The Czechoslovak Case: A Missed Opportunity

The political and ideological dependence of East European ruling circles on the Soviet Union was such that the policies Gorbachev pursued in Moscow necessarily influenced their internal political equilibrium and relations between members, even without any pressure for change from the Soviet leader. His policy choices also had a legitimizing or legitimizing effect on their political preferences. Of course, the effects varied from one state to another, depending on the balance of power prevailing in its top leadership and within the country.

In Czechoslovakia, it was Prime Minister Lubomir Strugal who sought to take advantage of the conjuncture created by Gorbachev's assumption of power. Strugal had been Prime Minister of the Czech republic at the time of the Prague Spring of 1968 but had been won over to the group which took power after the Soviet military intervention. After Leonid Brezhnev's death, he had tried, without success, to have Czechoslovakia adopt a form of "Kadarism," that is, a controlled relaxation in the political sphere and an economic reform based on the introduction of market mechanisms.

After Gorbachev rose to power in Moscow, Strugal renewed his efforts, at first very cautiously. In order to do so, he established a network of contacts with the advisers of Kadar, Jaruzelski and Gorbachev, naturally pinning his greatest hopes on the last. Jaromir Sedlak, one of his principal advisors and collaborators, who was given the responsibility of establishing and maintaining links with Gorbachev's entourage, revealed important information about this process to this author.^[12] During a 1986 stay in Moscow, Strugal came to an understanding with the

[11] First interview with Valerii L. Musatov, Moscow, 4 November 1991.

[12] A significant proportion of the information that follows is based on an interview with Jaromir Sedlak, given in Prague on 4 May 1993, and above all on a very long research report which he subsequently wrote for me in the framework of this project. This 1993 report, entitled "The Road to the Velvet Revolution," concerns the relations between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership between 1985 and 1990; the sources for it are his personal notes and documents available in Czechoslovakia.

academician Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System and a reformist adviser to Gorbachev on East European affairs. He would regularly provide Bogomolov, through an intermediary—a researcher of the institute working at the Soviet embassy in Prague—with political analyses and reform propositions from Strugal's office, in order that they might be passed on to Gorbachev's entourage and that Gorbachev might be privy to full, correct information. The Czech prime minister could certainly have used regular diplomatic channels to pass on a certain amount of this information to Moscow. However, the Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Viktor Lomakin, was not a career diplomat, had been a regional Party secretary, and was politically close to Vasil Bilak, one of the Czechoslovak leaders who had called for Soviet military intervention in 1968. Bilak, a member of the Politburo, supervised foreign affairs for the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) and was the Soviet ambassador's prime interlocutor. Strugal was convinced that, through this intermediary, his analyses would arrive at Gorbachev's office with counteranalyses and negative commentary. He expected the opposite to happen by going through Bogomolov's institute.

At the beginning of 1987, Gustav Husak, who was more than 70 and in poor health, decided to retire from his position as general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, without fixing a date for his retirement. So began the political maneuvers for his succession. Though clearly in the minority in a Politburo dominated by conservatives, Strugal counted on his alliance with Antonin Kapek, the first Party secretary of Prague, to carry the day. Kapek was Boris Yeltsin's counterpart, as Yeltsin held the same position in Moscow, and there were contacts between them. Strugal did bet on the "Gorbachev factor," and on support from him. On March 2, 1987, shortly before an official visit Gorbachev was to make to Prague, and for which Strugal had high expectations, the latter made an important public speech at a ceremony organized by Kapek. He stated his support for a renewal of socialism in Czechoslovakia and criticized those politicians who claimed that the new policies adopted by the USSR were not relevant for them. He pointed out that these views were all the more incom-

prehensible as those expressing them had, only a short time before, been touting the universal value of the Soviet experience.^[13]

Miroslav Stepan, one of the most conservative leaders of the Czechoslovak Party, the right-hand man of Milos Jakes, and who was later imprisoned for having ordered the violent suppression of the demonstrations of November 17, 1989, writes in his memoirs that there was great nervousness among the leaders in Prague on the eve of Gorbachev's visit, which took place in April 1987.^[14] For this, they had good reason.

Indeed, among Gorbachev's advisers in Moscow, there was what Soviet observers termed a "Czechoslovak lobby" or a "Prague club," which had a favorable view of Dubcek's 1968 policies. This circle was composed of intellectuals and cadres who had served in Prague at the headquarters of the international communist movement's journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Among its members were Anatolii Cherniaev, Gorbachev's first assistant for international affairs; his spokesman at the time, Gennadi Gerasimov; G. Shakhnazarov, who later followed Gorbachev as part of his presidential staff; and Fyodor Burlatski, editor-in-chief of Literaturnaia Gazeta. Valerii Musatov recalls the discussions which took place in the Central Committee before Gorbachev's visit to Prague. Cherniaev suggested to Gorbachev that he take advantage of his stay in Czechoslovakia to present a new evaluation of the Prague Spring. This is not surprising: was the Prague Spring not, after all, an attempt at democratization in the framework of preserving a one-party system? Musatov adds, not unexpectedly, that Ligachev was opposed to such a reevaluation which, he said, would create grave problems for the Czechoslovak leadership and possibly for the USSR itself. "Gorbachev listened attentively to Cherniaev's suggestion, without saying anything, as was often his habit, and several of us had the impression that he would say something along these lines while in Prague."^[15] The Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System had also sent a

[13] Dissidents and former militants of the Prague Spring were impressed by the fact that Strugal avoided any negative reference to Dubcek and the 1968 events. For comments from one of them, see Milan Hübel, Cesty k moci (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1990), pp. 81–82, cited by Sedlak, "Road to the Velvet Revolution."

[14] Miroslav Stepan, Zpoved vezne sametove revoluce (Confessions of a Prisoner of the Velvet Revolution) (Prague: Grafit, 1991) pp. 112–113; sections were translated for us by Jaromir Sedlak.

[15] Second interview with Valerii L. Musatov, Moscow, 26 April 1993.

report on this question to Gorbachev, and it contained a recommendation similar to Cherniaev's.^[16]

For his part, Strugal's adviser had received (premature) assurances from his contacts in Moscow to the effect that Gorbachev would say something positive about the Prague Spring during his visit.^[17] Other signals also allowed him to believe in such an outcome. On the very eve of Gorbachev's departure, his spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, was asked by Western journalists what the difference was between the Prague Spring and perestroika. To this, Gerasimov answered with two eloquent words: "Nineteen years."^[18]

Despite the exceptionally warm reception Mikhail Gorbachev received from the population, and a context that seemed very favorable, he greatly disappointed the veterans of 1968 and Strugal's entourage. Gorbachev did not express any sympathy for the Prague Spring. He also, however, did not fully satisfy the conservatives, who held that the events of 1968 had been a "counterrevolution," preferring himself to qualify them as "chaotic." Perhaps he thought this to be a "centrist" characterization.^[19] Without a doubt, it was that same middle turf he was seeking when he stated: "I must say that we have often thought about Czechoslovakia after 1968. It is evident that there were many problems during that difficult period. But you, Czechs and Slovaks, have succeeded in overcoming them and you now have a very modern country."^[20]

Vasil Bilak and the conservative majority in the Czechoslovak leadership were relieved by Gorbachev's behavior and speeches. They interpreted them as proof of weakness on his part and were heartened in their maneuvers for Husak's succession. Several months later, an occurrence in Moscow was to solidify their confidence. The event was the removal, in early November, of Boris Yeltsin as Moscow Party first secretary and as member of the Politburo. This was the punishment he endured, it may be recalled, for the frontal assault he had launched against Ligachev in front of the Party Central Committee on October 21, accusing him of being the principal obstacle to perestroika. In the face of the virulent and

[16] Interview with Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, Moscow, 23 April 1993.

[17] Sedlak, "Road to the Velvet Revolution."

[18] Cited by Charles Gati, The Bloc That Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 178.

[19] In 1995, he wrote in his memoirs: "I am often asked why the Soviet Union only admitted very belatedly ... that the armed intervention of 1968 was a mistake. The answer is simple: the Soviet Union had to change a lot before being in a position to engage in self-criticism" (Gorbachev, Erinnerungen, p. 879).

[20] Pravda, 11 April 1987.

practically unanimous reaction of the speakers who rose to defend Ligachev and attack Yeltsin, Gorbachev, who had initially succeeded in delaying any punitive action, was finally compelled, several days later, to oversee the removal of the man he himself had brought to Moscow in 1985.^[21] The departure of Boris Yeltsin and Ligachev's political victory changed the balance of power in the Soviet Politburo, and Gorbachev emerged temporarily weakened.

It was in this context, and in connection with the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, that Gustav Husak came to Moscow on November 7; he had a long conversation with Gorbachev, which the latter recounts in great detail in his memoirs. Husak confided to his Soviet counterpart that he intended to resign from his position as general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (but not as head of state) in the near future. He expressed to Gorbachev his opposition to Vasil Bilak and even to Milos Jakes (who had been linked to the suppression of the Prague Spring) as possible successors.^[22] Conversely, he lauded Strugal's merits, and awaited Gorbachev's comments. The latter recalls that he had anticipated being consulted on this issue, and, for this reason, had discussed the question with the Politburo. In conformity with the decision taken there, he refused to give even the slightest advice.^[23] Husak nevertheless asked Gorbachev to personally receive Strugal, who was to come to Moscow some days later for meetings with his Soviet counterpart, Nikolai Ryzhkov, and Gorbachev accepted. Given that protocol did not call for such a meeting, Husak saw this as a way of reinforcing Strugal's political position.

In mid-November—Strugal had just returned from Moscow—Bilak, who evidently understood the meaning of Strugal's meeting with Gorbachev, decided to launch an offensive in Prague within the Politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, where he had a majority, to immediately settle Husak's succession.^[24] Under these unfavorable conditions, Husak refused to retire. In the meantime, given the balance of power in the Party leadership and the absence of support from Gorbachev, Husak

[21] See Michel Tatu, Gorbatchev: l'URSS va-t-elle changer? (Paris: Le Centurion, 1987), pp. 243–249; Roy Medvedev and Giuletto Chiesa, Time of Change (New York: Random House, 1989), pp. 133–148.

[22] Gorbachev, Erinnerungen .

[23] "I had foreseen the course this discussion would take; we had discussed it in the Politburo and we stuck to our collective decision. We did not want to prescribe the manner in which the fraternal parties ought to resolve their leadership problems" (ibid., p. 882).

[24] The head of the CPSU Central Committee's department for relations with socialist states relates these events with more, and sometimes contradictory, details. See Vadim A. Medvedev, Raspad: kak on nazreval v "mirovoi sisteme sotsializma" (The Collapse: How It Happened in the "World Socialist System") (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1994), p. 147.

began to envisage a compromise, under which he would cede his position to Jakes, in the hope that Jakes would join forces with Strugal. But Bilak was only interested in having him serve as "deputy general secretary." During this deadlock, which lasted through several meetings, ^[25] Husak, using the Soviet ambassador in Prague as an intermediary, asked that Gorbachev contact him by telephone. Gorbachev refused.^[26]

This example is a prime illustration of Gorbachev's weakness at that time. To call a contender might have been compromising. But to phone his direct counterpart would have been in conformity with all established rules. Several of the less combative conservative Czechoslovak leaders had a very servile attitude toward the USSR, and a hint of support from Gorbachev for Husak might have modified their position. In a note to Gorbachev, Medvedev, responsible for relations with socialist countries, recommended that the former simply express his confidence in Husak.^[27] Before Gorbachev could do so, however, Husak finally succeeded in pushing through his compromise solution.^[28]

On December 18, the CCP Central Committee ratified the compromise. According to Strugal's adviser, the Soviet prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, called his Czechoslovak counterpart, urging him to cooperate with Jakes to ensure harmony in the new leadership. Similarly, Gorbachev called Jakes to congratulate him and to encourage him to work with Strugal.^[29] Moscow apparently expected Jakes to ensure political stability and Strugal to pursue economic reform. This is exactly the type of formula that Ligachev desired for the USSR itself. But Jakes, while paying lip service to the Soviets' perestroika, proved to be an ally of his party's dominant conservatives, even in the area of economic policy, and

[25] Medvedev and Gorbachev both note that the balance in the Politburo was seven to three against Husak, but ten to ten in the broader meeting of the Politburo, candidate members, and the Secretariat.

[26] Medvedev, Collapse, pp. 147–148.

[27] The text of the memorandum is in Medvedev, Collapse, p. 50.

[28] Asked about the events in 1991, Jakes responded: "Certain comrades were not in favor of promoting Strugal, and proposed my candidacy. I was informed that this proposition was received positively by the CPSU.... Gorbachev was undoubtedly informed about my candidacy. By whom? Maybe by the embassy or other sources" (Reporter, 17, 1991, supplement, pp. 5–6; translated for us by Jaromir Sedlak). In fact, Gorbachev was informed about Husak's proposed compromise by his ambassador. The fact that he refused to give an opinion could be interpreted as tacit approval.

[29] Sedlak, "Road to the Velvet Revolution."

despite the fact that he later managed to push Bilak aside. In 1988, Kapek was forced out of the leadership, and Strugal left political life.

It is missed opportunities such as this, and Gorbachev's frequent passivity toward Eastern Europe, that led Vitalii Zhurkin, one of the architects of the "common European home" and director of the Institute of Europe, to say that the Soviet leader did not have a coherent policy toward those countries.^[30] We shall return to this issue. But we can already indicate, at this point, that the coherence of his European policy would end up giving a very particular configuration to his hesitation and caution regarding Eastern Europe.