4. Indecision and Confusion
I have indicated that the 1966 coup took place with widespread acquiescence. This was also true for Onganía's designation as president by the junta of commanders in chief. Onganía seemed to be an introverted and unspectacular leader, projecting the image of a future in which order and calm would prevail. The initial statements of Onganía and the Junta,[13] which concerned order, reconciliation, and the serious and efficient management of public affairs, evoked favorable responses.[*] It therefore came as no surprise that the first step taken by the "Argentine Revolution" (apart from baptizing itself as such) was to suppress the institutions that the new authority considered to be the main causes of the frustrations of the past. Congress and political parties were disbanded, political activity was prohibited, and, with the intention of putting it to good use, party property was diverted to public education.[14] Nothing was said as to whether political parties would exist in the future, but even the liberals applauded the elimination of these parties.[†] Furthermore, since the BA had been implanted to eradicate disorder and subversion, a "National System of Planning and Action for National Security"[15] was instituted, resulting in the creation of the National Security Council (CONASE).
With the bourgeoisie enthused,[‡] union leaders expressing their support, Perón blessing the coup, various ex-political parties offering their personnel to the new government, and the Radicals bereft of any capacity to oppose the coup, the "disorder" of the previous period seemed to have been dispelled by the image of authority that the new government assiduously projected. The universities, "politicized and plagued by leftists," were seen as the only remaining bastions of conflict. Many approved when the universities were "intervened"—the legally elected officers replaced by government appointees—on July 29, 1966, although there were some objections to the brutalities committed in the process.[16]
[*] An example of the initial euphoria of some intellectual sectors is the collective volume entitled La "Revolución Argentina." Análisis y prospectiva (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Depalma, 1966). A more concrete indication of optimism about the future was the sharp rise in quotations on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange in the week after the coup. Economic Survey reported these gains to be the highest on record (July 5, 1966, p. 58).
[†] See the enthusiastic statements of all the media during the week of July 3–10, 1966, on the "definitive" elimination of these agents of "demagoguery" and "ineffectiveness" or even of "totalitarianism."
[‡] For expressions of support from all of the organizations of the upper bourgeoisie, see La Nación, July 14, 1966. The CGT was also happy with the new government; see La Nación, August 24, 1966, p. 5.
But they were deceived who waited for the torrent of decisions out of which would arise a "revolutionary mystique." The first cabinet was composed of self-proclaimed "moderate nationalists" who shared the president's paternalist orientation. Military liberals, like General Alsogaray, returned to their divisional commands, while prominent liberal civilians (like his brother Álvaro, who was appointed ambassador to the United States) were removed from the day-to-day conduct of government affairs. One of the most visible paternalists in the new cabinet was Interior Minister Enrique Martínez Paz. In addition to generating some qualms over the way he managed the closing-down of the universities, Martínez Paz obviously enjoyed proclaiming the "end of politics" in Argentina and denouncing the infinite evils for which he blamed the political parties. He also condemned democracy unequivocally.[17] Another paternalist, Secretary of Government Mario Díaz Colodrero, made similar statements, although he was more cautious in his denunciations of formal democracy. For his part, Onganía insisted that the initial, economic stage of the Argentine Revolution focus on two tasks in addition to economic normalization: the implantation of "order and authority" in society and the reorganization of the state apparatus. The latter was to be made more efficient by cutting personnel, "rationalizing" the central administration and public enterprises, improving tax collection, and implementing ambitious projects to expand the physical infrastructure.[*] Since public works projects took considerable start-up time and since the only visible fruits of "rationalization" were mountains of charts and regulations, the task attended to most rapidly was the dismissal of numerous public employees.[18]
The prospect of a streamlined state apparatus that would focus on assuring favorable conditions for the expansion of private capital was well received by the upper bourgeoisie.[†] But it clashed head-on with the public employees' unions and with the port workers, who began an extended strike when the "modernization" of the port of Buenos Aires
[*] The goal of reorganizing the state apparatus was stressed repeatedly by Onganía: "It is necessary to give preference to the organization of the state … to place a high priority on organizing the state such that this takes precedence over the other one that must also be organized,. which is the community" (La Nación, October 30, 1966, p. 1). Cf. also his speech in La Nación, November 8, 1966, p. 4, and Planeamiento y desarrollo de la acción de gobierno-directiva .
[†] The presidents of the UIA and the CAC responded enthusiastically to the announcement that the state apparatus was to be rationalized (La Nación, August 19, 1966, p. 1 and August 23, 1966, p. 7). Other organizations of the upper bourgeoisie also voiced their support (La Nación, November 9, 1966, p. 8). It is also worth noting that quotations on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange rose sharply immediately following this announcement.
commenced with massive layoffs and changes in the work process.[19] Similarly, the effort to overcome the sugar monoculture of Tucumán Province, which was defined as another major modernization task, began with a series of mill closings, aggravating the poor employment situation of that region and generating numerous strikes and violent protests.[20] The government did not take this heavy-handed approach, however, in dealing with workers in other sectors dominated by private capital. In August 1966 two important unions—the metal workers and the textile workers—began the renegotiation of their collective agreements by denouncing the "selfishness" of their employers and threatening to strike.[21] In these cases the government intervened to achieve a "just solution" that left employers protesting that the workers had made fundamental gains at their expense.[*]
Government officials also turned a deaf ear to demands for the repeal of the Law of Professional Associations (which was seen as the main mechanism underlying the "excessive power" of the unions) and for the establishment of "free unions. "[†] They opted instead for policies aimed at shifting control of the CGT to union leaders who were expected to be responsive to the paternalists. This decision was an early indication of a problem that would surface repeatedly throughout the period: the paternalists did not want to atomize the unions, as the liberals and the upper bourgeoisie demanded, but to unify them under their own control.
As the CGT struggled with the ambiguities resulting from the government's differing policies toward its member unions,[‡] the bourgeoisie was heartened by episodes that began to reveal that, in spite of the "equilibrating"
[*] Onganía was in attendance when, with great ceremony, the metal workers signed their Collective Work Agreement. The UIA complained that the government had exerted pressure on behalf of the workers in arranging both this agreement and the one signed by the textile workers. These protests cost the Undersecretary of Labor his job (La Nación, October 5, 1966, p. 1, and UIA, Memoria Anual, 1966–1967 [Buenos Aires, 1967], p. 59).
[†] The leading periodicals were the first to raise the issue of "free unions," arguing that if political parties were disbanded, "reasons of equity" demanded that a similar policy should be applied to the CGT, since it was the main organizational base of Peronism. They also asserted that existing laws that denied workers the freedom to decide whether or not to join a union and that prevented the emergence of a plurality of unions were obviously "totalitarian" vestiges of the past which would be intolerable in the era of liberty that had just been inaugurated. See La Nación, August 25, p. 6, and December 15, p. 6, 1966, and February 16, 1967; La Prensa, December 18, 1966, p. 6 and January 25, 1967, p. 6; and Economic Survey, July 19, 1966, p. 605.
[‡] In October 1966 Francisco Prado was reelected secretary general of the CGT. He and other CGT leaders immediately announced their desire to "carry on a dialogue with the government and with business" (La Nación, October 27, 1966, p. 20), and encouraged participation in the "Argentine Revolution" (La Nación, August 26, p. 11 and November 2, p. 1, 1966).
designs of the paternalists, the working class and various middle sectors were among the losers under the BA. One such episode was a speech by Onganía in which he reiterated commonplaces dear to the upper and Pampean bourgeoisies.[*] Another, more important, signal was the sanctioning of the Law of Mandatory Arbitration, which prohibited strikes or work stoppages until the issues in conflict had been submitted to government arbitration.[†] The paternalists viewed this law as necessary in the short run for halting the strikes that had begun to shatter the peace of the first days of the BA, and in the long run for eliminating activities incompatible with their utopia of an "organized community." Closer to the mark were the perceptions of the upper bourgeoisie and the leading periodicals, as well as of some union leaders, who realized that the Law of Mandatory Arbitration, given the already effected suppression of the electoral system, deprived the popular sector of its only remaining institutionalized means for articulating its demands. It was also quite clear that this law weakened the popular sector not only in its dealings with the state apparatus but also in its direct relations with the bourgeoisie.[‡]
The attempts to manipulate the CGT, the sanctions imposed on
[*] La Nación, November 8, 1966, p. 1. Besides announcing a frontal attack on inflation and the fiscal deficit, Onganía stated that "it is the intention of this government that industry remain in the hands of industrialists, and not in those of the state," whose activities would be limited to energy and steel and to "resolving problems of infrastructure." Organía also criticized "foreign exchange differentials detrimental to exportation" and "a system of taxation that [undermines] the security of the [agricultural and livestock] producer," raising the hopes of the Pampean bourgeoisie—which soon would be disappointed—for favorable directions in economic policy. Onganía's speech nevertheless displayed paternalist overtones in referring to "the technical capability and responsibility of the Argentine worker, which are amply demonstrated in the environment of a well-organized enterprise whose proper functioning is assured by a balanced sense of authority and reciprocal loyalty."
[†] Law 16,936 of August 27, 1966. As in a Collective Work Agreement, the settlement arbitrated by the government would be binding for all workers and enterprises in a specified economic activity.
[‡] In spite of these implications, the leadership of the CGT (which remained determined to "carry on a dialogue") issued a mild and ambiguous commentary on this law; see the press release reprinted in Santiago Senén González, El sindicalismo después de Perón (Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1971), 101–102. More critical responses came from unions excluded from the CGT leadership. The UIA responded to the Law of Mandatory Arbitration by applauding "the advances made in the rectification of norms and customs in labor and union relations" (UIA, Memoria Anual, 1966–1967, p. 57). Later, in commenting on this law and on the subsequent freeze on salaries, the UIA remarked chastely that, although it had always defended "freedom from state intervention" in relations between employers and workers and unions (as well as in other areas), "it is appropriate to recognize that in special situations and emergencies it is legitimate to adopt measures to assure public order … in such a way as to ensure harmony with the ends pursued [through economic policy]" (UIA, Memoria Anual, 1967–1968 [Buenos Aires, 1968], pp. 33–34).
public-sector unions, the pro-labor decisions taken with regard to the contracts negotiated in the metallurgical and textile sectors, and the Law of Mandatory Arbitration were all ostensibly the work of the Ministry of Economy and Labor, headed by Jorge Salimei. Salimei was a self-made man from the food industry with no direct ties to transnational capital, and a socially conscious "Catholic entrepreneur" both in his public stands and in the paternalist approach he took to managing his own enterprises. Salimei found himself directing a heterogeneous team that included other "Catholic entrepreneurs," some liberals, and some Christian Democratic técnicos who were well to the left of their colleagues. When Ambassador Alsogaray publicized his view that Argentina should sign a Guarantee of Investments Agreement with the United States in order to attract U.S. capital, both Salimei and Onganía took the position that, despite the indispensability of foreign capital, the abdication of Argentine sovereignty entailed by the ambassador's proposition was out of the question.[*] If this nationalist gesture did little to arouse the enthusiasm of the upper bourgeoisie, it was equally unsuccessful in helping Salimei resolve the conflicts internal to his team[†] or discover some way out of his obvious confusion as to what to do about the economy. The year 1966 closed with zero economic growth[‡] and a decline in the rate of investments.[§] Furthermore, a devaluation had improved neither the precarious balance-of-payments situation[||] nor the inflation inherited from the previous record.[#] Still worse in the eyes of the bourgeoisie was that, in the wake of union complaints about price increases,[22] price controls were imposed and sanctions enacted against
[*] Alsogaray even announced the signing of such an agreement (La Nación, July 26, 1966). By contrast, Onganía stated that while foreign capital would be welcomed, a Guarantee of Investments Agreement was unnecessary.
[†] Before the end of the year, Salimei forced the resignations of the Christian Democratic técnicos, including the president of the Central Bank.
[‡] During 1966 GNP rose only 0.7% above its 1965 level, equivalent to a per capita drop of -0.4% (BCRA, Sistema de cuentas de producto e ingreso de la Argentina, vol. 2, Cuadros estadísticos [Buenos Aires, 1975]).
[§] In 1966 gross fixed domestic investment fell 7.7% below its 1965 level. The net balances of short-term capital movements, long-term capital movements, and direct foreign investment were, respectively, -$105 million, -$76 million, and $2.6 million (figures in then-current U.S. dollars). See tables 7, 11, and 42 for these figures and their sources.
[||] At the close of 1966 the net reserves of the BCRA were US$176.9 million, less than the $208.9 million held in the month preceding the coup (see Table 9).
[#] The average monthly cost-of-living increase in Greater Buenos Aires in the second half of 1966 was 3.5%, which represented no improvement over either the second half of 1964 or the second half of 1965, when the monthly cost of living increase averaged 3.0% (see Table 8).
the "unscrupulous businessmen" who disregarded them.[*] The "state interventionism" of the preceding years, which had "penalized business" while ignoring that the "real" sources of inflation and sluggish economic growth were excessive wages and salaries and the fiscal deficit, had reared its head once again.[23]
Another notable feature of the second half of 1966 was a growing wave of student protest.[24] Its momentum increased after a student participating in a street demonstration in Córdoba was killed by the police, an action that made a major impact in a country as yet unaccustomed to episodes of this sort.
To the bourgeoisie, certain aspects of the situation seemed satisfactory. But there were others—too many others—that did not. Above all, the government was plainly uncertain about the overall direction of its policies. It seemed as if the great opportunity provided by the June coup was on the verge of being wasted. What had been unthinkable in June was taking place four months later: rumors of military unrest were circulating, and the possibility that discontent within the armed forces might lead to another coup could not be brushed aside.[†] Onganía could not easily be dispensed with, but the same did not hold for his collaborators. Martínez Paz and Salimei became the main targets of criticism[‡] and, apparently to eliminate dead weight, Onganía requested their resignations. On December 30, 1966, Onganía named Guillermo Borda Minister of the Interior and Adalbert Krieger Vasena Minister of Economy. Similar pressures within the army had already led to the removal of Pistarini as commander in chief and to his replacement by Julio Alsogaray.
In the meantime, the paternalists had failed in their efforts to engineer the emergence of a CGT leadership favorable to them. Economic and
[*] For the announcement that price control legislation (passed before the coup) would be put into effect, see La Nación, August 4, 1966, p. 1. Also, a "Regulation of Supply" law (n. 17,017) was enacted on November 18, 1966, increasing the government's capacity to control prices and raising the penalties for infractions.
[†] See, for example, reports about the "unusual proliferation" of tense military meetings, in La Nación, October 9, p. 6, and December 8, p. 6, 1966. "Military unrest" was also discussed in an article entitled "Behind the Crisis" in La Nación, December 11, 1966, p. 8, and in Primera Plana, December 6, pp. 8, 12 and December 13, pp. 14, 17, 1966. My interviews with military officers confirmed these tensions.
[‡] The "corporatism" of the Minister of the Interior and his staff was criticized in La Nación, October 6, p. 6 and November 13, p. 6, 1966; Primera Plana, October 25, 1966, p. 12; and Economic Survey, January 10, 1967, p. 1. Liberals such as Roberto Alemann, José A. Martínez de Hoz, Álvaro Alsogaray, and Adalbert Krieger Vasena were proposed as candidates for Minister of Economy; cf. La Nación as early as August 14, 1966, p. 6, and Primera Plana, November 22, 1966, p. 18.
social policy in the months that followed the coup had irritated everyone. Moreover, it was evident that the government was going to push ahead with its goal of "rationalizing" the state apparatus. This plan, together with the Law of Mandatory Arbitration, drove into opposition the current that Salimei and his team had counted on as their principal ally within the unions: the 62 Organizaciones de Pie, headed by José Alonso, which in October 1966 was defeated in a bid for the top positions in the CGT. It was assumed that the unions in this current were loyal to Perón, who, wasting no time in reversing his initial position, was now sending messages urging opposition to the government.[*] The paternalists' overtures to the 62 de Pie, despite their lack of success, pushed into opposition the latter's main rival, the 62 Organizations (or Vandorists), led by Augusto Vandor. Accordingly, it was not long before all the principal union currents were publicizing their disillusionment with the "anti-popular" policies adopted, no longer by the "Argentine Revolution," but by "the government that emerged from the June coup." The Vandorists, the 62 de Pie, and the Independents (who were at the time the other major union alignment) all came out against the above-mentioned November speech in which Onganía sought to reassure the bourgeoisie. With this convergence the union leadership, which until recently had been fraught with divisions, now seemed to have pulled itself together in opposition to a government that seemed, to the upper bourgeoisie, committed to folly: not only had it thrown away an excellent opportunity to complete the divisions within the union leadership, it had actually helped to heal them and, in so doing, had made itself the target of the newfound unity. On December 1, 1966, the CGT, even as it insisted that it was disposed to engage in "dialogue" with the government, declared a national work stoppage, under pressure from public employees' unions chafing from the effects of "rationalization," from the 62 de Pie, from Perón's exhortations to oppose the government, and from the growing unreceptiveness of many Vandorist unions to the negotiated settlements still advocated by Vandor and his associates.[†]
[*] On Perón's change of position, Primera Plana, April 11, 1967, p. 17. Perón ordered a public demonstration to take place on Peronism's commemorative day, October 17. The demonstration was forbidden by the government and gave rise to clashes in the streets that added another element of déjà vu to the "Revolution" inaugurated with so much fanfare in June (La Nación, October 18, 1966, p. 4).
[†] The CGT combined criticism of economic policy stressing unemployment, the cost of living, low wages, and "laissez-faire minorities" with offers for "dialogue" and "participation" (La Nación, December 9, p. 1, December 18, pp. 1–18, and December 29, p. 9, 1966).
Meanwhile, most nationalist civilian groups* had by this stage distanced themselves from what seemed to them to be a purely administrative government which, far from spearheading the "National Revolution," had adopted a "liberal" economic policy and had retained at its core persons as notoriously associated with this tendency as Ambassador Alsogaray—who, for his part, never missed a chance to criticize the economic and labor policies of his government. Less than six months after the coup, the government seemed to be cut off from society and sustained precariously by armed forces that showed unmistakable signs of unrest.
With the cabinet changes at the end of December, Onganía's government (defined in terms of whether its top positions were occupied by officials close to his person and orientations) had ended. July to December 1966 is properly viewed as an interim period, characterized principally by the confusion of many of the relevant actors as to who had actually won and lost the June 28 coup. When this period ended, the real work of the BA began.