11
Bureaucratic Reforms

Officially labeled a "revolution in administrative strcuture, but not against any persons," bureaucratic reform started in 1982 when the necessary groundwork was established. The reforms intended ostensibly to streamline the unruly bureaucracy and to make the leading cadres "revolutionized, better educated, professionally competent and younger in age."^[1] A hidden objective was to resolve the succession problem—the question that, according to Deng Xiaoping, would determine the fate of China—by promoting a new group of leaders whose personal interests were tied to the reform policy.

This chapter examines the results of that reform, analyzes the concrete strategy followed by the regime, and discusses the political implications of the sweeping leadership change.

Leadership Changes, 1982–87

The regime carried out leadership reshuffling in the following sequence:

1. It changed the ministers and vice ministers of the central government in May 1982.

2. It readjusted the leadership of the functional departments of the Central Committee—such as the organizational department and the propaganda department—in the summer of 1982.

3. It appointed a large number of new members to the Twelfth Central Committee in September 1982.

4. It reshuffled provincial leadership in 1983.

5. It adjusted the leading bodies at the district and municipal levels (completed in December 1983).

[1] Daily Report , 9 March 1982, K4.

6. It changed the leadership at the county level (completed in September 1984).

7. It reorganized the leadership at the enterprise levels.

8. It initiated the party rectification campaign.

9. It prepared a list of third-echelon cadres.

10. It carried out a second-round readjustment of the leadership at the central and provincial levels in 1985.

11. It promoted a large number of new generation cadres to the highest positions in the Thirteenth Party Congress.

The results of the first-round administrative reforms (1982–84) from the center down to the basic level are tabulated in tables 41 and 42.

The State Council

Administrative reforms strengthened the authority of the premier by ending the practice of placing each vice premier in charge of a specific functional area (xitong ). The number of vice premiers de-

creased from twelve to two, and the new system of "State Council standing conferences" (guowuyuan changwu huiyi ) was introduced. Many commissions (e.g., the State Agricultural Commission) were abolished, some ministries were merged (e.g., the ministries of power industries and of water conservancy), and a few new ministries were established (e.g., the ministries of aviation and of electronics). The bureaus with staff functions were combined, and some of the support functions—such as running nursery schools for the ministry personnel's children and motor pools—were transferred to newly established independent corporations, which would eventually operate on a profit-and-loss principle.^[2]

The reduction of personnel was equally impressive. The total number of ministers and vice ministers—excluding heads and deputy heads of commissions, offices, and agencies—was reduced by approximately 70 percent. The average age of leaders was lowered from sixty-four years to fifty-eight, and those with college-level educations increased from 38 to 59 percent (see table 42). The reorganization also decreased the total number of directors by 40 percent and their average age from 59 to 54, while improving their educational level (those with a college-level education rose from 35 to 52 percent).^[3] Most of those who had assumed leadership positions during the radical phase were removed.

Central Party Organs

Personnel changes in central party organs were less sweeping than in central government organs. According to the statistics of thirteen departments, the total number of directors and deputy directors was reduced by 40 percent, their average age was lowered from sixty-six to sixty-two, and the proportion of those with a college-level education increased from 43 to 53 percent. The heads of bureaus were reduced by 14 percent and their average age lowered from sixty to fifty-four. Those with a college-level education increased from 50 to 56 percent.^[4]

[2] For instance, after merging the ministries of water conservancy and of electric power, the total number of bureaus was reduced from 35 to 16 and the total number of persons from 1,500 to 720. Zhonggong Yanjiu , April 1982, 43.

[3] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renshi Zhidu Gaiyao (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1985), 221.

[4] Ibid.

Twelfth Central Committee

Less than half of the entire Eleventh CC of members elected in 1977 (43 percent) made it into the Twelfth CC convened in 1982. The rate was lower than that of either the Ninth CC (76 percent) or the Tenth CC (62 percent), but higher than the rate of the Eighth CC. However, not all of those who failed to make it into the Twelfth CC were purged; sixty-five members were transferred to the Advisory Commission. Most of the mass representatives (seventy-nine out of ninety-seven in the Eleventh CC) failed to get into the Twelfth CC—except for those who had some credentials in addition to their activities during the CR.^[5] With the Twelfth CC, the idea of having mass representatives in the Central Committee came to an end.

The PLA lost 32 percent (thirty out of ninety-two) of its Eleventh CC members. The total share of the military in the Twelfth CC decreased from 27 percent in the Eleventh CC to 19 percent, a level comparable with the 21 percent of the Eighth CC.^[6] The shared characteristics of the PLA leaders who lost their seats in the CC were (1) deep involvement in the CR when the PLA was ordered to provide military training to the Red Guards, (2) support for industry and agriculture in 1967, and (3) rapid promotion to influential positions in the revolutionary committees and party organizations during the 1968–76 period.

Provincial Organs

Changes in the provincial-level leadership were sweeping. For instance, the total number of provincial party committee members, governors, and vice governors was reduced from 698 (twenty-three persons per province) to 463 (fifteen persons per province), a reduction of 34 percent (see table 41). The average number of provincial party secretaries was reduced in some provinces from fourteen to five (Sichuan and Hunan), and the standing committee mem-

[5] For a detailed discussion of the Twelfth CC, see Hong Yung Lee, "Twelfth Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," Asian Survey 23 (June 1983).

[6] For the military's changing share in the central committee, see Zhonggong Yanjiu , October 1982, 114–21.

bers from somewhere in the twenties to about fifteen, depending on the size of the province. Consequently, provincial leaders with a college-level education increased from 20 to 44 percent (table 42).

The total number of bureaus at the provincial, district, and municipal levels declined from 16,658 (555 per province) to 10,604 (350 per province)—a reduction of 36 percent. The percentage of cadres in these positions with a college-level education increased from 14 percent to 51 percent, whereas their average age was lowered from sixty-two to fifty-five.^[7] One-third of the new leadership was from enterprise, higher educational institutions, or research institutes, and many of them (22 percent in Qinghai province) had professional titles.^[8]

District and Municipal Organs

At these levels, the total number of leaders (including secretaries, standing committee members, and bureau directors) was reduced by 36 percent; their average age was lowered from fifty-eight to fifty. Those with a college-level education increased from 14 to 44 percent and, in the case of Qinghai province, 14 percent of them had professional titles.^[9]

County, Town (Zhen), and Village (Xiang) Organs

Reorganization reduced the average age of county-level leadership from forty-eight to forty-two and produced a leadership composed of forty-, thirty-, and twenty-year-old cadres.^[10] The percentage of college graduates among the county magistrates increased from 18 to 43 and among the county party secretaries, from 4 to 43. More than 80 percent of the counties had either a party secretary or a magistrate who had a college-level education, and 15 percent of them had professional titles.^[11]

[7] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 224.

[8] Ibid., 225.

[9] Ibid. Guizhou Nianjian (Guizhou: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 292.

[10] Those below forty years constitute one-third, and those above fifty were about 14 percent. Ibid.

[11] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 229.

Although the national aggregate figures on reforms at the zhen and xiang levels are not available, Guizhou provincial statistics may well represent the general trend. Guizhou lowered the average age of its zhen -level leaders to thirty-nine and xiang -level leaders to thirty-five. The number of those with an educational level of senior high school and above increased to 42 percent (including a college-level education of 10 percent) at the zhen level, and to 30 percent at the xiang level (including 0.96 percent of college-level education).^[12] However, even after the reform the situation is not ideal because of the shortage of educated manpower.

Enterprises

The regime carried out the reorganziation of key state-owned enterprises twice. The first-round adjustment replaced about 60 percent of the old cadres with new cadres—many of whom did not meet the age and educational specifications that the center set up—as a transitional measure.^[13] The second-round adjustment in 1984 further improved the age and educational structure of the newly constituted leadership at that level: it was comprised of those in their forties (63 percent), those below forty (20 percent), and those above fifty (17 percent), with an average age of forty-five. Reorganization also reduced the total number of leading cadres by one-third (6.3 persons per unit) and increased those with the college-level education by 89 percent.^[14] Most of the newly promoted managers "understand production, science, and technology."^[15]

The quality of the new enterprise leaders managed by district organs (diqu ) was much lower than that of the leadership in key enterprises. For instance, in Guizhou province the average age of leaders of district-level enterprises was fifty-two, and 40 percent had a college-level education. Leadership of county-level enterprises was a little bit lower: the average age was forty-seven, and 35 percent had a college-level education.^[16] The average age of leaders in Guizhou business units at the district level was fifty-two, and

[12] Renmin Ribao , 5 October 1984.

[13] Renmin Ribao , 3 July 1983.

[14] Ibid., 5 July 1986.

[15] Ibid., 1 December 1985.

[16] Guizhou Nianjian (Guizhou: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 292.

those with a college-level education averaged 84 percent.^[17] In county-level business units, leaders' average age was forty-seven, and 60 percent had a college-level education.

In brief, as the regime proudly declared, "after two years of structural reforms, the age, knowledge, and speciality structure of the leading bodies at various levels have improved substantially." According to another official source, about 20,000 young cadres—those "under fifty-five years old and with abundant specialized knowledge and long work experiences"—entered into leadership positions above the county level.^[18]

In addition to the leadership changes examined in the preceding section, the regime prepared a list of "third echelon of cadres"—those from the younger generation already targeted for promotion to specific leadership positions. In other words, it referred not to the pool of qualified candidates from which future leaders would be selected, but to the list of cadres chosen to replace the present leaders at various levels. They were cadres "on reserve." Some of them had already been assigned to leadership positions.^[19] Since even those newly promoted cadres are referred to as the "third echelon," the term is frequently used to refer to the younger, better-educated people in leadership positions.

The idea of a third echelon was apparently the rehabilitated cadres' effort to ensure political stability and continuation of their reform line after they died. "In order to ensure the stability of the state and continuity of the direction and policies of the party and state for a long period of time, it becomes necessary to start building up the third echelon."^[20] In other words, the third echelon was a device to maximize political stability through planned generational change.

Reserve cadres were selected not only for politically important leading positions at each level—such as secretary, governors, and magistrate—but also for all other responsible positions in administrative, functional, and military units—including enterprise and business units.^[21] The regime completed the selection of reserve cadre corps for provinces, districts, and counties by 1986. The PLA

[17] Ibid. Minority cadres were 5 percent with female cadres 3.8 percent.

[18] Liaowang , 5 October 1984.

[19] Renmin Ribao , 29 October 1984.

[20] Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 339.

[21] Gongchan Dangyuan , no. 22, 1985, 31.

also selected its own reserve cadres.^[22] Moreover, "the work of selecting, training, and managing the reserve cadre has been to a certain extent institutionalized."^[23]

Although some on the list had already been promoted to leading positions in each unit, about 70 to 80 percent of the third echelon as of 1986 were assigned to deputy positions, thus prompting some Chinese to name the third echelon "deputies." Presumably, as deputies they would receive on-the-job training and would gradually assume leadership positions when they were ready. Those without much managerial experience were sent to various party schools or to basic-level units to develop "overall leadership" ability. Sichuan and Hunan provinces sent some of their third echelon to Shenzhen city "directly to witness economic reforms."^[24] When the remaining third echelon will move into leadership positions depends largely on "requirements of the work."

Another component of the policy was the allocation of some college graduates to basic units so that they would be trained as future leaders "who have not only education and specialized knowledge, but who would also be familiar with the actual conditions of China and be willing to integrate themselves with the masses."^[25] Probably initiated by Hu Yaobang, these young people were billed as the future leaders of China in the transition between the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries.^[26] About 12,000 college graduates participated in the program, and some have already assumed leadership positions at basic levels.^[27] This practice, however, came to an end in 1986.

As shown in table 43, each province and ministry prepared lists of candidates for key leadership positions at different levels. The total number at each level approximated the number of incumbents, which were probably fixed by regulations. Reserve cadres were even selected for directorships of provincial bureaus. According to an official source, a total of about 100,000 cadres were

[22] Renmin Ribao , 10 September 1983.

[23] The central organizational department set up a young cadre bureau to be responsible for preparing lists of young cadres, constantly supplementing them while dropping those proven to be unqualified. Rencai Tiandi , no. 10, 1985, 26–27.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Renmin Ribao , 15 October 1986.

[26] Rencai Tiandi , no. 10, 1985, 26–27.

[27] Liaowang , 17 November 1986, 1.

selected for the third echelon: approximately 1,000 for the provincial and ministerial leadership positions, 20,000 for jobs at bureau and district levels, and the rest for the county-level positions.^[28]

Table 44 indicates that the average age of the third echelon selected for provincial-level cadres was about forty-five, ten years younger than the incumbents; the average age of those selected for district- and bureau-level positions was about forty; and the average age of those for the county level was about thirty-five.^[29] Most cadres in the third echelon had college-level educations, including those selected for provincial- and district-level leadership positions.^[30] Of the 452 cadres selected for leadership positions in one hundred and twenty-one enterprises under the ministry of coal, 86 percent were below age forty-five, 76 percent had a college-level education, and 70 percent possessed specialized knowledge, that is, had professional titles.^[31] Likewise, Shanghai reported that 90 percent of its 1,500 reserve cadres had a college-level education and 70 percent had career backgrounds as professionals and specialists,

[28] Ibid., 5 October 1984, 10–11; 17 January 1985, 17–18.

[29] Renmin Ribao , 20 April 1984; 11 September 1984; 14 January 1985; 15 November 1984.

[30] Ibid., 20 April 1984.

[31] Ibid., 20 October 1984; 10 April 1984.

mostly in engineering fields.^[32] For example, all of Shanghai's five mayors and deputy mayors were engineers.

Apparently after reviewing the results of the administrative reforms, the regime carried out a second-round readjustment at the central and provincial government levels in April 1984. Instead of an across-the-broad readjustment, the regime replaced those who had survived the first readjustment of 1982–83 with 126 younger cadres. Sixty-three percent of those newly promoted were under fifty, and 80 percent of them had a college-level education.^[33] As a result, the new leadership within each office formed a "ladder-shaped" structure by including those in their sixties, fifties, and forties. The average age was lowered to fifty-three, and the educational level improved: those with college-level educations grew from 43 to 60 percent of all leading cadres at the central and provincial levels.^[34]

After achieving this change in the civilian sector, Deng Xiaoping announced his plan to reduce the size of the military forces by 1 million—approximately one-half of which were officers—by cutting the number of military officers in central military organs and big military regions by 20 to 50 percent. The new military leadership has a ladder-shaped age structure: the central leaders in their sixties, leaders of strategic forces in their fifties, division commanders in their forties, and brigade commanders in their thirties.^[35]

At the fourth plenary session of the Twelfth Party Congress (convened in September 1985), fifty-four full members and ten alternate members (out of 341 elected in 1982) of the Twelfth Central Committee resigned.^[36] After the old cadres were removed, about sixty new cadres were added to the CC. Most of the new members were promoted to key posts in the party, government, and military and then moved into the CC when the meeting was convened. The average age of those newly added to the CC was fifty-seven, and thirty-three of them (60 percent) had career backgrounds in engineering, economic planning, or industrial manage-

[32] Ibid., 19 September 1984.

[33] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , p. 235. Renmin Ribao , 8 September 1985.

[34] Renmin Ribao , 5 October 1985; 9 September 1985.

[35] The average age of regional military commanders was lowered by eight years. Liaowang , no. 27, 8 July 1985.

[36] Renmin Ribao , 17 September 1985.

ment. Most of the newly added made it to the Thirteenth CC with only four (out of sixty) retiring. In contrast, 91 of 152 who had been elected in 1982 retired. Only six of the alternate members who had joined the CC in 1986 retired, whereas 52 out of 98 alternate members elected in 1982 resigned.

By the time the Thirteenth Party Congress was closed in October 1987, Deng Xiaoping had achieved a generational change in China's political leadership, the goal that even Mao had failed to achieve through his CR. Most of the first generation revolutionaries retired, and a new generation of leaders rose all the way to the standing committee of the Politburo, the innermost circle of power.

Tables 45 and 46 compare characteristics of CC member in 1982 with those in the Thirteenth CC in 1987—ministers, provincial party secretaries (the first party secretary system was abolished), and governors. They are the key decision-makers in the Chinese bureaucracy. Several observations can be made in connection with these tables.

First, all ministers, provincial secretaries, and governors have seats in the Central Committee. Unlike the radicals promoted by the Gang of Four to the CC in the Ninth and Tenth CC leaders have solid power bases in the formal bureaucracies of central and provincial organs. Although their prestige among subordinates and their informal power bases are not known, the fact that they hold concurrent positions in the CC and other power organs shows that they can exert substantial political influence.

Second, the average age of the new leaders now entrenched in power organs indicates that most of them joined the revolution in the latter part of the civil war or around the time of liberation. In contrast, except for the few still remaining in government positions, usually as chiefs of central government commissions, the anti-Japanese war generation has largely been removed from active duty. By and large, the majority of the top political elite (who were around twenty-three years old in 1949) belong to the postliberation generation. Some of them may have joined the revolution in the latter stages of the civil war, but those who have college degrees would have been students at that time.

Third, the average age of the four groups is similar, thus indicating that the regime's effort to lower the age at the top level was successful. Particularly amazing is the fact that the average age of

provincial secretaries is only fifty-six, lower than even government ministers. Except in the early stages, during the 1950s when the CCP was developing its institutional structures, top-level Chinese leaders have never been younger.

Fourth, their level of education appears to be quite high, although information is incomplete. It is likely that most of them have college-level educations, although only 100 CC members, sixteen secretaries and governors, and eighteen ministers have been positively identified as such. The new leaders are from the best-educated groups in China.

Fifth, 45 percent of the 1987 ministers, 25 percent of the secretaries, and 33 percent of the governors are engineers. If one adds the people with experience in economics and management, the number of those whose speciality is production increases to 70 percent of the ministers, 32 percent of the secretaries, and 50 percent of the governors. This represents the greatest change from the Maoist era. In contrast, there are only a few cadres with experience in overall political leadership—5 percent of the ministers, 36 percent of the secretaries, and 30 percent of the governors. Virtually none of the leaders has had any in-depth experience in the propaganda field. This illustrates the lessening importance of a political career as the required background for promotion to top leadership positions.

Sixth, only one person among the eighty top leaders has any career background in the military. He is Zhang Aiping, the minister of defense. In the coming years, the new leaders will probably face difficulties in dealing with the military.

Seventh, it is believed that the vice ministers, deputy secretaries, and vice governors, although not included in table 45, are younger than the other groups, as well as better educated—hence more competent functionally.

It is not only at the top level leadership positions of the party-state, but also at the basic levels and in the mass organizations that the technocrats were promoted to leadership positions. About one-half of the delegation to the Sixth National People's Congress had college-level educations, mostly in functional fields. Even the portion of intellectuals increased from 16 percent to 40 percent in the sixth political consultative conference.

According to a survey conducted by the statistical bureau of the

Ningxia autonomous government in 1985, more than one-quarter of all provincial intellectuals were promoted to leadership positions, and a majority of them were engineers and technical personnel.^[37] Another source reports that by March 1983, one-third of all high-ranking intellectuals in seventy-nine central units assumed leadership positions.^[38] Jiangsu province reports that 54 percent of all those who entered leadership positions in its department, municipality, and county levels were intellectuals.^[39] By 1986 about a half million young and middle-aged cadres had been promoted to leadership positions at the county level or higher. This figure equals all the government cadres with similar ranks, or 10 percent of all Chinese cadres with similar ranks.^[40] Most of the newly promoted leaders had studied science and technology. For instance, Shanghai reported that 70 percent of its bureau directors and 61 percent of its county-level standing committee members had majored in the natural sciences.^[41]

In brief, the best term for the newly emerging elite group is "bureaucratic technocrats" because they owe their rise not to any commitment to socialism, but to possession of the knowledge, skills, and expertise that China needs for economic development. They come mostly from the postliberation generation and the best-educated section of the population. About 100 of the 160 Thirteenth CC members have college-level educations, whereas only four out of every 1,000 Chinese have received a similar level of education. Less than half of these have specialities, mostly in engineering and other production-related fields. This is largely due to the shortage of trained experts in the "soft sciences" and to the present stage of China's industrialization, where increasing production is still the major concern. As the political elite, bureaucratic technocrats have two weaknesses. Very few of them have an in-depth knowledge of economics and management—"soft knowledge" in current Chinese terms.^[42] For instance, among 5,000 leaders of large state-owned enterprises, about 84 percent had career

[37] Ningxia Shehui Kexue Tongxin , no. 2, 1986, 8–16.

[38] Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao (Sichuan), 21 July 1985.

[39] Renmin Ribao , 23 October 1986.

[40] Hong Qi , no. 17, 1986, 11.

[41] Jiaoxue Cankao , no. 3, 1988, 18–27.

[42] Shehui Kexue Dongtai (Hubei), 1 June 1984.

backgrounds in science and engineering fields, whereas only 11 percent studied management.^[43] Also, having spent most of their careers as technical staff in functionally specialized organs, they have accumulated very little experience in overall administrative leadership.

Although bureaucratic reform has replaced old revolutionaries with bureaucratic technocrats in leadership positions, it did not have much impact on the age and educational structure of the cadre corps as a whole, simply because of limited educated manpower. As far as the size of the bureaucracy is concerned, the reform is a "total failure," particularly at the provincial level and below.^[44] After the reforms, the overall number of cadres increased from 20 million to 21 million and then to 29 million in 1988.^[45] The increase in cadre size pushed up administrative expenditures from 4.2 percent of the total government budget in 1978 to 6.8 percent in 1982, 7 percent in 1983, and 8 percent in 1985.^[46]

At another level is the fundamental problem of "offices standing like trees in a forest, organizations bloated, numerous layers, unclear responsibilities and tasks, and overstaffed bureaucracy." One Chinese scholar summarized the results of the reform in the following way:

Units that should be abolished are not abolished. On the surface the units are merged; but internally the size has increased. The original personnel have not been reduced; instead, they were internally absorbed. People continue to create works, and as a result, the seignorial and deputy positions are numerous. At lower levels administrative units set up many "general corporations," "leading small groups," and "management offices."^[47]

Some cynics argue that the reforms resulted in "three-too-manys and one-too-fews: more work, more offices, more cadres, but fewer people actually working." The effort to separate the party from the government and to develop a clear hierarchical command structure exacerbated the complexity of the bureaucracy. For in-

[43] Zhongguo Renshi Guanli , no. 7, 1987, 1–7.

[44] Jiaoyan Cankao , 1 February 1986; 15 April 1986.

[45] Huaqiao Ribao , 16 January 1988. For the Anhui provincial situation, see Zhongguo Renshi Guanli , 3 March 1987, 1–7.

[46] Jiaoyan Cankao , 15 April 1985; Renmin Ribao , 7 March 1985.

[47] Lilun Yu Shijian (Shenyang), June 1985, 18–19.

stance, before the reforms county-level authorities had only two systems: party committees and government organizations. But now there are five different sources of authority: party committees, the government, people's congresses, political consultative conferences, and disciplinary committees. As a result, according to China's own description, the bureaucratic structure is heavy at the top, like an "upside-down pyramid. Leading cadres are too many, and those who do actual work are too few."^[48]

The reform also did not change the tendency for each organization to maintain itself as a self-contained unit with a large number of support staff, virtually "owning the cadres" and workers, and practicing the "life-tenure" system.^[49] Overstaffed offices continue to "stand like trees in a forest," forming numerous layers. The phenomenon of "documents and conferences forming mountains and seas" persists. Many cadres still "spend half a day drinking a cup of tea, smoking a cigarette, and reading a paper of internal circulation."^[50]

Reform Strategy

If one follows Samuel Huntington's distinction between blitzkreig and Fabian approaches to reform strategy, the Chinese case approximates the latter.^[51] The regime carried out bureaucratic reorganization and leadership changes slowly but firmly, step by step, level by level, and area by area, employing a bureaucratic method to solve bureaucratic problems. Supplemented by heavy reliance on work teams sent out to lower levels, this organizational approach ensured the maximum influence of the top leaders.

The regime first readjusted the leadership at the central level and then set up a "small group to lead the leadership changes at the provincial level" with Song Renqiong as its head. This group carried out a pilot project in Sichuan province and distributed its results to other provinces as an example.^[52] Accordingly, each prov-

[48] Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 3, 1987, 34.

[49] Jingji Fazhan Yu Tizhi Gaige no. 7, 1986, 7–12.

[50] Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 2, 1978, 5.

[51] Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 346.

[52] Ibid.

ince prepared and submitted its reorganization plan to the central group for approval. The newly organized provincial leadership in turn carried out the leadership adjustment in their subordinate units according to specific guidelines set up by the central authority. They also organized "inspection teams"—staffed by cadres in the personnel field and retired senior cadres—which interviewed potential candidates for the lower-level leadership positions and gathered the masses' opinions of them.^[53]

Instead of aiming at the ambitious and risky goal of replacing all older cadres in each unit at once, the regime replaced them bit by bit, dividing each unit's potential political adversaries and dealing with them one by one. The method of "entrance first, and exit second," according to Deng Xiaoping, and "first adding and then subtracting" (xian zuo jiafa, hou zuo jianfa ), in Hu Yaobang's terms, enabled the regime to reduce the total number of leadership positions in each unit, to remove some incumbents—generally those politically unreliable, physically infirm, or less capable—and then to promote the younger and better qualified. Through this method the regime could first make the newly appointed a majority in each organ and then in the next stage replace those who survived the initial readjustment with younger people.

For reorganizing the local leadership, the central authorities issued several guidelines, which set up overall goals for the reorganization of provincial-, district-, municipal-, and county-level organs. The "Notice Regarding the Opinion of Reshuffling the Provincial-Level Leading Groups" limited the number of provincial secretaries for each province to four to five, set the maximum age of the first party secretary at sixty-five, and stipulated that new leading groups should include "various specialists familiar with the works of industry, agriculture, culture, education, and science and technology."^[54] Limiting the number of secretaries to three to five, the guidelines for municipal-level reforms prescribed that at least 50 percent of the municipal leadership have an educational level higher than senior high school, that none of them exceed the age of sixty, and that those under fifty constitute 50 percent. For

[53] Guizhou Nianjian , 292.

[54] Xingzheng Guanlixue Ziliao Huibian (Hunan: Hunansheng Bianzhi Weiyuanhui Bangongshi, 1985), 50–78.

the district party, the standing committee member system was abolished, one-third of party secretaries and administrative heads had to have a senior high school education, and more than one-third had to be under fifty.^[55] A similar guideline was issued on 1 December 1983 for the county-level leadership: the average age had to be forty-five and one-third had to have a college-level education. Even in selecting third-echelon cadres, the center apparently issued several specific guidelines with regard to requirements for age, education level, functional competency, and political reliability.

The official criteria used in selecting new leaders were commitment to reform, education level, professional competency, and age. Two of the four standards stress ability for cadre selection, whereas emphasis on the young amounts to rejecting the seniority system. Although a virtue criterion is retained, the new official criteria unquestionably marked a drastic departure from past practice by one-sidedly emphasizing political qualifications and seniority. The new standards attach more importance to ability than the Maoists did.^[56]

However, we do not know how much relative weight each of the four standards carried and how they were applied for each individual cadre selected to leadership positions. But the overall results of the bureaucratic reforms allow us to examine the changing weight of virtue, seniority, and ability.

Age and educational standards are both unambiguous and objective criteria. The regime tried to make the age structure of the leadership parallel the bureaucratic hierarchy. In other words, the average age of the lower-level leadership should be less than that of the superior unit. In addition, the regime intended to keep the age structure of a particular leadership group "ladder-shaped" by including old, middle-aged, and young people—a notion similar to the three-in-one formula advocated by the Gang of Four. Thus, the age requirement depended primarily on the leadership position in question.

Table 47 demonstrates small differences in age between those who were removed and those who were newly promoted in 1982. Those who were promoted to the leadership position were younger than those whom they replaced. Many of the old CC members

[55] Ibid.

[56] Renmin Ribao , 7 August 1985.

were transferred to the Central Advisory Commission. But the age consideration was not applied uniformly because some cadres younger than those who stayed in official posts were nonetheless removed. The average age of the CC members who lost their seats was lower than that for those members who survived. None of the Eleventh CC members with the record of rehabilitation failed to make it into the Twelfth CC despite their old ages.

A similar pattern can be observed for those who resigned from the CC in 1985 and those who stayed. Twenty-eight of the fifty-two senior leaders who were in their seventies retired, whereas only six out of twenty-two who were in their sixties resigned. The average age of the retired members was seventy-five. Age was a factor in determining who should stay and who should retire, and seniority ceased to work to the political advantage of the older cadres. Clearly, however, a political factor was also operative. Among the thirty-five senior cadres who had entered the Central Committee at the Eighth Party Congress (all of whom were over seventy), only eighteen retired, whereas seventeen stayed in 1982. Eight of the twelve leaders who survived the CR retired, whereas only ten out of the twenty-three rehabilitated senior leaders resigned in 1982. These figures indicate that the importance of age as a factor in determining who would stay varied depending on a cadre's rank: the higher one's rank, the less important age became; for the lower-ranking cadres, however, age was a crucial factor.

Although the regime heavily publicized "ability" (nengli ) as the

most important standard for personnel management and although Chinese intellectuals were fascinated with the "science of talent," and set up numerous study groups to do research on the topic, in the official media "ability" is only discussed in general terms as a capacity to work "efficiently . . . to finish an assigned task . . . to be 'bold in practical spirit' . . . [and] to make an actual contribution."^[57] Since "ability" can be measured only in relation to the specific task of each organ of the party-state and China has not yet achieved that level of organizational differentiation, "ability" is frequently equated with a much more easily measurable concept: educational level. This approach results in such simplistic views as the following: "the younger, the better," "the more educated the leadership, the better," and "the more persons with professional titles, the better." The regime promoted the educated and functional specialists with such zeal that it created shortages of experts in the fields in which the newly promoted had previously been working.

Professional competency is difficult to measure, particularly for outside observers. However, one can use professional titles and the possession of "practical knowledge" obtained through on-the-job training to determine the weight given to "professional competency" in the bureaucratic reforms. A large number (40 percent) of new ministers and vice ministers promoted in the 1982 readjustment had served as directors and deputy directors of functional bureaus of government ministries. If one includes those who had career experiences in functional departments at the provincial level as well as those with professional degrees—for example, engineers—in this category, the number of persons with long work experiences in a functional field rises to 71 percent. On the other hand, very few members of the State Council had a career background in the party secretaryship. Thirty-seven percent of provincial leaders in 1983 had once served as a director or deputy director of a functional department at the same level, while 29 percent were from secretary positions at lower levels.^[58]

In terms of functional areas, 60 percent of the ministers and vice

[57] Rencai Tiandi , 19 October 1985.

[58] Hong Yung Lee, "Evaluation of China's Bureaucratic Reforms," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , no. 4, 1984, 34–47.

ministers were identified as having work experience in production fields, that is, industry, agriculture, finance, and transportation. Among the subcategories of production, the majority had experience in production rather than planning, and surprisingly few people had work experience in agricultural fields. The number of people with experience in ideological and political fields was quite low: 18 percent among government leaders. In contrast, a high percentage (42 percent) of provincial party secretaries had career backgrounds exclusively in what can be considered political fields, positions in such organizations as the Secretariat, the organizational department, secretary general offices, and party committees at the lower level. Undoubtedly, the regime promoted many specialists without any overall administrative leadership experience to high-level decision-making posts several grades higher than their original ranks.

Although the regime publicly emphasized the importance of "being revolutionized" and insisted that it could be inferred from "one's political attitude and quality, ideological work style, and ideals," the category apparently worked only as a catch-all criterion for political qualifications. More specifically, the term referred to one's willingness to support the political and ideological line of the center, which was in turn often inferred from one's activities during the CR. Those who had enjoyed rapid promotion during the Gang of Four period failed to pass the test of being "revolutionized," in spite of their appropriate age and probable sufficient professional competence. On the other hand, for the group that was promoted during the reform period, evidence that they were not actively involved in past factional politics seemed to be good enough for them to pass the political test. In other words, the political requirement for promotion during the reforms was not a positive but a negative test of loyalty. The Deng group did not seem to demand that cadres be loyal to their group, but it did demand that they not be loyal to other groups such as the radicals or Mao. The Deng group did not need to require positive loyalty, for those cadres who owed their promotion to reform policy would support the group anyway.

In a sharp departure from the Maoist era, the official news media did not suggest that an understanding of Marxism-Leninism, dedication to the mass line, or a willingness to sacrifice

one's private interests should be used as indicators of political qualification. Even the "socialist principle" was infrequently mentioned. When it was, it was broadly interpreted to include any principle that "brings good fortune to the people, develops productivity, or contributes to socialist business."^[59]

This does not, however, mean that political qualifications ceased to be a factor; political factors were also operative. If a cadre was comparatively young, but his political loyalty was questionable (this group consisted mainly of those who had enjoyed rapid promotion before the ascendancy of the Deng group), he was removed or transferred to the less important Advisory Commission.^[60] Age did not help those with questionable political reliability—those who had enjoyed rapid promotion during the radical period. On the other hand, most rehabilitated cadres and all senior leaders who had entered the CC before the CR—including those who managed to stay in the CC up to the Eleventh CC and those who were purged and then rehabilitated to enter that CC—survived into the Twelfth CC or into the Advisory Commission. In contrast, people who first entered the Ninth CC had less chance of surviving than those who were first appointed to the Tenth or Eleventh CC.

Some conservative veteran leaders continue to regard "being revolutionized" as the most important criterion. "Those with virtue but without ability can be politically trusted. But unfortunately they cannot be given important responsibilities. It is dangerous to place those with ability but without virtue in key positions, because they can use their ability for bad purposes."^[61] By contrast, reformers tended to downgrade the importance of "being revolutionized," almost equating it to the ability to carry out reforms. Decision-makers therefore could readily exploit the ambiguity of the term to select whoever shared their own political views.^[62]

For a while the regime publicized the "pioneer type of personality"—the person with the courage and determination to challenge any such obstacles to reforms as "the old way of thinking, the unnecessary existing regulations, inertia, resistance, and

[59] Qunzhong , 13 February 1985, Dangde Shenghuo , no. 2, 1985, 5.

[60] Hong Yung Lee, "Evaluation."

[61] Renmin Ribao , 2 October 1982.

[62] Lilun Yu Shijian , 6 August 1986.

foot dragging."^[63] The official media also defended newly promoted reform-minded younger leaders (whom the old cadres criticised as "arrogant, impatient, and subjective") on the grounds that "thinking independently and persisting in the correct view is not arrogance."^[64] Praise of the pioneer type—reminiscent of the Gang of Four's "rebel spirit"—has recently disappeared from Chinese publications.

In addition to shifting emphasis from virtue to ability, the regime has made a great effort to broaden its search for the best qualified candidates. It has pledged to "end the past practice of searching secretly for candidates within each unit [by] completely disregarding the boundary between state-owned and collectively-owned, party members and nonparty members, regular college graduates and the self-educated." In order to discover "hidden talent," the provincial leaders frequently sent out inspection teams, and also divided the search among themselves.^[65]

Another method employed to broaden the search was to instruct lower-level units to submit names of possible candidates for positions at the upper levels. For instance, the central organizational department asked each province to recommend promising cadres.^[66] This method, if widely used, will allow the provincial leaders some input into the selection of central leaders. In fact, whether it is due to this process or not, many provincial leaders recently moved to central government positions.

The selection of new leaders was supposed to be a complex process involving many different parties in order to ensure a broad search for high quality. According to the official formula, the procedure for selecting reserve cadres involved "strict observation of new criteria for each cadre, adherence to the mass line, screening by the organization department, collective discussion of the matter by the party committee, and final review by the organization office of upper echelons."^[67]

Party leaders were told not to rely exclusively on personnel dossiers, but rather personally to conduct heart-to-heart talks with

[63] Renmin Ribao , 14 September 1984; Sichuan Ribao , 6 April 1983.

[64] Qunzhong , 31 February 1985; Renmin Ribao , 18 November 1984.

[65] Renmin Ribao , 20 November 1984.

[66] Ibid., 15 February 1985.

[67] Liaowang , 17 November 1986, 1.

candidates, to watch them at work, and to solicit opinions from those who knew the candidates personally.^[68] In some cases, the decision on one cadre required interviews with as many as sixty persons, including "superiors, colleagues, subordinates, school classmates, chauffeurs, service personnel, and family members, as well as his political opponents during the CR period."^[69] In addition, a public opinion poll was quite frequently used. For instance, the Anhui provincial party committee surveyed the opinions of more than 6,000 cadres and masses to draw candidates for provincial-level positions. Out of the several hundred candidates selected according to the poll scores, careful evaluation and screening finally produced twenty cadres for provincial top-level positions.^[70]

However, despite these efforts to broaden the search for talent, retiring cadres still exerted enormous power in selecting their own successors. Furthermore, there is ample reason to believe that nepotism has been widespread in personnel management. First, the official criteria were too broad and ambiguous, and candidates meeting the official criteria regarding age and education were too numerous. Second, involving diverse groups in the selection process and listening to divergent views tended to make the incumbents' opinions more decisive in the final selection.^[71] The regime's effort to formalize the evaluation of cadres by developing a multitude of criteria did not reduce the discretionary power of the incumbents. The frequently reported method of "public opinion polls" was ineffective because only decision-makers had access to the outcome of these polls, and there was no way of knowing whether the results were reflected in the actual cadre selection.

Retiring cadres frequently abused their authority despite the warning not to use their "personal feelings of like or dislike" or "whether or not a candidate complies with their personal views." "When recommending young cadres, a few old cadres do something not in line with the principle, or in obvious violation of the party principle, thereby creating controversy among colleagues and the people." Many incumbents selected their successors from

[68] Ibid., 20 November 1984.

[69] Ibid., 20 April 1984.

[70] Liaowang , 17 November 1986, 1.

[71] Ibid., 7 August 1985.

relatives, friends, and others whom they knew well, thus suffering from "the diseases of impression" and allowing "those who are close to the leadership to flourish."^[72] According to a Chinese maxim, "a dwarf general recruits only dwarf soliders"; thus, submissive comformists among the "better educated and younger in age" had a better chance for promotion.

Understandably, ordinary Chinese were not happy with the policy of allowing retiring cadres to choose their successors as an inducement to retire, labeling the practice "the director responsibility system" (shouzhang fuze zhi ), which was not much different from the feudal succession symbolized in Mao's statement—"with you in charge, I am at ease."^[73] The practice may turn out to be a costly concession for the Leninist Party organization because it encouraged the further "privatization" of official positions by officeholders, resulting in more fragmentation of the party's authority—which economic reforms have already substantially weakened.^[74]

In brief, the evidence indicates that the regime relied largely on such objective and universal criteria as age, educational level, and professional competency in making personnel changes. This use of nonpolitical and achievement-oriented criteria marked a sharp departure from the Maoist stress on virtue, which was open to subjective interpretation to such an extent that it gave rise to what Andrew Walder calls "principled particularism."^[75] This time the merit-based criteria were universal, but their application gave decision-makers a chance to incorporate their personal preferences. According to another Chinese maxim, "age is treasure, education helps, but the supporter is the most important," indicating that the regime skillfully made use of the particularistic application of universal criteria in order to mollify incumbent old revolutionaries and to consolidate the reformers' power base while bringing about fundamental changes in the cadre corps.^[76] As a result of the particularistic application of the universal criteria, some social groups benefited from the reform while others did not.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Jing Bao , 10 July 1985; Renmin Ribao , 9 June 1985.

[74] Lilun Naican , no. 5, 1986.

[75] Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

[76] Zhengzhi Yu Xingzheng Yanjiu , November 1985.

The losers are the middle or low-ranking administrative cadres who are fifty to fifty-five years old, those who started their careers at the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy in the 1950s when they were in their early twenties.^[77] As the requirements for cadre recruitment and promotion shifted to educational achievement and professional knowledge, it became obvious that this group of cadres—generally known as the "jack-of-all-trades campaign cadres"—had nothing to count on. They possess neither the necessary education level nor any special knowledge.^[78] They are not liberation cadres who participated in the civil war and hence are entitled to lixiu ; nor do they have the ability to contribute to the Four Modernizations. Worse still, they are too old according to the official age requirement. Thus, they consider themselves stuck in a "stopped elevator," "ships anchored in a harbor," or "trains stopped at the last station."

They try, however, to defend themselves by insisting that the practical knowledge that they accumulated during their prolonged careers should not be overlooked and that although their "biological age is old," ideologically they are not old. Since they have solved most of their family problems, such as raising children and getting them married, they are at the best stage in their life to concentrate their energy and attention on their work without being distracted by personal problems. Their hero is Chen Yun, who flatly declared, "Realization of the Four Modernizations should depend on the party's leadership. Some people are saying that most of our cadres are the cadres of 'medicine for all diseases.' According to my view, we cannot achieve the Four Modernizations without these cadres who are jacks-of-all-trades. We should not belittle the role of such cadres."^[79] Nonetheless, the campaign cadres are losing their position and influence, although they still constitute a major portion of China's middle-level cadres. Even if they manage to remain in their positions, none of the campaign cadres has managed to reach the top level. On the whole, the top-level leadership has

[77] For this type of cadre, see Dangde Shenghou , no. 12, 1983, 38–39; no. 13, 1983, 38–42.

[78] Some science and technical cadres in the middle-age bracket feel that they have no chance of moving up; they believe in "self-survival and self-dying." Renmin Ribao , 27 May 1985.

[79] Dangde Shenghou , no. 13, 1983, 42.

jumped over several generations of cadres, from the Long March generation to the postliberation generation.

The groups that have most conspicuously benefited from the new policy are the children and the former secretaries of high-ranking cadres, as well as former leaders of the Communist Youth League.^[80] It is easy to understand why children of high-ranking cadres have benefited most from the system.^[81] First, it was their parents who selected their own successors and who have access to information at the top level. Sometimes high-ranking cadres used their retirement as leverage to gain the appointment of their children to appropriate positions, although the dingti system was not officially applicable to cadre positions. Alternatively, they could use their extensive personal network by offering reciprocal favors to other decision-makers.

Most of the children of cadres could meet the official requirements of age and education. Since older cadres currently retiring are about sixty-five years old, their children fall within the forty-to-fifty-year-old age bracket. Their children were born in the Yanan period, and they finished their secondary education before 1966. Some of them went to the Soviet Union in the 1950s for further studies. In addition, these children meet the political requirements. Many of them participated in the CR at the initial stage, but they soon became targets of the mass movement as radical rebels led by children from less desirable classes rose to power. Thereafter, they were subjected to various types of political persecution during the Gang of Four era. Because of these hardships they are generally wary of excessive political struggle and disapprove of ideological orthodoxy. Furthermore, retiring cadres know that they will not be betrayed, politically or otherwise, if their children succeed them.

Political Implications

The bureaucratic reforms succeeded in replacing the revolutionary cadres with bureaucratic technocrats who are qualitatively differ-

[80] As criticism of the special privileges of the children of high-ranking cadres spread, the regime prohibited them from assuming important leadership positions without the approval of the center. Renmin Ribao , 2 February 1986.

[81] Jiushi Niandai , September 1985.

ent from their predecessors in terms of political experience, socialization, and value orientation. This rise of technical experts marks an end to the Maoist era associated with the former revolutionaries—originally recruited from the least educated and poorest segments of the population for guerrilla warfare. It also signals an end to the Maoist practice of selecting political leaders for their revolutionary potential rather than for the expertise needed to develop a modern society. Because they were chosen to help China's industrialization, bureaucratic technocrats have an incentive to continue the merit-based recruitment policy.

During Mao's era the revolutionary cadres possessed political power, whereas intellectuals with skill and knowledge functionally indispensable to the modern industrial society were not only completely excluded from political power but were also persecuted as the "stinking ninth category." To Maoist radicals, intellectual class interests were incompatible with those of poor peasants, and their knowledge enabled them to raise critical questions about the Maoist revolutionary approach. Although the CCP's bias against intellectuals originally came from Mao, it was largely supported by members who were recruited from the less educated and poorest sectors of the population. During the Maoist period, among the educated only ideologues whose major task was to manipulate Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought flourished politically.^[82] Not only did this practice end with the advent of the reforms, but also for the first time in Chinese history, a social group possessing the knowledge and skills necessary for modernization came to power.^[83]

Presently, bureaucratic technocrats are not completely free to exercise their political authority. Some newly promoted specialists feel that they are not given enough political authority and freedom to utilize their expertise.^[84] Old cadres continue to exert political influence: a few of them still remain in the Politburo and Secretariat; others have seats in the Central Advisory Commission; and the

[82] Among many absurd episodes of ideologues imposing their simplistic political criteria on educated sectors during the CR, the most revealing is that the Gang of Four rounded up about 613 professors in a surprise raid and then subjected them to a written test on politics and official ideology. Not surprisingly, only thirty-five passed. Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983.

[83] Huntington, Political Order .

[84] Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 21 July 1985.

bureaucratic revolutionaries are still well entrenched at the middle and lower levels. The old guard's political muscle was dramatically demonstrated in the dismissal of Hu Yaobang from the general secretaryship and the recent decision to recentralize economic authority.

Nonetheless, interference by old revolutionaries is a transitional phenomenon that will decline as time passes. Unlike Eastern European countries where technical specialists were gradually coopted into state organs dealing only with economic affairs, Chinese technocrats have infiltrated the highest political offices such as the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CCP.^[85] In addition, conservative leaders such as Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo were apparently not deeply involved in the selection of the new cadres. Even if they did have the power to select their own successors, to find someone who could have balanced the political and ideological requirements with the prerequisites of economic development would have been impossible. Moreover, there is ample indication that the bureaucratic technocrats are becoming more assertive vis-à-vis the old revolutionaries. The public media initially urged the old cadres to help the new generation of cadres "get on the horse and then see them sent off." But now, the slogan has changed to "help them to ride the horse and let them manage by themselves."

It is uncertain whether the bureaucratic technocrats have the leadership ability or political acumen to lead China through the multitude of contradictions inherent in these rapid social changes, while achieving unity among themselves, particularly when the senior leaders, now working as a centripetal force, disappear. Having been placed in political positions by rapid promotion that skipped several grades, many bureaucratic technocrats lack leadership experience. Some are simply unqualified for their political positions, and others are afraid of taking responsibility and so look to the revolutionary cadres to decide complex matters.^[86] Furthermore, among the bureaucratic technocrats there are many different groups with different policy preferences. To make mat-

[85] Ibid.

[86] Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 8 September 1985, 32–39; Renmin Ribao , 12 August 1985.

ters even more complicated, bureaucratic technocrats are supposed to work collectively, but the new leaders have not yet mastered the technique of reaching consensus among specialists in different fields. Already there are signs of policy disputes among the bureaucratic technocrats, for example, on price reforms.

The important point to remember, however, is that unlike the old revolutionaries who split over the fundamental goals of the regime, the technocrats agree on basic goals but disagree on the method to achieve them. This trend of viewing policy differences among themselves as a technical matter rather than as a matter of principle will confine the disruptive consequences of inner-elite conflicts.^[87] The promotion of technocrats to political positions is not based on their proven leadership ability but on the belief that their rigorous scientific training will enable them to grasp any problem in its totality and to find the solution through an analytical approach.^[88] It is hoped, therefore, that as time passes, the bureaucratic technocrats will expand their horizons from those of specialists to those of generalists or will combine their in-depth speciality with a broader view, in the manner of the Chinese figurative expression of "T-shaped knowledge," thereby acquiring political wisdom and insight.^[89]

Perhaps the most difficult question concerns the bureaucratic technocrats' ideology and leadership style. There is absolutely no data bearing on the direct implications of this issue, but much indirect evidence indicates that they are critical of the existing ideology. For instance, the ideological commitment of cadres since 1980 has been declining, and the younger generation is more critical of the socialist ideology than the old generation.^[90]

Three factors will probably determine the political value and leadership style of the bureaucratic technocrats. Their long experiences in bureaucratic settings will have fostered an organizational mentality, but the technical work they engaged in before will also

[87] For this point, see Jean Meynard, Technocracy (London: Faber & Faber, 1965), 134.

[88] For technical training and leadership capability, see Ezra N. Suleiman, Elites in French Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[89] For the issue of unqualified bureaucratic technocrats, see Ganxu Ribao , 28 September 1985; Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 12, 1986, 17–18.

[90] Hong Qi , no. 17, 1988, 11–12; Xinxiang Pinglun , no. 7, 1982, 13–14; Diaocha Yu Yanjiu , no. 12, 1986, 11–13.

have preserved an outlook derived from their professional training. Moreover, their own understanding of the role of political leaders will affect their actual behavior. Although it is obvious that bureaucratic technocrats as political leaders will experience cross-pressures between the demands of their professional backgrounds and their political role, there is no way of knowing the relative weight of these factors. However, if one uses Frederic Fleron's distinction between "cooptation" and "recruitment" as a measure of determining their outlook, the bureaucratic technocrats were co-opted rather than recruited. According to Fleron, those coopted into the political elite after serving a long time in a specialized professional position tend to bring their professional attitude to the new political roles.^[91]

One point is very clear. The bureaucratic technocrats have a better understanding and better qualifications to deal with such prerequisites of industrialized society as functional specialization, coordination of various parts, rational decision making, and problem solving. Moreover, as Thomas Baily argues, all "technical intelligentsias" are pragmatic in the sense that they resent the bureaucratic rules that have constrained their work in the past, attach priority to "getting the job done," and view ideology not as a dogma but as something to be interpreted flexibly for the economic goal.^[92] Similarly, it seems that bureaucratic technocrats in China share a relative indifference to politics and ideology, accompanied by the urge to get on with the accomplishment of professional tasks.^[93] Thus, they will probably prefer structured and orderly environments, opting for technical and piecemeal rather than comprehensive political solutions to China's problems.

Compared with old revolutionaries, the new leaders are more self-confident, less dependent on the party for guidance, urban-oriented, forward- and outward-looking, and with minimal emotional ties to or understanding of the rural peasants.^[94] At the same time, the new leaders also lack personal moral integrity and com-

[91] Frederic Fleron, "Representation of Career Types in the Soviet Political Leadership," in R. Barry Fareell, ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), 123–38.

[92] Thomas Baily, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 85.

[93] Ibid., 262.

[94] Xueshu Jiaoliu (Heilongjiang), no. 2, 1982, 38.

mitment to the Communist ideology that the old revolutionary cadres possessed. In the eyes of old revolutionaries, this quality has caused the widespread corruption and abuse of political authority for private gain by the new generation of leaders.^[95]

Being pragmatic does not mean being politically liberal. As "intelligentsia" rather than "critical intellectuals," using Alvin Gouldner's terminology, the new Chinese leaders are authoritarian in their political outlook and will utilize their expertise to improve and maintain rather than innovate and change the existing system.^[96]

Yet, a caveat: the new leaders are co-opted precisely because they promised to create new institutions and to promote economic development at a time when the old Maoist system was being thoroughly discredited. In this sense, they are quite different from the Brezhnev generation in the Soviet Union and the technical intelligentsia of the Eastern European countries who were recruited by the old leaders to run the existing system more effectively.^[97] The bureaucratic technocrats' lack of ideological commitment will help them to push for structural reforms.^[98] Moreover, in contemporary China, age and level of education are closely correlated with support of reforms: the younger and better educated are more likely actively to participate in reform efforts.^[99] The reason is simple: the better educated are more innovative, less persistent in old habits, and more cost-efficient, thereby benefiting more from reforms. In addition, the bureaucratic technocrats know that their political future is inextricably tied to the success of the Four Modernizations. Since the political ideology has been discredited and the party's charisma is fading, the bureaucratic technocrats must build legitimacy by delivering the promised economic benefits to all the Chinese people.

[95] Ningxia Shehui Kexue Tongxin , no. 2, 1986, 8–16.

[96] Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979).

[97] Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988).

[98] For the relationship between level of education and willingness to take risks, see Zuohao Zai Zhishifengzi Zhong Fazhan Dangyuan Gongzuo (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1985).

[99] For the relationship between education and attitude toward reforms, see Xueshi Yu Shijian , May 1985, 5.