The New Text Legacy: From Philology to Politics

The opening salvo in Yun Ching's series of essays demonstrated how much conceptual change had been incorporated in both the New Text and ancient-style prose agendas:

In ordering the empire, the sages did not use excessive force to control the situation. They sought out the means to keep things within bounds and that's all. By necessity, they employed means that would accord with human feelings [jen-ch'ing]. Consequently, the middle way for institutions [chung-chih, that is, neither too autocratic nor too lenient] was the model of the sages.

[59] Wilhelm, "Chinese Confucianism," p. 309, and Hummel et al., Eminent Chinese , pp. 959-60. See also Wu-chin Yang-hu hsien ho-chih (1886), 26.46a-46b. For Yun Ching's ties to members of the Chuang lineage, see Yun, Ta-yun shan-fang chi , pp. 182-83, 211, 226, 232.

[60] Yun, Ta-yun shan-fang chi , pp. 4-12 (ch'u-chi chüan 1).

The expression "accord with human feelings" (ho hu jen-ch'ing ) resonates with the late-eighteenth-century reevaluation of human aspirations, exemplified by Tai Chen's notion that "the sages ordered the world by giving an outlet to people's feelings." Tai Chen in the 1770s attacked what he considered the moral straitjacket of Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy but limited his critique to scholarly issues. By Yun Ching's time the context had changed, however. Yun placed his discussion of the classical affirmation of human desires within a general discussion of political change, whereby the goal of reform was to accord with human aspirations. As a k'ao-cheng scholar, Tai Chen had not yet made the link between reevaluation of Neo-Confucian moral theory and institutional reform.^[61]

Contrasting the sages with the rule of the five hegemons (wu-pa ), who had usurped the kingship prerogative during the Eastern Chou dynasty, Yun Ching stressed the need for institutions that did not conflict with human feelings: "With regard to human feelings, if they do not reach extremes of indiscretion, the sages by necessity would not reject them. This was the Way of the Three Dynasties." Unfortunately, according to Yun, the "glory of early antiquity" had been lost during the era of the Spring and Autumn Annals (722-481 B.C. ) and the Warring States period (403-221 B.C. ), despite efforts during the Hah dynasties to revive the sagely teachings. The institutional structure of the empire, ever since the rapacious policies of the Ch'in dynasty (221-207 B.C. ), had never recaptured its earlier ideals or models. Yun Ching's intention in writing on the Three Dynasties was to clarify the legacy of the sages: "Consequently, I have discussed [the Three Dynasties] in detail, seeking out the origins of kingly government and investigating its vicissitudes in order to overturn the theories of the various Confucian erudites. I hope thereby that we can be enlightened concerning the sagely way of ordering the empire."^[62]

Yun's second essay discussed ancient land policy in light of early feudal institutions, which guaranteed the people proper sustenance from the fields they cultivated. Yun Ching observed that the sages had adapted policy to changing conditions, recognizing that institutions could not remain glued to the past. As feudal institutions had become increasingly inappropriate, Yun went on, the sages had devised new

[61] Ibid., "San-tai yin-ke lun i," p. 4. On Tai Chen's position see my "Criticism as Philosophy," pp. 172-75.

[62] Yun, "San-tai yin-ke lun i," p. 4.

ways to solve land tenure problems that would accord with the needs of the people. Yun Ching rhetorically concluded:

Therefore I say, even the sages would not oppose those who go beyond the middle way of government or those who are not satisfied with the middle way, as long as they do not overtly go against human sentiments. For this reason, if I am right, we can understand the means by which the Three Dynasties were at peace and well-governed for a long period. If, however, I were wrong, then the times of [the sage-kings] Yü, T'ang, Wen, and Wu would have long since been lost and forgotten. Would their sons and grandsons have had even one day of rest? [Yet, their views] hold for ten thousand generations.^[63]

Flexibility was the sine qua non of proper governance of the people.

In the third essay, Yun Ching drove home his main thesis. The secret to successful government was adaptation. Blindly following the ancients was wrong. The ancients themselves had created order by according with the times: "With regard to preceding dynasties, [the sage-kings] changed what could be changed. What could not or need not be changed they preserved. That was all there was to it. "

The example Yun Ching cited to verify his thesis was the well-field (ching-t'ien ) system, a feudal model for egalitarian land tenure that was frequently invoked by Confucians from Mencius through the late empire as the ideal. Quoting the Kung-yang Commentary, Yun Ching argued that even this hallowed Confucian ideal had long since been deemed inappropriate because conditions no longer prevailed that would enable the system to work. To maintain the egalitarian ideals of the well-field system under conditions of empire expansion and population growth, Yun contended, required adjustments and changes to the system "to accord with the times in order to equalize human feelings" (yin-shih i chün min-ch'ing ). Successive changes in land tenure worked out during the Hsia, Shang, and Chou dynasties served as both models and warnings. The legacy of the sage-kings was not engraved in stone.^[64]

Yun Ching began to test the limits of Confucian ideals in the fourth essay. Historical realities, must take precedence over political and moral abstractions:

The well-field system was a model that could not be discarded. Yet, in the end it was discarded. Confucians have all blamed and cursed [the Legalist]

[63] Ibid., "San-tai yin-ke lun erh," pp. 5-6.

[64] Ibid., "San-tai yin-ke lun san," pp. 6-7.

Shang Yang [d. 338 B.C. ] for this. Shang Yang's crime was in initiating the Ch'in [dynasty] policy of separating land into private parcels [ch'ien-mo ], which extended from the area within the pass to the east [that is, the Wei River valley in northwest China]. Discarding the well-field system was not [Shang] Yang's crime. When a model is about to be put into practice, the sages cannot prevent it. When a model is about to be discarded, the sages cannot prevent that [either].

By rejecting the Sung Learning fixation on unalterable Confucian social and political principles, Yun Ching attempted to reintegrate institutional flexibility with Confucian statecraft. Remarkably, he cited an indirect defense of Legalism in order to gainsay the rhetoric of idealistic Confucians.

Institutions survived, according to Yun, because they accorded with the desires of the people (yin min chih yü ). When they no longer did, they were discarded. The well-field system worked when the empire was limited in size and population. Appropriate to a small kingdom, it was impossible to put into effect when the empire grew substantially:

For this reason, people living during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods could not see the benefits of the well-field system enjoyed by earlier generations. What they saw instead was how they suffered from the harm of the equal-field system. Its advantages were long since past and thus easily forgotten. Its harm was close-at-hand, and thus it was quickly gotten rid of.^[65]

Institutional change occurred because of unceasing changes in the heavenly Way (t'ien-tao ) and human affairs (jen-shih ). In fact, the Ch'in dynasty marked the boundary between antiquity and imperial China, according to Yun Ching. Institutional changes that followed were not the work of Legalist criminals, but rather resulted from the unalterable (pu-te pu-jan ) march of time:

Before the Ch'in [dynasty], what was put into practice at all levels of the state and society were all institutions of the Three Dynasties. After the Ch'in, what has been put into effect at all levels of state and society are not all derived from the institutions of the Three Dynasties. The well-field system is one example. What would the sages' position be on this? I say, the sages cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, their writings ali remain, and we can scrutinize and learn from them. . ..

If Confucius and Mencius had been born during the time of the first emperor [of the Ch'in, that is, Shih-huang], would they necessarily have pressured the empire to revive the well-field system? Alas! This is a view that vulgar Confucians are sure to defend.

[65] Ibid., "San-tai yin-ke lun ssu," pp. 7-8.

Yun Ching was broadening Confucianism to include a notion of progressive change within the empire's institutional framework.^[66]

All of the first four essays in the series were composed in 1800. Nine years later Yun Ching returned to them and prepared the final four essays. In essay five Yun turned his attention to tax issues. During the Three Dynasties, he contended, land taxes were high, one in ten, but the state mobilized its resources equitably through a corvée to meet public and military requirements. After the Three Dynasties, however, land taxes were low, one in thirty, but people no longer shared equitably in their labor duties, with slaves and hired laborers performing corvée for the wealthy.

The people, happy under the equitable policies of the Three Dynasties, now succumbed to sadness and rancor. Growing social and material divisions among the people produced parasitism. Growing trade and specialization meant that more and more unproductive groups depended on less and less productive people. This dangerous development could not last for long. According to Yun Ching, the nourishing potential of heaven and earth could not support such conflicting developments.^[67]

Envoking an ideal time when the people had cultivated the land of the empire as free peasants, Yun Ching then held up the present by way of contrast when only the wealthy owned land and the poor tilled the soil as tenants. An endless cycle of poverty was the product of this inequitable land system, Yun concluded. A "disease of agriculture" (nung-ping ) was the way he described it. Yun's account of antiquity reflects more recent agricultural developments, which we trace in chapter 1. Specifically, Yun's notion of a shared corvée was a stalking-horse for the comprehensive li-chia land and tax system that had been pride of the first Ming emperor. The drift of peasants into tenancy after the Three Dynasties resembled late Ming social changes. It was then that the forces of commercialization and monetarization in the farm economy culminated in the Single-Whip tax reforms, effectively dismantling the labor service statutes of the tax system and forcing many peasants into tenancy and bond servant status. For Yurt Ching, antiquity was a mirror for contemporary problems.

Likewise, artisans and merchants suffered from economic disloca-

[66] Ibid., p. 8.

[67] Ibid., "San-taj yin-ke lun wu," p. 8.

tions produced by an inequitable tax system after the Three Dynasties. Unlike today, Yun Ching explained, the sage-kings of antiquity had devised policies to increase the productivity of the four groups of people (ssu-min, that is, gentry, farmers, artisans, and merchants) to meet the demands of society. Because the four groups were now becoming less numerous, the needs of the larger society could no longer be met. Old social distinctions had become anachronistic. Yun proposed the following solution:

What was the Way of the sages? In my view, they did not create difficulties for the four [groups of] people. What is the Way of not creating difficulties for the four [groups of] people? In my view, this is done by not creating difficulties for [those engaged in] farming, crafts, or commerce, but at the same time stressing no more than the supervision by the gentry.

One can see between the lines of this narrative that Yun was pointing to the growing problems of overpopulation and rural poverty that by the Chia-ch'ing Emperor's reign had become endemic. Confucians were asked to loosen their control over peasants and merchants.^[68]

The sixth essay turned to the military institutions of the Three Dynasties. The Hsia, Shang, and Chou had all instituted what Yun Ching called a "commoners' army" (min-ping ), which depended for its logistical support on an organizational infrastructure that allowed men on duty to avoid nonmilitary tasks. Off-duty soldiers provided the food, clothing, and weapons. The Chou dynasty in particular had fallen because its leaders had not maintained the organizational structures necessary for a "commoners' army."

Yun added, however, that as the size of the empire grew, small-scale local troops were no longer appropriate in major military battles. In a small kingdom, one could expect a soldier to be a farmer as well. But in later periods of large empires, this military strategy was self-defeating. Forcing military men to double as farmers led to military decline. Compelling farmers to double as soldiers led to agricultural decline. Changing conditions of warfare in an expanding empire made older organizational forms obsolete.

Yun Ching said that during the Han and T'ang (618-906) dynasties further reforms of the military system had been introduced. Confucians, using models derived from the Three Dynasties, criticized the reforms when they failed to live up to ancient ideals. According to Yun Ching,

[68] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

however, this criticism was misplaced. What was important was to make changes appropriate to the present situation. A "commoners' army" should be organized in the latest and most advanced ways possible. To restrict military organization to forms appropriate to a small kingdom in ancient times would be counterproductive.^[69]

Ancient administrative policies dealing with obligatory state labor service occupied Yun Ching's attention in essay 7. After discussing the myriad state-assigned labor duties during the Three Dynasties (land tax, military tax, farming tax, etc.), Yun contrasted the egalitarian ideals of the ancient system of shared local responsibilities with the inequities of later dynasties. Under the umbrella of a discussion of antiquity, Yun described the post-fifteenth-century monetarization of state labor duties, which we summarized in chapter 1. The result was the virtual disappearance of the labor service tax as a locally shared responsibility. The rich were able to hire others to take their place.

Yun Ching observed that since the middle of the T'ang dynasty, when the empire tilted economically toward the rich farmland in south China, the earlier system whereby government officials performed most state labor duties (kuan-i ) was no longer sufficient. Population growth and the expansion of the empire during the late T'ang and Sung dynasties required labor service from the people to help keep pace with the tax and military system previously handled by officials. The Ming li-chia system represented for Yun Ching the bureaucratization of this long-term process, as local village leaders accepted more state responsibilities and were given official titles for their efforts. This change, Yun held, sought to address the inadequacies of earlier corvées.^[70]

What was now required, Yun Ching went on, was further reform to ameliorate the inequities that had built up in the state labor service since the Sung and Ming dynasties. Labor service now fell most heavily on the shoulders of those who could least afford it, while those who could afford it were increasingly able to evade their tax responsibilities. Yun defended an evolutionary perspective on institutional reform: "There are no institutions in the empire that are [totally] without harm. There are no affairs that do not [in any way] cause unease for the people. One should select what accords with the requirements of the times and effect it in such a way that its deficiencies are lessened."

[69] Ibid., "San-tai yin-ke lun liu," pp. 9-10.

[70] Ibid., "San-tai yin-ke lun ch'i," pp. 10-11.

The benefits of the labor service, according to Yun, had long since been left behind: "If we realize that the labor service of officials can be lessened, then we can eliminate vexing matters. If we realize that the labor service of the people can be completely abolished, then all within the empire will be overjoyed and responsible ."^[71] By 1800 Confucians such as Yun Ching had recognized that the corvée was counterproductive.

In the eighth and final essay Yun Ching presented an eloquent summation of his position. The sage-kings had put in place a system of government that was still appropriate to the present, he contended, but the exact institutions and policies of that idealized system were subject to modification:

From the above we can observe that the way the sages ordered the empire can be realized. If the gains [from government institutions] have not reached completion, then one doesn't change everything [pu pien-fa ]. If the benefits [derived from political structures] are still incomplete, then one doesn't change [those] structures [pu i-ch'i ]. This is common sense. . ..The way of the early kings was to make changes that accorded with the times [yin-shih shih-pien ].

Sage-kings had bequeathed a notion of flexibility that avoided the extremes of totalistic reform or reactionary preservation.

The "middle way for institutions" (chung-tao) allowed the sages to navigate freely between political extremes. In conclusion, Yun Ching lashed out at Confucian ideologues and formalists who appealed to the sages for empty ideals:

Those Confucians and erudites cannot go far enough in honoring the sages and worthies, but they have thereby ignored the general populace. They dare to follow ancient ways but are cowards when it comes to present requirements. They are earnest in believing in specialties [chuan-men ] but are weak in examining all the possibilities. Is this sufficient to know the sages?

To counter the chaotic words (luan-yen ) of those who had grasped only a small Old Text faction (i-chia ) of the wisdom of the sages, Yun Ching vociferously favored a New Text Confucian statecraft agenda that emphasized pragmatism in making necessary reforms.^[72]

Yun Ching's ancient-style-prose essays articulated Confucian statecraft

[71] Ibid.,p. 11.

[72] Ibid., "San-tai yin-ke lun pa," pp. 11-12.

within an evolutionary perspective. The Three Dynasties were models (fa ) for Confucian statecraft, not institutional icons. The well-field system, local "commoners' army," and state corvée were for Yun Ching early anachronisms that had long since proved ineffective. Yun portrayed Confucius and the sages in his essays as creative innovators who operated according to the limits placed on them by the "realities of the times" (shih-shih ). But the portrayals were carefully modulated. A friend and frequent correspondent of the New Text scholars Chuang Shu-tsu, Liu Feng-lu, and Sung Hsiang-feng, Yun Ching expressed through his essays a vision that combined the moral ardor of ancient-style prose with New Text voluntarism. A form repopularized in the late eighteenth century for expressing Sung Learning moral philosophy was tempered by Yun Ching with an affirmation of human aspirations and the need for institutional reform. The dispassionate Han-Learning-style examination of China's institutional history was infused with statecraft concern for the present.^[73]

Yun Ching's essays on the Three Dynasties were not well-researched exercises in k'ao-cheng erudition. They were emotional calls by an activist Confucian to find new solutions to old problems. Aroused Ch'ang-chou literati exemplified by Chuang Ts'un-yü, Hung Liang-chi, and Yun Ching were products of an economic and social crisis exacerbated by the political recriminations generated by the Ho-shen affair. Conceptual change that stemmed from Han Learning currents of thought and added epistemological leverage to dismantle the rigorous formalism of Neo-Confucian political orthodoxy neatly dovetailed with activist Tung-lin-style political rhetoric. Intellectual change spilled over into statecraft rhetoric.

Wei Yuan, Liu Feng-lu's student and follower, similarly managed a celebrated synthesis of New Text voluntarism and statecraft reform. In writings that resembled the evolutionary scheme for institutional change laid out much earlier in Yun Ching's 1800-1810 essays, Wei Yuan also discussed the irrevocability of change:

From the Three Dynasties and before, Heaven was completely different from the Heaven of today. The earth was completely different from the earth of today. People were all different from the people of today. Moreover, things were all different from the things of today. . ..

Sung Confucians only talked about the Three Dynasties. The well-field system, feudal organization, or civil service examination procedures of the

[73] ibid., "Yü Sung Yü-t'ing shu," (Letter to Sung Hsiang-feng), p. 142, and "Ta Chuang Chen-i hsien-sheng shu" (Reply to Mr. Chuang Shu-tsu's letter), p. 226.

Three Dynasties by necessity cannot be revived. Such [talk] only allows those who are practically oriented to criticize Confucian methods for their ineffectiveness. According to the way the gentleman creates order, if it is attempted without [according with] the mind-set of the Three Dynasties and before, only vulgarity will result. Not knowing the circumstances and conditions in [changes] from the Three Dynasties to the present has produced ineffective [government]. . ..

The past, although the basis for the present, was not an eternal ideal. Just as last year's calendar does not apply to this year, so "those who speak adoringly of the past must test it in the present."^[74]

Yun Ching had set New Text studies on a course that would ultimately lead to the triumph of political discourse over classical philology among late Ch'ing Confucians. Unheralded and unread in twentieth-century scholarly circles, Yun brought to virtual completion the political implications of Chuang Ts'un-yü's turn to Kung-yang Confucianism in the 1780s and the formation of the Ch'ang-chou New Text school. By 1810 classical scholarship and political discourse were reunited in a post-Neo-Confucian form, whose Confucian legitimacy came more and more from efforts to unify Han and Sung Learning. By rereading Yun Ching's tour de force, we can better understand the intellectual, social, and political winds of change felt by New Text Confucians thirty years before the Opium War.

[74] Wei Yuan chi, pp. 47-49, 156-58.