4.

Kantians are right to insist that our view of partial norms and sentiments, like friendship and parental love, involves their being "filtered" through other considerations. Consider a conception of friendship not filtered by the regulative effects of other norms, partial or impartial. On this view, friendship requires one always to give priority to friends no matter what other considerations are at stake. No matter whether it involves love of family, sympathy for those in need, or respect for the dignity of others, friends always come first. On this view, any failure to give priority to friends in cases of conflict is an act of betrayal, for when the counterfactual test is applied to this conception of friendship, it reveals that there is no possible world in which others take priority over one's friends. The counterfactual test shows, then, that friendship on this conception is asymmetrical in its regulative effect on all other norms within this conception of practical reason. Other kinds of norms on other conceptions of practical reason can have this same property. Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac seems to give religious faith this kind of status in Kierkegaard's understanding of the teleological suspension of the ethical.^[7] Also, many moral theories afford some norms this status. What should be clear at this point is that attributing such a property to partial norms is counterintuitive, to say the least.

For now, however, it is important to see that some regulative norms can and do have another property, namely, the property of symmetrical regula-

[7] . Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling , trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Anchor Books, 1954).

tive effect or function.^[8] Consider in this regard friendship and parental love. For most of us, conceptions of these norms ascribe to them the property of having symmetrical regulative effect on each other. That is, not only do we believe that

Friendship is regulated by Parental Love just because there is some practical context in which (i) acting on Friendship is irrational (wrong) because it violates Parental Love and (ii) were it not for Parental Love it would be rational (permissible) to act on Friendship

we also believe that

Parental Love is regulated by Friendship just because there is some practical context in which (i) acting on Parental Love is irrational (wrong) because it violates Friendship and (ii) were it not for Friendship it would be rational (permissible) to act on Parental Love.

Within a conception of practical reason where the only regulative influences on these norms come from each other, considerations of family sometime override considerations of friendship but there are no other exceptions for the priority given to friends. On this view, some cases of favoring family over friends are not acts of betrayal and should not be so viewed by the friends. Think here of what you would expect of a friend if you had to cancel an appointment because your child was ill. A conception of friendship that makes exceptions in this way only for family is a conception of friendship involving a minimal regulating influence, which is revealed by the scope of the counterfactual conditions regarding other norms. A maximally regulated conception of friendship would be one the normative dimensions of which were influenced by the entire range of considerations a fully admirable agent would have, including impartial sympathy and respect for others. So it is implausible that any acceptable conception of friendship or any other partial sentiment will reflect the concept of asymmetrical regulative effect on other norms. Moreover, it will reflect the regulative effect of other norms on it, including the regulative effect of im-

[8] . The concept of symmetrical regulative function or symmetrical regulative effect is similar to the concept of bidirectionality found in the work of Henry Richardson. I discovered and read Richardson's excellent book, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends , only after the manuscript of Agent-centered Morality was sent to the copy editor. For his discussion of bidirectionality, see Henry S. Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 141, 143, 176–77, 182.

partial respect. This can be captured in a rather complex statement of the counterfactual conditions included as a test of the extent to which the partial norm is regulated by other norms. Partial norms, then, are regulated both by other partial norms and by impartial norms, and at least some of the regulative functions between partial norms are symmetrical.

If my conception of friendship includes within it a reflection of a regulating influence of parental love, then I will not think of some cases of my giving priority to my children over my friends as cases of betrayal of my friends; and I will expect my friends to see this as such. Similarly, if my conception of parental love includes within it a reflection of a regulating influence of friendship, then I will not think of some cases of my giving priority to my friends over my children as cases of betrayal of my children; and I will expect my children to see this as such. It is only through conceptions of sentiments or norms that display such symmetry of regulating influence that we can integrate various kinds of partial sentiments and norms into our lives and avoid devastating alienation. Think what it would be like for friends and children to lack an intuitive understanding of the symmetry of norms alluded to here.