations with Christian women to the list of resultant evils suggests that social issues were at least as compelling in the issuance of the royal proclamation.^[38] Royal officials, then, had to contend with two forms of

Muslim dissimulation: the incognito almugaver mixed in with the Mudejar population, and the Muslim in Christian attire concealing his religious affiliation. Detection and capture of almugavers and Mudejar spies would have been extremely difficult.

Nevertheless, there were some successes. In 1480 there were still pending from 1475 cases of Valencian Muslims accused of the crime of collera , the kidnapping of Christians for sale as slaves in Islamic countries.^[39] Mudejars of Nompot, near Alicante, and Aspe were arrested for the same crime.^[40]Almugavers captured in Murcia and in an area as far north as the Vall de Uxó were to be interrogated about their mode of operation and the accessories to their crimes.^[41] Enhanced travel restrictions proved effective. Mudejars traveling on the prohibited backroad linking Tibi to Cocentaina were seized.^[42] Others who had journeyed to Granada without royal license were caught and punished with enslavement.^[43] There was surprisingly little arbitrary seizure of Mudejars by royal officials, which excess Fernando's road controls might well have provoked. In any case, the forays of almugavers with the collusion of Mudejar colleagues seem to have ceased after 1483. This was due to the escalation of the war against Granada, which forced the Nasrids into a defensive posture. Also, the war brought more stringent border controls, so that Murcian Muslims could enter the kingdom only through the city of Orihuela.^[44] Therefore, the war that erected a barrier to commercial traffic also shielded Valencia from the depredations of Granadan almugavers .

During the decade-long crusade against Granada Fernando does not seem to have viewed the Mudejars as a serious military problem. Strategies were not adapted for the eventuality of a Mudejar rising in Granada's favor, nor were preventive measures taken beyond the investigation of rumors. It is true that after the taking of Alhama, in an effort to raise subsidies for the war from the estates of Valencia, the king warned various nobles and prelates that on account of its large Muslim population and its proximity to Granada the kingdom could be in some danger were Granada not conquered.^[45] However, Fernando probably should not be taken too seriously here. Such a warning was a bargaining ploy, not an honest assessment of the real possibilities of a Nasrid counteroffensive. It is possible that at this early stage of the war (January, 1483) Fernando still had the Ottoman threat at the back of his mind. Indeed, it was only with respect to the Turks that Fernando had even suggested the impracticable disarming of all Mudejars. The Nasrids lacked the Turks' offensive capabilities and appeared weak before the combined power of Aragon and Castile. Fernando could afford to be confident that Christian dominance in Valencia would circumscribe Mudejar disloyalty to the few who intrigued with almugavers and cor-

sairs. The royal confidence was well founded, for not a Mudejar sword was unsheathed in defense of the beleaguered Nasrid sultanate.

If reluctant to draw their swords, it may be that the Mudejars were more willing to empty their purses in support of the Nasrids. In December 1486, it was reported that all the morerías of the kingdom, seigneurial as well as royal, were providing the sultan with annual subsidies equaling the value of the hides of all the animals they had slaughtered, probably during the ^cid^[*]al-kabir^[*] , the festival commemorating the sacrifice of Abraham.^[46] Five months later the report was more detailed. Apart from their embassy to the Turks, the Mudejars had been sending financial support to the Nasrids since 1481. In each morería the faqih^[*] was charged with the responsibility of collecting funds from every Muslim. In addition to proffering financial aid, the Mudejars were doing what they could to turn toward the sultan the favor of the Divine. The faqih s were leading their congregations in a prayer that beseeched God to exalt the sultan of Granada and to destroy the Catholic Monarch and his hosts, along with "other ignorant words of blasphemy that offend the ears." The king, exasperated, ordered investigation and, if necessary, punishment. As for the results, the documents are silent.^[47]

It seems reasonable that in lieu of military activity the Muslims of Valencia would have resorted to the collection of funds to assist the monarch of the last Islamic state on Spanish soil. A subject minority, the Mudejars derived moral and spiritual sustenance from the existence of that remnant of al-Andalus to which they were bound by both religion and kinship. José Hinojosa Montalvo suggests that the Nasrid sultan exercised a spiritual leadership over the Valencian Muslims, noting that in 1455 the sultan had expressed his concern about the welfare of the Mudejars by sending to the Valencian authorities a strong protest over the sack of the city's morería .^[48] It is possible that the Mudejars invoked the name of the reigning Nasrid in their Friday prayers. They might have taken it a bit further by praying for his victory over Fernando's armies. Their effort to make contact with the Turks in the Nasrids' behalf, if true, is another indication of their deep attachment to the Granadan sultanate. Still, beyond the inaudible sinking of Muslim hearts, the fall of Granada had no further reverberations in Mudejar Valencia.

The exigencies of the war against Granada did not drastically alter Fernando's Mudejar policy. So long as the Mudejars displayed their obedience by paying taxes and refraining from anti-Christian violence on a large scale, Fernando felt free to pursue a relatively "liberal" wartime policy. Given the size of Valencia's Muslim population, their well-known contacts with Granada, and the Ottoman danger, a policy of cruel repression would not have been exceptional. Two factors probably dissuaded Fernando from resorting to harsh and hasty expedients. One

was the very size of the Muslim population, which cautioned him against an oppression that might have provoked a rebellion more quickly than the feelings aroused by the war itself. The other was his assumption that the nobles could control their own Muslim vassals, and his realization that they would likely oppose any extreme departure from the traditional Mudejar policy. Thus, Fernando exercised discretion and restraint in response to the reports of Mudejar insurgency. A reading of the documentation indicates that the conduct of the war did not significantly disturb Mudejar communities in their local economic and social pursuits.

The war had its greatest impact on the Mudejars' freedom of travel. Royal control of Mudejar movement was nothing new, however. Alfonso V had established in 1418 that Muslims living in areas north of the Jijona River could not travel south of the Jijona without the permission of the bailiff general. This measure was meant to prevent their passage into Granada and Castile.^[49] Although economic fluctuations must be taken into account, since the majority of Mudejars traveled south for commercial reasons, an examination of the number of travel licenses granted each year can be helpful in determining the effects of the war.^[50]

The decrease in the number of licenses granted during the war years 1485 through 1490, although only moderate until 1489 and 1490, reflects a more stringent wartime policy. In 1491, once Almería and Baza had fallen and the capture of Granada seemed certain, almost twice as many licenses were granted as in the busiest prewar year of 1481. This spurt of activity indicates a Mudejar reaction to the bailiff general's relaxation of the previous stringency. This high level continued in 1492 and 1493, except now Mudejars could travel to Castile and Granada as well as beyond the Jijona River. Postwar population shifts stimulated by Fernando's policy (see below) account for much of this movement. The

marked decrease in the number of licenses granted after 1494 can perhaps be attributed to a gradual cordoning off of the former sultanate as an aid to Talavera's missionary efforts. The mere trickle from 1500 through 1502 was due to the revolts in the Alpujarras and to the subsequent conversions of the Muslims of Granada, Murcia, and Castile.^[51] From this it can be ascertained that royal policy in Valencia was precautionary and mildly restrictive rather than unduly repressive. Except for the itinerant retail merchants, most Mudejars would not have found such restrictions especially burdensome.

Fernando's postwar policy was an affirmation of his belief in the continuing viability of Mudejarism. Satisfied that Valencian society had survived the shocks of the Granadan campaigns and the worst of the Ottoman threat without major incident, he saw no problem in encouraging the settlement of Granadan Muslims in Valencia. After all, as the "royal treasure" the Mudejars were a valuable asset to which the Granadans were merely an addition. Muslims from Vera, Almería, and Granada were settled in a number of Valencian localities.^[52] Valencian Muslims with relatives in Granada were allowed to retrieve them for relocation in Valencia.^[53] Even those Granadans who had first opted for the Maghriban sites of Oran and Tunis were given a second chance to become royal vassals in Fernando's kingdom.^[54] For both conqueror and conquered the lure of material benefits outweighed the ideal of life in a land of religious uniformity.

Another aspect of this postconquest "liberalization" was the issuance of licenses for travel to and from the new kingdom of Granada. Freed Muslim slaves who had chosen to remain in Valencia were permitted to return home to Granada to visit relatives and to take care of personal affairs.^[55] Some Mudejars took advantage of the opportunity to enjoy the splendor of Granada's Islamic culture. A Muslim from the Vall de Uxó went there to study Islamic law.^[56] This state of affairs was to last only a few years, after which time Fernando's more balanced approach was thwarted by the extremism of Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros.