Differing Perspectives On The Process

The Question Of Relative Influence

The picture of policy making sketched above is both incomplete and misleading. For one thing, there are other players in the game, such as advisory councils, interest groups, opposition parties, and the media. For another, the actual dynamics of decision making vary considerably depending on the issues and stakes involved, the idiosyncrasies of the ministries and agencies, and many other variables. Moreover, the preceding picture glosses over the controversy regarding the relative weights of bureaucrats and politicians in the policy equation. It is the last-mentioned question that we propose to explore briefly. Whether one subscribes to the elitist perspective, of which the most popular version posits a triple alliance of the LDP, the bureaucracy, and big business, or to the pluralist perspective, which stresses a diversity of participants, a fragmentation of power, and a complexity of options, there is general agreement that the bureaucracy and the LDP are the two most powerful institutions in the policy-making process.^[38]

Opinion is divided about which of these two institutions is more influential. Although there is a growing tendency among scholars to view the controversy as sterile, we should nonetheless take note of two contending schools of thought: the "bureaucratic-dominance school" (kanryo yuiron ) and the "party-dominance school" (seito yuiron ).

"Bureaucratic-Dominance" School

Perhaps the leading exponent of the "bureaucratic-dominance school" is Tsuji Kiyoaki, a distinguished student of Japanese public administration. Tsuji argues that three developments have helped to bolster

[38] For an overview, see Haruhiko Fukui, "Studies in Policymaking; A Review of the Literature" in T. J. Pempel, ed., Policymaking in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 22-59. See also Bradley M. Richardson, "Policymaking in Japan: An Organizing Perspective" in ibid., pp. 239-68 and T. J. Pempel, "Conclusion" in ibid., pp. 318-23.

bureaucratic power in Japan. First, the decision of the Allied powers to rule postsurrender Japan indirectly meant that the government bureaucracy through which indirect government would be conducted would retain its erstwhile influence.^[39] Because the other groups that had exercised power in prewar and wartime Japan—the military and financial cliques (gunbatsu to zaibatsu )—were dismantled by the Occupation authorities, the bureaucracy's power position actually improved after the Japanese defeat in World War II.^[40]

Second, the bureaucrats benefited immensely from a strong conviction on the part of the Japanese people that bureaucracy was a neutral instrument, a conviction bordering on religion (isshu no shinko ). Unwilling to recognize legislators and party politicians as legitimate wielders of authority, the people sought consolation from the "fantasy" of bureaucratic neutrality.^[41] Third, the weaknesses of other political forces, particularly party politicians, further contributed to the ascendancy of bureaucrats.^[42]

To the preceding list, Chalmers Johnson, a leading American student of Japanese bureaucracy, would add a fourth reason for the expansion of bureaucratic influence: "the requirements of economic recovery led to a vast ballooning of the bureaucracy." The upshot of all this, in Johnson's words, is that "although it is influenced by pressure groups and political claimants, the elite bureaucracy of Japan makes most major decisions, drafts virtually all legislation, controls the national budget, and is the source of all major policy innovations in the system."^[43] In a more recent study, however, Johnson writes that "during the late 1970s a subtle combination of events started an apparent decline in the power of the bureaucracy and a concurrent rise in the power of the LDP—or, as the Japanese press puts it, a trend away from the kanryo shudo taisei (bureaucratic leadership structure) toward the to shudo taisei (party leadership structure)."^[44] We shall address this theme in the next section.

Nonetheless, the bureaucracy's virtual monopoly on bill-drafting is indisputable. Throughout the postwar period, nearly nine of every ten

[39] Tsuji, Shinpan Nihon kanryosei no kenkyu , pp. 273-75.

[40] One of the first observers to note this phenomenon was John M. Maki. See his article, "The Role of Bureaucracy in Japan," Pacific Affairs , 20(Dec. 1947): 391.

[41] Tsuji, Shinpan Nihon kanryosei no kenkyu , pp. 275-77.

[42] Ibid., pp. 277-81.

[43] Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle , pp. 44 and 20-21.

[44] Chalmers Johnson, "Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan," Journal of Japanese Studies , 12, no. 1(Winter 1986): 24.

bills enacted into law by the Japanese Diet have originated in the cabinet, meaning the bureaucracy. Although the proportion of cabinet-sponsored bills has begun to decline slightly since the 1970s, it still exceeds the 80-percent mark.^[45]

Moreover, as T. J. Pempel has demonstrated, the success rate of cabinet-sponsored (hence bureaucracy-drafted) bills was higher than 75 percent between December 1955 and December 1970, whereas that of bills sponsored by individual members of the Diet ranged between 11 and 14 percent during the same period.^[46] The success rate of cabinet bills has remained high in recent years; in the 1980s it has ranged from 72 percent in the 108th Diet (December 1986-May 1987) to 95 percent in the 96th Diet (December 1981-August 1982).^[47] The preponderance of the bureaucracy in drafting legislation continues unabated.

As for the bureaucracy's control over the national budget, a careful study by John C. Campbell has shown that although the Ministry of Finance exerts a powerful influence in Japan's budget-making process, it nonetheless shares power with the LDP. Even when the latter does not intervene directly, Finance Ministry bureaucrats try to anticipate LDP reactions. However, "the most striking aspect of Japanese budgeting, to those familiar with other budget systems, is that the major party organization intervenes routinely at nearly all stages of the budgetary process." On the other hand, the real impact of LDP organs, such as PARC, is diluted by their need to depend on the bureaucracy and sometimes on interest groups for information. The lack of sufficient time further hampers the exercise of effective party control.^[48]

Three other indicators of "bureaucratic dominance" merit brief mention: (1) the prevalence of former bureaucrats in the LDP, (2) the quasi-legislative powers of the bureaucracy, and (3) de facto bureaucratic control over advisory commissions. A significant development in postwar Japan has been the entry of a large number of former bureaucrats into the political arena, a development that has been aided by the custom of early retirement for higher civil servants as well as by

[45] For relevant statistics, see Domoto Seiji, "Seisaku keisei katei no shisutemu: Hoan seitei katei ni miru seifu yoto kan chosei" [The Policy-Making Process: Mutual Adjustment Between the Government and the Ruling Party in the Legislative Process], Jurisuto , special issue, no. 29 (Winter 1983): 57, and Sato and Matsuzaki, Jiminto seiken , pp. 277-79.

[46] T. J. Pempel, "The Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan, American Journal of Political Science 18, no. 4 (Nov. 1974): 650, table 1.

[47] Asahi shinbun , 28 May 1987.

[48] Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics , pp. 137-43, 2, and 127-28. The quotation is from p. 2.

their political ambition. As a result, about 25 percent of LDP Diet members have been former bureaucrats. Inasmuch as LDP Diet members constitute virtually the exclusive source of cabinet members and prime ministers, this has meant that about 40 percent of the former and 53 percent of the latter (nine out of seventeen) have been former bureaucrats.^[49] The entry of so many former bureaucrats into the Diet implies that its perceived power is great. In other words, it can be treated as a sign not of bureaucratic ascendancy but of the Diet's dominance.

So far as the quasi-legislative powers of the bureaucracy are concerned, the executive branch, acting either as a group or as individual ministries and agencies, is empowered to issue ordinances and communications having the force of law. In fact, most laws contain provisions delegating ordinance powers to specific bureaucratic agencies.^[50] These ordinances outnumber laws by the ratio of nine to one.^[51]

Finally, the proliferation of advisory commissions (known generically as shingikai ) has not really encroached upon bureaucratic power. On the contrary, they have actually become "tools of bureaucratic control." Bureaucrats exercise a large amount of influence over the selection of shingikai members, control "the areas of investigation," provide the staff and expertise for investigation, and draft the reports.^[52]

"Party-Dominance School"

Just as journalistic exposes have played a considerable part in popularizing the concept of "bureaucratic domination" (kanryo shihai ), so

[49] Jung-Suk Youn, "Recruitment of Political Leadership in Postwar Japan, 1958-1972," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977, Chap. 5; Peter P. Cheng, "The Japanese Cabinets, 1885-1973; An Elite Analysis," Asian Survey 14, no. 12 (Dec. 1974): 1066; Key Sung Ryang, "Postwar Japanese Political Leadership—A Study of Prime Ministers," ibid. 13, no. 11 (Nov. 1973): 1010-20. For more recent data, consult such standard references as Kokkai benran [National Diet Handbook] (published semiannually by Nihon Seikei Shinbunsha) and Seiji handobukku [Political Handbook] (published by Seiji Koho Senta). Of the 304 LDP members elected to the House of Representatives in the "double" parliamentary election of 6 July 1986, 70 (23 percent) were former bureaucrats. The proportion in the 1983 election had been 22 percent (N = 57). Asahi shinbun , 8 July 1986.

[50] Chalmers Johnson, "Japan: Who Governs? An Essay on Official Bureaucracy," Journal of Japanese Studies , 2 (Autumn 1975): 11. According to Spaulding, "the bureaucracy's ordinances powers, though still important, have been significantly narrowed. Under the 1889 Constitution, there were two main categories of executive ordinances: those implementing laws passed by the Diet and those dealing with the numerous 'imperial powers' over which the Diet had no control whatever. The second category was abolished by the 1947 constitution." Robert M. Spaulding, Jr., prepublication review of an earlier version of this study, May 1987.

[51] Pempel, "The Bureaucratization of Policymaking," pp. 654-57.

[52] Pempel, Patterns of Japanese Policymaking , pp. 70-71.

investigative reporters have been instrumental in alerting the public to what they perceive as the ascendancy of the LDP over the bureaucracy. Three examples will suffice. In a long-running series on bureaucracy begun in July 1977, Asahi shinbun brought to the reader's attention a steady diminution of bureaucratic influence. The paper noted that budgets prepared by Finance Ministry bureaucrats were no longer being rubber-stamped by the Diet and that in such key policy areas as setting the price of rice and health insurance, LDP politicians were clearly playing the dominant role. The paper declared that a trend toward the "predominance of politics" (seiji no yuisei ) had become discernible since the 1960s.^[53]

Another year-long series on bureaucracy in Mainichi shinbun in 1979-80 also documented the growing power of politicians over bureaucrats. Symptomatic of the latter's vulnerability, according to the paper, was the saying that "[the tenure of] bureau chiefs can be counted in days, [that of administrative] vice-ministers in hours." The implication was that bureaucrats in these top-level positions could lose their jobs should they antagonize key politicians in the ruling political party.^[54] In a 1980 book based on serialized reports in the weekly magazine Shukan bunshun , Tahara Soichiro underscored the changing nature of the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in Japan. He quoted Finance Ministry bureaucrats as acknowledging the erosion of their power. They told Tahara that three distinct eras could be identified in the relative power position of the Finance Ministry: the era of unipolarity (ikkyoku kozo jidai ), the era of bipolarity (nikyoku kozo jidai ), and the era of tripolarity (sankyoku kozo jidai ).^[55]

The era of unipolarity was coterminous with the American Occupation (1945-52). During the "golden days" of the Occupation, Finance Ministry bureaucrats enhanced their power vis-à-vis other bureaucrats, the Diet, and opposition parties by invoking the name of "GHQ," that is, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Given the absolute authority of SCAP, no one could argue with what was claimed to be a GHQ order. In their dealings with

[53] Asahi Shinbun "Kanryo" Shuzaihan, Kanryo: Sono seitai [Bureaucrats: Their Mode of Life] (Tokyo: Sangyo Noritsu Tanki Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1978), esp. pp. 143-52.

[54] Mainichi Shinbun Shakaibu, Kanryo: Sono fushoku no kozo , passim. The quotation is from p. 59.

[55] Tahara, Nihon no kanryo , pp. 140-48.

SCAP, on the other hand, Finance Ministry bureaucrats discovered that they could have their way by alleging a strong opposition by the Diet and other ministries. Acquisition of decision-making powers by the Finance Ministry in preparing the national budget, in monetary policy, and in other areas was also facilitated by its virtual monopolization of strategic information and by the complexity of the issues involved.^[56]

With the end of the Occupation, however, came an increasing assertiveness of other ministries and agencies, with which the Finance Ministry was compelled to share power. The era of bipolarity had thus begun. However, it came to an end in the latter half of the 1960s, when a new era, one of tripolarity, commenced. The third pillar of power was the LDP (notably its PARC divisions), which had acquired its own expertise in budgetary matters as well as in substantive policy areas.^[57]

In the scholarly community, the most articulate proponents of "party dominance" are probably Muramatsu Michio and Yung H. Park. In his study of the perceptions of 251 bureaucrats and 101 members of the Diet, Muramatsu found substantial evidence that lends support to the journalistic impressions noted above. Table 29 indicates that all four groups with firsthand knowledge of the policy-making process chose party politicians as the most influential group in greater proportion than they did bureaucrats. To be sure, senior bureaucrats were almost evenly divided in their assessment of the relative influence of politicians and bureaucrats, but the margin is substantial among middle-level bureaucrats, whose perceptions are no less important than those of their seniors.

That LDP Diet members picked party politicians over bureaucrats by a margin of more than two to one may reflect the tendency of politicians everywhere to inflate their own importance. Because "party politicians"—actually, the Japanese term used in the interview was simply "political party" (seito )^[58] —implied LDP members, the responses of opposition Diet members were probably untainted by such ego-related needs. On the other hand, the impact of ideology on the latter's

[56] Ibid., pp. 143-45.

[57] Ibid., pp. 145-46. For a study of the role of the Finance Ministry in budget making that shows the increasing influence of both other ministries and politicians, see Kuribayashi, Okurasho shukeikyoku . Kuribayashi calls other ministries the "Second Finance Ministry" (daini no Okurasho ; p. 250). For his discussion of the LDP's role, see pp. 252-54.

[58] Muramatsu, Sengo Nihon no kanryosei , p. 27.

perceptions is shown by the relative frequency with which "big businessmen" (zaikai, daikigyo ) were mentioned.^[59]

Table 30 displays data from another source. Compiled from a study by Akira Kubota, the table shows several interesting things.^[60] First, looking at the last two columns, we find that higher civil servants in Japan rated party leaders and cabinet ministers as more influential in policy making than themselves. Interestingly, members of parliament (the Diet), while expressing an inflated estimate of their own influence, tend to be slightly more subdued in measuring the influence of party leaders and, particularly, cabinet ministers. Nonetheless, if we set aside members of the Diet, the overwhelming impression is one of bureaucrats and politicians sharing power on a more or less equal basis.

Second, comparison of Japan with the other three countries shows that the relative position of bureaucrats vis-à-vis politicians is stronger in Japan than in the other countries. Although, at first glance, the perceived influence of higher civil servants in Britain is higher than that of their Japanese counterparts, the gap between civil servants and cabinet ministers is appreciably wider in Britain than it is in Japan.

Third, the table confirms that parliament plays only a modest role in policy making in parliamentary systems; however, its perceived influence is greater in Japan than in Britain and West Germany. As

[59] In interpreting these data, it may be instructive to keep in mind John C. Campbell's observation that "nearly everyone involved with Japanese budgeting finds it in his interest to magnify the role played by the majority party." Bureaucrats in both line ministries (i.e., all ministries except the Finance Ministry) and the Finance Ministry can blame the LDP for gaps, deficiencies, and problems in the budget. "Journalists find 'political interference' a dependable source of picturesque copy. LDP leaders and members also like to think of themselves as influential and surely wish to convince interest groups and constituents of their efficacy in obtaining financial benefits. Even the objective scholarly observer will tend to play up the role of the majority party, because its direct participation in decision making is one of the most distinctive features of the Japanese budgetary system." Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics , pp. 137-38.

[60] Kubota's study is reported in the following sources: Kubota Akira, "Seiji erito no kokusai hikaku" [An International Comparison of Political Elites], Kankai , Oct. 1976, pp. 158-63; Kubota Akira and Tomita Nobuo, "Nihon seifu kokan no ishiki kozo: Sono kokusaiteki doshitsusei to ishitsusei" [The Value Structure of Japanese Higher Civil Servants: Its International Homogeneity and Heterogeneity], Chuo koron , Feb. 1977, pp. 190-96; Kubota Akira, "Kokusaitekini mita Nihon no kokyu kanryo" [Japan's Higher Civil Servants in International Perspective], 20 parts, Kankai , Mar. 1978-Oct. 1979. The study was part of a multinational comparative research project based at the University of Michigan. The Japanese phase of the project was undertaken by Kubota (University of Windsor), Tomita Nobuo (Meiji University), and Ide Yoshinori (University of Tokyo). The book by Aberbach and his colleagues cited at the outset of this chapter (see n. 1) is basically a report of the larger research project; it, however, omits the Japanese portion of the project altogether.

might be expected, parliament (Congress) is perceived as having the greatest amount of influence in the United States.

As noted earlier, Yung H. Park's study, published in 1986, is based on interviews with more than two hundred politicians, bureaucrats, and other knowledgeable persons. He attributes an increase in the relative influence of cabinet ministers and LDP politicians to several factors, of which the most notable are the "specialization" of politicians and the "partisanization" of former bureaucrats who enter politics.^[61]

The specialization of politicians refers to "the accumulation of vast administrative knowledge and experience in the hands of politicians," which has been brought about by the prolonged rule of the LDP and the multiplication of opportunities for LDP Diet members to serve as parliamentary vice-ministers, ministers, and members of Diet standing committees and PARC divisions. LDP Diet members with specialized knowledge operate in informal policy groups known as zoku (literally, tribe).^[62]

The growing prominence of zoku Diet members may indeed be the single most important indicator of a shift in the balance of power in Japan's policy-making arena, a shift the Japanese press has dubbed toko kantei (the ascendancy of party and the decline of bureaucracy) and toko seitei (the ascendancy of party and the decline of politics). The party (to ) in these phrases refers to the LDP.^[63]

Becoming a member of zoku , of which there were eleven in 1987—commerce and industry, agriculture and forestry, fisheries, transportation, construction, social welfare, labor, education, posts and telecommunications, finance, and national defense—however, is not

[61] Park, Bureaucrats and Ministers , pp. 29-54. Spaulding reminds us that "in the United States, [the specialization of politicians] has been augmented by a huge increase in the size of the Congressional staff , so that even a Congress member lacking specialized knowledge has access to it without relying on the executive branch." Spaulding, prepublication review of an earlier version of this study, May 1987. Although the Japanese Diet, too, has an independent research staff—in the form of research offices (chosa shitsu ) attached to standing committees, legislation bureaus (hosei kyoku ) in both houses, and the Investigation and Legislative Research Bureau of the National Diet Library—it pales in comparison with the resources available to members of the American Congress in terms of size and importance.

[62] Park, Bureaucrats and Ministers , p. 30. The importance of zoku is also explained in Kawaguchi Hiroyuki, "Jiminto habatsu to kanryo, joron: Kyoson suru habatsu to 'zoku'" [Liberal-Democratic Party Factions and Bureaucrats, Introduction: The Coexistence of Factions and "Tribes"], Kankai , Mar. 1983, pp. 98-109. Campbell also mentions zoku but implies that their role is relatively marginal; he defines them as "numbers of LDP members who get together only at budget time to press for greater expenditures in some policy area." Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics , pp. 118-19.

[63] Inoguchi and Iwai, "Zoku giin" no kenkyu , pp. i-iii and 1-40.

easy. An LDP Diet member must fulfill the requirements of seniority, experience, and expertise before he is accepted as a full-fledged member of a zoku . Generally speaking, appointment as chairman of a PARC division signifies such a status. This in turn requires not only four terms as a Diet member but also the acquisition of expertise in a substantive policy area through previous participation in policy making in that area.^[64] An additional factor in the selection of divisional chairmen is factional balance. The seventeen LDP Diet members who were appointed as divisional chairmen in November 1987 following the inauguration of the Takeshita administration were divided as follows: four from the Takeshita faction, three each from the Miyazawa, Abe, and Nakasone factions, one from the Kono faction, and three from the House of Councillors.^[65]

Thanks to prolonged immersion in their chosen field of specialization, members of zoku can frequently boast more expertise in their field of specialization than senior bureaucrats, who are subject to frequent rotation in assignments. Even former bureaucrats, who constitute a sizable proportion of the LDP Diet contingent, undergo a socialization process during which they internalize the goals and values of the LDP, becoming politicized and "partisanized." Yung H. Park argues that this serves to undercut the widely held assumption that former bureaucrats in the Diet and the cabinet are "Trojan horses" that augment the influence of their erstwhile colleagues.^[66]

"Partisanization" occurs not only among former bureaucrats who enter politics but also among incumbent bureaucrats, particularly those at the bureau-chief level, who interact most frequently with politicians. All this spawns the phenomenon known as the "politicization of administration" (gyosei no seijika ). Government ministries are depicted as being mere "support arms" for the LDP and its zoku or "junior partners" with the LDP or as "suffocating" under LDP pressure.^[67]

In table 30 we saw that, with the notable exception of the U.S. Congress, parliaments are perceived as having only modest influence in policy making; however, the Japanese Diet received higher marks than either the British Parliament or the West German Bundestag. Both Muramatsu and Park show that the influence of the Diet as perceived by bureaucrats and politicians alike is far greater than conventional

[64] Ibid., pp. 120-21 and 293-304.

[65] Asahi shinbun , 13 Nov. 1987.

[66] Park, Bureaucrats and Ministers , pp. 33-47.

[67] Ibid., pp. 95-96.

wisdom suggests. Eight percent of Muramatsu's respondents said that the Diet played a decisive role in enacting legislation, whereas 68 percent said that it exercised a fair amount of influence (kanari eikyo ari ).^[68] According to Park, the "importance of the contemporary Diet is most visible . . . in its reactive roles of amending, delaying, and rejecting government-LDP bills."^[69] In fact, 22 percent of the bills enacted by the House of Representatives (266 out of 1,208) during the 1967-75 period (the 56th through the 76th Diet) and 17.6 percent of those enacted by the House of Representatives (178 out of 1,009) during the 1976-86 period (the 77th through the 104th Diet) were amended during the legislative stage.^[70]

Hans H. Baerwald, a leading authority on the Diet, also rejects "the concept of the Diet as an absolute nullity." In his words, "substantive decisions, to be sure, are made outside the Diet, but if they are to be effectuated (that is, generally accepted as being legitimately a part of the law of the land) their proponents must take into account the balance of forces present in the Diet at a given point of time. . . . The Diet's most crucial role is to reflect the divisions of opinion and the pluralistic groups of the Japanese society."^[71]

Finally, the proponents of the "party-dominance school" underscore the growing importance of interest groups. Although the respondents in Muramatsu's survey rarely chose interest groups as the most influential factor in policy making (see table 30), they mentioned interest groups much more frequently as their second and third choices.^[72] As Park puts it, "interest groups have become increasingly multitudinous and assertive, performing, with a growing vigor, functions of initiating, amending, and rejecting, thus limiting the traditional discretion of bureaucratic policymakers." He adds that interest groups also make life difficult by taking their case directly to LDP politicians.^[73]

As mentioned previously, Chalmers Johnson has taken note of the preceding developments. He attributes the "apparent trend" toward the consolidation of "party leadership structure" not only to the professionalization of politicians but also to "excessive 'sectionalism' and

[68] Muramatsu, Sengo Nihon no kanryosei , p. 182, table 5-2.

[69] Park, Bureaucrats and Ministers , p. 110.

[70] These statistics were computed from the data in Sato and Matsuzaki, Jiminto seiken , pp. 282-85.

[71] Baerwald, Japan's Parliament , p. 140.

[72] Muramatsu, Sengo Nihon no kanryosei , p. 28, table 14. For an extended analysis of interest groups, see ibid., pp. 207-56.

[73] Park, Bureaucrats and Ministers , pp. 126-27.

jurisdictional infighting within the bureaucracy" and "a shift in the recruitment of political leadership away from ex-bureaucrats and toward long-incumbent pure politicians." He shows that former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei has played a major role in "bring[ing] the bureaucracy to heel" and that in so doing Tanaka has helped to set off a trend toward "a genuine democratization"—"in the sense that the previously very large gap between the real power and the legal authority of political officeholders in Japan is narrowing."^[74]

In a provocative study published in 1987, Yamaguchi Jiro argues that a milestone event that marked the beginning of the end of bureaucratic dominance was the 1965 decision of the Japanese government to abandon the balanced budget and start financing deficits with government bonds. A decisive factor in this policy change, according to Yamaguchi, was political resolve (seijiteki ketsudan ), specifically that of Fukuda Takeo, who became finance minister in June 1965. Increased revenues led to stepped-up competition for funds by the various ministries and agencies, a marked growth in interest-group activities, and, most important, an escalation of intervention by LDP politicians in the budgetary process. The politicization of the budgetary process was further fueled by the deliberate policy of the Finance Ministry's Budget Bureau to restrain government spending through what it hoped would be checks and balances of political competition. In Yamaguchi's view, however, the end of bureaucratic dominance does not necessarily imply the advent of the era of an unquestioned party, that is, LDP, supremacy. Rather, the two sets of actors, bureaucrats and LDP politicians, interact and cooperate with each other to a higher degree than ever before.^[75]