Profane Politics, Sacred Politics

Older saintly quarrels, the ideology of the holy man, and the political economy of the desert shaped the later responses of religious notables to the French invasion. But what of the ties between "secular" political elites and sufi leaders of the emerging Rahmaniyya order? Information on relationships between provincial or rural Muslim notables and traditional central authorities or their local representatives is not abundant.^[105] Yet these older relationships are also crucial to an understanding of the conquest era since France at first attempted to control her fractious African prize by relying upon Turkish ruling formulas. And if the deylical regime

collapsed precipitously in 1830, many of the traditional political arrangements endured in one form or another for decades after the fall of Algiers.

It can be posited that the ruling caste in provincial capitals, like Constantine, bestowed honors, privileges, and other forms of both symbolic and material recognition upon desert religious notables, such as the Rahmaniyya lineages of the Ziban. Nevertheless, the Rahmaniyya's founder, a Berber from eastern Algeria, enjoyed a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the Turkish rulers in Algiers. On the one hand, according to the founder-saint's biographer, Muhammad al-Hafnawi, the pasha (dey) invited Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman to the capital to instruct him and his family in sufi doctrines from the East. This the saint and sufi obligingly did, even residing in the ruler's household for a time. While al-Hafnawi cited this incident as a moral parable regarding rightful sufi adab (conduct) in the palaces of the mighty, he also implied that religious notables could dwell among the most powerful without necessarily incurring moral opprobrium.^[106] On the other, some within ruling circles in Algiers viewed Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman as a potential danger to the political order. His movement, based upon eastern Khalwatiyya reformism, was deemed menacing due to the social composition of his popular following—among the bellicose Kabyle mountain folk of the Jurjura only imperfectly within the political center's grasp. Only the saint's departure from the capital in the early 1790s, and perhaps the threat of unrest from his partisans, saved him from harm.

Moreover, the interest that governing elites took in rural or provincial holy men did not stop at the borders of the two Ottoman regencies. The Husaynid rulers of Tunis courted sufi leaders in neighboring Algeria as a matter of policy, conferring gifts and establishing hubus to their benefit. For example, both the Rahmaniyya zawiya of Khanqa Sidi Naji and the Tijaniyya centers of Gummar (Guémar) and Tammasin (Témacin) in southeastern Algeria received Tunisian subsidies. The generosity of Tunisia's princes to religious notables in Algeria would assume political importance after 1830.^[107] But what of relations between religious notables and the local secular elites upon whom the rulers in distant capitals inevitably relied to govern places like the pre-Sahara?

Collective social action in the post–1830 period cannot be fully grasped without understanding the surrounding political milieu within which privileged saintly lineages had always operated. Mention has been made of the fact that saints and sufis, such as Sidi Muhammad b. 'Azzuz, were compelled by their peacekeeping functions to resolve disputes for tribal shaykhs.^[108] Religious clans, like the 'Azzuz of al-Burj, were enmeshed in a political culture dominated by the play of the saffs or leagues and the struggles of

tribal warlords, above all, the Bu 'Ukkaz and Banu Ghana. Moreover, the fragmentary evidence that exists for the precolonial era raises issues about the truism of the holy man's professional neutrality, which may have been in practice more nuanced than previously thought.

The Rahmaniyya of Tulqa traditionally maintained amicable ties with central authorities—or rather with their regional delegates. Sidi 'Ali b. 'Umar was the friend and adviser of the Banu Ghana's leader, who headed one of the saffs that divided the pre-Sahara's inhabitants into two political camps.^[109] While the saffs were a much older mechanism for venting as well as containing political struggles, in the late eighteenth century the leagues of the southern Constantine became embroiled in a fierce contest between the Banu Ghana and the Bu 'Ukkaz for the coveted post of shaykh al-'arab, a contest discussed in detail in the next chapter. In addition to friendship and patronage with the Banu Ghana, the Rahmaniyya notables of Tulqa were also on amicable terms with the oasis's local secular shaykhs, the Awald Ziyan. Significantly, in the Jabal Cherchar, Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz's rivals, the Awlad Sidi Naji, were also aligned with the Banu Ghana, which suggests that the Rahmaniyya shaykh may have been on the opposing side.^[110]

In contrast to the leaders of Tulqa, the 'Azzuz of al-Burj appear to have had a preference for the Bu 'Ukkaz clan. Shaykh Muhammad even sent the eldest of his eight sons, al-Hasan, to be educated from childhood on at the Bu 'Ukkaz's zamala (a tribal camp or settlement; in Turkish North Africa, a tribal cavalry serving the state). There Hasan was raised as a sort of warrior-marabout, reminiscent of the older Maghribi tradition of the ribat. The French commandant, Jospeh-Adrien Seroka, who eventually fought against Hasan b. 'Azzuz in the Ziban, provided this portrait of him, one of the few such descriptions of a sufi personage from the period:

There was something extraordinary about his appearance; his head was as large as a bull's, his arms and legs were enormous, his voice was like a lion's roar. Seeing his thick mass, made rather for the leisure of the zawiya than the life of a soldier, one would never have believed that he [Hasan b. 'Azzuz] was an accomplished cavalryman and fierce warrior.^[111]

In marked contrast, Hasan's brother, Mustafa b. 'Azzuz was given a scholar's education and groomed as a future leader of the Saharan Rahmaniyya. Another younger sibling, Muhammad, was shaykh of the small Rahmaniyya center in the oasis of Sidi Khalid; other males in the lineage also followed religious careers. Thus, Hasan's training was unique among the eight male offspring of Shaykh Muhammad b. 'Azzuz. Confiding a son to the Bu 'Ukkaz for warrior training may have been a calculated strategy to

cement relations between powerful desert warlords and a sufi order then in the process of expansion. This strategy would have protected not only the 'Azzuzes' interests but also those of the nascent tariqa. Conversely, the Bu 'Ukkaz may have sought legitimacy by associating themselves with the leader of the most dynamic sufi order in the Sahara at the time. Finally, enrolling a son in a "secular' profession ensured that sainthood, baraka, and leadership were not disputed, and thus dissipated, among family members from a single privileged lineage.

Given the close ties between the two sufi clans, the fact that the 'Azzuz of al-Burj opted for one saff while the Rahmaniyya notables of Tulqa were associated with the opposing political league appears perplexing. Nevertheless, it may have been a form of saintly realpolitik—bet hedging dictated by the rapid shifts in the political wheel of fortune as first the Banu Ghana and then their opponents momentarily gained power. This form of coping to ensure political survival was repeatedly relied upon by many Muslim notables during and after the conquest period.