IV

It is to the reconstruction of this latter work that I now want to turn. The one thing we know for certain about the work is that Panaetius included Anaxagoras' dictum on his sons death, "I knew my son was mortal," a dictum which became famous as an expression of "Stoic" emo-

[45] Cf. refs. in nn. 21, 24, 27-29, above; Plut. chaps. 8-9, 14-15, discussed below.

[46] See, e.g., 93, 95, 98 (esp. constantiae, constantia ), 102 (esp. ex quo elucebit omnis constantia ), 103; cf. Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum , 55ff.; Brunt, "Dio Chrysostom," 19 n. 2 and refs.

[47] See esp. 98: hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur ; cf. 126ff., esp. 130-132, 142, 145-146 (one should learn to "tune" one's conduct by using the guidance and implied moral criticism of the reactions of others), and 147.

tional fortitude.^[48] In fact, we have more than just this isolated quotation to work on. Plutarch's citation of the dictum, in the treatise on peace of mind and elsewhere, provides an immediate context of significance, and one which is confirmed both by analogous passages of Seneca's treatise on this subject and by parts of the discussion of courage in Cicero's De officiis . The common theme is the classic Stoic practice of praemeditatio futurorum malorum , surmounting evils by anticipating them.^[49] The principal recurrent motifs in the discussions are (1) a studied anticipation of future possible disasters, so that nothing will occur to make one say "I had not thought of that";^[50] and (2) an insistence on the radical distinction between external contingencies (which do not depend on our agency) and our state of mind and character (which do), a distinction expressed in terms of the maintenance of calm within a storm.^[51]

On the face of it, the resemblances between these works provide an adequate basis for a reconstruction of Panaetius' general strategy in the treatise. The fact that the immediate context of Panaetius' citation of Anaxagoras' dictum has marked points of resemblance to the discussion of courage in the De officiis suggests that this is the context in which to look for the Panaetian strategy in the treatise on peace of mind. Indeed, one might outline a plausible strategy along the following lines. Whereas Democritus, in his treatise on euthumia, focused on the role of sophrosune in moderating desires and ambitions (and was followed in this line of approach by Epicurus),^[52] Panaetius focused rather on the role of courage (andreia ) or greatness of spirit (megalopsuchia ). In effect (one might conjecture), his claim was that peace of mind came not from restricting one's desires to the attainable (and so minimizing the disappointment and distress which the contingencies of fortune might bring), but by preparing oneself mentally to meet any misfortune; thus, Anaxagoras is enabled to meet his son's death with the ringing declaration that he knew he had begotten a mortal. Panaetius' strategy, as so reconstructed, is an orthodox Stoic one (like the account of courage in On

[49] Cf. Cic. Tusc . 3.29ff., 52ff.; I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung (Berlin, 1969), 60-62.

[51] Cic. Off . 1.83 (cf. 67, 72-73); Sen. Tranq . 14, esp. 10; Plut. PE chaps. 17-18, esp. 475e-476a.

[52] Cf. discussion above, esp. nn. 20 and 27.

Proper Function ), and one designed to confront the existing Democritean and Epicurean ones.

As a matter of fact, I think this general characterization of Panaetius' aims is not wholly wide of the mark; but I also think it does not quite capture the scope or the character of Panaetius' project. For one thing, as Pohlenz pointed out, the very choice of the topic of euthumia (as opposed to, say, apatheia) indicates that Panaetius is moving further into the terrain of Democritus and Epicurus than one might expect in an orthodox Stoic work.^[53] Consistent with this is the fact that both the later treatises (by Seneca and Plutarch) combine what one might call a Democritean approach to euthumia, emphasizing the importance of restricting desires to what is attainable, with the Stoic emphasis on preparing oneself to meet the vicissitudes of life with equanimity.^[54] More striking still is the fact that, in taking up the Democritean approach, they also take up a theme which is common to Democritus, Epicurus, and the decorum section of the De officiis: namely that any project we undertake should be one that matches our own individual capacities and inclinations, whether or not it corresponds to the highest ambitions we can conceive.^[55] In other words, just as it is possible to recognize a network of connections between the two later treatises and the courage section of De officiis (giving us the context of Anaxagoras' dictum), so too it is possible to see a network of connections between the two later treatises and the decorum section, centering on the theme of the importance of "being yourself" (in the sense of matching your project to your individual nature) if you are to achieve peace of mind.

However, these points of connection raise fundamental questions about the character of Panaetius' overall position in On Peace of Mind . Earlier I suggested that, although the emphasis on retaining one's nature in the decorum section resembled Democritus', it still remained part of a recognizably distinct and basically Stoic position. What was the case in On Peace of Mind ? Did Panaetius here move closer to the Democritean position and situate the theme of retaining one's nature in the context of the pursuit of euthumia rather than virtue? And if so, how, did this

[53] Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum , 134.

[55] Cf. refs. in nn. 17, 19, and 40, above; also Sen. Tranq . 6.2, 7.2; Plut. PE chap. 13, esp. 472c.

square with the more orthodox Stoic approach indicated by the citation of Anaxagoras' dictum? I think there is a possible answer to these questions, and that it goes beyond suggesting that Panaetius' approach was simply additive , combining different strategies without mutual assimilation.

I think that Panaetius tried to synthesize the approaches by focusing on their common elements and by deemphasizing the fundamental point of divergence between them, namely their differing conceptions of the telos of life. He focused on the fact that (1) both approaches emphasize the extent to which our happiness and unhappiness depend on ourselves, as rational agents; (2) both approaches emphasize the extent to which the unification of our lives and characters depends on ourselves; and (3) both approaches emphasize the importance of being (and being conscious of being) virtuous.^[56] He underlined this common ground by giving an additional sense to the idea of "being yourself," namely that of being your "real" or "essential" self, that of the rational moral agent; and of stressing the role of that self in giving one's life unity. This sense of "being yourself" is not new to Greek philosophy; one can find striking antecedents in Plato and Aristotle.^[57] But it is not an idea that seems to have been deployed in the earlier writings on euthumia; and Panaetius' introduction of it seems to represent a deliberate move to underline the common ground in these two approaches.

I want to conclude this reconstruction of Panaetius' On Peace of Mind by noting some passages in Seneca and Plutarch in which this strategy is exemplified. Clearly, some of the examples and coloring have been added, but I believe the basic approach is Panaetian. It is worth noting in advance that these passages are couched predominantly in reflexive terms, that is, in terms of one's relations with oneself. This indicates that, in the treatise on peace of mind, Panaetius extended to the treatment of praemeditatio malorum and greatness of spirit the reflexive mode of exposition that is characteristic of the decorum passage; and thus he added the implied thesis that acting in the way recommended constitutes "being yourself" in a deep sense. Thus Seneca, for instance, advocates that we meet misfortune by having the mind (animus ) recalled from all external things into itself (se ipsum , 14.2);^[58] and, in a related context, he praises the attitude of the wise man who regards "not just his possessions and social worth but also his body, eyes and hand . . . and indeed himself

[56] Cf. refs. in nn. 20-21, 27-29, 31, 38-39, 45-47, 49-51, above.

[57] See, e.g., Pl. Alcibiades 1.132-135, esp. 133b-c; Pl. Rep . 611c-612a; Arist. Nicomachean Ethics 1166a13-23, 1168b34-69a3, 1178a2-7; the "self" so singled out is reason, either in its practical or theoretical functions.

[58] For the context, see passage e at the start of this essay.

(se . . . ipsum ) as transitory (or "loaned," precaria , 11.1)." This second passage may seem to contradict the first; but the common theme is that one's self (that is, one's real self) is identical only with one's agency, or what is "up to us," and that even that self is "loaned" to us for the duration of our lives. Seneca's point, in these cases, is that by thinking about ourselves in this way we will meet death with equanimity.

The figures that Seneca idealizes in these passages are those who realize the nature of the self, and who are thereby enabled to meet death with equanimity and peace of mind. Hence, he praises the rational detachment of Julius Canus, who approached his end determined to watch and see "whether the animus is conscious of leaving in that swiftest of moments" (14.9). "No one," as Seneca puts it "played the philosopher longer," and, in so doing, he exhibited "calm (tranquillitas ) in the midst of a storm and a mind (animus ) worthy of immortality" (14.10). Implied in Seneca's commendation is the idea that such a man has performed virtuously in playing to the end a worthwhile role.^[59] Hence, Julius Canus' stance is similar to that of the wise man in 11.3 who is able to say to fortune, "receive back a mind (animus ) which is better than the one you gave." Although the stance idealized is more obviously Stoic than Epicurean, the Epicureans too could appreciate heroic indifference in the face of, or at the prospect of, death.^[60] Similarly, there is nothing in the basic doctrine of the passage (that an understanding of the "real" nature of the self can give us the equanimity to confront death and disaster) that either school would find unacceptable, or that would force into the open the deep ethical differences between the schools. And the implied message, that we should, in this sense, "be ourselves" (or realize that this is our self) seems designed to serve as a focus for such shared convictions.

The same strategy is evident in the cognate parts of Plutarch's treatise, including the context that contains the quotation of Anaxagoras' dictum. Thus, as part of an argument that reflecting on possible disasters can help us to confront them, Plutarch urges us to realize that fortune has power only over our "unsound" part (our body), whereas "we ourselves have power over the better part, in which the greatest of our goods is situated, namely sound beliefs and learning and arguments which issue

[59] For this view of the role as ethical vehicle, including the role of philosopher as well as statesman, see Sen. Tranq . 1.10-12, 3-5, esp. 4.1-6 and 5.1-3 (Socrates as an exemplar of virtus confronting fortuna ); the whole passage seems to be a response to Cic. Off . 1.69-73, or its Panaetian original.

[60] On the "philosophical" death, cf. M. Griffin, "Philosophy, Cato, and Roman Suicide," G&R 33 (1986): 65-77, 192-202, who brings out the nondoctrinal status of this ideal. See further Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 24, esp. A, D, E; and n. 62, below.

in virtue." Hence, we should appreciate that, while fortune can make one ill or poor, it cannot take away the character of a man who is "good and brave and great-spirited," a man whose wise disposition (diathesis ) can bring "calm" in physical and emotional storms.^[61] In a passage that is reminiscent of Seneca's presentation of Julius Canus, Plutarch claims that the best protection against fear of death is an understanding of "the nature of the psyche," and a realization that death is a change to the better or at least to nothing worse, so that, if things are externally bad, "the harbor is near" and we can "swim away from the body as from a leaky boat."^[62] As in Seneca, the capacity to survive disasters without loss of peace of mind is taken to depend on a proper understanding of our "real" self, the rational agency on which our happiness ultimately depends. And, again as in Seneca, awareness of oneself as a good moral agent makes a crucial contribution to one's peace of mind. Hence, nothing "affords one's life so much calm (galene ) as a mind that is pure of evil acts and intentions and that has, as the source of its life, a character (ethos ) which is undisturbed and unstained."^[63]

Thus far, Plutarch's evidence simply confirms the version of Panaetian strategy given by Seneca; but in some other contexts Plutarch places a further informing gloss on this strategy. In discussing the decorum theory, I noted the Panaetian emphasis on the idea that our conduct and character can acquire a certain moral "beauty." In the decorum section the stress is on the visibility of this beauty to others; but in Plutarch's treatment it is on the visibility of this beauty to the person concerned. He suggests that we can, by reflecting on our lives and emphasizing the good rather than the bad, endow our lives with the kind of beauty that promotes a sense of well-being.^[64] As in the decorum passage, awareness of the beauty of one's life is associated with awareness of its unity and self-consistency. This latter theme is developed in a related passage, in which Plutarch emphasizes the role of memory in constituting personal identity or, as he puts it, in allowing "life to become one by weaving together the past and the present."^[65] In the conclusion of the work Plu-

[61] Plut. PE chap. 17, 475d-476a; for the philosophical background, cf. nn. 51 and 54, above.

[62] Plut. PE chaps. 17-18, esp. 476a-c; the attitude and the language have both Stoic and Epicurean parallels, cf. Broecker, Animadversiones , 177-179.

[63] Plut. PE 477a-b; for fuller quotation, see passage g at the start of this essay; cf. Sen. Tranq . 11.3 and 14.10.

[64] See Plut. PE chaps. 8-9, esp. 469a ("blending" the worse elements with the better) and 470a (the folly of admiring works of art instead of one's own life). See also chap. 15, esp. 473f (mixing one's experiences in one's psyche "as on a palette") and 474a-b (combining the different "notes" in one's life to make a harmonious fusion). Cf n. 47, above.

[65] Plut. PE chap. 14, esp. 473d (cf. fuller quotation in passage f at the start of this essay). The theme is linked with an allusion to a contemporary debate about growth and identity over time that curiously anticipates some modern preoccupations. Cf. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), esp. part 3; see, e.g., 446: "On the Reductionist View [which Parfit advocates], the unity of our lives is something we can affect. We may want our lives to have a greater unity, in the way that an artist may want to create a unified work. And we can give our lives greater unity, in ways that express or fulfill our particular values and beliefs." For a different modern version of "self-creation," cf. Nietzsche, discussed below.

tarch alludes to this theme of self-unification through the management of time, saying that this enables us to conjoin happy memories of the past with cheerful hope for the future (477f). In a related passage, he refers to the importance of having "fine deeds" of one's own to remember so that one can view one's life with equanimity (477b). These passages seem to give us access to a further strand in Panaetius' complex strategy in this work. He combines the Epicurean theme of unifying one's life by recollection of past pleasures with the Stoic theme of coping with future evils by preparing for them. These themes are normally kept separate, or indeed contrasted;^[66] but Panaetius seems to have combined them as part of a policy of seeking peace of mind through self-unification (a policy which figures in both the approaches on which he draws). The theme of self-unification is naturally related to that of "being yourself" in the sense he emphasizes in this work, that is, being your "true" self as a rational moral agent. Whether or not Panaetius' composite strategy is, at bottom, philosophically coherent is a question one might want to pursue further; but I feel reasonably dear that this was his strategy in this work, and that it is a sufficiently distinctive and interesting one to be worth trying to recover.