French Initiative

Like the British and Germans, the French moved from an initial focus on the military implications of SDI to a consideration of its technological and industrial potential as well. Unlike Germany and the United Kingdom, France remained adamantly opposed to the idea of space-based strategic defenses (French security interests are discussed in the next section). President Mitterrand however became acutely aware of the technological boost SDI threatened to give to American industries. After the Weinberger invitation the French president recognized that SDI might draw away European scientific and technological talent. This fear was the basis for his EUREKA proposal.

On 17 April 1985, barely three weeks after the Weinberger invitation, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas presented a letter to his EC colleagues announcing that President Mitterrand proposed to the other EC countries the "immediate creation of a technological Europe, aiming to permit our continent to master all of the high technologies."^[18] The letter stated that recent collaborative successes like Airbus, Ariane, ESPRIT, and the EC project for joint research on nuclear fusion proved that Europe could cooperate effectively if the means were adequate. Thus, even though it eventually took shape outside of EC structures, EUREKA benefited from the collaborative enthusiasm generated in part by EC programs. In fact the French suggested that the program could employ the funding

[18] "Au Conseil des Ministres: le projet 'EUREKA' d'une Europe de la technologie," Le Monde , 18 April 1985, p. 30.

model developed in ESPRIT, with governments and industry each contributing half. The Dumas letter also said that France and Germany together were proposing the program. For political reasons that I will explain later, the initiative had to come from France. The proposal was for a European Research Coordination Agency (whence EUREKA), with a light administrative structure, to coordinate research in optoelectronics, new materials, high-power lasers, particle beams, large computers, AI, and high-speed, high-integration semiconductors.^[19]

This close duplication of SDI technological domains and some initial French vagueness about whether EUREKA was intended to be a military or a civilian program led many to conclude that it was a direct response to Star Wars and the precursor to a European strategic defense system. Such a conclusion is not accurate. It is worth recalling that Mitterrand had instituted a rapid turnaround in French technology policies in 1983. After two years of national-champion technology policies and go-it-alone economic policies generally, France suddenly became a supporter of European cooperation. In the fall of 1983 Mitterrand circulated his memorandum to the EC governments calling for a "European industrial space," including increased technological collaboration to meet the U.S. and Japanese threat. Furthermore, France became a vigorous supporter of the Commission's telematics programs, ESPRIT and RACE. The EUREKA proposal fits in this pattern.

Furthermore, the planning for EUREKA took place among ministries and agencies charged with civilian technology programs. Military planners apparently had no role. In fact several participants from different positions in the French administration confirmed that the idea for EUREKA was particularly "Elyséenne"—that is, the initiative came from President Mitterrand and a handful of his advisors at the Palais de l'Elysée. Mitterrand, according to officials at the Research Ministry and at the Elysée, had expressed the desire to launch a major European initiative; he wanted to be seen as doing something for Europe.^[20]

The Elysée had reflected on the American SDI program and other defense R&D programs (like the Strategic Computing Initiative). According to one member of Mitterrand's staff, the consensus was that although American military R&D programs were probably not

[19] "Au Conseil des Ministres," Le Monde , 18 April 1985, p. 30; Agence Europe , 25 April 1985, p. 7.

[20] Interviews 10, 14, and 39.

as effective as Japanese civilian ones in promoting commercial interests, nevertheless the U.S. programs were virtually certain to lead to dramatic technological advances. The Elysée thought this development was potentially dangerous, as it could leave France dependent on the United States for certain advanced technologies. Recent difficulties in obtaining specialized parts for the French (civilian) earth-observation satellite because of American military restrictions had served as a reminder of French technological vulnerability.^[21]

The notion of a European technological program came in large part from Jacques Attali, one of Mitterrand's close advisors. By the end of 1984 Mitterrand and his circle were entertaining the idea. Discussions broadened to include representatives of the Research Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. Research Minister Curien, a scientist with extensive European experience as president of the European Science Foundation and former chairman of the Council of the ESA, supported the idea provided that it not appear too French but rather be clearly European.^[22] Discussions revealed a general consensus that precompetitive research (as in ESPRIT, which was regarded as a success) was not then the primary problem. Rather, downstream and applied activities at the European level were seriously lacking. As a result, a new market-oriented program would have to be outside of EC structures, which were unsuited for commercial activities. In addition French officials had learned from various committee meetings and conversations that there was industrial support for such a market-oriented collaborative program.

Into this setting arrived the Weinberger letter. The invitation for European scientists and corporations to join in SDI research posed several new challenges. The one that preoccupied Mitterrand, in addition to the technological advances that would benefit American industries, was that European scientists and engineers would be attracted to SDI's forefront research and massive funding. Such a brain drain would divert already scarce research talent and facilities desperately needed by European industries for commercial competitiveness. An analysis of the EUREKA proposal in Le Monde depicted the prevailing attitude in the French government as being that Europe would participate in SDI as a subcontractor, leading to fragmentation of European technological resources and brain drain.^[23] Furthermore, European companies would be unlikely to

[21] Interview 39.

[22] Interview 14.

[23] "EUREKA," Le Monde , 19 April 1985, p. 1. See also de Medici, "Europe Sees SDI as Two-Edged Sword," 10: "The French government is preoccupied by the possibility that the research and development of SDI may work as a powerful 'vacuum cleaner' by attracting the 'best and the brightest' and the most promising work out of the European laboratories and industries."

benefit from commercial spinoffs because American security controls would prevent them from having full and timely access to the results.

French officials articulated these concerns repeatedly in the months following their April EUREKA proposal. At a meeting of foreign and defense ministers of the Western European Union (WEU)^[24] French Foreign Minister Dumas declared, "If we do not rapidly coordinate our policies, nothing will prevent our researchers, our capital and our industries from giving in to the temptation of immediate ad hoc collaboration [in SDI], with the role of the Europeans being reduced to one of a sub-contractor."^[25] Weeks later, in ruling out official French participation in SDI research, President Mitterrand employed similar language.^[26]

Mitterrand's position was backed by a study conducted by the Centre d'Analyse et Prévision, with the help of public establishments (like the CNES and the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique) and industry (like Matra and Thomson). The study concluded that although SDI would contribute to American industrial competitiveness in some areas, participation by European firms in SDI was not the best response, as commercial spinoffs were uncertain and European participation would be sought in areas where Europe was ahead anyway. The study also concluded that EUREKA would better meet European goals, as it would address Europe's greatest need, commercial development of technologies.^[27] In early June Mitterrand stated that SDI and EUREKA did not compete in their objectives, as one was military and one was civilian. Rather, they competed

[24] The WEU is a forum for the discussion of European security issues; the members are the Benelux countries plus France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

[25] Henri de Bresson, "M. Dumas: 'le defi pour l'Europe est d'abord technologique,'" Le Monde , 25 April 1985, p. 2.

[26] Bernard Brigouleix, "Pourquoi la France ne participera à l'IDS," Le Monde , 7 May 1985, p. 4. Although France rejected a government-to-government agreement on SDI research, by late 1985 the government was saying that it would permit French companies, even the state-owned ones, to participate in SDI projects on their own initiative; Judith Miller, "Allies in West Lend Support to 'Star Wars,'" New York Times , 30 December 1985, p. 1.

[27] Philippe Lemaître, "Le programme EUREKA doit proposer un champ d'applications civiles plus large que le projet strategique de M. Reagan," Le Monde , 8 May 1985, p. 4.

for budgets and brain power, and with EUREKA both would remain in Europe.^[28]

Thus the Weinberger letter acted as a "catalyst," according to French Research Minister Curien, for the launching of ideas that France had been formulating for many months.^[29] The first step was to contact the Germans. German support would be essential in any case, and Mitterrand had been diligently cultivating the Franco-German relationship as the foundation of Europe. Foreign Minister Dumas alerted his German counterpart, Genscher, that the French government was discussing internally the possibility of a European high-technology program. According to officials at the BMFT, Genscher had been thinking along similar lines (he was a staunch opponent of SDI participation). But because he did not feel that he had enough political backing in the CSU/CDU-FDP coalition to propose such a program, Genscher asked Dumas to take the initiative. However, both French and German officials agree that the EUREKA initiative was intended to be European from the beginning, that it was not meant to be a Franco-German project with other countries tacked on as needed.^[30] As I will show later, the Paris-Bonn connection was also important in giving EUREKA concrete form and substance.