Preferred Citation: Herbst, Jeffrey. The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1993 1993. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2199n7n7/


 
Chapter 2— Ghana in Economic Crisis

The Second Rawlings Coup

With Ghana facing these disastrous conditions, Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings initiated his coup on December 31, 1981, an event known throughout Ghana as Rawlings's second coming. Rawlings came to power seeking, in his own words, "nothing less than a revolution."[34] As was customary for Ghanaian leaders, Rawlings noted soon after the coup that the country had hit bottom: "For so many of the adult population of this country over the last few years, even if they have not resorted to suicide to escape the shame of their condition, there has been for them no point to this life, nothing to look forward to except a continued slaving for others to enjoy."[35] However, in the early days after the coup, Rawlings did not even hint at an economic philosophy that would reverse the plunge of the nation. Rather, in his first speech, he talked about government power, indicating a willingness to use even more force than his previous administration had: "There is no justice in this society and so long as there is not justice, I would dare say that 'let there be no peace .' "[36]

The new Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), as the group of civilians and army officers who ruled with Rawlings called themselves, then went about proclaiming a revolution. The economic policies they

[32] Calculated from Kodwo Ewusi, Statistical Tables on the Economy of Ghana, 1950–1985 (Legon: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, 1986).

[33] Dr. Joseph Abbey, "Ghana's Experience with Structural Adjustment," mimeo, n.d., 2.

[34] Radio Broadcast to the Nation, 31 December 1981, reprinted in A Revolutionary Journey: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, vol. 1 (Accra: Information Services Department, n.d.), 1.

[35] Radio and Television Broadcast to the Nation, 5 January 1982 in ibid., 4.

[36] Radio and Television Broadcast to the Nation, 31 December 1981 in ibid., 3–4. Emphasis in the original.


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implemented, however, did not differ significantly from those of previous governments. Instead, the PNDC's four-year economic program, announced in December 1982, devoted itself to establishing a state monopoly on export-import trade, eliminating corruption in the allocation of import licenses, and trying to reorient trade away from the West.[37] With a flourish of populist and socialist rhetoric, the government sought to mobilize workers, students, and the rest of the urban population to bring about (through unspecified policy measures) radical change in the economy. Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs) and People's Defence Committees (PDCs) were established to mobilize the population, and quite a bit of organization was done on the shop floor. While helping urban workers, the Rawlings regime seemed to accentuate the urban bias of previous regimes by imposing controls on the sale and price of food, the major source of income for the 70 percent of the population that live in the rural areas.[38]

The government also tried to coerce traders, sometimes through blatant physical force, into making goods available at controlled prices. In other words, the Rawlings regime instinctively adopted the old measures of trying to cure the ills of the economy through expanding the state. The regime's calls for vigilante action against anyone perceived as an enemy of the state led to continual human rights violations by many the regime had designated, or who had appointed themselves, to advance the "revolution." The first year of PNDC rule was replete with violent acts against those who even appeared to be in opposition to the regime, notably the kidnapping and brutal murder of three high court judges on June 30, 1982. As the Catholic bishops of Ghana stated,

In the wake of the "revolution" atrocities of all sorts have been committed against innocent civilians by some members of the armed forces and various groups purporting to support the revolution. The wanton killings, senseless beatings, merciless molestation and general harassment continue without the Government showing any willingness or ability to do anything about them.[39]

Similarly, the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies noted, "The application of the law of the jungle has resulted in the total break down of law and order. There is no accountability. Many who hold guns or are protected by the gun feel they can do anything and get away with it."[40]

[37] Ghanaian Times, 31 December 1982.

[38] Baffour Agyeman-Duah, "Ghana, 1982–1986: The Politics of the P.N.D.C.," Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 4 (1987): 623.

[39] Catholic Bishops' Conference of Ghana, Statement on the State of the Nation (Accra: Catholic Bishops' Conference, 1982), 2.

[40] Quoted in Echo (Accra), 25 July 1982, 2.


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As both the economy and civil society fell apart, it soon became apparent to the regime that it did not have the economic policies to cope with the crisis confronting Ghana. First, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, which the PNDC had hoped would come to the aid of its revolution, told Ghana they had no money, suggesting that the Rawlings regime negotiate a program with the IMF. Second, soon after Rawlings took power, there was an increasing realization, among at least some members of the regime, that the socialist/populist slogans they were mouthing did not add up to a coherent economic program. Even the usually sycophantic Ghanaian press observed in April 1982 that the regime had no economic policy to speak of.[41] Finally, 1982 and 1983 were absolutely disastrous years: the country suffered from a severe drought, which caused a decrease in agricultural production, and bush fires damaged a substantial portion of the countryside. Further, Nigeria, experiencing its own problems, expelled approximately one million Ghanaians who had been working in the country illegally. Thus, almost overnight, during the worst economic crisis the country had ever faced, the government had to cope with the influx of an additional 10 percent of its population desperate to work.


Chapter 2— Ghana in Economic Crisis
 

Preferred Citation: Herbst, Jeffrey. The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1993 1993. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2199n7n7/