Socialization Of Japanese Youth: An Overview

Two Views

In most societies the principal agents of preadult socialization are the family, schools, and peer groups. Although all three are important in Japan, schools appear to play the pivotal role. According to William K. Cummings:

Education occupies a much more central place in the lives of Japanese than American youth. Japanese children believe their performance has great personal consequences; they go to school more hours out of each year; they have fewer alternate ways to spend their time. Moreover, their parents encourage them to work hard in school. It might be said that the Japanese student's relation to his school approaches that of a patient or criminal to a total institution.^[12]

What, then, are the principal values that pupils learn in Japanese primary and secondary schools? As part of the democratization program, the American Occupation authorities made a major effort to

[11] Armstrong, European Administrative Elite , p. 20. Emphasis added.

[12] William K. Cummings, Education and Equality in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 145.

reform the educational system. Among other things, the power of the central government to control teachers and curriculum was curtailed, locally elected educational commissions were given the power of supervision over schools, teachers were encouraged to form professional associations, and the contents as well as the methods of teaching were democratized.^[13]

The extent to which the goals of the Occupation were actually attained is debatable. That of decentralization, for example, proved to be elusive. With the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan in 1952 came a gradual revival of old ways. The national government, through the Ministry of Education, has regained much of its erstwhile authority over educational policy. Although teachers have emerged as a powerful counterweight to the government under the leadership of the radical Japan Teachers Union (JTU, or Nikkyoso), they have had only limited success in blunting the power of the increasingly conservative Ministry of Education. Nonetheless, some scholars credit JTU with having helped to diffuse democratic values among Japanese school children.^[14]

Taken as a whole, the various components of Japanese schools add up to an effective tool for creating "new values," which Cummings sums up as the "egalitarian sentiment." In his view, this sentiment consists of three parts:

1. An egalitarian orientation to jobs . This orientation stresses the ways in which all jobs contribute to the greater good and hence are deserving of respect. Grading of jobs in terms of their importance or prestige is deemphasized.

2. An orientation toward individualism . This orientation encourages the nurturance of personally conceived goals and evaluates highly striving to realize these personal goals instead of merely following the accepted way. In the work realm, this orientation toward individualism leads individuals to seek intrinsic rewards and to place less emphasis on status and income.

3. A participatory orientation . This orientation leads individuals to participate critically in groups, associations, and other collectivities. It leads one to challenge traditional patterns of hierarchical authority in the family, the work place, the community, and the polity.^[15]

Cummings argues that both preschool socialization and interactions with peer groups tend to facilitate and reinforce the internalization of

[13] Ibid., pp. 29-39. For analysis of the American Occupation authorities' policy toward higher education, see Pempel, Patterns of Japanese Policymaking , pp. 35-51.

[14] Cummings is the principal proponent of this idea. Other scholars, notably Rohlen, believe that the influence of the JTU has been exaggerated. See Thomas P. Rohlen, Japan's High Schools (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), esp. p. 238 n. 12.

[15] Cummings, Education and Equality , pp. 177-78.

the egalitarian values. In his view, child-rearing practices and interpersonal relations have become "relatively egalitarian" in the postwar period, thus predisposing contemporary Japanese children "to expect egalitarian relations in other social situations."^[16] Moreover, participation in "largely school-based extracurricular activities" by middle-school children further bolsters such democratic values as "participation, expressiveness, and cooperation."^[17]

Cummings finds redeeming features even in the fierce competition in entrance examinations. He notes, for example, that entrance into top-rated universities in Japan is based solely on universalistic criteria, namely, one's scores in entrance examinations. Contrast this with the situation in the United States, where a multitude of particularistic criteria, such as being offspring of a rich alumnus or a generous contributor, enter into the equation. This implies that the examination competition serves to guarantee equality of opportunity.^[18] On the other hand, Cummings acknowledges that one's chances of success in entrance examination are enhanced to a significant extent by "the consumption of various forms of extra-education, such as attendance at juku , special high schools, yobiko , and lessons from household tutors.^[19] Because all of these things cost a considerable amount of money, not everybody can afford them, hence equality of opportunity is appreciably eroded.

A somewhat different picture emerges from a study of high schools by Thomas P. Rohlen. Although Rohlen shares the views of Cummings and other non-Japanese observers^[20] that the achievements of Japan's basic education--in terms of the proportion of school-age population that complete schooling, levels of knowledge and skills learned by students, results of achievement tests in science and mathematics, and other statistical indicators--are quite impressive, he does not share Cummings's thesis that schools help students acquire egalitarian values. As Rohlen puts it:

Japanese high schools are not training grounds for democracy, Japanese traditional values, or a new egalitarian order. Rather, they are best

[16] Ibid., p. 96.

[17] Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[18] Ibid., p. 218. Strictly speaking, it is not just scores in entrance examinations but also those in uniform preliminary examinations administered by the state, known as kyotsu ichiji (common preliminary), that help determine the outcome for applicants to national and public universities.

[19] Ibid., p. 224.

[20] See, for example Ezra F. Vogel, Japan As Number One (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1980), pp. 158-83.

understood as shaping generations of disciplined workers for a technomeritocratic system that requires highly socialized individuals capable of performing reliably in a rigorous, hierarchical, and finely tuned organizational environment.^[21]

These two views, however, are not as irreconcilable as they may appear at first glance. As Rohlen himself points out, the differing perspectives may be a function of the levels of schools studied: primary versus high schools.^[22] It is possible that although Japanese children become exposed to and even internalize egalitarian values in primary schools, by the time they enter high schools these values are no longer salient concerns, being eclipsed by the overriding goal of preparing for university entrance examinations. What count most at this stage are "diligence, sacrifice, mastery of detailed information, endurance over the many preparatory years, willingness to postpone gratification, and competitive spirit."^[23]

Depending on the potency with which the primary-school experience propagates egalitarian values, one cannot rule out the possibility that they may survive the rigors of high-school years. Early socialization frequently proves to be more efficacious than what follows later. In short, it can be hypothesized that two sets of values, one egalitarian and the other instrumental, dominate the preadult socialization stage in Japan and that the two are not mutually exclusive.

An International Comparison

Finally, to gain some comparative perspective let us examine selected results of a world youth-survey project. Initiated in 1972, the project has collected data on the attitudes of youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four in eleven different countries at periodic intervals. The survey utilized the same set of questions as well as national probability samples, hence the data lend themselves to cross-national comparison to an unusual degree.^[24]

[21] Rohlen, Japan's High Schools , p. 209.

[22] Ibid., p. 6.

[23] Ibid., p. 109.

[24] For a complete description of the project, including its chronology, methodology, questionnaire, and responses, see Sorifu, Seishonen Taisaku Honbu, ed., Sekai no seinen tono hikaku kara mita Nihon no seinen: Sekai seinen ishiki chosa (dai 3-kai) hokokusho [Japanese Youths As Compared with the Youth of the World: Report on the Survey of the Attitudes of the World Youth (the Third Survey)] (Tokyo: Okurasho, Insatsukyoku, 1984).

Table 24 presents some measures of patriotism and commitment to or alienation from one's country and society. In terms of "pride" in one's own country, young people in Japan occupy a middle position among the five industrialized democracies. On the other hand, Japan ranks lowest in the proportion of youths expressing willingness to sacrifice their own personal interests for their country. Note, in particular, the gap between the United States and Japan. The proportion of Japanese youths who are either satisfied or more or less satisfied with "the way things are in [their] country" is only 35 percent, as compared with 89 percent for West Germany and 60 percent for the United States. Finally, whereas in all five countries only a tiny fraction of the

respondents said their number-one goal in life was "to work on behalf of society," the proportion of such youth in Japan was among the lowest. One way of interpreting these data is to conclude that Japanese youths have become remarkably self-centered, even more so than their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe. To the extent that preoccupation with one's personal interests bespeaks individualism, one can also argue that Japanese youths are in some ways more individualistic than their counterparts in other industrialized democracies. It is worth noting, however, that such attitudes apparently declined, rather than increased, between 1977 and 1983.

Turning to attitudes toward parents, we see in table 25 that the picture is somewhat murky in Japan. On the one hand, Japan has the lowest proportion of respondents who acknowledged having "real

clashes" with their parents and the highest proportion of respondents preferring a strict father. On the other, not only is the latter proportion (32 percent in 1983) relatively small, but it is also eclipsed by the proportion of those preferring "a father who tries to be friends with his children" (54 percent in 1983). Moreover, a greater proportion of

Japanese youth endorse a permissive father than do the youth in the four Western countries. Finally, it is rather surprising to see Japanese youth in the third place in expression of filial piety, behind their counterparts in France and the United States. Can all this be viewed as further evidence of the rise of egalitarian sentiment among Japanese youth ?

If, as noted previously, universalistic values are stressed in Japanese education, is this reflected in the attitudes of Japanese youths? Slightly less than half of the Japanese youth surveyed in 1983 cited "personal abilities" as one of the two most important ingredients of success in life, but seven in ten mentioned "personal effort." The belief that hard work can reinforce innate ability and even compensate for the lack of it seems to be widely shared among the youths of the five countries. The differential perception of the relative importance of "family position and social rank" between Japanese youths and that of the other countries is perhaps indicative of the salience of universalistic criteria in Japan. The surprisingly low proportion of Japanese youths who mentioned "good education" as one of the top two requirements for success, however, should be balanced against their responses concerning the perceived value of "having gone to a top-rated college."^[25] That more Japanese youths were sensitive to the importance of "major field of study" than were the youths of the other countries simply reflects a well-known fact of life in Japan: graduation from a faculty of law, particularly that of Todai, can provide that crucial margin of success in close matches.

All in all, the attitudes displayed by Japanese youths closely parallel those of their counterparts in the United States and the three European countries. The data do not indicate in any way that the Japanese youth are more authoritarian than the youths of the other four countries.