The New Realism
Side by side with this dark assessment, recent American political leaders have generally received high marks for what is viewed as their "realistic," "sober," "sensible," "constructive" approach to U.S. foreign policy. While their policies were seen more in terms of necessity than virtue, Soviet Americanists had high personal regard for former President Nixon and especially for Secretary Kissinger.
Despite the initial suspicion with which they viewed his election in 1968, Richard Nixon's anti-Soviet past was not without its bright side. Thus in a November 1970 symposium Arbatov told his colleagues at the USA Institute about the argument heard in the United States which suggests that
the fact that the people now in power enjoy a solid reputation as conservatives, figures of rigidly anti-communist convictions, has its positive aspects since people of that sort do not fear criticism from the right. They are free of that "inferiority complex" that has compelled some liberals to act in such a way as to demonstrate that they are "more Catholic than the Pope." In that case, the present leaders can go much further in the policy of the relaxation and normalization of the international situation.
Such suggestions, in Arbatov's judgment, contained a "certain logic, especially considering the 'service record' of certain of the more liberal predecessors of the present leaders of the United States."[60] Thus not only were "liberals" (presumably Democrats) seen to be frivolous and fainthearted, they were, paradoxically, always under suspicion of being "soft on communism." A Republican administration, especially one with impeccable anti-communist credentials, would be immune from charges of "selling out." His conservative flank protected, Nixon could, said Arbatov, "go much further" in negotiations with the Soviet Union.[*]
[*] A similar line of reasoning was applied by Berezhkov to the 1976 elections. As he told an Italian audience in late 1975, "The situation is complicated in the United States right now because of the elections next year and the tendency to win votes by adopting anti-communist stances. Nixon showed himself to be the most suitable person for bringing about a new phase in the relations between the [superpowers] because he knew no one could ever have accused him of being weak." Without a secure reputation as hard-line conservative, Berezhkov suggested, President Ford was much more vulnerable to internal pressure. As a result, he correctly forsaw, Soviet-American relations might well become more difficult. FBIS, 18 December 1975, p. B3.
Another factor attracting the attention of Soviet analysts was the new administration's interest in "new methods of foreign-policy management." Given the political complexion of the Nixon leadership, this came as something of a surprise. While Henry Kissinger "has himself always shown considerable interest in new methods of analyzing international situations" and recruited Charles Hermann, a specialist on simulation from Princeton University, to serve on his staff, the interest of the president in such matters was unexpected. According to Vitaly Zhurkin, a "serious attempt" to create an efficiently functioning decision-making system was being made "paradoxically . . . precisely under Nixon, a figure of conservative persuasion from whom it would seem that one could not expect special interest in scientific 'innovation' in the sphere of administration, analysis and so forth."[61] While "liberals" are frivolous, conservatives are conservative.
In any event the new NSC system, WASAG, political gaming (using during the Cambodian crisis) and other management reforms introduced by the new administration were seen to be efforts to systematize the process of decision making, i.e., to filter out irrelevant (bureaucratic) influences, and rationalize the method of presenting alternatives to the president for decision. Given the grave importance of the choices he must make, this well-ordered approach to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy was a potential, if somewhat surprising virtue of the new Washington leadership.[62]
The real source of interest, however, was less the organizational changes introduced by the Nixon administration than the modifications it was seen to have made in U.S. foreign policy. Here, clearly, the American policy makers received very high marks indeed. As Trofimenko noted, the adoption of the policy of détente by the United States "required a quite serious reexamination of the basic principles of its foreign policy and a very radical change in its practices."[63] It is this "radical," even "drastic" change in U.S. foreign-policy behavior which won the administration such great respect.
The contributions of the Nixon administration are said to be both practical and conceptual. Practically, the summit conferences—the personal meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States—are considered to be of "exceptional importance."
During the cold war period, notes Trofimenko, the Soviet Union and the United States communicated with or "signalled" to each other "primarily by threats—direct or indirect." Despite the availability of extensive opportunities to do otherwise, "the two sides actually conducted their dialogue by means of various indirect 'signals'—ostentatious measures and countermeasures, actions and gestures in international forums—but in no way by direct contact." With the inauguration of the summit conferences, which began when President Nixon visited Moscow in May 1972, and especially as these meetings became yearly events, "the development of systematic contact at the highest diplomatic level" allowed for "frank and direct exchange of opinions." Such exchanges do not, of course, necessarily lead to elimination of differences. However, writes Trofimenko, they are a considerable improvement over the former system of "signalling." A frank discussion, he writes, is always useful "because it helps to get a better understanding of the intentions and interests of the other side and therefore provides an opportunity for . . . seeking solutions based on taking the interests of both sides into account."[64] For reasons to be explained shortly, the concern of the Nixon White House to learn about the intentions and interests of the Soviet Union and "to take them into account" is considered a marked improvement over the policies and attitudes of preceding administrations.
American willingness to negotiate regularly with the Soviet Union is based, in the view of Soviet analysts, on a prior modification of the American self-image. In the 1940s, Washington was seen to be inspired by a boundless faith in U.S. military and economic, hence political, supremacy, a cocky self-assurance which led it to pursue its cold war "positions-of-strength policy." The "Acheson concept of talks from a position of strength," writes Trofimenko (quoting historian Norman Graebner) "meant in practice no talks at all. . . . Diplomatic confrontations, as the secretary of state repeatedly said, should be used not for talks but to record Soviet diplomatic defeats. So long as Western superiority was not sufficient to ensure precisely such a result, Acheson preferred that the West avoid settlement."[65] Haughty with its own sense of omnipotence, the cold war "positions-of-strength" policy led to diplomatic bankruptcy.
The new American leadership, by contrast, took a modest and
restrained view of its own capabilities. Writing in 1972 one Soviet theorist suggested that Henry Kissinger is "among those American strategists to whom a sane view on certain problems is not alien. Evaluating the role and place of the United States in the contemporary world," he writes, Kissinger has noted its "limited capabilities."[66] Americans now recognized, as Kissinger openly admitted, that "we cannot do everything and achieve everything merely by the intensification of our own efforts."[67] In a speech to State Department employees, notes Chetverikov, Kissinger observed that "from the U.S. viewpoint, international relations are going through 'a critical transitional period.' This is expressed, above all, in the radical change in the world position of the United States. 'We no longer have,' he said, 'either an insuperable safety margin nor over-whelming predominance in resources.'"[68] The change in America's self-image was best symbolized, according to Svyatov, by comparing the statements of two U.S. presidents—made a decade apart:
"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of freedom." (John Kennedy, 1961)
"America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world." (Richard Nixon, 1970)[69]
Such declarations, in the Soviet view, implied a major change in official American thinking.
The officially accepted slogan of "supremacy" in world affairs by means of achieving "superiority" in all of the means which make up the arsenal of foreign political and foreign economic coercion has been replaced by the expression "an important role in world affairs"; this has been a substantial departure from the view which was dominant during the first two postwar decades.[70]
This "substantial departure" from traditional "supremicist" views was the product of this country's recent political experiences. "Events," suggests Trofimenko, "especially the fiasco in Vietnam . . . made America recognize that it played a more humble role."[71] American analysts were forced to the conclusion, writes Kokoshin, that the United States "must take into greater consideration not only its own
possibilities and desires but also the state of world affairs."[72] They were also led to understand "the inevitability and necessity of a dialogue with 'potential opponents,'" i.e., the USSR and China.[73]
Given a less inflated self-image, American policy makers are no longer so disdainful of diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union. Only with the acceptance of this more modest role, it is argued, could the American leaders recognize, as they did at the May 1972 summit, that the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union must be based on the principle of equality.[74] Previous assumptions regarding "supremacy" would not have permitted Washington policy makers to consider the interests of anyone save themselves. As significant, however, has been their willingness to recognize the need for negotiations, particularly in the sphere of strategic weaponry. Here, especially, what has proved to be of such great importance is the intellectual competence of the U.S. leadership. In the view of leading institute analysts, the Republican administration had a sound conceptual grasp of the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Writing in 1972, for example, Trofimenko saluted the American understanding of deterrence. "It should be said," he writes, "that in conditions of nuclear-missile standoff between the two great powers" not only are the military arsenals and strategies of each side important but "ever-increasing significance" is attached to the question of "what each side thinks of the capabilities and intentions of the other side. Thus," he continues, "H. Kissinger stressed that what a potential opponent believes about the intentions of the other side 'is substantially more important than the objective truth. Deterrence takes place above all in people's minds.'"[75]
This understanding, suggests Trofimenko, is the only basis for preserving the strategic stability between the Soviet Union and the United States. Each side must be convinced "that the other side does not intend to carry out a preventive nuclear attack against it." He goes on:
This conviction will be strongest when it is based on a knowledge that the other side does not possess the physical capability of delivering a first (disarming) strike. In a situation of "mutual deterrence," such knowledge becomes a real deterrent force only when their opponent holds the same
views on this matter as they do, that is, when each of the sides believes that the other side will in all cases preserve its capability, will and readiness to deliver a crushing response in case a nuclear missile attack is undertaken against it.[76]
It is in terms of the essentially "psychological framework of deterrence," writes Trofimenko, that the concept of "sufficiency" introduced by the United States assumes significance. Thus, he notes, "President Nixon emphasized that one of the particular criteria of 'sufficiency' was the necessity of a deployment of U.S. strategic forces which the Soviet Union could not view as a provocation. 'Sufficiency' Nixon stated, 'also signifies that the number, specifications, deployment of our forces will not provide the Soviet Union with grounds for interpreting them as an intention to threaten the USSR with attack in order to disarm it.'"[77] Washington, in his view, clearly knows what it is doing.
Furthermore, Trofimenko goes on, the United States understands that deterrence "is to some extent a closed circle. Any attempt unilaterally to change these established limits can only lead to a new turn in the spiral of the arms race . . . and create an atmosphere of increased nervousness in which the world is moved closer to the edge of global thermonuclear conflict." The White House, in the view of Soviet observers, is aware of the destabilizing effects of a continuing escalation of the arms race. For this reason, Kissinger has opposed those in the United States demanding "preservation of American nuclear superiority." In responding to their arguments, writes Trofimenko, the secretary of state takes the position that
the constant expansion of strategic weapons does not lead to an additional level of security. It only leads to a balance at higher levels of complexity and risk and, moreover, at the cost of colossal expenditures; this would engender an atmosphere of hostility and suspiciousness which would only make the emergence of political conflict more likely and would in time dispel the aspiration to create a calmer and more secure atmosphere in the world.[78]
The American leadership clearly recognizes, then, that effort to implement qualitative weapons improvements "destabilizes the existing balance to a particularly dangerous degree by creating a lack of confidence in the intentions of the other." This awareness, writes Trofimenko, was the basis of the SALT agreements.
The American leadership's understanding of this circumstance was reflected in the fact that it moved to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union to limit offensive and defensive weapons systems. The establishment of certain limits on the corresponding systems is very important on the level of "removing" the fears, whether real or illusory, of each side that the other side is nurturing the idea of a preventive "counterforce" strike.
Further testimony regarding the understanding by the ruling circles of the United States of the dangers involved in a nuclear "confrontation" including the psychological problem of incorrectly interpreting the intentions of one's opponent, is seen in the signing of the American-Soviet agreement on measures to reduce the dangers of nuclear war.[79]
For Trofimenko, then, Washington's "understanding" of the psychological dynamics of the arms race and, more broadly, of the need to take concrete measures to control international conflicts, prevent nuclear war and regularize and stabilize Soviet-American relations has been crucially important to the summit agreements signed since 1972.
The lack of movement in Soviet-American relations during the Ford presidency, as we have already seen, led to considerable disillusionment in Moscow. The stark contrast between the much-acclaimed achievements of 1972–74, on the one hand, and the stalemate and recriminations of 1975–76, especially regarding the renunciation of the trade agreement, on the other, could not but cast a pall on earlier enthusiasms.
Nowhere, perhaps, was Soviet disenchantment more apparent than in Trofimenko's commentary on the previously much-heralded achievements of the Nixon administration. He openly criticized Nixon for attempting to create what was, in effect, an "imperial presidency," an accusation till then assiduously ignored by Soviet Americanists. Writing in late 1976, Trofimenko charged that Nixon's organizational reforms were designed not, as had been claimed, to improve governmental efficiency; rather, they were "a maneuver to concentrate state power in the White House." As for the reorganization of the NSC under Henry Kissinger, this reform "led in point of fact to the creation of a barrier, isolating the president and his assistant for national security affairs from outside influences."[80] Despite the new procedures, concludes Trofimenko, the American foreign-policy apparatus produced "obviously ill-considered" programs. The results
have been so abysmal, he writes, that "for many theorists and political leaders in the United States"—and the Soviet Union?—"even the old method of making decisions on the basis of 'bureaucratic compromises' within the ruling elite came to be seen as a blessing in comparison with the impulsive reactions of the 'reformed' foreign-policy mechanism."[81] Such "impulsive" actions as the U.S. military alert during the Yom Kippur War, the Mayaguez affair, and the administration's endorsement of military assistance to Angola apparently convinced Trofimenko that the new foreign-policy mechanism was, from the Soviet point of view, no improvement over those used by previous administrations.
While obviously disappointed—the intensity of their criticism may reflect the measure of their own earlier ardor—Soviet analysts continue to have high regard for Washington's "new realism." We have moved, in their eyes, a long way from the cold war. In April 1976, though concerned about the trend in Soviet-American relations, Arbatov, continues to place "a high value on the positive changes that, despite difficulties, have been achieved . . . in recent years" and sees the future as having "good prospects."[82]
The main elements of the "new realism" which still attract attention—and are the basis of the "good prospects"—relate to Washington's attitude towards the main political and psychological issues of the Soviet-American strategic relationship. Despite their recent uneasiness, the Americanists hold to the view that Washington still recognizes the urgent need to avoid nuclear war. Acceptance of peaceful coexistence in relations between the two nuclear powers, the USSR and the United States, according to a symposium at the USA Institute, is "the 'categorical imperative' of American foreign policy." Symposium participants generally agreed that "the avoidance of nuclear war will remain the foreign-policy goal of the ruling groups in the United States, regardless of changes in the present administration, during the whole period that this kind of warfare presents a danger."[83] Soviet analysts do note, however, that Americans differ as to "the ways and means of achieving this goal." While most agreed that "the present approach of the Washington administration" sought to achieve this objective by means of "normalizing relations" with the USSR, especially by freezing the arms race, others, especially those connected
with the "military-industrial complex," sought to improve the quality of American strategic weaponry.[84] Thus, even though committed to a laudable goal, the U.S. leadership may shift its strategic orientation and adopt programs menacing to Soviet interests. Washington's policies therefore bear close and continual scrutiny.
A second aspect of the "new realism" which apparently still retains its vitality is the continued acceptance by the White House of the principle of military equality with the USSR. An essential feature of its policy of moving from "confrontation to a dialogue with 'potential adversaries,'" wrote Trofimenko, was the Nixon administration's understanding of "the impossibility of achieving a position of strategic military superiority over the USSR" and, in this connection, its willingness—"far greater than ever before shown"—to conduct "equitable negotiations" with the Soviet Union regarding the limitation of weapons, especially strategic ones.[85] Washington's "realism," on this question, he points out, was far from certain. Faced with a situation of nuclear balance, the Republican administration in 1969 confronted the question of which path to choose:
to undertake new attempts to get ahead of the USSR or to stabilize the existing nuclear parity by means of mutually beneficial agreements . . . ? For the first time in the whole postwar period, the United States opted for the variant of equitable settlement and concluded the well-known agreements on strategic arms limitation which laid the cornerstone in the foundation of the normalization of Soviet-American relations, of détente.[86]
From the Soviet standpoint, American acceptance of the principle of "military parity" is crucial to their demand for "political parity." or equality. Only under conditions of equality are negotiations conceivable.
Here, too, Soviet analysts have some doubts. Trofimenko noted, for example, that "under pressure of right-wing forces and, perhaps, also under the influence of some kind of moods within the [Ford] administration, itself," views again were found which spoke of "the possibility of achieving superiority over the USSR."[87] Though in principle still committed to the principles of military parity and equal security, official Washington is seen to be under considerable pressure
to adopt a more assertive posture. The ability of "sober-minded circles" to persist in support of such realistic policies and stave off Pentagon pressure is in question. The power struggle for the soul of Washington must be carefully monitored.