Retirement And Reemployment

Monetary compensation for civil servants is only part, albeit a significant part, of the rewards they receive. They also receive various psychological rewards as well as deferred ones. The latter include separation pay and pension and also opportunities to find postretire-

[14] Sase Minoru, Nippon komuin jijo [The Condition of Japanese Civil Servants] (Tokyo: Nihon Jitsugyo Shuppansha, 1978), p. 108.

[15] Asahi shinbun , 26 Mar. 1986 (evening ed.).

[16] Johnson, "Tanaka Kakuei," pp. 1-28.

ment careers—the so-called "second careers" (daini no jinsei ). Two facts make such reemployment opportunities particularly important in the Japanese context: (1) Japanese higher civil servants retire relatively early and (2) their retirement benefits are seldom sufficient.

An Overview Of Resignations

Although a mandatory retirement system did not take effect until March 1985, most civil servants, particularly higher civil servants, retired at relatively early ages. Before focusing on the latter, however, let us first look at the overall picture. Table 34 contains some relevant statistics. Note that this table pertains to the Administrative Service I only. If the other salary schedules were added, the total numbers of resignations in the last column would increase about fourfold in the years covered.

Several things are apparent from the table. First of all, disproportionately large numbers of women resign from the civil service before age twenty-nine. Although, overall, women constitute between 15 and 20 percent of all those who resign, they account for between 36 and 55 percent of those who resign in their twenties. This is no doubt related to the difficulty of combining marriage and career in the early years.^[17] On the other hand, not only has there been a steady decline in the proportion of younger resignees as a whole, but women's share of the below twenty-nine group has dwindled markedly.

Also noteworthy is that in the 1970s the single largest age group among resignees was the thirty-fifty-four-year group. Further breakdown is available for recent years only, and it shows that, although resignations occur more frequently between the ages of forty-five and fifty-four, they also occur in significant numbers between the ages of thirty and forty-four. Another notable trend has to do with a steady increase in the proportion of resignees in the fifty-five-fifty-nine-year group. The proportion of resignees in the over-sixty group remained fairly high until 1985, when a law mandating retirement at age sixty entered into force. If we look at the age distribution of incumbent civil servants in the Administrative Service I, we find that the proportion of the over-sixty group has declined precipitately from 11.9 percent in 1973 to 0.9 percent in 1985.^[18]

In the pre-1985 period, early retirement was a function of cultural norms, pressure from superiors, and financial incentives. A key cultural norm is a strong sense of equality among cohorts: all members of the same entering class in the same ministry share such a keen sense of equality that they cannot function in any hierarchical relationship among themselves. As we have previously noted, when one member of an entering class reaches the pinnacle of the career civil service, administrative vice-ministership, all of the remaining classmates feel compelled to resign. Given the limited opportunities for advancement, however, "noncareer" civil servants seldom face similar constraints.

[17] A survey of 1,598 civil servants who resigned before reaching the age of 30, conducted by the National Personnel Authority in 1964, found that 55.4 percent of women (N = 960) cited marriage as the reason for their resignation. "Marriage" also included childbirth, rearing children, and other family-related matters. The most important reason cited by men, on the other hand, was alternative employment in the private sector (31.2 percent). See Kondo Masaru, "Shokai: Jakunen taishokusha no jittai" [Introduction: the Realities of Young Resignees], Jinji-in geppo 186 (Aug. 1966): 6-9.

[18] Jinji-in, Nenji hokokusho , 1973, in Kanpo [Official Gazette], extra ed., no. 72, 19 Aug. 1974, p. 15; idem., Komuin hakusho , 1987, p. 46.

Pressure from superiors, on the other hand, affects all civil servants, particularly those who are not on the elite track. Known officially as taishoku kansho (encouraging retirement) and unofficially as kata tataki (a tap on the shoulder), this procedure typically involves not only a suggestion that the civil servant in question should retire but also assistance in arranging reemployment for him.^[19] There is an additional inducement: the lump-sum retirement allowance increases by one-third for those who retire in this fashion.^[20]

Available evidence suggests that nine out of ten civil servants who retire after the age of fifty-five do so after receiving kata tataki .^[21] With the introduction of a mandatory retirement system in 1985, however, the proportion of "encouraged resignations" will probably decline sharply. As noted, the new system designates sixty as the mandatory retirement age for most civil servants. Those who are exempt from this rule include physicians and dentists (whose retirement age is set at sixty-five), guards (whose retirement age is set at sixty-three), and other persons who are specifically exempted by the rules of the National Personnel Authority.^[22] Although some observers have expressed fear that the mandatory retirement system may lead to a de facto increase in the retirement age of higher civil servants,^[23] its actual impact on higher civil servants may well be minimal.^[24]

Retirement Of Higher Civil Servants

The single most important factor affecting the retirement patterns of higher civil servants will no doubt continue to be the culturally rooted norm that decrees that one should avoid the embarrassment of taking

[19] Asahi Shinbun "Kanryo" Shuzaihan, Kanryo: Sono seitai , pp. 90 and 130-31.

[20] For example, those who retire after twenty years of service receive 28.875 times their monthly salary at the time of retirement, whereas the regular rate is twenty-one times the monthly salary. For those with thirty years of service, the difference between "encouraged retirement" and retirement at personal convenience is 54.45 times the monthly salary versus 41.25 times the monthly salary. See "Komuin no taishoku teate to nenkin" [Civil Servants' Retirement Allowance and Annuity], Jinji-in geppo 402 (July 1984): 22.

[21] The National Personnel Authority has published statistics on "encouraged resignations" for the years 1968 through 1972 only. They show that their proportion ranged from 89 to 96 percent. See Jinji-in, Nenji hokokusho , 1969-1973.

[22] Jinji-in, Komuin hakusho , 1982, pp. 44-45.

[23] Kato, Kanryo desu, yoroshiku , pp. 180-81. Kato is a former higher civil servant in the Home Ministry.

[24] This assessment was given to the author by Nakajima Sachiko, a counselor (sanijikan ) in the Appointments Bureau (Nin'yokyoku ) of the National Personnel Authority in an interview on 7 June 1985.

orders from one's peers. With rare exceptions, therefore, the promotion of a member of one's entering class to the position of administrative vice-minister will continue to trigger resignations by his classmates; by the same token, the failure to be promoted to the position of bureau chief or its equivalent with one's classmates is a signal that the time for retirement has arrived, even if no kata tataki may have occurred.

For these reasons the average age of higher civil servants at various stages in their career suggests when most resignations are likely to occur. Table 35 shows that the average age has steadily increased across the board over the years. The sole exception is section chiefs: according to the table, their average actually decreased by 1.4 years between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s. The average age of senior section chiefs in 1986, however, was 2.2 years higher than that of all section chiefs.

If we look at bureau chiefs, we find that their average age increased by nine years between 1949 and 1986. Equally striking is the steady aging of administrative vice-ministers: whereas they were still in their late forties in 1949 and 1954, they were in their late fifties by 1986. More relevant for our purposes is the average age of newly appointed administrative vice-ministers, for that is the age when the remaining

members of their respective entering classes retire. We have data for three time periods: 1972-73: 53.6 (N = 34), 1981-83:56.5 (N = 42), and 1984-87:56.0 (N = 50).^[25]

What all this suggests is that the average retirement age of higher civil servants has steadily increased over the years. As we saw in chapter 5, nearly all careerists advance to the rank of section chief, hence the moment of truth arrives just before promotion to the rank of bureau chief. For, given the nature of the bureaucratic pyramid, only a handful of positions are available at this exalted level. Those who are passed over must leave, and they are in the majority. It is not surprising, then, to learn that the average retirement age for all higher civil servants approximates the average age of bureau chiefs: it was 52.9 in 1972-73 and 55.2 in 1985.^[26]

Reemployment Patterns

Even if retirement benefits were adequate, those who retire in their fifties would find it necessary to seek reemployment or something useful to do. For most people, however, the retirement benefits are far from adequate. Until 31 March 1986, for example, a civil servant with thirty years of service was entitled to a separation allowance amounting to about four and half years of pay and an annuity totaling 55 percent of salary.^[27] Effective 1 April 1986, a new system of annuities went into effect; under its extremely complicated provisions the retirement benefits of civil servants were expected to increase slightly.^[28] Most higher civil servants, therefore, seek reemployment either by choice or by necessity.

[25] The figure for 1972-73 is from B. C. Koh and Jae-on Kim, "Paths to Advancement in Japanese Bureaucracy," Comparative Political Studies 15, no. 3 (Oct. 1982): 304, table 6. The figures for the 1980s were calculated from a data set compiled by the author from the following sources: Kankai , May 1981-Sept. 1987; Asahi shinbun , May 1986-Sept. 1987; Yomiuri nenkan bessatsu, bun'ya betsu jinmei roku [Separate Volume Supplement to Yomiuri Yearbook, Who's Who by Fields], 1985 (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1985); Seikai kancho jinji roku, 1987-nenban ; ibid., 1988-nenban .

[26] See Koh and Kim, "Paths to Advancement,' p. 304, for the 1972-73 average; for the 1985 figure, see Jinji-in geppo 425 (June 1986): 5.

[27] "Komuin no taishoku teate to nenkin," p. 22. The computational formula for annuity consists of multiplying the retiree's last salary by a rate determined by his length of service. For the first twenty years the rate is 0.4. Each additional year thereafter earns a credit of 0.015. The maximum rate is 0.7. The amount of separation allowance is a function of both length of service and the reason for separation. A civil servant who resigns voluntarily after twenty years of service will receive twenty-one times his last monthly salary, whereas a thirty-year veteran will get 41.25 times his last monthly salary.

There are a number of options for those seeking postretirement jobs. One is to find employment in the private sector. This move from the ostensibly exalted position of a higher civil servant to an employee of a private, profit-making firm is known as amakudari (descent from heaven).^[29] As Gerald L. Curtis notes, however, what happens may not necessarily be descent but ascent; the former bureaucrat may actually enjoy more affluence and prestige than ever before.^[30]

The second option is to land a job in a public corporation, known collectively as "special legal entities" (tokushu hojin ). Unlike the first option, this does not involve any legal restrictions. That is to say, there is no need to seek permission. The third option is to become a member of the Diet, which of course requires winning an election.^[31] Although there are other possibilities, such as teaching, research, and working for a local-government body, the three options noted above seem most important. Let us examine them in more detail.

Amakudari

As noted, amakudari in a narrow sense is subject to some legal restrictions.^[32] Article 103 of the national public-service law stipulates a

[28] For a comprehensive review of the new system, see Kokka Komuin Nenkin Seido Kenkyukai, ed., Kokka komuinto no shin kyosai nenkin seido no shikumi [The Plan of the New Cooperative Annuity System for National Civil Servants and Others] (Tokyo: Zaikei Shohosha, 1986) and Jinji-in, Taishoku Teate Nenkin Seido Kenkyukai, ed., Komuin no tameno taishoku teate nenkin gaidobukku [Retirement Allowance and Annuity Guidebook for Civil Servants] (Tokyo: Okurasho, Insatsukyoku, 1986). Under the new system, civil servants are subject to a dual system of annuities. First, they are required to enroll in kokumin nenkin (citizens' annunity plan) along with all other citizens; this requires monthly payment of premiums. Second, the civil servants continue to participate in kyosai nenkin (cooperative annuity plan), which, too, requires monthly contributions on the part of its participants. The formula for computing benefits, however, has become so complicated that at least five different tables need to be used; in addition, the calculation of the average monthly salary during one's entire civil-service career, which becomes the constant in the equation, is beyond the capability of individuals. It will be done by computers in the Social Insurance Agency. In computing the average monthly salary, adjustments are made to neutralize the effects of inflation and other factors.

[29] For an informative analysis of this and related matters, see Johnson, "The Reemployment of Retired Government Bureaucrats in Japanese Big Business," pp. 953-65.

[30] If that is the case, then a more accurate term would be amaagari (ascending to heaven). See Gerald L. Curtis, "Big Business and Political Influence," in Vogel, ed., Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making , p. 44, no. 32.

[31] Johnson, "The Reemployment of Retired Government Bureaucrats," pp. 953-54; Ino Kenji and Hokuto Man, Amakudari Kanryo: Nihon o ugokasu tokken shudan [Bureaucrats Who Descend from Heaven: A Privileged Group That Moves Japan] (Tokyo: Nisshin Hodo, 1972), pp. 91-92.

two-year moratorium on the reemployment of retired civil servants in profit-making enterprises if the government organs in which they have served during the preceding five years have had a "close connection" (missetsu na kankei ) with such enterprises. However, the article adds that this prohibition shall not apply should a recommendation for exemption by the government organ concerned be approved by the National Personnel Authority.^[33]

Depending on how it is interpreted and applied, then, article 103 has the potential of preventing conflicts of interest. In 1963, the Diet appended a requirement to article 103: the National Personnel Authority was enjoined to report annually to both the Diet and the cabinet regarding the number and details of all the exemptions it granted in the preceding year. Officially known as the "Annual Report on Approval of Employment in Profit-Making Enterprises" (Eiri kigyo e no shushoku no shonin ni kansuru nenji hokoku ), the report has been dubbed the amakudari white paper by the mass media. Table 36 presents summary statistics from these reports in selected years.

Note that the numbers shown in the table refer to cases rather than individuals. From time to time, an individual may seek approval for employment in more than one position; occasionally, therefore, the number of cases exceeds that of individuals. Even though table 36 displays statistics for selected years only, we shall also refer, in the following discussion, to the years not covered in the table.

First, we can see a marked increase in the total numbers over the years. The 1986 total is almost double that of 1965. There was actually a notable decline in 1986 from the previous year, when the total had climbed to 320. Second, it is remarkable that a handful of ministries have dominated the scene throughout the period; although the five ministries have continued to account for an overwhelming majority of all the cases, their degree of dominance actually decreased in the 1970s compared with the late 1960s. Beginning in 1977, the Ministry of Posts and Communications joined the five ministries listed in the table as a

[32] In a narrow sense, amakudari refers to the reemployment of retired government officials in private, profit-making enterprises only. Their reemployment in public corporations is called yokosuberi (side slip). However, the broad meaning of amakudari encompasses both. Although Johnson makes the distinction, Ino and Hokuto do not. For a reference to yokosuberi , see "Shinso or saguru: Kareinaru amakudari no urade ugomeku yokubo" [In Search of Truth: The Desire That Squirms Behind the Splendid Descent from Heaven], Kankai , May 1982, p. 140.

[33] See paragraphs 2 and 3 of art. 103 of the law in Jinji-in ed., Ninmen kankei horeishu , 1984 ed., p. 33.

major player in the game. In 1986 it surpassed both MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture, with twenty-eight exemptions.

Third, the Ministry of Finance has been the indisputable leader: in all eight years covered in the table, it was number one, accounting for an average of 24 percent of the total exemptions. Although the number-two position goes to MITI, the other ministries are not very far behind. What all these ministries have in common is their close linkage with the strategic sectors of the Japanese economy. The close patterns of interaction between them and their respective clientele groups make retiring higher civil servants valuable assets to their prospective employers in the private sector: not only do the retirees possess managerial ability and substantive expertise but they can also measurably facilitate interactions with the government bureaucracy. To ascertain whether the National Personnel Authority actually performs the function of obviating or, at least, minimizing conflicts of interest, we need to know details of specific cases, which are not available. Fragmentary evidence suggests, however, that the authority is not a rubber stamp: in the 1970s, it rejected between 3.0 and 7.4 percent of the requests for exemption.^[34]

Table 37 discloses another notable trend in amakudari : the growing number of technical officials. Whereas they accounted for only four of

[34] Murobushi Tetsuro, "Kokyu kanryo—riken no kozo" [Higher Civil Servants: The Structure of Interests], Sekai , Feb. 1980, p. 56.

every ten cases in 1965, their share nearly doubled by 1970. After declining slightly in 1975, the proportion of technical officials surpassed that of administrative officials in 1980. Their lead widened in 1985. All this suggests that a major reason that former government bureaucrats are hired by private firms may be the substantive expertise they bring to their jobs in addition to other assets.

As noted, even though all the cases included in the annual amakudari white papers pertain to former bureaucrats with the rank of section chief or its equivalent and above, only a handful of them actually occupied key positions in the headquarters of the ministries and agencies. Of the 318 persons who were granted exemptions by the National Personnel Authority in 1985, for example, only 49 (15.4 percent) were in that category (honshocho kacho shoku ijo ). Of this number, 13 held the rank of bureau chief or above.^[35] In 1986, 38 (15.3 percent) of the 248 persons receiving exemptions were in the same category, of whom only 7 had held the rank of bureau chief or above.^[36]

To examine briefly the destinations of the 20 highest-ranking retirees in these two years, the largest proportion of the group (7, or 35 percent)

[35] Asahi shinbun , 28 Mar. 1986.

[36] "Showa 61-nen eiri kigyo eno shushoku no shonin ni kansuru nenji hokoku" [1986 Annual Report on Approval of Employment in Profit-making Enterprises], Jinji-in geppo 437 (June 1987): 6.

went to banks, all but one being appointed as advisers (komon ). The lone exception became vice president (fuku todori ). In fact, komon is the title most commonly given to these people, accounting for 8 of the 20 titles. Technically, they are not of the directorial rank (yakuin ); therefore, approval of reemployment is believed to be almost pro forma. In most cases, they will be elevated to directorial positions after a lapse of two years. Should a change in status occur earlier, however, approval by the National Personnel Authority is required de novo. Exactly half of the group landed yakuin positions immediately: one presidency (torishimari yaku shacho ), one vice-presidency (fuku todori ), two managing directorships (senmu torishimari yaku ), one executive directorship (jomu torishimari yaku ), four directorships (riji ), and one consulting directorship (torishimari yaku sodan yaku ). Also noteworthy is that a recently privatized company, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (formerly the Japan Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, or Nihon Denshin Denwa Kosha), hired 5 of the top group, 1 of them as an executive director and 2 as directors.^[37]

Inasmuch as the Ministry of Finance is the single largest source of amakudari , let us examine the destinations of its high-level retirees. In 1984, 29 persons at the rank of section chief or above in the ministry (honsho kacho-kyu ijo ) retired. Of this total, only 1, a former administrative vice minister, did not seek immediate reemployment. The destinations of the remainder were as follows: government-affiliated financial institutions, 6; public corporations, 9; private banks, 2; private firms, 8; licensed tax accountants (zeirishi ), 3. In terms of position titles, 16 became directors, and 5 became advisers. On the other hand, of those who entered the private sector, only a few landed jobs in what may be described as first-rate companies, which included Mitsui Trust Bank, Japan Air Lines, and Mitsubishi Shoji.^[38]

The number of retirees in the same category in 1985 was 35. Of this total, 1 died and 1 was preparing to run for the House of Representatives in the next election. Five became licensed tax accountants, and the remainder went to either public corporations or private banks and firms. Although 11 became directors, none was hired by a really prestigious firm. Officials in charge of finding reemployment for the Finance Ministry's retirees complained of a growing scarcity of suitable landing spots; noting they had to "lower their heads" to find reemployment

[37] For destinations of these and other high-ranking retirees, see Asahi shinbun , 28 Mar. 1986, and 28 Mar. 1987.

[38] Ibid., 19 Feb. 1985.

positions for their retirees, they pointed out that it was difficult to call their ministry a "first-rate government agency" (ichiryu kancho ) any longer.^[39]

The situation in 1986, however, was far from gloomy. All but two of the Finance Ministry's 32 high-level retirees found employment in that year. The 2 who did not apparently chose not to seek immediate reemployment; one of these was former administrative vice-minister. Although the destinations of the 30 varied widely, the largest number, 7, went to public corporations. Three went to private banks, 2 to insurance companies, and 5 to other private firms. Three went into private practice as either an attorney or a licensed tax accountant. One entered the Judicial Training Institute with the aim of entering the legal profession. Among the more notable destinations were the Tokyo Stock Exchange (executive director), the Mitsubishi Trust Bank (adviser), the Japan Foundation (executive director), and the Sumitomo Life Insurance Company (adviser).^[40]

All in all, the record of the Finance Ministry in finding postretirement employment for its elite-track bureaucrats seems solid. It is plain that the ministry remains the premier government agency insofar as amakudari is concerned. No other ministry or agency, for example, has produced so many directors and presidents of banks.^[41] As we shall see below, moreover, the Finance Ministry is the leading source of candidates for the Diet as well.

Yokosuberi

The movement from ministry or agency to a public corporation is known as a "side slip" (yokosuberi ).^[42] Most writers, however, use the term amakudari to encompass this form of reemployment by retired officials as well.^[43] Unlike amakudari as strictly defined, yokosuberi allows the retired government bureaucrat to remain in the public sector; what happens is equivalent to a transfer from the mainstream of the

[39] Ibid., 16 Feb. 1986.

[40] Ibid., 8 Mar. 1987.

[41] For examples of and statistics pertaining to amakudari of retired Finance Ministry bureaucrats to the various banks and financial institutions, see Takamoto, Okura kanryo nokeifu , pp. 159-95; Asahi shinbun , 22 May 1986; "Kasumigaseki konhidensharu," Bungei shunju , July 1986, p. 163.

[42] Johnson, "The Reemployment of Retired Government Bureaucrats," p. 953.

[43] Although Chalmers Johnson differentiates between the two terms in his Asian Survey article cited above, he blurs the distinction in his study Japan's Public Policy Companies (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978). In the latter Johnson defines amakudari as the "practice of employing retired government officials as chief executives or members of boards of directors of public and private corporations" (p. 5, emphasis added). Elsewhere in the study, however, he mentions the difference between the two terms (p. 102). For another definition of amakudari that subsumes yokosuberi , see "Shinso o saguru: Kareinaru amakudari," p. 144.

government to its periphery, for he will be reemployed by one of the hundred-odd "special legal entities." In 1980, there were 111 such entities, of which 3 were kosha (public corporations), 16 were kodan (public units), 19 were jigyodan (enterprise units), 10 were koko (public finance corporations), 2 were tokushu ginko (special banks), 2 were kinko (depositories), 1 was eidan (corporation), 11 were tokushu kaisha (special companies), and the remainder were called by a wide variety of names. These entities employed nearly a million persons, of whom fewer than 800 were in executive positions (yakuin ).^[44] In 1985, however, 2 of the 3 kosha were privatized, and the third was scheduled to follow suit in 1986.^[45]

Because yokosuberi is not subject to any legal restrictions, the government does not publish any comprehensive data on it. Nonetheless, a labor federation, to which labor unions comprising employees of special legal entities belong, collects data on its own and publishes annual reports. According to its report published in 1987, 379 of 489 yakuin in eighty-three special legal entities it studied in 1986 were retired higher civil servants. This amounted to 77.5 percent of the total. MITI had produced the largest number of the subgroup (N = 54), followed by the ministries of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (N = 46), Finance (N = 34), and Construction (N = 30).^[46]

Yokosuberi differs from amakudari , narrowly construed, in another sense: the same individual can experience it more than once. The retired higher civil servant who moves from one yokosuberi post to another, collecting generous separation allowances in the process, is known as wataridori (migratory bird). According to information disclosed by opposition-party members in the House of Representatives in May 1969, of 363 retired higher civil servants serving as yakuin in 108 special legal entities at the time, 75 (20.7 percent) had experienced yokosuberi three times or more. Of the latter, 15 had experienced it four times, and I five times. Separation allowances collected by these people during each transition were equal to 65 percent of their total earnings

[44] For a complete list and definitions of these "special legal entities," see Gyoseikanri benran [Handbook of Administrative Management], 1980 (Tokyo: Gyosei Kanri Kenkyu Senta, 1980), pp. 28-39. The English translations were taken from Johnson, Japan's Public Policy Companies , pp. 5-7 (Glossary of Japanese Terms).

[45] See "Shinso o saguru: NTT, min'eika no sono ato" [In Search of Truth: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone in the Wake of Privatization], Kankai , May 1986, pp. 164-73.

[46] Asahi shinbun , 5 Apr. 1987.

during their tenure in each job. Although the percentage was lowered to 45 in 1970 and to 36 in 1978, the comparatively high salaries of yakuin in public corporations make the separation allowance quite generous.^[47] In 1986, about a quarter of the 379 former bureaucrats occupying leadership positions in the special legal entities were wataridori .^[48]

A leading example of wataridori is Funayama Masakichi, who retired as administrative vice-minister of the Finance Ministry in 1953. He first served as a director of the Bank of Japan and then became the deputy governor of the Japan Monopoly Corporation. His next job was with the Japan Export-Import Bank, where he was deputy governor. Finally, he was appointed the governor of the Smaller Business Finance Corporation. The separation allowances he had collected prior to his last appointment amounted to over 27.5 million yen, a considerable sum in the 1950s and 1960s.^[49]

Entering Politics

The option of running for a seat in the Diet is available only to the select few among retired higher civil servants. Whereas amakudari , broadly defined, is typically arranged by the prospective retiree's ministry or agency, running for election is something one must arrange on one's own. Because virtually all retired higher civil servants run as candidates of the Liberal-Democratic party, they find it necessary to affiliate themselves with one of the factions within the party in order to win official endorsement. Factional affiliation is also necessary to help finance the campaigns, which cost astronomical sums.

As we saw in the preceding chapter, in the double election of 6 July 1986, a total of 80 former higher civil servants were elected to the House of Representatives, accounting for 23.3 percent of the 300 successful LDP candidates. Of the 72 LDP candidates who were elected to the House of Councillors in the same election, 24 (33.3 percent) were former bureaucrats. Another former bureaucrat who ran as a Democratic Socialist party candidate was also elected to the upper house.^[50]

[47] Murobushi, "Kokyu kanryo," pp. 59-60. The formula for calculating the amount of separation allowance is as follows: monthly salary at the time of separation × number of months served × 0.36. Sekiguchi Takeshi, Komuin tengoku! ! [Civil Servants' Heaven] (Tokyo: Aro Shuppansha, n.d.), p. 161. Although this book does not show any publication date, it appears to have been published in 1978. The copy that I used had been purchased by the U.S. Library of Congress on 14 July, 1978.

[48] Asahi shinbun , 5 Apr. 1987.

[49] Ino and Hokuto, Amakudari kanryo , p. 22; for other examples of wataridori , see ibid., pp. 22-24, and Sekiguchi, Komuin tengoku! !, pp. 162-63.

[50] Asahi shinbun , 7 July 1986 (evening ed.) and 8 July 1986.

The broad picture given above, however, pertains to all former higher civil servants. Table 38 is therefore aimed at showing what happens to those retired civil servants who elect the political option. It is plain that throwing one's hat into the political arena is not as easy as it sounds: in the 1986 election, only 4 of every 10 former bureaucrats who had not previously been elected to the Diet achieved their goals. The probability

of success varied inversely with age: those in their fifties were more than twice as likely to succeed as those in their forties and thirties.

Although the relationship between rank and the probability of electoral success is somewhat murky because of missing data, the two nonetheless seem to covary to an appreciable degree. Whereas 7 of the 9 persons who had attained the rank of division chief or higher won their bids, only 2 of the 10 former section chiefs did so. On the other hand, the success rate of those who had not even attained the section-chief rank is quite good, although because of the small numbers involved, caution is called for in drawing any conclusions.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the ministries that contribute most to amakudari also produce the largest number of candidates for the House of Representatives. The success rates of the top two, Finance and MITI, however, are mediocre at best.^[51]

Let us now consider briefly the situation regarding the House of Councillors. Of the twenty-five former bureaucrats elected to the upper house on 6 July 1986, six were freshmen. A comparison of the backgrounds of the six freshmen with those of the eleven novice members of the House of Representatives yields some interesting results. To begin with similarities, all are Liberal-Democrats. And, by a remarkable coincidence, all are graduates of the University of Tokyo. However, the upper-house members are considerably older: their average age is 58.2; in fact, half are in their early sixties. By contrast, the average age of the lower-house group is 50.4, and none is in his sixties. Another striking difference has to do with their former bureaucratic ranks: whereas only three of the eleven representatives had attained the rank of bureau chief or above, all of the councillors had done so. Half of the latter had retired as either administrative vice-minister or director general (chokan ).^[52]

An Assessment Of Reemployment Patterns

As noted, the need for reemployment of retired higher civil servants is rooted in the twin realities of early retirement and insufficient retire-

[51] For a discussion of the motives of young Finance Ministry bureaucrats who resign to run for elective offices, see Kuribayashi, Okurasho shukeikyoku , pp. 203-24.

[52] Biographical data on the candidates, both successful and unsuccessful, were gleaned from Tsuchiya Shigeru, "Kanryo shusshin rikkohosha sotenken" [A Complete Examination of Candidates Who Are Former Bureaucrats], Kankai , Apr. 1986, pp. 160-71; May 1986, pp. 142-51; and June 1986, pp. 145-57; Asahi shinbun , 7 July 1986 (evening ed.) and 8 July 1986. Of the twenty-five former bureaucrats elected to the upper house in July 1986, nine had served as administrative vice-ministers and two as directors general (chokan ). Only one had retired as a section chief. The remainder had been bureau chiefs. In terms of educational background, twenty were graduates of the University of Tokyo, four were graduates of Kyoto University, and one was a graduate of a technical high school.

ment benefits. Of the two, the former may be a more potent cause of amakudari , broadly defined, than the latter. Unless the practice of early retirement ceases, therefore, the need for reemployment will persist. However, there are no signs that the practice will change to any notable degree.

Hallowed by tradition, early retirement is sustained by the interaction of organizational dynamics and cultural norms. The progressive diminution of positions in the upper levels of the organizational pyramid dictates a pruning of the ranks among the old-timers. Moreover, a strong sense of equality among peers defined by the year of entry expedites resignations by those who fall behind leaders in the unacknowledged but nonetheless real race toward administrative vice-ministership.

Amakudari in a narrow sense, that is, reemployment by a private firm, can occur in three distinct ways. The most common mode is for the ministry or agency to take charge and arrange a landing spot for the retiree. Another mode takes the form of what the Japanese call "scouting." In this mode it is the private firm that takes the initiative: the firm seeks out a higher civil servant who has the kind of expertise, experience, and contacts that it needs most. In a variant of this mode, a firm may ask a ministry or agency to recommend a suitable candidate. In a third and final mode, the civil servant is rewarded for past services rendered to a firm; the initiative in such cases usually emanates from the retiring civil servant himself. All three modes may require approval by the National Personnel Authority.^[53]

No matter what form it may take, amakudari entails mixed consequences. On the positive side, it contributes to the optimal utilization of talent, facilitates communication between government bureaucracy and private business, and "enhance[s] the effectiveness of administrative guidance."^[54] On the negative side, amakudari may

[53] Ino and Hokuto, Amakudari kanryo , pp. 169-71. According to Ojimi Yoshihisa, a former administrative vice-minister of MITI, "From the point of view of private companies, there is a need for these men [retired higher civil servants]. Requests frequently come to the personnel division of the ministry. Thus, placement is usually taken care of by the personnel division." See Ojimi, "A Government Ministry," p. 110.

[54] Johnson, "The Reemployment of Retired Government Bureaucrats," p. 964. See also Curtis, "Big Business and Political Influence," p. 45; Kazuo Noda, "Big Business Organization," in Vogel, ed., Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making , p. 133; Akimoto Hideo and Kanai Hachiro, "Taidan: Komuin rinri to 'amakudari' mondai o megutte" [Conversation: Concerning the Ethics of Civil Servants and the Problem of "Descent from Heaven"], Jinji-in geppo 377 (June 1982): 4; Hayashi, Nihon Kanryo kenkoku ron , pp. 61-71.

compromise the independence and integrity of government bureaucracy, breed corruption, and confer unfair advantages on the firms that hire retired higher civil servants. It also has demoralizing effects on those members of the private firms whose promotional opportunities are undercut by the lateral entry of outsiders. To a large extent, however, the potential for corruption is offset by the modus operandi of Japanese organizations, which, by accentuating consensual decision making and diffusing authority and responsibility, makes it difficult for any individual to do favors for clientele.^[55] As we have seen already, this is borne out by the actual record. Not only is corruption among incumbent higher civil servants rare, but the behavior of retired officials who have landed amakudari positions has not been marred by any scandals.^[56]

The entry of former bureaucrats into the political arena via the ballot box, too, can be viewed from the standpoint of resource utilization. The expertise and experience they bring to their roles as members of the Diet can theoretically enhance the latter's capability to formulate policy and monitor policy implementation. On the other hand, the necessity to plan ahead—to find a patron, to align oneself with a faction, and to build a political base, no matter how rudimentary it may be—may conceivably interfere with a dispassionate discharge of bureaucratic responsibilities. The potential for compromising the bureaucrat's objectivity and neutrality is ever present.

On balance, then, the reemployment of retired higher civil servants is neither an unmitigated evil nor a cause for satisfaction. It represents a pragmatic response to real needs of individual bureaucrats, the government bureaucracy as a whole, and private business.^[57] So long as the needs remain, the practice is likely to persist. The real challenge for the Japanese government remains how to prevent flagrant abuses, how to minimize patent conflicts of interests, and how to retain the trust and confidence of its citizens in the basic integrity of higher civil servants.^[58]

[55] Akimoto and Kanai, "Taidan: Komuin rinri," p. 5.

[56] This last point is stressed by a former bureau chief in the National Personnel Authority. See Shima Yotsuo, "Kaisobun Amakudari mondai' arekore" [Reminisciences: Aspects of the "Problem of Descent from Heaven"] in Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei sanjunen no ayumi , p. 394.

[57] Johnson, "The Reemployment of Retired Government Bureaucrats," p. 965.

[58] In a survey of a national sample of 2,445 adults conducted by the prime minister's office in 1973, 65 percent of the respondents thought retired civil servants were either well off or relatively well off, citing their annuity, separation allowance, and reemployment in that order. Thirty-seven percent disapproved of amakudari , and 31 percent endorsed it. Of those who disapproved of the practice, 63 percent said it should not be allowed even after a lapse of several years. See Sorifu, Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo, Komuin ni kansuru seron chosa, Showa 48-nen 9-gatsu [Opinion Survey Concerning Civil Servants, September 1973] (Tokyo: Sorifu, Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu, 1973), pp. 10-13 and 20-21.