Literati Perceptions of Ho-Shen

Like the eunuch usurpation during the Ming, the Ho-shen affair altered Confucian discourse on gentry-official responsibilities vis-à-vis the welfare of an imperiled dynasty. For a faction to succeed in imperial politics required access to the emperor's favor. By gaining imperial support, Ho-shen could with relative impunity assemble a formidable group of supporters who were identifiable as a powerful clique in imperial and provincial politics. This unorthodox—many viewed it as illegitimate—road to power had been the key to eunuch influence for several earlier dynasties.

Opposition to Ho-shen in the 1790s, like opposition to the eunuch Wei Chung-hsien in the 1620s, brought together a disparate collection of literati and bureaucratic dissatisfaction to form a polarized faction.

[12] Nivison, "Ho-shen and His Accusers," p. 232.

Behind the unified ideological façade of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's last two decades of direct and indirect rule (he "retired" in 1795, yielding titular power to his son), covert power alignments appeared that would later emerge as overt "voices of remonstrance."^[13]

In the eyes of many Chinese and Manchus, the threat that Ho-shen posed to Confucian political life and official careers conveniently exceeded the dangers of factionalism. When the ideological objections to factions were challenged in lurid literati accounts of Ho-shen's subversion of the throne for personal profit and greed, imperial bans on "factions" were portrayed as morally suspect. The Confucian opposition now held the high ground. Their "public-minded" (kung ) duty as concerned Confucians was seen to conflict with the selfish (ssu ) predators feeding on imperial access. The terms of discourse on political factions were slowly reversed in the 1790s.

Little actually changed until the death of the retired Ch'ien-lung Emperor in 1799. Important court officials such as Chuang Ts'un-yü, for example, could not speak out directly. Hence in the 1780s Chuang chose New Text interpretations of the Annals, as we have seen, to disguise his misgivings about Ho-shem A decade later, heeding the advice of ministers who were aligned against the handsome and well-placed Manchu, the Chia-ch'ing Emperor slowly effected Ho-shen's demise. Upon taking personal command of the government, the new emperor invited all qualified officials to memorialize the throne on the problems facing the dynasty. This privilege of submitting opinions to the throne (yen-lu, lit., "pathway for words") signified an opening of the political process after decades of the throne's rejection of unsolicited advice.^[14]

Many of Ho-shen's opponents, surprisingly, were Han Learning scholars. They rallied around the Manchu Grand Counselor A-kuei (1717-97) and Chu Kuei (1731-1807), a northern Chinese who was a friend and former tutor of the Chia-ch'ing Emperor. A-kuei was a colleague and associate of Chuang Ts'un-yü when the latter served in the Grand Secretariat a decade earlier. Chu Kuei's elder brother, Chu Yun, was a highly respected Han Learning scholar and patron of k'ao-cheng research. Chu Kuei—himself a supporter of Han Learning and evidential scholarship—had been recalled to Peking by his former imperial pupil to serve as head of the Board of Civil Office in the Ministry of Rites. The role of Han Learning scholars in opposing the Ho-shen fac-

[13] ibid., pp. 232-43.

[14] Ibid., pp. 240-41. See also Hucker, "Confucianism and the Chinese Censorial System," pp. 182-208.

tion demonstrates a degree of political involvement that has never been associated with the k'ao-cheng movement. It suggests that the typical portrayal of Hah Learning as apolitical philology needs to be revised substantially.^[15]

Among the Han Learning antagonists Chu Kuei had assembled, Hung Liang-chi, Sun Hsing-yen, and Chang Hui-yen were Ch'ang-chou natives. The contributions of Ch'ang-chou scholarship and statecraft traditions among the Chu Kuei group should not be underestimated. Hung and Chang were closely associated with the Chuang lineage in Ch'ang-chou, for example. Given Chuang Ts'un-yü's opposition to Ho-shen in the 1780s and his association with A-kuei (whose efforts to promote the official career of Chuang's nephew Shu-tsu were sabotaged by Ho-shen [see chapter 3]), Ts'un-yÿ's classical studies took on special meaning for Chu Kuei's group. Two years after Ho-shen's death, for example, Chu prepared a preface for Chuang Ts'un-yü's Correcting Terms in the Spring and Autumn Annals that lauded the author's efforts to enunciate the Kung-yang vision of the Annals. As we have seen, the latter was encoded with anti-Ho-shen sentiment.^[16]

For many among Chu Kuei's group the emperor's moves to remove Ho-shen from power did not go far enough. Although he acknowledged that many of Ho-shen's followers must have shared in crimes attributed to Ho-shen, the emperor could not allow the slightest criticism of his father, who had given Ho-shen the scope to maneuver in court. Moreover, the Chia-ch'ing Emperor wished to avoid a full-scale purge, which was the only way to weed out the Ho-shen faction. Instead, he chose to view Ho-shen as responsible for corrupting those below him. The enemy was not a faction but an individual. With Ho-shen gone, the loyalty of officials, he hoped, would return to where it belonged—the person of the emperor.