I

As I have said, I think that Panaetius' thinking on the importance of "being yourself" in On Peace of Mind constitutes an original synthesis of

[7] See esp. the essays of Ludwig Koenen, R. R. R. Smith, and Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, above.

[8] In the modern period, the call to "be yourself" has often been associated with markedly individualistic stances (cf. the discussion of Nietzsche in V below), and it is of interest to see if a study of this theme bears out the common claim that Hellenistic philosophy is characteristically individualistic. See, most recently, M. Hossenfelder, "Epicurus—Hedonist Malgré Lui," in The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics , ed. M. Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge, 1986), 245-263, esp. 246-249. One of the problems in testing this claim lies in determining what "individualism" means; on the complex strands in the modern understanding of "individualism," see S. Lukes, Individualism (Oxford, 1973), and T. C. Heller, M. Sosna, and D. E. Wellbery, eds., Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought (Stanford, 1986). See further below.

[9] As S. Toulmin underlines, one cannot simply equate the use of reflexive vocabulary with consciousness of "the self" as a distinct entity; see Toulmin, "Self-knowledge and Knowledge of the Self," in The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues , ed. T. Mischel (Oxford, 1977), 291-317. However, in the context of ethical theories in which there are already indications of a concern with "the self" as a psychological entity, reflexive language can help to indicate the kind of self presupposed and the stance adopted toward that self.

[10] I pursue these questions in The Self in Dialogue: Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy (Oxford, forthcoming).

Democritean-Epicurean and Stoic approaches; and I want to begin by outlining the two lines of approach which he synthesizes. I will then examine these two strands in more detail, drawing, for the Stoic side of the synthesis, on Panaetius' own thinking in On Proper Function (as represented in Cicero's De officiis ).^[11] In my reconstruction of On Peace of Mind , I shall draw, like other scholars, on points of similarity between Cicero's De officiis and two later works on peace of mind, by Seneca and Plutarch, which are apparently based on that of Panaetius.^[12] But my main concern will be to bring out the synthesis of Democritean-Epicurean and Stoic lines of thought, and to show how this synthesis results in the theme of "being yourself" acquiring a new depth and complexity of meaning.

I shall begin by outlining the principal differences between the Democritean-Epicurean and Stoic approaches to the subject of peace of mind.^[13] The essential difference, from which all the other differences flow, lies in their thinking about the final goal or end of life (telos ), a difference which has been seen since antiquity as the central point of ethical difference between the Epicureans and Stoics. For Democritus and Epicurus, peace of mind, understood as euthumia or ataraxia , was regarded as man's proper goal (or part of it), a goal to be pursued deliberately, albeit one which was compatible with the practice of virtue in certain forms. For the Stoics, on the other hand, virtue was the only proper goal for deliberate pursuit, the only real "good"; absence of emotional disturbance, in its strongest form apatheia , was seen rather as a by-product of this pursuit, insofar as it was characteristic of the state of mind of the completely virtuous or "wise" man.^[14]

[13] In this outline I will (a ) lump together Democritus and Epicurus on the one hand and the early Stoics and Panaetius on the other and (b ) ignore common ground between the two approaches. Subsequently, I will (a ) unpick the components of these two strands and (b ) explore the degree of common ground between them.

[14] See A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987) 21B, esp. 4, 6; 210, P; 58A; 61A; 63 passim, esp. A, F, L, M. Cf. ibid. 1:398-399, where the authors emphasize that the Stoics, like most other philosophical schools, accepted that the "end" of life was happiness (eudaimonia ) but argued that this goal was constituted by virtue. It is worth pointing out that this new collection of texts, translations, and commentaries is an invaluable aid to future research (note, e.g., the bibliography at 2:476-512), and that it makes the charting of the terrain of Hellenistic philosophy a real possibility.

From this central difference, related differences flowed. In the Stoic approach, the choice of one's role in life was seen as the selection of a context in which one could give expression to the desire to act "well," that is, virtuously; hence, they stressed the importance of choosing a role that one's talents and inclinations allowed one to practice well, and to carry through to the end (or to one's own end). In the Democritean-Epicurean version, on the other hand, the choice of role was viewed primarily in terms of whether or not it was likely to produce euthumia or ataraxia. In this version too, one was urged to maintain one's natural talents and inclinations; but this was presented as a means of obtaining peace of mind rather than of finding the most appropriate role for virtuous action.

A comparable difference exists in their attitude to meeting life's un-chosen contingencies (as distinct from choosing a role for one's life). Both sides emphasize the importance of a rational critique of desires in enabling one to counter contingencies, and both emphasize the possibility of achieving in this way a kind of "self-sufficiency" (autarkeia ). For Democritus and Epicurus, the means of achieving this lies in discouraging desires for objects which one might not in practice obtain (or which do not in fact yield pleasure), and discouraging emotions (such as fear of death) which are inherently distressing or which may have distressing consequences. The Stoics too practiced a kind of "preparation for future evils" (praemeditatio futurorum malorum ). But the essential feature of this lay in the insistence on the radical distinction between what is and is not "up to us," and on the fact that only the former category of things (that is, virtuous or non-virtuous actions) constitutes what is genuinely good or bad; external contingencies are "matters of indifference."^[15] Similar differences are evident in the way in which each side approaches the theme of shaping one's life and giving it unity. The Stoics saw consistency and stability as being, like apatheia , natural by-products of the wise man's state of mind and his adoption of virtue as an absolute priority. Insofar as this attitude interpenetrated a person's whole life, that life would acquire the "good flow" (eurhoia ) that Zeno identified with happiness.^[16]

[15] For autarkeia in Democritus, see F 176, 210 DK; cf. 119, 146, 191; in Epicurus, Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 21B (4) and Caizzi, above; in Stoicism, Diogenes Laertius 6.128, cited by Annas, below.

[16] See esp. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 61A (= Diog. Laert. 7.89): "virtue is a consistent character (diathesis ), choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external. Happiness consists in virtue since virtue is a soul which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life." Cf. also 63A on eudaimonia as a eurhoia biou .

Democritus and Epicurus seem also to have seen one's life as being unifiable, though rather by a self-conscious process of focusing one's projects and desires. They also advocated the management of memories and anticipation so as to maximize one's sense of well-being and to guarantee a pleasurable unity of consciousness.