The Soviet Effort In Defensive Systems
Western understanding of Soviet intentions is often beset by uncertainties, and the case of strategic defense is no exception. Are the Soviets pursuing some long-term goal of achieving an effective defense in order
to break out of the ABM Treaty? Or are they simply pursuing allowable defensive efforts to limit damage from a nuclear attack and doing research so as not to be put at a disadvantage if the United States should achieve some technological breakthroughs? Are they content to have SAMs functioning as anti-aircraft weapons, or are they secretly attempting to render them effective against ICBMs as well? Are they using the loopholes of the treaty that allow development of anti-tactical weapons and ASATs as efforts to develop technologies that will permit broader ballistic missile defense than is foreseen in the treaty? All that can be established beyond dispute is that for forty years the Soviets have pursued a large and comprehensive program in passive and active defenses, the total size of which has grown steadily, despite the ABM Treaty, and which has been supported by formidable and broadly based research efforts. So far as can be ascertained, however, the Soviet Union has not exceeded the bounds on testing and development set by the ABM Treaty. And there is good reason to believe that because it decided to agree to a limitation on ABMs, the Soviet civil and military leadership has adopted a strategy of retaliatory deterrence essentially the same as that previously adopted by the United States.
The Soviet program for BMD research was originally established by Joseph Stalin in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Stalin is thought to have been influenced by several considerations: the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union by the Luftwaffe, Britain's vulnerability to the German V-1 and V-2 weapons, and the knowledge that Soviet technologists, with the help of captured German rocket scientists and engineers, were working on the development of ICBMs.[14] At the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, in October 1961, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky announced that "the problem of destroying enemy missiles in flight has been successfully resolved," and in July 1962 Premier Nikita Khrushchev boasted that Soviet missile forces were so accurate that they could "hit a fly in space."[15]
Although these claims were wildly inflated, the Soviets have invested heavily not only in research on strategic defense but also on actual deployments—mainly, however, for defense against bomber attack rater than ballistic missiles. The Soviets apparently believe that although air defense can be "damage-limiting," a territorial defense against ICBMs is neither feasible nor affordable.
The Soviets maintain the world's most extensive missile early-warning system. It includes a satellite network for launch detection, over-the-horizon radars, and a series of large phased-array (capable of being electronically steered) radars (LPARs) on the periphery of the country (and
inland, at Krasnoyarsk, in apparent violation of Article V1-b of the ABM Treaty, which requires that each party locate such radars only "along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward"). The satellite system is capable of providing about thirty minutes warning of any U.S. ICBM launch and of determining the general area of its origin. The two over-the-horizon radars could provide the same time warning, but with less precision and certainty than that provided by the satellite network. In addition, the Soviets maintain eleven large "Henhouse" detection and tracking radars at six locations on the periphery. These can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from satellites and over-the-horizon radars, and provide target tracking in support of deployed ABMs. The Soviets are currently constructing six new LPARs, including the controversial Krasnoyarsk installation in central Siberia. According to the DOD, these systems "duplicate or supplement" the coverage of the "Henhouse" network, "but with greatly enhanced capability."[16]
An ABM system has been deployed around Moscow, as allowed under the ABM Treaty, and has been undergoing improvements since 1980. The original single-layer system included sixty-four reloadable aboveground launchers at four complexes, collectively called the Galosh system. Each complex was served by six mechanically steered "Try Add" guidance and engagement radars and all were assisted by the "Doghouse" and "Cathouse" target-tracking radars south of Moscow, which are believed to provide battle management for the defense of Moscow. The system is now being enlarged to accommodate one hundred launchers, the maximum allowable under the ABM Treaty. When completed, it will provide two layers of defense, one composed of silo-based, long-range, modernized Galosh interceptors (designated by the United States as SH-04 or ABM X-3) designed to engage targets outside the atmosphere; the other using silo-based, high-acceleration Gazelle interceptors (or SH-08) to engage targets within the atmosphere. Thus, the Soviet system will resemble the United States' combination of Spartan and Sprint missiles. It will also have associated engagement and guidance radars and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based Gazelle launchers may be reloadable, and the system may have become fully operational in 1987.[17] Because of the range of the Galosh, the system provides some degree of regional protection. The "footprint" of the missiles extends over several thousand square miles of Soviet territory, an area that includes three hundred ICBMs.[18]
The new LPARs could supplement older radars by providing early-warning
and pointing data for the new Moscow ABM system. All the new LPARS will become operational in the late 1980s and will make up a comprehensive network. The CIA estimates that this system will provide the Soviets with "a much-improved capability for ballistic missile early-warning, attack assessment, and targeting" and will provide battle-management support for a widespread ABM system.[19] In August 1986 two additional LPARs were discovered to be under construction in the western U.S.S.R. The United States has complained that the radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk is in violation of the ABM Treaty. This facility may or may not be intended to serve for eventual countrywide battle management in an ABM system. The Krasnoyarsk radar is said by the DOD to close a gap in a combined radar early-warning and tracking network: "Together, this radar and the five others like it form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the southwest." Its orientation, the DOD contends, "indicates it is for ballistic missile detection and tracking"—not space-object tracking as claimed by the Soviets.[20] Indeed, in view of the radar's capacities and orientation, it is most unlikely that it was intended for space tracking. Conceivably, the installation is intended to fill the gap in the early-warning system that could not easily be filled by the construction of peripheral radars, perhaps owing to soil conditions and the remoteness of the sites. Or, as Michael MccGwire has speculated, the radar might have been placed at Krasnoyarsk to detect an attack from Trident submarines stationed in the Bering Sea or the Gulf of Alaska—a threat not anticipated when the Soviets agreed to the limitation on placement of LPARS in the ABM Treaty—and to place the installation within a defensible perimeter in the event of an invasion through Xinjiang in northwest China.[21]
Soviet air defense is said by the Pentagon to have "excellent" capabilities against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes, but only "marginal" capabilities against low-flying aircraft. These facilities are undergoing a major overhaul, which will result in the fielding of an integrated system more capable at low altitudes. This system will include the use of the I1-76 Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS), similar to that developed by the United States, in addition to more than one hundred MiG 31/Foxhound interceptors equipped with look-down shoot-down radar and multiple-target engagement capability air-to-air missiles.[22]
The Soviets have put a very substantial effort into the development of ground-based air defenses and fighter interceptors: thirteen different
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have been developed, each designed to counter a particular type of threat. These SAMs include the latest deployed system, the SA-10, and another under development, the SA-X-12, which may have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles such as the U.S. Lance and Pershing I and II as well as aircraft.[23] Currently, the Soviets deploy more than 9,000 SAM launchers at 2,100 sites for strategic defense, in addition to 4,600 launchers for tactical SAMs. More than 1,200 fighter interceptors are dedicated to strategic defense, and an additional 2,800 other interceptors are also available. A quarter of the interceptors are MiG-25/Foxbat A/E high-speed interceptors for high-altitude defense. The rest consist of older aircraft (one-third of the force) and two new fighter interceptors, the Su-27 Flanker and the MiG-29 Fulcrum, both of which are designed to be highly maneuverable in air-to-air combat and are equipped with two new air-to-air missiles, one long range, the other short range.[24]
To locate and target incoming attacks, the Soviet Union has deployed more than 10,000 radars of various types at about 1,200 sites, providing virtually complete coverage at medium-to-high altitudes over the country and, in some areas, beyond its borders for hundreds of kilometers. The over-the-horizon radars provide warning of the approach of aircraft flying at high altitude. Coverage of low-flying aircraft is concentrated in the western regions and in high-priority areas elsewhere. Since 1983 two new types of air-surveillance radars have begun to be deployed. These assist in providing early warning of cruise missile and bomber attacks and in enhancing air defense electronic warfare capabilities.[25] The new Soviet "Pawn Shop" missile guidance radar and "Flat Twin" tracking radar are modular and could be assembled, once mass-produced, at a number of sites within a matter of months. The Reagan administration has complained that these radars are a "potential violation" of the treaty because they fall in the category of mobile ABM systems and components that are specifically banned.[26] The usual interpretation of the treaty does not preclude systems of this type.
Of the five SAM systems now operational (designated by the United States as SA-1, -2, -3, -5, -10) and SA-X-12, only the SA-10 seems capable of defending against targets with radar cross sections as small as that of a standard ("nonstealthy") cruise missile. Sixty sites are now operational, and work is under way on at least another thirty. More than half these sites are near Moscow, suggesting that the Soviets have put a high priority on terminal defense of wartime command-and-control systems, as well as of military and key industrial complexes. A mobile
version of the SA-10 is being developed to support theater forces, but it could also enhance the survivability of SAMs used in the Soviet Union for strategic defense.[27]
The SAMs and interceptor aircraft are further enhanced by antiaircraft artillery (AAA), more than 11,500 pieces of which are deployed with units at all levels of readiness and in all regions. At battalion and company levels and with nondivisional units, as many as 25,000 shoulder-fired SAMs are stocked. More than 8,100 SAMs and AAA pieces—the largest concentration—are found opposite NATO; more than 4,200 are near the Sino-Soviet border and in other eastern areas of the U.S.S.R.[28]
The Soviets have also pursued a variety of measures of passive defense, aiming to protect missiles as well as the party and government leadership, major economic assets, and the general population. Extensive planning has been done for the transition of the economy to a wartime posture. A program has been under way for thirty years to harden command posts and establish survivable communications for military commanders and civilian managers. Commanders and managers at all levels are provided hardened alternate command posts well away from urban centers. This system, comprising 1,500 hardened facilities with special communications, is patterned after similar capabilities provided the armed forces. More than 175,000 key personnel are thought to be provided such protection, in addition to the many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities. Vital materials have been stockpiled, many in hardened underground structures. Blast shelters have been built for workforces, and contingency plans have been drawn up for the relocation of factories and equipment.[29] ICBM silos, launch facilities, and command-and-control centers have been sufficiently hardened to resist destruction by some U.S. weapons. Means of communication have been made more elaborate, so as to provide redundancy, and have also been hardened to resist the effects of nuclear attack. New, mobile ICBMs, including the road-mobile SS-25 and the rail-mobile SS-24, have also been developed. These new missiles will complicate the attacker's targeting task, especially because these missiles can be hidden in tunnels or in special hardened and camouflaged sites. The Soviets have also developed long-range nuclear-armed submarines comparable to the U.S. Poseidon, which also help to assure the survival of its retaliatory forces in the event of a preemptive attack.
In addition, three Soviet SAMs—the SA-5, SA-10, and SA-X-12—may already have some ABM capability. The SA-5 has been tested in
conjunction with ballistic missile flights but is considered to have, at most, a marginal BMD capability. The SA-10 and SA-X-12, according to the DOD, may have some ability to intercept certain types of U.S. ballistic missiles.[30] But all these missiles are likely to be effective only against older-generation SLBM warheads rather than against newer ICBM warheads; the former are generally slower and offer larger radar cross sections. The SA-X-12 might be able to engage U.S. tactical missiles, such as the Lance and Pershing I and II; it has reportedly been tested successfully against a Soviet intermediate-range Scaleboard missile. The SA-X-12 is mobile and could be stored and concealed.
The Soviet high-energy laser research program dates from the 1960s and is said to be much larger than that of the United States. The Defense Department estimated in 1979 that Soviet spending on high-energy lasers was five times that of the United States. The U.S.S.R. has built more than a half-dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges and employs more than ten thousand scientists and engineers in laser development, notably at Sary Shagan. These specialists, who are quite capable, have worked on chemical, gas-dynamic, and electric-discharge lasers; they are pursuing necessary support technologies for laser weapons, such as efficient power sources; and they have the ability to produce high-quality optical components. According to the DOD, the Soviets have already deployed ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites and are presently likely to have lasers capable of serving as ASATs.[31]
Soviet laser research is thought to be aimed at developing three types of air-defense weapons: for defense of high-value strategic targets in the U.S.S.R., for point defense of ships at sea, and for air defense of theater forces. The DOD claims that the laser intended for strategic defense is already in the prototype stage and could be deployed and operational by the late 1980s, most likely in conjunction with SAMs in a point-defense role. Also under development is an airborne laser that could have such missions as anti-satellite operations, protection of airborne assets, and cruise-missile defense. Soviet researchers are also working on space-based kinetic-energy weapons, ground- and space-based lasers, and particle-beam and radio-frequency weapons. They are reported to believe that such systems hold promise for BMD and for improved conventional defense.[32]
Some reports indicate that Soviet ground-based lasers are already available for military use. The ground-based lasers at Sary Shagan are reported to have potential ASAT capabilities against low-flying U.S. satellites.
A U.S. press report has claimed that Soviet ground-based microwaves at a facility in a mountainous area at Dushanbe, in the Tadzhik Republic (where a laser facility is reported to have been built), disabled U.S. photoreconnaissance satellites in low polar orbit on more than one occasion in 1986. The U.S. Air Force Space Command has denied such attacks, but a French commercial satellite photography service has circulated photos of a well-developed facility at the Dushanbe site.[33] The German newspaper Bild Zeitung quoted top-secret U.S. and NATO reports of Soviet lasers disabling optics and electronics on U.S. satellites. Others speculate that the Soviets already have the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare against space systems. In view of the Soviets' recent reported work on microwave weapons that generate single pulses with peak powers exceeding one gigawatt and repetitive pulses of more than 100 megawatts, it is also speculated that the Soviets could test a ground-based microwave weapon by the 1990s capable of damaging satellites. (Jamming reconnaissance satellites almost certainly would violate ABM Treaty prohibitions on interfering with "national technical means" of verification. The United States is working on improving the resistance to jamming of satellites by incorporating laser crosslinks, improving satellite autonomy, and developing extremely high frequency [EHF] spread-spectrum and laser heterodyne communications systems.) Senior DOD intelligence officials say the Soviets now possess a "limited operational capability" to blind some U.S. satellites. Others contend that Soviet ground-based DEWs could damage some types of penetration aids and thus indirectly serve as BMD weapons.
Nevertheless, the present Soviet missile-defense capability, even if it were made the basis of a countrywide defense, could not prevent enormous damage from a U.S. nuclear attack, or even from an attack by an adversary with a smaller arsenal. Coupled with Soviet offensive capabilities, however, it can be said to increase uncertainty in the minds of a potential attacker. Soviet offensive forces alone account for considerable uncertainty; the defensive systems add to it. (This is, of course, one of the rationales offered by SDI proponents for building a U.S. defense.) Defense also helps to enhance the prospect that Warsaw Pact forces would prevail in a conventional conflict in Europe. U.S. countermeasures—especially air-breathing systems equipped with "stealth" technology—could defeat the Soviet defenses, but as defenses cause higher rates of attrition, they compel dedication of more weapons, thus tending to nullify the strategic doctrine of "flexible response." Targeting flexibility
is bound to be somewhat constrained by the addition of defensive systems, and damage expectations become less predictable.[34]