PART FIVE
INTELLECTUALS AND IMAGES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE

Introduction

A. A. Long

As a profession and as a cultural institution, philosophy had been firmly established in the Greek world since the later years of the fifth century BC . Its prestige was underlined by the great work of Plato and Aristotle during the first three-quarters of the fourth century. On a Hegelian view of intellectual history the achievements of these two thinkers mark philosophy's high point in the Greek world; what came next, in the Hellenistic period, was diffusion and decline. If we measure the significance of a cultural phenomenon simply by the qualities of its greatest representatives, the Hegelian judgment rings true. No other ancient philosophers match Plato and Aristotle in range anti creative intelligence. That point is underlined by the afterlife of these thinkers in later antiquity, when Neoplatonism and commentary on Aristotle dominate the philosophical scene.

If, on the other hand, we look for an epoch in Western history when philosophy was at its richest in terms of diversity, interschool debate, and educational influence, the Hellenistic period is a top candidate. The scholarship of the past two decades has amply documented this point. A budding student in Hellenistic Athens had a wealth of philosophical options to choose among. The schools themselves came to be called haireseis , "choices," because now for the first time it made sense to ask, "Which philosophy do you espouse?" expecting the answer Stoic, Epicurean, or some other sect. Choice of a philosophical school was not comparable to selecting among universities. It was a decision about the whole orientation of one's life. People might, of course, shop around, listen to various philosophers' lectures, or shift their allegiances. But a committed Epicurean or Stoic stood for something, or rather for radically different things—divergent theologies, cosmologies, attitudes to

politics, and, above all, doctrines concerning what makes for the best human life. "Platonist or Aristotelian" was never a comparable disjunction.

The holistic character of Stoicism and Epicureanism is a sign of the times. When Zeno began teaching in Athens's "painted colonnade" (Stoa) and Epicurus founded his Garden School, neither philosopher could have foreseen the success his movement would enjoy over a period of some five hundred years. In origin these philosophical sects were experimental, simply two of the many alternatives available to the curious youth of Athens and to others who came to that city for their advanced education. What was it that ensured a great future for Stoicism and Epicureanism and, correspondingly, permitted them to supplant the Cynics, Cyrenaics, Eretrians, and other schools that were still active around the year 300 BC ? One answer, and surely in large part a true one, is that Zeno and Epicurus had the philosophical genius to be able to defend their doctrines with compelling reasons. From the outset, it seems, their approach to philosophy was more systematic than that of the minor schools that they supplanted, and more in tune with the spirit of the times than that of their rival Platonists and Aristotelians. Yet, as with Socrates' extraordinary impact, an important explanatory factor must have been the personalities, living example, and lifestyles of the men themselves—the kind of image they projected, the way they were seen to live the philosophy they taught. Our access to this intriguing subject is hampered, of course, by a lack of reliable biographical data. Nonetheless, we seem to know quite a lot about the way Zeno and Epicurus struck their contemporaries and how they wanted to be viewed.

The image of these two philosophers had not been studied with the care it merits. Fernanda Decleva Caizzi has put that straight. Contrary to what one might have supposed, it is the austere Zeno rather than the hedonist Epicurus who appears to have been the more self-conscious in this regard. Caizzi finds a good explanation for this in the different demands the rival philosophies made on their followers' values and modes of life. The route to happiness professed by Zeno was exigent in its low valuation of most conventional goods. To make the point, Zeno seems to have taken poverty to extremes, exceeding even the doctrinal "indifference" attached to wealth by the Stoa. (His consistency or inconsistency on this point is well discussed by Julia Annas in her comments.) More generally, Caizzi is convincing in her suggestion that Zeno, living like Socrates in the public eye, wanted to be viewed as the Hellenistic counterpart to his illustrious predecessor; this must have been an important element in his success. Epicurus, by contrast, emphasized the ease and naturalness of living quietly. The life he recommended was, as Caizzi

says, "an attainable ideal." It did not require public demonstrations of its feasibility or highly personal exemplifications of what it required.

The new directions of philosophy in the Hellenistic world have often been viewed as a direct response to social and cultural conditions supposed to distinguish this era from what preceded—individualism, breakdown of civic cohesion, uncertainty about self-definition. Like most generalizations, this one is valuable so long as it is not regarded as complete and unqualified. The new Hellenistic schools were continuous in many respects with earlier philosophy. Zeno and Epicurus did not advance simplistic nostrums even if the souls to whom they particularly appealed were troubled. Hellenistic philosophers' insights were carefully grounded in arguments and analysis of concepts. The issues they debated, as Julia Annas makes clear, involve considerable sophistication in the understanding of a "final" good. It remains true, however, that Stoicism and Epicureanism were "philosophies of life" very directly and single-mindedly. That was their novelty. Their success was largely due to the fact that the extensive contributions they made to other areas of philosophy clearly cohered with and helped to sustain the central ethical theory.

In traditions where logic and metaphysics are studied purely for their own sake, holistic philosophies are often suspect. It may be thought a bad mistake to try to connect philosophies of life and the most difficult abstract questions; or worse, philosophies of life may be regarded as one person's idiosyncratic preferences masquerading as general recommendations. It would not be too difficult to defend Stoicism and Epicureanism against this objection. More to the point, the ethical dimension of Hellenistic philosophy is of central importance for understanding what speculative thought could contribute to ideas of the self at this period, and the extent to which individualism and self-concern were explicitly recognized notions.

Rivals though they were, Stoicism and Epicureanism had a common project in essence—to give persons willing to reflect on themselves and their experience a plan of life or a rational orientation to the world. By the time of Panaetius (second century BC ), as Christopher Gill ably shows, a Stoic professor, while maintaining his school allegiance, could be sufficiently open-minded to drag, creatively on anything that seemed useful in the philosophical tradition. His paper and Julia Annas' comments on it are too subtle to be summarized briefly. What they show, with differences of emphasis and interpretation, is the significant connections that were perceived between an ethical goal—for instance, peace of mind or virtue—and self-reflection or understanding one's hu-

man nature. It is clear from these wide-ranging discussions that Hellenistic philosophy played a major part in fashioning ideas about the self—what it means to take charge of one's own life, where autonomy lies, and how mental states can be monitored. Whether or not this constitutes an interest in individualism, the self-concern emphasized by Hellenistic philosophy plainly fitted the zeitgeist. True happiness was to be sought and found by discovering what human nature requires. That Hellenistic quest, like so much else in Hellenistic culture, helps to define where we are today.

The Porch and the Garden:
Early Hellenistic Images of the Philosophical Life

Fernanda Decleva Caizzi

I

Alciphron, the rhetorician of the Roman imperial age, gives a nice description in one of his letters (3-19) of a group of Athenian philosophers, invited to a birthday party:

Among the foremost present was our friend Eteocles the Stoic, the elderly man with a beard that needed trimming, the dirty one , the one with his head unkempt , his brow more wrinkled than his leather purse. Present also was Themistagoras of the Peripatetic school, a man whose appearance did not lack charm () and who prided himself on his curly whiskers. And there too was the Epicurean Zenocrates, not careless of his curls and also proud of his full beard, and Archibius the Pythagorean, "the famed in song" (for so everybody called him), his face overcast with a deep pallor , his hair falling from the top of his head fight down to his chest, his beard pointed and very long, his nose hooked, his lips drawn in and by their very compression and tightness hinting at the Pythagorean silence (). All of a sudden Pancrates too, the Cynic, thrusting the crowd aside, burst in with a rush; he was supporting himself on a club of oak—his stick was studded with some brass nails where the thick knots were, and his wallet was empty and hung handily for the scraps. Now the other guests, from the beginning of the party to the end, kept to a similar or identical etiquette , but the philosophers, as the drinking progressed and the loving-cup kept going its rounds, exhibited, each in turn, his brand of tricks. Eteocles the Stoic, for example, because of old age and a full stomach, stretched out and snored; and the Pythagorean, breaking his silence, hummed some of the Golden Verses to a musical tune. The excellent Themistagoras, since according to the Peripatetic doctrine he defined happiness not in terms of soul and body only, but also in terms of external goods, demanded more cakes and an abundant variety

of fine cuisine. Zenocrates the Epicurean took the harp girl in his arms, giving her languishing looks from half-closed eyes, and saying that this was "tranquillity of the flesh" and "consolidation of pleasure" . The Cynic, first of all, with Cynic indifference, relieved himself, loosening his robe and letting it drag on the floor; then he was ready to screw Doris, the singing girl, in full view of everyone, saying that nature is the starting point of reproduction.^[1]

The passage describes the philosophers as looking and behaving differently from ordinary people—in this case the parasites, one of whom is the letters author—and from each other. This is clearly connected with the different theory each philosopher is more or less faithfully reflecting and putting into practice.^[2] Alciphron's witty account is entirely in line with a typology of philosophers from the Classical age, familiarized by comedy and also through the anecdotal tradition.

Earlier than Alciphron, Dio Chrysostom wrote a speech On Deportment (Or . 72), where he complains that people cannot help mocking and insulting "someone in a cloak but no tunic, with flowing hair and beard"; "and they do this although they know that the clothes he wears are customary with the so-called philosophers and display a way of life."^[3]

In these passages—and many others one could quote from later sources—the philosopher clearly appears as somebody different from other people in his external features and, what is more interesting, as somebody whose external features and behavior are related to the contents of his philosophical thought. The biographical and anecdotal material concerning philosophers, assembled by Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus, shows the same pervasive patterns. Even though emphasis on "deportment" may be considered typical of a later period, this kind of description is by no means restricted to the Roman imperial age.^[4] It is found in the comic tradition as early as Aristophanes, and in many comic fragments about philosophers of the fourth and third centuries. Attic comedy is very important in fixing a sort of philosophical mask, and very influential on later authors like Alciphron and Lucian. Yet the features adopted to describe a particular philosopher, superficial and stereotyped though they may be, should not be dismissed without care-

[1] The Letters of Alciphron, Aelian and Philostratus , with an English trans. by A. Rogers Benner and F. H. Fobes (Loeb Classical Library, 1979), adapted. I am greatly indebted to Tony Long for making this paper less unpalatable for Anglo-American readers than it originally was.

[2] Cf. also Alciphron Ep . 4-7, on the supercilious and pompous Academic philosopher.

[3] Dio Chrysostom , with an English trans. by H. Lamar Crosby (Loeb Classical Library, 1951), V, adapted.

[4] cf. J. Geffcken, Kynika und Verwandtes (Heidelberg, 1909), 53ff.

ful study; and perhaps they can offer a picturesque but not unsuitable way of introducing the main theme of this paper.

II

As far as I know, a general and comprehensive work concerning the image of the philosopher in Classical antiquity is still lacking. By "image" of a philosopher I mean two things: (a ) the way he intends to show himself to other people, that is to say, how he conceives philosophical life and his own personal role compared with other ways of living, and what features he thinks consonant with the role he has chosen to play; and (b ) the way he is viewed by others, whether by nonphilosophers, or by his pupils and followers, or by hostile persons (for instance, by professional rivals or those who attack him for any other reason). Both facets are important, though the first is harder to delineate, and the second cannot be entirely kept separate from it; we get the largest part of our information about the first aspect through sources of the second.

In most cases—and these include the Hellenistic philosophers—the sources obviously present a serious problem. Their reliability is often extremely hard to test. In addition, images of philosophers are mostly transmitted by the biographical tradition, which is usually late and full of fictional elements. Different philosophers are sometimes characterized in the same way. Nevertheless, in this paper I wish to maintain that, although much care is needed in handling such texts, it would be a mistake to dismiss them all as insignificant or false. Even as pieces of literary fiction, they offer a picture of what is presumed to be typical of a philosopher and so, indirectly, they may give us an idea of how a philospher wants other men to see him or of how we may suppose he behaved in order to give rise to a specific biographical or comic report concerning himself. Difficult though it is to distinguish earlier from later sources, the biographical tradition seems to have had a conservative tendency, so that in many cases no substantial novelty was added to the general features of the original picture.^[5]

No inquiry into the image of Hellenistic philosophers can pass over Socrates; he is the first philosopher who is vividly described by a variety of sources. In fact, we are told a lot about the way he behaved, dressed, and acted, and we are made to feel that this is connected to and ex-

[5] This comes out very clearly in Pyrrho's biography, where the Antigonus material on Pyrrho's extravagant behavior has been included and preserved in spite of its being very disturbing to the later Pyrrhonists. For an attempt to make use of its significance for studying Pyrrho's biography, cf. my commentary in Pirrone: Testimonianze (Naples, 1981), passim.

plained by his philosophical attitude. Moreover, it is well known that the contemporary authors who described him have been enormously influential.^[6] Irrespective of their relative historical value, they acquaint us with a philosophical character whose name was Socrates, and whose typical features passed to the Hellenistic age via Attic comedy and the works of the Socratic philosophers.

Generally speaking, in the philosophical literature the image of the philosopher is connected with theoretical doctrines, mostly in the field of ethics. In comedy—the other medium central to the Hellenistic age— the philosopher is portrayed because he can interest the dramatist's audience, either by the contrast between his outward behavior and the values of ordinary life or by the way his paradoxical theories are opposed to common sense and common belief. In the biographical literature the information collected about external features and behavior is often related to the philosophical theory, either as showing the consistency of the philosopher or as showing a gap between theory and action.^[7] We find plenty of remarks of this kind in the biographies of Hellenistic philosophers, revealing a particular interest in the practical and pedagogical role of the philosopher. The occurrence of this theme is not just a sign of a widespread literary fashion; and even if in some cases the details about the philosophers' behavior look highly implausible, they must not be considered complete fiction. It is more reasonable to think that they reflect an actual tendency on the part of the philosopher to adopt and display a certain way of life, and the expectation by the nonphilosophers that he do so. The influence of Socrates' life and Socratic literature on the later tradition must never be underrated.

Although I am deeply conscious of the danger one is exposed to in making historical use of sources of this kind, I hope I will be able to show that the risk is worth taking, and that such sources make it possible to increase, or at least to confirm, our philosophical information and to

[6] Among the works still available to us: Aristophanes' Clouds , some of the Platonic dialogues (especially Apology, Phaedo , and Symposium ), and some chapters of Xenophon's Memorabilia . A. Dihle, Die Entstehung der griechischen Biographie (Göttingen, 1956), esp. 13ff., rightly ascribes to the figure of Socrates and to the logoi Sokratikoi a decisive impulse to the birth of biographical literature, even if some sketches of earlier biographical work may be found in the fifth century. What perhaps still need to be more investigated are the models or patterns which Socrates himself evoked and through which his pupils saw him and described him, but this subject would take us away from the Hellenistic age. This important point was missed by G. Böhme, Der Typ Sokrates (Frankfurt a.M., 1988).

[7] From this point of view, one should correct Wilamowitz's remarks about Antigonus of Carystus (Antigonos yon Karystos [Berlin, 1881], 33): it is true that Antigonus is not interested in the philosopher's theories per se, but most of the anecdotes he collects are in some way related to them.

achieve a better understanding of the connection between a philosopher's theory, his personality, and his behavior in practical life.

In order to make dear what we are looking for, we may start from the obvious point that the Hellenistic philosopher proposes an ethical ideal, the state and the life of the "sage," corresponding to the telos one has to look for in order to live well and be happy. To the scholar investigating the image of the philosopher, the following questions arise at once. What is the relation between the philosopher and the sage he is speaking about? Does the philosopher present himself as a sophos? In what way does the peculiar quality of "being a sage" manifest itself? Can we detect a precise intention on his part to set himself up as a living paradigm for his pupils, or just to show them a paradigm through his words?^[8]

Another important issue related to this one concerns the social role of the philosopher, the place he occupies in the surrounding community, his being popular or unpopular, and the causes of this—not only the external, contingent ones, but those that depend on his deliberate choice as well. What function does he attribute to his profession, how does he select pupils, what does he do for them? What kind of person does he attract? What is his attitude to political power, and what are the consequences of it?

Thanks to Diogenes Laertius (to whom one should add some important passages from Athenaeus), we are told a lot about the lives of the two most important Hellenistic philosophers, Zeno and Epicurus. Since the life of Epicurus has been the more thoroughly studied, I devote the main part of the paper to Zeno.

III

Zeno's conversion to philosophy is connected with Socrates through his reading Xenophon's Memorabilia^[9] and also with Crates the Cynic, as the living philosopher most similar to Socrates. We are told that Zeno found it hard to practice Cynic "shamelessness" (anaideia ). In spite of this information, Zeno's earliest work, The Republic , showed remarkable traces of Cynic influence (it had been written "on the dogs tail," as somebody said for a joke, DL 7.4). All this is well known, but I would like to stress

[8] This set of problems goes back to Socrates as well, and to the portrait or portraits made by his pupils, in which ideal and reality were closely interwoven.

[9] My argument is not affected by the different versions about the way this happened: DL 7.3, 31, and Themistius Or . 23 = SVF 1.9. For the philosophical presence of Socrates in Hellenistic philosophy, see now A. A. Long, "Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy," CQ 38 (1988): 150-171.

the fact that Zeno's behavior in everyday life, as described in many anecdotes, shows that "Cynicism," although in a less radical form than that adopted by Crates or Diogenes, continued to be part of his image. This may be explained either as a stereotype, a kind of literary topos, or as an indication that Zeno aimed to preserve some connection with the Cynic tradition. I take the latter alternative to be more plausible and to fit our evidence better. In fact, Zeno accepted that part of the Cynic heritage which he considered genuinely Socratic and which mostly concerned the philosopher's role in the community and his protreptic and pedagogical function.

At the end of his book devoted to the Cynics, Diogenes Laertius writes (6.104): "For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a shortcut to virtue ; and it was in this way that Zeno of Citium lived his life."^[10]

This statement is important, and more compatible with what we read in the biography of Zeno than scholars usually believe. I hope to show that it is connected with the philosopher's image and its function and, further, that in Zeno's case we can infer from sources of the b type some conclusions of the a type.

Even if Zeno did not, in fact, adopt his teacher Crates' radical way of living, nevertheless he held fast to some fundamental patterns of the Socratic-Cynic tradition, the ones that helped to convey a philosophical message, like a kind of school advertising. We are told about the place Zeno chose for teaching: a public one, the Painted Colonnade (stoa ) alongside the agora, in the very center of the town, but at the same time one that made it difficult for many people to listen to him, even if many wanted to (see DL 7.5: "his object being to keep the place uncrowded").^[11]

This is a significant choice, especially if we compare it with other schools' locations—Epicurus' Garden, the Academy—or with the crowd of people who sometimes listened to Theophrastus' lectures.^[12] Zeno's decision seems to me to reveal a typical and important feature: the intention of isolating himself while remaining under other people's eyes , instead of withdrawing completely from them. In this sense, he is a follower of

[10] Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers , with an English trans. by R. D. Hicks (Loeb Classical Library, 1958), adapted.

[11] Cf. the story about Crantor, DL 4.24, who had retired to the temple of Asclepius because of an illness, and people flocked round him while he walked up and down because they thought he was starting a new "school." This gives us an idea of the Athenians' attitude to philosophy.

[12] DL 5.36-37; cf. the witticism in SVF 1.280: "And Zeno, seeing that Theophrastus was admired for having many pupils, said, 'It is true his chorus is larger, but mine is more harmonious.'"

Socrates' "displacement" (atopia ) and of the Cynics, who spent all their time among people, even if not with people as such. If we may trust both Aristophanes and Plato on this point—and I believe we should—Socrates deliberately chose not to look or to behave in the way one could expect from him, given both his social status and his exceptional intellectual gifts.^[13] This was a good way for somebody with a message to attract attention. Socrates was followed in this practice by Antisthenes and in a much more radical form by Diogenes. Socrates' personality stood out among his contemporaries and looked strange to people who did not understand the philosophical meaning of apparently paradoxical behavior. Plato, who spoke of wonder as the starting point of philosophy (Tht . 155c), connected it beautifully to Socrates in the Phaedo , describing the reactions of his pupils to his attitude to death (58a3; 58e1; cf. 59a5); and Alcibiades' famous description of Socrates in the Symposium is on much the same lines. It emphasizes the typical Socratic opposition between appearance and reality, which so much impressed his followers and friends and which was mocked in Aristophanes' Clouds .^[14]

Wonder arises when we are confronted with something we don't expect, or someone behaving unusually. A precondition for wonder is visibility, and this is what some of the Socratics and the Cynics sought to achieve. Zeno likewise. He used to go around with two or three persons, asking for money in order to make people run away from him, and selecting students in various memorable ways. All this shows his attracting and repelling pupils at the same time. These activities are surely connected as deliberate ways for Zeno to distinguish himself from the crowd of contemporary philosophers performing in Athens.^[15]

We are told that, although he agreed to take part in Antigonus Gonatas' symposia, he stayed by himself (DL 7.13-14) and avoided close contacts with the populace. He was "sour and his face was screwed up. He was very miserly and un-Greek in his stinginess, using economy as his excuse.^[16] If he criticized anyone, he would do it concisely and not

[13] This emerges from an important passage of Xenophon (Mem . 1.6), where Antiphon objects to Socrates that he does the opposite of what one should do to be happy: the interesting point is his deliberate refusal to make money out of philosophy, as his colleagues did and as he could easily have done. From a social point of view, this is a very strong form of atopia .

[14] For instance, Socrates is described as somebody able to teach people how to be successful in order to get money and live easily, while he looked pale, hungry, and miserable.

[15] Selecting pupils is a feature of Socrates as well, continuing in the Socratic tradition. In the Hellenistic age it became, of course, an urgent problem because of the strong rivalry between the schools; cf. Hieronymus on Timon, DL 9.112.

[16] This is a typical commonsense explanation, perhaps coming from contemporary comedy; we shall see on the contrary that Zeno's euteleia has a clear philosophical meaning.

effusively, from a distance" (DL 7-16; Athenaeus 2, 55F): ,^[17] are the terms used to describe him, all of them, we may note in passing, rather far from the ideal image of the Stoic sage, polite and gentle . I will come back to this point later.

Yet Zeno was held in high honor by citizens both of Athens and of Citium (DL 7.6) and by Antigonus Gonatas, who "also favored him, and whenever he came to Athens would hear him lecture and often invited him to his court." It is likely that part of Zeno's ultimate popularity depended on his attracting Antigonus' attention. The text of the decree concerning Zeno voted by the Athenians and probably inspired in some way by the king (DL 7.15) deserves attention and careful explanation (DL 7.10-11):^[18]

^[19]

Whereas Zeno . . . has for many years been devoted to philosophy in the city and has continued to be a good man in all other respects, exhorting to virtue and moderation those of the young who came to him to be taught, directing them to what is best, exhibiting to everyone his own life as a model consistent with the doctrines that he presented.

Many anecdotes treat the educational function of Zeno as comparable to the one attested by Eubulus for Diogenes the Cynic's behavior toward Xeniades' children.^[20] The stories concerning Zeno's relation to pupils and his own conduct show two apparently contrasting features: a moderate one, so to speak, and a radical one. This corresponds to divergent

[18] W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford, 1913; repr. 1969), 309 and n. 106, thinks that the text in Diogenes Laertius combined two different decrees, one in honor of Zeno in his lifetime, and the other for his burial. This is not relevant to the way I shall make use of it.

[19] This is an important remark, indirectly showing that Athens was a place where many ephemeral schools were opened and soon passed away. The importance of continuity in philosophy—a typical Socratic theme—is underlined also by Epicurus on many occasions.

information about Zeno's way of life. According to Antigonus of Carystus he was rich enough to use money for helping his master Crates and for public enterprises like any other citizen of Athens or Citium (DL 7.12); his diet is described as healthy but not at all ascetic (DL 7.13). Elsewhere (DL 7.26-27), however, descriptions of his way of life correspond rather closely to the Cynic one:

He was extremely hardy and frugal; the food he ate did not require cooking and the cloak he wore was thin (). Hence it was said of him: "He is the victor over winter's cold, incessant rain, blazing sun and dread disease. Public festivity does not sap his strength. Night and day he concentrates tirelessly on his teaching."^[21]

This is certainly hyperbole, but the relevant question is: Why and what for? All the more so, as this is not an isolated text. Some comic fragments (DL 7.27) show that Zeno was usually described by contemporaries in similar terms. There is an unmistakable emphasis on poverty, and this is also apparent in Timon's verses on Zeno's followers (DL 7-16), a quotation that may well stem from Antigonus, who was well informed about the subjects of his biographies:^[22]

And he had about him some ragamuffins, as Timon says in these lines: "While he got together a crowd of the poor, who surpassed everyone in beggary and were the most poverty-stricken of people."

Antigonus reports a comment by Zeno which sounds like an apology (Athenaeus 13, 565D = SVF 1.242) and helps to confirm the general appropriateness of Timon's words:

That wise Zeno of yours, as Antigonus of Carystus says, had a premonition, as it would seem, of your lives and of your hypocritical profession; he said that they who listened casually to his discourses and failed to understand them would be filthy and mean , just as those of Aristippus' school who have gone wrong are sensualist and aggressive.^[23]

Dirtiness is a superficial sign of poverty, something one can adopt without any serious ethical intent, a mask to conceal a mean spirit (

[21] Trans. A. A. Long. Together with the points of difference, we can dearly catch parallels to the endurance of Diogenes the Cynic and Grates.

[22] For the Antigonean source of Zeno's bios , cf. Wilamowitz, Antigonos , 103 ff.

in Antigonus' words). Polemics of the Roman imperial age against false Cynics are well known, but the problem of distinguishing a serious philosophical use of poverty from a merely exploitative one is as old as Socrates.^[24] Plato describes Socrates' going "washed" (leloumenon ) to Agathon's symposium as exceptional.^[25] Poverty and a careless attitude to the body's toilet are often connected in descriptions of philosophers; but it is noteworthy that in other cases—for instance the Academics or the Peripatetics^[26] —the emphasis is on just the opposite feature. That is why I believe that the features comic poets emphasized and made fun of, even though they doubtless exaggerated them, were real.

Zeno's sentence and Timon's satiric verses, combined with the evidence from poetry and comedy (DL 7.27-28), suggest a rather strong connection between early Stoicism and poverty.^[27] In fact, if we look closer at it, we realize that the sentence quoted by Antigonus in Athenaeus assumes that the choice of life by Zeno's followers depended in some way on his attitude. We have a version of this sentence by Zeno's fellow Stoic Ariston which tends in the same direction (Cicero ND 3.77):

If it is true, as Ariston of Chios was in the habit of saying, that philosophers do harm to their audience when the audience put a bad interpretation on good doctrines, since people could leave Aristippus' school sensualist and Zeno's austere (acerbos ). . . .

Austerity (acerbitas ), as we have seen, was just the quality attributed to Zeno by the biographers: that is to say, it may be considered part of his image.

All this can perhaps be better understood by reference to Diogenes the Cynic's words (DL 6.35):

He used to say that he imitated the chorus trainers; for they too set the note a little high, to ensure that the rest should hit the right note.

[26] Cf. Antiphanes F 33 (11 p. 23 K.); Ephippus F 14 (II p. 257 K.) and T. B. L. Webster, Studies in Later Greek Comedy (Manchester, 1953), 52-53, who recalls Theophrastus Char . 26 on the oligarchic man and Plato Rep . 425a; for Aristotle, see I. Düring, Aristotle in the Early Biographical Tradition (Göteborg, 1957), 356.

Equally relevant is Crates' description of the island of Pera (F 4 Diels = 351 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons v. 2): "fair, fruitful, rather squalid, owning nothing" (,^[28]). In this verse the oxymoron between the two half-lines shows very aptly the difference between the true nature of the Cynic town and way of life () and the way it appears to other people, who look at it from outside, that is, from their conventional world.

According to Stoic theory, both wealth and poverty arc "indifferent": they make no difference to happiness, but wealth is "preferable" to poverty (DL 7.106 = SVF 3.127). Yet Zeno, in the biographical tradition, makes a strong didactic use of poverty; it is something he practices, and he expects others to do likewise. In a sense, then, poverty is presented as something "preferable," and the Stoic, at least from a practical-pedagogical point of view, seems to modify in some way the theory mentioned above.^[29]

Athenaeus 6, 233 A-B (= SVF 1.239) reports:

The Stoic Zeno, while he made an exception of the legitimate and honorable use of money, nevertheless deemed it in all other respects "indifferent," and discouraged both the pursuit and the avoidance of it, prescribing that one should preferably make use of plain and simple things.^[30]

This text shows the same ambiguity in the attitude to wealth and poverty that we find in the biographical tradition. Anecdotes on Cleanthes (DL 7.168, 169-70) seem to confirm the emphasis on poverty and its significance. So too, for instance, does a story about the handsome and rich but untalented youth who wanted to attend Zeno's lectures (DL 7.22):

First of all Zeno made him sit on the dusty benches, so that he might dirty his cloak; then he put him in the place where the beggars sat, so he would rub up against their rags. In the end the young man went away.^[31]

Taking all the evidence into account, we may conclude that poverty was part of the Stoic philosopher's original image—I mean something essentially connected with him. We may also assume he stressed it on

[29] Cf. DL 6.87, about Crates turning his property into money and distributing it among his fellow citizens.

purpose, in spite of his actually being less poor than such sources might lead one to believe.

Contemporary comic poets confirm this feature of Zeno. In his play Philosophers ,^[32] Philemon wrote:

A single loaf, dessert of dried figs, water to drink—a newfangled philosophy this man adopts: he teaches poverty and gets disciples.

So too Theognetus in his play The Ghost or Miser :^[33]

You'll be the death of me, fellow, with all this! You have stuffed yourself sick with the silly doctrines of the Painted Porch, that "wealth is not man's concern, wisdom is his peculiar possession, standing as solid ice to thin frost; once obtained it is never lost."

When we turn to Epicurus' frugality, which is described as very similar in practice to that of the Stoics (cf. DL 10.11), one big difference from Zeno is evident. There is no hint that poverty as such was part of Epicurus' image. This is shown not only by the lack of positive evidence, which by itself is significant and to which I shall return, but also by statements like the following (Ep. Men . 130):

We also regard self-sufficiency as a great good, not with the aim of always living off little, but to enable us to live off little if we do not have much (^[34] ), in the genuine conviction that they derive the greatest pleasure from luxury who need it least.^[35]

Diogenes Laertius (10.119), reporting from Epicurus' second book On Lives , says that the Epicurean wise man will not become a Cynic or a beggar, and even when he has lost his sight he will not withdraw himself from life (

[32] DL 7.27 = F 85 (IV p. 29 M.).

[33] F 1 (III p. 364 K.); cf. also Phoenicides ap. Stob. Flor . 6, 30 = IV, 511 Meineke for the topos of philosophical contempt for money.

[35] Trans. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1987), 114.

^[36]). Similarly, the Epicurean is advised to combine frugality with cleanliness.^[37] All these passages look like polemics against Cynicism, and I believe we should take them as attacking early Stoicism as well, in its retention of Cynic features as part of the philosopher's image (in spite of an apparently similar sentence by Zeno [DL 7.22]). This is confirmed by some facts: (1) the connection in Epicurus' same book On Lives of Cynic and Stoic themes, such as an attack on the Stoic defense of well-reasoned suicide (SVF 3.757); (2) a fragment by Colotes (p. 166 Crönert) in which attacks on Stoics and Cynics show them to be virtually inseparable in Epicurean eyes; and (3) a passage in Stobaeus (2 p. 114 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.638) where the Stoics are quoted explicitly on the sage's Cynicism: "They say that the sage will be Cynic, this being identical to persisting in Cynicism, not that, being a sage, he will engage in Cynicism" ().^[38]

Zeno's Republic could hardly have been a permanent target of attack unless some relevant aspects of Cynicism were preserved by the Stoics even later. I take the meaning of Stobaeus' sentence to be a request that the Stoic, once he has become a "sage," should preserve that part of Cynic principles he had adopted in his previous progress toward virtue and that "practicing Cynicism" must not be interpreted as inaugurating a Cynic "sect" (as far as one can use this term for Cynicism) in a stricter sense: this is just what I have previously labeled as part of the philosopher's "image."^[39]

What is left of Metrodorus' book On Wealth is even more helpful in order to understand the different attitudes to money of Zeno and Epicurus. What distinguishes them is precisely, in my opinion, Zeno's Cynic tendencies.

In fact, Zeno's public attitude to money and his deliberate roughness should be interpreted as exhibiting "the short way to virtue" to people who did not follow him on the long and hard route to philosophy. His

[36] So Bywater (cf. DL 7.130); see H. S. Longs apparatus ad loc.

[38] Cf. also Apollodorus ap. DL 7.121 = SVF 3.17. The passage, whose text has been much discussed, has been recently examined by M. O. Goulet-Cazé, L'ascèse cynique: Un commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI 70-71 (Paris, 1986), 22 and n. 22. Even if the sentence reached Arius Didymus from Apollodorus, Epicurus' parallel text shows that the discussion on this theme started much earlier.

[39] If I am right, perhaps our evidence on Epicurean anti-Cynic polemic should be reconsidered and also the traditional opinion on the lack of anti-Stoic attacks.

impressive image stood for a way of life which seemed to the Athenians' eyes to recall and restore the ancient and traditional civic virtues, above all sophrosyne , for which he was praised in the decree.^[40]

In the same text much emphasis is laid on Zeno's consistency of theory and practice. By itself, this was nothing new:^[41] "I hate a sophist who is not wise toward himself" is a well-known sentence by Euripides (F 905 N.^[2] ) and later adopted by Menander (Monost . 332). If, as we have seen, Antigonus Gonatas might be considered the inspiration of the decree, it may be fruitful to look more closely into the relationship between the two men, as described by the sources.

After Zeno's death, Antigonus is reported to have said: "What a life performance I have been deprived of."^[42]

Plutarch accused Zeno of inconsistency because he spoke about politics without practicing it.^[43] In fact, Zeno's attitude to political power is an important feature of his image and witness to his consistency: the Athenians appreciated his choice of "a peaceful lifestyle" and the refusal to visit royal courts or to send messages to kings.^[44] His allegedly silent response to royal ambassadors sharply contrasts with the traditional court-philosopher type.^[45] This detached attitude is not called in question by the supposed letter he wrote to Antigonus Gonatas. As Wilamowitz rightly remarked,^[46] the two letters quoted in Diogenes Laertius 7.7-9 are patently false, and his arguments can be supplemented.

The idea that Zeno refused to go to Macedonia purely because of his old age is totally inconsistent with the general picture we have of him. In our sources Antigonus is described as visiting him, inviting him, offering

[44] SVF 1.284, in two versions, one concerning Ptolemy, the other Antigonus.

[45] Cf. SVF 1.273, where Zeno reports a story about Crates reading Aristotle's Protrepticus in the shoemakers shop and criticizing its dedication to Themison.

[46] Wilamowitz, Antigonos 110 and n. 15.

him gifts, in other words as a king paying honor to the philosopher, never vice versa. So DL 7.15:

And when asked why he admired him, he said: "Because, although I gave him many substantial presents, they never made him arrogant nor yet appear humble."

Old age as the only reason for refusing to go to Macedonia does not suit this picture, since it implies that, were it not for his age, Zeno would accept.

Besides, Antigonus' letter speaks about Zeno's "perfect happiness" . Zeno proposes to send his pupils, ("if you associate with these, you will in no way fall short of the conditions necessary for perfect happiness"). Addressed to a king, this is a flattering sentence, completely out of tune with what we are otherwise told about Zeno; and so in a sense is the "perfect happiness" attributed to the philosopher by the king, who was expected to be acquainted with his teaching. In fact, if we look carefully at the evidence concerning Zeno, we find no hint of his thinking or presenting himself as the perfectly virtuous and happy sage.

On the other side, the stories about Stoic philosophers of the earlier generation visiting a kings court sound rather unfavorable and look as if they were collected (or invented) in order to show off the philosopher's conceit about being a good politician (referring to the Stoic theory of the sage as the expert in politics) and failing in this undertaking. This is reported about Persaeus in his collaboration with Antigonus; and even Sphaerus is described as having to defend himself against Ptolemy's attempt to refute his claim to wisdom.

Antigonus once, wishing to test him out [sc. Persaeus], caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy, and his face fell: "Do you see," he said, "that wealth is not a matter of indifference?"^[47]

"Testing out the philosopher" (.) is an aspect of the contest between the monarch and the philosopher which had been commonplace since the early Socratic tradition. Now, the emphasis is on the typical Hellenistic theme of con-

sistency, just as we find in the Athenian decree. It is worth noticing that in this particular case Zeno, the philosopher who refuses invitations, is the winner, while Persaeus, who accepts the king's invitation, is described as losing his match.

In Sopater's Celts (Athenaeus 4, 160E = F 193 Kaibel) we read:

Among them it is the custom, whenever they win any success in battle, to sacrifice their captives to the gods; so I, imitating the Celts, have vowed to the heavenly powers that I shall burn three of those counterfeit dialecticians on the altar. Look! Having heard that you diligently choose philosophy and philology and that you have stoical endurance, I am going to make a test of your doctrines first by smoking you; then, if I see one of you during the roasting pulling up his leg, he shall be sold to a Zenonian master for export, as one who knows no wisdom.

This passage recalls an apophthegm ascribed to Zeno (SVF 1.241), that he would prefer to see one Indian being burnt , than to listen to all the arguments on labor . It is remarkable that in Sopater's text (which should be dated to about 270 BC ) the mocking is directed more against followers than against Zeno as the preacher of endurance (apatheia ). Shall we consider this a casual fact? Perhaps not, if we take into account all the evidence I have collected.

If we look closer at this fact from our specific point of view, we realize that Zeno's attitude to kings and his refusal to leave Athens^[48] have two alms, connected to each other: of staying under the Athenians' eyes and of compelling a king to look for the philosopher. This seems to me to have a very important consequence concerning the philosopher's image: one could say that the king in visiting the philosopher becomes a kind of advertising agent, in fact the best in an age in which the new political trend strongly imposes some very powerful and impressive individuals on public opinion, if I may use this anachronistic expression. One recalls the deification of Demetrius by the Athenians, and the hymn that was

composed in his and his wife's honor.^[49] This corresponds to an increasing personality worship, inconceivable in Greece before Alexander's deeds, and relevant to our subject.

Writing about the Stoic sage, L. Edelstein stressed the importance of "the new consciousness of man's power that arose in the fourth century, the belief in the deification of the human being."^[50] Taking this remark as a starting point, we may say that part of the success and renown of a particular type of philosopher in the first period of the Hellenistic age arises indirectly, as a kind of reflex of his political interlocutor's power and fame—not so much in the trivial sense that friendship with a king is useful to a philosopher for help and support, but in a more subtle sense: the more the philosopher resists the king, the more he consolidates his public image and role, as a kind of counterpower or alternative paradigm of the happy and successful life. I assume this to be an important feature not only of the ideal Stoic sage but even of the Stoic philosopher himself, as showing the way to the happy life.

This typically Hellenistic way of building a philosopher's image is familiar from accounts of the meeting between Diogenes the Cynic and Alexander. Most of the anecdotes concerning Diogenes' relation to political men must be considered complete fiction, and quite implausible historically. Yet as fiction, some of them have a special meaning and function, transcending the traditional monarch/philosopher opposition. DL 6.79:

Demetrius in his work On Men of the Same Name asserts that on the same day on which Alexander died in Babylon Diogenes died in Corinth.

The invention of perfect synchronism between two events as important as death^[51] has a symbolic purpose, as is evident in some of the other anecdotes. Two of these, surely the most famous ones, are particularly relevant; DL 6.60, 38:

Alexander once came and stood in front of him and said, "I am Alexander the great king." "And I," he said, "am Diogenes the Cynic." ()

When he was sunning himself in the Craneum, Alexander came and stood in front of him and said, "Ask me anything you like." To which he replied, "Stand out of my light." (.)

[49] Cf. Athenaeus 6, 253 D ff.

[50] L. Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 13.

[51] One could mention Plato's biography and the coincidence of dates between his birth and Apollo's, and the relation between him and Socrates through the same kind of remarks; cf. A. S. Riginos, Platonica: The Anecdotes concerning the Life and Writings of Plato (Leiden, 1076).

In both cases, the meeting and the remarks of the two men are impressive for their complete ease and economy of description. In the first text, perfect symmetry is the relevant feature; in the second, it is Diogenes' down-to-earth rejoinder to the kings conceited exhibition of power. We are clearly being confronted with two divergent ideals and contrasting images.^[52]

The point of some other anecdotes, as has often been noticed, is to praise Alexander's magnanimity,^[53] but another aspect needs to be stressed too: I mean the propaganda this kind of material offers to a philosopher, to enjoy in a parasitical way, so to speak, the extraordinary fame and glory of his interlocutor. The man who is a symbol of all the traditional contents of eudaimonia (youth, beauty, strength, power, wealth, glory) is contrasted with and in a sense defeated by somebody endowed with nothing of this sort, just the inner power of intelligence, logos , and virtue. As a result, all the kings qualities are metaphorically transferred to the philosopher. The symbolic event so described exhibits the perfect Cynic or, in more abstract terms, his perfect moral freedom.

These anecdotes probably arose in the period immediately following Diogenes' death. What seems worth stressing is their affinity with the evidence for Zeno's life and attitude to royal politics. The main difference in the anecdotes I have quoted between the image of Zeno and the one of Diogenes is that Diogenes and Alexander, in spite of their being historical figures, are symbolic or ideal characters, while Zeno is not, nor does he seem to encourage in any way the assimilation of his own person to the Stoic sage.^[54] This recalls the fact that the Stoic sage was conceived as a model of rational perfection and, as he has been rightly called, "a bearer of ethical paradoxes" (ein Trager ethischen Paradoxien ).^[55] The sage could be concretely exemplified only through mythical or very remote historical personages.

A crucial feature of the Stoic theory about the sage is the radical opposition between the "virtuous" and the "vicious" person (), and the absence of any ethical type in between. In addition, at least in theory, the Stoics held that a human being could become virtuous,^[56] though the difficulty of finding an actual sage is emphasized by

[52] The wit of these texts presumes Alexander to be at his fullest glory, hence they postdate his Asian adventure; of course, that is another reason to consider them deliberate fiction.

[53] Cf. Socraticorum reliquiae VB31 Giannantoni and his commentary, vol. 3, 398 ff.

[54] In the case of Zeno we don't seem to have anything comparable to the idealization of Plato in the Academy, which started with Speusippus' Encomium Platonis , or to Epicurus' deification.

[55] E. Schwartz, Ethik der Griechen , ed. W. Richter (Stuttgart, 1951), 69.

many sources.^[57] Since happiness depends entirely on virtue, and every adult human is either virtuous or vicious, none of the latter could strictly be deemed happy . Chrysippus (SVF 3-510) said:

The man who progresses to the furthest point performs all proper functions without exception and omits none. Yet his life . . . is not yet happy, but happiness supervenes on it when these intermediate actions [sc. his performance of proper functions] acquire the additional properties of firmness and tenor and their own particular fixity.^[58]

There is only one passage in Zeno's biography where he is described as "happy" (DL 7.28):

In this species of virtue [i.e., self-control, ] and in dignity he surpassed everyone, and indeed in happiness. (.)

Immediately after this we are told that Zeno died at a great age and in good health, which, according to popular morality, was a sign of eudaimonia . Such remarks, like the praise for his virtue and moderation in the public decree, show how a biographer could ignore Chrysippus' distinction between the state of the man who has progressed to the furthest point (, the text cited above) and the state of the sage. But to the Stoics themselves the distinction remained of capital importance. In fact, they stressed it so strongly that it became a commonplace even outside the school.

Baton, a comic poet familiar with philosophy,^[59] in a passage from The Murderer quoted by Athenaeus (4, 163 B = III 326 Kock) has somebody deliver the following verses:

[57] Cf. A. Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten Stoa (Berlin, 1897 [repr. 1979]), 200, and the detailed discussion in R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften 2.1 (Leipzig, 1882).

[58] Trans. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosphers 1:363.

[59] Of. Plutarch De adul. et amico 55C, and I. Gallo, "Commedia e filosofia in età ellenistica, Batone," Vichiana 5 (1976), 205-242.

I summon here the philosophers who are moderate, who never give themselves a single good thing, who look for the wise man in their strolls and talks, as for one who has run away . Wretched fellow, why, when you have the income, do you stay sober?

Baton likewise compares the Stoic sage to a runaway slave in a passage where the goal of Epicurus is opposed to the Stoic telos (Athenaeus 3, 103 C-D = III 328 Kock):

Those at least with raised eyebrows, who seek on their walks and in their discourses for the "wise man," as if he were a runaway slave, once you set a strange fish before them, know what "topic" to attack first and seek so skillfully for the "capital" point, that everybody is amazed.

In a long passage by Damoxenus, about a cook connecting his science to Epicurean physics, Stoics and Epicureans are opposed in similar but even more explicit terms (Athenaeus 3, 103B = III 349 Kock):

In this way Epicurus condensed pleasure into the sum of wisdom [?]. He could chew carefully. He is the only one who saw what the Good is. The Stoics are always seeking for it, but they don't know what its nature is. What, therefore, they have not got and do not know, they cannot give to anyone else.

These verses may allude not only to the Stoic model of the sage but also to discussion between Stoics and Academics. The main point, however, is their confirmation of the other sources—I mean that Zeno did nothing to present himself as a wise man, but simply as somebody aiming at virtue.^[60]

The joke about the Stoic searching for the sage, as if the latter were a runaway slave, recalls the story that Diogenes the Cynic went around with his lamp in daylight looking for a "man." In both cases the philosopher is described, in a Socratic way,^[61] as not achieving completely what he is talking about; in spite of this, he may be praised for his "consistency" since the proposed model is a goal he aims at by rules of behavior that never lose sight of it and are never self-contradictory. As we have seen above in the case of politics, problems concerning the image of the Stoic philosopher arise when the difference between the ideal paradigm and its historical realization fades away. This did not seem to happen in the case of Zeno.

IV

In the case of Epicurus, what emerges is a very different picture of the philosopher's relation to the goal he proposes and to the philosophical life.

It is hardly necessary to describe Epicurus' school or his ideal of retired life. All this has been studied and is well known.^[62] I would rather draw attention to the following facts. First, the lack of a biography by Antigonus of Carystus.^[63] As for a biography written by members of the Epicurean school, Wilamowitz explained this by saying it was "as little necessary to them as a Goethe biography would be today";^[64] thanks to Epicurus' letters, the school had a lot of material on the teacher and did not need a special collection of it.^[65] "But the outsiders had execrated the person distasteful to them along with his doctrine."

I do not believe that a disagreement over theory is the main reason why Antigonus did not write a Life of Epicurus. Rather, we should look

[61] This has been remarked, for Diogenes, by H. Niehues-Pröbsting, Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus (Munich, 1979), 82-83.

[62] See now D. Clay, "Individual and Community in the First Generation of the Epicurean School," in S YZHTHS IS : Studi sull'Epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante (Naples, 1983) l:225-279.

[63] On Usener's attempt to read Antigonus instead of Ariston in DL 10.14, see G. Arrighetti, Epicuro: Opere , 2d ed. (Turin, 1973), 488.

[64] Wilamowitz, Antigonus , 128 n. 1.

[65] Diogenes Laertius quotes Apollodorus' Life of Epicurus and many other late sources, favorable or hostile; they show that after Epicurus' death the debate on his personality became increasingly sharp.

to the deliberate silence of Epicurus himself and of the school members, manifested in their living apart from people in a strict sense. This was a choice very different from other philosophers' ways of teaching and living, especially that of the Stoics, which can perhaps be compared to the Academic tradition.^[66] No living image of Epicurus as a person was presented day by day to the Athenians' eyes, and what came out of the school was just one word, "pleasure" : something apparently very easy for everybody to understand and attack, and very different from the remote "good" of the Stoics.

There is a kind of inverted symmetry between Stoics and Epicureans on the philosopher and the ethical goal: the Stoic was living in public and proposing a far-off ideal; the Epicurean was living in seclusion and proposed an attainable ideal, not only in a trivial sense, but, as we shall see, in a sense central to the philosophy itself.

To return for a moment to Antigonus—perhaps he did not write Epicurus' Life simply because the philosopher lacked a public image, a lack increased by a high feeling of protection toward the master which restrained his pupils from talking about him outside the school. The exceptions to this, collected by Diogenes Laertius at the beginning of his biography, show that the only possibility of getting news about Epicurus' behavior depended on somebody's leaving the school and slandering him.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that we have no comic passage concerning Epicurus' deportment, his way of dressing, hairstyle, and beard.^[67] This proves he did nothing deliberately to make a vivid impression, and indirectly it shows that comedy deserves credit and attention as a source: it is likely that comic poets did not create a personage out of Epicurus because there was no living model under their eyes.^[68] Instead, we may note that, in spite of its superficiality, the comic evidence of Epicurean ethical philosophy reflects at least in part its genuine character, as confirmed by Epicurean texts themselves. In the comic fragment already quoted a clear antithesis is drawn between Epicurus, who knows the nature of "good," and the Stoics, who look for it "in their strolls" ).^[69] There is a rather striking parallel in a fragment by Epicurus (F 423 Usener):

[67] Cf. A. Weiher, "Philosophen und Philosophenspott in der attischen Komölie" (Diss. Munich, 1913), 74-75; it is likely that the biographers would have quoted the evidence if there was any.

[68] See, for instance, the hedonic Epicurean described by Alciphron.

The highest joy is w escape a big evil; this is the nature of "good," if one understands it rightly, and then stops, not walking about chattering emptily about the "good."

These words show dearly that the good can be grasped by the mind and that the man who has done so will really possess it. Unlike Zeno, Epicurus can state in simple words the "nature of the good." This is a leitmotiv not only of Epicurean ethics, but also of Epicurus' image. Even if, as previously stated, we have for Epicurus nothing similar to Antigonus' biographies, a passage like the famous last letter to Idomeneus is in itself very significant (DL 10.22):

On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life (), I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind ( ) at the remembrance of our past conversations.

Epicurus deliberately speaks of himself as of somebody "living happily," and the remark is of course reinforced by the mention of such terrible physical pain.^[70] In the surviving Epicurean texts the terms and are typically used to indicate the state of happiness, instead of the much more common . Of course, the latter are not missing, but they occur with remarkably less frequency.^[71] From Ep. Men . 127 we would infer, at first sight, that Epicurus made a technical distinction between and :

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy , some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness , some if we are even to live.

Here seems to refer to mental tranquillity, which, when added to bodily freedom from pain, has as its result . From this point of view, is viewed as higher than , as

[71] Cf. H. Usener, Glossarium Epicureum , ed. M. Gigante and W. Schmid (Rome, 1977), s.v.

unifying the soul and the body's state.^[72] It is true that in general and are synonyms, and Epicurus uses them so (for instance at the beginning of the Letter to Menoeceus ). Still, a difference may be detected if we look at , the standard word for divine happiness since Homer.^[73] Epicurus' preference for words of the same root may reveal, even in the language itself, the connection between divine and human happiness, which he emphasizes in so many passages of his ethics.

Ep. Men . 135 (end):

Practice these things and all that belongs to them, in relation to yourself by day, and by night in relation to your likeness, and you will never be disquieted, awake or in your dreams, but will live like a god among men. For quite unlike a mortal animal is a man who lives among immortal goods. ().

The only divine quality man cannot have is indestructibility.^[74] In the Letter to Herodotus (76-77, 78, 81; cf. Ep. Men . 123) is the property of the gods, while the former without the latter is regularly used for man (Ep. Hdt . 78, 79, 80). Nonetheless (F 141 Usener) Epicurus writes to Colotes, who had paid his teacher a sign of honor typically reserved for the gods:

You made us worship and honor you in our turn; go and be immortal and think of us as immortal. ().

The well-known similarity between the divine and the human condition is felt so strongly that even the epithet typically reserved for gods can be applied to the Epicurean. From this arose the famous comparison of Epicurus to a god, familiar from Lucretius.^[75]

[73] Cf. C. De Heer, MAKAP—EYD AIMW N—OL BIOS —EYTYXHS : A Study of the Semantic Field Denoting Happiness in Ancient Greek to the End of the Fifth Century BC (Amsterdam, 1969).

[74] VS 31: "In dealing with death all of us humans inhabit a town without walls."

[75] 5.8 ff.; cf. Cicero Tusc . 1.48 and Fin . 5.3 for his images on rings and household objects. A recent study by B. Frischer, The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982) is devoted to the iconography of Epicurus. The main thesis of the book, that Epicurus' original statue at Athens was intended to recruit pupils, seems to me rather unconvincing, though Frischer's analysis of the typology of Epicurean sculptures is interesting in itself.

Pyrrho, another philosopher of the early Hellenistic age, is similarly praised by his follower Timon (T 61 Decleva Caizzi = F 67 Diels), but I would like to point out an important difference between the image of Epicurus and that of Pyrrho. Here are Timon's verses:

This, Pyrrho, my heart yearns to know, how on earth you, though a man, live easily in peace, never taking thought, and consistently undisturbed, heedless of the whirling motions and sweet voice of wisdom? You alone lead the way for mankind, like the god who drives around the whole earth as he revolves, showing the blazing disk of his well-rounded sphere.^[76]

Timoh's picture of Pyrrho emphasizes the philosopher's unique achievement and contrasts it with the miserable crowd of "mortals." Timon's verses on Pyrrho, and Antigonus' anecdotes about his way of life, tally well.^[77] Pyrrho himself is said to have described his ethical goal as "difficult" (, T 15 Decleva Caizzi). In contrast with Epicurus, Pyrrho left no disciples whose lives resembled his at any deep level. The philosophers who revived his name much later made no attempt, so far as we can tell, to imitate Pyrrho's lifestyle.

Although the Epicureans venerated the founder of their philosophy, they did not conceive of the Epicurean life as one that was outside their own reach. On the contrary, once one has discovered, thanks to Epicurus, that pleasure is the beginning and end of the happy life (Ep. Men . 127: ), the end is taken to be easy to attain . Epicurean texts are strikingly full of eu - compounds: pleasure and good are easy to get, evil and pain are easy to avoid.^[78] Nothing similar is offered by Zeno's biography or fragments, and this is surely not accidental.

[76] Trans. Long and Sedley. For some points in Pyrrho's ethical attitude which may have attracted Epicurus, see my commentary to T 28-31 (Pirrone: Testimonianze , 182 ff.) and my article, "Pirroniani e accademici nel III secolo a.C.," in Aspects de la philosophic hellénistique , ed. H. Flashar and O. Gigon, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 32 (Vandoeuvres and Geneva, 1986), 147 ff.

[77] See my commentary, passim.

Epicurus speaks of becoming godlike, but this is very different from what Plato intended by "likeness to god." In the Platonic tradition the goal is something one approaches but never attains in ordinary life, just as one cannot attain perfect knowledge and truth in an embodied state; the dichotomy between intelligible and sensible, divine and human, is influential at every level. In Epicurus, divine does not signify a different order of reality from human. Long and Sedley have argued that the gods, according to Epicurean theory, are paradigms of everybody's ethical goal, idealized models of what man wants to achieve, "paragons of the Epicurean good life."^[79] If it is correct to maintain—as they convincingly do—that in the original theory the gods are thought-contents, with no independent reality outside human minds, we can understand the meaning of Epicurus' ethical goal even better.

A remark about Epicurus' emphasis on "self-sufficiency" will serve as an appropriate conclusion.^[80] Self-sufficiency can have two meanings: to need nothing because one is content with what one has, and to need nothing because one has everything. Epicurean texts use it in the first sense, while Stoic ones use it mainly in the second. In fact, contrary to what one could expect, autarkeia is not a pervading theme of early Stoic texts, and as far as I know it is attributed to Zeno only in an epigram by Zenodotus, a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon (cf. DL 7.30).^[81] Apart from the well-known doxographical formula about the self-sufficiency of virtue, only one early occurrence of the term, as cited in the index to von Arnim's collection, is significant, SVF 2.604, from Chrysippus' On Providence: "Only the cosmos is said to be self-sufficient, since it alone has in itself everything it needs" (). This statement agrees with the traditional meaning of autarkeia as a divine qual-

[79] Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers 1: 144 ff.

it).^[82] So, according to the Stoics, it belongs strictly only to the cosmos (and, we may easily infer, to the ideal sage who possesses virtue, not to the man who is not yet virtuous). According to Epicurus, on the other hand, self-sufficiency is a condition every individual can and should achieve in his lifetime, in order to adapt his needs to what he has and be happy, just as every man can make himself godlike (Letter to Mother , ap. Diog. Oen. F 62 Grilli = 53 W.):

Neither small, nor of no importance are the things which now happen to us, such as to make our soul's disposition equal to the divine one, and to show that, not even because of mortality are we inferior to the immortal and blessed nature.

Panaetius on the Virtue of Being Yourself

Christopher Gill

(a) The man who wants contentment [or "peace of mind"] should not undertake many activities, on his own or in company with others, nor should he choose activities beyond his own capacity and nature [

].
DEMOCRITUS F 3 DK^[1]

(b) So not every activity suits everyone; but you should follow the Pythian inscription, "know yourself," and apply yourself to the one activity for which you are naturally suited

and not force yourself to aspire to one kind of life after another, doing violence to your nature [

].
PLUTARCH PERI EUTHUMIAS 472C

(c) So even Epicurus thinks that those who are fond of honor and reputation should not remain in private life but should follow their natural inclinations [

] by entering public life and engaging in politics. Because of their nature

, they are more likely to be agitated and distressed by staying in private life and not getting what they want.
PLUT. PE 465F-466A

(d) Each person should hold firmly on to his own qualities [tenenda aunt sua cuique], provided they are individual without being immoral [non vitiosa, sed tamen propria], so that the propriety [decorum] that we are looking for may be maintained. We must act in a way that does not conflict with our common human nature but which (with this proviso) allows us to follow our own individual nature. So we should use our own nature as the yardstick [regula] for our choice of projects [studia], even if other projects art weightier and better.
CICERO DE OFFICIIS 1.110

(e) Most of all, the mind [animus] must be recalled from all external things into itself [se ipsum]. Let it trust itself rejoice in itself, value its own concerns, retire as far as possible from what is not its own [alienis] and involve itself with itself [se sibi adplicet], not feel losses, and regard even adversities in a positive spirit.
SENECA DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI 14.2

(f) So unperceptive and graceless forgetfulness comes over the masses and takes possession of them . . . and does not allow life to become one [

] by weaving together the past and the present; but separating the person of yesterday from the one of today, and the one of tomorrow from the one of today, as though each person were different, it makes all events nonexistent, because they are not remembered.
PLUT. PE 473C-D

(g) [Nothing] affords one's life so much calm as a mind

that is pure of evil acts and intentions and that has, as the source of its life, a character

which is undisturbed and unstained, from which flow fine deeds in which one can take pride, and memory which is sweeter and more reliable than hope.
PLUT. PE 477A-B

[1] H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker , 10th ed., rev. W. Kranz (Berlin, 1952), hereafter cited as DK. All translations from Greek and Latin in this essay are mine.

In this essay, I have two aims in view. One is to offer an account of the philosophical theories which provide the informing framework for the preceding quotations, all of which, I shall suggest, constitute versions of the advice to "be yourself."^[2] The other is to reconstruct the main lines of Panaetius' lost work On Peace of Mind (Peri euthumias ). These two objectives are related, in that the theme of "being yourself" is one to which Panaetius seems to have given special emphasis, both in his work On Proper Function (Peri tou kathekontos ) as well as in On Peace of Mind . Although Panaetius was a Stoic, and a head of the school, he was unusually open to other philosophical approaches.^[3] I want to suggest that his treatment of the theme of "being yourself" in On Peace of Mind , in particular, constitutes an interesting and original synthesis of Stoic and Democritean-Epicurean approaches. Hence, studying Panaetius' thinking on this subject gives us access to a whole strand of thinking in Hellenistic ethics, and one in which the interplay between different schools is as important as their independent theoretical positions.

How does this essay relate to our larger concerns in this volume? For one thing, I hope that my discussion will complement Fernanda Decleva Caizzi's vivid contrast between Zeno and Epicurus, as regards their ethical stances and styles of self-presentation. In studying Panaetius' thinking on this subject, I shall try to explore some points of contact between

[2] The evident difference between the senses in which these passages convey the meaning "be yourself" (i.e., "observe your own nature," passages a-d ; and "be your essential self" and "unify yourself," passages e-g ) is one of the main points I shall discuss.

these divergent positions, and thus to trace, in this respect, the origins of the philosophical eclecticism which is so marked a tendency in the later Hellenistic and Roman periods.^[4]

At the same time, my theme bears directly on the overall subject of this volume and of the conference on which it is based, self-definition in the Hellenistic world. So far in the volume, the question has not, I think, been raised whether the notion we have been deploying, that of self-definition, has any equivalent in the conceptual framework of Hellenistic Greece. To say this is not to criticize the procedure we have been following. The notion of self-definition typically belongs to a "second-order" vocabulary (that of social psychology or social anthropology, say), in terms of which we offer explanations for actions originally conceived in other terms. Hence, it is entirely natural that we should analyze as modes of "self-definition" social practices (such as those of commemorating one's vows to the gods, or to one's dead relatives) whose "ideology," or overt function, is explicated in the culture—if at all—in quite different terms.^[5] However, it is also worth asking whether Hellenistic culture deploys any such notion as self-definition; and it is, in part, an interest in this question that has directed me toward an aspect of Hellenistic intellectual discourse that is markedly reflexive or self-related in character.

There is a further aspect of Hellenistic culture that makes this topic one of special interest. Although the social practices of any culture can, in principle, be studied as a means of self-definition, it seems more appropriate to do so when it matters to the society concerned that it is a self which is being defined. When the culture concerned is sufficiently individualistic or self-conscious in its ethics to make it a matter of explicit concern how an individual defines himself or herself, the subject of self- definition takes on a special relevance.^[6] It is commonly claimed that Hel-

[4] On this tendency, see J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long, eds., The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy , Hellenistic Culture and Society 2 (Berkeley, 1988). At the Berkeley conference, Paul Zanker suggested to me that we can find in Hellenistic art a parallel to the kind of transition I describe in this essay (from the bold, uncompromising doctrines of the early Hellenistic philosophers to the more nuanced and less doctrinal thinking of thinkers like Panaetius). The parallel lies in the transition from the innovative, "baroque" styles of third-century art to the more subtly modulated, "rococo" style of the second century, a style which (like that of Panaetius) is more readily acceptable to conventional taste and attitudes. (I hope I have reported his suggestion correctly.)

[5] I allude to the essays of Paul Zanker and Folkert van Straten, above. Interestingly enough, both the implied "vocabulary" of second-century grave reliefs discussed by Zanker, above, and the ideological justifications of kingly benefaction discussed by Klaus Bringmann, above, are sometimes couched in the language of social roles and virtues which Panaetius deploys in propounding his model of "self-definition," as presented in Cicero De officiis 1.

[6] See further, on the issue of the relationship between the conceptual framework of those investigating and those being investigated, especially in connection with the notion of self, M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes, eds., The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History (Cambridge, 1985), esp. Lukes, "Conclusion," 282-301. This issue is raised in connection with the ancient world by W. Burkert, and A. J. Malherbe, "Craft versus Sect," in Self-definition in the Graeco-Roman World , ed. B. F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders (Philadelphia, 1983), l-3, 46.

lenistic culture had such an ethos, one promoted especially by the redrawing of the politico-cultural map by Alexander and his successors and the consequential confrontations between Greek and non-Greek cultures; and several of the essays in the volume have brought out the way in which the project of "defining oneself" became a matter of some urgency for Hellenistic monarchs, for philosophers, and for Greek society as a whole.^[7] The theme of the importance of "being yourself" in Hellenistic ethics seems to provide a means of exploring how self- consciousness was understood, at least in one area of the culture's discourse; and also of seeing how far, and in what sense, the stance adopted is an "individualistic" one.^[8] Also, the study of the reflexive mode in Hellenistic philosophical vocabulary seems to offer a special point of access to the understanding of the conception of the self in that age;^[9] and this seems relevant, in a different way, to our theme of self-definition, as well as to my own current research interests.^[10]

I

As I have said, I think that Panaetius' thinking on the importance of "being yourself" in On Peace of Mind constitutes an original synthesis of

[7] See esp. the essays of Ludwig Koenen, R. R. R. Smith, and Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, above.

[8] In the modern period, the call to "be yourself" has often been associated with markedly individualistic stances (cf. the discussion of Nietzsche in V below), and it is of interest to see if a study of this theme bears out the common claim that Hellenistic philosophy is characteristically individualistic. See, most recently, M. Hossenfelder, "Epicurus—Hedonist Malgré Lui," in The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics , ed. M. Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge, 1986), 245-263, esp. 246-249. One of the problems in testing this claim lies in determining what "individualism" means; on the complex strands in the modern understanding of "individualism," see S. Lukes, Individualism (Oxford, 1973), and T. C. Heller, M. Sosna, and D. E. Wellbery, eds., Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought (Stanford, 1986). See further below.

[9] As S. Toulmin underlines, one cannot simply equate the use of reflexive vocabulary with consciousness of "the self" as a distinct entity; see Toulmin, "Self-knowledge and Knowledge of the Self," in The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues , ed. T. Mischel (Oxford, 1977), 291-317. However, in the context of ethical theories in which there are already indications of a concern with "the self" as a psychological entity, reflexive language can help to indicate the kind of self presupposed and the stance adopted toward that self.

[10] I pursue these questions in The Self in Dialogue: Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy (Oxford, forthcoming).

Democritean-Epicurean and Stoic approaches; and I want to begin by outlining the two lines of approach which he synthesizes. I will then examine these two strands in more detail, drawing, for the Stoic side of the synthesis, on Panaetius' own thinking in On Proper Function (as represented in Cicero's De officiis ).^[11] In my reconstruction of On Peace of Mind , I shall draw, like other scholars, on points of similarity between Cicero's De officiis and two later works on peace of mind, by Seneca and Plutarch, which are apparently based on that of Panaetius.^[12] But my main concern will be to bring out the synthesis of Democritean-Epicurean and Stoic lines of thought, and to show how this synthesis results in the theme of "being yourself" acquiring a new depth and complexity of meaning.

I shall begin by outlining the principal differences between the Democritean-Epicurean and Stoic approaches to the subject of peace of mind.^[13] The essential difference, from which all the other differences flow, lies in their thinking about the final goal or end of life (telos ), a difference which has been seen since antiquity as the central point of ethical difference between the Epicureans and Stoics. For Democritus and Epicurus, peace of mind, understood as euthumia or ataraxia , was regarded as man's proper goal (or part of it), a goal to be pursued deliberately, albeit one which was compatible with the practice of virtue in certain forms. For the Stoics, on the other hand, virtue was the only proper goal for deliberate pursuit, the only real "good"; absence of emotional disturbance, in its strongest form apatheia , was seen rather as a by-product of this pursuit, insofar as it was characteristic of the state of mind of the completely virtuous or "wise" man.^[14]

[13] In this outline I will (a ) lump together Democritus and Epicurus on the one hand and the early Stoics and Panaetius on the other and (b ) ignore common ground between the two approaches. Subsequently, I will (a ) unpick the components of these two strands and (b ) explore the degree of common ground between them.

[14] See A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987) 21B, esp. 4, 6; 210, P; 58A; 61A; 63 passim, esp. A, F, L, M. Cf. ibid. 1:398-399, where the authors emphasize that the Stoics, like most other philosophical schools, accepted that the "end" of life was happiness (eudaimonia ) but argued that this goal was constituted by virtue. It is worth pointing out that this new collection of texts, translations, and commentaries is an invaluable aid to future research (note, e.g., the bibliography at 2:476-512), and that it makes the charting of the terrain of Hellenistic philosophy a real possibility.

From this central difference, related differences flowed. In the Stoic approach, the choice of one's role in life was seen as the selection of a context in which one could give expression to the desire to act "well," that is, virtuously; hence, they stressed the importance of choosing a role that one's talents and inclinations allowed one to practice well, and to carry through to the end (or to one's own end). In the Democritean-Epicurean version, on the other hand, the choice of role was viewed primarily in terms of whether or not it was likely to produce euthumia or ataraxia. In this version too, one was urged to maintain one's natural talents and inclinations; but this was presented as a means of obtaining peace of mind rather than of finding the most appropriate role for virtuous action.

A comparable difference exists in their attitude to meeting life's un-chosen contingencies (as distinct from choosing a role for one's life). Both sides emphasize the importance of a rational critique of desires in enabling one to counter contingencies, and both emphasize the possibility of achieving in this way a kind of "self-sufficiency" (autarkeia ). For Democritus and Epicurus, the means of achieving this lies in discouraging desires for objects which one might not in practice obtain (or which do not in fact yield pleasure), and discouraging emotions (such as fear of death) which are inherently distressing or which may have distressing consequences. The Stoics too practiced a kind of "preparation for future evils" (praemeditatio futurorum malorum ). But the essential feature of this lay in the insistence on the radical distinction between what is and is not "up to us," and on the fact that only the former category of things (that is, virtuous or non-virtuous actions) constitutes what is genuinely good or bad; external contingencies are "matters of indifference."^[15] Similar differences are evident in the way in which each side approaches the theme of shaping one's life and giving it unity. The Stoics saw consistency and stability as being, like apatheia , natural by-products of the wise man's state of mind and his adoption of virtue as an absolute priority. Insofar as this attitude interpenetrated a person's whole life, that life would acquire the "good flow" (eurhoia ) that Zeno identified with happiness.^[16]

[15] For autarkeia in Democritus, see F 176, 210 DK; cf. 119, 146, 191; in Epicurus, Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 21B (4) and Caizzi, above; in Stoicism, Diogenes Laertius 6.128, cited by Annas, below.

[16] See esp. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 61A (= Diog. Laert. 7.89): "virtue is a consistent character (diathesis ), choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external. Happiness consists in virtue since virtue is a soul which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life." Cf. also 63A on eudaimonia as a eurhoia biou .

Democritus and Epicurus seem also to have seen one's life as being unifiable, though rather by a self-conscious process of focusing one's projects and desires. They also advocated the management of memories and anticipation so as to maximize one's sense of well-being and to guarantee a pleasurable unity of consciousness.

II

Let us look at these two positions in more detail, beginning with that key fragment of Democritus which is often cited by later writers on euthumia:

The man who wants contentment [or "peace of mind": ] should not undertake many activities, on his own or in company with others, nor should he choose activities beyond his own capacity and nature . But he should be on his guard, so that, when good fortune strikes and leads him delusively [ ] toward excess, he rejects this and does not attempt more than he can . A reasonable load is safer than a great mass.^[17]

From this fragment, taken in conjunction with others, several points emerge about Democritus' position. One is that euthumia is conceived as a goal (perhaps the goal) in life,^[18] and that the appraisal of one's natural capacities and inclinations is seen as a means to achieving that goal. A second point, reiterated in what seem to be versions or glosses of Democritus' view, is that one should give focus to one's life, not choosing a plurality of objectives or roles (nor restlessly oscillating between them); and that the kind of life chosen should not be one which "forces" or "constrains" one's nature.^[19]

These aspects of Democritus' thinking are those in which the theme of "being yourself" (in the sense of "adhering to your own nature") is

[17] F 3 DK; cf. Epicurus fragment given by Diogenes of Oenoanda (F 53 Grilli; F 40 Chilton), cited in DK, F 3 n. l; Sen. Tranq . 13.1; Plut. PE 465c.

[18] Cf. J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The Creeks on Pleasure (Oxford, 1982), 29-31; and M. Nill, Morality and Self-interest in Protagoras, Antiphon, and Democritus (Leiden, 1985), 76-77. The idea that Democritus' ethical thinking is centered on a single telos may be anachronistic; cf. C. Kahn, "Democritus and the Origins of Moral Philosophy," AJPh 106 0985): 1-31, esp. 25-26; and M. R. Wright, review of Nill, AncPhil 8 (1988): 117-21. But he was certainly viewed in this light by some later ancient writers and was probably so viewed by Epicurus and Panaetius.

most evident. But these aspects are related to a more general strategy of self-management. The core of this strategy lies in encouraging satisfaction with what "is present" (that is, present in one's own life and present at any one time), and discouraging the desire for what "is absent" (but present in someone else's life or potentially present in one's own future life). A related theme is that "fools" mismanage their sense of time, failing to appreciate the available satisfactions of the present and looking restlessly toward imaginary future advantages.^[20] Another aspect of this strategy emerges in the claim that, just as "great joys come from contemplating fine deeds," so consciousness of having performed "just and lawful deeds" gives one freedom from care and euthumia, whereas someone who is aware of having done wrong "is afraid and torments himself."^[21] One of the features of Democritus' fragments which has recently attracted attention is the commendation of virtuous acts (apparently) for their own sake, a feature which is not obviously compatible with the presentation of euthumia as an overall goal.^[22] A line of explanation suggested by the fragments quoted is that it is the consciousness of having performed good acts which contributes to one's mental well-being (although it does not follow that the good acts are envisaged as having been performed for the sake of achieving such well-being).^[23] If so, there are a number of respects in which Democritus' strategy for self-management was developed by Epicurus and, it would seem, by Panaetius in On Peace of Mind .^[24]

Epicurus, like other thinkers, took note of Democritus' comments on the importance of not going "beyond [your] capacity and nature," if you are to achieve euthumia.^[25] Indeed, he seems to have been sufficiently impressed by the importance of this point to make an exception, for those naturally inclined to political action, to his general discouragement of political involvement—on the grounds that, "because of their nature [such men] are more likely to be agitated and distressed by staying in private life and not getting what they want."^[26] However, the

[21] F 194, 174 DK; cf. 211, 215, and Plut. PE 466a (supposedly a quotation of Democritus; Broecker, Animadversiones , 61).

[22] See, e.g., F 96, 107a, 264 DK; cf. Kahn, "Democritus," 27-28; Nill, Morality and Self-Interest , 85ff.

[23] An analogous question arises with Epicurus; cf. below, esp. ref. in n. 30.

[25] Cf. refs. in nn. 17 and 19, above.

[26] Plut. PE 465f-466a (= Epicurus F 555 Usener). His position is the inverse of the Stoic one, according to which only special circumstances (including exceptional natural talent) validate exemption from political involvement; cf. Cic. Off . 171-72, discussed below. For a significant clarification of Epicurus' position on political involvement, cf. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers 1: 136-137; and ref. in n. 73, below.

main respect in which Epicurus developed Democritus' thinking in this area lay in his great elaboration of the theme of self-management as regards desires, emotions, and attitude to time; and these developments are strongly reflected in subsequent writings on peace of mind.

Thus, for instance, Democritus' theme that "fools" mismanage their attitude to time, by living for an imagined future of illusory advantages, is clearly taken up by Epicurus and contrasted with the wise man's achievement of peace of mind through a proper attitude to past, present, and future.^[27] The idea that one's life can be unified by consciousness of past, present, and future pleasures (an idea which seems to have been taken up by Panaetius) is implied, at least, in Epicurus' writings.^[28] There are indications too that Epicurus pursued the related line of thought that mental well-being can be enhanced by pleasurable consciousness of one's own virtuous actions.^[29] This raises again the issue whether Epicurus' conception of pleasure as the ultimate goal can allow for the idea that virtue is intrinsically good or good only as a means of maximizing pleasure. This is an issue that Epicurus may have confronted himself, though, if so, it is not easy to determine his final position.^[30] But it seems likely at least that Epicurus saw pleasurable consciousness of one's own good acts (toward friends, for instance) as a significant part of the kind of memory that can make one's present awareness pleasurable and also give one confidence for the future; and in this respect too he probably provided the basis for subsequent elaboration of this means of self-unification.^[31]

III

These Democritean and Epicurean theories represent one of the two principal strands on which Panaetius drew in formulating his ideas on

[27] See, e.g., Cic. De finibus 1.57-63, Tusculan Disputations 5.95; cf. n. 20, above.

[29] See, e.g., Cic. Fin . 1.57-58; for the related point that criminals cannot escape from anxiety and distress, Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 22A (5), B (3), L (7).

[30] Cf. J. Annas, "Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness," Philosophical Topics 15 (1987): 5-21; Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers 1: 137-138.

[31] On Epicurus' (complex) position on friendship, see Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers l: 137-138; cf. Plut. PE 477a-c, f.

"being yourself" in On Peace of Mind . The other strand consists of Stoic thinking on comparable topics. As it happens, the two most relevant passages fall within Cicero's De offficiis l, which is based closely on Panaetius' On Proper Function .^[32] The two passages are (l) the discussion of peace of mind (tranquillitas animi ) in connection with greatness of spirit and (2) the discussion of the "fitting" (decorum ) in connection with self-control, and especially the four-personae theory.^[33] Both these discussions take up topics analogous to those we have considered in Democritus and Epicurus, namely the criteria for choosing one's role in life, the relevance of one's nature to this choice, and the best way of unifying one's life and character. And both discussions do so from a Stoic ethical standpoint, in which virtue is conceived as the overall goal of purposive life.

However, there are some important differences of approach, which go beyond the difference in their specific subject matter. Although both passages seem to be quite closely based on Panaetius' treatment in On Proper Function , the discussion of decorum is generally recognized as representing the most elaborate and innovative part of Panaetius' work.^[34] It also reflects what seems to be a well-marked feature of his thought, namely a greater willingness than is normal in Stoicism to engage with the concerns of imperfect, if well-intentioned, people to accept that different people may validly pursue virtue in significantly different ways.^[35] Associated with this difference is a rather different treatment, indeed a rather different valuation, of the importance of one's own nature, in the two passages. Also, the passage on decorum is couched in a more reflexive style, both in the sense that it invites the reader to reflect on the implications for himself of the advice given (implications which necessarily differ for different people), and in the sense that it lays great stress on the importance of maintaining your own nature in choosing your role. In doing so, this passage has a similar emphasis to some of the comments of Democritus and Epicurus already considered. And, although Panaetius' overall approach clearly remains a Stoic one, the passage on decorum shows some indications of interest in the alternative, Democritean-Epicurean, approach to "being oneself" and peace of mind, an interest which becomes much more marked in On Peace of Mind .

Let me begin with the discussion of courage (conceived as "greatness

[32] For Cic. Off . 1 as evidence both for On Proper Function and On Peace of Mind , cf. refs. in nn. 11 and 12, above; as far as I know, we have no way of telling which of these two works of Panaetius was written first.

[33] Cic. Off . 1.66-81, 92; 93ff., esp. 107-21.

[34] Cf. Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum , 55ff.

[35] Cf. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 63G, 66C, D, E, and commentary, 1:66-67.

of spirit," megalopsuchia or magnitudo animi ) and with the strategy outlined here for obtaining peace of mind. This discussion consistently reflects the orthodox Stoic view that virtue is the only proper goal for deliberate pursuit and that absence of emotional disturbance (apatheia ) is a by-product of this pursuit, insofar as it is characteristic of the character (diathesis ) of the wise man. It is from the recognition that only what is "fine" (honestum ) is "good" (bonum ) that there derive the indifference to externals (rerum externarum despicientia ) and the freedom from disturbance of mind (perturbatio animi ) that is characteristic of an animus that is fortis et magnus (Cic. Off . 1.66-67). It is these same factors that bring with them tranquillitas animi et securitas , and which enable one to surmount the misfortunes of life without losing one's dignitas (sense of worth) and constantia (Cic. Off . 1.67, 69).

The Stoic thesis that you attain peace of mind by pursuing virtue, not peace of mind, is underlined by discussion of the ways in which most people, ill-advisedly, do take peace of mind as their objective, typically by seeking otium in the country as a means of escaping negotia publica . Cicero criticizes those whose reasons for seeking otium are poor ones (for instance, those who do so because they want to live "like kings," so as "to live as you please," sic vivere ut velis );^[36] and those whose alleged reason (a contempt for glory) conceals a weakness of character that makes them unwilling to confront the vicissitudes of public life (Cic. Off . 1.71). He does note various factors which qualify as legitimate grounds for exemption from public involvement, including the possession of an exceptional natural talent (ingenium ) for philosophy.^[37] But for those whose nature allows this as a possibility, the public role is strongly recommended as being a means by which, above all, mankind can be benefited and magnitudo animi expressed (Cic. Off . 1.70-71). For those who make this choice, and who achieve greatness of spirit in this role, tranquillitas animi and constantia accrue, as a by-product of the tenacious maintenance of a role to which they attach proper ethical weight.^[38]

It is worth underlining the ethical strategy involved here, to sharpen comparison with the passage on decorum . The key elements are: (1) the ethical ideal (the animus fortis et magnus ), (2) one's individual nature and capacities, and (3) the project or life chosen (notably, the bios praktikos or

[36] Cic. Off . 1.70; on the connotations of the latter phrase, cf. Pohlenz, Antikes Führer-tum , 46.

[38] 72-73, cf. 80-81, 83.

theoretikos ). The basic thesis is that the main determinant in one's choice should be (1), the ethical ideal. Attention is also paid to (2), one's individual nature, but rather as a limiting factor than as a central concern. It is the achievement of (1) that is presented as conferring consistency of life and peace of mind. When we turn to the passage on decorum , and especially to the four-personae theory, we find a strategy that is, on the face of it, simply a more elaborate version of this. The four personae (masks, roles, or statuses) are presented as normative reference points to guide our selection of what is "fitting" for us and so to enable us to achieve "self-control" (sophrosune/temperantia ). The four personae consist of the three elements identified above, with one addition. The first persona is our common human nature as rational agents capable of self-direction and virtue (hence this persona constitutes the central ethical ideal), and the second is our specific nature as individuals. The third element of the earlier discussion is subdivided into two further personae : (3), the social position and status in which we find ourselves at any one time, and (4), the project or bios we choose for ourselves. The essence of the theory is that, as well as acting in a way that is "fitting" to each persona , we should harmonize these personae to each other if we are to achieve the kind of lifelong consistency (aequabilitas . . . universae vitae ) which constitutes decorum . Above all, the two most important personae , our nature as (virtue-bearing) human beings and as individuals, must be harmonized to each other.^[39]

In broad outline, the two passages express the same (Stoic) thesis that all other considerations (the choice of a role, one's attitude toward one's nature, the unification of a life) are subordinate to, and depend on, the pursuit of virtue. However, there are significant differences of emphasis, notably the much greater stress, in the decorum passage, on the importance of maintaining one's own natural characteristics and of treating one's own nature as a key normative reference point in one's choice of life and as a crucial factor in the achievement of a unified, self-consistent life.^[40] Indeed, of all ancient texts, this is the one in which the theme of

[39] See 93ff., esp. 98, 100, 107-121; cf. my "Personhood and Personality: The Four-Persona Theory in Cicero's De Officiis I," OxfStAncPhilos 6 (1988): 169-199. This discussion does not present tranquillitas animi as a concomitant of the achievement of virtue (as 1.66ff. does); rather, making oneself tranquillus and free from perturbatio is presented as part of the "self-control" involved in acting "appropriately" to our nature as human beings; see 101-102, 131, and 136.

[40] See esp. tenenda sunt sua cuique . . . propria . . . propriam nostrum naturam sequamur . . . studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur (cf. passage d at the start of this essay). neque attinet naturae repugnare . . . nihil decet adversante et repugnante natura (110), cf. further 111-112; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum (113); suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium . . . (114); ad suam cuiusque naturam consilium est omne revocandum (119). Cf. 120.

the importance of "being yourself," in this sense, is most emphatically affirmed.

I have suggested in another context that, although the basic theory is a coherent one, there are certain problems and incoherences in the detailed working out of the theory, and that these seem to go back to Pan-aetius himself. These consist, in essence, in a failure to stress sufficiently the importance of maintaining consistency with all the four personae (especially the crucial one of our universal nature as rational moral agents) and, relatedly, a failure to confront the difficulties which such a project entails.^[41] The emphasis, for instance, on maintaining one's individual nature, and on the importance of this for the achievement of lifelong consistency (aequabilitas and constantia ), is not matched by an equal emphasis, in the same context, on the importance of maintaining our common. human persona .^[42] In my other discussion, I have been inclined to ascribe this to a certain conventionality of thinking on Panaetius' part. As a Rhodian aristocrat and a friend of Scipio Aemilianus, he assumed rather readily that there would be no fundamental difficulty in meeting the claims of virtue, one's social position, and one's nature (interpreted in the light of social expectations) at one and the same time and to an equal degree.^[43] However, an alternative line of approach would be to suggest that, in adopting and developing Democritus' theme of the importance of following one's nature (if, indeed, it is from Democritus that he takes up the theme), he gives it an emphasis which is to the detriment of his own larger (Stoic) thesis.^[44] I do not want to press this point unduly;

[41] Thus, e.g., the importance of maintaining consistency with our common human nature is stressed most in 97-98, 100-106 (prior to the formal presentation of the four-personae theory), while the conduct appropriate to determinate ages and social roles is presented as a kind of appendix in 122-125 (cf. the continuing discussion of "fitting" styles of behavior, 126ff.), without explicit reference to the overall theory. See further Gill, "Personhood and Personality," where I contrast Epictetus' more rigorous handling of a persona theory in 1.2, 2.10.

[42] Cf. refs. in n. 40, above; note also the awkwardness of the advice to retain your nature even at the cost of being one of those qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur (109). There is some stress in 110-121 on retaining your common human nature; but the main stress is on one's individual nature, with parenthetic "glosses" on the importance of not pressing "individuality" to the extent that it becomes positively vitiosa (11), cf. vitia (114), vitiosae (120).

[43] For such conventionality, see esp. 104, 116, and 126ff., esp. 128, 138-140, and 148. See further, on Panaetius' background and the "Aristokratisierung der Ethik," Pohlenz, Antiktes Führertum , 130ff.; P. Brunt, "Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and of the Stoics," PCPhS 19 (1973): 9-34, esp. 19ff.

the larger differences between the Democritean and the Stoic approach (even in its Panaetian version) remain substantial. But the shared emphasis on consistency with one's nature does seem to be an indication of the interest in the Democritean-Epicurean approach that is so marked in On Peace of Mind .

One other possible indication, in the decorum passage, of interest in the Democritean approach, is the emphasis on quasi-aesthetic appreciation of one's own virtue. As we saw earlier, both Democritus and Epicurus seem to have stressed the contribution to one's mental well-being of consciousness of one's own virtuous actions; and the theme is developed in markedly aesthetic language in Plutarch's On Peace of Mind , where it is firmly linked with the theme of self-unification.^[45] The idea that decorum (both as an aspect of virtue in general and of temperantia in particular) can confer a kind of moral "beauty" on one's life is widely recognized as being a central element in Panaetius' ethical theory, and one which is sometimes linked with the theme of constantia ("self-consistency").^[46] The treatment of the idea in De officiis has a rather different emphasis from that in the other texts, in that there is more stress on the visibility of this beauty to others , and less on its visibility to oneself .^[47] This presumably reflects a larger difference of strategy: in Panaetius' On Proper Function , at least, the aim is to celebrate the inherent beauty of the virtuous life, rather than to illustrate the contribution of one's consciousness of virtue to one's personal happiness. However, this additional sign of Panaetius' possible interest in the Democritean-Epicurean approach is worth noting, especially given the elaboration of this idea (in a way that is closer to Democritus and Epicurus) in On Peace of Mind .

IV

It is to the reconstruction of this latter work that I now want to turn. The one thing we know for certain about the work is that Panaetius included Anaxagoras' dictum on his sons death, "I knew my son was mortal," a dictum which became famous as an expression of "Stoic" emo-

[45] Cf. refs. in nn. 21, 24, 27-29, above; Plut. chaps. 8-9, 14-15, discussed below.

[46] See, e.g., 93, 95, 98 (esp. constantiae, constantia ), 102 (esp. ex quo elucebit omnis constantia ), 103; cf. Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum , 55ff.; Brunt, "Dio Chrysostom," 19 n. 2 and refs.

[47] See esp. 98: hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur ; cf. 126ff., esp. 130-132, 142, 145-146 (one should learn to "tune" one's conduct by using the guidance and implied moral criticism of the reactions of others), and 147.

tional fortitude.^[48] In fact, we have more than just this isolated quotation to work on. Plutarch's citation of the dictum, in the treatise on peace of mind and elsewhere, provides an immediate context of significance, and one which is confirmed both by analogous passages of Seneca's treatise on this subject and by parts of the discussion of courage in Cicero's De officiis . The common theme is the classic Stoic practice of praemeditatio futurorum malorum , surmounting evils by anticipating them.^[49] The principal recurrent motifs in the discussions are (1) a studied anticipation of future possible disasters, so that nothing will occur to make one say "I had not thought of that";^[50] and (2) an insistence on the radical distinction between external contingencies (which do not depend on our agency) and our state of mind and character (which do), a distinction expressed in terms of the maintenance of calm within a storm.^[51]

On the face of it, the resemblances between these works provide an adequate basis for a reconstruction of Panaetius' general strategy in the treatise. The fact that the immediate context of Panaetius' citation of Anaxagoras' dictum has marked points of resemblance to the discussion of courage in the De officiis suggests that this is the context in which to look for the Panaetian strategy in the treatise on peace of mind. Indeed, one might outline a plausible strategy along the following lines. Whereas Democritus, in his treatise on euthumia, focused on the role of sophrosune in moderating desires and ambitions (and was followed in this line of approach by Epicurus),^[52] Panaetius focused rather on the role of courage (andreia ) or greatness of spirit (megalopsuchia ). In effect (one might conjecture), his claim was that peace of mind came not from restricting one's desires to the attainable (and so minimizing the disappointment and distress which the contingencies of fortune might bring), but by preparing oneself mentally to meet any misfortune; thus, Anaxagoras is enabled to meet his son's death with the ringing declaration that he knew he had begotten a mortal. Panaetius' strategy, as so reconstructed, is an orthodox Stoic one (like the account of courage in On

[49] Cf. Cic. Tusc . 3.29ff., 52ff.; I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung (Berlin, 1969), 60-62.

[51] Cic. Off . 1.83 (cf. 67, 72-73); Sen. Tranq . 14, esp. 10; Plut. PE chaps. 17-18, esp. 475e-476a.

[52] Cf. discussion above, esp. nn. 20 and 27.

Proper Function ), and one designed to confront the existing Democritean and Epicurean ones.

As a matter of fact, I think this general characterization of Panaetius' aims is not wholly wide of the mark; but I also think it does not quite capture the scope or the character of Panaetius' project. For one thing, as Pohlenz pointed out, the very choice of the topic of euthumia (as opposed to, say, apatheia) indicates that Panaetius is moving further into the terrain of Democritus and Epicurus than one might expect in an orthodox Stoic work.^[53] Consistent with this is the fact that both the later treatises (by Seneca and Plutarch) combine what one might call a Democritean approach to euthumia, emphasizing the importance of restricting desires to what is attainable, with the Stoic emphasis on preparing oneself to meet the vicissitudes of life with equanimity.^[54] More striking still is the fact that, in taking up the Democritean approach, they also take up a theme which is common to Democritus, Epicurus, and the decorum section of the De officiis: namely that any project we undertake should be one that matches our own individual capacities and inclinations, whether or not it corresponds to the highest ambitions we can conceive.^[55] In other words, just as it is possible to recognize a network of connections between the two later treatises and the courage section of De officiis (giving us the context of Anaxagoras' dictum), so too it is possible to see a network of connections between the two later treatises and the decorum section, centering on the theme of the importance of "being yourself" (in the sense of matching your project to your individual nature) if you are to achieve peace of mind.

However, these points of connection raise fundamental questions about the character of Panaetius' overall position in On Peace of Mind . Earlier I suggested that, although the emphasis on retaining one's nature in the decorum section resembled Democritus', it still remained part of a recognizably distinct and basically Stoic position. What was the case in On Peace of Mind ? Did Panaetius here move closer to the Democritean position and situate the theme of retaining one's nature in the context of the pursuit of euthumia rather than virtue? And if so, how, did this

[53] Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum , 134.

[55] Cf. refs. in nn. 17, 19, and 40, above; also Sen. Tranq . 6.2, 7.2; Plut. PE chap. 13, esp. 472c.

square with the more orthodox Stoic approach indicated by the citation of Anaxagoras' dictum? I think there is a possible answer to these questions, and that it goes beyond suggesting that Panaetius' approach was simply additive , combining different strategies without mutual assimilation.

I think that Panaetius tried to synthesize the approaches by focusing on their common elements and by deemphasizing the fundamental point of divergence between them, namely their differing conceptions of the telos of life. He focused on the fact that (1) both approaches emphasize the extent to which our happiness and unhappiness depend on ourselves, as rational agents; (2) both approaches emphasize the extent to which the unification of our lives and characters depends on ourselves; and (3) both approaches emphasize the importance of being (and being conscious of being) virtuous.^[56] He underlined this common ground by giving an additional sense to the idea of "being yourself," namely that of being your "real" or "essential" self, that of the rational moral agent; and of stressing the role of that self in giving one's life unity. This sense of "being yourself" is not new to Greek philosophy; one can find striking antecedents in Plato and Aristotle.^[57] But it is not an idea that seems to have been deployed in the earlier writings on euthumia; and Panaetius' introduction of it seems to represent a deliberate move to underline the common ground in these two approaches.

I want to conclude this reconstruction of Panaetius' On Peace of Mind by noting some passages in Seneca and Plutarch in which this strategy is exemplified. Clearly, some of the examples and coloring have been added, but I believe the basic approach is Panaetian. It is worth noting in advance that these passages are couched predominantly in reflexive terms, that is, in terms of one's relations with oneself. This indicates that, in the treatise on peace of mind, Panaetius extended to the treatment of praemeditatio malorum and greatness of spirit the reflexive mode of exposition that is characteristic of the decorum passage; and thus he added the implied thesis that acting in the way recommended constitutes "being yourself" in a deep sense. Thus Seneca, for instance, advocates that we meet misfortune by having the mind (animus ) recalled from all external things into itself (se ipsum , 14.2);^[58] and, in a related context, he praises the attitude of the wise man who regards "not just his possessions and social worth but also his body, eyes and hand . . . and indeed himself

[56] Cf. refs. in nn. 20-21, 27-29, 31, 38-39, 45-47, 49-51, above.

[57] See, e.g., Pl. Alcibiades 1.132-135, esp. 133b-c; Pl. Rep . 611c-612a; Arist. Nicomachean Ethics 1166a13-23, 1168b34-69a3, 1178a2-7; the "self" so singled out is reason, either in its practical or theoretical functions.

[58] For the context, see passage e at the start of this essay.

(se . . . ipsum ) as transitory (or "loaned," precaria , 11.1)." This second passage may seem to contradict the first; but the common theme is that one's self (that is, one's real self) is identical only with one's agency, or what is "up to us," and that even that self is "loaned" to us for the duration of our lives. Seneca's point, in these cases, is that by thinking about ourselves in this way we will meet death with equanimity.

The figures that Seneca idealizes in these passages are those who realize the nature of the self, and who are thereby enabled to meet death with equanimity and peace of mind. Hence, he praises the rational detachment of Julius Canus, who approached his end determined to watch and see "whether the animus is conscious of leaving in that swiftest of moments" (14.9). "No one," as Seneca puts it "played the philosopher longer," and, in so doing, he exhibited "calm (tranquillitas ) in the midst of a storm and a mind (animus ) worthy of immortality" (14.10). Implied in Seneca's commendation is the idea that such a man has performed virtuously in playing to the end a worthwhile role.^[59] Hence, Julius Canus' stance is similar to that of the wise man in 11.3 who is able to say to fortune, "receive back a mind (animus ) which is better than the one you gave." Although the stance idealized is more obviously Stoic than Epicurean, the Epicureans too could appreciate heroic indifference in the face of, or at the prospect of, death.^[60] Similarly, there is nothing in the basic doctrine of the passage (that an understanding of the "real" nature of the self can give us the equanimity to confront death and disaster) that either school would find unacceptable, or that would force into the open the deep ethical differences between the schools. And the implied message, that we should, in this sense, "be ourselves" (or realize that this is our self) seems designed to serve as a focus for such shared convictions.

The same strategy is evident in the cognate parts of Plutarch's treatise, including the context that contains the quotation of Anaxagoras' dictum. Thus, as part of an argument that reflecting on possible disasters can help us to confront them, Plutarch urges us to realize that fortune has power only over our "unsound" part (our body), whereas "we ourselves have power over the better part, in which the greatest of our goods is situated, namely sound beliefs and learning and arguments which issue

[59] For this view of the role as ethical vehicle, including the role of philosopher as well as statesman, see Sen. Tranq . 1.10-12, 3-5, esp. 4.1-6 and 5.1-3 (Socrates as an exemplar of virtus confronting fortuna ); the whole passage seems to be a response to Cic. Off . 1.69-73, or its Panaetian original.

[60] On the "philosophical" death, cf. M. Griffin, "Philosophy, Cato, and Roman Suicide," G&R 33 (1986): 65-77, 192-202, who brings out the nondoctrinal status of this ideal. See further Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers , 24, esp. A, D, E; and n. 62, below.

in virtue." Hence, we should appreciate that, while fortune can make one ill or poor, it cannot take away the character of a man who is "good and brave and great-spirited," a man whose wise disposition (diathesis ) can bring "calm" in physical and emotional storms.^[61] In a passage that is reminiscent of Seneca's presentation of Julius Canus, Plutarch claims that the best protection against fear of death is an understanding of "the nature of the psyche," and a realization that death is a change to the better or at least to nothing worse, so that, if things are externally bad, "the harbor is near" and we can "swim away from the body as from a leaky boat."^[62] As in Seneca, the capacity to survive disasters without loss of peace of mind is taken to depend on a proper understanding of our "real" self, the rational agency on which our happiness ultimately depends. And, again as in Seneca, awareness of oneself as a good moral agent makes a crucial contribution to one's peace of mind. Hence, nothing "affords one's life so much calm (galene ) as a mind that is pure of evil acts and intentions and that has, as the source of its life, a character (ethos ) which is undisturbed and unstained."^[63]

Thus far, Plutarch's evidence simply confirms the version of Panaetian strategy given by Seneca; but in some other contexts Plutarch places a further informing gloss on this strategy. In discussing the decorum theory, I noted the Panaetian emphasis on the idea that our conduct and character can acquire a certain moral "beauty." In the decorum section the stress is on the visibility of this beauty to others; but in Plutarch's treatment it is on the visibility of this beauty to the person concerned. He suggests that we can, by reflecting on our lives and emphasizing the good rather than the bad, endow our lives with the kind of beauty that promotes a sense of well-being.^[64] As in the decorum passage, awareness of the beauty of one's life is associated with awareness of its unity and self-consistency. This latter theme is developed in a related passage, in which Plutarch emphasizes the role of memory in constituting personal identity or, as he puts it, in allowing "life to become one by weaving together the past and the present."^[65] In the conclusion of the work Plu-

[61] Plut. PE chap. 17, 475d-476a; for the philosophical background, cf. nn. 51 and 54, above.

[62] Plut. PE chaps. 17-18, esp. 476a-c; the attitude and the language have both Stoic and Epicurean parallels, cf. Broecker, Animadversiones , 177-179.

[63] Plut. PE 477a-b; for fuller quotation, see passage g at the start of this essay; cf. Sen. Tranq . 11.3 and 14.10.

[64] See Plut. PE chaps. 8-9, esp. 469a ("blending" the worse elements with the better) and 470a (the folly of admiring works of art instead of one's own life). See also chap. 15, esp. 473f (mixing one's experiences in one's psyche "as on a palette") and 474a-b (combining the different "notes" in one's life to make a harmonious fusion). Cf n. 47, above.

[65] Plut. PE chap. 14, esp. 473d (cf. fuller quotation in passage f at the start of this essay). The theme is linked with an allusion to a contemporary debate about growth and identity over time that curiously anticipates some modern preoccupations. Cf. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), esp. part 3; see, e.g., 446: "On the Reductionist View [which Parfit advocates], the unity of our lives is something we can affect. We may want our lives to have a greater unity, in the way that an artist may want to create a unified work. And we can give our lives greater unity, in ways that express or fulfill our particular values and beliefs." For a different modern version of "self-creation," cf. Nietzsche, discussed below.

tarch alludes to this theme of self-unification through the management of time, saying that this enables us to conjoin happy memories of the past with cheerful hope for the future (477f). In a related passage, he refers to the importance of having "fine deeds" of one's own to remember so that one can view one's life with equanimity (477b). These passages seem to give us access to a further strand in Panaetius' complex strategy in this work. He combines the Epicurean theme of unifying one's life by recollection of past pleasures with the Stoic theme of coping with future evils by preparing for them. These themes are normally kept separate, or indeed contrasted;^[66] but Panaetius seems to have combined them as part of a policy of seeking peace of mind through self-unification (a policy which figures in both the approaches on which he draws). The theme of self-unification is naturally related to that of "being yourself" in the sense he emphasizes in this work, that is, being your "true" self as a rational moral agent. Whether or not Panaetius' composite strategy is, at bottom, philosophically coherent is a question one might want to pursue further; but I feel reasonably dear that this was his strategy in this work, and that it is a sufficiently distinctive and interesting one to be worth trying to recover.

V

I will conclude this discussion by returning to the question I raised at the beginning: does this account put us in a better position to say what, if anything, "self-definition" meant in the Hellenistic thought-world? Clearly, the area of discourse studied (philosophical ethics) limits the scope of any conclusions we can draw; but, given the ethical centrality of the topic, and the relatively "popular" level of the texts, there is some reason to think that the attitudes expressed may be indicative of more general patterns of thought within the culture. In particular, I will take up the question whether the material studied bears out the claim that Hellenistic ethical theory, like the culture from which it derived, was

distinctively "individualistic."^[67] Is it such individualism that makes the call to "be yourself" a recurrent one in this age?^[68] The question is a difficult one to answer, in part because of the complexity (and elusiveness) of the notion of individualism. But I will try to open up the question a little, indicating, as I do so, what sense of "individualism" I have in view at any one time. My comments will be based especially on Panaetius' On Peace of Mind , as I reconstruct this, though, to a lesser extent, on this whole strand of Hellenistic thinking.

In some respects, the material studied bears out the suggestion that the theme of the importance of "being yourself" is associated with the adoption of an individualistic stance. Even if such works have specific addressees, the basic appeal is to any person, regardless of the precise character of his polis and his family and social background.^[69] In the case of Panaetius' On Peace of Mind and its descendants, the nondoctrinaire character of the work widens the scope of the potential audience, who need not be committed Stoics or Epicureans. The individual addressee is treated as a significant unit (and not simply as the occupant of a given social space), capable, in principle, of choosing his role and shaping his life by those guiding norms whose validity he recognizes. And he is treated as being capable of doing so by reference to himself ; that is (as On Peace of Mind presents it) by reference both to his specific capacities and inclinations, as he understands these, and to his own conception of his "real" or "essential" self. Also, a central concern of this type of literature, at least from Panaetius onward, is to prepare one for a situation in which one has to function as a bare individual, deprived of political, social, and economic support. "Have you the kind of moral and emotional autarkeia to be able to say, with Anaxagoras, 'I knew my son was mortal,' and to surmount the negation of these kinds of support without losing your peace of mind?"^[70] This is the kind of question these texts put to their readers; and the emphasis on "being yourself" is a crucial part of the answer they offer. The answer, in essence, is that one can, at best, find in oneself, and in one's consciousness of one's life as a unified and significant whole, sufficient moral and emotional strength to survive the loss of all external supports. Such an answer is clearly, in one sense at least, an "individualistic" one.

[67] Cf. n. 8 and discussion above.

[68] As L Trilling has shown, Sincerity and Authenticity (Oxford, 1972), the call to "be yourself" has in the modern period been a clarion for (various kinds of) "individualism"; cf. below on Nietzsche.

[69] I will ignore for the present the presumption that the reader will be an educated male of sufficient means to give time and attention to this subject, although at least this much is clearly assumed about the reader. The works by Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch have named addressees, though it is not dear if Panaetius' two works were so addressed.

[70] Cf. refs. in nn. 15, 48-51, above.

However, it is important to define the nature and the limits of this "individualism." For one thing, although these texts set out to prepare a person for political and social isolation, they do not presume that such isolation is desirable in itself, or that it constitutes the basis of an ethical position. The fact that one is expected to shape one's own life does not entail that one must shape a life on one's own . The attitude toward social and political involvement advocated by the Hellenistic schools dearly varies; indeed it is one of the points by which the various schools were standardly distinguished. But, while the Stoics positively advocate political involvement (at least, as an expression of virtue),^[71] Epicurus, as we have seen, sometimes allows it to be advisable.^[72] And his objection, as Tony Long has argued persuasively, is not so much to political involvement as such, but to involvement based on false beliefs and desires.^[73] Panaetius evidently presumes that familial, social, and political engagement go to make up the fabric of the life one is setting out to shape; and that it is in this context that one is to appraise one's specific capacities and inclinations.^[74] This kind of presumption also underlies, to an extent, the recurrent theme that consciousness of one's virtue can contribute crucially to one's peace of mind. There is, of course, scope for debate about what, exactly, "virtue" meant to the different schools, and how their versions relate to the understanding of "virtue" in other parts of society. But it seems clear that the "fine deeds" which are held, from Democritus onward, to contribute to mental well-being derived, in part at least, from ethical engagement in social contexts. It is consciousness of such engagement that contributes to one's sense of "self," and to one's "thread of life" and thereby gives one the inner confidence to survive the loss of such contexts without losing peace of mind.

Also, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that one is invited to formulate one's own stance toward one's life does not entail that the stance to be adopted constitutes what one might call "radical individualism," in which simply being a unique and distinctive individual is regarded as inherently valuable. As an example of such a stance, we might take the significance given by Nietzsche to the call to "be yourself," or to "become who you are."^[75] Some of the implications of this stance come out in the following passage:

[71] Cf. refs. in n. 59, above.

[72] Cf. refs. in n. 26, above.

[73] A. A. Long, "Pleasure and Social Utility: The Virtues of Being Epicurean," in Aspects de la philosophic hellénistique , ed. H. Flashar and O. Gigon, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 32 (Vandoeuvres and Geneva, 1986), 283-324.

[74] Cf. Cic. Off . 1.107-121, and refs. in n. 55, above.

[75] Cf. A. Nehamas, Nietzsche: Lift as Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), chap. 6: "How One Becomes What One Is," esp. 171-172.

One thing is needful .—To "give style" to one's character—a great and rare art! It is practised by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. . . . Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. . . . In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!^[76]

It is interesting that this passage articulates the quasi-aesthetic attitude toward oneself and one's life which, we have seen, is characteristic of Panaetius, both in On Proper Function and On Peace of Mind .^[77] But whereas Panaetius is concerned with a kind of moral beauty, or at least a beauty that is fully compatible with morality, Nietzsche's stance, here as elsewhere, is resolutely "immoralist."^[78] The essence of his art of "self-creation" is that the difference between "strengths and weaknesses," "good and bad," matters less than whether the creation is determined by a "single taste." As Nehamas suggests, what Nietzsche urges is that we appraise ourselves by the same criteria as we judge figures in literature: what matters about Shakespeare's Richard III or Dostoyevsky's Fyodor Karamazov is not whether he is good or bad but whether he is a distinctive and interesting individual , and the same standards should be applied in our "self-creation."^[79] One might define the difference between Nietzsche and Panaetius by couching Nietzsche's theories in terms of the two senses of "being yourself" Panaetius deploys in On Peace of Mind . Nietzsche seems to want to make the specific, individual self (which Panaetius thinks we should take account of, in choosing our role) into the sole normative criterion, or rather into the "essential" self that Panaetius presents as the deeper ethical norm. There may be scope for asking if Panaetius has fully worked out the normative relationship between those two senses of "oneself."^[80] But it is clear that he does not want to collapse the second into the first and to make our particularity (in both its good and its bad aspects) the only basis for shaping our lives. The "individu-

[76] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , trans. W. Kaufmann (New York, 1974), 290.

[77] Cf. nn. 47 and 64, above.

[78] On Nietzsche's "immoralism" as a serious and challenging moral position, cf. P. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford, 1978), chap. 6; Nehamas, Nietzsche , chap. 7.

[79] Nehamas, Nietzsche , 192-194.

[80] I suggested that some problems existed in the working out of the relationship between the first and second personae in the passage on decorum in Cic. Off . 1 (n. 41, above), and the same might be true in the case of the two senses of "being yourself" in On Peace of Mind (though given the speculative nature of my reconstruction it might be hard to establish this firmly).

alism" implied in Panaetius' call to "be oneself" thus falls well short of Nietzsche's, and the comparison with Nietzsche helps us to define those limits.

In conclusion, I will raise—though not try to answer—one important, final question: namely, whether the kind of "individualism" I have ascribed to Panaetius in On Peace of Mind constitutes a distinctively Hellenistic stance, or one which could be paralleled in earlier Greek philosophy. The question is an important one because it is difficult to answer. If one thinks of Pythagoras, say, or Heraclitus, or Socrates, it is clear that the adoption of a stance of reflective detachment from (or postreflective involvement in) one's society is characteristic of Greek philosophers from an early period, and that these earlier figures too reserve the right to formulate their own criteria for such stances.^[81] As I have noted in passing, we can find in earlier Greek philosophy some equivalents for the concerns associated with "being yourself" in the Hellenistic writings on euthumia, namely with natural aptitude and inclination and with one's "essential" self.^[82] Also, the idea that a degree of "self-knowledge" (in some sense) and consciousness of a life committed to an ethically valued role can provide the basis for equanimity in the face of mortal danger already underlies Plato's Apology —a fact which explains Socrates' role as an exemplar in these texts.^[83] Clearly, to confront this question adequately, we should need to define the pre-Hellenistic analogues of the euthumia topic and the several analogues of the theme of "being yourself" (including, of course, the "choice of lives" theme),^[84] and proceed systematically to analyze the points of similarity and difference. I have no intention of trying to do so here. But I simply note the seriousness of the problem as an indication of the fact that, whatever is true of other areas of Greek culture, "individualism" of a sort has deep roots in earlier Greek philosophy.^[85]

[81] I would be interested to see how M. Hossenfelder would respond to this point, in view of the reasons he offers for regarding Hellenistic philosophy as distinctively "individualistic" (n. 8, above).

[82] Cf. refs. in nn. 44 and 57, above.

[83] Cf. Pl. Apology , esp. 21-22, 28-30; Sen. Tranq . 5.1-3; Plut. PE 475e.

[84] See, e.g., Xenophon Memorabilia 2.1.21-34; Pl. Gorgias 484c-486c; Pl. Rep . 360e-361d, 588b-592b; Arist. Eth. Nic . 10.7-8.

[85] This is a heavily revised version of the paper given at the Berkeley conference. I have taken full account of Julia Annas' incisive criticisms, while also trying to state in a clearer form the points I was trying to make in that paper. I am grateful for helpful written comments by Tony Long and Walter Englert, and also for Paul Zanker's interesting suggestion (n. 4, above); and I am also appreciative of the invitation to participate in this stimulating interdisciplinary venture.

Response

Julia Annas

Fernanda Decleva Caizzi has focused, in her fascinating and learned paper, on images of the philosophical life in two ways: the way the philosopher presents himself to other people, and the way other people tend to see the philosopher. Christopher Gill has focused in a highly original way on one ethical philosopher, Panaetius, and the way in which he tries to unite seemingly rather distinct ethical strategies as to how one should achieve one's ethical goal. These two papers are distinct in their subjects and hence in their treatments, and in these remarks I shall deal with each paper separately. But before doing this I think that it is worthwhile briefly to discuss the way that both papers highlight, in different ways, an important point about Hellenistic philosophy which is immediately relevant to the overall theme of this conference: self-definition in the Hellenistic world. Gill has made some remarks on this in his paper, but perhaps a little more can usefully be said on this point.

It is a commonsense assumption in the ancient world that you and I and everyone have a "final end"—that is, I do not just have some projects and plans and commitments in an unrelated jumble but have, at some level, a unified view of how they fit together, of how they form my life as a whole, of where my life is going. All of us have this view in an inexplicit way,^[1] and the complacent and stupid among us may never do more. But it is a mark of the reflective person that he brings to consciousness this fact about himself, that his projects and commitments

hang together as a whole. And it is this point, of conscious self-concern, which forms the entry point for ethical reflection. For ancient ethics is about how best to live your life, about what your aims should be and how you can be happy. And so it is that a kind of concern about yourself raises questions which can only be answered by philosophy; for it is the philosophers who have thought long and hard about happiness and virtue and the problems that these engender. Any intelligent person, then, will be led to ponder a range of philosophical alternatives just given the natural outcome of a kind of self-concern, namely awareness of herself as a person whose concerns and projects form a whole life which is going in one way rather than another. This does not mean, of course, that ethics is all that there is to philosophy, or that ethics dictates conclusions to other parts of philosophy like logic and epistemology (as has been too readily believed by past scholars). But it does show how a very ordinary kind of self-concern leads people to direct concern with philosophy (in a way for which we have no modern parallel). It shows why both a philosopher and his audience would be naturally concerned about the image of his life. For philosophy enters into our reflections by way of offering us reasoned answers as to how to live; and it is natural to ask, when considering one of these answers, whether it works for the person offering it. Does Zeno, or Epicurus, not only talk about but present a life that I find attractive or compelling as an improvement on my own? So the image of the philosopher is relevant to his message in a direct way. And the fact that we are led to philosophy by thoughts about ourselves shows that the issue in Panaetius that is highlighted is one at the heart of Hellenistic ethics. If I am led to philosophize about happiness and virtue by way of thoughts about myself, it is a real question how far thoughts about myself can legitimately persist in the development of the answer, and what form they will take. And so both papers point up the way that the question, "How best should I live?" is both natural to any intelligent person thinking about herself, and the main question that philosophy answers, both by argument and in presenting a certain picture of a life.^[2]

I

Decleva Caizzi points out that it is in the Hellenistic period that we find the emergence of stereotypes of philosophers, that is, images of philoso-

[2] It might be objected that the question, "How am I to live?" is the entry point for ethical reflection in all periods of Greek ethics and does not specifically characterize the Hellenistic period. This is true, but it is also true that in this period the question acquires a new urgency, both in that ordinary people are more self-consciously aware of its importance and in that philosophy as a whole is more sharply focused on ethical answers to it.

phers which show aspects of their theories in their way of life and behavior. We are dependent for this, of course, on the biographical material in authors like Diogenes Laertius, and it is obvious that most of this reveals more about the thought patterns of the originators of the material than it does about its subjects. Nevertheless, Decleva Caizzi is surely right that these stories are of great value in showing that philosophers were expected to act in a way revealing of their theories. And this expectation does seem to be decisively new. We have, for example, no comparable stereotype of Plato or even Aristotle. Their "biographies" contain much material, most of it transparently projected from the works, but no illustrative images of this kind. There is a large amount of this kind of material about Socrates, but it proves precisely the point at issue. The stories, anecdotes, and so on, told about Socrates reflect the philosophical school for which the author is claiming Socrates as figurehead. The stories show great variety because in the Hellenistic period Stoics and Skeptics laid claim to Socrates as a forefather,^[3] as well as hedonists,^[4] in competition with the pictures we find in Xenophon and Plato. Aristotle's ethics requires, given the stress he lays on the development of dispositions, that one's actions express one's ethical beliefs; but he only once makes the point in connection with appearance and details of behavior—his notorious claim that the will have a deep voice and will not hurry along.^[5] And the result is not very happy. But Theophrastus' Characters develops in a quite thorough way the thought that the kind of character trait you have will show up in the kind of thing you do and your general appearance.^[6] The Characters develops this only for particular traits, but the idea is not far off that the priorities and dominant concerns in your life as a whole will find expression in the kinds of things you do and the way you present yourself to and interact with others.

Decleva Caizzi contrasts the images of Zeno and Epicurus that we find preserved in Hellenistic biography, and she notes a significant contrast. Zeno's image is that of someone setting himself apart from most people in a striking way. He makes a point of his poverty and of the independence of the powerful which his philosophical stance entitles him to, at

[3] See A. A. Long, "Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy," CQ 38 (1988): 150—171.

[4] The Cyrenaics claimed descent from Socrates, and Diogenes Laertius sees them this way, listing them as Socratics in book 2. For the tradition of Socrates as hedonist, see the papyrus fragment P. Köln 205 (discussed by M. Schofield, "Coxon's Parmenides," Phronesis 32 [1987]: 349-359).

[5] Aristotle Eth. Nic . 1125a12-16.

[6] Thus grossness and stinginess show up in one's appearance; cowardice about the gods shows up in silly, superstitious behavior over trivialities; failures of intelligence show up in tactless comments at weddings, boring chatter to strangers, and so on.

least in his own eyes. By contrast the details of Epicurus' life do not stand out, and the Epicurean school makes no attempt to show their leader as a striking or dominant personality. I find this contrast convincing, and my comments are limited to details. I wonder whether this self-presentation by Zeno is linked as closely as Decleva Caizzi suggests to a specifically Stoic conception of the philosophical life, rather than a Cynic or Socratic one. And I have a few comments to make on what she says about Epicurus' image, and the accessibility, and the godlike nature, of the Epicurean final end.

Decleva Caizzi does not, of course, underestimate the Cynic elements in the image of Zeno that she discusses. But she also claims that it shows something important about Stoicism, and that Zeno's emphatic poverty, for example, shows some kind of modification of the Stoic view that wealth is a preferred indifferent. It seems to me that there are more problems than she suggests in combining this kind of ostentatious poverty and at times antisocial behavior with Stoic ethics as we know that from our major sources.^[7] If this is so, then Zeno's image is not the right image for Stoicism, as that developed after Chrysippus, and I think that some later Stoics were right to find it embarrassing and to distance themselves from it.^[8]

Decleva Caizzi mentions Zeno's uncompromising attitude to Antigonus as an example of a consciously adopted philosophical attitude, comparing it with the famous stories about Diogenes and Alexander. I would like to note that Zeno's attitude can also be explained in political rather than philosophical terms, but I do not have enough knowledge of the historical background to pursue this.^[9] So I shall concentrate on Zeno's poverty. Decleva Caizzi mentions many stories which indeed show a self-conscious, didactic use of poverty, surely meant to recall Socrates, and I won't repeat them. What I would like to stress is that this sits ill with some other facts. One is that Zeno brought a lot of money to Athens and

[7] Cicero De finibus 3; Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131; Arius Didymus ap. Stob. Ecl . 2.57.13-116.18. Arius and Diogenes derive from common sources, which seem to be textbook accounts of Stoic ethics that may well go back to Chrysippus. They display an ambivalent relation to Cynicism. Cf. Arius 114.24-25, discussed by Caizzi, above; Cic. Fin . 3.68. Diog. Laert. 121 preserves a more positive attitude, but in isolated form. Panaetius seems to have been more violently anti-Cynic; cf. Cic. Off . 1.128, 148.

[8] This is quite distinct from the later attempts to emend or suppress Zeno's Republic ; this concerns Stoic theory itself, and since it was about the ideal state, it has no direct implications for how the Stoic will behave in actual society. Chrysippus, whose image and behavior were quite different from Zeno's, wrote a Republic which seems to have been just as extreme as Zeno's as to what the ideal Stoic society would be like.

[9] The political interpretation is argued by Andrew Erskine in The Hellenistic Stoa (London, 1990).

used it to finance shipping loans.^[10] Now even if we can't trust this just as it stands (and it contrasts with the stories of shipwreck before Zeno came to Athens), the fact that it is in Diogenes Laertius' biography shows at least that in the ancient tradition it was accepted that Zeno was not really poor. Further, as Decleva Caizzi points out, Antigonus of Carystus reports evidence that he was wealthy enough to contribute toward public works.^[11] In this he contrasts with Cleanthes, who was most unusual in that he really had to earn his living.^[12] But Zeno had a private income, like most ancient philosophers; and so conspicuous poverty on his part shows a deliberate attempt to reject the advantages given him by fortune, like Crates the Cynic, who gave away great riches.^[13]

What Stoic grounds would Zeno have for doing this? Nature, in Stoic ethics, motivates us to seek what is natural for us, and this includes all the preferred indifferents, which Aristotle called external goods—health, fitness, and so on. Wealth is always regarded as one of these, and indeed how could it not be? Wealth is, as Rawls puts it, a primary good; whatever else you may want, it increases your resources for doing that. How could it be rational to disable yourself from achieving your ends? And so we find that in standard Stoic theory wealth is a preferred indifferent, and the Stoics even discuss at great length what are the best ways of making money and claim that the Stoic is the only true money maker (as well as the only true king, etc.).^[14] Decleva Caizzi suggests that Zeno modified this idea to some degree, quoting a passage from Athenaeus to the effect that Zeno made an exception for the legitimate and honorable use of money but in other respects classified it as an indifferent and discouraged pursuit and avoidance of it, saying that one should use plain and simple things in a preferable way.^[15] We should note that this passage is not a very good witness, since its author seems not to understand Stoic theory. For Zeno money could not be anything other than indifferent. But an honorable use of money is not an exception to this, nor is it reasonable to discourage pursuit and avoidance of an indifferent. That something is an indifferent in no way implies that one should minimize one's concern with it. It implies only that its value is different in kind from the value of virtue, and the latter always overrides it. That one's money is indifferent implies neither that one should increase it nor that one should renounce it; it implies only that its use should be unquestionably constrained by virtue.

[10] Diog. Laert. 7.13.

[11] Diog. Laert. 7.12; see Caizzi, above.

[12] Zeno took some of his wages (Diog. Laert. 7.169), making him even poorer.

[13] Diog. Laert. 4.87.

[15] Athenaeus 6.233b-c; SVF 1.239. See Caizzi, above.

Still, the Athenaeus passage, despite confusion, does suggest that Zeno was thought more negative toward wealth than most. Is this attitude consistent with Stoic ethical theory? He could certainly have made it consistent by appealing to the idea of "circumstances."^[16] It is reasonable to follow our natural motivation to protect our own resources—except in certain circumstances; perhaps Zeno thought that his circumstances were special, so that poverty rather than comfort was appropriate for him. And he may well have thought this if he cast himself as a Socrates, especially a Socrates in the Cynic mode (we should remember that the leaders of the skeptical Academy consciously cast themselves as Socratic teachers without affecting poverty). For Zeno what was crucial was to get the message across to people, and this he could not effectively do unless he stood out in the people's minds as a teacher dedicated to his message more than to his own concerns. Zeno's image would then be appropriate from a "practical-pedagogical point of view," as Decleva Caizzi says. But this is achieved at a certain cost. For Zeno's striking image is not that of the life appropriate for the average Stoic. Becoming a Stoic requires you to use your wealth virtuously; to think that it requires you to renounce it is just a mistake. But then becoming a Stoic does not require you to become at all like Zeno. Zeno's image is immediately comprehensible as that of the unworldly, Socratic teacher; but even if it is appropriate to what he sees as his mission, it is importantly in conflict with his message. It is not surprising that none of his successors imitated his didactic use of poverty. Cleanthes simply was poor, a very different thing; and from Chrysippus onward the heads of the school followed their own theory and treated wealth as just another indifferent requiring no special attitude. Later Stoics could treat Zeno as special, his position as founder of the school excusing his "missionary" fervor. But if they were troubled by it they were right, for it is a cardinal point in ancient ethics that your life should match your theories, and Zeno's life makes him an exception to his own theory, and his image does not present the kind of life that a convert to Stoicism would lead.^[17]

Epicurus, by contrast, does not appear as a striking figure at all, and his limited lifestyle is, as Decleva Caizzi claims, not an adoption of pov-

[16] Ariston's theory depends heavily on the use of this idea, so it is reasonable to assume that it was available to Zeno.

[17] In all this I have been following Caizzi's assumption that what we find in the ancient biographies, especially the one by Diogenes Laertius, represents settled fact, if not about Zeno at least about his image in the Stoic school. It is possible, of course, that what we have is only one of several versions; certainly Diogenes seems to be following a particularly "Cynicizing" version (see Jaap Mansfeld, "Diogenes Laertius on Stoic Philosophy," in Diogene Laerzio: Storico del pensiero antico , Elenchos 7 [Naples, 1986], 295-382). But the fact that there was such a version at all shows that Cynic influences on the beginning of the Stoa were thought to be important.

erty but a strategy for ensuring the right kind of (static) pleasure. One reason for this not mentioned in the paper: Epicurus stressed the value of community and cooperation as opposed to ambition and emulation. In the first generation of Epicureans, at least, there seems to have been an attempt to present Epicureanism as a joint effort. Even the doctrines sometimes float in their attribution between Epicurus and other leaders of the school, such as Hermarchus and Metrodorus. This side of the school has been well discussed by Diskin Clay.^[18] Later, of course, Epicurus' own image predominated in the school, in the form of capsule doctrines as well as in the form of pictures on rings and cups.^[19] But in his own lifetime there seems to have been some attempt to present him as primus inter pares and the Epicurean way of life as one in which Epicurus' level of achievement was one that others could reach as well; and this may be important in accounting for the lack of an exemplary image with telling detail.

Two more minor points: Epicurus does talk of Epicurean happiness as being equal to that of the gods, but I wonder whether this is distinctively Epicurean. The Stoics also say that the wise person's happiness is not inferior to that of Zeus,^[20] and the idea in both cases is the same: happiness is, when attained, "complete"; that is, it cannot be increased, and does not get better by lasting longer, for it is not the kind of thing that can be quantified at all. There is thus no sense in which human happiness is inferior to that of the gods merely because it is shorter-lasting. This idea is common to both schools (despite its extreme difficulty). I am also not convinced that the "divine" nature of Epicurean happiness is implied by the preponderance of over in Epicurean texts. Apart from the fact that our sources are not extensive enough for us to generalize safely, we have one Hellenistic source, Arius Didymus, who says firmly that it makes no difference which word you use.^[21] Stylistically is the "loftier" word and thus more appropriate for the gods, but there seems to be no difference of meaning or of reference.

I wonder also whether the Stoics are as indifferent to as Decleva Caizzi suggests. Their claim that virtue is for happiness is central and frequent, and its being a "doxographical formula" suggests its importance in Stoic thought rather than the reverse. The thought behind it is a striking one; see Diogenes Laertius 6. 128:

[18] D. Clay, "Individual and Community in the First Generation of the Epicurean School," in S YZHTHS IS : Studi offerti a Marcello Gigante (Naples, 1983), 255-279.

[19] Cic. Fin . 5.3.

[20] Arius 98.19-99.2. It is as choiceworthy, as fine, and as lofty.

[21] Arius 48.6-11. Unfortunately there is a corruption at the end of the sentence, but this does not affect the present point.

"For if," he says, "high-mindedness is self-sufficient () for putting us above everything, and if it is pan of virtue, then virtue too is self-sufficient for happiness, despising even the things that seem annoying."

"He" here is Hecaton, but the thought is ascribed to Zeno and Chrysippus as well.

II

Christopher Gill's ambitious attempt to reconstruct the main lines of Panaetius' On Pease of Mind results in a very rich paper in which many points of interest are raised; I shall focus on just a few.^[22]

Gill contrasts two approaches to the topic of or peace of mind, which he calls the Democritean-Epicurean and the Stoic approach. Panaetius, he argues, seems to have made an interesting combination of both approaches in his essay on peace of mind, a combination we can trace in the later works of Plutarch and Seneca on the same topic. I do not have any direct criticisms of Gill's project, but I would like to take up some aspects of what he calls the Democritean-Epicurean approach.

Seneca opens his own book on tranquillitas by commenting that Democritus has written an excellent book on this. It strikes me as worthy of comment that in the Hellenistic period we find a resurgence of interest in Democritus as an ethical theorist. This side of his thought is completely neglected by Plato and even by Aristotle, who pays minute attention to his physical theories. Even in the Hellenistic period he was regarded as a somewhat unsophisticated predecessor; Cicero says patronizingly that what he said was fine but not very polished, for he said little about virtue, and what he did say was not very articulate.^[23] And yet he has acquired the rank of a major ethical theorist. He plays a strikingly large role in the introductory portion of Arius Didymus' account of ethics. Admittedly this is selective and seems to have been shortened at least once from a longer version; still, it is noteworthy that Democritus figures prominently twice alongside Plato. He and Plato both "put in the soul";^[24] and there is a lengthy and interesting comparison of Democritus with the position of Plato's Laws on reason and pleasure.^[25]

While the fragments we possess contain much of interest, as Gill

[22] The present version of the paper is considerably revised and recast from the one read at the Berkeley meeting; and since many of my original comments have been met or overtaken by the revised version, the present comments are substantially new.

[23] De finibus 5.87-88.

[24] Arius 52.13-53.1.

[25] Arius 53.1-20.

shows, they scarcely explain so notable a rehabilitation. It is only from the Hellenistic sources that we learn that Democritus located in the soul, and called it and the like;^[26] is our final good, though this seems to be distinct from the happy life, which consists in the pursuit of knowledge;^[27] is not pleasure but a calm and stable state of soul.^[28] Although our situation is rendered difficult by the unsatisfactoriness of the fragments we possess, and although we should heed Cicero's warning that Democritus' position was not very well worked out, we can perhaps conjecture what it was about Democritus' position that appealed to the much more sophisticated Hellenistic thinkers. Democritus seems to have been seen as internalizing happiness: happiness, our final end, is seen not as consisting in a certain life (the pursuit of knowledge), but in the way the agent feels and is disposed in living this life. In characterizing this as cheerfulness and well-being Democritus could well seem a forerunner of Epicurus in ethics as well as in physics, though Epicurus' view of pleasure is considerably more sophisticated.

Ethical thinkers after Aristotle all share a common formal framework for ethics. We seek a final end; this is given a thin specification as happiness; the work goes into showing what it is that happiness consists in. Gill begins from the sharp difference between Epicureans and Stoics on this score: Epicurus claims that happiness consists in ; the Stoics, that virtue is sufficient for happiness. From this difference, he claims, flow others, notably that for the Stoics one's strategy for living well consists in finding a context in which one can act virtuously; peace of mind is not a goal one should aim at directly but is what results when one has succeeded in becoming virtuous. The Democritean-Epicurean approach, by comparison, is to aim directly at peace of mind, a strategy which will result in, for example, discouraging desires one cannot fulfill. The Democritean-Epicurean approach encourages the agent to modify desires she already has and to give focus to and unify her life as it is, with the aim of achieving greater peace of mind, while the Stoic approach is to focus only on becoming virtuous; there is no independent value given to organizing or modifying one's desires as they are to achieve peace of mind. Gill raises the interesting question of whether Panaetius, who in many matters was prepared to modify orthodox Stoicism toward a more intuitive position, was prepared to combine Stoic with Democritean-Epicurean strategies in his work On Peace of Mind . On

[27] Cic. Fin . 5.87-88.

[28] Diog. Laert. 9.45.

the face of it no compromise seems possible: if one's final end is virtue, then the only way to seek peace of mind is through being virtuous. Gill suggests that Panaetius sought to reconcile these different approaches by stressing the theme of "being yourself": I am most truly myself when thinking and acting as a rational moral agent, and it is focusing on this self that gives my life unity and produces peace of mind.

Gill's paper directs our attention to the way in which, in the Hellenistic period, different ethical schools were prepared to find common ground and to recast their own positions in terms taken over from or acceptable to their opponents. This phenomenon, very marked in Panaetius, has often been regarded as a weakness of later Hellenistic thought, but we are now beginning to appreciate it more justly.^[29] Broadly, there are two motives for taking over parts of one's opponent's position, the combative and the irenic. The combative is what one finds in areas of intense debate: by taking over your opponent's position you show that you can accommodate it within your theory, thus neutralizing it as an objection to you.^[30] The irenic arises from the desire to minimize differences, to show that different positions are putting forward basically the same idea. Panaetius' motive here seems to have been irenic; he is showing, as Seneca was later to do, that even Epicurus is in agreement with some basic points that seem uncompromisingly Stoic.

Whether an irenic compromise is giving too much away depends on how really distinct the different positions are to begin with. I will suggest that the kind of contrast that Gill draws between Epicurean and Stoic views of the final end does not capture interesting aspects of the Epicurean approach, and that the approaches of the two schools may not have been as distinct as he suggests.

It is common ground to all the schools, as I remarked above, that we seek a final end or good, and that this is happiness. Further, all the schools^[31] accept that the final good, whatever its content, must be complete: it is not sought as a means to or part of any further good, whereas all the other goods we seek are sought as means to or parts of it. Epicurus certainly accepted this: the exposition of Epicurean ethics in De fini-

[29] Cf. J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long, eds., The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy , Hellenistic Culture and Society 2 (Berkeley, 1988), to which Gill also refers.

[31] with the interesting exception of the Cyrenaics, who thought that we should maximize particular intense pleasures, without regard to our life as a whole (Diog. Laert. 2.37).

bus 1 contains the unambiguous point that "the highest or final or ultimate good (which the Greeks call ) is that which itself has no further object, whereas it is the object of everything else."^[32] Epicurus thus accepts that right from the start there is an important formal constraint on his final good, pleasure: it has to be pleasure so understood as to be a complete goal, a goal that includes all our other goals.

It is less certain that Democritus was aware of the need for such a formal constraint on his final end. We run up against the problem that our Hellenistic reports of his ethics make them sound more sophisticated than anything we find in the fragments, and we do not know how far Hellenistic thinkers recast his thoughts to fit more modern molds. In what follows I stick to the firmer ground of Epicurus' thought, though I am sure that Gill is right that Democritean elements were studied and developed alongside those of Epicurus in the Hellenistic period.

This formal constraint, which Epicurus never disputes, has crucial consequences for the way in which he conceives of the pleasure that we are to aim at. Pleasure, if it is to fit this role, cannot simply be a feeling; it must be something more lasting and capable of unifying all our projects. Thus Epicurus is led to distinguish kinetic from static pleasure: what we aim at in life is static pleasure, and this is , peace of mind.^[33], however, is not just peace of mind in the intuitive sense, freedom from the things that are actually bothering you now. Right now I may be feeling free from care, but thinking one has peace of mind does not make it so. I will not actually have achieved unless two substantial conditions are met: I must be experiencing the pleasure of being in the natural state, and I must be virtuous. Satisfying both these requirements takes us some way from our intuitions, but there is no doubt that Epicurus requires them.

, being static pleasure, is the pleasure of being in the natural state.^[34] For it is the pleasure I get when I fulfill only natural desires. Epicurus' division of desires is too complex to deal with adequately here, but it is at least clear that he opposes natural desires to empty desires, which depend on "empty" beliefs, beliefs which are false and dysfunctional to the agent.^[35] Natural desires spring from human nature; empty desires are based on false beliefs. Even this much makes it clear that we shall not be able correctly to identify desires as natural or as empty without knowing what human nature is and requires, and which beliefs are

[32] De finibus 1.42.

[33] For the distinction, see De finibus 1.37-39, 2.9; Diog. Laert. 10.136 (a very vexed passage); Usener 68; Kuria doxa 3.

[34] See Usener 416, 417; Diogenes of Oenoanda F 2.8-13 Chilton.

[35] Letter to Menoeceus 127; Kuria doxa 29; Vatican Sating 21.

false; and on both these issues Epicureans come to very different conclusions than do other people. The agent will identify very different desires as natural before and after internalizing Epicurean theory, for that theory will have greatly revised her views as to which beliefs are false. Epicurus does not remove this problem by telling us that natural desires are easy to fulfill,^[36] for what normally counts as easy depends on what your means are, and he clearly does not mean that a desire for caviar is natural if it is easy for you to fulfill it, having lots of money. He means that natural desires are easy to fulfill for the person who has a right understanding of human nature. And thus seeking turns out to require, not just an attitude to one's own desires now, as one is, but a correct understanding of one's human nature, and of which of one's beliefs are false—it turns out in fact to require quite a lot of Epicurean theory.

Achieving further requires that the agent be virtuous, something that is not surprising if one gives due prominence to the requirement that one's final good must be complete, must include all of one's goals. Epicurus insists that to achieve the kind of pleasure that can be the agent's final good, it is necessary for him to be virtuous. For virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, while all other goods can be separated from it;^[37] pleasure and the virtues mutually entail each other;^[38] and the virtues have grown to be a part of pleasure.^[39] There is room for discussion as to whether Epicurus regarded virtue as having intrinsic value and as forming and making up the pleasant life to be aimed at, or whether he regarded it (as some of his language sometimes suggests) as having at best instrumental value.^[40] But this does not affect the point that virtue is unavoidably necessary for the person seeking . Peace of mind cannot be attained by doing bad things and then trying to forget them or to keep one's mind off them; one must live courageously, wisely, justly, and temperately to get the only kind of pleasurable peace of mind that can serve as one's final good.

The upshot of this is that I do not think Gill is right to characterize the Epicurean strategy as one in which peace of mind is "man's proper goal . . . a goal to be pursued deliberately, albeit one which was compatible with the practice of virtue in certain forms."^[41] Rather, virtue, with-

[36] Usener 469; Kuria doxa 15.

[37] Diog. Laert. 10.138; Usener 506; Letter to Menoeceus 132.

[38] Kuria doxa 5; De finibus 57; Letter to Menoeceus 132.

[40] I have argued for the former in "Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness," Philosophical Topics 15 (1987): 5-21.

[41] Gill, 334 above.

out any qualification of "certain forms," is essential to achieving peace of mind. One can, of course, act badly and in ignorance of what human nature requires, and feel good about it; but that is not peace of mind. The attainment of demands that one accept Epicurean theory about human nature, that this be a true theory, and that one have the virtues.

I do not find, therefore, the large difference of approach that Gill does between Stoics and Epicureans here. In particular, I do not see why the Epicurean approach should be committed to greater concessions to individuals' natures as they are, or to focusing and unifying their lives as they are. Stoics and Epicureans are equally committed to the position that most people radically misconceive their own good; for neither of them is it true that we should seek peace of mind independently of being virtuous and of trying to understand human nature.

Gill produces a very startling comment ascribed to Epicurus from Plutarch's essay On Peace of Mind (465f-466a). People who care about honors and reputation, it goes, should enter public life, since they will be frustrated if they don't; and twice this is said to be because of their nature. If this is really an Epicurean dictum, it stands in the sharpest contrast to the Epicurean position as I have put it forward. For we find explicit concession to the way people actually are, and to their individual nature, even where that is highly faulty by Epicurean standards. One of the most central Epicurean tenets is that one should not go into public life, for its rewards are illusory and its frustrations certain. The idea that humans need public life and political involvement rests, according to Epicurus, on a wrong conception of what it is that humans do need, which is really fulfilled in small Epicurean gardens. It was this revisionary notion of what human nature requires, more than any other, which called forth opposition from the other schools.^[42] It is extremely hard to see why Epicurus would have put forward the advice we find in Plutarch. It can be seen as advice for the beginner: someone who starts out with ambitions for public life is encouraged to fulfill them at first, lest frustrations interfere with his project of becoming an Epicurean. But this does not solve the problem, since it would be bad advice; political ambitions rest on false beliefs, and the more they are encouraged the more false and empty beliefs the agent will acquire, making it even more difficult for him to become an Epicurean. In fact, given Plutarch's open hostility to Epicureanism, and his policy of collecting passages in Stoic and Epicurean works that he sees as "contradicting" one another, it is hard not

[42] Plutarch devotes a whole essay to it; it is prominent among the difficulties raised for the Roman Torquatus in De finibus 2.

to suspect that we have a passage which is misunderstood, or disingenuously misrepresented. But if Plutarch is being honest, and understanding what he is reporting, we must conclude that Epicurus did on occasion say things that contradicted his main theses.

If what I have suggested is right, Panaetius is not so much uniting different strategies as recognizing the extent of what Stoics and Epicureans share. While they differ on the content of the final good and of the status of virtue in it, they agree that it requires virtue and understanding of human nature. And rather than continue the debate on the content, Panaetius was happy to absorb whatever seemed of independent value in the rival approach: unifying one's life by memory and anticipation, for example, or stress on the management and redirection of one's desires.

If Panaetius tried to do this, as Gill suggests, by stressing the notion that the real self is the rational self, he was doing so on terms more favorable to Stoicism than to its rival, for there is a certain unclarity in Epicureanism as to the role of the rational self. There are many passages that stress the way that the agent can, by recalling past pleasures, negate the effect of present pain; the most famous is of course Epicurus' last letter. And these imply that a present experience acquires its significance from the person's rational attitude to it. But there is an obvious problem in reconciling these passages with the notorious thesis that "all good and evil lie in sensation," which is put to such crucial use in the argument that death is nothing to us.^[43] Plutarch criticizes that argument on the reasonable ground that it is not true of us that all good and evil lie in sensation; this is precisely to neglect the rational component of our idea of the self. It is because we are rational beings that we care about our lives as wholes, and have attachments to things whose value transcends our lives.^[44]

I agree with Gill, however, that Panaetius is certainly making a concession from orthodox Stoicism in considering peace of mind at length at all. My own explanation of this would put less stress than Gill does on the desire to incorporate a rival approach that makes peace of mind more prominent. For, as we have seen, Panaetius could certainly not compromise with the Epicureans on the content of the final good; while given their formal similarities, and the resulting concessions of the Epicureans to virtue, he could take over some of their strategies without qualm. Rather, I would see the increased importance that Panaetius gives to peace of mind as fitting in with his other attempts to decrease

[43] Letter to Menoeceus 124-125.

[44] Cf. 1098d-1099b.

the distance between Stoic theory and educated opinion, along with deemphasis of the role of the ideal agent and an increased interest in aspects of human nature other than the moral.^[45]

All the Hellenistic schools agree that there are formal constraints on our final good, and that taking these seriously may involve us in considerable redefinition of happiness from what we intuitively take it to be. Once we grasp what the formal conditions require, we will be led to revise our priorities, and with them our conception of what it is that makes life worthwhile and happy. The Stoics take this process furthest: they claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness, for only virtue meets the formal conditions that happiness must. This violates our intuitions, indeed is the most notorious Stoic "paradox"; and although, like many other Stoic claims, it appears considerably less outrageous once we take into account the whole theory and the way it meets our intuitions overall, it remains one of the obvious stumbling blocks to ready acceptance of the theory. In giving peace of mind extended separate treatment, Panaetius may well have been attempting to show that the Stoic theory made more contact than commonly thought with intuitive demands on happiness; for peace of mind plays some part in most conceptions of happiness. In so doing he was not compromising orthodox Stoicism, though he was, in the spirit of his day, incorporating in an irenic way strategies and thoughts of value offered even by rival views.

[45] Cf. Gill "Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero's De Officiis 1," "OxfStAncPhilos 6 (1988): 169-199.