10
Preparation for Cadre Reform

After the rehabilitated cadre group managed to make the Four Modernizations the regime's major goal, it became increasingly evident that not only the existing cadre corps (including the rehabilitated cadres) but also Mao's five conditions for selecting cadres were not adequate for the new tasks. Nonetheless, any effort to reform the existing cadre corps was bound to offend the political interests of various cadre groups, including the veteran cadres whom Deng Xiaoping relied on for political support. Therefore, Deng approached the leadership changes cautiously, opting for a realistic alternative, in contrast to Mao's extreme policy, which aimed at bringing about wholesale change in the leadership through the mass mobilization during the CR. He first changed the criteria for personnel management from political loyalty to the ability to further economic development. Departing from the Maoist practice of purging incumbents in order to create vacancies, Deng devised a special retirement system—lixiu —which enabled senior veteran cadres to retire with honor and privileges, and then relied on organizational methods to remove the CR radicals from cadre positions.

Changing Criteria for Cadre Recruitment

Hua Guofeng originally envisioned very limited personnel changes both in the purge of the Gang of Four's followers and in the rehabilitation of the victims of past political purges. While Hua and his group were still in power, official discussion of cadre recruitment reflected Mao's line: the news media continued to uphold his five conditions for revolutionary successors, while arguing that the Gang of Four had distorted Mao's cadre line for their own political gain.^[1]

[1] For instance, see Renmin Ribao , 24 August 1978.

However, after 1978, ability and productivity were frequently mentioned as important qualities for cadres. For instance, Renmin Ribao , on 2 March 1978, proposed five criteria for leaders: (1) support of the pragmatic policy of revolutionary cadres, (2) party spirit, (3) personal integrity, (4) ability, and (5) understanding the real-life conditions of the masses. Commitment to revolution was dropped from the requirements, and the only obvious political criterion was support for the struggle against the Gang of Four. Mao's emphasis on a cooperative spirit and adherence to the mass line was retained, but with a slightly modified sense: requiring cadres to be concerned with the masses' hardships is more specific then merely emphasizing the mass line. The former underscores the masses' real needs, whereas the latter emphasis allowed leaders to impose their own views upon the masses. In addition, new conditions specifically included work ability, party spirit—whatever that meant—and personality. Once this definition became official, it allowed a shift of emphasis from political criteria to work-related ones.

The news media soon became more explicit in saying that cadres had to have functional knowledge. For instance, the "Rules of Inner-Party Life" that the party adopted to guide its members rejected the slogan, "Outsiders can lead insiders," calling instead for every cadre to possess some practical knowledge.^[2] Deng Xiaoping personally endorsed the idea in a speech in January 1980: "Regardless of position, every [cadre] has to have a certain amount of specialized knowledge and work ability in a functional field. Those without such knowledge must study. Those with some amount must continue to study. Those who cannot or are not willing to study must be changed."^[3]

At the same time, the regime stepped up criticism of the Gang of Four for having exclusively emphasized "class status" while discriminating against any cadre with "bad class background," "complicated social relations," or "historical problems." The official decision to do away with the label "rightist" and abolish the term "four bad class elements" made it theoretically possible to recruit cadres

[2] Hong Qi , no. 6, 1980, 2–11.

[3] Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 208–24.

from all sectors of the Chinese population.^[4] While rejecting any political criteria, the new official line attached paramount importance to "ability" and "present performance," which in contrast to "past performance" refer exclusively to the expertise needed for economic development.^[5]

The emphasis on ability inevitably led to questions about the relationship between ability and "seniority" (zige ), which, although not officially sanctioned, was the most important factor in pre-CR personnel managment and in reinstating victims of the CR. The Gang of Four had challenged the emphasis on seniority by attacking veteran cadres as "revisionists." Now, seniority was again regarded as an obstacle to improving the personnel management system. For instance, an editorial in Renmin Ribao , entitled "Eliminate Seniority," rejected seniority as a criterion for personnel management on the grounds that although it reflected wisdom gained from experience to a certain extent, it was not the same as ability.^[6]

By the end of 1979, when the public debate on the slogan "Practice is the sole criterion for testing empirical truth" had substantially undermined Hua's power base, the top leadership felt confident enough to address the problem of aged cadres. The necessity to recruit and promote middle-aged and young cadres to leading positions was first publicly raised by Ye Jianying, the eighty-four-year-old chairman of the National People's Congress, who, as a senior member of the cadres and one who had stayed in power throughout the political upheavals, was known to stand neither wholly with the victims nor wholly with the beneficiaries of the CR.^[7] After Ye's speech the organizational department of the Central Committee convened a month-long conference attended by everyone of importance in the organizational field. Hu Yaobang transmitted Deng's instruction that the aim of organizational work should be changed to fit the task of modernization.^[8]

Although we have no eyewitness accounts of this meeting, it

[4] Renmin Ribao , 17 November 1978; Jiefang Ribao , 29 January 1979.

[5] Beijing Ribao , 27 February 1980.

[6] Renmin Ribao , 28 June 1980; 22 July 1980.

[7] Ibid., 30 September 1979.

[8] Ming Bao (Hong Kong), 29 October 1979.

must have mapped out a rather detailed policy for reforming the bureaucracy. Later Song Renqiong, the new director of the organizational department, explained the intended new policy of changing leadership, using age and formal education as the most important criteria.^[9] Hu Yaobang further elaborated this point by declaring, "[We should] recruit cadres from the graduates of colleges, middle schools, and specialized schools or equivalent ones. [We should] generally not directly select [cadres] from among workers and peasants who have little education."^[10]

Deng endorsed Hu's point in much-publicized speeches. Demanding that party leaders at the various levels select cadres primarily from the forty-to-forty-five-year-old age group, he said, "What do we mean when we talk about people around forty years old? They are the ones who entered college in the late 1950s. It has been thirty years since the founding of the nation. Those who graduated from college in the early 1960s are now forty to forty-five years old."^[11]

In another long speech at a Politburo meeting on 15 August 1980, Deng advanced the slogan of making the cadre corps "better educated, professionally more competent, and younger." Although it was obvious that many of the incumbent cadres could not meet these criteria, he did not include any grandfather clauses. Neither did he claim that there was any virtue in "redness" except for the need to "preserve the four principles"—upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought, the socialist road, the party's leadership, and the proletarian dictatorship.^[12] Deng's speech was sent to the lower levels with a note instructing them to forward their opinions before 15 October 1980. After his speech the news media began discussing ways to make the cadre corps fit Deng's criteria better.

With regard to promotion, the official news media recalled that in the past it had been Deng Xiaoping who had objected to "helicopter" promotions. Therefore, the media argued that promoting younger generations of cadres to leading positions was not the

[9] Renmin Ribao , 9 July 1980.

[10] Ibid., 16 December 1980.

[11] "Deng Xiaoping's Report on the Present Situation and Tasks," Zhengming , no. 29, March 1980, 11–23.

[12] Issues and Studies , 17(3) (March 1981), 81–103.

same as what the Gang of Four had done and that criticizing the Gang's practice did not mean rigidly to observe a step-by-step approach. "With regard to especially outstanding cadres [we] should give them a convenient elevator so they can go up fast."^[13]

Rational though the Deng policy may have seemed for increasing efficiency, it obviously discriminated against most cadres with worker and peasant backgrounds. With little formal education but much experience, they could be considered "reds," but not "experts." Thus, many strong criticisms were raised in the subtle Chinese way. Some delegates to the National People's Congress complained on behalf of those cadres who "had been working hard for several decades" for the regime.^[14] Others warned the reform not to "cut everything with one knife."^[15] Discontented cadres characterized the policy as an attempt to "make those who conquered the world retire" and to "make all cadres from worker and peasant backgrounds step aside."^[16] Some cynics summarized the changes like this: "In the past cadre selection depended on being a 'rebel.' Now cadre selection is based on writing quality [wenzhi , a derogatory term used to refer to feeble intellectuals in traditional China], and worker-peasant cadres are forced to retire"^[17]

Their complaints drew a sympathetic response from Hua Guofeng, who was still premier. In his report to the third plenum of the Fifth National People's Congress, he affirmed the need to reform the existing cadre corps. But, he declared, "we should take the necessary measures to help large numbers of government functionaries and cadres to study full or part time in order acquire and increase the general and specialized knowledge they need for the Four Modernizations. These measures include special schools and training courses for cadres either at their posts or on leave."^[18]

Probably having read the critical responses to his 15 August speech, Deng made many concessions to the old cadres in his speech of 15 December 1980. He added "revolutionization" as one of the goals of reform, promised the flexible application of age and

[13] Gongren Ribao , 25 September 1980.

[14] Renmin Ribao , 16 September 1980; 19 December 1980.

[15] Ibid., 12 September 1980.

[16] Ibid., 16 December 1980.

[17] Qunzhong , March 1981, 37; Lilun Yu Shijian (Shenyang), no. 4, 1981, 48; Wenhui Bao , 14 October 1980.

[18] Renmin Ribao , 15 September 1980.

education requirements, and indicated that implementation of reform would be carried out gradually. More important, he tried to calm the fears of incumbent cadres: "If we depart from our present cadre corps, we will not be able to complete any of our tasks, and it is impossible for us to make cadres younger."^[19]

An article entitled "On the Problems of Strengthening Party Leaders" elaborated on all the points in Deng's speech. First, the article advocated making cadres "revolutionized, better educated, professionally more competent, and young." Second, it conceded that age requirements should and would not be rigidly applied. Third, it made it clear that formal education was not the only criterion for measuring cadres' ability: "If workers and peasants come to have professional knowledge and management ability through self-study and training, they do not naturally fall into the above category" (of those to be dismissed from office).^[20]

Fourth, the article made specific concessions to cadres of the land reform generation. They were promised the opportunity to receive professional training because, "Even if they stop producing in order to study for three years, they still will be able to serve ten more years." Fifth, the article promised the incumbent cadres a greater voice in selecting their successors by endorsing what is known as the "first-enter-and-then-exit" method.^[21] That is, old cadres in positions of leadership would recruit their own successors and train (or watch) them for a while; only when the successors proved their ability (or loyalty to the old cadres) would the old cadres retire. This procedure was designed both to minimize the chances that the CR rebels would become leaders and to dispel the old cadres' doubts about the younger people's ability.

Last, while making concessions to the old cadres, the article took a tougher position toward the younger generation of cadres who had been promoted during the radical period: "We should resolutely remove and expel from the leading bodies those whom the central leading comrades describe as being one of these three types of people: (1) those who rose in rebellion with Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, (2) those seriously influenced by the Gang of

[19] Issues and Studies , 17(7) (July 1981), 101–19.

[20] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1981.

[21] Beijing Ribao , 27 June 1981; Deng Xiaoping supported a similar method. Dangfeng Wenti (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1982), 68.

Four's ideology, and (3) "those who had been involved in beating, smashing, and looting."

The article symbolized an end to the Maoist practice of using exclusively political criteria for the personnel management of cadres.

The Retirement System

China did not have a regular retirement system for cadres. In its early days, the regime had neither an immediate need nor sufficient resources to set up an elaborate retirement system. Its most senior leaders were in their early forties, and the wage system for cadres was not introduced until 1956. The only need then was to care for the wounded and sick cadres discharged from active duty. The regime adopted a series of regulations in a piecemeal fashion to deal with the different categories of sick and disabled people. Eventually, all the scattered regulations were put together into an "insurance system," which offered lump-sum severance payment to the discharged.

In 1978, the regime changed payment to a monthly pension system, which offered 40 to 60 percent of original wages. With this package of retirement benefits, the regime encouraged old cadres voluntarily to retire, glorifying retirement as the last contribution they could make to the nation. Although the official policy may have been sound, retirement was not an ideal option for the veteran cadres at that moment.

First, traditionally, incumbents of official posts are more respected than those who have retired after successful careers. To a certain extent, this is the case in every society, but in China the practice is extreme, as indicated in the proverb, "Those in power were treated as dearly as a beloved father figure, while those out of power became strangers even in the eyes of their own children." Concerned with the future careers not only of their children but also of their grandchildren, veteran cadres were reluctant to lose the personal influence that was needed to secure a better education and jobs for their offspring.^[22]

Second, despite the glorification of retirement, it was not man-

[22] Zhengming , no. 51, January 1982.

datory for everyone. Some could stay on active duty. "Our party is leading such a large nation. In the process of prolonged struggle, the party has produced some leaders who have abundant experiences and who enjoy high prestige inside and outside China. Among such old cadres, some have good health. Having such cadres remain in the leadership positions is in the interests of party leaders."^[23]

Third, the uncertainty of China's political future made retirement a risky option. At that time, voluntary retirement was considered a glorious act, but if a radical faction returned, there would be no guarantee that the promised retirement benefits would continue. Fourth, the fact that retirement was not handled by a central agency—like the Social Security administration in the United States of America—but by one's original unit made retirement more risky. The retirees' future welfare depended largely on the whim of their successors. Last, the old revolutionaries were not psychologically and sociologically prepared for retirement. Accustomed to a collective life centered in their own unit and possessing neither special skills nor personal hobbies, they were afraid of being cut off from their units.^[24]

Consequently, very few cadres retired in 1982, when the regime initiated the administrative reforms, except those who were physically disabled and deputies or low-ranking staff from the middle level of the bureaucracy.^[25] Some old cadres changed their minds after their initial decision to retire.^[26] Others wanted to continue active duty as deputies under the nominal leadership of the young cadres whom they had selected as their successors.^[27]

In order to overcome the reluctance of the old cadres, the regime gradually fattened the retirement benefits by developing a special retirement for the veteran cadres known as lixiu , an abbreviation of lizhi xiuyang , which means "leaving a job to recuperate."^[28] In a

[23] Lilun Yu Shijian , 22 February 1985.

[24] Daily Report , 15 April 82, K16.

[25] During this period only cadres at district, municipal, and county levels retired. Nanfang Ribao , 2 October 1980; Renmin Ribao , 18 November 1979.

[26] Zhongguo Nongkan , no. 12, 1981, 30–31.

[27] Beijing Ribao , 12 March 79.

[28] The practice is also known as changqi gongyang (long-term recuperation), mianzhi xiuyang (removed from active duty to rest), and lizhi xiuyang (leaving position to rest).

strict sense, lixiu is closer to a permanent leave of absence than it is to retirement.^[29] Unlike retirement (tuixiu ) that is applied to all cadres, only a limited number of veteran cadres who met specific requirements were entitled to lixiu . It allowed them to retire with "unchanged political treatment" and "slightly better economic treatment."

The idea of giving special consideration to old cadres who had contributed to the foundation of the Communist regime was not entirely new in China. The 1957 regulation on the "retirement of workers and staff" had a separate section for old cadres who "had started revolutionary work before the second revolutionary war." This group of old cadres was entitled to pensions up to 14 percent more than their regular wages.^[30] In 1958 the regime decided to allow veteran cadres to assume honorary positions so that they could have a long-term leave of absence with full pay. Later, the regulation changed to allow them to retire with full salary.^[31]

In 1963 the Secretariat of the CCP under Deng Xiaoping proposed that old and feeble cadres with the ranks of vice minister and provincial secretary be allowed to retire while still retaining all their political and economic privileges.^[32] The justification for the proposal was that it would facilitate the "cultivation of a new generation of successors" by promoting young cadres to vacancies created by the policy. Two years later, the organizational department issued a tentative regulation that lowered the required bureaucratic ranks to deputy heads at the district level. When the regulation reached the State Council, it further expanded the scope of eligibility to include all veteran cadres who had joined the party before 1937, regardless of their current ranking, and all deputy secretaries who had participated in revolutionary work prior to 1945. However, the proposal was not implemented because of the CR.

In 1978 the regime for the first time set up two different retirement systems: one for cadres and one for workers. Order no. 104 of 1978, "Temporary Regulation on Settling Old and Feeble Cadres," incorporated some of the special consideration the re-

[29] Ming Bao , May 27, 1978.

[30] Chao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renshi Zhidu Gaiyao (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1985), 415.

[31] Ibid., 423, 427.

[32] Ibid., 382.

gime had previously planned to give to the veteran cadres, using two criteria to determine eligibility: work age and bureaucratic rank. The cadres who had joined the revolution before 9 September 1949 had to have the rank of deputy secretary at district level, and those who had started their work before 1945 had to have the rank of county deputy secretary. Low-ranking cadres were entitled to lixiu if they had joined the revolution prior to July 1939.

Large-scale rehabilitation raised the question of how to deal with victims of the CR whose health would not allow active duty, and in November 1978 the central organizational department declared that "senior cadres who joined the revolution during the second civil war" should be allowed to retire with all the privileges of their ranks retained.

Those with financial difficulties should be given extra help. Relatives of old cadres who died should be taken care of. Government organs and party committees at the various levels should set up organs in charge of old cadres' affairs. Organs should be staffed by persons with strong party spirit. The organizational department at the county level should set up organs or assign persons to do the work of the old cadres.^[33]

As the regime embarked on sweeping administrative reforms, the idea of taking care of the needs of veteran cadres developed into a vehicle to induce old cadres to retire, and the scope of eligibility further expanded. In April 1982 the party center formally adopted the "Regulation Regarding Old Cadres' Lixiu ," which the standing committee of the National People's Congress further modified to make more cadres eligible.^[34] When the regulation was finally promulgated on 7 October, eligibility for lixiu was further broadened to include all cadres who joined the revolution during the first revolutionary war regardless of their current bureaucratic ranking. The anti-Japanese war cadres were eligible for lixiu if they held the rank of deputy magistrate, or the eighteenth grade. For civil war cadres, the rank of deputy secretary at the district level, or fourteenth grade, was required.^[35]

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Minzheng bu Zhengce Yanjiushi, ed., Mingzheng Fagui Xuanbian (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 1986), 154.

On 27 November 1982 the central organizational department decided to treat all cadres who were grade 18 or above, but who had not yet held the position of bureau director, as though they were directors. And the personnel labor department rendered an authoritative interpretation that extended eligibility retroactively to cadres of enterprises and business units. As a result, all cadres who had started work before September 1949 and who had attained grade 18 or above were entitled to lixiu .^[36]

In May 1983, the labor ministry issued another regulation which intended to clarify the eligibility of lixiu but actually further widened the eligibility by removing the requirement of bureaucratic rank. Consequently, all those who joined the revolution before 30 September 1949, regardless of their official rank, became entitled to lixiu . Also entitled were former Red Army soldiers, all those who had worked in the liberated areas, and all those who did underground work in the enemy area.^[37] People who had started as workers in factories in the liberated areas before 1949 but who later became cadres were also eligible.^[38] On 7 January 1985 the central organizational department and the united front department jointly issued a "Regulation Concerning Lixiu Problems of the Democratic Personnel." According to this regulation, all people who joined the democratic parties before the first political consulative conferences and who supported the CCP ever since were entitled to lixiu . Old specialists who met specific conditions were also qualified for special treatment after retirement.^[39]

The requirements now for lixiu are: (1) having participated in revolutionary work before the foundation of the PRC, (2) having engaged in full-time nonmanual labor work, and (3) having received payment for work in the form of wages, supplies, or a combination of the two. In brief, anyone who worked full time for the revolution before the foundation of the PRC is now entitled to lixiu . Even former bureaucrats of the Manchu puppet government are eligible if they surrendered to the CCP between 1 January 1943 and 2 September 1945. They are, however, treated as liberation war cadres rather than anti-Japanese war cadres.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., 155–57.

[38] Dangde Shenghuo (Heilongjiang), no. 12, 1983, 15.

[39] Nanfang Ribao , 2 October 1980; Zhibu Shenghou (Beijing), no. 8, 1986, 42.

As to the age requirements for lixiu , the 1982 regulation specified sixty-five for ministers, vice ministers, provincial secretaries, and governors, and sixty for vice ministers, provincial deputy secretaries, and vice governors.^[40] Although not mandatory, the pressure to retire voluntarily was high particularly after bureaucratic reforms started in 1982. As a result of the reforms, some lost their positions while others found themselves with all their opportunities for promotion gone under the leadership of former younger subordinates.^[41] In other cases, incumbents used the strategy of selecting their own successors and then requesting the approval of the upper echelon for them.^[42] Those who voluntarily retired had a better chance of becoming advisers. In some cases, when a newly promoted young head suggested to his former boss—now a subordinate—that he be transferred to another place, the old cadre realized that he had to retire.^[43] However, because of widespread sentiment against forcing old revolutionaries to retire, especially when new salary increases are expected, leaders of each unit are extremely reluctant to pressure old revolutionaries to retire.^[44]

For the actual benefit of lixiu , various practices used in the past were added to make the retirement package attractive. Initially the fringe benefit was less than the perquisites the incumbent already enjoyed. For instance, according to the 1978 Order no. 104, the retirement pension, even for old revolutionaries, amounted to only 60 to 90 percent of their salary.^[45] Gradually, the amount of the pension grew. Official policy now is to guarantee an income slightly higher than the regular salary for retirees, including previous fringe benefits, although the actual amount of the retirement pension for cadres varies depending on their work age.^[46] All grade 14 cadres who joined the revolution before 1948 but who have not

[40] Daily Report , 11 February 1982; Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[41] See, e.g., Zhao Jianming's decision to retire, in Renmin Ribao , 17 February 1982.

[42] Banyue Tan , no. 5, 1983, 6–9.

[43] Renmin Ribao , 2 July 80.

[44] Interviews in China on 28 August 1986.

[45] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[46] The most senior ones—those who started their work before 1937—receive a fourteen-month salary per year; those who joined the work before 1942 are given a thirteen-and-a-half-month salary; those who joined the work before 1945 are given a thirteen-month salary; those who joined the work before 1949 are given the salary of twelve months. Minzheng bu Zhengce Yanjiushi, ed., Mingzheng Fagui Xuanbian .

reached the level of director of a bureau are treated economically and politically as director-level cadres, and all eighteenth-grade cadres—regardless of whether or not they have actually served as county magistrates—will enjoy the benefits of a county magistrate. In addition, retired old revolutionaries are given subsidies for price increases.

Retirees are entitled to housing equal or better than what they occupied as incumbents. Many units build new housing for their retirees. The units without the financial capability to do so request funding, materials, and locations from the housing authority of the upper level.^[47] Housing conditions for retirees thus depend largely on the financial ability of their units.^[48] Politically powerful units and units that generate profits can provide housing that meets the central guidelines specifying different sizes of housing for different ranks of cadres. Generally, it is the military units that can afford to build additional housing for their retired brass in many choice locations. On the other hand, housing conditions in academic units appear to be poor, often failing to meet the standards of national regulations.^[49]

Retirees are given preferential treatment in health care. In addition to medical care covered by public expense (gongfei ), they have priority for newly built and rather luxurious hospitals with the best medical facilities. Many units build new hospitals and allocate a specific number of hospital beds exclusively for retirees.^[50] Some retirees receive monthly allowances for medical expenses. When sick, retirees are authorized to hire nurses at public expense. In addition, retirees have varying degrees of privilege to use automobiles from their original units, depending on their rank.^[51] In some places, retirees are given monthly transportation allowances. Retirees also enjoy the same privileges as incumbents to visit their parents or children with expenses paid by the units. They are even

[47] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 9, 1984.

[48] Daily Report , 8 January 1982.

[49] Harbin Yanjiu , no. 3, 1984, 42.

[50] For various measures taken by Liaoning province, e.g., see Renmin Ribao , 24 September 1984.

[51] Retirees of vice minister and above can use a car for any personal purpose, whereas former director-level cadres can request a car for such specified purposes as going to the hospital or attending official activities. When the unit cannot provide a car, retirees can hire commercial transportation and the expense will be reimbursed by the unit. Dangde Shenghuo , no. 12, 1983, 15.

entitled to subsidies for haircuts. When a retired cadre dies, his family is entitled to all subsidies due cadres of his same rank.^[52]

The regime guarantees that "basic political treatment will not change" even after retirement. In other words, retirees have access to official documents, important political reports, and conferences. Many units set up new reading rooms where retirees can read official documents.^[53] Retired party member cadres often form their own party branches and groups.

The 1978 order originally encouraged retired cadres to move to towns smaller than those they inhabited as cadres—from large urban centers to medium- and sized cities and from medium-sized cities to rural areas. The order was also intended tightly to control any movement of retirees to such large cities as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin by requiring official permission on a case-by-case basis. But the restriction has gradually been relaxed. First, the regime made exceptions by allowing cadres who had worked in remote areas—for instance Qinghai province—to return to interior (neidi ) cities. Then retiring cadres in mountainous and desert areas were permitted to return to provincial capitals where "transportation is adequate and supplies are good." In 1984 the regime authorized cadres who had served in "front areas" to retire to medium- and small-sized cities.^[54]

Dingti (hiring the child of a retiring cadre in the same unit) has not been officially recognized,^[55] but an official regulation allows an old cadre to bring a son or daughter to live with him when he retires.^[56] Since his unit will be responsible for finding a reasonable job for the retiree's offspring, he often manages to find a job for his offspring in his own unit. Among the 570 retired cadres in Harbin, 39 percent of them mentioned dingti as the reason for their retirement.^[57]

Since 1978 a series of regulations gradually evolved to specify how the retirees should be managed. Basically, all retirees are managed by their original unit. An exception is made for retirees who

[52] Minzheng bu Zhengce Yanjiushi, ed., Mingzheng Fagui Xuanbian .

[53] Chao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[54] Renmin Ribao , 6 February 1984.

[55] Interviews in China on 28 August 1986.

[56] Chao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[57] Harbin Yanjiu , nos. 3–4, 1984.

are settled in other provinces; in these cases, management authority is transferred to the personnel or civil affairs bureaus of the local government. Low-ranking military officers are transferred to the jurisdiction of the local government, but all other officers are managed by their original military unit.^[58] Each unit pays pensions from its administrative expenses.

In order to manage the retirees, the regime set up "old cadre bureaus or sections" staffed by full-time cadres within organizational departments and personnel bureaus at all levels of the administrative hierarchy.^[59] Various functional bureaus and enterprise and business units have similar offices. As was the case with personnel management, high-ranking cadres of each unit are managed by the "old cadre offices" of superior units, whereas low-ranking cadres are handled by the personnel bureau of their own units.^[60]

Not surprisingly, the lixiu system has produced many undesirable consequences. It increased the regime's administrative expenditures and set up an ironic precedent, that is, one can earn more when retired than when on active duty. Worse still, the system allowed retiring cadres to take their bureaucratic rank and status into society, thus further contributing to possible stratification of society along the lines of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Although formally removed from official positions, retired revolutionaries continue to exert enormous political influence, some through the advisory system that the regime initiated from the top level down to the county level.^[61] Although advisers are supposed to make only suggestions to the formal authorities, they are bound to exercise an inordinate amount of behind-the-scenes influence. First, in China, where the level of institutionalization is rather low, real power often lies in an individual person rather than in an office. Second, many of the newly promoted leaders often seek advice from retirees, who have had more political experience and more extensive personal connections, and to whom they owe their own promotion. More important, retired old revolutionaries are well organized into advisory commissions, disciplinary commissions,

[58] Renmin Ribao , 18 October 1984.

[59] Ibid., 24 September 1984.

[60] Wenhui Bao , 16 June 1981; Renmin Ribao , 27 July 1981.

[61] Shanxi Ribao , 21 January 1982; Renmin Ribao , 17 February 1982.

or party groups with their own spokesmen, constituting the most powerful political group outside the formal bureaucracy. They are officially encouraged to discuss current problems that they consider important, paying special attention to the selection of future leaders, ideological trends, and corruption, and, when the necessity arises, they convey their collective views to the appropriate authorities or write letters to newspapers.^[62] Their political muscle was dramatically demonstrated in the dismissals of Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao Ziyang in 1989 from the general secretaryship. Although the advisory system seems to be a temporary measure that will come to an end with the disappearance of the "founders," the old revolutionaries headed by Deng Xiaoping still exercise enormous political power.^[63]

The other problem with the lixiu system is that it creates inequality for different generations of cadres and perpetuates the importance of seniority. Using 30 September 1949 as the cutoff date for eligibility to lixiu , although understandable, offers undue advantage to northerners while penalizing southerners, simply because south China was liberated in the last days of the civil war. Also due to the absence of rigorous bureaucratic formality in the chaotic period of the civil war, it is extremely difficult to determine the exact date when a cadre started work. In addition, the lixiu system cannot maintain equity for cadres employed in different units, since under the present system each unit is responsible for taking care of its retirees. The system also raises the question of conflict of interest as the retired cadres seek new employment in units that they previously regulated, further contributing to cadre corruption.^[64]

Despite these problems, the lixiu system was effective in persuading old cadres to step down from their offices. The total number of old cadres who joined the revolutionary work force before 1949 is estimated to be about 2.5 million for 1982. As shown in table 40, only a fraction of them (7,260) had retired by 1982. The number

[62] Renmin Ribao , 17 November 1984.

[63] It is reported that the advisory system at the county level and below has been abolished. But it is also known that advisers at the lower levels simply changed their titles to "inspectors," while continuing to exercise their political influence both formally and informally.

[64] Renmin Ribao , 15 April 1985.

of retirees increased to 21 percent of all old revolutionaries in 1983 and 40 percent by 1984. Total retired cadres in 1982 was only 0.06 percent of all retirees that included blue-collar workers. But the percentage increased to 6.6 by 1985.^[65] This national trend approximated the trend in Liaoning province, which reportedly had 132,000 cadres—33 percent of the 556,777 responsible cadres—who had reached retirement age in 1984. Only 3,300 (2.2 percent) of them retired between 1978 and 1981; the number then increased to 9,130 (6.8 percent) in 1982 and to 50,000 (15 percent) in 1983. Table 40 shows the dates 570 cadres retired—a 10 percent sample of the total 5,700 retired cadres—in Harbin as of September 1984. More than 62 percent retired after 1983. The retirement of old cadres gained momentum only after 1982 when the regime initiated a special retirement package for old revolutionaries. Yunnan provinces had about 33,253 cadres entitled to lixiu ; among them 14,793 have retired, and the rest are expected to retire by 1990.^[66]

[65] Deborah Davis, "Unequal Chances, Unequal Outcomes: Pension Reform and Urban Inequalities," China Quarterly , no. 114, June 1988, 223–42.

[66] Yunnan Sheke Dongtai , May 1988, 17.

As noted, the lixiu system was initially designed for a small number of cadres with high seniority and ranking. However, eligibility gradually expanded to include all veteran cadres who had joined the revolutionary work before the foundation of the PRC. Old cadres who retired before the introduction of the lixiu system are allowed to change their status to lixiu . The evolution of the system clearly shows how a politically influential group forced the regime to broaden the scope of a policy beyond its original intentions. Although the retirement policy may not be a typical case because it involves the most powerful political group, veteran cadres, it may foretell how specific policies will be subjected to the influence of various interest groups in future years.

Purging the "Three Types of People"

During the CR, a large number of rebels joined the party and then became cadres. Those in leadership positions had usually worked as administrative cadres for more than ten years, accumulating rich political experience and building up networks of personal connections (guanxi ) at the basic levels. They may have lost their confidence in the Gang of Four long before its fall, but their former victims would not trust them, since former rebels could develop into a political force to challenge Deng Xiaoping and his reform programs. The Deng group therefore reinvestigated the former rebels in the party rectification. Obviously, Deng's group felt that the two previous screenings of the Gang's followers were not thorough, because they had been conducted at the time when the CR was not yet officially repudiated and Mao's mistakes were not yet exposed.

Unlike the Maoist method of mobilizing the masses, the regime relied on a carefully planned organizational method for investigating the radicals, limiting the scope of the purge to "three types of people." The first referred to CR rebels who "had seized political power 'in rebellion,' rose to high positions, and committed evils with serious consequences"; two constituent elements of this group were rapid promotion through power seizures and evil activities. The second were "factionalists in their ideas," who were defined by three constituent elements: vigorous propagation of radical ideology, factional ties with Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, and continuation of factional activities after the fall of the Gang.

The third included anyone who "had indulged in beating, smashing, and looting during the CR," broadly interpreted to include "framing, making false charges, and persecuting and torturing people to ruin their health." Not only those who had been personally involved in these activities, but also their "back-stage bosses responsible for smashing institutions, seizing files by force, and damaging both public and private properties" fell into this category. The leaders of the mass organizations who "had plotted, organized, and directed violent confrontation that resulted in serious consequences" were also included.^[67]

The regime made a distinction between the "three types of people" and "serious mistakes." Those who had participated in "beating, smashing, and looting" in a "general sense," those who had joined the Gang of Four's network under the influence of leftist ideology, and those who had simply carried out the official line coming down through the Gang's communication channel were considered as having made "serious mistakes." For those who had committed serious mistakes, organizational conclusions would be drawn and "due measures" would be taken. But those who had already been investigated and punished were not reinvestigated. "Ordinary mistakes" were not investigated and did not require any organizational conclusion. The materials relating to "ordinary mistakes" did not enter into one's dossier; they were kept at the rectification office or the office of the core investigation group for the period of rectification.^[68]

Old cadres who had erred during the CR were exempted from the "three types" because they had made "contributions to the people and for the revolution."^[69] Their mistakes were classified as "serious mistakes," but if they had made self-criticisms for their errors, they were not expelled from the party. Also, ordinary party members "who said and did wrong things" were regarded as having made "serious mistakes" or "ordinary mistakes," for which the maximum penalty was delayed registration for party membership. The regime also excluded the public security apparatus from the investigation.^[70] "If the public security field carried out the orders

[67] Beijing Review , 17 October 1983.

[68] Zhibu Shenghuo , no. 13, 1985.

[69] Renmin Ribao , 26 August 1981.

[70] Zhibu Shenghuo , no. 18, 1985.

and directives of the upper echelon according to CR policy, and even if the result was a wrong case, generally speaking the responsibility will not be pursued."^[71] Rural party members and such basic-level party organs as the village (xiang ) and the town (zhen ) were excluded from investigation. Former middle school students were generally not investigated unless there were compelling reasons to do otherwise. Also the factional infighting of the Red Guards was not investigated unless the consequences of the fighting were serious.

In contrast, former Red Guards who had tortured people to the extent of injuring their health and those who had intentionally fabricated charges, falsifying evidence to persecute cadres and masses, were classified as one of the three types.

The basic guiding principle for the investigation was to be "firm and cautious, while not overlooking even one suspect." Mindful of the past abuse of "quotas," the regime insisted that no unit would be assigned quotas for the three types.

With these general guidelines, each unit investigated its own cases under the overall supervision of local party committees. Leaders who were suspected of having special ties with the three types were adjusted before the investigations started. The units that suffered serious damage from the CR and important cases—"cases that affect the entire unit or that involve top leadership"—were investigated first. If a case involved many people working in different units, the unit that the case affected most seriously was responsible for forming a joint investigation team with the others and for collecting materials. Renmin Ribao reported a case that involved forty-four units.^[72]

In order to investigate events that happened more than ten years before, investigations usually divided the CR into several stages, reconstructing each event and analyzing "its start, development, and consequences." Victims' testimony was collected in order to discover those most responsible for an incident. The regime also recommended investigating only "armed struggle" (wu dou ) rather than "struggle by words" (wen dou ).

The last stage of an investigation involved determining whether

[71] Xuanchuan Shouce (Beijing), January 1985.

[72] Renmin Ribao , 31 July 1984.

or not the investigated person should be classified as one of the three types. A final decision on each case was to be made collectively by the party committee.^[73] Party leaders were specifically warned not to be "too lenient" and to take great care to separate those who really deserved to be classified as one of the three types from those who had made a "serious mistake" and those who had made a "general mistake." Any final decision on the three types was submitted to the upper echelons for approval. The three types were then dismissed from their posts and expelled from the party. In addition, some of them were brought to court, even if the legal time limit for prosecution was past.

Despite the regime's stress on the careful collection of evidence and strict interpretations, many investigations were apparently conducted in an untidy and loose fashion. The multiplying factors—specific mistakes and crimes, degree of responsibility, degree of repentence, and political performance after the third plenum—that investigators had to consider, however, obfuscated rather than clarified ambiguities in defining the three-type persons.^[74] Moreover, there was absolutely no guidance on the type of evidence and no rules governing its interpretation. One can, however, notice a departure from past practice on two points. First, the three types were defined by the actual damage incurred to the party and the people rather than by a person's title or membership in a particular faction during the CR. The second and more important point was that the purged did not suffer as much as in the Maoist era. "For those who are expelled but are still fit to serve as cadres, appropriate arrangements will be made; those unfit to serve as cadres should be provided with opportunities to find jobs and earn a living."^[75]

However, the emphasis on consequences rather than on intentions was not much help in determining who fit the three types. It was extremely difficult to distinguish the types from beneficiaries of the CR—including those who did not actively participate in the process but were promoted simply because the large-scale purge in the CR created many vacancies that had to be filled. The ideology

[73] Gongchandangyuan , nos. 11–12, 1985, 46–49.

[74] Zhibu Shenghuo (Shanghai), no. 13, 1985.

[75] Dangde Shenghuo , September 1984, 10.

of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing was an official line at that time, and not many people dared to challenge or refuse to publicize the official ideology. The phrase "beating, smashing, and looting" was as loose as the previous criteria. Most of the killing occurred in the context of factional struggles between rival mass organizations. Depending on how one defines looting, it can be applied to most of the initial Red Guards—largely composed of children of high-ranking cadres, including Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, He Long, and Chen Yi—who had participated in the campaign against the "Four Olds"—old ideas, culture, customs, and habits. Persecution of their fellow classmates from "bad" family backgrounds can be construed as "beating."

Given the complexity of the CR and the ambiguous and contradictory official criteria, party committees at the various levels exercised enormous discretionary power in deciding who should be purged. The universities were usually lenient toward former rebels (now college students), because they kept no detailed records of their past behavior and had not enough manpower to investigate each student.^[76] Investigating the three types of people in enterprises was also difficult because of the large number of personnel changes after the CR.

Basic-level cadres were not eager aggressively to pursue screening the three types. Instead, they adopted the tactics of "dragging, waiting, and avoiding." The cadres had every reason to be evasive. First, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to investigate—not to mention collect evidence and interview witnesses—an incident that occurred almost twenty years before. Many cadres did not want to undermine the stability of their units by reopening wounds and renewing factionalism. Also, they believed that the three types were harmless and powerless "dust in the trace of a wagon wheel."^[77] The official line, however, insisted that they still

[76] Interview in Beijing in 1986.

[77] During the ten years of the CR, former rebels were subjected to several investigations: initially the military investigated them for their connection with "ultraleftists" and "May 16 elements"; immediately after the fall of the Gang of Four, they were again investigated for possible connection with the fallen radicals, although this phase was limited in scope; in 1982, the Deng-Hu group issued order no. 55 to investigate the "three types of people"; the bureaucratic reforms of 1982–83 removed whoever managed to survive until that moment; and finally they were subjected to a new investigation in the party rectification.

posed a dangerous threat because of their skill in mobilizing the masses. Former rebels in sensitive areas such as the organizational, personnel, disciplinary, and legal fields had to be screened with the utmost care.

The evasive tactics devised by the former radicals compounded the difficulties of investigation. In the previous eighteen years many of them had changed their jobs and places of residence, sometimes falsifying their identities. One such case described in Renmin Ribao reported that the personnel dossier of one person had no trace of his activities during the CR. By changing their names, others even managed to "sneak into the third echelon, taking advantage of being young, well-educated, and professionally competent." Others pretended to repent by changing their attitude and behavior "one hundred and eighty degrees" to support the current official line. Some former rebels bought the protection of leading cadres through bribery and other means.^[78] A word from leading cadres that "their works are not bad, and I don't see any taint of their cruelty" was good enough to save them.

Another difficulty concerned how to discern individual responsibility for collective actions. During the chaotic period of mass mobilization, the boundary between legality and illegality and between individual-initiated and organization-sanctioned actions was blurred. Most of the political violence during the CR took the form of group or mass action rather than individual behavior. Moreover, many of them were sanctioned by the official ideology and often carried out through the existing organizational channels. For instance, the military was ordered to intervene in the CR to restore order; in carrying out this task, it frequently resorted to violent means, sometimes inciting one faction to launch violent attacks on others. But during the investigation, the regime tried to hold individuals responsible for the consequences of collective actions. Since most of the current PLA leaders—all party committee members except one in the case of the Chengdu military region—had led PLA units in the task of supporting the left during the CR, very few of them could claim to be completely innocent.

The last difficulty involved dealing with the two factions that split almost all organizations. With regard to the question of which

[78] Renmin Ribao , 8 June 1984.

faction was correct and which was incorrect, the official line held that both factions made mistakes and that factional ties were irrelevant to the investigation of the three types of people. New party secretaries who had nothing to do with the CR were appointed to the units seriously plagued with factionalism. Nonetheless, the lingering influence of factional ties had been particularly noticeable in the personnel management of cadres. Local party cadres used factional viewpoints in investigating the three types, taking a protective attitude toward members of their own factions—by making "the big incident a small one, if their own faction was involved, and making the insignificant matter of major importance, if members of their rival faction were involved."^[79]

As a result, former members of the rebel faction bore the brunt of the investigation. In contrast, the investigation did not often affect former members of the conservative Red Guards, who publicly declared that since they defended the party committee, there was nothing to investigate about them. Most of the conservative Red Guard organizations had been led by the children of former high-ranking cadres, who were now rehabilitated and returned to former power. In fact, some leaders openly pleaded that the activities of the initial Red Guards should not be investigated. "Those who made serious mistakes at the early stage of the CR, but those who made corrections of their mistakes during the middle stage of the CR, should be trusted. But those who tenaciously followed the counterrevolutionary group of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, and those who did bad things, should never be used for important positions."^[80] Many former leaders of the initial Red Guard organizations (such as the sons of Chen Yi and He Long and the daughters of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Song Renqiong) are now working in cozy positions in the state or military units or are abroad for study, whereas their adversaries are probably languishing in jail.^[81]

Despite the initial estimate of 15 percent of party members slated for removal and a Hong Kong observer's speculation that as many as 4 million (4 percent of party members) would be purged, it seems that the total number of people purged as one of the three

[79] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang , 16 April 1984, 20.

[80] Dangde Shenghou , 1984, nos. 9, 10.

[81] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang (Liaoning), 16 April 1984, 20.

types was very small.^[82] Most of the types reported in the official newspapers were accused of having abused their cadre positions to commit such crimes as corruption and rape, in addition to their original mistakes during the CR. By bringing additional charges, the regime portrayed the three types as "bad persons" prone to irregular behavior. There is no way for outside observers to determine the official assertion. But it implies either that the former rebels were condemned when they made additional mistakes in cadre positions or that the regime falsified or exaggerated the additional mistakes to discredit the former rebels morally.^[83]

Although only a small number of people were purged as the three types, a question of fairness persists. Did the investigation use well-defined objective criteria for all suspects fairly and equally? Undoubtedly, those who were condemned still feel that they were unfairly punished.

A less harsh fate for the purged cannot be much comfort for those branded as the three types because, otherwise, they would have been selected as China's future leaders. As the official news media publicly recognizes, the only difference between the three types and the candidates for China's future leadership lies in their political performances during the CR. Both the three types and candidates for the third echelon are young or middle-aged and well educated.^[84] If one had a clean record during the CR, he can enter the ranks of future leaders. But those condemned as the three types lost their current positions, not to mention the chance to be promoted.

Understandably, many of the Red Guard generation are still confused. Some of them are completely disillusioned and alienated from the political process and are searching for a vehicle to express their wounded feelings and painful experiences. The more courageous ones, who are still dedicated to searching for a solution to the Chinese problem, have reached the conclusion that the basic problem with China does not lie with Mao, revisionism, old party leaders, or the innocent youth who threw themselves eagerly into the political movement, but with the political system itself. To

[82] Ming Bao , 5 October 1983; "Zhengdang Shidian Cankao Cailiao," Dangde Shenghuo , 25 July 1983.

[83] Renmin Ribao , 10 July 1984.

[84] Hong Qi , no. 1, 1984, 1.

them China's hopes rest with democracy and a pluralism that will tolerate different views. There is no doubt that as the Communist revolution had been the definitive event of their parents' generation, so the CR was to become the event that politically defined Mao's next generation. China's first revolutionary successors came of age in that tremendous upheaval; the events of those years will color their vision. For many, it has left emotional scars that are not yet healed. But with or without healing, this generation will shoulder China's future.