4
War of Nerves
January-June 1941

In the international controversies that are likely to arise in the Orient growing out of the question of the open door and other issues the United States can maintain her interests intact and can secure respect for her just demands. She will not be able to do so, however, if it is understood that she never intends to back up her assertion of right and her defense of her interest by anything but mere verbal protest and diplomatic note.
President Taft, inaugural address,
March 4, 1909

"Japan entered the year 1941 determined to wrest what further gain she could from the war in Europe, but still undecided as to when and where."^[1] Secretary Hull's perception was reasonably on target. Tokyo still did not know how far it could go before provoking war with the United States—whether it could call Washington's bluff and take the Indies and Singapore without an all-out conflict. Japan inched its way into Southeast Asia through Indochina and Thailand, not yet prepared to launch a major invasion. By midyear, however, it was ready to commit to a concerted offensive into the region.

Trouble in Thailand

A border dispute between Thailand and Indochina provided Japan the leverage it needed to punish recalcitrant Vichy au-

thorities in Indochina. Japan, which hoped to secure bases in southern Thailand, backed Bangkok's claim to parts of western Cambodia and Laos. The dispute took a violent turn in November 1940 when Thai troops attempted to cross the border. The French retaliated, and a small war broke out. In December the Thai government refused a French offer to have the matter arbitrated by a neutral third power.^[2]

On January 4, 1941, the U.S. minister in Thailand reported to Hull that "a Japanese fifth column movement is being organized for any eventuality that may arise in this area making it possible for Japan to control this country in its own interest and for use as a base for [operations] against Singapore." He cited reports of Japanese troop infiltration, the arrival of Japanese officers in Thailand, and a Japanese agreement to supply Thailand with 400 planes in return for raw materials.^[3]

On January 6, the British embassy sent the State Department its own analysis of the situation in Thailand. The British believed Japan was backing Thailand in order to prolong the hostilities and weaken European interests in the entire region, creating a power vacuum that Japan could fill. If Japan chose to mediate the dispute, it would gain a foothold. "The strategic position which Japan no doubt hopes to acquire in both countries is one from which it can menace the integrity of other territories lying to the south," the report said. Allowing Japan to win allies in Thailand would thus be "to the detriment of Indochina, Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies and the British possessions in the Far East."^[4]

Thailand declared martial law along its border with Indochina on January 8, declaring: "[W]e must now settle accounts with the French." Thai troops soon invaded Cambodia, forcing the French back many miles and inflicting heavy casualties.^[5] The British, frantic to see a settlement reached before the Japanese solidified their position, pleaded with the United States to relax its position against the Thais and help settle the conflict "in view of the importance of Thailand as a base for operations against Burma, Malaya and Singapore." Grew, who relayed this message to the State Department, agreed with the British.^[6]

London's fears were well founded. While Thailand battled France over the border, Japanese troops reinforced their "temporary" positions in Indochina, made new demands on the French, and even allowed the Thais to use airfields the French had ceded to Japan.^[7] The British soon gave the United States more bad news, reporting that "about the middle or later part of February, coincident with attempted German invasion of the British Isles, Japan is to attack in the south, possibly Burma, 'to knock out' the British Empire; action is to be taken before the United States is prepared and so quickly that the United States will not be given time to make decision for or against intervention—the United States in any event would face dilemma of deciding between military operations in Atlantic and Pacific."^[8] Such warnings came often. By now, U.S. leaders believed a Japanese strike to the south could come almost at any time.

Hull warned the Thai ambassador on January 13 to end the fighting, declaring that Japan's sole interest was in dominating all of Asia and that it would swallow up Thailand when ready.^[9] Japan kept the Western powers off guard by offering to settle the conflict on January 21; both sides quickly accepted. A cease-fire was arranged for January 28, and negotiations began the next day. The parties finally reached a settlement on January 31.^[10]

Yet the British remained dissatisfied. In another aide-mémoire to the State Department, they cited new reports suggesting that come April Japan and Thailand would coordinate attacks against Indochina. Japan would seize Vietnam, letting the Thais slice off Laos and Cambodia as their prize. "Japan would then have reached, with the minimum of effort, a position extending to the boundaries of Burma and providing powerful bases for operations against that country, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies." The British memorandum asked the United States to warn Japan off.^[11]

Ominous intelligence reports were coming in from all quarters. On January 27, for example, Grew informed Hull of a possible "surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor . . . planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of 'trouble' between Japan and the United States." The secretary distributed this "fantastic" re-

port to the War and Navy departments.^[12] On February 4 the Navy Department warned of a possible large-scale offensive by Japan against Southeast Asia to be coordinated with a German attack on Great Britain on February 10.^[13] The Japanese press, meanwhile, continued to play up the chauvinistic speeches of government officials.^[14] For Grew, it was now clear that "if definitive action [to stop Japan] is to be taken, it may have to be taken before too long."^[15] The outlook for U.S.-Japanese relations, he wrote, "has never been darker."^[16]

The Drought-Walsh Mission

It was with warnings like these in mind that the State Department approached the diplomatic efforts of two private citizens—Bishop James Walsh and Father James Drought of the Catholic Foreign Mission (Maryknoll) Society. The two men had visited Japan in November 1940 on their own peace-seeking mission and managed to obtain interviews with influential Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Matsuoka. Impressed by the possibilities for peace, the priests returned to the United States with several documents summarizing their view of the Japanese negotiating position. On January 23, 1941, Roosevelt gave them an audience.^[17]

Walsh began the conversation by stressing that he had no illusions about the power and influence of the military in Japan. He emphasized the need to strengthen the liberals in Japan by coming to an understanding that would undercut the military, but his words cast serious doubt on whether such an understanding could last. The peaceful elements in Japan, he noted, "feel that if some constructive cooperation is not realized with the United States before March or April, the Fascist element will take control in both China and Japan, no matter whether England or Germany wins in the spring offensive." At the same time, the United States could not push Japan too far, for "the loss of the China War and the imminence of an American War, would put the radical nationalists, civil and military, in complete control." Finally, the bishop stressed the need for absolute

secrecy, owing to the fragility of Japanese politics. "If our efforts became known in Japan," he warned the president, "the Konoe government would be toppled and war would immediately break out in the southwestern Pacific."^[18]

Based on recent experience, Hull and other policymakers were not inclined to put much faith in negotiations, except as they might delay Japan's military progress. Although Walsh's impressions of the Japanese negotiating position seemed hopeful, Hull later observed, "The President and I, of course, had heard such opinions emanating from the liberal group in Japan before. Whatever the intentions of the liberals, the military group had virtually always been too strong for them." The proposals presented by Walsh stood "in drastic contrast" to what Hull assumed to be the real state of opinion in the Japanese government. He believed there was "no likelihood" of Japan's taking a conciliatory position. Furthermore, with Japan still jockeying for position in Thailand, Hull could "view the approach of Bishop Walsh and Father Drought only with caution."^[19]

Roosevelt sent a copy of Walsh's memorandum to Hull on January 26 with a note asking for guidance. The secretary responded at length on February 5. Obviously discomforted at the prospect of sensitive negotiations bypassing the State Department, he cast doubt on "the practicability of proceeding on any such line at this time." He pointed out that the Japanese government was sending a new ambassador, perhaps with new proposals for negotiation, and therefore "we should not I think, resort to other agents and channels before we have even talked with the ambassador and while we can work through Mr. Grew in Tokyo."^[20] Roosevelt, however, would let no avenue for peace go unexplored. He overruled Hull and proposed letting Walsh and Drought continue their efforts.^[21]

But Roosevelt did listen to Hull's more substantive criticisms of the proposals Walsh brought. These reservations concerned the threat posed by Japan to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. "[I]f through the good offices of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in China," the secretary wrote Roosevelt

on February 5, "the likelihood would be that Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that Japan would change her present course of aggression to one of peaceful procedures.^[22] There could be no clearer evidence that Hull's view of China was not clouded by sentiment or abstract principle. He was a realist whose real priorities lay in Southeast Asia. China was the flypaper that tied up Japanese divisions and prevented them from jeopardizing U.S. interests to the south.

Hull sent along to the president a longer memorandum by Hornbeck that explored this logic in greater depth. Hornbeck opened his analysis with a "fundamental" assertion that Japan's dominant military group could only be stopped by "the resistance of a stronger obstacle or . . . a greater force." Short of entering the war itself, the United States could look only to China to provide that force and safeguard U.S. economic interests in Southeast Asia: "Many of Japan's leaders earnestly desire now to extricate Japan from its present involvement in China in order that Japan may be in a better position than it is at this time to embark on conquest to the southward in areas which are richer in natural resources than is China and from which Japan might, if successful in conquering these areas, enrich herself more rapidly than she can in and from China. Any arrangement which would help Japan to extricate herself temporarily from her involvement in China would be of doubtful soundness from the point of view of the United States."^[23]

The ultimate logic of this analysis was that negotiations were useless unless Japan wrapped up its military adventures altogether, not piecemeal. For all the reasons Hornbeck had outlined in December, the United States could not compromise the security of Western interests in Southeast Asia. But to safeguard those very interests in the Indies, Washington could not compromise too much on China for fear of freeing the Japanese military to engage in further conquests. This reasoning lent itself to the show of negotiations but no real concessions. Unless Japan backed down all the way, this logic would lead to war.

Further evidence that Japan was bent on grabbing the resources of Southeast Asia unless forcefully stopped came from a British aide-mémoire delivered on February 7. It amassed evidence pointing to an imminent Japanese advance on the region, starting with Camranh Bay and air bases in southern Indochina.^[24] While Japanese officers set up shop in Saigon, the British began transferring their forces from Singapore to northern Malaya.^[25] On February 10, Assistant Secretary Long recorded in his diary: "The Japanese are preparing for a southward movement and it looks very much as if they would cross the Malay Peninsula and attack Rangoon, Saigon and Penang. Rangoon controls the southern lead to the Burma Road, and Penang controls the northern end of the Straits of Malakka which leads to Singapore. . . . [I]t looks as if they were preparing this move . . . simultaneously with the German move against England which is expected in April at the latest."^[26]

Tensions between Japan and the Western powers grew as Roosevelt announced on February 11 that U.S. supplies would continue flowing to Britain even if the United States became involved in a Far Eastern war.^[27] But Japan still had the initiative. By February 14, Ambassador Grew was able to report without hesitation, "The French are finished in Indochina."^[28]

With the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia mounting daily, Roosevelt, Hull, Stimson, Knox, Stark, and Marshall met on February 11 and decided to warn all Americans out of such sensitive areas as Rangoon, Burma, and Singapore. But the decision was rescinded owing to the arrival of the new Japanese ambassador, Admiral Nomura. Even if the chances of peace were as slim as one in a hundred, the administration would give negotiations a chance.^[29] Roosevelt attended the first meeting of Nomura and Hull on February 14 to impress Nomura with the United States' determination to achieve peace. If a settlement proved impossible, the private administration agenda was to keep talking and delay the conflict—"to slow down the Japs," as Stimson put it.^[30]

Roosevelt appreciated the Japanese government's gesture in sending Nomura, a friend from the president's days as assistant

Navy secretary in the Wilson administration. Unfortunately, Nomura was not an experienced diplomat and spoke little English. These shortcomings caused serious difficulties in later discussions between the two governments. Although gracious to his old friend, Roosevelt firmly outlined the U.S. position. Noting that the American people were "seriously concerned . . . at the course of Japan," Roosevelt referred to the "movements of Japan southward down to Indochina and the Spratley Islands and other localities in that area" as matters of "very serious concern." Roosevelt warned that another incident like the 1937 sinking of the U.S.S. Panay , in the light of the American public's hostility towards Japan, could lead to war.^[31]

The same day that Roosevelt spoke with Nomura, the U.S. counselor of embassy in Japan, Eugene Dooman, exchanged views with a high-ranking Japanese diplomat. Declaring that "a Japanese threat to occupy lands from which the United States procured essential primary commodities would not be tolerated," Dooman added,

It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and the British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States. . . . The United States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indochina and elsewhere for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategic-important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication.

Dooman explained candidly that the United States' piecemeal approach to economic sanctions reflected a desire not to provoke Japan into threatening regions of vital economic importance to the United States: "The United States . . . [is] well

aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences."

Dooman concluded by implying that the future of peace in the Pacific hinged upon whether or not Japan chose to continue its expansion into the South Seas, saying "it was quite possible to pass over the present critical period without war, but that one essential condition to this more or less happy issue out of our difficulties must be the realization on the part of the Japanese that they cannot substantially alter the status quo in Southeast Asia, particularly, without incurring the risk of creating a very serious situation."^[32] Dooman could hardly have drawn the line between peace and war more clearly. Although coming from a second-tier diplomat, this blunt message had Grew's approval. Washington never disavowed it and almost certainly gave its approval a few days later.^[33]

The next day the British ambassador, Lord Halifax, and the Australian minister of embassy, Richard Casey, called on Hull for a briefing on the conversation with Nomura the day before. The meeting had evidently not lifted Hull's spirits. He told the visitors of his fear that a militaristic group within Japan would either launch an attack against the Netherlands East Indies or Singapore or "inch by inch and step by step, get down to advance positions around Thailand and the harbor of Saigon, Indo-China. This would leave the peacefully disposed elements in Japan, including the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, to express their amazement and to say that such actions were without their knowledge or consent." Once again, the United States' chief negotiator was suggesting that negotiations might be in vain.^[34]

All three powers took the threat outlined by Hull seriously. On February 16 the British announced they were prepared to

mine an area of 4,000 square miles around Singapore without advance notice. A major Australian military force reached Singapore two days later—the "largest and most powerful reinforcement of men, guns and machines ever to arrive at that base in a single convoy." On February 20 Washington announced that it was sending a number of modern U.S. bombers via Hawaii to strengthen the British defenses at Singapore. At the height of the crisis, the New York Times called for firmness: "The possibility of a Japanese attempt to seize Singapore is a threat to which the United States cannot afford to remain indifferent. . . . Of the rubber which the United States imports, all but an unimportant share comes from plantations in the regions dominated by Singapore. Much the greater part of our equally indispensable supply of tin comes from Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, under the shadow of Singapore. With that port in unfriendly hands, our imports of these and other essential commodities, and our trade with an important section of the world, would be jeopardized."^[35]

Apparently the Japanese government did not expect such a show of force. Asahi denounced the "encirclement" campaign by the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. In a more conciliatory statement, the Japanese said that although their interests in the South Seas were "a matter of life and death," any attempt to seize the area by force would only "cause destruction and bring no favorable result to Japan." The statement promised that Japan would "seek a settlement by peaceful means" unless the other powers sought to "stifle" Japan.^[36] This enlightened pragmatism failed to dampen the State Department's suspicions, however. Acting Secretary Welles replied coldly in public on February 18, "In the very critical world condition which exists today the Government of the United States is far more interested in the deeds of other nations than in the statements that some of their spokesmen may make."^[37]

The war of words did not escalate further, and Japan took no military action. Washington concluded with relief that the appearance of a strong front by the Western powers had prevented a devastating confrontation. From the evidence of Jap-

anese troop movements and naval preparations, an official Australian analysis concluded that Japan must have planned to launch a major invasion to the south between February 16 and 20. The report, sent to the State Department on March 6, argued that the sum of Roosevelt's warnings to Nomura on February 14, the publicity given to mutual defense consultations of Australia, Britain, and the United States, and the extensive coverage of Far Eastern affairs by the American press convinced the Japanese that further aggression would be met by force. The Australian analysis concluded that next to sending the U.S. fleet to Singapore, the most effective U.S. response to Japan's expansion would be a massive publicity campaign spotlighting and condemning Japan's every aggressive move.^[38]

In the wake of the February crisis, the U.S. minister in Thailand, Hugh Grant, assessed Tokyo's slightly chastened attitude: "Japan is not going to attack Malaya now and will attempt to avoid a conflict with the United States and with Great Britain because of her economic situation but she will continue her program of expansion through intrigue and sabotage."^[39] Indeed, Japan continued to apply pressure to the French in Indochina. As mediator of the border dispute between Thailand and Indochina, Japan proposed that the French cede one-third of Laos and Cambodia to Thailand. The Vichy authorities rejected this proposal on February 21, pledging to fight before giving up such a vast portion of their colonial holdings. Decrying France's obstinacy, Foreign Minister Matsuoka told the Japanese Diet that "the white race must cede Oceania to the Asiatics." On February 28 Japan declared that France must accept its proposal or face the consequences. The Vichy government finally capitulated on March 11.^[40]

Still searching for the one chance in a hundred that peace could be preserved through negotiations, Hull held the first of a long series of informal discussions with Ambassador Nomura on March 8.^[41] Hull lost no time in making clear that the United States would remain hostile as long as "Japanese troops, planes, and warships are as far south as Thailand and Indo-China, accompanied by such threatening declarations as Japa-

nese statesmen are making week after week."^[42] Roosevelt met with the ambassador again on March 14 to reinforce that message, declaring that the United States could not tolerate Japan's drive toward "Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Indian Ocean." Through peace, he emphasized, Japan too could benefit from the region's resources if it joined the United States in upholding the principle of free trade and open markets: "The President came back to the matter of the great work the United States has been doing for economic equality of opportunity, and said that if Great Britain wins, she must be willing for Germany to have equal access to all raw materials and equal trade opportunities. He then remarked that the United States and Japan do not produce rubber and tin and numerous other commodities produced by the British Empire, and that by international arrangements, access to each and all of these must be equal to each country alike."^[43]

Unswayed, the Japanese continued their military buildup in Indochina. On March 20 Grew reported that Japan had 135,000 troops stationed on Hainan and another 15,000 in Indochina. The German government, he wrote, was pressuring Japan for an immediate attack on British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, but Japan was not ready. Nevertheless, Grew believed that soon Japan would use Thailand as a base from which to seize Singapore, Malaya, and surrounding areas, depending on "Japan's estimate of the correlations of forces both in Europe and the Far East and the consequent risks involved."^[44]

A British aide-mémoire on April 8 supported Grew's belief that Japan's position in Thailand would soon pose a grave threat to the nearby European colonies. "Japan's general position as mediator and guarantor," the memorandum argued, "gives her ample opportunities for keeping naval forces in Indo-China and Thai waters and even military forces in South Indo-China." With such bases Japan could easily strike south to Malaya and the Indies. The aide-mémoire concluded that the Western powers should resist Japan to save Singapore and to "prevent loss to ourselves and gain to the Axis of an important source of supply of rubber and tin."^[45]

Anglo-American Naval Cooperation

Faced with an impending Japanese move southward, U.S. and British naval officials had for some time been discussing the possibility of joint operations in the Pacific in case deterrence failed. These efforts culminated in late March 1941 with the signing of the "ABC-1 Staff Agreement," which essentially pledged the United States to cooperate with Britain's defense of Southeast Asia.

Anglo-American staff conversations began late in 1937 as an indirect result of Japan's invasion of southern China and the forging of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Roosevelt and Hull foresaw the possibility that the United States ultimately would engage in a two-front war with Japan and Germany. They instructed Adm. William Leahy, the chief of naval operations, to draw up contingency plans, assuming Britain as an ally. Soon the director of Britain's War Plans Division was contacted to discuss further the possibility of naval cooperation. In January 1938, officials from both navies agreed to recommend joint action to stop a thrust by Japan to the south.^[46]

Although representatives of the two countries kept in contact, serious staff conversations resumed only in September 1940 in London. Delegations from Britain and her dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand traveled to Washington to initiate more formal joint staff conferences on January 29, 1941. A disagreement soon developed. The British delegation believed the defense of Singapore was of fundamental importance and that the United States should transfer part of the Pacific Fleet there in order to deter Japan from cutting Britain's lifelines. Adm. Richard Turner, spokesman for the U.S. naval delegation, opposed the idea of dividing the fleet and "resisted the demand" made by the British, according to the conference minutes. "It was agreed that for Great Britain it was fundamental that Singapore be held; for the United States it was fundamental that the Pacific Fleet be held intact."^[47]

On March 27 the various delegations finally came to an understanding known as the ABC-1 Staff Agreement. A world-

wide strategic accord, the document asserted the primacy of the European war effort and recommended a defensive effort against Japan. Incorporated directly into the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, known as "Rainbow 5," the agreement specified the duties of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific: "If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia."^[48]

As Admiral Turner pointed out later, "It would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it."^[49] In fact, the ABC-1 agreement provided for a whole series of U.S. tactical offensives against Japan, with the primary goal of diverting Japan's naval forces and supporting British forces in the South Seas.^[50]

Knox and Stimson accepted the ABC-1 Staff Agreement on May 28 and June 2, respectively. Although Roosevelt himself never explicitly endorsed its content, he made known his general approval and allowed all future military planning to be governed by its provisions. Because the agreement was in no sense a treaty, the United States was not bound by it, yet Britain and its dominions had every reason to expect the United States to abide by its terms. The joint accord presented the administration with a firm moral obligation to come to Britain's aid in case of war in Southeast Asia. Later conferences at Singapore, whose resolutions were not officially accepted, hardened the administration's resolve—always conditional on an unpredictable Congress—to follow Britain into war if Japan breached the West's stronghold in Southeast Asia.^[51]

Attempts at a Negotiated Settlement

War was still the last thing anyone in London or Washington wanted. Negotiations to stave off or at least delay that eventu-

ality remained a high priority for policymakers, however pessimistic their view of Japan's ultimate intentions.

The arrival of Col. Iwakuro Hideo in New York on March 21 seemed a hopeful sign. The State Department knew him to be a representative of the Japanese War Ministry, extremely influential with the younger officers. As the principal assistant to the head of the Military Affairs Bureau, Iwakuro obviously carried great clout. He immediately joined the Walsh-Drought team to help draft a proposal for an "understanding" as a basis for negotiations between Japan and the United States.^[52] Walsh and Drought had so misread Japanese intentions during their stay in Japan that Iwakuro was forced to rewrite the preliminary drafts they prepared before his arrival. Even, so the colonel's draft made an incautious attempt at reconciliation with the United States. Roosevelt saw it on April 5 and Secretary Hull on April 9.^[53]

For the next few days the State Department carefully reviewed the terms of the plan. The proposed agreement allowed Japan to remain bound by the Tripartite Pact and essentially pledged the United States to neutrality in the European war. Japan would negotiate an accord with China to withdraw Japanese troops, but if China refused the terms, the United States would have to cut off aid to it. Japan agreed to respect the Open Door, but the United States would have to recognize Manchukuo. Both countries would cooperate in the acquisition of Southeast Asian raw materials. Finally, Japan expected the United States to help exert diplomatic pressure "for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.^[54]

Hull was immediately struck by the lack of guarantees that Japan would follow through on its proposals for China. Without such guarantees, a U.S. accord with Japan would undermine Chiang Kai-shek, especially if he were denied U.S. aid. "How could we ask Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate when there were so many loopholes for Japanese interpretation, and how could we agree to discontinue aid to China if he refused?" Hull later asked.^[55] Faced with the possibility of conflict both in Eu-

rope and in Asia, the United States could not risk losing China; it was too important as a quagmire that kept Japan from its more dangerous regional aims.

In reaching these conclusions, the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs appreciated a sharp analysis by Stanley Hornbeck, which dealt "succinctly" with "the fundamental question presented."^[56] Hornbeck noted that the agreement said nothing about the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina and did nothing to protect the European colonies from Japan. He presumed that Japan's real goal was to "get a considerable part of that army out of China and to have . . . her resources available for possible activities in some other direction (which might be against British interests or Dutch interests or even American interests—or Soviet interests)." Under the circumstances, "Japan's present involvement in China is to the advantage of the United States and Great Britain."^[57] As always, Hornbeck was an unsentimental, hardheaded realist on the China question.

Maxwell Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, prepared his own appraisal of the situation on April 14. His analysis closely paralleled Hornbeck's. Like Hornbeck, he suggested continuing aid to China, explaining that if another year passed with Japan still bogged down in China, "then there is a distinct possibility that the present balance of Japanese opinion in regard to Japan's future course of action may be decisively turned." U.S. policy, he continued, "has had as one of its effective purposes the attrition of Japan's energies and resources by steps undertaken gradually on a basis designed to obviate creating the impression that they were in the nature of overt acts directed primarily at Japan." Hamilton concluded that the United States could best prevent further Japanese-expansion by continuing to confront Japan "with determination, without element of bluff."^[58]

Washington received another blow when it learned that Japan and the Soviet Union had signed a neutrality pact on April 13. After the public announcement, Hull issued a bland statement pointing out that the pact changed nothing and that

its significance "could be overstated."^[59] In reality, however, the administration feared that with the Russian threat removed from Japan's rear, the threat to Southeast Asia increased. "The pact will tend to stimulate and support the Japanese extremists who advocate a vigorous prosecution of the southward advance," Grew theorized, "because it guarantees Soviet neutrality in case Japan gets into war with a third country (i.e. the United States)."^[60] Secretary of the Navy Knox told the American Newspaper Publishers Association on April 24 that the latest pact would enhance "the likelihood of an expansion of hostilities by Japan into a region which is one of the sources of critical war materials for both Great Britain and ourselves."^[61]

When Nomura and Hull discussed the terms of Iwakuro's draft proposal on April 16, the secretary expressed his mixed reaction. Some of its conditions might be acceptable, he suggested, but [t]he one paramount preliminary question about which my Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that your Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan for settlement."^[62] Hull handed the ambassador a list of four essential principles of reasonable international conduct that would have to form the basis for further negotiations. These points included:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;

2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;

3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;

4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

If the Japanese government would accept these rules of conduct, Hull said, friendly and earnest negotiations between Japan and the United States could begin immediately. The fact that no great power had ever respected all four points did not bother the secretary; failure to profess these principles would, in his eyes, demonstrate Japan's evil intentions.

After some thought, Nomura told the secretary that the principle of equality might indeed provide a good starting point for discussion. Hull shot him down. "We could not think of entering into negotiations if your Government should even hesitate in agreeing to this point," he snapped. "No country in the world would get more from the doctrine of equality than Japan." In no mood to argue, Nomura turned instead to the fourth point—nondisturbance of the status quo. Could not acceptance of this point interfere with Japanese operations in Manchuria? But Hull was really only concerned with preventing any new disturbances—such as an invasion of Southeast Asia. He replied that "the question of non-recognition of Manchuria would be discussed in connection with the negotiations and dealt with at that stage, and that this status quo point would not therefore, affect 'Manchukuo,' but was intended to apply to the future from the time of the adoption of a general settlement."^[63]

Nomura personally saw merit in the U.S. case. He cabled home to advise that "since there is danger that an advance southward militarily by our Empire would lead to war between the United States and Japan," his government should pursue its ends "by peaceful means without resorting to the sword." The United States, he added, had promised to "support our [peaceful] economic penetration thither."^[64]

Despite Nomura's goodwill, however, his lack of training as a diplomat and his poor English led to serious difficulties in the negotiations. When he sent to his superiors in Tokyo a copy of the unofficial "Draft Understanding," he failed to convey along with it Hull's objections or even the secretary's four principles. Instead Nomura left the impression that the draft represented an official U.S. position paper. Hull had hoped the Japanese government would accept the draft as a starting point for their side of the negotiations and that further discussion would make the entire package more acceptable to the United States. Japan had the same idea from the opposite angle. Each side, therefore, adopted a position more uncompromising than the original proposal; this hardening, in turn, caused each side to believe that the other was reneging on prior commitments. This

shared and fundamental misunderstanding caused much disappointment and distrust in both camps.^[65]

But diplomacy was proving a thin reed upon which to rest hopes for peace, given the chasm that separated the interests of the United States and Japan. While Hull talked with Nomura, the Japanese military pushed its political offensive in Thailand, and the British continued to pester Hull with their predictions that Japan would strike at Singapore from new bases in that country.^[66] What to do about the situation was an unresolved tactical question. Hull feared that Japan already controlled Thailand and believed that mere verbal protests would do little good unless backed up by force, which was impractical.^[67] Grew, by contrast, argued that extremist Japanese leaders should quickly be disabused of their notion that the United States would not fight if Japan attacked Southeast Asia.^[68]

One alternative to direct military intervention was already under way: aid to China. On April 25, Lauchlin Currie offered Roosevelt his arguments for stepping up military assistance to China in order to keep Japan safely bottled up there:

Singapore is the key to the Indian Ocean, Australasia and Oceania. It is as indispensable to the continuation of Britain's war effort as it is to Japan's dominance of the East. It may be assumed, therefore, that Japan will move against Singapore whenever conditions appear favorable.

Japan would be prepared to offer China peace on very favorable terms for the purpose of releasing large numbers of men and planes and quantities of material . . .

Therefore the defense of Singapore should be a cardinal feature of our strategy and the British strategy.

The best defense of Singapore is in China. Were China put in a position to assume the offensive, Japan would have to strengthen her forces in China, rather than weaken them. The assumption of a vigorous air offensive by the Chinese against the Japanese in China and in Japan and in Indochina, would also effectively tie up the Japanese air force.^[69]

Echoing these sentiments, Hornbeck on May 5 reiterated his belief that Japan was seeking a way to disengage from China

only to divert to "other fields a portion of her resources and reserves." Any treaty giving Tokyo an easy out would only assist Japan "toward an improving of her position for pursuit of a policy of further adventuring southward or adventuring even against us," increasing the likelihood that the United States would have to "fight in two oceans."^[70] Heeding such arguments, President Roosevelt on May 6 declared the defense of China to be vital to the defense of the United States and authorized shipments of lend-lease supplies to China.^[71]

The next day, Nomura, armed with a long-delayed communication from his government, met with Hull for another informal discussion. The ambassador informed Hull that his superiors wished simply to sign a nonaggression pact with the United States rather than pursue the April 9 draft proposal. The idea was a nonstarter; it would commit the United States to holding back if Japan attacked British or Dutch territories in Southeast Asia. Such a pact "would have meant our agreeing to refrain from war with Japan no matter what she did in the Far East," Hull understood.^[72]

The secretary was especially suspicious because a day earlier Japanese and French authorities had announced the completion of an economic agreement virtually incorporating Indochina into the Yen bloc. France agreed to grant Japan most-favored-nation status with respect to "the entry, the establishment, the acquisition and possession of movable and immovable property, the exercise of commerce and manufacturing industry, the imposition of taxes of various kinds and the treatment of companies." Furthermore, Vichy authorities agreed to give Japan highly favorable tariff treatment. U.S. leaders saw the accord as just one more piece of evidence that Japan would soon try to consolidate its hold over all of Southeast Asia.^[73]

Nomura called on Hull again on May 12 with a draft of a new peace proposal. Hull was no more impressed than before, noting with disapproval the "modification of the provision in his original document about Japan's keeping out of the South Sea area in a military way." In this new draft, Japan referred only

to its well-known "peaceful nature." As Hull saw it, "very few rays of hope shone from the document."^[74] He could not have been encouraged by Grew's subsequent talk with Matsuoka in Tokyo on the May 14. Japan would carry out its southward advance by peaceful means, Matsuoka assured the U.S. ambassador, unless "circumstances render this impossible." Such circumstances apparently included Britain's troop build-up in Malaya, which Matsuoka claimed was inflaming public opinion in Japan.^[75]

With the Japanese threat looming larger, officials in Washington took great interest in Grew's analysis of the situation. On May 22, Sumner Welles sent Roosevelt an excerpt from Grew's diary of March 30, 1941, already distributed throughout the department by Hornbeck. Grew's basic assumption, like Roosevelt's, was that "the future safety of the United States, our future way of life and all that, are inextricably bound up with the safety of the British Empire." It followed necessarily that "we cannot in our own interest and security afford to see Singapore fall" to Japan. "The fall of Singapore into Axis hands," he maintained, "would, first and foremost, result in the rapid severance of Britain's most important life-line" to the men and materiel in its Asian colonies and the dominions. Grew argued that "the risks of not taking positive measures to maintain our future security in the Far East . . . are likely to be much greater than the risk of taking positive measures as Japan's southward advance proceeds (whether by nibbling or with a direct thrust)." He advocated strong action to neutralize Japan's "challenge to our whole economic and political position in Asia and Australasia," which, if successful, would mean "the incalculable loss of the Chinese, Indian and South Seas markets for our exports as well as our access to vital materials (rubber, tin, jute, etc.) produced in those regions." Grew thus proposed that the administration inform Japan that any advance on Singapore would bring the United States into the war.^[76]

Hornbeck bolstered Grew's strategic-economic analysis of Anglo-American interests in Southeast Asia with another long memorandum, "Better To Give Aid on Two Fronts and Fight on

One Than to Withhold Aid on One and Have to Fight on Both." Like Grew, he accepted as axiomatic the U.S. interest in saving the British Empire. Again like Grew, he viewed control of Singapore as a vital element in preventing Japan from dividing the Empire and severing supply routes to Britain. To protect this key Western outpost, Hornbeck advised, "we should do all that we can toward discouraging Japan from making an attack upon Singapore; we should generously assist China—thereby keeping Japan busy with China—and we should dispose of certain increments of our armaments products and our armed forces so that what is visible in British hands in Malaya, in Dutch hands in the Netherlands East Indies, and in American hands in the Philippines will deter the Japanese from taking the risks of a major movement south of Manila." But Singapore was ultimately as important to the United States as it was to Britain, he maintained. "To be effective as an arsenal [of democracy], both for supplying of other nations and for meeting our own needs, it is vitally necessary that we have access to essential raw materials from all over the world." That meant keeping Japan out of Southeast Asia at all costs. "[W]e cannot under existing conditions give effective assistance to Britain and get along without rubber and tin, etc., from the Singapore area."^[77]

With threats growing daily on two fronts, however, tactical disputes once again flared within the administration over where to deploy U.S. military forces. In late April, Stimson, Knox, and Marshall began arguing that the U.S. fleet should be sent back to the Atlantic Ocean in order to protect sea lanes to Britain. As Marshall observed, "if the Atlantic is lost all the raw materials in Malaysia will be of no avail. If the Atlantic is lost, the Pacific is also lost."^[78] But the State Department and the leading admirals opposed the move. Hull still believed that the presence of the fleet in the Pacific would help pressure Japan into signing an agreement favorable to U.S. interests. "Further, he and his advisors believed that the disappearance of the American fleet from the Pacific would be taken by the Japanese as a go-ahead signal for their southward expansion; from such expansion there might well result a situation in which the United States

would be forced to fight," Stimson later recalled.^[79] Roosevelt explicitly accepted Hull's analysis.^[80] The president was firmly convinced that the Pacific Fleet must remain based in Hawaii to protect Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand.^[81] In the final compromise, three battleships and an aircraft carrier were transferred to the Atlantic, but the main body of the fleet, including nine battleships and three aircraft carriers, remained at Pearl Harbor.^[82]

The truth was that the United States simply did not have enough warships to cover both fronts. On June 4, Assistant Secretary Long bemoaned the fact that "we are not prepared—not enough planes, guns, explosives, shells. Not a sufficient supply of those articles." With Britain tied down in Europe, the United States would have to fight a Pacific war alone. "If we were ready to start I would not worry so much about it all," Long confided in his diary, "but the combination of circumstances means we almost must face the world alone—for Japan will soon be starting on her road to oil in Java, with tin and rubber to torment us with. But as a result of it all I am very depressed."^[83]

Hull's mental state was not much different. When the Japanese ambassador visited on June 2 to claim that except for minor phrasing, the positions of the two governments were very close, Hull could hardly contain himself. Severely challenging Nomura's judgment, he questioned whether Japan "seriously desires" to enter into a peace settlement and help revive the Open Door in Asia. "The kind of statements that Matsuoka and others are making daily sharply raise the question I just put to you," Hull told the ambassador. "I'm forced to inquire whether Japan really is seeking this sort of agreement, or whether she is only seeking a way to get out of China and then go forward in other directions with methods and practices entirely contrary to the principles that would have to underlie our settlement."^[84] Taking up the line Hornbeck preached daily, Hull was not about to jeopardize Southeast Asia by pulling Japan out of its Chinese quagmire. An impasse had been reached, and Hull made little progress with Nomura and his associates in later negotiations that month.^[85]

For several months the Japanese had been negotiating with the Dutch to secure a favored commercial position in the Netherlands East Indies. Understandably reluctant to join Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," authorities in the Indies resisted Japanese demands, despite the clear risks.^[86] On June 9 Grew reported to Hull that the Dutch had refused the latest Japanese requests for special privileges for immigration, business opportunities, and mineral resource exploitation. The Dutch officials asserted the principle of commercial equality, demanded assurances that no materials be re-exported to Germany, and refused to let the Indies fall under the Japanese sphere of influence, in marked contrast to Vichy's acceptance of Japanese hegemony in Indochina.^[87] Japan broke off negotiations on June 17.^[88]

Elsewhere in the region, the State Department was devising a plan to wean Thailand away from Japan. On June 17 Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote the British minister in Bangkok, who had requested U.S. assistance in denying Japan the rubber and tin of Thailand. Acheson simply proposed to buy up all stocks of the two strategic materials. "We believe, with you, that a serious situation exists in Thailand and that it is desirable that efforts be made to the end that Thailand's political independence and normal economic relations be maintained," Acheson wrote. "The defense needs of the American Government are such that, irrespective of other considerations, we should be glad to purchase all of Thailand's rubber and tin, or as much as might be obtainable."^[89] Welles said much the same: "This Government attaches great importance to the acquisition of tin and rubber."^[90] The State Department proposed that the United States loan Thailand $3 million and reconsider export restrictions affecting Thai goods in order to expedite the deal. The British enthusiastically supported the plan, believing it would significantly reduce raw material exports to Japan and improve Thailand's relations with the West. But negotiations with the Thai government moved slowly, and the U.S. proposal was effectively killed when Japan occupied southern Indochina in late July.^[91]

On June 22, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, presenting administration leaders with yet another crisis and more tough questions. Besides the enormous implications for Europe, what did it mean for Japan? Would it now go north to seize Siberia, or plunge into Southeast Asia, now that its rear was secure? Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, hoped the invasion would "result in a postponement for at least a few months of any Japanese attack upon British and Dutch possessions to the southward" as Tokyo reassessed its position: "In my judgment the strongest motive which would impel Japan not to attack British or Dutch possessions in the Pacific is the likelihood that such action by Japan would result in war with the United States. It seems to me that there is much less likelihood that a Japanese attack on Russia would result in war with the United States and I would therefore be very skeptical of a Japanese pledge not to attack the Soviet Union."^[92]

At least some members of the department fervently hoped Japan would go north and ease pressure on the Western position in Southeast Asia.^[93] It was not to be, however. Instead, a decisive turning point in U.S.-Japan relations was reached in early July, when Japanese leaders made their fateful decision to prepare for a major push into the prized territories of Southeast Asia. These intentions were no mystery to the United States, whose leaders spent the last few months of peace trying to delay Japan until the U.S. position in the Pacific could be fortified. With full knowledge of the risks, Japan was backing both countries into a corner from which they could not escape.

At an Imperial Conference attended by top major military and political leaders in Japan on July 2, factions looking south for greater glory carried the day. An invasion of the Soviet Union was not ruled out, but the army and navy won permission to acquire bases in southern Indochina and prepare for further conquests. The "Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation," approved at the conference, declared that in order to "guarantee the security and preservation of the nation" and achieve its goals in the "southern regions," preparations for "war with Great Britain and the United States will

be made. First of all . . . various measures relating to French Indochina and Thailand will be taken, with the purpose of strengthening our advance into the southern regions. In carrying out the plans outlined above, our Empire will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States."^[94]

Prime Minister Konoe, the first to speak at the conference, stressed the urgency of the situation and the need for Japan to embark steadfastly on this new program of empire building. If the Western powers stood in the way, Japan must push them aside and "remove all obstacles."^[95]

Navy Chief of Staff Nagano Osami spoke forthrightly on the need "to push steadily southward." If the Western colonial powers continued their obstructionist tactics, he argued, Japan would "finally have to go to war with Great Britain and the United States. So we must get ready, resolved that we will not be deterred by that possibility." Against the United States specifically, the admiral believed that Japan should not flinch from its "policy to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, even if this ultimately involves the use of force."^[96]

Only two days later, Ambassador Nomura sent Secretary Hull a simple but astounding note. "I am glad to inform you," he wrote, "that I am now authorized by the Foreign Minister to assure you that there is no divergence of views in the Government regarding its fundamental policy of adjusting Japanese-American relations on a fair basis."^[97] In the light of what was to come, U.S. leaders could not help but question such declarations of peaceful intent. Japan's credibility would soon reach a new low.