Chapter Two
Financial Resources in the Pentekontaetia
"I regard it as the truest explanation [for why the war began], although the one least able to be articulated, that the Athenians, increasing their power and engendering fear in the Lakedaimonians, made recourse to war necessary."[1] This sentence, polemical in its implied opposition to common beliefs about the causes of the war, informs the Pentekontaetia in the same way that Thucydides' initial assertion about the merit of his subject did the Archaeology. For just as the Archaeology contained the argument and evidence to support the premise that no previous war was as great as the Peloponnesian War, so the Pentekontaetia attempts to present a cogent argument to support the
sections of the History help to define, clarify, and expand upon key statements such as 1.1.2 and 1.23.6 and, in the process, reveal Thucydides' central ideas about power.[3]
In the Archaeology, Thucydides analyzes power by tracing its origins to the points in history when it surfaced, isolating its essential preconditions and criteria (or their absence to explain the lack of significant military achievement) in periousia chrematon, prosodos , and nautikon , and thereby demonstrating the factors necessary for its increase (auxesis ). As noted in the last chapter, Thucydides' approach has larger implications and aims: the historian was so consistent in singling out these same elements in his analyses of events he ultimately dismissed as mere flirtations with military greatness compared to the Peloponnesian War that the reader expects him to judge Athenian power by identical criteria. In this chapter we shall examine Thucydides' approach to the relationship of financial resources and naval power in the Pentekontaetia; for it is especially in this section of the work that we should be able to determine his views on the anatomy of power and to assess the value of the Archaeology as an introduction to the historian's ideas and methodology informing the work as a whole.
The Pentekontaetia, and especially 1.89-96, is introduced by an assertion made in 1.88. Thucydides has, between the Archaeology and Pentekontaetia, presented the grievances and disputes that finally set off the conflict of 431 and has completed relating the relevant logoi on the eve of war, which dealt both with these specific complaints and with issues of the Athenian empire more generally.[4] The immediate consequence was that the Lakedaimonians voted to go to war, but not, accord-
[3] The need to support his view of Athens' dunamis and of the reason for its effect on the Spartans explains the selective nature of this section of the History and the strict focus on Athenian, rather than on both Athenian and Spartan, power. It is Athenian power that inspires the fear crucial to Thucydides' theory of the origins of the Peloponnesian War (on the importance of fear in the work generally, see de Romilly, C &M 17 [1956]:119-27). Moreover, the basis and nature of Spartan power were obvious and uncontroversial, while Thucydides, as he makes clear, regarded Athenian power as something unprecedented in the context of traditional Greek military experience. The Pentekontaetia is, therefore, not intended as a historical sketch of the fifty years intervening between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, though it is commonly regarded as such and thus criticized for omissions; Proctor, Experience , 185, puts his dissatisfaction more metaphorically: "The Pentecontaetia is like a badly loaded shopping-basket from which a number of sorely needed articles are missing;" cf. also, e.g., Gomme, HCT 1:361-413; Meiggs, AE , 444-46; McGregor, "Athenian Policy," 67; Lenardon, "Thucydides and Hellanikos," 60; Gabba, JRS 71 (1981):51.
[4] On which see chapter 3, below.
ing to Thucydides, because of the persuasiveness of the logoi ; rather, "they feared the Athenians, lest their power increase further, as they saw that much of Greece was already subject to them" (1.88). This recalls directly the
The first circumstance that enabled the Athenians to increase their power was the rebuilding of their walls. Thucydides offers an extensive description of the manner in which the Athenians successfully refortified their city after the destruction of the Persian invasion in 480 (1.89-93), including a detailed account of Themistokles' ruse designed to forestall Spartan opposition to the Athenian project. The historian comments on the speed with which the walls were built around the city and then describes the completion of the walls in the Piraieus; this brings him back to Themistokles, who emerges as the architect of Athens' naval arche and dunamis (1.93), a visionary who foresaw that Athens' power would rest on the sea.[6] We then learn briefly of the military campaigns
[6] He does not, interestingly, mention the revenue from the mines at Laureion with which the Athenians built their fleet prior to Xerxes' invasion (Hdt. 7.144); this may be because it concerns a point anterior to that which marks the real beginnings of Athens' dunamis , or because Herodotos mentions it and Thucydides generally avoids repetition of other treatments unless he deems them inaccurate. Reference to the campaigns of 478 recalls Herodotos; but these directly relate to Athenian dunamis .
of 478 B.C. (1.94), which had also been reported by Herodotos (with whose fuller account Thucydides undoubtedly agreed, insofar as he makes no corrections here). But in 1.95 the focus narrows and the pace of narrative adjusts to concentrate on the detail of events. Chapters 1.95-96 are especially crucial for understanding Thucydides' conception of the development of power, and as we begin to explore them in depth, our goal will be to unpack as much as possible the historian's underlying assumptions, purpose, and criteria for inclusion.
At the end of 1.94, Thucydides begins to identify as precisely as possible each stage in the process by which allies in the Hellenic League grew dissatisfied with Pausanias, the Spartan commander of the expedition, and requested a change in the leadership of the hegemony from Sparta to Athens.[7] The meticulous attention to chronology is often attributed to a desire to correct inaccuracies in other accounts, such as that of Hellanikos, whom Thucydides singles out in 1.97.2.[8] But this explanation, though plausible, is not complete: there are other, internal reasons underlying the narrative which emerge as he describes the events that led to the transfer of leadership.
In fact, the need to fix each decision and action as it unfolded arises from Thucydides' very purpose in writing this section: to isolate each significant step in the evolution of Athenian power. The painstaking nature of this chapter is necessary to allow Thucydides to bring out dearly what he regards as a crucial factor, namely, the role of the allies. The transfer of hegemony became possible at this specific juncture only because the allies so intensely disliked their leader's medizing and generally obnoxious behavior that they appealed to the Athenians to replace him. The egregiousness of Pausanias, then, which greatly antagonized others in the Hellenic League, was responsible for at least the timing of the transfer, a point reiterated by Thucydides further on (1.96.1, 1.130.2).[9]
Is Thucydides' account, pointing out that the Athenians became the new hegemon on the initiative of the allies, also intended to correct Herodotos, who presents a different version?[10] In the latter's brief mention (8.3.2), it was the Athenians who instigated the transfer of hegemony by
[8] For a discussion of Thucydides' use of Hellanikos in general throughout the Pentekontaetia, see Lenardon, "Thucydides and Hellanikos," 58-67; also Ziegler, RhM 78 (1929), 59, 62, 66-67. See also below, p. 59.
[10] Herodotos' version is seen as contradictory to Thucydides' by, e.g., Sealey, "Origins of the Delian League; 236-37; Rawlings, Phoenix 31 (1977):8.
using Pausanias' behavior as an excuse (
The story, then, is told from two different perspectives, the Athenians' (Herodotos) and the allies' (Thucydides). Herodotos' account, while emphasizing the underhanded nature of the Athenians' action, need not contradict the notion that the allies grievously resented Pausanias' obnoxious conduct, nor does Thucydides' account preclude the possibility that the Athenians themselves by that time desired the leadership of the allies. As Thucydides notes, they readily accepted the proposal to assume the command (1.95.2).
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the two accounts produce appreciably different effects. Thucydides, emphasizing the role of the allies, appears less judgmental and less cynical about Athenian motives in the transfer than does his predecessor. Both accounts are of course retrospective, viewing the origins of the Delian League from a time when virtually the entire membership of the alliance had been reduced to subjection by Athens. Thucydides' intention, however, is hardly to absolve the Athenians. We need to keep in mind the aim of the Pentekontaetia. It is not simply a narrative of events, filling in the gap from the end of Herodotos' account to the advent of the Peloponnesian War. On the contrary, it has the objective of demonstrating the means by which Athens' power evolved and increased. There is an important point to recognize: the polis had not emerged from the successes of 480-479 with sufficient power—or popularity—to explain the result of the events of 478, namely the transfer of hegemony and the measures which directly followed. Let us take a closer look.
In 480 the majority of the Greeks were opposed to the idea of Athe-
[12] Larsen, HSCP 51 (1940):184-85.
nian leadership in the Hellenic League and preferred that of the Spartans.[13] According to Herodotos, the Athenians, though desirous of the leadership, waited for an opportune moment to show their hand; Pausanias' behavior was a gift. Sparta's greater strength and popularity underlie the decision to deny Athens, still a minor, relatively weak power in the Greek world, the leadership at that time. How much did the allies' attitude change by 478?
The Athenians' reputation was improved by their contribution in the war; on the other hand, the Spartans also demonstrated extraordinary bravery and skill, no doubt enhancing their own standing among the Greeks. Moreover, Themistokles' method of extorting money from the islanders who had not supported the Hellenic cause could only have made many uncomfortable.[14] It is difficult to believe that, by 478, sentiment so strongly favored the Athenians that on their initiative alone the command would have passed to them. It is significant that no move in that direction had yet been made; the Spartans continued to exercise their leadership until Pausanias' authority became intolerable to the allies.
Let us return to Thucydides. His version of the transfer was the result, I suggest, of solving a puzzle: to explain how Athens was able to move so quickly from a state of insufficient power and popularity to a position of unprecedented potential, at the head of an alliance whose members paid an annual contribution of which the Athenians had charge. This stage, the transfer of hegemony, was critical to Thucydides, who was interested in the precise way in which a new kind of power evolves. Accordingly, the reasons for emphasizing the validity of the charges against Pausanias and the
The overall issue Thucydides addresses here is how a single polis could acquire the means to achieve naval dunamis . The steps are dearly indicated: the rebuilding and completion of the fortifications, followed by the promotion of the city to the head of a naval alliance, the terms of which immediately put Athens in such an extraordinary position to exploit its allies that Thucydides could not explain this outcome by Athens' own real power at this juncture. Thus, he attributes it to the strength of the hatred felt toward Pausanias—and, not negligibly, to the Spartans' own willingness to wash their hands of naval leadership in distant parts
[13] Hdt. 8.2.2.
[14] Hdt. 8.111-12.
(1.95.7). He then moves to the next stage of the argument, in 1.96, to demonstrate how the Athenians set in place the very mechanism that would make possible their naval arche .
This important chapter, high on the list of intensively scrutinized and controversial passages in the History , has always been regarded as a description of the purpose, general arrangements, and constitution of the Delian League.[15] On that basis, its deficiencies are patent, and it is often criticized for its many omissions, for example, the absence of any reference to the oaths taken to cement League loyalty attested in other authors.[16] However, chapter 96 is not intended purely as a description of the arrangements of the Delian League; rather, its precise and singleminded function is to provide the evidence and analysis for a specific stage in a larger argument about the origin and development of Athenian power. We will begin to explore its contents and implications by first looking at the passage as a whole:
After the Athenians received the hegemony in this way, since the allies were willing [for them to do so] because of their hatred of Pausanias, they assessed which cities should provide chremata and which should contribute ships against the barbarian—a pretext being retaliation for their suffering by plundering the Kings land. Moreover, then, for the first time, the Athenians established the office of Hellenotamiai, who received the phoros ; this was the term used for the payment of chremata . The first assessment of photos was 460 talents. The treasury was on Delos, and the meetings were held in the temple.
Following the participial phrase reiterating the explanation for the transfer of hegemony, Thucydides immediately places the Athenians in control of all that follows: they assessed (
[15] Some important treatments in which, in addition, more extensive bibliography may be found are: Larsen, HSCP 51 (1940):175-213; ATL 3, esp. 234-43; Chambers, CP 53 (1958):26-32; Meyer, Historia 12 (1963):405-46; Sealey, "Origins of the Delian League," 233-55; McGregor, "Athenian Policy," 67-84; Jackson, Historia 18 (1969):12-16; Meiggs, AE , 42-47; Raaflaub, Chiron 9 (1979): 1-22; French, Antichthon 22 (1988): 12-25.
[16] Giovannini and Gottlieb, "Thukydides und die Anfänge," 7-45, use that particular omission to overthrow the idea that the Delian League was a new organization separate from the Hellenic League. Reasons for finding this unpersuasive will emerge below.
[17] Larsen, HSCP 51 (1940):175-213; Meyer, Historia 12 (1963):405-46; Sealey, "Origins," 233-55; Jackson, Historia 18 (1969):12-16; Rawlings, Phoenix 31 (1977):1-8; Raaflaub, Chiron 9 (1979):1-22; Robertson, AJAH 5 (1980):64-96; French, Antichthon 22 (1988): 12-25.
Discussion has been guided by the prevailing belief that the
The
An objection might be raised against this seemingly excessive pedantry on the grounds that, even if the
Military alliances were common in the Greek world, and, in cases where the impetus for their formation was an obvious threat, one wonders whether an explicitly stated purpose was ever necessary. This seems especially true of the Delian League, whose initial aim was self-evident: to continue the operations of the naval arm of the Hellenic League.[19]
[18] 3.10.3; 6.76.3-4. Whether these assertions, all in highly tendentious contexts, are to be taken at face value is another matter, but they at least suggest an ostensible, wellknown purpose of the League.
[19] That the Delian League was a new alliance, and not simply the continuation of the old Hellenic League, is dear, even though Thucydides does not speak explicitly of a new league and refers in 1.95-96 to the mere change in hegemony of an existing league, especially in light of Thucydides' later comment that the Athenians withdrew from "the existing alliance against the Mede" after the Spartans rejected their help at Ithome (1.102.4), which can refer only to the Hellenic League; but cf. Giovannini and Gottlieb, "Thukydides und die Anfänge."
What required clarification and explanation when a League was formed were its terms and obligations, especially if a novel arrangement was introduced. Indeed, the Delian League had several unprecedented features, stemming from the fact that it was a naval alliance: first, the institution of phoros , a system whereby the hegemon demanded regular payments from each polis in the League. As we saw in the Introduction, as a rule, individuals were required to equip and provision themselves for military campaigns;[20] public support was the exception. Moreover, not only was the providing role of the polis absent from or minimal in the military sphere, but even money itself did not have a significant presence in the functioning of alliances and war. Therefore, the very idea of introducing money on any large and regular scale, implicit in the systematic institution of phoros , would have been unfamiliar, and its necessity unclear.[21] Furthermore, the notion of assessment, that is, a system of projected regular payments, was novel enough within a polis without adding the unprecedented aspect of removing a polis's portion from the city to an extra-polis fund.[22] Wherever the Athenians got the idea to establish this system of financial obligations, its originality in a purely Greek context should not go unappreciated.[23]
The central point is that innovations require explanation, hence the
[20] Pritchett, GSAW 1:30-34.
[21] See below for a discussion of the reasons for maintaining that phoros consisted entirely of money. I am drawing a distinction between the temporary need for money that occurred especially in naval ventures, e.g., during the Ionian Revolt and the campaigns of 480-479, and the institution of a systematic, regularized procedure of compulsory financial obligations.
[22] In Athens during our period, no regular, direct taxation, as opposed to extraordinary, irregular taxes, existed; Andreades, HGPF , 366, n. 2.
[23] I shall return to this presently.
[24] We do not know whether the members of the Delian League knew that it was to be permanent; Thucydides' discussion in 1.99 suggests at the least that, whether or not the alliance itself was permanent, the allies did not really expect or understand at the outset that the Athenians had in mind a standing navy. The widespread assumption in the scholarship is that the rich bore the burden of tribute payment, but even those who share this assumption have to recognize that, in the end, we do not know how the obligation was met (e.g., Finley, Ancient History , 79); see Nixon and Price's discussion, "Size and Resources," 151. Even if the assessment and distribution of the requirement within the polis were equitable, it still meant parting with local resources in an exchange of uncertain financial return; I shall be concerned with this question below.
this statement, we are on slippery ground. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the collective attitude of League members in 478 to photos in a Greek military context. However, although we must recognize the speculative nature of the attempt, it is important to try to determine the implications of tribute assessment so that we can appreciate fully the significance of the measure and of the necessity for the
We can start with some probable comparisons and associations. After the battle of Salamis, a Greek fleet under Themistokles' command visited various places in the Aegean with the purpose of extorting money from medizers (Hdt. 8.111-12).[26] The context is specific—retaliation for support of Persia—but Herodotos leaves open the possibility that Themistokles' action instilled fear in those who had not openly supported either side. Recollection of the earlier Athenian demands for money, "or else," could have had one of two effects (or a combination) on a member of a League under Athenian hegemony in 478 facing the prospect of phoros : concern, or relief at having a regular system imposed on all regardless of one's loyalty during the war.
Second, contributions for military ventures in the Hellenic world were neither unprecedented nor unacceptable. We have the evidence of Plu-
tarch (Arist . 24.1) that the Greeks made a contribution (apophora ) to the war effort of the Hellenic League (significantly, the context is largely naval); these contributions, however, need not have consisted solely of money. As need occasionally arose, allies could expect to offer financial assistance in addition to meeting their regular requirements. Naval activities, however, necessarily changed the exception to the rule. Naval warfare, and a Standing naval alliance, required a stable financial source to build, equip, maintain, and repair ships, as well as to provision rowers.[27] Therefore, in 478 the Greeks in the new league were being asked to comply with an arrangement rather different from one-time payments in a time of emergency. Indeed, the implications of an assessment—something regular, systematized, and long-term—sharply contrast with the notion even of annual levies based on the needs of war; they suggest that what was envisioned was a permanent standing navy.
Finally, perhaps the most important issue is whether the photos of the Delian League bore a similarity, so obvious later on, to tribute imposed on a subject by a ruler outside of the Greek world.[28] The only precedents for systematic obligations of tribute come entirely from non-Greek powers, though they occurred in areas of Greek contact (for example, Persia, Lydia, Skythia, Thrace, and Egypt). Non-Greeks were known to pay tribute to non-Greeks, and even Greeks to non-Greeks, but not Greeks to other Greeks.[29] Near-contemporary evidence shows that tribute was an effective signifier of barbarian despotism.[30] Some, possibly the majority, of the original members of the Delian League had themselves been subject to Persian domination, which included the requirement of tribute. What would their reaction have been to the apparently fixed requirement now established by the Athenians? Would the contribution called photos have evoked barbarian connotations?
Oswyn Murray has argued that the word the Greeks used for Persian
[27] The most thorough treatment of naval finances is that of Blackman, GRBS 10 (1969): 179-216; see also Jordan, Athenian Navy , 56-116 (though much of the evidence collected comes from the fourth century).
[28] Certainly in its developed form, when the treasury was moved to Athens and the symbolism of subjugation was made concrete by the procession of allies and their tribute to the Akropolis, the similarity was unmistakable; cf. Thucydides' own implicit equation of the two in his account of tribute and gifts in the Odrysian kingdom, below, chapter 4, pp. 125-26.
[29] Barbarians to barbarians, e.g.: to Darius, Hdt. 3.89-96; Skythia, Hdt. 1.106.1. Greeks to barbarians: to Cyrus, Hdt. 7.51.1; to Croesus, 1.6.2; to Darius, 6.42 (Artaphernes' assessment); to Xerxes, 7.108.1.
tribute was likely dasmos and that the term phoros was meant to distance it from the Persian practice; similarly, when the Athenians launched their second naval alliance in the fourth century, they favored, with good reason, the innocuous-sounding suntaxis , "contribution;' over phoros .[31] Murray's suggestion has much to commend it; certainly Thucydides' remark on the term phoros , "for that was what the payment of chremata was called," does require explanation. It is also possible, given the likely difficulty of imagining a time when the word was neutral in tone, that the historian wants to point out that the nowdistasteful word had been used all along. This would be consistent with his frankness in characterizing the new League as an arche , rather than a hegemonia , even at its inception (1.97.2).[32] Thus, Thucydides states that the empire was always an empire, and the photos was always called phoros .[33]
It is usually assumed that Persian tribute was the model for both the idea and the amount of phoros .[34] But it needs to be made clear that this is pure speculation, and the question of how the institution of phoros appeared in 478 must not be confused by the obvious similarities between barbarian tribute and Athenian photos after the arche was mature.
In the end, we cannot be certain what connections the charter members of the Delian League drew between Persian tribute and phoros ; nor should we assume a uniform reaction. Greeks who had previously been under Persian control may have felt a suspicion that the photos now demanded of them was something like the tribute they had been paying to the Persians. However, the Athenian photos differs significantly from Persian tribute in the voluntary nature of the contribution in the case of the Delian League and the stated use to which it was to be put (that is, the
Still other questions remain concerning the
[32] As Winton rightly notes, MH 38 (1981):147-52, though he finds hegemonia to be synonymous with arche .
[34] See, recently, Nixon and Price, "Size and Resources," 145-46, with bibliography in n. 8, 145; on Persian tribute and taxation, see Tuplin, "Achaemenid," in Carradice, Coinage , 137-58.
herently fraudulent, and in what way would the pretext given have satisfied Delian League members—but it will be best to return to them after we have considered fully Thucydides' comments following his reference to the assessment of money and ships.
Thucydides continues by noting that then, for the first time, the Athenians established the office of Hellenotamiai, who received the phoros , and he adds an exegetical comment on phoros : "this was the term used for the payment (phora ) of chremata ." The context and wording make it likely that the Athenians filled the board from their own ranks;[35] they would in any case have maintained ultimate control as hegemon of the League. It is notable that Thucydides not only explains the term phoros but also defines it as consisting of chremata . Here chremata is money, not supplies or provisions, for photos not only was assessed in money but also was to be housed in a common treasury (I shall return to the significance of this later). Moreover, Thucydides expressly states that the photos was to be received by the Hellenotamiai, whose purview included only items of monetary value, but not supplies. This too may have set it apart from the Persian system of taxation and compulsory gifts.[36]
Many scholars have doubted, or at least have been uncomfortable with, the figure of 460 talents for the total of the first assessment, despite the limitations of our knowledge about the founding membership of the League and the fact that the accuracy of an assessment figure cannot necessarily be fairly tested by reference to estimated totals for later periods. Nevertheless, the flood of scholarship on this one sentence has attempted primarily to account for the figure in any way other than by taking Thucydides' statement at face value. It will be useful to summarize the main lines of approach and argument. The editors of ATL , for example, supposed that the figure, because of its magnitude, must indude both money and the monetary value of ships.[37] Chambers, on the other hand, argued that the photos could only mean cash and not the cash equivalence of ships, and concluded that Thucydides was in error on the amount of the first assessment.[38] Robertson also believes that the figure is incorrect and, further, may even have been a "deliberate fiction" given to Thucydides by Athenian informants, a figure which "would pal-
[35] So the schol. to 1.96; Meiggs, AE , 234, treats it as fact; cf. Thompson, C&M 28 (1967):216, who thinks that it was a Delian magistracy before 454; against his view, also see, e.g., Gomme, HCT 1:86, 272-73, 279; ATL 3:230 with n. 26; Woodhead, JHS 79 (1959): 149.
[36] Cf. Wallinga, Mnem . 37 (1984):401-37, who argues that Darius at least, and perhaps Cambyses, monetized the Peralan tribute; cf. also Tuplin, "Achaemenid," esp. 137-45.
[37] ATL 3:236-43; cf. also McGregor, "Athenian Policy," 67-84. Eddy, CP 63 (1968):186
[38] Chambers, CP 53 (1958):28, 29-30.
liate Athens' exactions in later days."[39] The view of Gomme, and then French, that the tribute quota lists do not accurately reflect the total tribute collected, has been revived by R. K. Unz, who argues that not all tribute reached Athens and only out of that which did was quota paid to Athena.[40] Finally, Meiggs suggests that tribute assessments were higher in the beginning of the League than later on.[41]
Of what can we be certain? First, as we noted above, the assessment must refer only to cash. How much further can we go in accepting Thucydides' testimony? The sum of 460 talents has been called into question solely on the basis of the evidence of the tribute quota lists (which do not begin until almost twenty-five years later) or, more accurately, on inferences drawn from the lists, which suggest lower actual totals of tribute for later periods when (it is thought) League membership was higher and tribute increased. There is no reason to dispute the credibility of Thucydides' figure. His impressive attention to details about the institution of tribute as a whole in 1.96 suggests careful research; in addition, it is clear that the first assessment was still generally well known in the later fifth century.[42] It is best, then, to draw the most cautious conclusions that we can from the tribute quota lists: they allow the inference that the actual tribute collected about twenty-five years after 478 was less than 460 talents.[43] Second, there is no reason to assume from Thucydides' narrative that the first assessment required only minimal amounts from individual poleis;[44] value terms such as "moderate" or "low" are meaningful only in later periods, after the precedent of phoros had been set. Moreover, the financial burden on each polis depended on the number of members in the original League and the nature of distribution among them, neither of which can be determined definitively. That the first assessment was adopted as the standard in the terms of the Peace of Nikias may suggest only that Aristeides' settlement seemed moderate in comparison with subsequent ones. It may also have had political rather than financial value: as the first assessment hearkened back to the League's inception, it recalled a time of voluntary unity, general consent, and goodwill. Perhaps the most important consideration, however, is the difference between assessment and collection: the former is an ideal or standard to which reality probably rarely corresponded. In this case, the
[39] Robertson, AJAH 5 (1980):68.
[40] Gomme, HCT 1:273-79; French, Historia 21 (1972): 1-20; Unz, GRBS 26 (1985):21-42, esp. 21-28.
[41] Meiggs, AE , 58-67 (with the exception of that in 425).
[42] Thuc. 5.18.5.
[43] Ca. four hundred talents on the estimate in ATL 3:265-74.
[44] Contra Robertson, AJAH 5 (1980):68, in whose opinion Thucydides "harp[s] on the moderation and equity of the first assessment."
disparity between the 460 talents assessed in 478 and the estimated tribute collected, based on the quota lists, does not actually prove that Thucydides' figure is too high. Rather, it is most sensible to infer that, as a matter of routine and practice, the Athenians always assessed a higher amount than they actually expected to collect.
Another factor that has strongly influenced the view that the first assessment must in fact have been "moderate" is the reputation of the man credited for it, Aristeides, whose constant companions were justness and fairness.[45] What is the evidence for the mildness of Aristeides' assessment?
Both Plutarch and Diodoros state that Aristcides' nickname, "the Just," arose from his general reputation for justice. According to Diodoros, he won this renown by dividing the tribute "exactly and justly" (
Plutarch's amusing story (Arist . 7.5-6) about the illiterate man who asked Aristeides to write his name on the ostrakon because he disliked hearing Aristeides referred to constantly as "the Just" may suggest that Aristeides had acquired that nickname by the 480s, that is, before the first assessment; but one is reluctant to give too much credence to either this story or its implied chronology. Contemporary opinions about Aristeides were more equivocal than those in later sources. Herodotos' view was that Aristeides was "the best and most just man in Athens" (8.79.1), an opinion based, he points out, on information about Aristeides' character. He reiterates his view several chapters later (8.95). Meiggs suggests that Herodotos "may be taking sides in a controversy;' because of the manner in which he introduces his opinion.[46] Furthermore, his portrayal of Aristeides is contrasted against that of Themistokles, whom Herodotos treats much less favorably than does Thucydides, for example. Alongside Herodotos' assessment we may place the contemporary view of Kallaischros, who called Aristeides "fox by deme and fox by nature."[47]
None of these largely anecdotal indications brings us much closer to determining precisely how the assessment itself was regarded. But it is
[45] Plut. Arist . 24; Arist. Ath.Pol . 23.3; Diod. 11.47.2.
[46] Meiggs, AE , 42, n. 3.
useful to recognize when considering the nature of the original assessment that, first, any judgment is relative: it would not have looked the same to Athens' allies in 478 as it did in 421. Moreover, Aristeides' subsequent reputation for determining an assessment that could be called "just" (and "exact") may mean no more than that it was distinguished by its lack of arbitrariness, being arranged according to specific guidelines and principles. Finally, Aristeides' reputed justness, which seems to be rooted mainly in his conduct in Athens, does not necessarily tell us much about his attitude and policy toward non-Athenians.[48]
We have not found adequate reason to reject the evidence of Thucydides that the first assessment was 460 talents. But let us pursue a different line of inquiry from that usually taken to see if we can explain a figure as high as 460 talents. It is possible that the sum reflected an ambitious program, in support of which the allies were asked to contribute an amount that was higher than that we infer was actually collected at a later date. Here we meet the
Consider the institution of photos and the stated explanation against its historical background: following the final battle of the Persian Wars at Mykale the preceding summer, the Greek victors, with the exception of the Peloponnesians, laid siege to Sestos by the Hellespont. The undertaking proved a test of perseverance and endurance, lasting some ten months into the winter until the city finally surrendered. Two lessons would have been apparent: first, that such operations could be expensive, especially if they lasted a long time (and they certainly would without sufficient resources); and second, that they could also be extremely lucrative. For example, Herodotos tells the story of the satrap Artayktes, who plundered the nearby sanctuary of Protesileos containing numer-
[48] Thus, I am arguing that the substantial nature of the first assessment does not provide evidence that the original membership of the League was larger than scholars have estimated, so that the assessment should be viewed as distributed among many states and the burden on each would thereby be considered "equitable." Cf. Chambers, CW 57 (1963):10; French, Historia 21 (1972):6; Huxley, PRIA 83 (1983):198.
ous items of gold, silver, and bronze, and who said that, in return for his life, he would give two hundred talents to the Athenians (and one hundred to Protesileos for looting his sanctuary) (9.116, 120.3). But Artayktes met instead with a grisly end, and the Athenians sailed home with the rest of the booty (ta alla chremata ), which, by inference from the description of the wealth of the sanctuary alone, not to mention that of Sestos itself, was worth a king's ransom.
It is likely that League members anticipated tangible rewards for their efforts as a result of ravaging Persian territory;[49] indeed, it is probable that such a prospect would have been necessary to convince the allies to part with their own financial resources, pool them in a common fund, and not even to have any surplus redistributed to them at the end of a campaigning season. The Athenians would have had persuasive grounds on which to base their case for phoros . Aggressive campaigns in territory held by the Persians could be costly and, in order to insure success, not only anticipated funds but those in excess of expectations would be necessary so that in the event of emergency and unforeseen difficulties, the League would be able to draw on immediately available and expendable—thus cash—financial reserves (and so avoid the problems faced, in Thucydides' analysis, by the Greeks at Troy). The chief lure enticing League members would be the prospect of rich rewards like those they had seen the preceding year at Sestos—but they could benefit only if they agreed to pay out systematically and in larger amounts than might have been necessary simply for minimal success.[50]
This reconstruction of motivation and considerations at the inception of the Delian League seems to me to explain reasonably, without an unduly procrustean approach to Thucydides' words, the relationship between the surprisingly large figure of 460 talents and the stated purpose of phoros and ships. Why did Thucydides regard the explanation as fraudulent? The reality as he appraised it convinced him that the rhetoric was a lie: from the start, tribute and the navy were used for purposes other than those expressed to the new members.
The interpretation proposed here—that the allies were led to believe that revenge would be sweetest and rewards greatest if they were willing to invest, perhaps heavily, in the League navy—strikes an insidious chord, reminding us of Thucydides' comment in the Archaeology that
[49] Blackman, GRBS 10 (1969):186; Finley, Economy and Society , 50 (= "Fifth-Century Athenian Empire," 113); cf. also Sealey, "Origins of the Delian League;' 233-55, whose argument about booty may have more merit in it than scholars have been willing to admit; see Pritchett's collection of evidence on booty in GSAW 5:363-401.
[50] I owe this idea of a "corporate" model of "investment" and "dividend" to W. R. Connor, whose stimulating comments at an earlier stage of the manuscript were beneficial to my thinking about the beginnings of the Delian League.
the stimulus of gain (
Thucydides concludes his discussion in chapter 96 by noting that "the treasury was on Delos, and the meetings were held in the temple [of Apollo]" (1.96.2). This sentence provides another financial detail, one which many modern readers doubtless pass over quickly. Yet as it occurs in a passage so highly selective in content, Thucydides' reference to the treasury demands careful attention; for on closer scrutiny, it reflects on the nature and novelty of the arrangements made by the Athenians.
Why did Thucydides consider that this detail about the League treasury merited inclusion? It may not seem surprising at first that he would complete a discussion of the financial arrangements of the Delian League by giving the location of the treasury. But Thucydides did not pursue comprehensiveness simply for its own sake; one of his hallmarks, often a great source of frustration for historians of the fifth century who wish for more evidence, is his ability to eliminate what is extraneous or insignificant to his purpose.[51] Moreover, it is unusual in literary works to be told even the general location of a treasury, even in historical works whose authors relate financial matters. For this reason we know regrettably little about the location of many funds of money, sacred and other. Therefore, mere mention of such information is noteworthy, especially when it occurs in a highly selective description of certain features of the Athenians' new hegemony.
On a basic level, its very inclusion confirms the degree of Thucydides' interest in the financial arrangements of the early League. It also may provide an implicit contrast between past and present; that is, at that time the tribute was housed on Delos, not in Athens. Indeed, in a sense Thucydides does not fail to mention the transfer of the League treasury to Athens; rather, he supplies this information in a way other than that which we expect.[52]
[51] Note that in the Pentekontaetia itself (1.97), Thucydides finds it necessary to defend in the first person his reason for including as much as he does of details which, from the standpoint both of structural narrative and of his purpose, would not seem entirely germane to his thesis.
[52] Much weight is given in discussion of Thucydides' "omissions" to his failure to state explicitly when the treasury was moved, or even that it was moved. Although I think that in 1.96 he is alluding to the change in location of the treasury, he still does not mention when it occurred. But is it a serious omission in that he neglected something relevant to his argument (so, e.g., Gomme, HCT 1:370; de Romilly, TAI , 91; Meiggs, AE , 444)? The historian leaves the reader no doubt that the Athenians controlled the League funds from the beginning. Given this fact, the treasury's location is not significant. This is not to deny the symbolic importance of the transfer of the League treasury to Athens; it is probable that the allies regarded the move as a significant step toward oppressive control. But Thucydides was not much concerned with symbols; what mattered to him, especially in the area of finance, was the money itself and who controlled it.
Most significant, however, is the institution of a common extra- and inter-polls treasury in which a part of the coined financial resources of separate, independent Greek poleis were amalgamated, with Leagueauthorized treasurers charged with their oversight. This arrangement bears no substantive resemblance to panhellenic dedications at sanctuaries such as Delos, Delphi, and Olympia, in which valuables offered to the god by various cities were housed side by side. The idea of a centralized, common treasury intended for use in military activity was an innovation with highly significant implications: first, it testifies concretely to the existence of fundamental, though ultimately ephemeral, cooperation. The poleis gave over to a common purpose precious resources that would be used to benefit not just themselves (so the expectation would have been held out) but also one other; moreover, if my hypothesis is correct that estimates exceeding minimum campaigning costs were used in the first assessment in order to create a surplus and thus necessitate a proper treasury with its own board of officials, the allies were being asked to forgo the return of any surplus at the end of the annual campaign. If the allies understood this clearly at the outset, this too is an important indication of their initial commitment.
Whether or not a surplus was envisioned from the start, it is dear that a reserve must have begun to accumulate early on.[53] This ktesis and periousia in the League treasury over the course of the fifth century testify to an important change both in policy and attitude from the traditional way of dealing with surplus by distributing it among the citizenry and, in the context of the Delian League, among League members.[54]
The League treasury served as a focus of unity among its members; this is not, however, simply a conceptual issue. The creation of a treasury signals recognition of the importance of financial power in the military sphere, for the centralization of wealth was necessary to enable an auxesis in power. The importance of this factor is brought out clearly in Archidamos' speech before the assembled Spartans on the eve of war, especially when he reminds the Spartans of their lack of public wealth and the difficulty of putting scattered resources to use.[55] Archidamos' words, in such dose proximity to the beginning of the Pentekontaetia, have a
[53] Thuc. 2.13.3 (reserve at its height).
[54] Themistokles first departed from the usual practice in Athens, Hdt. 7.144.1; cf. Plut. Them . 4.1-2; Nepos Them . 2; distributions on Siphnos, Hdt. 3.57.2.
[55] 1.80.4. For a detailed discussion of this speech, see below, pp. 81-85.
special resonance in the context of 1.96; for the reader already is aware of the significance of centralized resources to naval power and, therefore, can well appreciate the perspicacity in creating a centralized treasury for League funds. This was a novel example of the kind of common effort (koine ), in its financial as well as naval manifestation, of which Thucydides establishes the importance in the Archaeology. The Athenians had developed a solution to the problem of achrematia that, the historian argued earlier, frustrated the Trojan expedition (1.11).
Thus, a standing naval alliance engendered institutional and administrative developments—a common treasury, new system of revenue (phoros )—which accompanied the need for surplus and expenditure that constitute an advancement beyond a rudimentary concept of money and reserve.[56] The financial structure of the League presupposes the idea of deposits and accounting and shows clearly the Athenians' full appreciation of the efficiency of money in the naval sphere; there is no indication that those who were assessed tribute could make a contribution in kind by providing supplies and provisions. Why not? The tributary system (and, gradually, naval arche ) was founded on the idea of preparedness, as was land-based military activity. But unlike hoplite warfare, in which needs were predictable, actual fighting was of short duration (until the Peloponnesian War), and money was not necessary, naval warfare made unexpected and longer-term demands; a reserve of money was essential because needs could not be precisely anticipated and the ability to procure what was necessary immediately was key to success.
Obviously, I have discussed the creation of the League treasury in inverse proportion to the length of Thucydides' comment on its location. However, this attention is justified, for understanding the unfamiliarity of the arrangements of the League, the fundamental recognition of the need for money, and the apparent goodwill at the time is essential for appreciating the extraordinary step taken by the poleis that voluntarily parted with and forfeited control over their own financial resources. In this treasury, then, lie the origins, both practical and symbolic, of an imperialism created and maintained by one power's exploitation of others' resources. That it happened initially without force is an important feature of Thucydides' understanding of the evolution of Athens' arche .
This scrutiny of chapter 96 reveals Thucydides' paramount concentration on the finances of the League. In order now to grasp fully the
[56] Cf. the surplus theory, which—through the idea that surplus fosters the development of economic institutions and enables social and economic changes—has some relevance for the Delian League if one understands that only financial developments on the polls level with broader political effects (for both Athens and its allies) are at issue, not economic developments; cf. the useful discussion of the history of the development of surplus theory by Pearson, "The Economy Has No Surplus."
point of such attention, let us enumerate its contents and appreciate the specificity and detail. Thucydides states, after noting in a participial phrase that the Athenians took possession of the hegemony, that: (1) the Athenians decided who should pay money and who should furnish ships; (2) they said they were doing this for the purpose of retaliation by ravaging the King's land; (3) they created the board of Hellenotamiai, who received the tribute; (4) for thus the payment of money was called; (5) the first phoros was assessed at 460 talents; (6) the treasury was on Delos, and the meetings were held in the temple.
Every sentence, every clause, in this chapter concerns the institution of phoros . It is a tightly defined, extraordinarily detailed, exegetical description of the financial measures taken by the Athenians on their accession to the hegemony. This single-minded focus, combined with the absence of general constitutional arrangements, stipulations, and initiating oaths, such as we find in other authors,[57] alerts us to the presence of a different aim altogether. Chapter 96 is the decisive stage in, and the centerpiece of, Thucydides' argument about the creation and development of Athens' power; in other words, it constitutes the chief support for the purpose of the Pentekontaetia. It is of great significance that, following the comment that the Athenians first decided who should pay money and who should contribute ships, Thucydides proceeds to focus solely on the financial resources of the League, demonstrating his deeply penetrating analysis of power: he probes below the level of gods, warriors, or method of warfare, down to the concrete financial foundation of naval power. This kind of analysis of power is remarkable in the context of earlier ancient literature; its argument gives prominence not so much to the means by which war was waged (that is, the navy) as to the financial resources that underpin military success on the sea.
Chapter 96, then, is composed of a deliberate selection of carefully and cogently presented evidence that Athens' auxesis originated in the imposition of tribute and the creation of a centralized treasury in Athenian hands.[58] It is no more a general description of the League's origins than was the historian's account of Agamemnon and the Trojan expedition a general description of that great event of the past. I bring up Agamemnon not as a random case in point; for Thucydides' treatment of that chieftain offers additional insight into the approach taken in 1.96 and demonstrates the importance of the Archaeology in introducing the
[57] Arist. Ath.Pol . 23.5; Plut. Arist . 25.1.
[58] Contra , e.g., McGregor, "Athenian Policy," 69-70: "What we have in [1.96] is a selection made by Thucydides of the results of the congress.... Thucydides incorporates in his History , although not comprehensively, what happened in consequence; but the order of composition in this chapter is almost accidental, it has no special historical meaning.... It comprises the stage-setting."
principles of selection and the focus of attention in the rest of the work. Thucydides' explicit rejection of the importance of oaths with respect to the acquisition and maintenance of power in his analysis of Agamemnon's ability to compel unity and obedience gains additional significance in connection with 1.96 and vice versa. The oaths of Tyndareos, he argues, had nothing to do with the real basis of Agamemnon's power; rather, the dunamis of this "big man" derived from Pelops, to whose wealth Thucydides explicitly alludes. In 1.96, Thucydides chooses to omit any reference to the oaths the allies took at the inception of the League. Why? Because it is implicit here as it was made explicit in 1.9 that dunamis is built on concrete, material resources; naval dunamis , specifically, rests on financial resources, not on symbolic foci of unity.
In an important sense, the account of 1.94-96 mirrors Thucydides' treatment of the origins and explanation of the Peloponnesian War. He differentiates between the events critical for understanding the timing of the war (the
Thucydides has now completed his account of the means by which the Athenians were able to capitalize on the conditions following the Persian
[60] Cf. among Mahan's six criteria for sea power, "national disposition," Influence of Sea Power , 50-58.
Wars. Chapter 97 marks a change: it, and the rest of the Pentekontaetia, does not, strictly speaking, continue the argument of 1.89-96. To be sure, although much remains to be added to the analysis of the development of and increase in Athenian power, an additional goal now emerges. The chief purpose of the Pentekontaetia is, as we have seen, to present an argument. Mere tracing of events per se is not precisely germane to the historian's goal in this section of the work. Accordingly, when Thucydides signals that in what follows, he will be relating erga from the period between the inception of the Delian League and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War with a more general aim of recounting events both in war and in the administration of affairs involving the Persians, their own allies, and the Peloponnesians—in short, adopting a procedure less rigidly oriented to the purpose introduced in 1.88—he finds it necessary to step out of the narrative expressly to explain his reasons for doing so: authors of Hellenika omitted this period, concentrating on the time before the Persian Wars or on the wars themselves. Hellanikos, the only writer who touched on the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars in his Attic history, did so only cur-softly and with inaccurate chronology (1.97.2).
The very presence of such a comment made in the first person (
Thucydides begins by relating early League activities in a way that emphasizes their function in enhancing Athens' strength at the expense of the League as a whole. As in 1.96, he pointedly focuses on the Athenians, not the League collectively, as the initiators of aggression against primarily Greek targets, whose defeat brings tangible, concrete benefit to the Athenians themselves, with nothing said explicitly about that to the allies.[62] The inference is not necessarily that the allies in fact derived no advantage from the early campaigns of the League; rather, that Thucydides' narrative is constructed to demonstrate the falsehood of the
Explicit reference to the suppression of piracy and colonization recalls the use to which the naval power of Minos was put; there Thucydides spelled out the probable concrete benefits of thalassocracy and the suppression of piracy in terms of economic gain, and a connection was suggested between revenue and naval power, and colonization as a means of extension and consolidation of naval power. Singling out in both cases the significance of naval power for acquiring wealth through the eradication of piracy and other means is deliberate; once again, as in 1.96, the Archaeology informs substantively the selection of material and analytical criteria.
Thucydides' treatment, then, of the uses to which League moneys and navy were immediately put demonstrates the Athenians' ability to employ the allies' voluntary efforts and contributions in the process of auxesis . League membership is gradually expanded by coercion, as the Karystians and Naxians are forced by siege into the alliance, while League wealth increases from such expansion, from slavery, and presumably revenue from piracy and from tribute from the new members. Thucydides then moves from specific examples of the treatment of uncooperative Greeks to a general analysis of the significance of dissatisfaction and revolts. His approach is familiar: he is not interested in disaffection and revolt simply as a reflection or consequence of arche , but rather in their relevance for understanding the auxesis of empire.
[62] This is brought out well by Rawlings, Phoenix 31 (1977):1-8.
First, he suggests a pattern of revolts that resulted in "enslavement" in violation of "the established agreement" (
Thucydides next analyzes the specific means by which the general climate of dissatisfaction led to a decisive increase in Athens' naval dunamis . He continues to present a subtle and complex picture of the evolution of an unequal power relationship between Athens and its allies, while at the same time offering insight into his own thinking about the nature of naval power. Let us look closely at the passage, introduced by a general comment:
No longer were the Athenians otherwise at all agreeable [to the allies] as leaders, nor did they serve on campaigns on an equal basis,[63] and it was accordingly easier to compel to submission those who revolted. For this [inequality] and its consequences, the allies were themselves responsible. For it was because of their reluctance to serve on campaign that a good number, in order to remain at home, had themselves assessed to pay a proportionate amount of money instead of ships, and the navy increased in strength [verbal form of auxesis ] to the Athenians' benefit from the expense (dapane ) incurred by the allies; while the allies, whenever they would revolt, went into war unprepared (aparaskeuoi ) and untrained. (1.99.2-3)
Thucydides thus plots the next decisive stage of the arche : he argues that, as in the transfer of hegemony, the allies once again facilitated the growth of Athenian power—unwittingly, but not without their own self-interest in mind. In this case, the process was insidious: by preferring to pay tribute over serving on campaign, they financed an Athenian fleet at their own expense, and that, ultimately, brought about their own subjugation. As the institution of tribute is regarded as the foundation of Athens' dunamis , it is likewise the mechanism of auxesis . The revenue-expense-power ratio could not be more precisely defined than it is in this passage, in which the necessary use (dapane ) of money to sustain a fleet is presented by the historian in its most explicit form; while it is itself an elaboration of an earlier remark by Archidamos (1.83.2), which concisely makes the same point that the function of money in the sphere of naval power lies in expense. Indeed, the increase in requirements of money
over manpower would have crystallized the fact that money was the basis of the Delian League's dunamis . Thucydides, thus, continues to analyze naval power not on an abstract or static plane in which, for example, the institution of tribute would be used to indicate the deteriorated status of the allies; rather, tribute is the key to understanding the anatomy, the very phusis , of naval power.
The role of the allies in the Athenians' auxesis thus continues to be of crucial importance to Thucydides, who argues that the Athenian arche cannot be understood simplistically as a one-way relationship between oppressor and victim. Additionally; his analyses of 1.95-96 and 1.99 in particular reveal an astute understanding of embryonic power and the nature of auxesis : power does not burst forth fully formed. To put it in Thucydidean terms: the phenomenon of the Athenian arche cannot be explained simply by the use of force; such power requires massive expenditure that no one polis from its own internal resources could possibly have sustained; it depends on the concentration of money pooled from a large area under the control of one polis. It was self-evident that Athens could not exert power before acquiring power; that is why the relationship between Athens and its allies is central to Thucydides' analysis, for the financial resources necessary for naval arche had to come voluntarily from them. The phenomenon of voluntary change of status, then, acquires a larger, fundamental significance in the growth of Athenian power. Indeed, this unique aspect of Athens' arche , namely, that it was developed largely without the direct use of force, is a point remarked on explicitly by the Athenians at Sparta, partly as a justification for its existence.[64]
Thucydides suggests, then, a general trend of conversion to tributary status. Quantification is difficult, if not impossible, both of those who voluntarily changed their status and of those who became tributary as a result of revolt. His account of voluntary change, however, has elicited serious doubt chiefly because of its presumption of an initially sizable number of ship contributors in the League and the motivation he offers for the change. Some scholars have gone so far as to reject the entire chapter, but the reasons advanced are ultimately unpersuasive.[65] More serious objections to taking 1.99 as good historical evidence have been proposed by E. Ruschenbusch in a series of articles concerned with citi-
[64] 1.75.2, 76.2.
[65] Robertson, AJAH 5 (1980):65, finds that the conversion to tributary status "strains credulity" because it is impossible, he argues, to suppose that there could be a fixed, standard monetary value of a trireme. Yet there is no reason to suppose this. Robertson is making an assumption about how monetary payments would have been assessed in relation to ship payments and then using that assumption to discount Thucydides on the grounds of impossibility; I shall return to this shortly.
zen population figures in many small communities, mainly islands, in the Delian League.[66] Ruschenbusch has concluded that the number of citizens in practically all of these communities would have been too small ever to have been sufficient to man one trireme, much less more than one.[67] How strong are the grounds for this view?
First, it presupposes a direct parallel between ancient population figures and those between the years 1879-1940; in other words the population in most of these small communities would have remained basically stable over a long period of time. While one can accept the premise that fewer dramatic changes might have occurred over time in these communities compared to larger ones, this view does not adequately take into account many significant variable factors such as disease, emigration and immigration, depletion of land resources, and changes in the arability of land due to drought. Second, ancient testimony other than that of Thucydides tells against Ruschenbusch's thesis: numbered among the Greek poleis .contributing ships to the Hellenic cause in the Persian Wars are many which likely were original members of the Delian League—the Eretrians, Keans, Naxians, Styrians, Kythnians, Seriphians, and Siphnians (Hdt. 8.46.2-4). In addition, there were many Greeks in the Persian fleet who contributed both men and ships, detailed also by Herodotos: the Ionians alone furnished one hundred ships (7.94), the islanders, seventeen ships (7.95.1), and those from Pontos, one hundred ships (7.95.2). And as Blackman has noted, the losses of ships in the Persian Wars were probably not tremendously large.[68] It is dear that Ionian and Hellespontine allies had their own ships, which would have been necessary to sail to their respective homes following the siege of Sestos.[69]
[66] Ruschenbusch, ZPE 53 (1983):125-43, 144-48; "Modell Amorgos," 265-71; ZPE 59 (1985):253-63. Cf. also Merkelbach and Varinlioglu, ZPE 59 (1985):264.
[67] He bases his population estimates on two factors: believing, first, that there is a close relation between amounts of tribute, citizen population, and an agricultural livelihood, he arrives at a figure of I talent of tribute per 800 citizens, 3,000 dr. per 400, and so on; and second, that population figures between the years 1879-1940 establish limits applicable to the fifth and fourth centuries B.C . (ZPE 53 [1983]: 126). Difficulties in estimating occur (1) in the case of naval, nonagricultural cities, since agricultural potential and yield are the criteria used in the estimates; (2) in the case of cities whose tribute exceeded I talent, because they may have had other sources of income that were considered when the tribute was assessed. Thus, if one accepts the conclusion that only a very small number of cities would have been able to contribute manned ships, then one is compelled to question the accuracy of Thucydides' statement in 1.99, which carries the implication that many states had contributed ships in the early years of the League. One is forced, therefore, to choose between population estimates based on modern analogy and the ancient testimony of Thucydides.
[68] Blackman, GRBS 10 (1969):180-81.
[69] Thuc. 1.89.2; Blackman, ibid. Herodotos, however, does not mention that the allies took part in the siege; still, they had participated in the earlier campaigns.
But there is another consideration as well: Ruschenbusch rejects the idea of ship contributors among the majority of allies on the grounds that they would have lacked the necessary complement of two hundred to man a single trireme; yet nowhere does Thucydides or any other source state that triremes alone were eligible for the League fleet. Indeed, there is every reason to suppose that some of the ships contributed were pentekonters, which at least Melos, Seriphos, and Siphnos are known to have supplied in the Persian War campaigns (Hdt. 8.46). Accordingly, many of the smaller communities could easily have contributed ships and men, even if we were to accept Ruschenbusch's estimates. In addition, merchant ships (
We would like to be able to quantify more precisely Thucydides' vague
The reason that Thucydides supplies for the allies' preferring to pay tribute, "in order not to be away from home," is credible, though its implication that paying tribute entirely exempted allies from military service does not inspire complete confidence. However, his explanation may suggest that in the absence of a large war (during which time we know that allies served alongside Athenians), it was possible for service on campaigns to be minimal. But if we accept Thucydides, are we compelled to reject Plutarch (Kim . 11), who describes the initiative as coming from the Athenians (and specifically Kimon)? The difference between sources here is rather similar to that between Thucydides' and Herodotos' treatment of Pausanias, which we examined earlier in this chapter. In both cases, Thucydides explores the question of the allies' responsi-
[70] As in, e.g., Thuc. 6.22 (explicitly allied boats), 30.1, 44.1; 7.7.3, 17.3, 18.4, 19.3.
[71] As in the case of Chian ships, 8.15.2.
bility, while not, in my view, discounting the possibility of Athenian motives. In this case, Thucydides' account permits an eagerness on the part of the Athenians that allies contributing ships change to the tributary category.
Let us return to the terms of the adjustment in the relationship between Athens and the allies who changed their status. The Athenians arranged for them to pay a sum of money which Thucydides describes as a "proportionate" or "corresponding cost," an amount that the allies "had coming to them."[72] What does the phrase mean? We are not to suppose one fixed sum for everyone who converted to a monetary payment. Rather, just as the various poleis were assessed different amounts of tribute depending on their individual circumstances, and had likely contributed different numbers of ships, so for each, the "corresponding cost" would also have varied. But we have no reason to assume that the Athenians attempted directly to correlate the cost of a trireme and tribute payment[73] nor that the amount would have been lower than a rough equivalent of the cash outlay on a trireme (or other kind of ship).[74] First of all, as Thucydides puts it, the issue was not one of lightening a polis's financial or equivalent burden but of reducing the time spent away from home (which could have a financial effect). We should not overlook the possibility that subjective criteria such as time, travel, and effort would have been taken into account. Those who chose voluntarily to change their category, after all, were paying money for others to perform the service and take on the burden which they had previously carried. That is, the
We can see how the change described in 1.99 is crucial for understanding the development of the relationship between Athens and its allies from the standpoint of exchange. At the beginning of the League, allies contributed to a common effort. A fundamental change occurred, as described in 1.99, when the relationship transformed into a cash payment by one party (the allies) for a service by another party (the Athenians). Thus, the operation becomes, in a limited but important sense, a strictly economic act or contract. Payment of cash for a service re-
[73] Contra Robertson, AJAH 5 (1980):65.
[74] Blackman, GRBS 10 (1969):184; cf. Finley's suggestion, Economy and Society , 49 (= "The Fifth-Century Athenian Empire," 112-13), that, following the battle of Eurymedon, the prospect of a reduced financial burden offered by tribute would have contributed to the change in category, with his general discussion on 49-50.
moves entirely the good-faith element of a common contribution and roughly equal exchange; from the perspective of charis , the Athenians, as Perikles points out in the Funeral Oration, always have the upper hand (2.40.4).[75]
In 1.94-99, Thucydides highlights the Athenians' alacrity in using their position to their decided advantage; but in cases that also involved actions or decisions motivated by the allies' self-interest, the historian shapes his account accordingly to give prominence to this aspect, which he judged essential to the development of Athenian power. His attention to the allies' responsibility clearly ties in with an earlier discussion about developing power in the period sandwiched between the "second account" of Minos and Troy (1.8.3) that we examined in the previous chapter. The connection is deliberate; indeed, the parallels are striking.[76] Recall the linear progression from Minos to Agamemnon: the result of Minos' naval rule, by which he expelled pirates and colonized the islands, was a general increase in the use of the sea, and the ktesis of wealth. Stronger and weaker alike were party to the development of a profoundly unequal relationship that fed the self-interest of both: the weak were motivated by the expectation of advantages which would make the price of subjugation tolerable, while the strong, by possessing periousiai , won for themselves the weaker as subjects. In the course of time, the numbers of those on one side were great enough to mount a campaign the size of the Trojan expedition. It follows, therefore, that Agamemnon as the head of this campaign had power through inherited wealth, not through oaths (1.8.2-9.2).
This parallels remarkably the account of 1.96-99: the hegemony of Athens in the Delian League led to the expulsion of pirates and colonization (Skyros). It insured the ktesis of wealth (the League treasury, tribute, and other revenue). Athens and the allies both had reasons to develop an unequal relationship: the weaker allies were willing to endure subjection for the benefits first of plunder, then of protection without personal sacrifice; while the stronger Athenians, in control of the periousiai of the League, were able to render the allies subjects. The result was a naval power extensive enough to undertake a war of the scope of the Peloponnesian War.
The coherence of the two analyses both confirms and offers additional insight into 1.94-99. For we can appreciate how the treatment of the evolution of Athens' rule in those chapters fits into a larger historical
[75] See Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice , 171-73, for the implications of an increasingly "economic" character of a contract.
[76] Scholara have noted general similarities between the account of the Trojan expedition and the Athenian empire and have suggested other specific correspondences; e.g., Rabel, CJ 80 (1984):8-10; Hunter, Klio 62 (1980):203-5.
conception about the development of power and power relationships. It is also clear that Thucydides' method of focusing alternately on the allies and the Athenians is not intended to lay blame at key stages on one side and thus remove it temporarily from the other, but rather to show that both sides are intertwined in a complex relationship, with each expecting to gain something tangible. Thucydides presents a dispassionate analysis, making no moral judgments on either the Athenians or the allies. It is tempting at first glance to read implicit condemnation of the Athenians into this account because of its careful attention to their use of the League to develop their own power at the allies' expense in money and freedom; but it is important to remember Thucydides' purpose in writing these chapters. We have examined them with the utmost scrutiny and have found a strict adherence to the aim of analyzing rationally the concrete stages by which the Athenian arche evolved—and this purpose precludes moral judgment and criticism.
In Thucydides' account of the increase in tributary members of the alliance and its role as a catalyst in the development of arche , the beauty of the Athenian arche emerges in elegant and simple form. The Athenian arche rested on the use (dapane ) of the resources of the allies; moreover, the allies' regular contribution of money to the League treasury enabled the Athenians not only to sustain but also to increase (thus, auxesis ) their fleet. The connection between chremata and nautikon through expense could not be more clearly expressed. That it was not an obvious connection is suggested by the fact that Thucydides judged it important to explain the relationship. The additional ingenuity of the arrangement was that at decisive stages cooperation, not compulsion, was responsible for auxesis , a remarkable circumstance in the history of power and arche (cf. Xen. Por . 5.5). The consequence was the nonviolent acquisition by one polis of the precious wealth of others; that it was for the purpose of maintaining power over those same poleis that supplied the wealth is a great irony.
Thucydides has marked distinct stages in the increase in Athens' power after establishing its initial foundations. Thus, the imposition of tribute upon some of the allies was the fundamental basis on which the Athenians built the phenomenon of the arche . The next stage was the change to tributary status of most of the ship-contributing members. Thucydides emphasizes a crucial result of this: the allies were the ones Who paid for the Athenian navy. The necessity and function of expense, dapane , will echo throughout the work, linked with the need for revenue. In war, as Archidamos notes, expense is the constant factor. In the development of naval arche , it is the sine qua non.
In the rest of the Pentekontaetia, Thucydides points out other ways
by which Athens' dunamis increased as well. Revolts turned out to the advantage of the Athenians, because their suppression usually resulted in the imposition of tribute, if the polis was not already tributary. Such was the case with Thasos (1.101.3). In addition, the Athenians would compel the state to pay an indemnity, so that they ultimately suffered no serious financial loss, as in the case of both Thasos and Samos (1.101.3, 117.3). Furthermore, Thucydides' account of the revolt of Thasos is illuminating also for pointing to financial benefits other than tribute derived from the empire even in the early years of the League. The revolt was prompted, he tells us, by a dispute concerning the mines under the control of the Thasians, and after the revolt was suppressed, the Athenians gained control of the mines. This testifies to a considerable source of income over and above tribute which presumably benefited the Athenians alone and, furthermore, which would have made its way directly to Athens, rather than the League treasury on Delos.[77] Finally, Thucydides specifies the financial gain which resulted when Athens forced new members into the League, as they did Aigina (1.108.4). In all of these cases, Athens gained not only money but also ships, for the states were required to surrender their fleets.
In the Pentekontaetia, therefore, Thucydides has applied the same method and criteria used in the Archaeology to illuminate and to judge the development of Athenian power. Thus, the reader is given the means by which to weigh Athens' strength against that of the most notable previous rulers and states: Minos and Agamemnon, for example, also possessed a fleet, periousiai chrematon , and empire, but of a lesser degree compared to the Athenians in the fifty years before the war. In addition, the emphasis on inherited power in the Archaeology also continues in the Pentekontaetia: the Athenians took over an existing League and built on it.[78] As has also emerged, the Archaeology is instrumental in adumbrating the chapters in the Pentekontaetia that treat the development of the arche ; in particular, Thucydides' account of Minos and Agamemnon informs and enriches the reader's understanding of the nature of Thucydides' analysis of Athenian power.
Our examination of these two analytical sections of the work, the Archaeology and the Pentekontaetia, has sought to lay out the historian's approach to and conception of the role of financial resources with re-
[77] Herodotos, 6.46.3, estimates the amount of revenue extracted from the mines at Skapte Hyle at eighty talents, and the total from the island and mainland ranging from two hundred to three hundred talents annually.
[78] This perhaps explains why Thucydides does not portray the Delian League as a new alliance, but rather, more the continuation of what was already created, in contrast to later sources who do present the Delian League as something new and separate from the Hellenic League led by the Spartans.
spect to naval power. It should be clear that this is not simply an aspect that Thucydides was aware of and noted, but rather, that it is at the very core of his understanding of the historical development of power, to such an extent that he gives it prominence in the section of the work which penetrates to the foundation of Athens' naval arche . In his analyses of earlier powers, for which evidence was lacking, the historian had recourse to eikos arguments and similar deductive reasoning, which addressed, significantly, the role of financial resources in their development as well. We now have the conceptual framework to turn to Thucydides' main subject, the Peloponnesian War itself, to continue to explore the historian's treatment of financial resources.