11
From Sulla to Pompey
The Revival of the Eastern Imperium, 81-70
The clique of Sullan partisans and timeserving latecomers to the Sullan cause that swept into power with its victory in 82 has traditionally received low marks for its turn at the helm of state in the 70s: characterized by a vicious combination of indolence, inefficiency, and corruption, the "Sullan oligarchy" inevitably collapsed in 70 of its own internal failings and inflexibility. But the faults discerned in the Sullani are old acquaintances of the Roman historian that are not met here for the first time and have a long life ahead of them in Augustan or Trajanic splendor; their prominence in the 70s, one senses, is part of the script of an old morality tale that goes back at least to Sallust but possesses great power still for modern interpreters.
Not long ago, however, a sober reassessment presented a very different picture of the 70s, portraying it more plausibly in terms of a gradual and careful return to political normalcy after the grave disruption of civil war, rather than as a process of governmental decline and fall.[1] Among the achievements of the post-Sullan era, I wish to argue, must be counted the reassertion of Roman supremacy in the East after the catastrophe of the Pontic attack had demonstrated the weakness of Rome's imperium , and Sulla's too-hasty departure left the job of restoring it incomplete. The decade of the 70s saw an unprecedented commitment of Roman military resources to the East in a succession of campaigns, for most of the period in two, and finally in three, theaters of operations, which marks a watershed in the history of the development of Rome's Eastern empire. While
[1] Gruen, Last Generation , 6-46.
individual episodes in this massive military effort, notably of course the origins and events of the Third Mithridatic War, have received dose attention, no attempt has been made to put together a more general account of Roman activities in this period not only in Asia Minor but in Thrace, Moesia, and the west coast of the Black Sea, as well as in the Aegean, Crete, and Cyrenaica. The result has been a failure to recognize the full significance of this momentous period in the history of Rome's Eastern intervention. In the sketch that follows I shall attempt to give proper weight to the less familiar campaigns and avoid, except where significant for the broader picture, rehearsal of the well-known narrative of the conflict with Mithridates.
The Restoration of Roman Power in Macedonia, Greece, and Asia Minor
We have noted the rather unsettled state in which Sulla left the East toward the end of the 80s: Macedonia and Greece virtually stripped of defenders and pressed hard by Thracian incursions; Mithridates only moderately chastened and still ready to face Roman arms in the field; the Dardanus pact an embarrassment and not officially ratified; pirates continuing to flourish on the seas. Little could be done to improve the situation until Rome itself was returned to constitutional government and Sulla's "restoration of the state" was complete, although the assignment to Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, one of the consuls of 81, of Macedonia, which had not had a consular commander since Minucius Rufus three decades previously, indicates that the restoration of security in the southern Balkans was recognized as a high priority. Still, nothing is known of Dolabella's military activity, and it seems unlikely that he did much more than consolidate Roman authority in central and coastal Macedonia, where we find him involved in effecting the restoration of Thasian mainland territory seized recently by Thracians.[2]
However, in 80 Sulla laid down the dictatorship, symbolically returning the res publica to its normal functioning under the consuls.[3] Again, there is a dear sign of Roman military priorities: the consular provinces for 79 determined in 80 under the Sempronian law were both Eastern—Mace-donia and Cilicia. The West—so it appeared—was safe: Pompey had ruthlessly put down the Cinnans in Sicily and Africa, while Sertorius, the last remnant of significant opposition, was now a refugee, driven out of Spain
[2] Sherk 20-21.
[3] For the date of Sulla's abdication of the dictatorship, see above, p. 268, n. 32.
by Sulla's general C. Annius (Plut. Sert . 7), and apparently not long for this world. The maintenance of Macedonia as a consular province is a noteworthy and important sign that the damage done to Roman power by the Mithridatic invasion and Thracian attacks of the previous decade had not yet been undone; but the selection of Cilicia as the destination of a second consular army is perhaps a more surprising move, requiring further explanation.
Cilicia before the Mithridatic War had sometimes been in essence a "piracy command," sometimes a base of land operations in support of Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia, anticipating its later function in the 50s as "the highroad from western Asia to Syria."[4] The attempt to pin onto the year 80 or indeed any other the establishment of a "territorial" province—a concept not recognized in Latin usage—seems fundamentally misguided in its assumption that the creation of a province was an event rather than an incremental and gradual process.[5] Nevertheless, the dual threats of Pontic meddling in Cappadocia and piracy ensured that Cilicia provincia would continue to be assigned after Murena's departure: an ex-praetor, another Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, was in command there in 80-79.[6] But in 80 Cilicia was assigned to a consul of 79; both consuls would go east, an event whose importance has not been sufficiently noted. For the single precedent for operations by two consular armies in the East we need to go back as far as 189-188 at the conclusion of the war with Antiochus and the Aetolians.
[4] Syme, Roman Papers , 1:123. Pirates and support of Ariobarzanes (Sulla 96-95, Oppius 89-88): see chap. 9.
[5] See chap. 1. Magie, whose criticisms of all earlier dates are forceful, sees a "new province" organized by Sulla or Murena (RRAM , 284-85, 1161-65, nn. 12, 14-16). Sherwin-White, RFPE , 152-53 with n. 13 (cf. JRS 66 [1976] 10-11), misinterpreting (and misquoting) Cic. Verr . 2.1.44 (posteaquam Cn. Dolabellae provincia Cilicia constituta est ; which refers of course to the assignment of Cilicia to Dolabella as his praetorian provincia ), supposes that in 80, under Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, Cilicia was newly "established" as a "separate territorial province" from Asia. See Badian, TLS , August 24, 1984, p. 952. Badian, Roman Imperialism , 35, makes Servilius the creator of the "proper territorial province of Cilicia, as distinct from the old provincia. " (How did Romans distinguish "proper territorial provinces" from provinciae ?) So too Liebmann-Frankfort, Frontière orientale , 205-10, and in Hommages Renard , 453-54. The more recent tendency is to date the province about the time of the lex de provinciis praetoriis of ca. 100 (p. 233 n. 40) or ca. 90 (Ferrary, Athenaeum 63 [1985] 443-44). But Syme's more flexible conception ("Cilicia began as a maritime command and turned into the provincia of a proconsul moving backwards and forwards along a continental road": Roman Papers , 1:125) is more attuned to the realities of Roman provincial practice.
[6] Remembered chiefly for the legateship under him held by the villainous Verres: sources in MRR , 2:80.
What explains this extraordinary commitment of two consular armies, which recalled the height of Rome's military efforts in the East in the early second century? Piracy had once again achieved grave proportions, and operations against the Cilician pirate strongholds did indeed ensue. But a consul had never been sent out solely on an expedition against pirates. As it happens, there was much more than mere piracy to cause concern about southern Asia Minor. Mithridates had still not yielded up all of Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes, who was just now pressing his complaints against the Pontic king before the Senate.[7] Mithridates' son-in-law Tigranes, who had helped to set in motion the crisis of the later 90s by expelling Ariobarzanes, had conquered Seleucid Syria, taken the title "King of Kings," and had recently taken over much of Seleucid Cilicia (presumably Pedias), encircling further the exposed Cappadocian king.[8] The persistence of the Cappadocian dispute and Mithridates' resumption of empire building around the Black Sea must have given many Romans reason to think that the war had reached only a pause, not an end, and that the Roman position in Asia Minor needed to be reinforced in view of the possibility of a resumption of hostilities.[9] Yet, interestingly, the activities of P. Servilius Vatia, who received the province of Cilicia, would show that Rome did not desire war with Pontus. Perhaps a strong demonstration of Roman resolve would encourage Mithridates to yield up all of Cappadocia, which Sulla now ordered (
Mithridates now became docile, recognizing Roman determination and sobered by the failure of his recent attempt to subjugate Colchis. A new Pontic embassy to Rome arrived in 78 to declare that Mithridates had now withdrawn from Cappadocia and asked for ratification of the terms of the agreement at Dardanus.[10] Roughly at the same time that this embassy was in Rome, the proconsul Servilius was crossing to Asia Minor with at least
[7] Ariobarzanes sent an embassy to Rome to complain of Mithridates' power in Cappadocia in 79 or 80 (App. Mith . 67; see McGing, FPME , 136 with n. 17).
[8] For Tigranes' conquest, probably in 83, of Seleucid Syria and neighboring Cilicia, see Justin 40.1.3-2.3; App. Syr . 48, 70; Plut. Luc . 21, Pomp . 28; Dio 36.37.6; B. V. Head, Historia nummorum (Oxford 1911), 772-73. The Seleucid princes Antiochus XIII and Philip II were, however, able to take refuge subsequently in Cilicia—perhaps Trachea (Just. 40.2.3; Diod. 40.1a). Cf. Sullivan, Near Eastern Royalty , 97-105.
[9] Cf. Sherwin-White, JRS 66 (1976) 11. On Mithridates' expansionism, cf. App. Mith . 67, with McGing, FPME , 135-36, and Glew, Chiron 11 (1981) 121-22. "A pause, not an end": M. Cotta, cos. 74, at Plut. Luc . 5.1. see Sall. H . 2.47.7 Maurenbrecher, quoted below, n. 18.
[10] App. Mith . 67. For Mithridates' weakness at this moment, See Glew, Chiron 11 (1981) 121-23.
two legions to add to the two already there.[11] Sulla, with whose prestige the terms of the agreement at Dardanus was bound up, was now dead and could not give direction. The consuls, distracted by civil discord, refused to admit the Pontic embassy on the grounds that there was more pressing business, in effect making the Dardanus pact a dead letter and leaving much to the discretion of the commander in the field, Servilius.[12]
The sequel is significant. Servilius turned his attention to operations against coastal strongholds of the pirates in Lycia and Pamphylia, which occupied him probably through 76.[13] However, in 78 or 77, while Servilius thus busied himself, the Armenian king Tigranes invaded Cappadocia and is said to have hauled off some 300,000 persons eastward to people his new capital Tigranocerta.[14] Although Appian alleges that Mithridates was behind the raid, Tigranes, King of Kings and at the height of his power, had sufficient reasons of his own for undertaking it. It is significant that we hear nothing of Ariobarzanes on this occasion, and that Servilius chose to make no retaliatory move against either Tigranes or Mithridates. The Armenian king's invasion of Cappadocia was not used as a pretext for war either with Mithridates, who apparently made no move himself, or with the Armenian king, despite this second attack in twenty years on the much-abused Ariobarzanes. Rome, therefore, was neither seeking another dash with Mithridates, nor had it accepted a brief to defend the territorial integrity of Cappadocia against all comers. There was good reason for caution: Sertorius had returned to Spain, had caught the Sullan regime off guard, and his rebellion had now turned quite serious. This was no time for a confrontation with Mithridates. Still, one did not want to give the impression of weakness either to a foe who, from Sallust's perspective, was
[11] On the number of legions in Asia Minor in this period, see especially Broughton, in ESAR , 4:569; cf. Sherwin-White, RFPE , 154, 157 n. 33.
[12] App. Mith . 67. The consuls are usually thought to be those of 78; but 77, at the beginning of which the Lepidan crisis was at its height, must be considered a possibility.
[13] See especially Ormerod, JRS 12 (1922) 35-56. Also, Ormerod, Piracy , 214-20; Magie, RRAM , 1168-74 nn. 19-26; Sherwin-White, RFPE , 154-58; Marasco, RivStorlt 99 (1987) 137-39. Servilius confiscated territory of Attalea in Pamphylia and Olympus in Lycia (Cic. Leg. agr . 1.5, 2.50); obviously Rome did not make into public land, much less control, the entire coast of Lycia and Cilicia (so Cic. Leg. agr . 1, fr. 3): Magie, p. 1169 n. 19.
[14] App. Mith . 67; cf. Strabo, 11.14.15, C532. On the date, see Glew, Chiron 11 (1981) 124 n. 61. Tigranes may have sacked Soli in Cilicia too on this occasion, if not earlier (Dio 36.37.6; Plut. Pomp . 28): according to Strabo, Tigranes deported to his new city the populations of twelve Greek cities (11.14.15, C532), probably mostly from Cilicia (see Plut. Luc . 26.1, 29.2-4).
clearly perceived as still menacing Roman interests in Asia.[15] Therefore Servilius's attack in 76/75 on inland Isauria, on the north slope of the Taurus Mountains and far from the coast where he had previously been operating, probably had a higher objective than military glory for the commander and booty for the army. Isauria controlled the strategic route from Pamphylia on the coast—still the heart of Cilicia provincia —through to Cappadocia.[16] But if this was a response to Tigranes' attack, it was one that left no room for a direct dash. Servilius returned home probably late in 75 to celebrate a triumph, but Cilicia was assigned again to a consul L. Octavius (cos. 75).[17] Mithridates' mere presence, despite the absence of any hostile moves, demanded the maintenance in Asia Minor of a consular army.[18]
While the guarded peace in Asia Minor persisted under Servilius, his consular colleague, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, began in 77 a major Roman offensive in the southern Balkan region that would persist through the decade, the first extended military effort on the Macedonian frontier since the passing of the Scordiscan crisis in the last decade of the second century. Claudius was detained in Italy by illness and the seditio Lepidana , but once he had arrived in Macedonia provincia he had launched an offensive against the Maedi around Mt. Rhodope and levied tribute on the Dardani settled around the upper Axius River to the northwest.[19] In 76, however,
[15] Sall. H . 1.77.8 Maurenbrecher (a speech put into the mouth of the consul Philippus): Mithridates in latere vectigalium nostrorum, quibus adhuc sustentamur, diem bello circumspicit . Glew, Chiron 11 (1981) 124-25, overinterprets, thinking that the passage shows that Romans knew Mithridates was behind Tigranes' attack. In general, Glew exaggerates the "crisis" of relations with Pontus at this point, apparently supposing that Ariobarzanes had been expelled (p. 125).
[16] Sherwin-White, RFPE , 155-57, suggesting further that Servilius built the road to Iconium later atteste d. Despite Sherwin-White, p. 155, the fact that the law on the praetorian provinces of ca. 100 specifies that Lycaonia is part of the sphere of operations of the Asian commander rather than of the "Cilician" (JRS 64 [1974] 202, III, lines 22-27) hardly suggests that Roman control had ever been effectively asserted this far inland. A new inscription from Isauria commemorates Servilius's evocatio of its gods before its capture: CIL I , 2954; cf. AE , 1977, 816.
[17] Triumph: Cic. Verr . 2.1.57. Octavius: Sail. H . 2.98 Maurenbrecher. After Octavius's death early in 74, Cilicia was transferred to L. Lucullus, consul in that year: MRR , 2:101.
[18] Sall. H . 2.47.7: exercitus in Asia Ciliciaque ob nimias opes Mithridatis aluntur (spoken by a consul of 75, C. Aurelius Cotta). On Cilicia in the 70s see also Ferrary's discussion of the lex de Termessibus: Athenaeum 63 (1985) 444-47.
[19] Delayed departure: Sall. H . 1.127, 1.77.22 Maurenbrecher. For his campaigns, see especially Livy Per . 91; Eutr. 6.2.1; Festus Brev . 9; Oros. 5.23.17; Jord. Summ. Rom . 220; Sall. H . 2.80 Maurenbrecher. Also Papazoglou, Central Balkan Tribes , 179-83. The honorand of IG II .4109 and Hesperia 41 (1972) 128 is almost certainly his homonymous son, the consul of 54.
Claudius's fortunes were varied against the Maedi, and in the same year he succumbed to sickness. Despite the Sertorian rebellion and the heightened tension in Asia Minor, C. Scribonius Curio, consul in 76, was sent out to succeed him with no less than five legions.[20] While Sallust makes the consul C. Cotta in 75 declare that, among the other ills troubling the Republic, Macedonia was plena hostium (H . 2.47.7 Maurenbrecher), Curio's campaigns fully reestablished Roman power in the southern Balkans after the vicissitudes of the previous two decades. By 73 he had terrorized into submission the Dardani, whose subjection by Claudius had been rather incomplete, became the first Roman commander to reach the Danube, and received a triumph for his efforts, perhaps in 72.[21]
Yet, although by now Rome was already involved in renewed warfare with Mithridates, Curio too received a consular successor in Macedonia, M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73), the natural brother of L. Lucullus. The continuation of the military offensive in Thrace after the victories of Curio may seem surprising at first; its explanation presumably lies in the resumption of war against Pontus. Mithridates held sway over much of the Black Sea region, the northwest and west coast of which was an important source of revenues, supplies, allied contingents, and mercenaries.[22] M. Lucullus probably took command of the province already in the course of his consulship, in 73, since his predecessor Curio returned in that year; from the Aegean coast near Aenus he appears to have marched up the Hebrus against the Bessi, whom he defeated severely below Mt. Haemus, then eastward to the Black Sea through the land of the Moesians, capturing their stronghold Cabyle on the way.[23] He then captured the Greek cities
[20] Claudius and the Maedi: Jul. Obs. 59; cf. Oros. 5.23.19. Curio's legions: Frontin. Str . 4.1.43.
[21] The Dardani after Claudius's death: Sall. H . 2.80 Maurenbrecher. Curio's campaigns: esp. Livy Per . 92, 95; Eutr. 6.2.2; Amm. Marc. 29.5.22 (terror); Festus Brev . 7; Oros. 5.23.20; Jord. Summ. Rom . 216. Honors for Curio as patron at Oropos: IG VII. 331. See Münzer, RE 2A (1921) 864; Papazoglou, Central Balkan Tribes , 281-83, 325-26, 409-10.
[22] See Pippidi, Scythica minora , 165-67. For Mithridates' control of the Greek cities of the Dobrudja, see especially McGing, FPME , 57-60. For Bastarnaean, Sarmatian, Scythian, Celtic, Thracian, and other troops, in part allied contingents, in part mercenaries, see App. Mith . 13, 15, 69, 71, 109, 111; Memnon, FGrH 434 F 27.7-8, 29.6, 34.3; Dio 36.9.3-4; Justin 38.3.6-7. Cf. McGing, FPME , 61-62; Griffith, Mercenaries , 189-90; Danoff, RE suppl. 9 (1962) 1155. Memnon, FGrH F 37.6 for the supplying of Sinope from the Crimea (cf. 34.5: Heraclea).
[23] On his route, see Papazoglou, Central Balkan Tribes , 410-14; also on the campaign, Münzer, RE 13 (1926) 417. Sources in MRR , 2:118-19; full text in Sarikakis, "ArconnteV , 85-88. The most important for this part of the campaign are App. Ill . 30; Amm. Marc. 27.4.11; Eutr. 6.10.1; Festus Brev . 9; cf. Sall. H . 3.51, 4.18 Maurenbrecher; Livy Per . 97; Frontin. Str . 3.10.7; Oros. 6.3.4; Jord. Summ. Rom . 220-21.
of the Euxine coast from Apollonia in the south as far north as Istrus, near the mouth of the Danube, and seems to have shown the flag against the Scythians.[24] Returning from the wars already in 71, Lucullus celebrated a triumph de Macedonia .[25]
M. Lucullus's campaigns in the Dobrudja and Moesia were hardly intended to put the area under firm Roman control. Although the Greek cities of the western coast of the Black Sea were apparently recognized after their capture as "allies,"[26] the Moesians, who stood between them and the Roman-dominated portion of Thrace, were not fully conquered until the campaigns of M. Licinius Crassus in 29-28 B.C. , and firm Roman control effectively terminated at Mt. Haemus.[27] Nor, further west, did Roman power extend to the Danube: Cicero in 55 still emphasized the indeterminacy of the northern frontier of the province (Pis . 38), which existed only where it could be enforced militarily against peoples who were far from permanently pacified; much work remained for Augustus before the Danube could become a dear terminus of Roman power. But the Balkan offensive of the 70s convincingly reasserted Rome's imperium in Macedonia, restoring thereby the security of Greece that had been badly disturbed from the north twice in the previous decade; and by means of a series of deep thrusts into hostile territory, it gave a clear demonstration of the revival of Roman military vigor. It is remarkable that the post-Sullan regime attempted to do this, let alone managed it, while at the same
[24] See especially Eutr. 6.10.1; App. Ill . 30; Festus Brev . 9; Jord. Summ. Rom . 220-21; Jerome Chron . 152k Helm; IGBulg I , 314a. The statue of Apollo that Lucullus took from Apollonia was famous: see Strabo 7.6.1, C319; Pliny HN 4.92, 34.39 (cf. 34.36); App. Ill . 30; Solin. 19.1.
[25] Cic. Pis . 44; Eutr. 6.10.1; Schol. Bob . 177 Stangl; ps.-Asc. 222 Stangl. For the date of his return, see Plut. Crass . 11.2 and App. BC 1.120, with Münzer, RE 13 (1926) 417.
[26] See Dio 38.10.3, and Papazoglou, Central Balkan Tribes , 413. The Roman treaty of alliance with Callatis probably belongs earlier (see chap. 7), pace Pippidi, Scythica minora , 172-81.
[27] Sources for Crassus's campaign in Sarakakis, "ArconteV , 145-47; see Papazoglou, Central Balkan Tribes , 414-30. Note that Dio says the expansion of the Bastarnae that incited Crassus's response had nothing to do with the Romans until, having conquered Moesia, they crossed Mt. Haemus (51.23.3-4). Cf. C. Antonius Hybrida's ill-starred invasion of Moesia and the Dobrudja in 62-59: Sarakakis, pp. 94-96; Broughton, MRR , 2:175-76, for sources.
time maintaining a consular army in Asia Minor against the threat and subsequently the reality of war with Mithridates and the long operations against Sertorius in Spain.
The Occupation of Bithynia and Pontus
Until mid-decade Roman military efforts in the East had been concentrated on Macedonia provincia , where no less than five legions were active, while four legions in Asia Minor guarded against Mithridates and performed police duties on the Lycian-Pamphylian coast and the routes over the Taurus. Every year since 78 there had been two consular armies in the East. Never had the Roman presence in the East been so massive and persistent. But events in the year 74 escalated Rome's involvement in Eastern parts far beyond even this level.
In that year Nicomedes IV, king of Bithynia, died.[28] Nicomedes had named the Roman people as his heir, evidently in case of intestacy.[29] Upon his death, the claims of a supposed son by his wife Nysa were asserted before the Senate, but certain Bithynians, who, Sallust notes, came of their own volition, denounced him as a fraud;[30] it is clearly implied that a true heir would have blocked Roman inheritance. Nicomedes' reasons for leaving his kingdom to Rome in the absence of an heir are as obscure to us as those of Attalus III, but the guess may be ventured that since he recognized that the kingdom would pass from his line in any case, this seemed the only way to deter Mithridates from seizing it and to ensure that his tra-
[28] For the date, Eutr. 6.6.1, with McGing, Phoenix 38 (1984) 14-15, who shows that the royal Bithynian coin with an era date corresponding to the year beginning in October 74 does not, in fact, imply that Nicomedes died only in the last quarter of 74. On the other hand, we can hardly conclude from our exiguous evidence that the king died very early in 74, as do, for example, Ward, AJAH 2 (1977) 31, 33, and Keaveney, Lucullus , 204, or even late in 75, as Merkelbach has recently argued (ZPE 81 [1990] 97-100). Merkelbach's claim that the early date is confirmed by the new text from Ephesus (SEG XXXIX. 1180) is countered by Heil, EA 17 (1991) 9-11, who rightly points out that the naming of the consuls of 75 (lines 73, 75) does not date the law to that year. See further below, n. 34.
[29] This is dearly implied by App. Mith . 71; Schol. Grov . 316 Stangl; Sall. H . 2.71, 4.69.9 Maurenbrecher. For full citation of sources, see Magie, RRAM , 1200-1201 n. 49.
[30] Sall. H . 2.71 Maurenbrecher: quos adversum multi ex Bithynia volentes accurrere falsum filium arguituri (cf. 4.69.9). The setting, as Maurenbrecher noted, is dearly Rome. McGing, FPME , 143-44, and Magie, RRAM , 1201 n. 50, rightly note that we cannot assume that Mithridates' pretext for invading Bithynia was to vindicate this man's claim; but there is no reason to reject the dear evidence of the two passages of Sallust that such a claim was asserted. That does not mean that it was valid.
ditional protector from Pontus, Rome, would determine its fate rather than his enemy.
The most recent precedents—Cyrene, inherited by the Roman people in 96 but apparently neglected for decades, and Egypt, which according to testamentary terms might have passed to Rome by now—show that the assumption of control by Rome at least in the near future was not by any means inevitable.[31] Even the Attalid legacy was hardly accepted with alacrity, as we have seen. In 74, however, no hesitation to commit resources more deeply to the East is evident. Quite the reverse. No sooner was the question of Nicomedes' supposed son taken care of than the proconsul of Asia, M. Iunius Iuncus,[32] was sent to establish the Roman presence in the former kingdom, while his quaestor, Q. Pompeius, oversaw the collection of the movable royal property and its transport to Rome, a process that was apparently completed by the time of Mithridates' invasion in the spring of 73.[33] (Iuncus was already in Bithynia and, we may suppose, had his hands quite full with more pressing affairs when, probably in the winter of 74-73, an impertinent graduate student named C. Iulius Caesar appeared before him to demand the immediate punishment of some pirates he had rounded up.)[34] As we shall see, Bithynia was made a consular province already in the course of 74.
[31] See further below, appendix J.
[32] On the name, see Ward, AJAH 2 (1977) 26-29.
[33] On Pompeius, see Festus 320 Lindsay, with Miltner, RE 21 (1952) 2061 (no. 25), and Sumner, Orators , 129-30. Pompeius won the agnomen Bithynicus for this action, which argues for a rather prominent role in comparison to his superior officer Iuncus. It is unjustified, however, to suppose with Drumann and Groebe, Geschichte Roms , 4:321, and Miltner that Pompeius therefore "organized" the province. Heil EA 17 (1991) 9-11, argues plausibly that the newly published Roman customs law (SEG XXXIX.1180), which refers to toll stations in Bithynia (lines 8-26), belongs in this year.
[34] Sources: Vell. Pat. 2.41.3-42.3; Suet. Iul . 4.1-2; Plut. Caes . 13-2.4; cf. Vir. ill . 78; Polyaenus Strat . 8.23.1; Val. Max. 6.9.15; Fenestella Fr. 30 Peter. I date the event to 74-73 rather than the traditional 75-74: Suetonius puts Caesar's capture early in the winter season (hibernis iam mensibus , 4.1), and the sources strongly imply that Caesar went straight up to Bithynia after his release and the capture of the pirates (Vell. Pat. and Plut. Caes . 2.6; Suet. Iul . 4.2 knows of no trip to Asia, much less Bithynia, till Mithridates invaded in 73). Iuncus can hardly be put in Bithynia before rather late in 74 (pace Ward, AJAH 2 [1977] 31), since not only do we need to leave room for Nicomedes to die at some unknown point in 74, but also for embassies to Bithynia before the Senate took its final derision and for Iuncus to be informed about the result. Hence the winter of Caesar's capture and his trip to Bithynia must be that of 74-73. Keaveney, Lucullus , 201-2, objects that M. Cotta had by then already relieved Iuncus; but that is quite uncertain.
Rome, then, moved with uncharacteristic speed and resolution to take up this royal inheritance. The circumstances that demanded such a firm response seem clear. Mithridates had remained a sufficient threat to require the maintenance in Asia Minor of a consular army of four or five legions since ca. 79. He had a history of meddling in Bithynia, while the news that arrived in Rome around this time of alliance with Sertorius was certainly ominous.[35] The Pontic invasion of Bithynia, which indeed came within a year of Nicomedes' death, may well have been regarded as almost inevitable. The Senate seems to have been inclined to ensure that Bithynia's wealth would benefit Rome, whose resources were stretched to the limit around mid-decade, rather than Mithridates—hence the speed with which the royal possessions were laid hold of and spirited out of the country.[36] Thus, although the war against Sertorius continued to drag on, dearly hampered by the demands of other theaters,[37] and a consular army was operating in Macedonia, it was in Rome's interest to extend its commitments in Asia Minor in order to prevent Mithridates from growing much stronger.
Iuncus's occupation of Bithynia upon Nicomedes' death was only a temporary expedient, and war with Mithridates over the kingdom was dearly expected. Already in 74, when L. Octavius, consul in the previous year, suddenly died in his province of Cilicia, L. Licinius Lucullus, the current consul, eagerly sought and received that province and was given as well not only Asia provincia but also overall command of "the war against Mithridates." His colleague, the pompous and inept M. Aurelius Cotta, was likewise sent east with Bithynia as his province.[38] As Cicero makes
[35] For the date of the alliance, see McGing, Phoenix 38 (1984) 18, who, however, exaggerates its effect in precipitating war (cf. FPME , 144-45). On the alliance itself, see most recently McGing, pp. 137-39; Spann, Q. Sertorius , 99-104.
[36] For the strain on the aerarium at this time, see n. 37 and Badian, JRS 55 (1965) 120; Crawford, RRC , 2:637.
[37] Note Pompey's threat in this very year (74) to leave Spain if more troops and supplies were not sent (Sall. H . 2.98.1-10 Maurenbrecher; App. BC 1.111; cf. Plut. Pomp . 20).
[38] On the provinces of Lucullus and Cotta, see Plut. Luc . 5, Memnon, FGrH 434 F 27, and Vell. Pat. 2.33.1. "The war against Mithridates": Cic. Acad . 2.1.1, Mur . 33. Several important discussions of the origins and outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War have appeared recently. See especially Glew, Chiron 11 (1981) 109-30; Sherwin-White, RFPE , 159-65; McGing, Phoenix 38 (1984) 12-18, and FPME , 132-45; Keaveney, Lucullus , 61-74, 188-205. On the date of the beginning of hostilities, the arguments of Sherwin-White and McGing for early 73 are more persuasive than those of Merkelbach (ZPE 81 [1990] 97-100) and Keaveney (pp. 188-205) for 74. See above, n. 28.
clear in a speech delivered in 63, Lucullus was expected to make a pre-emptive strike against Mithridates from the south or southwest while Cotta held Bithynia.[39] But Roman plans to seize the initiative were foiled by the aged but energetic king of Pontus, who chose to fight the war on his own terms by invading Bithynia at the opening of the campaigning season in the spring of 73, rather than await Lucullus's strike.
A problematic passage of Memnon of Heraclea may suggest that even before the consular armies appeared early in 73 Bithynia was flooded with publicani , for it seems to say that the Heracleans murdered the tax gatherers among them shortly after the arrival of Mithridates' fleet early in 73 and the Cyzicus campaign.[40] This, if true, would be remarkable testimony to the eagerness with which the Romans laid hold of the revenues of Bithynia. However, Memnon probably implies nothing of the kind. It is impossible to suppose (as Memnon has been understood to say) that the publicani swept into Heraclea shortly after Mithridates' fleet had come through and the Romans in Bithynia were in full retreat! It seems fairly dear that Memnon, having mentioned the incident that brought to an end Heraclea's privileged status as free "ally and friend" of Rome (assistance to Mithridates' fleet in 73, despite alliance with Rome), simply moved forward in time in a short digression that traces the direct consequence of that act after the expulsion of Mithridates from Bithynia—the reduction of Heraclea to tributary status, the arrival of publicani , and their murder by the proud Heracleans. If this reading of the text is right, then it is not necessary to suppose that in the short time between Iuncus's occupation of the kingdom and Mithridates' invasion it was somehow decided just which Bithynian cities would pay tribute to Rome. Although some Bithynians at least had not viewed Rome's entry into the inheritance as a catastrophe for themselves, as the rejection of the alleged pretender's claims shows,[41] others no doubt were favorable to Mithridates (Plut. Luc . 7.5), or at least hostile to Rome.
[39] Mur . 33. See Memnon, FGrH 434 F 27.2, implying that Mithridates too expected a Roman advance from the south through Cappadocia.
[40] FGrH 434 F 27.5-6, accepted without demur by McGing, FPME , 146, and Brunt, Fall , 187, while Janke, "Untersuchungen," 84-85, recognizing the difficulty noted below, does violence to Memnon's text in moving the murders to the period before the Mithridatic invasion. Memnon is quite explicit that Heraclea became tributary only as a consequence of the assistance it gave to the Pontic fleet passing westward. See now Keaveney, Lucullus , 232 n. 68, who reaches the same conclusion as I. Chronology of the arrival of Lucullus and Cotta: Sherwin-White, RFPE , 164-65.
[41] Sall. H . 2.71 Maurenbrecher.
For our purposes a detailed narrative of the Third Mithridatic War is unnecessary.[42] We need only observe the broad outline of Lucullus's recovery of Bithynia and conquest of Pontus, and to bring this campaign into relation with other contemporary Roman activities in the East.
Mithridates, bursting into Bithynia, took the Romans wholly by surprise. Having quickly blockaded Cotta in Chalcedon, he pushed on into the Roman province of Asia and laid siege to Cyzicus. By capturing Cyzicus Mithridates doubtless hoped to incite a general revolt against the Romans and repeat his successes of 89-88; but the stubborn resistance of its citizens and Lucullus's wise refusal to give battle drained the Pontic attack of its momentum.[43] In the winter of 73-72 the besiegers became the besieged, and Mithridates attempted to move off but was heavily defeated on land and sea as he did so. Mithridates swiftly relinquished Bithynia and beat a retreat to Cabira in Pontus, where in 71 he was again defeated by Lucullus, to all appearances derisively. Mithridates abandoned his kingdom and fled for succor to his son-in-law, Tigranes of Armenia. By the end of 70 the last Pontic strongholds at Amisus, Sinope, Amasea, and Heraclea fell, and Mithridates' kingdom was entirely in Lucullus's hands. In 70, returning briefly to Asia provincia , Lucullus threw a great victory celebration at Ephesus for the felicitous conclusion of the war.[44]
Lucullus, and we may suppose others, believed the war essentially over: only a bit of tough diplomacy (Lucullus's legate Ap. Claudius Pulcher was sent to Tigranes to demand Mithridates' extradition)[45] or, failing that, military intimidation would be required to encourage Tigranes to hand over Mithridates for the triumph and a glorious conclusion to a stunning victory.[46] It did not seem entirely premature for Lucullus now to inform the Senate of the victorious conclusion of the war, and for the Senate to respond with the appointment of a commission of ten senators to advise the
[42] On the campaigns of Lucullus, see the recent, concise accounts of McGing, FPME , 145-63, Sherwin-White, RFPE , 159-85, and now Keaveney, Lucullus , 75-128. Cf. Magie, RRAM , 321-50. Bernhardt, PrH , 64-72, provides an illuminating discussion of the attitude of the Greek dries toward the antagonists.
[43] Cf. IGRR Ill. 34, with Robert, Etudes 314.
[45] On the embassy see especially Sherwin-White, RFPE , 174-76, who, however, seems to assume that the purpose of the embassy was only to provide a pretext for an invasion of Armenia.
[46] The complaints registered at Plut. Luc . 24 and Vell. Pat. 2.33, if they are not merely retrospective elaborations, probably reflect no more than the inevitable carping of jealous competitors.
imperator in making the settlement.[47] Lucullus's ostentatiously traditional procedure here contrasted sharply with that employed by Sulla in 85-84 and advertised symbolically not only the dominant position of the Senate in the post-Sullan regime but also the restoration of Roman power in the East (by this time, as we have seen, the war in Macedonia had reached an equally triumphant conclusion). His decision almost immediately thereafter (perhaps already in the winter of 70-69) to invade Armenia, after Ap. Claudius failed to induce Tigranes to hand over the king, eventually undid almost all he had achieved and brought personal humiliation. But at the time he surely expected that some strong arm-twisting would quickly produce the desired result and that his Armenian campaign would only provide a splendid coda to his work. He may have anticipated some criticism by passing along a rumor that the two kings were preparing to invade Asia (Plut. Luc . 23.7), but, like the identical assertion of Cicero in his speech of 66 (Leg. Man . 4, 7), this was a rhetorical point, hardly to be taken too seriously. Only with the benefit of hindsight could it be claimed that Lucullus had begun a major war without proper authority.[48]
Crete and Piracy
There was one blot on the impressive record of conquest and consolidation in the East enjoyed down to 70: the Cretan campaign of M. Antonius, son of the commander sent against the pirates in 102 and father of the triumvir.[49] And yet its failure should not obscure the importance of the fact that despite Rome's heavy commitments in Macedonia, Asia Minor, Spain, and Italy itself after the outbreak of the Spartacus revolt, yet another major military effort in the East was undertaken. The "Sullan oligarchy" was hardly lacking in vigor.
Antonius was given in 74 a novel type of command against the pirates, whose spread throughout the Mediterranean now required an imperium that was not territorially restricted to any of the traditional provinciae (such as Cilicia, his father's province); hence it could be called, perhaps
[47] Sources in MRR , 2:129. See Broughton, TAPA 77 (1946) 40-43, and MRR , 2:131 n. 6, for selection of the commission late in 70 or early 69. Twyman, ANRW I.1 (1972) 868-69, argues, however, with some plausibility that the commission was sent out only in 68, for it would seem to have arrived only in 67 (Plut. Luc . 35.5-6; Dio 36.43.2).
[48] So Sherwin-White, RIPE , 175; see contra now Keaveney, Lucullus , 99-104, 112-13.
[49] On the agnomen Creticus, see now Linderski, ZPE 80 (1990) 157-64, who takes a more positive view of Antonius's achievement than the older accounts of Foucart, Journal des savants , 1906, 569-81, and van Ooteghem, Pompée , 162-64.
invidiously, an imperium infinitum .[50] It is unclear how far we should take Velleius's vague statement that Antonius's imperium was like Pompey's later under the lex Gabinia (2.31.3). Like Pompey's command, it covered the entire Mediterranean, but we should probably not take Velleius's reference so literally as to conclude that, as (probably) was Pompey, Antonius was expressly given superior (maius ) imperium to that of provincial commanders in the coastal regions; such an extraordinary grant by the Senate without some opposition seems highly implausible.[51] Even so, Antonius's command was a striking novelty, and an important step by the Senate toward controlling the pirate epidemic.
As we have seen, the Roman Senate and its commanders had traditionally given only sporadic attention to the problem of piracy in Eastern waters, despite the brave words of the law of ca. 100 inscribed in various coastal cities and on the monument of L. Aemilius Paulus at Delphi.[52] Since the expedition of M. Antonius the Elder against the Cilician pirates in 102, they had more recently received attention from L. Murena and his lieutenant A. Terentius Varro and even, only a few years past, from a consular army and fleet under P. Servilius Vatia.[53] Still the Senate shrank from committing resources sufficient to solve the problem. Doubtless Roman commanders in Asia Minor were constantly called upon to make do with half-measures, as, for example, the governor of Asia in 80-79, C. Claudius Nero, who ordered up from Poemaneum a dubious guard of ephebes for the protection of exposed Ilium.[54] Greek inscriptions indeed leave us in some doubt as to whether Roman-directed efforts achieved more than those undertaken on Greeks' own initiative. The Ephesians received timely help from the Astypalaeans in one incident ca. 100; there is no mention of Rome. An inscription to be dated roughly to this period commemorates
[50] Cic. Verr . 2.2.8, 2.3.213; cf. Lactant. Div. inst . 1.11.32. Jameson, Historia 19 (1970) 542, rightly questions whether infinitum can be regarded as a technical term. On the extent of Antonius's command see also Maróti, Acta Antiqua 19 (1971) 266-70, against Hinrichs, Hermes 98 (1970) 501-2.
[51] See, however, Sall. H . 3.2 Maurenbrecher; ps.-Asc. 259 Stangl, which may suggest imperium maius . On Pompey's command and its relation to Antonius's, see Jameson, Historia 19 (1970) 539-60, who goes too far at pp. 556-58 to explain what is probably only Velleian imprecision. See also n. 107 below. Grant by the Senate: explicitly attested by a poor authority (Lactant. Div. inst . 1.11.32), but certain enough, given the emasculation of the tribunate.
[52] In general on piracy in the East in this period, see Magie, RRAM , 239-40, 281-83; Broughton, in ESAR , 4:520-22; Sherwin-White, RFPE , 154. On pirates' cooperation with Mithridates, see the judicious discussion of McGing, FPME , 139.
[53] See pp. 227-39, 274-75, and 295-96.
[54] OGIS 443.
a noteworthy Athenian campaign off Cilicia against the pirates, for which the demos received the gratitude of a series of communities, including the Lycian confederation, Phaselis, and Cythnos; we should not, in view of Rome's record, assume without evidence that the expedition was undertaken on Roman orders or carried out under Roman command.[55] Another series of texts of this time commemorates a Lycian expedition led on land and sea by one Aechmon against the pirates. There is no reference to Romans.[56] On the face of it, the epigraphic record suggests that local powers of the Aegean did not simply wait for Roman direction in seeing to their security against the pirates.
The record of the Roman Senate against Eastern piracy is one of abiding indifference only rarely punctuated by significant responses. The younger Antonius's mission in 74 is an institutional novelty in the extent of the command given the praetor, therefore implying that the Senate had awakened to the need to take unprecedented steps. But it would be hasty to assume that the Senate was overly concerned about piracy specifically in Eastern waters. For all the difficulties that piracy may have caused in the East during this period, what precipitated this extraordinary mission was rather the spread of rampant piracy to the West and the consequent interruption of Rome's grain supply, a problem that became acute precisely in 75.[57] And indeed Antonius's first moves (as Pompey's later) were made in the West and were surely intended to dear the major Roman grain routes in Western waters.[58] Yet after a year or two of operations in the Western seas, Antonius's efforts focused on Crete, an objective that was
[55] IG II 3218, with Robert, Opera minora , 3:1377-83, who, however, presumes Roman direction. The text mentions only an embassy to a Roman, L. Furius Crassipes; the gratitude of the towns is directed at Athens, not Rome. Astypaleans: IGRR IV. 1029.
[56] OGIS 552-54, with Kalinka, ad TAM II, 264, and Magie, RRAM , 1168 n. 18.
[57] Sall. H . 2.45 Maurenbrecher; Cic. Planc . 64; cf. Sall. H . 2.47.7 Maurenbrecher: Macedonia plena hostium est, nec minus Italiae maritima. . . Ita classe quae commeatus tuebatur minore quam antea navigamus . See also Plut. Pomp . 25.1, 26.2, 27.2, Luc . 2.5; Dio 36.23.1-2, stressing grain shortages reaching back into the 70s. Cic. Leg. Man . 33 and Dio 36.22.2 mention a piratical raid on Ostia and the defeat of a consul at an unknown date. On social causes of the growth of piracy, see especially App. Mith . 92, 96; Dio 36.20.2. On the spread of the problem westward, see now Marasco, RivStorlt 99 (1987) 139-42.
[58] For these operations, see Cic. Verr . 2.3.213-16, Div. Caec . 55; ps.-Asc. 259 Stangl for Sicily; Sall. H . 3.5-6 Maurenbrecher for actions off Liguria and Spain. Foucart, Journal des savants , 1906, 573-75, Ward, AJAH 2 (1977) 33, Magie, RRAM , 292, and Gruen, Last Generation , 35-36, 385, 435, fail to connect Antonius's mission with the grain crisis.
probably anticipated from the beginning. (Some textual support, for what it is worth, comes from Lactantius, who believes that Antonius's mission was "to pursue the pirates and secure the entire sea," Div. inst . 1.11.32.) Already in 73-72 Antonius's legates were mustering supplies and troops in and from the coastal towns of the Peloponnese.[59] Antonius was afterwards blamed for having attacked Crete merely out of lust for conquest (Flor. 1.42.1). This looks like the usual moralistic scapegoating of failed commanders. Crete could not be ignored by anyone charged with the job of checking piracy in the Mediterranean, for the recent troubles had shown how closely linked the maritime security of the West was to that of the East. Antonius formally complained to the Cretans that they favored Mithridates and supplied him with mercenaries against Rome, and that they had supported and provided safe haven for the pirates, perhaps out of favor for Mithridates.[60] These charges are not likely to have been entirely fabricated. Cretan pirates in fact took second place in notoriety only to their Cilician neighbors;[61] Crete was indeed the richest source of mercenaries in the Hellenistic world (hired by, among other employers, the Romans themselves),[62] and, according to Memnon, who, however, has an axe to grind here, Mithridates had actually sent some forty or so ships to Crete early in the war, which were defeated by Lucullus's legate Triarius on their return trip in 71.[63]
The concentration of Roman attention against Crete in the later 70s needs also to be set against the background of a sudden revival of interest
[59] The date requires some justification. Antonius's death in Crete, in the midst of operations, cannot be dated more closely than 72-71 (Livy Per . 97; cf. Cic. Verr . 2.3.213; ps.-Asc. 202, 259 Stangl; Schol. Bob . 96 Stangl). But if we assume that the preparations in the Peloponnese for the campaign in Crete covered at least two consecutive years, as is suggested by Syll[3] 748, lines 15-20, with lines 32-35, and that one of those years was 72/72 (IG IV[2] 1.66 = SEG XI.397, lines 21-22), it seems best to put Antonius's death in 71 and the beginning of preparations in the Peloponnese no later than early 72, but more likely in 73, inasmuch as the inscription from Gytheum seems to recount three successive sets of Roman demands (lines 15-19, 25-27, 32-34) during the terms of two eponymous officials. See also Migeotte, L'emprunt public , 93-94. On the legate C. Iulius mentioned in the Gytheum inscription, usually identified with the future dictator, see Broughton, MRR 2:115-16 n. 6 and 3:105.
[60] App. Sic . 6.1; cf. Flor. 1.42.1. It may be noted that in 67, during the war with Metellus, "Cilicians" are mentioned as present at Lappa (Dio 36.19.1).
[61] See Plut. Pomp . 29.1; Strabo 10.4.9, C 477; Syll 535. See Brulé, La piraterie crétoise , which unfortunately concludes in the mid-second century.
[62] Griffith, Mercenaries , esp. 105, 168-69, 174-77, 186-87, 245-46, 263. Cretans in Roman service: Griffith, pp. 234-35.
[63] FGrH 434 F 29.5, 33.1, with Janke, "Untersuchungen," 101-2, 111-12.
in Cyrenaica. Cyrene had been left to the Roman people by the testament of its former king, Apion, as far back as 96; yet it was not until 75 that Cyrene was assigned as a provincia , probably in response to a revival of Ptolemaic claims on the traditionally Lagid territory and to the suddenly pressing question of Rome's grain supply.[64] One of the great cereal-growing regions of the Mediterranean could supplement the city's stores, but only if the route the grain would travel from Cyrene, across the Mediterranean to the Peloponnese before turning west, could be made secure from piratical attack.[65] Antonius's Cretan campaign was likely therefore also in part a consequence of the decision in 75 to act on the will of Apion and exploit Rome's old rights in Cyrene. It was not solicitude for Greek welfare, still plagued after all by Cilician pirates, or a high conception of imperial duty that brought M. Antonius east, but the demands of the center of consumption at Rome, which even the post-Sullan Senate could not ignore.
Two inscriptions from coastal Peloponnese connected with Antonius's preparations for the Cretan campaign illustrate how onerous a task it was, not merely for Rome but also for the Greek cities, to organize a major naval campaign against the pirates: the texts document severe exactions of soldiers, grain, cloaks, and money among other things, as well as Antonius's quartering of troops upon the cities.[66] The campaign was notorious even in Rome for the burdens it laid upon the allies: some claimed that Antonius was a remedy more harmful than the disease.[67] Gytheum, we know from one inscription, had to borrow the better part of a talent from Roman financiers to meet the demands made of it[68] —sobering evidence that even modest exactions might be beyond the capacity of local reserves—and in Epidaurus the introduction of a garrison and its presence over an extended period of time caused a severe shortage of grain, no doubt exacerbated by the requisitions of grain taking place elsewhere.[69]
[64] Cyrene is outside the geographical limits of this study. The suggestion given in the text is defended in appendix J.
[65] See especially Flor. 1.41 on the association of Cretan and Cyrenaean piracy, natural in view of the communication between the two places on opposite but relatively near shores (cf. Hdt. 4.151; Strabo 17.3.22, C838). See Laronde, Cyrèe , 479.
[66] See Syll 748, lines 15-19, 25-27, 33-36.
[67] Cf. Sall. H . 3-2 Maurenbrecher: orae maritimae . . . curator <<nocent>ior piratis . Cic. Verr . 2.2.8, 3.213; ps.-Asc. 259 Stangl; Dio 36.23.2. Cic. Leg. Man . 67 very likely alludes to Antonius's reputation in this regard.
[68] 4,200 drachmas, to be precise: Syll 748, lines 32-36. For the financial details see now Migeotte, L'emprunt public , 90-96.
[69] SEG XI.397 (to be used instead of IG IV[2] 1.66), lines 20-37; cf. Rostovtzeff SEHHW , 951-52. See also Syll 748, lines 25-26. Still, the "League of the Achaeans" went so far as to honor Q. Ancharius, probably Antonius's quaestor (contra Broughton, MRR , 2:115 n. 5), with a statue at Olympia (IvO 328).
Piratical operations out of Cretan harbors were probably beyond the capacity of the island's cities to control, even had they wanted to do so, and when the Cretan response to Antonius's complaints was found to be insolent, the Roman commander made war upon them. The campaign did not go well. Antonius, with significant naval assistance from Byzantium, suffered a heavy defeat against the Cretan Lastbenes, who captured his quaestor. A truce was patched up that Antonius was pleased to present as a victory before he succumbed to illness.[70] The Senate was less easily satisfied: rather than exploiting the opportunity to cut back its Eastern commitments, by August of 70 the renewal of war against Crete was being actively contemplated, and Crete may well have been decreed as a consular province for 69 in accordance with the lex Sempronia .[71] The Cretans in alarm responded by sending an embassy of thirty of their most eminent men to try to avert conflict and to restore past friendly relations.[72] Meanwhile, Creta provincia was assigned to the new consul Q. Caecilius Metellus, for Q. Hortensius, who had received it by lot on 1 January, had chosen to remain in Italy and relinquished the province to his colleague; Metellus was to proceed to Crete to accept its surrender and make war against the recalcitrant.[73]
The Cretan envoys, who evidently knew well how things were done in Rome, went about their business very effectively, first making the rounds of salutations at the homes of the leading senators and making personal appeals. So vigorously did they press their case that it was found necessary to ban by senatorial decree loans of money to them which were being used to finance bribes. They were finally brought into the Senate auspiciously, probably only in February of 69, the month when foreign embassies were
[70] App. Sic . 6.1-2; Flor. 1.42.2-3; Livy Per . 97; Diod. 40.1.1 for the truce. The Cretans seem to have captured and released Antonius's quaestor (Dio F 111.1), apparently under the terms mentioned by Diodorus. On Antonius's truce and the declaration of war against Crete, see Linderski, ZPE 80 (1990) 161-64; Passerini, Athenaeum n.s. 14 (1936) 45-53. The occasion on which the Byzantines assisted an Antonius, which their envoys still thought worth recalling in A.D. 53 (Tac. Ann . 12.62), is likely to be this campaign rather than that of his father: in 69 one of the first items of foreign business for the Senate was to consider giving Byzantium the status of a free city (Cic. Verr . 2.2.76) Contra Ormerod, Piracy , 226 n. 5; Magie, RRAM , 1161 n. 12.
[71] Cic. Verr . 2.2.76; Dio 36.1a.
[72] Diod. 40.1.1-2. Cf. Dio F 111.1.
[73] Dio 36.1a, F 111.2.
usually heard at this time.[74] The groundwork the Cretan envoys had laid at first paid off, for, reminded by the envoys of the Cretans' past services to the imperium , the Senate voted to absolve them of the allegations against them and restore to them the title of "friends and allies," presumably on the terms settled with Antonius.[75] It may be that with the (temporary) easing of the grain shortage in Rome in the later 70s the magnitude of the task of eradicating Cretan piracy had come to seem rather daunting in comparison to the benefits it might bring.[76] The wars in Macedonia were over, that in Asia Minor apparently so: a commission of ten was soon to travel east to advise Lucullus on arrangements for a lasting peace. The imperium populi Romani , whose prestige had suffered much in the 80s, was fully restored where it most counted, thanks to the efforts of no less than eight consuls and two consular armies in constant, simultaneous operation since 77; the pleas of the Cretan envoys despite their victory showed that little damage had been done even by Antonius's failure. It might have been an appropriate time to call a halt to Rome's greatest and most extended military effort in Eastern parts and celebrate the victories of the past decade. But at this juncture P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, the future consul of 57, "invalidated" the decree, most probably by a tribunician veto—perhaps the first important use of the restored power of the tribunate.[77] We are not informed as to whether Spinther's veto implies popular impatience with senatorial inaction toward Crete perhaps exacerbated by continued discontent over the grain supply or merely partisanship in Metellus's favor. In any case, the Cretans returned home without accomplishing anything, and they and their policy were immediately discredited when an ultimatum arrived from Rome demanding the delivery of 300 hostages as well as the victor over Antonius, Lasthenes, and another chief named Panares; 4,000 talents in indemnities; all pirate ships (how
[76] On the steps taken in the later 70s to restore the availability of cheap grain in Rome, see Gruen, Last Generation , 385, 435.
these would be distinguished was doubtless left unclear); and the return of all Roman captives (presumably by now sold as slaves, for the most part). The attempt to appease Rome had failed miserably, and Lasthenes and his supporters were now able to persuade the Cretan people to fight for their traditional freedom.[78] The Roman demands went unanswered; finally, probably only early in 68, Metellus began operations against Crete with a force of three legions and quickly blockaded Lasthenes and Panares in Cydonia.[79] As during Antonius's campaign, the war on Crete impinged on the Greeks of the mainland: Metellus's legate L. Valerius Flaccus was active in Athens, Sparta, Achaea, Boeotia, and Thessaly.[80]
There we must leave him for now, noting that despite opposition within the Senate yet another consular army was now committed to a new theater of operations in the East. The hesitancy of the Senate is, however, significant and may reflect a still limited view of Roman Eastern commitments. The restoration of security in Macedonia and Greece had justified a series of vigorous, offensive campaigns; the threat of Mithridates had required an unparalleled military buildup in Asia Minor. These efforts had by 70 met with great success: the imperium had been powerfully reasserted. It appears that a senatorial majority was ready to declare victory and turn back from the offensive against piracy begun in 74. As a body the Senate was even now not ready to commit the necessary resources to a determined effort to dear the Libyan and Aegean seas of the pirates if a face-saving peace settlement could be arranged with the troublesome Cretans. But Spinther's veto of the settlement presages the laws of the tribunes Gabinius and Manilius in 67 and 66 urging novel and dramatic solutions to the remaining problems of the imperium .
Popular Politics and Eastern Empire in the Sixties
The Gabinian Laws
The first of the two leges Gabiniae of 67 replaced Lucullus in command of the war against Mithridates. Discussion of this law must be somewhat
[78] Diod. 40.1.3; App. Sic . 6.1-2.
[79] See Livy Per . 98 (note Metellus designated as pro cos .); App. Sic . 6.2; Phlegon, FGrH 257 F 12.12; Flor. 1.42.4. Metellus was honored in Greece at Athens (IG II 4107) and (by Italians) at Argos (CIL I , 746), probably on his return trip (note the title imperator ). On the Argive inscription cf. van Berchem, BCH 86 (1962) 305-13.
[80] Cic. Flac . 6, 62-63, 100.
more extensive than its importance might seem to warrant because certain misconceptions have until quite recently clouded the manner of Lucullus's replacement.
Unfortunately for Rome, Lucullus's invasion of Armenia in 70-69 did not produce the expected result—Tigranes' betrayal of his father-in-law. Instead, despite heavy defeats inflicted by the Roman army, and Lucullus's capture of Tigranes' own capital, Tigranocerta, in 69 and Nisibis in 68, the Armenian king hung on doggedly, while Mithridates was able to slip back into his kingdom in 68 with a new army provided by Tigranes. This was a major coup for Mithridates and an inexcusable error on the part of Lucullus, for the resourceful Mithridates, once again in Pontus, was able to disrupt the Roman rear and finally inflict a devastating defeat upon Lucullus's legate Triarius at Zela in 67.[81]
Our sources tell of growing opposition to Lucullus at home in Rome from as far back as 71-70, when he took measures for debt relief in Asia. The decision in 69 that Cilicia would be a consular province for 68 and, at the beginning of 68, the assignment of Asia to a praetor are presented as attempts to erode Lucullus's position that preface the final stroke, the lex Manilia of 66 transferring the command to Pompey.[82] Modern scholars have often accepted this picture without sufficient reflection.[83] Already toward the middle of 69, before any bad news arrived from Armenia, the Senate had decreed that Cilicia would be one of the consular provinces for 68.[84] Lucullus had, after all declared the war over; the assignment of Cilicia to another—leaving, of course, Lucullus in command of the war against
[81] For these campaigns, see especially Sherwin-White, RFPE , 176-85; McGing, FPME , 154-63.
[82] See especially Plut. Luc . 20.5, 24.3; Dio 36.2. On Lucullus's measures for debt relief, see Plut. Luc . 20 (probably to be distinguished from the taxes mentioned in App. Mith . 63). See Keaveney, Lucullus , 96-97, with 233 n. 69, and 275 n. 59 above.
[83] See chiefly van Ooteghem, L. Lucullus , 153-54; also, among others, Magie, RRAM , 343-49; Gruen, Last Generation , 131; Seager, Pompey , 30-32; Keaveney, Lucullus , 111-15, 120-22. Twyman, ANRW I.1 (1972) 864-73, despite dubious prosopographical assumptions, and Williams, Phoenix 38 (2984) 221-34, correct aspects of the opinio communis . See the sensible objections of Brunt, Fall , 516 endnote 2, to the view, founded wholly on Plut. Luc . 20.5, that equestrian hostility was the determining factor in an early attack on Lucullus's command (esp. Badian, Publicans , 98-99 with 151 n. 84, and Keaveney, Lucullus , 114-15).
Mithridates—followed from acceptance of that claim. But, in any case, interference with Lucullus's command was avoided by senatorial authorization to the consul to whom Cilicia was finally allotted in 68, Lucullus's own brother-in-law Q. Marcius Rex, to raise three new legions to take to his province.[85] Why a consul in Cilicia? Not to steal Lucullus's thunder. With preparations for war against Crete to the west against piratical colleagues of the Cilicians, and a second offensive in Armenia to the east against the kings, Cilicia had in 69 suddenly become a linchpin of strategic operations in the East, which now were to be conducted by no less than three consular armies.[86] Cilicia needed a commander on the spot, not in Armenia. In any case, Marcius did not even leave for Cilicia until 67;[87] he was hardly hastening to rob Lucullus's glory. In the event, the function Marcius was to serve was rendered obsolete by Pompey's arrival in Cilicia later in 67, but he may not have been entirely inactive in his province before Pompey appeared, since he was acclaimed as imperator and later laid claim to a triumph.[88] Marcius's refusal later to diminish his own forces when Lucullus requested troops from him may not therefore have been due entirely to petty envy.[89] Pompey's fame has entirely obscured Marcius's activities in Cilicia, but it is not unlikely that, like Pompey's own legates, Marcius laid much of the groundwork for the great man's success.[90]
Likewise the significance of the return of Asia provincia to its normal praetorian status at the beginning of 68 has been distorted, following the lead, it is true, of Dio.[91] It is hard to see how this affected Lucullus's
[85] Sail. H . 5.14 Maurenbrecher; Suet. Iul . 8; cf. Dio 36.4.1.
[86] See Sherwin-White, RFPE , 186-87 (no evidence, however, that Cilicia may have been transferred to Marcius Rex by popular vote, as Sherwin-White suggests). We may recall the recent rumor of an imminent strike into Lycaonia and Cilicia (Plut. Luc . 23.7). The connection with the Cretan war was seen by Münzer, RE 14 (1930) 1584-85. If the lex de Termessibus is indeed to be dated to 68 (see now Ferrary, Athenaeum 63 [1985] 439-42), it should perhaps be taken as a sign of consolidation of the Roman position in Cilicia at this time. See Ferrary, pp. 446-47.
[87] As seems dear from Dio 36.15.1; Sail. H . 5.14 Maurenbrecher; cf. Suet. Iul . 8.
[88] Sall. Cat . 30.2, 33.1.
[89] Dio 36.15.1, 17.2; Sall. H . 5.14 Maurenbrecher; cf. Münzer, RE 14 (1930) 1584-85.
[90] On the assignment of Cilicia, see also Twyman, ANRW I.1 (1972) 867-69.
position in the war against Mithridates, when the assignment of Asia to praetors in subsequent years evidently in no way undermined Pompey's command under the Manilian law. Again, it is necessary to recall that Lucullus himself had advertised the return of peace in western Asia Minor with his victory celebration at Ephesus; and it was "hardly practicable for a general operating in Armenia to administer provinces to the west."[92] Dio's presentation of the provincial assignments in Asia Minor of 69-68 as punishment for Lucullus's allegedly self-interested dilatoriness (36.2.1-2) is, therefore, probably no more than an inference based on hindsight. Both of these assignments were made by the Senate, not the comitia , and the Senate was hardly attempting to sabotage the war against Mithridates and Tigranes. The ground was not being cut from under the feet of the Roman imperator in an insidious popularis or Pompeian prelude to the lex Manilia of 66.
The change came not incrementally, but in one blow. A law proposed by A. Gabinius toward the end of 68 or early in 67 sent the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio to relieve Lucullus in the command of the bellum Mithridaticum —not merely, as it is usually represented, to provide an independent command over Bithynia and Pontus, thereby fragmenting the Roman command and chipping away further at Lucullus's position for Pompey's eventual benefit.[93] Glabrio expected to finish off the war easily and snatch the prizes of victory.[94] Since he was so sanguine, and Gabinius's law also provided for the discharge of the two Fimbrian legions that had been in Asia nearly twenty years,[95] it is dear that the law was voted before
[92] Brunt, Fall , 516 endnote 2.
[94] Dio 36.17.1.
[95] Sail. H . 5.13 Maurenbrecher; Cic. Leg. Man . 26; Dio 36.15.3; Plut. Luc . 33.5-35.6; cf. App. Mith . 90.
news came of the disaster at Zela in the same year. In Rome, the war was dearly thought to be virtually over, which makes it dear that this lex Gabinia was not part of a subtly orchestrated plan to put Pompey in charge of the war against Mithridates.[96]
We can infer that the main public complaint against Lucullus was his needless prolonging of the war to satisfy his private greed.[97] Lucullus later showed that he was not above gross self-indulgence, and his own huge share of the booty won in the East was dearly sharply contrasted by Gabinius in his contiones with the tight rein he kept on the soldiers under his command.[98] Lucullus had taken a considerable risk, both military and political, with his attempt to bully Tigranes into relinquishing Mithridates while announcing that the war was at an end, and two years after his invasion of Armenia it was easy to conclude that that move had been a grave error. In fact, as his offer to Pompey in 66 showed, Tigranes was on the verge of succumbing to the pressure,[99] but too late to benefit Lucullus. It is important to recognize that Gabinius's law replacing Lucullus, despite the overturning of the Senate's determination of consular provinces, inspired no opposition worthy of commemoration in our sources: with the war dragging on inconclusively more than two years after Lucullus announced its conclusion, his powerful friends in the Senate could do nothing more to help him.[100]
The more famous Gabinian law of 67 dealt derisively with the problem of piracy. As in 74, piracy was above all an explosive and "popular" issue because of the havoc it was still playing with the grain supply to the city of Rome.[101] This was above all a Western matter; but the failure of Antonius's expedition to have any lasting effect and the swift return of the
[96] Williams, Phoenix 38 (1984) 225-30. Keaveney, Lucullus , 120-21, returns to the old view that Pompey orchestrated the move.
[97] See Leg. Man . 26: [sc. Lucullus ] vestro iussu coactus qui imperi diuturnitati modum statuendum vetere exemplo putavistis ; cf. App. Mith . 90; Plut. Luc . 33.4; Dio 36.2.1, probably transferring the complaints voiced in 67 to the previous year. Extortion charges brought against Lucullus on his return were however dropped; cf. Alexander, Trials , no. 206.
[99] Plut. Pomp . 32.9; Dio 36.50-52.
[100] Rightly noted by Williams, Phoenix 38 (1984) 231.
[101] See especially Plut. Pomp . 25.1, 26.2, 27.2; Cic. Leg. Man . 33-34, 44; App. Mith . 93; Livy Per . 99; Rickman, Corn Supply , 50-51. The drop in prices that followed Pompey's appointment to the piracy command (Cic. Leg. Man . 44) reveals both the magnitude of risk of the grain trade hitherto and the confidence of traders in its imminent decline.
pirates to the coasts of Italy despite Metellus's operations on Crete made it clearer than ever that a truly extraordinary effort would have to be mounted against all of their strongholds at once. Now, eight years after the severe grain shortage that had precipitated Antonius's command and despite repeated attempts by the Senate to control the problem, it was if anything even more acute. We can hardly wonder that the urban populace reacted violently against all resistance to Gabinius's proposal, which effectively tapped popular resentment against the Senate's failure to secure the grain supply against the pirates.[102] But the resilience and tenacity of the pirates in the face of the Senate's best efforts of the last seven years in particular made the issue something bigger than one concerning the subsistence of the urban populace. The glory of the empire was now at stake: the arrogant depredations of the pirates, who had even attacked a Roman fleet in Ostia, sacked Caietae, and captured two Roman praetors, had at last come to appear a standing refutation of Rome's claim to imperium , above all in the East, where many notable cities had been captured and plundered, including Cnidus, Colophon, Samos, and Delos.[103] "Or did you think this was imperium, " Cicero cried in his speech for the Manilian law the next year, "when legates, quaestors, and praetors of the Roman People were being seized, when we were cut off from public and private communication with all the provinces, when all the seas were so completely closed to us that we were unable either to undertake private Or public business abroad?"[104] Only with the seas cleared of piracy, Cicero declared, did the Roman people "at last seem truly to command [imperare ] all peoples and races on land and sea."[105] Cicero's emphasis in these two passages on the appearance of imperium and the recent failure of Rome to maintain it is striking and significant: he does not, be it noted, say "at last you command" but "at last you seem to command." Plutarch and Appian
[102] Dio 36.24.1-4, 37.1-2; Plut. Pomp . 25.3-7, 27.1-2; Asc. 72 Clark. See van Ooteghem, Pompée , 166-71; Gruen, Last Generation , 435-36; Seager, Pompey , 33-35; on Caesar's supposed support for the law, see Watkins, Historia 36 (1987) 120-21, esp. n. 6.
[103] Cic. Leg. Man . 33, 53; Plut. Pomp . 24.4-6; Phlegon, FGrH 257 F 12.13.
[104] Cic. Leg. Man . 53: An tibi tum imperium hoc esse videbatur cure populi Romani legati quaestores praetoresque capiebantur, cum ex omnibus provinciis commeatu et privato et publico prohibebamur, cure ita clausa nobis erant maria omnia ut neque privatam rem transmarinam neque publicam iam obire possemus?
[105] Cic. Leg. Man . 56 (looking back at the result of the lex Gabinia ): Itaque una lex, unus vir, unus annus non modo vos illa miseria ac turpitudine liberavit sed etiam effecit ut aliquando vere videremini omnibus gentibus ac nationibus terra marique imperare .
similarly stress the symbolic importance of the problem.[106] The problem of piracy had become, then, also a problem of image, in effect a standing refutation of Rome's claim to imperium. Imperium was no longer simply a matter of holding supreme power, of commanding the obedience of organized states; the growth of piracy, at first largely ignored because of the limited conception of imperium , finally came to reveal an uncomfortable contradiction between Rome's ability to command the obedience of cities and kings and its inability to enforce the obedience of pirates, mere "brigands" (latrones ).
To deal with this problem Gabinius proposed that extraordinary resources be entrusted to the state's most successful general the double triumphator Cn. Pompeius Magnus and consul of three years before. As passed in its final form, Pompey was granted for three years a provincia that was not territorially but only functionally defined—the war against the pirates—and most likely with imperium superior to all others within fifty miles of the sea. Five hundred ships, twenty legions, and a sum of HS 144,000,000 were to be at his disposal, and he was given the right to nominate personally twenty-four legates to assist him.[107] As under the law of ca. 100, all kings, chiefs, peoples, and cities were requested to cooperate in the effort (App. Mith . 94).
As it was for Antonius, Pompey's first and most important order of business was to dear the Western seas around Sicily, Africa, and Sardinia, the three chief sources of grain for the city.[108] In the meantime operations in the eastern Mediterranean were left to his legates Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus (off North Africa), M. Terentius Varro (off western and southern Greece), the historian L. Cornelius Sisenna (in the Aegean), M. Pupius Piso, L. Lollius, Q. Metellus Nepos (on the coasts of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to Cilicia), and two Pompeii (off Egypt).[109] Pompey accomplished
[107] Sources in MRR , 2:146. On the problem of Pompey's imperium , see Jameson, Historia 19 (1970) 539-60, who opts for maius , and Seager's criticisms at Pompey , 35-36, 42, preferring aequum (maius for the lex Manilia ). On the law, Miltner, RE 21 (1952) 2093-98, is exhaustive.
[108] Cic. Leg. Man . 34: haec tria frumentaria subsidia rei publicae .
[109] Pompey's legates are listed at App. Mith . 95, with Flor. 1.41.9-10. See Miltner, RE 21 (1952) 2095-98; Broughton, MRR , 2:148-49; van Ooteghem, Pompée , 172-75. It may be noted that Nepos in "Cilicia" was operating virtually shoulder-to-shoulder with his cousin, the consul of 69, still in Crete. The Pompeii iuvenes are perhaps A. and Sex., brothers of Q. Pompeius Bithynicus, not Pompey's sons: Miltner, pp. 2097-98; C. Cichorius, Römische Studien (Leipzig 1922) 188; Sumner, AJAH 2 (1977) 14-15.
this most pressing, but on the whole simpler, task in a mere forty days.[110] Pompey's legates had done their work well in the meantime: aided, no doubt, by the lack of a safe haven in Crete clue to Metellus's campaigns, they had managed to drive back to their strongholds in Cilicia those pirates whom they did not immediately destroy.[111] Pompey could thus set out again from Brundisium, enjoy a trip to Athens and a meeting with Rhodes's main tourist attraction, the philosopher Posidonius, and still win a decisive victory at Coracesium in Cilicia only forty-nine days later.[112] The victory at Coracesium finally secured Roman mastery—the imperium populi Romani —over Cilicia Trachea, whose rugged coast had been infested with pirates' bases for the better part of a century. But, as usual, it is necessary once again to stress that this need not imply any legal, organizational activity formally imposing Roman rule, for which, once again, there is no evidence. When Cicero says in the speech for the Manilian law that Pompey "on the forty-ninth day joined all Cilicia to the imperium of the Roman people" he is not talking of the imposition of a provincial structure and the creation of a legal entity—on the very day of Coracesium, the forty-ninth day out of Brundisium!—but simply of the significance of the victory over the pirates, the decisiveness of which is stressed in the immediately following clauses.[113] On any account Cicero exaggerates, for Cilicia Pedias was almost certainly at this time still in the hands of Tigranes, whose conquests were not stripped away by Pompey until the settlement late in 66.
Pompey dealt with the captured pirates with unexpected leniency, and even resettled them in numerous colonies, one of which (a resettlement
[110] Plut. Pomp . 26.4; App. Mith . 95; Livy Per . 99; Flor. 1.41.15, mistakenly giving this length to the entire maritime war.
[111] See esp. App. Mith . 95; Plut. Pomp . 27.4-28.1. Miltner, RE 21 (1952) 2099-2101.
[112] Athens and Rhodes: Hut. Pomp . 27.3; Strabo 11.1.6, c492. Chronology: Cic. Leg. Man . 35; cf. Plut. Pomp . 28.2 (less than three months for the entire campaign). Coracesium: esp. App. Mith . 96; Veil. Pat. 2.32.4; Flor. 1.41.12-13; Plut. Pomp . 28.1-2; cf. Strabo 14.5.2, C669.
[113] Leg. Man . 35: undequinquagesimo die totam ad imperium populi Romani Ciliciam adiunxit; omnes qui ubique praedones fuerunt partim capti interfectique sunt, partim unius huius se imperio ac potestati dediderunt . See also App. Mith . 96 and Plut. Pomp . 28.1. On Pompey's "annexation" of the rest of Cilicia, see Magie, RRAM , 301, with 1181 n. 45, adducing provincial eras that are as likely to date from Pompey's victory or the foundation of dries; cf. van Ooteghem, Pompée , 177.
of Soli) was to bear the name of the imperator himself (Pompeiopolis).[114] He was in Pamphylia, probably in the midst of organizing this task, when those Cretans who were still holding out against Metellus in Cnossos and elsewhere in the central and eastern parts of the island, and being handled very roughly, heard of his enlightened policy and, suddenly eager to classify themselves as pirates, offered to capitulate to him rather than to Metellus.[115] A famous dash of wills between the Roman commanders ensued. Pompey's legate L. Octavius was sent to accept the Cretans' surrender but found that his presence on the other side of the ramparts in no way deterred Metellus's siege operations against Eleutherna, Lappa, and Hierapytna. When another of Pompey's legates, Cornelius Sisenna, crossed from Greece to Crete with a military force and promptly died, Octavius took over his soldiers and nearly dashed openly with Metellus.
The crisis was finally averted, however, when in 66 news reached Pompey of the transfer to him of command of the Mithridatic War (Dio 36.45.1). Metellus was now left to complete the subjugation of Crete after a bitter three years' conflict.[116] Metellus imposed terms on the Cretans that signified the end of their long-lived independence, doubtless including the payment of vectigalia to Rome.[117] Crete was "ours," said Cicero in 63.[118] Likely enough, after Metellus's return Crete and Cyrenaica were assigned as a single provincia to a quaestor.[119] By 66, then, the seas were safe, and
[114] Colonies of ex-pirates in Cilicia, Dyme in Achaea, and Calabria are mentioned in the literary sources: App. Mith . 96; Dio 36.37.6; Plut. Pomp . 28.4; Strabo 8.7.5, C 388-89; Serv. ad Verg. G. 4.127; cf. Livy Per . 99; Veil. Pat. 2.32.4-6; Flor. 1.41.14. Inscriptions from Ptolemais in Cyrenaica apparently reveal the existence of another: see Reynolds, JRS 52 (1962) 102.
[115] For the course of the Cretan war in 67 and the dispute between Pompey and Metellus, see Livy Per . 99; App. Sic . 6.2; Phlegon, FGrH 257 F 12.12; Flor. 1.42.4-6; Plut. Pomp . 29; Schol. Bob . 96 Stangl; Cic. Leg. Man . 35, 46; Dio 36.17a-19.1; Val. Max. 7.6 ext. 1.
[116] See Livy Per . 100; App. Sic . 6.2; Veil. Pat. 2.34.1; Flor. 1.42.6; Dio 36.19.2-3; Eutr. 6.11.1-2; Oros. 6.4.2; cf. ICr II.23.14.
[118] Flac . 30. Veil. Pat. 2.34.1: in populi Romani potestate redacta (cf. Oros. 6.4.2).
[119] Justin alone speaks of Crete's being "made" a province (39.5.3). Between Metellus and the civil war, the only official of whom we hear in either of these places is the quaestor M. Iuventius Laterensis ca. 61, on whom see Perl, Klio 52 (1970) 330-31; Laronde, ANRW II.10.1 (1988) 1013 n. 46. In view of the fact that our knowledge of praetorian provinciae in the late 60s and 50s is rather good, the absence of evidence for the praetorian assignment of Crete and Cyrenaica encourages the hypothesis that it was regularly assigned to a quaestor whose chief task was to collect the vectigalia . See, however, the full exposition of Perl, pp. 327-54 (Crete and Cyrenaica separated, the latter normally praetorian), and the comments of Laronde, p. 1013 (separate provinces, but Cyrenaica only quaestorian).
while Pompey received most of the credit, Metellus Creticus deserved a nod as well (Cic. Flac . 30).
The tribune Gabinius's two plebiscites—the lex de bello Mithridatico , transferring command in the war to Acilius Glabrio, and the lex de piratis persequendis , which gave Pompey a special mission in the Mediterranean and enormous resources with which to perform it—were more than simply partisan maneuvers. The two Gabinian laws follow in the direction pointed by Lentulus Spinther's veto of peace with the Cretans and represent a strong assertion of the popular will for a more active, less restrained policy than that currently being followed in the Senate. The law on piracy is of particular importance: the problem of the security of the seas had at last developed from one chiefly affecting provincials and those Romans on public and private business in the provinces to one that directly impinged upon the voting urban populace. Hence, finally, the commitment to clearing the seas decisively—a momentous step that signifies a much broadened sense of the imperial mission. At last, Cicero commented in 66, the Roman people achieved the appearance of universal dominion.[120] The Manilian law of the following year continues the trend, and the valuable glimpse we receive of the public debate on the measure from Cicero's speech on it gives an indication of some of its implications.
The Manilian Law
At the beginning of 66, there were no less than four commanders of consular rank (not counting Lucullus) heading armies in the East that now totaled some seventeen legions; now for the fifth successive year since 70 more than half of the mobilized legionary strength of Rome was operating in the East.[121] But this massive military effort on a variety of fronts was not yet over. The pirates had been tamed, the war in Crete was at last reaching its end, but in Pontus the Roman defense was paralyzed by Lucullus's lack of authority and the inertia or lack of resources of the new commander, Glabrio.[122] Pompey's stunning success against the pirates pre-
[120] Leg. Man . 56: Aliquando vere videremur omnibus gentibus ac nationibus terra marique imperare .
[121] See the estimates of Brunt, Italian Manpower , p. 449, table 14.
[122] Dio 36.17.1; cf. Cicero's assessment of the man at Leg. Man . 5 and Brut . 239. Williams, Phoenix 38 (1984) 226, notes in fairness that Glabrio's freedom of action was badly circumscribed by the military situation after Zela and Gabinius's discharge of the veterans.
sented an irrefutable argument for turning command of the Mithridatic War over to him in the current crisis. Although it was by a law of the tribune C. Manilius that the change of command was effected, this time strong support was forthcoming from within the senatorial leadership: no lesser men than the consulars P. Servilius Isauricus (cos. 79), C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76), Cn. Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 73), and C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73) openly supported the proposal, which made it safe for the new man Cicero, praetor in this year, to come forth in its favor and win credit with the urban populace thereby.[123] Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78) and Q. Hortensius (cos. 69), who led the opposition as they had against the Gabinian law on piracy the previous year, did not press the point unduly,[124] and the law was passed without difficulty. The lex Manilia was not, in fact, overly controversial, for Pompey had convincingly justified the trust put in him the previous year.
Cicero's speech to the people in support of the Manilian law is a valuable document for investigation of Roman attitudes toward eastern empire as expressed in political rhetoric around the middle of the decade. We must not lose sight of the fact, of course, that the arguments employed in it must have been chosen for their appeal to its primary audience: the urban plebs , meeting in an informal assembly (contio ). Among Cicero's arguments for regarding events in Asia Minor with great seriousness, gloria imperil and the defense of allies naturally take their due place (Leg. Man . 4, 6, 11-14)—an important sign that these things did matter even to Roman city dwellers—but Cicero stresses above all the necessity to protect "your revenues" (vestra vectigalia ).[125] The theme is struck immediately, when the Mithridatic War is first mentioned (bellum grave et periculosum vestris vectigalibus ac sociis , 4), and the phrase vestra vectigalia is repeatedly stressed (4 bis, 5, 6). "Your revenues" are after all "the sinews of the state" (17), and those in the province of Asia were the richest (maxima , 6, 14) and most reliable (certissima , 6) that Rome possessed.[126] Asia, alone among the provinces, Cicero points out, was wealthy enough to pay
[123] Sources for the law in MRR , 2:153. Consular support: Cic. Leg. Man . 68; see van Ooteghem, Pompée , 203-4.
[124] Plut. Pomp . 30.4; Cic. Leg. Man . 51.
[125] Torelli, Athenaeum 60 (1982) 3-49, notes the prominence of the theme. Compare how Cicero presumes a similar concern about (mis)use of the revenues in Leg. agr . 2.35-62, 98. For vestra vectigalia , cf. Leg. agr . 247, 56. On the financial crises of 88-63, cf. Crawford, RRC , 2:637-38; Barlow, AJP 101 (1980) 202-19.
[126] For nervi rei publicae cf. Leg. agr . 2.47. That Cicero is speaking specifically of Asia provincia and not of all tributary allies in Asia Minor is clear from Leg. Man . 5, 7.
substantially more than was needed for its defense alone (14); while, according to the interpretation in chapter 10, revenues from it had increased vastly after the first dash with Mithridates, it had never required a sizable legionary garrison before then, nor indeed after Lucullus's victories over the Pontic king. The loss of Asia's revenues would entail the loss of "the adornments of peace" (pacis ornamenta )—a veiled reference to games, public buildings, and perhaps hoped-for grain subsidies and land distributions—and "the resources for war" (subsidia belli , 6).[127] Of course, the war was not being waged in Asia provincia , nor had it been, save for the siege of Cyzicus, which was over as early as 72.[128] Cicero needs therefore to stress at some length that in order to assure the flow of crucial revenues, Asia must be defended not merely from armed invasion, but even from any anticipation of one (14-15). A further argument aims more directly at individual interest. Many Romans, Cicero points out—not only equestrian publicani but others of all orders—have invested their fortunes in Asia (16-18; cf. 4). The beginning of the first war with Mithridates, when thousands of Romans were slaughtered and so many fortunes lost in Asia, "taught us" (nos docuit ) that private credit in the city of Rome itself depended on the survival of private investment in Asia (19). The degree to which this point must be elaborated, and the telling words "believe me," dearly imply that this argument is not so familiar to his audience, who are not themselves, for the most part, financiers, and about whose general indifference to the fate of his beloved publicani Cicero has shown himself to be more than a little worried (17-18). But many members of his audience may well have been borrowers, and so Cicero seeks to persuade them that they have a personal stake in the protection of Roman financial interests in Asia by reminding them of the collapse of credit twenty-two years before.
Cicero's arguments for the Manilian law clearly enunciate a new conception toward eastern empire, one that goes well beyond the maintenance of a hegemonial position and emphasizes above all the exploitation of the fruits of conquest not merely to maintain Roman strength in war but for the enjoyment of the Roman people in peace. Its origins can of course be
[127] Cp. 14: si et belli utilitatem et pacis dignitatem retinere voltis . Cf. Cic. Leg. agr . 1.3: tu populo Romano subsidia belli, tu ornamenta pacis eripias ? For the notion of subsidia belli see also Sail. H . 1.77.8 Maurenbrecher: Mithridates in latere vectigalium nostrorum, quibus adhuc sustentamur, diem bello circumspicit .
[128] Plutarch's story of Mithridates' capture of towns of "Asians" together with the Sertorian M. Marius (Sert . 24.3-4) is probably either apocryphal or a loose reference to Bithynia. Cf. Magie, RRAM , 1206-7. n. 10.
traced back to the Gracchi, who had first urged the use of Asian revenues to finance "your privileges" (vestra commoda ), as Gaius had put it.[129] Yet before 69 the practical impact of such rhetoric was quite restricted. It was the confrontation with Mithridates and the pirates, and the threat that these hostile forces came to pose not merely to the finances of the state but to the direct, material interests of Roman negotiatores, publicani , and the entire urban plebs , that made the argument for exploitation virtually unanswerable. With the recovery of the fun powers of the tribunate the Roman people would permit no scruple of international diplomacy or constitutional tradition to weaken the effort to protect and augment its commoda . The result was a sequence of tribunician interventions into the affairs of the Eastern imperium , from Spinther's veto of peace with the Cretans in 69 through the Manilian law of 66, that at last sprang the latches of the old hegemonic attitude.
Pompey's Settlement in Bithynia and Pontus
A detailed narrative of Pompey's campaigns in Asia Minor, the Caucasus, Syria, and Palestine can be found elsewhere;[130] we shall survey them only in the most cursory manner. Mithridates was quickly routed in battle once again by the new Roman commander in 66. Barred by Tigranes himself from taking refuge with him again, Mithridates fled to Colchis on the southeast shore of the Black Sea, one of the last remnants of his empire, presumably in an attempt to rally his fortunes by retaking possession of the Bosporan kingdom in the Crimea, now held by his son Machares, who had come to terms with Lucullus. Pompey, late in 66, left Mithridates to his desperate flight round the Black Sea and invaded Armenia, whose king, already harassed by the Parthian Phraates at Pompey's instigation, quickly came to terms. Throwing himself at Pompey's feet, Tigranes won recognition as king but was stripped of his conquests of the last thirty years, which were now at Rome's disposal as conquered territory, and required
[129] See above, p. 110, n. 58. See also Cic. Leg. agr . 2.71: Vos vero, Quirites, si me audire vultis, retinete istam possessionem gratiae, libertatis, suffragiorum, dignitatis, urbis, fori, ludorum, festorum dierum, ceterorum omnium commodorum etc.
[130] See especially the recent, full account of Sherwin-White, RFPE , 186-234; more briefly, Seager, Pompey , 44-55; Gelzer, Pompeius , 76-99; van Ooteghem, Pompée , 204-38.
to pay an indemnity of 6,000 talents.[131] Pompey followed up this coup with a march into the Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian, which perhaps combined the objectives of pursuing Mithridates and driving him from his last possession of Colchis and of asserting Roman supremacy over former Armenian vassals and dependents in the area, which bordered land relinquished by Tigranes.[132] But Pompey turned back without making any attempt to pursue Mithridates to the Crimea and founded a city in part from his wounded and discharged veterans in Armenia Minor. Pompey laid claim to victory over Mithridates with its very name: Nicopolis.[133] Mithridates, however, remained beyond Pompey's grasp: he had continued around the Black Sea, expelled Machares, and soon reasserted control of the Crimean Bosporus.[134] Possibly it was concern over the direction of Mithridates' flight that led the Senate in 66 to decree Macedonia once again a consular province for 65, and again in 64 for 63.[135] But the need to assert Roman control over Tigranes' former possessions gave Pompey the excuse he needed to avoid the dilemma of being forced either to return home or to pursue Mithridates.
In 65 and 64 Pompey's legates and quaestor had entered Syria and Mesopotamia to stake the Roman claim to Tigranes' former southern possessions. Late in 64 Pompey himself marched into Syria, opening a new epoch in the history of Rome's Eastern expansion. His activities in Syria and Palestine in 64-63—his refusal to restore the Seleucid Antiochus XIII to the kingdom from which he had been expelled by Tigranes, in effect abolishing the moribund Seleucid monarchy, and his embroilment in the dispute between Parthia and Armenia over Gordyene and in the struggles
[131] Roman claim to Tigranes' conquests: Plut. Pomp . 33.4, 39.2; App. Syr . 49, Mith . 106, 118, BC 5.10; Veil. Pat. 2.39.1; Justin 40.2.3. On the territories involved, see Sherwin-White, RFPE , 194-95. Indemnity: Dio 36.53.5; Plut. Pomp . 33.4.
[132] For stress upon the latter, see Sherwin-White, RFPE , 195-203.
[133] Dio 36.50.3; cf. Strabo 12.3.28, C555; App. Mith . 105, 115. See Jones, Cities , 422 n. 20.
[134] See McGing, FPME , 164-66; Sherwin-White, RFPE , 203-6; van Ooteghem, Pompée , 238-44.
[135] L. Manlius Torquatus, to whom Macedonia fell in 65, was to receive recognition by the Senate as imperator (Cic. Pis . 44). No other military activity by Torquatus is known, once Flor. 1.39, mentioning an incursion into Rhodope and Caucasus by one "Volso," is discounted (rightly Papazoglou, Central Balkan Tribes , 176). C. Antonius Hybrida (cos. 63) succeeded Torquatus in 62 after trading provinces with Cicero, to whom Macedonia had originally fallen; by then of course Mithridates was dead. Nevertheless, Antonius eventually moved as far northeast as Istria, where he was defeated by the Bastarnae and lost legionary standards to be collected much later by M. Licinius Crassus (Dio 38.10.1-3; cf. 51.26.5). For Antonius's Black Sea activities, see also Syll 762 from Dionysopolis, lines 16-17.
of the Maccabean princes—are outside the bounds of this study.[136] Finally, as the imperator marched on Jerusalem in 63, the news came of Mithridates' suicide. Saved from the embarrassment of his main foe remaining at large, Pompey could now prepare to return home. Late in 63 he reappeared in Pontus to spend the winter at Amisus, where Pharnaces, who had finally betrayed his father, Mithridates, in the Crimea, sent him the old king's body, hostages, gifts, and the murderers of M'. Aquillius, in return for which Pompey recognized his kingship over the Crimean Bosporus and later enrolled him as a "friend and ally of the Roman people."[137] The Senate, informed by Pompey of the death of the king and the conclusion of the wars, immediately decreed a public thanksgiving of ten days, twice that given Marius for his victory over the Germans (Cic. Prov. cons . 27). The long struggle with the seemingly irrepressible king of Pontus was over.
Pompey spent the winter of 63-62 settling conditions in Pontus and Bithynia. It is unclear how much remained for Pompey to do in Bithynia. Whatever arrangements Iuncus had made in 74-73 were likely swept away with the loss of Bithynia in the following spring and the years of warfare that followed. Bithynia was, of course, entirely in Roman hands by 71, but it is noteworthy that Cicero, in his speech for the Manilian law, lays no stress whatever on possible revenues from Bithynia and notes only its ravaged state in 66 (Leg. Man . 5). We know that Pompey invalidated Lucullus's arrangements in general,[138] and that he imposed certain revisions, to be considered below, of the constitutions of the cities of the former kingdom of Bithynia. It seems, therefore, that the settlement of Bithynia was left for Pompey to undertake perhaps already in the latter part of 65 and the subsequent winter before his intervention in Syria. By 63—before Pompey's Eastern arrangements had been ratified—the publicani had certainly returned to Bithynia and were collecting rents from the former royal lands, now public land of the Roman people.[139]
The chief business, then, that confronted Pompey at Amisus was to settle the condition of the huge expanse of territory he had himself seized from Mithridates, Tigranes, and the hapless Seleucid. Native Icings and chiefs flocked to him as Pompey rewarded loyal allies and friends with a
[136] On these, see especially the full treatment of Sherwin-White, RFPE , 206-26.
[137] Plut. Pomp . 42; App. Mith . 113; Dio 37.14.1-2 (cf. 41.63.4, 42.45.2).
[138] Hut. Pomp . 31.1, Luc . 36.1; Strabo 12.3.33, C558. cf. Dio 36.46.2.
[139] Cic. Leg. agr . 2.50; Jones, Cities , 156.
share of the spoils.[140] From the former possessions of Mithridates, Paphlagonia was given to Attalus, Colchis to Aristarchus, and the priestly domain of Comana to Archelaus, son of the former Pontic general who had deserted to Murena after the first war with Mithridates. Pharnaces, Mithridates' son, like Tigranes, formally relinquished his kingdom of Crimean Bosporus and received it back from Pompey along with the title "friend and ally of the Roman people." Pompey, however, "freed" the city of Phanagorea, removing it from Pharnaces' dominion—an instructive example of how even now Roman conferral of the status of "free city" did not necessarily imply a privileged position in relation to Rome but titular freedom from any outside control.[141] From Tigranes' former possessions in Asia Minor, the wretched Ariobarzanes, now restored to his kingdom in Cappadocia, received a portion; Armenia Minor was given to some native dynast, perhaps Deiotarus of Galatia; Sophene was granted first to Tigranes' son, and then, when he refused to hand over its treasury to Pompey, given to Tigranes himself; and Tarcondimotus, a native chieftain in Cilicia, was given a domain between Trachea and Pedias.[142] Of Tigranes' Syrian and Mesopotamian possessions, and the former Seleucid territory, Pompey also made certain gifts to native kings and dynasts, while Hyrcanus was instated as high priest of Judaea only upon regular payment of tribute to Rome.[143] It has been argued that many of the kings to whom Pompey gave rewards of territory were similarly made subject to tribute. This hypothesis seems to rest merely on the parallel of Judaea and the magnitude of additional revenues that Pompey boasted in his triumph to have added.[144] It is perhaps unwise to accept the literal truth of Pompey's vaunt. Further, Judaea may well have been a special case: Pompey may have simply claimed for Rome, as heir to the Seleucid possessions, the
[140] Dio 37.7a. Plut. Pomp . 38.2 appears to refer to such activity already in 65-64.
[141] Pharnaces: Dio 37.14.1-2; cf. App. Mith . 113. App. Mith . 114 for the other arrangements. For Tigranes' recognition as "friend and ally," Dio 36.53.6.
[142] App. Mith . 105, 114; Dio 36.53.2; Plut. Pomp . 33.4-5; Livy Per . 101; Vell. Pat. 2.37.5; Eutr. 6.13; Flor. 1.40.27; Val. Max. 5.1.9. Deiotarus: Strabo 12.3.13, C 547; Eutr. 6.14.1; cf. Cic. Phil 2.94, Div . 2.79; Bell. Alex . 67.1; with Magie, RRAM , 1237-38 n. 41; Liebmann-Frankfort, Frontière orientale , 280-81. Armenia Minor: Jones, Cities , 422 n. 20.
[143] See especially Sherwin-White, RFPE , 206-26; Miltner, RE 21 (1952) 2114-16. On the abolition of the Judaean kingship, assessment of tribute, and its incorporation into Syria provincia , see especially Joseph. BJ 1.153-57 = AJ 14.73-79, with Dahlheim, Gewalt und Herrschaft , 265.
[144] Badian, Roman Imperialism , 78-79; contra: Dahlheim, Gewalt und Herrschaft , 264-65 with n. 165; Braund, RFK , 65-66.
obligations once due to that dynasty. There seems insufficient reason therefore to assume that the other territories handed over to loyal local dynasts in the usual fashion were also made subject to Roman tribute. Enough revenues were to come in from the new conquests to make such a novelty unnecessary. Pompey even gave at least one major city within the former area of Roman control the reward of "freedom" from Roman tribute and magisterial interference.[145] But what was truly novel about Pompey's settlement is not the extent to which the new conquests were left in the hands of native powers—a time-honored practice, especially in Asia Minor[146] —but how much he had expanded Rome's commitments and revenues in the East. In addition to the recent acquisition of Bithynia, Pompey made much of Pontus and Syria-Palestine, as well as eastern Cilicia (Trachea and Pedias), subject to Roman tribute and supervision.
As usual the information we possess about Pompey's leges in the new provinces is highly incomplete,[147] dependent as we are on chance citations in the sources. In Cilicia, Pompey may have done little more than settle former pirates in numerous "cities" and extend arrangements for the collection of Roman revenues to Trachea and Pedias, now formally wrested from the Armenian king. Our sources tell us only that Pompey brought Cilicia fully under Roman power.[148] What remained of the Pontic kingdom after the awards to Roman allies was joined to the former kingdom of Bithynia to form one province (Strabo 12.3.1, C541). We hear of only two cities freed from Roman tribute and recognized as autonomous entities: Sinope and Amisus, former residences of the kings, both freed by Lucullus in an act evidently upheld by Pompey.[149] The formerly free and allied city of Heraclea Pontica had now lost that privilege by its adherence to the cause of Mithridates.[150]
[145] Mytilene: Plut. Pomp . 42.4; Veil. Pat. 2.18.3; Strabo 13.2.3 C617; Syll 752-52; Robert, Opera minora , 5:561-83. Bernhardt, "Imperium und Eleutheria," 149-51.
[146] For the history of which, see Liebmann-Frankfort, Frontière orientale . For Pompey's settlement in particular, pp. 257-319.
[147] See Dio 37.7a, 20.2; Cic. Leg. agr . 2.52, 54: non(dum) legibus datis .
[148] See App. Mith . 106, 118; 117 for the Cilician colonies (see below, n. 158). For Leg. Man . 35, see above.
[149] Sinope: App. Mith . 83; cf. Magie, RRAM , 1215 n. 42. Cic. Leg. agr . 2.53, imagining an auction there by Rullus of the lands seized by Pompey, does not imply that it lacked "free" status. Amisus: App. Mith . 83; Memnon, FGrH 434 F 30.5; Plut. Luc . 19.4-5; App. Mith . 83.
[150] Memnon, FGrH 434 F 39-40; cf. 32-35 for the fall of the city to Cotta. Strabo 12.3.6, C542, wrongly implies that it had been subject to the kings of Pontus. See Jones, Cities , 152-53.
The most remarkable feature of Pompey's settlement of Pontus was his division of the former kingdom into eleven communities (
The foundation of cities in the East by a Roman commander was not entirely without precedent. Already in 83-82 we hear of the foundation by L. Murena of a city in Cappadocia, called after himself Licinea, to guard against Mithridates' raids—an act remarkably reminiscent of Hellenistic monarchy.[157] But nothing more is heard of this place, which was presum-
[151] Strabo 12.3.1, C541. For an attempt to list them, see Magie, RRAM , 1232-33 n. 35.
[152] For which see Jones, Cities , 154-55.
[153] Ep . 10.79-80, 112, 114-15. See Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny ad loc.; Jones, Greek City , 56-57, 171-72, and Cities 156-61; Rostovtzeff, SEHHW , 1571 n. 65; Magie, RRAM , 1231-32 nn. 34-35; Marshall, JRS 58 (1968) 103-9; Ameling, EA 3 (1984) 19-31 (with special reference to Bithynia). That the law Pliny cites for Bithynia was also applicable in Pontus is dear from Ep . 112: lex Pompeia . . . qua Bithyni et Pontici utuntur .
[154] See Jones, Cities , 159, with Cic. Leg. agr . 2.51.
[155] Broughton, in ESAR , 4:537-38; Sherwin-White, RFPE , 232 with n. 117. The communities themselves might then, of course, farm out collection to Roman negotiatores : see Cic. Flac . 91.
[156] Badian, Publicans , 99, and Roman Imperialism , 75. Contra Sherwin-White, RFPE , 232. On Badian's view of the integration of the Bithynian-Pontian and Asian tax-farming companies (Publicans , 76, 106-7), see now Cotton, Latomus 45 (1986) 367-73.
[157] Memnon, FGrH 434 F 26.1, with Reinach's emendation. See also Habicht, JRS 65 (1975) 74, for an Asian ethnic "Mourenoi."
ably stillborn in the decades of war that followed. But Pompey claimed to have founded, in addition to eight cities of "Cappadocians"—that is, in Pontus and Cappadocia—various colonies (ten?) of Cilicians, as well as others in Coele-Syria and Palestine.[158] Like Murena, Pompey did not hesitate to name the new communities after himself: in Pontus, Eupatoria, Mithridates' own unfinished project commemorating himself, appropriately became Magnopolis, and Pompeiopolis and Megalopolis also appear. In contrast to the other cities, which were settled by local inhabitants, Nicopolis in Armenia Minor, a foundation that commemorated victory over Mithridates in the battle of 66, was peopled in part by Pompey's wounded and discharged veterans, and thus became the first foundation of Roman citizens in the East.[159]
Pompey's city-foundations were motivated by more than self-glorification, however, or, as has been sometimes fashionable to suggest, imitation of Alexander.[160] The numerous colonies of Cilicians were the settlements of ex-pirates already noted above, most of them of course in Cilicia itself—among these a resettlement of Soli which received the name Pompeiopolis—but also around the Mediterranean in Achaea, Calabria, and Cyrenaica.[161] In Pontus Pompey's establishment of the political forms characteristic of the polis has been explained as an answer to the novel problem of imposing Roman administration in a land formerly organized along tribal and quasi-feudal lines.[162] This is plausible and might be elab-
[159] Interestingly, Nicopolis was founded in territory Pompey granted to a native dynast: see Jones, Cities , 422 n. 20.
[160] Imitatio Alexandri and philhellenism: Gelzer, Pompeius , 89, 99. Dreizehnter, Chiron 5 (1975) 213-45, administers a salutary, if overly speculative, corrective to that view. I do not share his extreme skepticism about Pompey's foundations and refoundations of communities.
[161] See p. 319 n. 114. On the foundations in Cilicia proper, see Jones, Cities , 202.
[162] Jones, Greek City , 56-57, and Cities , 157; cf. Sherwin-White, RFPE , 229-30.
orated somewhat. The Romans had long faced such a situation in Spain; and the Spanish precedent may help explain the Western flavor of the new constitutions, for Pompey had recently spent six years there fighting Sertorius and his Spanish allies.[163] Above all, we should note that the new cities played a central, intermediary role in the collection of revenues, as we have just seen. It would have been an exceedingly costly and inefficient business for the publicani to gather the taxes of the Roman people from the myriad of local chiefs and tribal communities that existed before; but by dividing Pontus into eleven poleis, Pompey had provided a structure that could itself assume much of the burden of the collection of revenues. But the likely priority of fiscal considerations in the administrative restructuring of Pontus ought not to obscure the radicalism of Pompey's intervention.
Equally remarkably, Pompey's constitutional arrangements for the new "cities" of Pontus were made operative in Bithynia as well,[164] where, unlike Pontus, urban life was well established and highly developed. We need not assume that by extending the lex Pompeia to Bithynia as well the constitutions of the Bithynian cities were revised from their foundations, but at the very least the law provided for a new kind of council unfamiliar to the East, which was enrolled from ex-magistrates and subject to the scrutiny of "censors" (
[163] In Spain Pompey may have founded Pompaelo/Pamplona (A. Schulten, Sertorius [Leipzig 1926] 121-22, and RE 21 [1952] 1994), but Dreizehnter, Chiron 5 (1975) 233-35, is skeptical.
[164] Above, n. 153.
[165] See now Ameling, EA 3 (1984) 19-31. For the Western, Roman influence on these rules, see Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny , 670-73, 721, 725.
[166] See Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny , 670. For Flamininus and Mummius, see chap. 3.
[167] See especially Jones, Greek City , 170-71.
easily amenable to the demands of the ruling power, and thus the local elites could be encouraged to act as virtual allies of the Roman authorities—often regarded, without good evidence, as a constant in Roman policy toward Eastern communities already from the second century.[168] The era subsequent to the First Mithridetic War is rich in novelties. Pompey's reorganization of Pontus, and his regulation of the constitutions of Pontus and Bithynia, are striking evidence of the new readiness of the Romans to resort to sweeping administrative restructuring in order to establish more securely not only their power but their capacity to draw the revenues that maintained it.
Pompey returned in the spring of 62 to Italy, making impressive stopovers at Mytilene, Ephesus, Rhodes, and Athens.[169] An inscription from Mytilene which dates to 63 or 62 honors Pompey for "having put an end by land and sea to the wars besetting the world."[170] In November of 63 Cicero spoke of the termination of all foreign wars by means of the prowess of one man and repeatedly echoed the theme in subsequent years; the bold claim was even made in the preamble to a Roman law drafted by A. Gabinius in his consulship—the man who had been responsible for conferral of the piracy command on Pompey.[171] After twenty-seven years of nearly constant warfare and chronic instability in Eastern lands and seas, Greece and Asia Minor were again able to enjoy relative peace, although preparations for C. Antonius Hybrida's ill-starred campaign against the Dardani in this very year were likely an unpleasant burden on the allies of the Greek mainland and Macedonia.[172] The augmentation of the imperium was duly celebrated in Rome. Cicero was inspired in 63 to put a new twist on
[168] So Jones, Greek City , 170-71; Briscoe, Past and Present 36 (1967) 3-20; Ste. Croix, Class Struggle , 323-33. Cic. Flac . 42-43, cited by Jones, p. 171 with n. 29, as evidence that by Cicero's day the councils of the cities of the province of Asia sat permanently, does not by any means compel this conclusion. (See P. Garnsey and R. Saller, The Roman Empire [Berkeley and Los Angeles 1987] 38-39.) Cicero ridicules Heraclides for not yet having entered the "senate" at Temnus at his age; but the same might be said with reference to an annually elected council. Note that Cicero does not say that Heraclides has not yet been able to hold office.
[169] Gelzer, Pompeius , 97-98; Miltner, RE 21 (1952) 2117-18.
[171] Cat . 2.11: omnia sunt externa unius virtute terra marique pacata . Cf. Cat . 3.26, Sest . 67, Prov. cons . 27. IDel 1511 = Insula sacra , p. 149, lines 19-20, quoted below, n. 173.
[172] Livy Per . 103; Jul. Obs. 61a; Dio 38.10.1-2; Cic. Att . 1.12.1-2. For the notion of a continuous thirty-year war, see Pliny HN 7.97; Oros. 6.1.30.
an old theme—Pompey had made the imperium coterminous with the orbis terrarum —and liked the formulation so much that he repeated it, with variations, numerous times in subsequent years.[173] For his part, Pompey advertised the extent of his conquests on placards carried in his triumph of 28-29 September 61, and on a dedicatory inscription on his temple of Minerva, which, according to Pliny's citation, asserted that Pompey had conquered an expanse from Lake Maeotis to the Red Sea.[174] He boasted that Asia, the most distant of the provinces when he had taken charge of it, was now surrounded by others.[175] The crisis that had begun with Mithridates' invasion in 89 was declared to be past; the prestige of the imperium populi Romani was at last restored, indeed vastly augmented and extended into exotic lands previously almost unheard-of.
The principle of maintaining the imperium against all challengers was an old one. In the past it had had little to do with territorial occupation, administration, or financial exploitation. But the long confrontation with Mithridates, which required a huge commitment of troops in the East over an extended period of time,[176] had brought a permanent change. For Pompey, the increase of Roman revenues was very much at issue. After his Spanish victories, the land grants voted his soldiers could not be carried out because of the weakness of state finances.[177] It is clear that the new revenues and Eastern booty gave a boost to the resumption of efforts toward land distribution from 63, and it is surely plausible to suppose that the increase in the urban grain subsidy secured by M. Porcius Cato in 62
[174] Pliny HN 7.97 (cf. Diod. 40.4) for the inscription. Triumphal placards: Plut. Pomp . 45.2-3; App. Mith . 117. See Dreizehnter, Chiron 5 (1975) 215-33, for discussion and aggressive emendation of the passages of Plutarch and Appian.
[175] Pliny HN 7.99: Asiam ultimam provinciarum accepisse eandemque mediam patriae reddidisse . Cicero echoes the claim in 56 (Prov. cons . 31): Asia, quae imperium antea nostrum terminabat, nunc tribus novis provinciis ipsa cingatur .
[176] See the estimates of Brunt, Italian Manpower , p. 449, table 14: between 80 and 75, five to nine legions in the East; between 74 and 62, ten to nineteen legions; from 70 to 62, more legions in the East than in the rest of the imperium .
[177] Dio 38.5.1-2; Cic. Verr . 2.3.182; Cf. reference to a lex Plotia agraria at Cic. Att . 1.18.6. The allegation of Clodius at Plut. Luc . 34 need not be accepted. Cf. Marshall Antichthon 6 (1972) 43-52, for the view that the measure never became law. For the shortage of state funds in the previous two decades, see the concise survey of Crawford, RRC , 2:637-38; Barlow, AJP 101 (1980) 202-19.
was palatable to fiscal conservatives only in view of the fantastic sums anticipated from the East.[178] Pompey was of course alert to all of this. Plutarch tells us that, in addition to the placards indicating the wide extent of Pompey's conquests and the cities and ships taken, others contained inscriptions which indicated that
whereas the public revenues from taxes had been 50 million drachmas, they were receiving from what Pompey had conquered for the city 85 million; and that 2,000 talents in coin and gold and silver objects were being deposited in the public treasury, without counting what had been given to the soldiers, of which the smallest portion had been 1,500 drachmas.[179]
With all due allowance for self-interested exaggeration, Pompey's claim to have added 85 million denarii to the annual revenues of the state and to have nearly tripled its previous income makes clear the extraordinary nature of the increase on any accounting.[180] Such explicit reference to nova vectigalia , put on a par with the more traditional elements of a triumphal catalog of conquest, is striking. Cicero, speaking for the Manilian law, had chosen to stress the importance of securing the Asian revenues; Pompey,
[178] See Cic. Leg. agr . 1.13, 2.61-62, Att . 1.19.4; Plut. Cat. min . 26, Caes . 8. A measure of contemporary fiscal expectations may be given by the election of censors in 61, a year before the end of the last quinquennium (convincingly identified now as L. Iulius Caesar, cos. 64, and C. Scribonius Curio, cos. 76: Nicolet, in Insula sacra , 111-25), and the massive overbidding for the Asian tax contract in that year (esp. Cic. Att . 1.17.9; cf. Badian, Publicans , 100, who stresses the severity of the competition).
returning from the campaign authorized by that very law, boasts of having multiplied the vectigalia populi Romani . The emphasis on exploitation of the imperium is unprecedented in our evidence.
In the roughly two decades after Sulla's departure from the East a combination of factors, mostly already present to some degree, conspired to transform decisively the Eastern imperium . Fundamental were the massive offensives in the Balkans and northern Asia Minor and the more sporadic operations against the pirates conducted by the Sullani in the 70s, a sequence of simultaneous, large-scale campaigns unparalleled in the history of Roman intervention in the East. Successes against the Thraco-Illyrian tribes and Mithridates were not matched by the efforts against the pirates, but Roman supremacy, the imperium in the old, restricted sense, was for the most part not only restored out of the shambles left by the First Mithridatic War but considerably enhanced. But that conflict also had forcefully brought home a new lesson: that the survival of the imperium itself and the material interests of many Roman citizens were directly bound up with the maintenance and indeed expansion of revenues from the East, particularly those from Asia Minor. Already in 88 enough private Roman capital was invested in Asia that its loss caused a collapse of credit in Rome, with unhappy consequences for citizens of all classes.[181] The loss to the state treasury of Asian revenues during the anarchy of the 80s must have been acutely felt as well. Sulla's great extension of tributary status in Asia Minor and Greece at the very time when fiscal demands imposed by extensive military commitments on various fronts soared made the Eastern revenues indisputably the foundation not only of the imperium but also of the amenities (commoda ) enjoyed by the Roman people. With the revival of the tribunate in 70, this link between exploitation of the Eastern imperium and the people's commoda became the linchpin of imperial policy, leading under Pompey first to a belated but decisive response to the plague of piracy and then to the greatest single accretion of territory subject to Roman tribute and the commands of Roman magistrates yet seen in the history of the imperium populi Romani .
[181] Cic. Leg. Man . 19. See Barlow, AJP 101 (1980) 202-19.