Sectarian Violence in Cotabato

The communal violence that swept across Cotabato in early 1970 was a diverse and complex phenomenon with multiple causes.^[13] Written and oral reports of the violent incidents confirm that they were overwhelmingly sectarian in nature—that is, they consisted of attacks by armed Christian or Muslim gangs on (often unarmed) members of the opposite ethnoreligious category. Most commonly, Christian gangs assaulted Muslim farmers and burnt their houses, and Muslim gangs retaliated in kind against Christian farmers. Although the ethnoreligious strife never occurred on a provincewide scale—instead exploding in particular localities or municipalities for fairly specific reasons and usually for a limited duration—the scale of destruction was catastrophic. In one two-month stretch, the Mindanao Cross reported more than 137 people killed. A government report published in the Mindanao Cross (November 20, 1971) cited 305 Muslims and 269 Christians killed, and almost five hundred homes burned, in the period between January and October of 1971. The actual number was likely

much higher as many incidents were not reported (McAmis 1974). By the end of 1971, the number of refugees within Mindanao forced from their home communities by the violence was estimated at more than 100,000 (Majul 1985; McAmis 1974).

While the preponderance of violent clashes was sectarian in appearance, the antagonisms that underlay them, when closely analyzed, were not solely (or even predominantly) ethnoreligious in nature. The three major lines of dissension in the region seem to have been principally class-based rather than ethnically motivated. These were, first, conflict between ordinary Christian settlers and Muslim elites; second, conflict between ordinary Muslims and Christian elites—often representatives of the state; and third, intra-elite conflict—usually, but not always, between Muslim and Christian elites. Although many, if not most, of the actual clashes occurred between ordinary Muslims and Christians, an exploration of four major outbreaks indicates that the antagonisms that motivated the violence were of one of the above three types, and that often those initiating the violence were in the employ of one or another elite group.

Episode 1: "Toothpick" and the Tiruray Resistance

In March of 1970 in the small town of Upi in the Tiruray Highlands south of Cotabato City, an eruption of violence occurred that is generally regarded as having opened a two-year period of intense sectarian conflict in Cotabato (see, e.g., George 1980; McAmis 1974; Stewart 1977). The instigators in this case were an armed band of Tiruray led by Feliciano Luces, alias "Toothpick," a Christian Ilonggo settler.^[14] They clashed initially with an armed Muslim gang led by Disumimba Rashid, an already notorious outlaw. Toothpick himself went on to attain quasi-legendary status as a ferocious and fanatical anti-Muslim (see, e.g., George 1980). It is impossible to assess the accuracy of this image, but it is important to note that, at the outset, newspaper reports indicate that Toothpick's attacks were neither simply anti-Muslim nor generally perceived that way.

Native Tiruray who had taken up plow farming and Ilocano farmers who had migrated to the Upi Valley in the 1920s had coexisted peacefully for some time. In the postwar period they were joined by Ilonggo homesteaders and, increasingly, by Magindanaons (Schlegel 1979). Since independence, the municipality of Upi had been under the

political control of the Sinsuat family. By 1970, the tensions produced by postwar immigration to Upi were released in violent responses to perceived exploitation. Early newspaper accounts and letters to the editor portrayed Toothpick's armed exploits as those of a Robin Hood defending poor Tiruray, Christians, and Muslims from Muslim outlaws in the employ of wealthy and powerful men. Newspaper reports suggest two causes for the outbreak of violence in Upi: "landgrabbing" and extortions by elites. Influential Muslims and Christians had reportedly titled a good deal of occupied land in the area and were using Muslim outlaw bands to gain possession by scaring off the inhabitants. In addition, Muslim datus had been coercing tribute from Christian and Tiruray villagers. The Tiruray band led by Toothpick was originally organized as a response to both those provocations. Later, Toothpick apparently was employed by a Liberalista Christian politician in a violent but unsuccessful attempt to oust the Sinsuats from power in Upi. The anti-Muslim reputation of Toothpick seems to have derived from those efforts.

Episode 2: Provincial Elections, Ilaga Terror, and the Manili Massacre

The next outbreak of sectarian violence occurred in the Cotabato Valley proper in late 1970, and by mid-1971 had encompassed eighteen municipalities in its northeastern portion (McAmis 1974, 46).^[15] This conflict was unrelated to that in Upi; it was also much more costly in lives and property damage, with scores of farms burned and farmers killed, and thousands made refugees. The violence was largely limited to new settlements in Christian majority areas. A newspaper editorial early in 1971 blamed the violence on "Ilonggo fanatics new to the area" (Mindanao Cross , February, 20, 1971). These were the so-called Ilaga, or "Rats"—armed bands of Christians, usually Ilonggos, that terrorized Muslims. The single most shocking act committed by the Ilaga—and the one that was to reverberate the farthest—was the massacre of sixty-five men, women, and children in a mosque in the village of Manill in June of 1971.

There has been a good deal of speculative writing pointing to a group of Ilonggo Christian politicians as the founders, masterminds, or sponsors of the Ilaga (see, e.g., George 1980; Majul 1985; Mercado 1984). These suppositions are beset by certain logical problems^[16] as

well as by an almost complete lack of reliable information. However, there is evidence to indicate that certain politicians gave some support, and reason to assume it would be in their interest to do so.

Local elections were held in 1971, with the governorship once more being contested. President Marcos again handpicked the Nacionalista candidate for governor—this time Carlos Cajelo, an officer in the Philippine Constabulary. Marcos had apparently come to the conclusion that no Muslim candidate could topple Pendatun's Liberalista machine in Cotabato, so he chose a Christian candidate, presumably aware that in order to win, Cajelo would need to draw virtually all Christian votes away from the incumbent, Simeon Datumanong.

Cajelo, who was still the active commander of the Philippine Constabulary of the province at the start of the campaign period, faced formidable problems in his bid. First, Datumanong was a moderately popular governor and Cotabato Christians were accustomed to voting for Muslim gubernatorial candidates. Second, Cajelo was a relative newcomer to the province and was not well known. Although an Ilonggo himself, he could not even automatically rely on Ilonggo support. A number of Ilonggo politicians and voters resented Cajelo as a presumptuous newcomer and had pledged their support to a popular veteran Ilonggo mayor who was running for governor as an independent Nacionalista candidate. Any development that moved Christians away from Muslims, consolidated Christian strongholds, and roused Christian interest in a strong law-and-order candidate was in the interest of Cajelo and those Nacionalista mayors who supported him (most, apparently, did not); and although as recent provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary he had ample access to armed force, the existence of a deniable, freelance force able to expedite such a development would also have been in his interest.

No firm evidence exists to support the suggestion that the official Nacionalista candidate for governor encouraged or supported Ilaga terror. The Liberalista Congressman Pendatun was, however, clearly of that opinion when in an October 1971 speech he blamed the violence in the province on Christian politicians trying to "wrest control of the province from Muslims" and warned his audience that the Ilaga would disturb "bailiwicks of the Liberalista Party one week before the elections" (quoted in Mindanao Cross , October 30, 1971). It may also be noted that Carlos Cajelo won the governor's race by a comfortable margin, that some municipalities that had always supported a Muslim

for governor voted in favor of Cajelo,^[17] and that Ilaga violence ended suddenly soon after the election.

Episode 3: Repudiating the Ampatuans

In a series of incidents that began in mid-1971, the Ampatuans were virtually driven out of most of their home municipality, Ampatuan, by armed Christian bands. Although Nacionalistas and strong supporters of Marcos, the Ampatuan clan suffered significant losses during this period. The Ampatuan datus were widely regarded as the most abusive toward Christian settlers. They reportedly sold a great deal of forested land to Christian homesteaders, allowed them to clear it, then drove them away. They were said to have extorted rice and money from Christian farmers, ruling their municipality as a private fief. Muslim farmers reportedly fared little better than their Christian counterparts and were taxed and fined excessively, in 1971, Christian victims of the Ampatuans retaliated. The Ampatuans responded in force and the municipality became a battle zone for some months. As in Northeast Cotabato, however, it was the ordinary unarmed Muslims of Ampatuan municipality who suffered most at the hands of Christian bands.

Episode 4: "The Battle of Buldun"

In August 1971, in the town of Buldun in the Iranun highlands to the north of the Cotabato Valley, fighting broke out between the indigenous Muslim inhabitants and Christian loggers for reasons not made clear in reports of the incident. After some Christian loggers were killed in retaliation for the shooting death of a local Muslim official, Buldun was fortified by local Muslims in expectation of a counterattack. A detachment of the Philippine Constabulary advancing on the town was fired upon and its commanding officer killed. The impression spread that those behind the barricades in Buldun were well armed and well organized and thus members of the "Blackshirts," the rumored military arm of the MIM. The Philippine Army arrived in battalion strength and Buldun was bombarded by artillery for four days, after which an ultimatum to surrender was issued to the townspeople. By this time, however, the national media had relayed the story of Buldun around the country, and public outcry forced the intervention of President Marcos, who personally negotiated with the mayor of

Buldun and averted the almost certain destruction of the town (George 1980; Majul 1985; McAmis 1974).

The Aims and Consequences of Sectarian Violence

These four episodes are meant to illustrate some notable aspects of the period of sectarian violence in Cotabato and throughout the southern Philippines.^[18] While in all four episodes it was Christians who were the primary instigators of violence, in two of them—at Upi and Ampatuan—the initial targets of the attacks were specific Muslim datus aligned with the Marcos administration. In the other two episodes—at Manili and Buldun—the primary targets were ordinary Muslims. The dissimilar nature of this initial targeting suggests that the apparently sectarian violence was neither uniformly structured nor monocausal. The first type consisted of more or less spontaneous uprisings by ordinary Christian settlers (or Tiruray farmers) aimed at oppressive Muslim datus. By 1970, the Sinsuats and the Ampatuans were the two most powerful Muslim political families in Cotabato. That their close connections with the ruling national party did not deter the Christian attacks upon them suggests strongly that their attackers were not simply agents engaged in a Marcos administration master plan to control the province. The hundreds of ordinary Muslims who were spillover victims of these two episodes of violence certainly experienced the attacks as sectarian in nature but also, one may imagine, directed blame at the datus who drew the Christian fury down upon them.

The second form of sectarian violence consisted of organized assaults on Muslim communities. The episodes of violence in the Cotabato Valley and Buldun point to the conspicuously non-neutral attitudes and activities of representatives of the state. At no time during the sectarian conflict in Cotabato did the Philippine Constabulary or Army assault a Christian armed camp the way they did Buldun. Further, when Muslim noncombatants were attacked by Ilaga gangs, the Philippine constabulary was invariably slow in coming to their defense. Most distressing to Cotabato Muslims was the ample circumstantial evidence implicating the Philippine Constabulary in Ilaga terror. An often-cited example was the fact that Manili, where the Ilaga massacred scores of Muslim civilians, was under formal constabulary control at the time of the massacre. The incidents in Buldun occurred just two months after the Manili massacre, and it is understandable that the Muslim inhabitants of Buldun reacted to the arrival of the Philippine

Constabulary with armed apprehension. By the end of 1971, with the man who was commander of the provincial constabulary at the time of the Manili massacre and the battle of Buldun now the governor-elect, Cotabato Muslims had good cause for intense distrust of the provincial and national administrations.

No documentary evidence exists to suggest that the apparent collusion of agents of the state with armed Christian terrorists was part of a political strategy formulated by the Marcos government. Nevertheless, incidents such as the Manili massacre and the battle of Buldun left many with the impression that such a "genocidal" state policy existed. That impression was consequential in at least three ways. First, the perception of a government-endorsed anti-Muslim policy reached the international Muslim community and led to protests and other activities on behalf of Philippine Muslims. Most important for subsequent events, that impression was gained by Libyan Premier Muammar Kadaffi, who heard news of the Manili massacre from a BBC radio broadcast (Majul 1985). In the United Nations, Kadaffi charged the Philippine government with genocide and threatened to give aid to Philippine Muslims (George 1980; Noble 1976). Evidence suggests that Rashid Lucman was the principal link at this time with both Tun Mustapha and Muammar Kadaffi.^[19]

Second, the perceived anti-Muslim strategy of the state also spurred the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an underground organization founded by Nur Misuari. According to Mercado (1984), in mid-1971 Misuari held an organizational meeting in Zamboanga that was attended by the most committed of the ninety original Malaysia trainees. At that meeting, certain traditional leaders, such as Datu Udtug, were repudiated for their opportunism, and the MNLF was organized with Nur Misuari as its chairman. Its goal was the liberation of the homeland of Philippine Muslims from the Philippine state. Although the MIM under Datu Udtug was rejected at the meeting, some traditional leaders, most notably former congressman Rashid Lucman, were approved for leadership positions in the MNLF.

Finally, the biased and aggressive actions of the Philippine Constabulary and Army left the ordinary Muslims of Cotabato with the lasting impression that those who held state power not only had little interest in protecting them but actively meant them harm. Associated with this impression was the developing realization that datu officeholders were either unable or unwilling to protect them against the hostile forces of the state. That knowledge, and the consequent search for new

protectors, conditioned the response of ordinary Muslims to the next major episode of state aggression.