Fly Whisks and Empires: The Fall of Algiers

By the eve of the 1830 conquest, order had been restored and the rebellions put down, and political calm reigned for the most part in Turkish Algeria. The real danger was not so much from within but from neighbors across the sea. Despite muted calls by some French commercial interests to rid the Mediterranean of "Algerine piracy," few prior to 1827 in Europe or the Maghrib anticipated that France would soon acquire an African "département."^[19] As the Napoleonic Wars ended, France's days as a global imperial power seemed to be waning. The loss of first Canada and then India during the Seven Years' War of 1756–1763 made France a second-rate colonial power, with only small commercial enclaves in Africa, Asia, and the West Indies.

Then the French stumbled into Algeria. Eventually the North African state represented an emblem of Great Power status, a measure of national and international dignity, regardless of Algeria's economic value or cultural compatibility with the Metropole.^[20] Ultimately, the impetus for new colonial holdings, particularly in the Maghrib, the Sahara, and West Africa, was to no small degree dictated by the obsessive drive to defend the oldest of France's Afro-Mediterranean colonies. In reality, the Scramble for Africa was unleashed by an imprudent dey's fly whisk in 1827 and not, as some historians of imperialism claim, a half century later.^[21] Yet France was imprudent as well. Compared with other imperial ventures, Algeria's sub-

jugation demanded the most lavish expenditure of men and materials—far greater than Britain's conquest of India. Prior to the expedition, it was calculated that no more than ten thousand troops would suffice to take Algeria; by 1847, one hundred thousand French soldiers were committed to the unfinished task of "pacifying" a population estimated at no more than three million.^[22]

For obvious ideological reasons, colonial apologists maintained that the Algerian state, if indeed such existed, was tottering in 1830. Rather, the botched nature of the early French occupation, and the fierce resistance encountered, transformed Algeria into a contest state for decades.^[23] Yet continuities in styles of rule and contestation persisted, principally because the French military consciously emulated their Turkish predecessors in erecting a system of domination for a country four times larger than France. The fall of Algiers was a rude shock not only to the capital's inhabitants but also to most in the regency, the Maghrib, and the Islamic world.^[24] The dey's capitulation created a sauve qui peut mentality among traditional elites and notables, who scrambled to turn events to their own advantage. Collective opposition to the invaders was frequently combined with, or even overshadowed by, rebellions against the remnants of the Turkish ruling caste as well as ancient intraelite quarrels. The state was effectively up for grabs; yet paradoxically, those most absorbed in seizing the state were not at first the French invaders—or so it seemed to the Algerians. France's vacillations over the fate of its African prize were mirrored by military commanders in the field, whose equivocal proclamations, behavior, and policies betrayed a lack of resolve. Moreover, had not the Spanish been driven from Oran within recent memory? Could not the same destiny await the French?^[25] Thus, the single most representative response on the part of many indigenous leaders was a wait-and-see position, an expression of bet hedging, which conferred considerable room for political manipulation and maneuvering. Gradually, two large-scale attempts at state building emerged: in the east, Ahmad Bey's effort to resurrect an Ottoman bureaucratic state; and in western Algeria, 'Abd al-Qadir's markedly different program of a classical tribal-based theocracy.

The Oran was the scene of the first concerted drive to right the toppled political order. Amir 'Abd al-Qadir's movement drew upon the religious legitimacy and organizational structure of the influential Qadiriyya sufi tariqa and the tribal traditions of the Eghris Plain near Mascara. Recognized in 1832 as sultan by the powerful Banu Hashim, the Banu 'Amir, and part of the Awlad Sidi Shaykh, the amir embarked upon a complex four-pronged program. First, he attacked French-held positions in Oran, while soliciting moral and material assistance from the Moroccan sultan, Mawlay 'Abd

al-Rahman. At the same time, he endeavored to bring to submission Algerian tribes refusing to render tribute and thus acknowledge his authority. In addition, 'Abd al-Qadir clearly saw that control of key trading ports and towns was critical for the economic health of his fledgling state; commercial channels with Europe had to remain open to obtain needed military supplies, particularly gunpowder and firearms. Finally, the amir's dealings with the French, both in Algeria and the Metropole, displayed remarkable sophistication. Through agents, he followed debates in France over Algeria's political future and sought to bargain with local French authorities when negotiations yielded more tangible gains than did outright confrontation.^[26]

The amir's approach to diplomacy and collective action served as a template for the political behavior of both secular and religious elites elsewhere in Algeria. Indeed, in the early 1850s, the Sharif of Warqala emulated the amir, after paradoxically fighting against 'Abd al-Qadir on France's side.^[27] The complexity of 'Abd al-Qadir's statecraft—apparent accommodation combined with stalwart resistance and behind-the-scenes maneuvering—served to keep French commanders off guard and conferred strategic advantage.^[28] As 'Abd al-Qadir's jihad gained momentum in the Oran, other experiments in reconstructing the state occurred in eastern Algeria.

The startling news that Algiers had fallen into infidel hands stirred the people of Constantine to action. By then the city's populace, under the Banu al-Fakkun's leadership, had attained an advanced, perhaps new, level of political maturity. During the tumultuous era stretching from 1792 to 1830, religious notables assumed increasingly public roles in the political fortunes of the city and province. These decades were characterized by revolts (in 1792, 1808, and 1817) or by sieges successfully repulsed (in 1804 and 1807) which politicized even ordinary people as well as making the Banu al-Fakkun more powerful than ever. Soon after the invasion, the capital's notables reinvested Ahmad Bey, who had been in office since 1823, as their ruler under the terms of a charter, specifying obligations and taxation procedures; the charter was signed by the ulama, shaykhs, and amins of the corporations.^[29] All in the city, humble and mighty alike, looked hopefully, if vainly, to Istanbul for assistance.

The support of urban notables and temporizing by the Porte, combined with the political void created by French bungling, encouraged Ahmad Bey to carve out his own kingdom. To do this, rivals had to be eliminated, particularly in the pre-Sahara, where struggles over the office of shaykh al-'arab continued unabated, and with mounting ferocity. Thus, one force for political continuity between the Turkish and colonial eras was the

persistence of these struggles. And the southern Constantine was one of the few regions where the two experiments in state formation, the amir's and Ahmad Bey's, collided.