The Last "Orthodox" Rural Self-Defense

As the Japanese forces turned inward to consolidate the occupied areas in 1941, the passive phase of the Kuomintang's resistance set in. Having borne the brunt of the invasion for more than three years while waging another war with the Communists, it was exhausted. It decided to hold the ring and pit the two adversaries against each other. The structural weakness of the Chinese polity was not altered by the coming of the war. But unlike its earlier manifestation, regionalism after 1941 worked temporarily to the advantage of Chungking. Following the defection of local armed organizations in 1940, the Kuomintang's regional forces began to enter into open or covert collusion with the Japanese forces in 1941. By the end of 1943, most Kuomintang forces in the occupied areas secretly colluded with the Japanese forces or formally submitted to the Nanking government. The CCP was alarmed and charged that this was "national salvation by detour" (ch'ü-hsien chiu-kuo ), i.e., a deliberate plot by Chungking to preserve its forces on the basis of temporary surrender. Actually the collusion seemed to be the result of fortuitous development. In most instances, according to Japanese records, cooperation was forcibly extracted from a regional force after repeated attacks by the Japanese and Communist forces threatened to decimate it.

About this time there were three pockets of Kuomintang influence in the Japanese-occupied area. In central Shantung, Yü Hsüeh-chung and his contingent remained until 1943.^[94] Han Te-ch'in remained in the Tungt'ai–Hsinghua area east of Lake Kaoyu until he was forced out of Kiangsu altogether in 1943.^[95] In Shansi Province, Yen Hsi-shan maintained a rather passive existence in the southwestern corner surrounded by the Japanese, the Communists, and the central army. As early as February, 1940, a personal letter from General Itagaki Seishiro^[*] , the chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Forces, was delivered to Yen by Su T'i-jen, the Shansi governor, asking Yen to support the government in Nanking. The negotiation, code-named Taihaku kosaku^[*] ("Yen Hsi-shan Operation"), made progress after Wei Li-huang, Yen's actual superior, was driven out of the province in early 1941.^[96] In September Chao Ch'eng-shou, Yen's confidant, signed the Basic Agreement and the Truce Agreement while some Japanese units were making threatening maneuvers at a distance.

[94] Amerasia Papers , p. 398.

[95] Ibid. , pp. 349–350.

[96] Pacification War , No. 1, p. 585.

Yen agreed to join the Nanking government on the basis of the Basic Treaty for Adjusting the Relationship between Japan and China , signed earlier by Wang Ching-wei. With Wang's consent, Yen was to be the vice chairman of the Nanking government and the chairman of its Military Commission. He was to have a force of 300,000, of which 100,000 were to be recruited from Shantung and Hopei. The Shansi Army was to receive 100,000 rifles, some heavier weapons, and a monthly pay of 12 million yuan from the Nanking government. In addition, 50 million yuan was promised as a credit to restore the local currency. By a subsequent administrative agreement, the Shansi Army was assigned to the "occupation district" in Chishan, Hsinchiang, Hotsin, Fushan, Yüehyang (Antse), Hsinyüan, Chiehhsiu, and Hsiaoyi. In addition, it was allowed to collect tax from Fenyang, Wenshui, and Ch'i hsien .^[97] It appears that the Japanese side reneged on some of its promises, which caused Yen Hsi-shan to refrain from formally declaring his allegiance to the Nanking government.

Yen Hsi-shan's collusion with the Japanese is the only case from which a formal agreement is extant, but more or less similar negotiations were carried out by other figures. They included P'ang Pinghsün, the commander of the Hopei–Chahar War Zone, and Generals Wu Hua-wen and Chang Lan-feng, commanders of sizable contingents in Shantung and Honan.^[98] Naturally the CCP had an interest in making exaggerated charges of collaboration. Chu Te states, for instance, that 500,000 troops and sixty or seventy generals colluded with the Japanese.^[99] But, because of its policy of "unification," the Kuomintang was relentless toward disloyal regional leaders. Thus Han Fuch'ü and Shih Yu-san, governors of Shantung and Chahar, were executed as traitors, and after 1943 it would have taken utter political insensitivity to hitch one's fortunes to the sinking ships of Japan and Wang Ching-wei. In most instances, therefore, collusion with the Japanese did not exceed an uneasy temporary truce involving an informal sphere-of-influence agreement.

Those pockets of Kuomintang influence that survived in the occupied area were regional powers in their own right rather than simply subordinate units of the central government. This seems to account for their ability to persist against Communist attacks—until 1943 under

[97] Ibid. , pp. 584–588.

[98] Lyman P. Van Slyke, ed., The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 90, 94.

[99] Lun chieh-fang-ch'ü chan-ch'ang , p. 16. See also Chung-Kung chung-yang wei k'ang-chan liu-chou-nien chi-nien hsüan-yen [The CCP Central Committee's manifesto on the sixth anniversary of the resistance] for a list of alleged collaborators.

the Kuomintang's banner and thereafter as Japan's nominal allies. The gradual "puppetization" of Kuomintang-affiliated units in Shantung is shown in the following figures reported in a Communist source.^[100] The figures are not reliable, but the trend indicated is.

The most interesting characteristic of these groups is not that they suffered from questionable political consciousness—as the Communists charged—but rather that they kept their total number relatively constant by taking on whatever color was most expedient. At bottom they seem to have enjoyed the support of the landlord class. As Chungking's fortune declined in the occupied area, the landlords' vested interest in the old order induced them to transcend the political differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. In this sense, they were the last decayed manifestation of rural self-defense on the "orthodox" side.

In the revolutionary Peking opera "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy," a detachment of Red Army regulars finds it impossible to take a bandits' lair in a straight military attack. A resort is then made to political "strategy." Such an episode seems to be an integral part of the Communist army's experiences. It may be that the CCP's difficulties in Shantung stemmed from the presence of a series of native guerrilla leaders such as Liu Kuei-t'ang, described earlier. This hypothesis can be confirmed in a case study of north Kiangsu, of which there is sufficient documentary evidence. Here the Communist forces encountered regional and local forces organized along the lines very similar to themselves. The case also points up the special character of central China as the Kuomintang's home.

Liu Shao-ch'i, as I have shown, was dispatched to north Kiangsu to override Hsiang Ying's "line." He formally upheld Mao Tse-tung and condemned Hsiang Ying in connection with the struggle against Wang Ming. According to Liu, Hsiang Ying "refused the valuable lessons of north China, and opposed base construction in central China as altogether impossible."^[101] Yet, in reality, Liu Shao-ch'i's manner of running the Central China Bureau and the New Fourth Army in-

[100] Liberated Areas , p. 90.

[101] Central China Bureau First Plenum , p. 43.

dicated that there were indeed some "special characters" to central China to which he had to accommodate himself. The peculiar traits of central China were summarized by Jao Shu-shih in November of 1942 at the Central China Anti-Traitor Conference:

If I may speak on the situation in central China from the narrow standpoint of anti-traitor work, then I would summarize it by the single phrase, "environment is complex, factional struggle is intense."

In complexity of the environment and intensity of factional struggle, central China exceeds the whole nation. Because central China is the hub of water and land transportation routes, both foreign and domestic, the biggest city of the nation, Shanghai, is located in central China. When we speak of factional organization and activities, then not only does our Party have a long history in Shanghai and the several provinces of central China, the Kuomintang and the Youth Party also have a very long history. The other groups like the Third Party, the National Socialist Party, the Trotskyites, Kuomintang-affiliated Fuhsingshe, the San-Min-Chu-I Youth Corps, the CC Clique—are all equally present. Again, if we speak of feudal organizations and their activities, then Sanpan, the Green and the Red Gangs, the Sword Society, Shenhsientao and other superstitious and sectarian organizations also abound in central China. Still again, if we speak of the spread of local bandits, then everyone knows that the areas around Lakes T'ai, Ch'ao, Kaoyu, and Hungtze and the coastal belt are notorious bandit areas in China. Even today many villages in north Kiangsu and eastern Anhwei have moats, stone fences, walls, and watch towers around them. Many are the houses with iron or wooden fences around them. These suffice to show how violent were the local bandits in these regions in the past. Finally the numerousness of turncoats is also characteristic of central China. As the result of more than ten years of rule by the anti-Communist elements, central China's situation is that secret service is strong everywhere. Since they adopted the "turncoat policy," a great many voluntary surrenders have resulted. For instance, in the Tungt'ai district of central Kiangsu alone, there have been more than 3,000. . . .^[102]

North Kiangsu was not like, for instance, the mountains of Shansi Province with its homogeneous peasant outlook. The three-cornered struggle between the Kuomintang, Japan (plus the Wang Ching-wei faction), and the Communist party added to an already bewildering social and political relationship.

In 1941, the Sixth Detachment of the New Fourth Army, led by P'eng Hsüeh-fen, had been procrastinating near K'aifeng in northern Honan in spite of the directive from the Central China Bureau to move east across the Tientsin–Pukow railway. Finally, it was at-

[102] Hua-chung ch'u-chien pao-wei kung-tso ti chi-pen tsung-chi chi chin-hou ti jen-wu , pp. 21–22.

tacked by a cavalry unit of the Kwangsi Army (the Fifth War Zone) and lost 4,000 men and 2,000 rifles, a "serious loss" second only to the New Fourth Army Incident in the annals of this army.^[103] The detachment moved east and rested briefly in the area of Lake Hungtze. It was designated as the Fourth Division while its commander—P'eng Te-huai's protégé—went on a half-time "study."^[104] In July, one brigade of the division was completely "localized" and lost its brigade designation.^[105]

In October, 1941, after six months of rest, the Fourth Division was ordered to move west again from the Lake Hungtze area to the center of the Huaipei District, still east of the Tientsin–Pukow railway. The division, which must have been no more than a few thousand strong, settled in the area of Ssuhsien, Lingpi, and Suiyü, where Anhwei meets Kiangsu. All three hsien seats and two outposts besides were occupied by the Japanese forces. There were fifteen companies of puppet forces of "extremely weak fighting power" as well. Recruited mostly from "bandits" and "drifters" (liu-min ), they numbered roughly one thousand.^[106] The die-hards in the area, on both Kiangsu and Anhwei side, drew on the strength of the Kwangsi army pressing eastward from across the Tientsin–Pukow railway. The Anhwei governor, Li P'ing-hsien, commanded the forces of Wang Chung-lien; and they were linked up with the forces under Han Te-ch'in in Kiangsu. In 1941, Han's forces on the Kiangsu–Anhwei border area were directed by Wang Kuang-hsia, who headed the First Detachment of the Security Forces.^[107] In the Ssuhsien–Lingpi–Suiyü area, there was one so-called independent regiment. It shared its habitat with the 33rd Division, so-called, of the Anhwei regional forces led by Tuan Hai-chou. Together they numbered little more than 4,000.^[108]

Beneath the independent regiment and Tuan Hai-chou's 33rd Division were a peculiar breed of local leaders whom the Communists chose to call "native die-hards" (t'u-wan ). About one dozen names of "native die-hards" appeared frequently in the Fourth Division's internal documents as a major source of threat to the Communists in the three-hsien area. As late as mid-1943, Teng Tzu-hui, the Division's political commissar, was stating that "it is impossible to eliminate the

[103] Central China Bureau First Plenum , p. 95.

[104] Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao , V, 162.

[105] Hsing-huo liao-yüan , VI, 454.

[106] Li Jen-chih, "Ssu-Ling-Sui yu-chi ken-chü-ti shih tsen-yang chien-li ch'i-lai-ti" [How the Ssu-Ling-Sui guerrilla base was built], Fuhsiao , November, 1944, p. 20.

[107] Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao , XIII, 74.

[108] Li Jen-chih, "Ssu-Ling-Sui . . . ," p. 20.

native die-hards militarily."^[109] The "native die-hards" turned out to be large landlords who had gathered soldiers around themselves for self-defense and offered their small domains as a sort of satrapy to Kwangsi-affiliated regional leaders.

I have shown in Chapter IV that the Fourth Division had to put to rest seventy or so groups of bandits in the Huaipei District by 1942.^[110] Although what precisely constituted bandits was never defined, they were reported to be another problem for the Communists.

Ssu-Ling-Sui is a notorious bandit area . . . the larger groups number five or six hundred like Chu Shih-lin's while small ones are made up of three to five. Each controls an area, and blocks the road to rob. Each loots at night and tends the field in the day. Each refrains from robbing its own area but concentrates on robbing elsewhere.^[111]

These bandits were natives of the Anhwei–Kiangsu border. The leaders among them possessed property and land. They were so deeply rooted in the locality that they refused to leave. In addition, there were half a dozen or so superstitious and sectarian organizations. It is not clear whether their membership was confined more or less to the poorer peasants. As in north China, these local organizations emerged spontaneously when the Japanese forces began moving up the Yangtze River after the Battle of Hsüchow.^[112] It was an atavistic return to the conditions of the nineteenth century.

As described in the Fourth Division's internal documents, it is almost impossible to differentiate between the "native die-hards," the puppet forces, and bandits. In some sense, they were all of a piece.

Before the war, local bandits in Ssu-Ling-Sui were linked up with the landlords and bad bosses; since the war they have been used by the enemy. Those who did not turn into puppet army became the die-hard forces. Because of this, local bandits, the puppets, and the die-hards have connection with each other. They mutually protect each other. . . .^[113]

Whether a local elite chose to be puppet or die-hard seems to have been decided by accidental factors such as kinship or political connections, local balance of power, etc. Several of them switched sides more than once. It was even discovered that the native die-hards' "political opinion is not necessarily opposed to communism," at least at this

[109] "Teng Tzu-hui t'ung-chih tsai Huaipei kao-kan-hui shang ti fa-yen" [The remarks of comrade Teng Tzu-hui at the Huaipei senior cadre conference], Fuhsiao , June, 1943, p. 9.

[110] See above, p. 133.

[111] Li Jen-chih, "Ssu-Ling-Sui . . . ," p. 31.

[112] Cheng Wei-san, K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yü nung-min yün-tung [The war against Japan and peasant movement] (Huainan District, 1942) (BI), p. 15.

[113] Li Jen-chih, "Ssu-Ling-Sui . . . ," p. 31.

stage when the Fourth Division was hardly in a position to carry out radical land reform.^[114]

Die-hard or bandit, the local elites seem to have been landlords in the area which was noted for high concentration of land in the hands of the rich. "Class distinction was sharp," and there were several fortress-like private homes of big landlords.^[115] The poor and the jobless no doubt made up the bulk of the soldiers in the private armies of the native die-hards and the puppet forces. In this sense, class division was overridden by local cohesion. The local elites terrorized peasant masses as the Fourth Division began to compete for the latter's loyalty. All local chiefs of pao (made up of several yen for the purpose of mutual responsibility) and yen , who controlled the pao-chia (the generic term that stands for the system of mutual responsibility and surveillance) system, were either landlords or related to landlords by blood.^[116] These bosses said at mass meetings, "It's all right to become local bandits or puppets, but we'll make sure to kill the whole family of anyone who helps the Eighth Route."^[117]

It was apparent that the Fourth Division was the stranger and nearly helpless against the concerted opposition of the natives:

The basic principle adopted by the die-hard force in military struggle against us is preservation of its strength, avoiding the powerful, but striking the weak. They do not clash with us in force. They deal with us by relying on the outposts of the enemy and the puppets. They use a high degree of guerrilla tactics and move about day and night. When the situation gets tense, they change place six times a day. The important cadres [kanpu ] move by themselves without escort of troops in order to avoid capture. In encampment of troops, they adopt dispersion and concealment. Their guns are entrusted to the civilians. They demand compensation when [the guns are] lost. When they face an attack, they take the principle of non-resistance and run away. When our forces carry out bandit suppression, they jump (to the exterior line), bore through (each has an olive drab uniform and can masquerade as puppet troop to enter the puppet outpost), or filter away. . . .^[118]

The native die-hards were outwitting the Communists in their own game.

The Fourth Division conducted a careful survey and "investigation" of native opposition. Information as to the background and family connections of puppet officers, for instance, was collected; then political bargains were struck. The puppet forces would be asked to join a "white skin, red heart" arrangement. "Contradictions" between the die-hards, between the die-hards and the puppets, between the bandits

[114] Ibid. , p. 31.

[115] Ibid. , p. 20.

[116] Ibid. , p. 38.

[117] Ibid. , p. 39.

[118] Ibid. , p. 41.

and the die-hards, etc., were studied and exploited. In 1942, the division captured two native die-hards but released them unharmed with a public pronouncement which lectured the need for united resistance. Subsequently, the two returned small favors.^[119]

Our Party and army are yet to attain complete superiority in power in this district. When the object of the united front—the puppets and bandits that surround us—are often aligned against us, we should not dissolve the contradictions among them. If we do, we may accelerate the confrontation between the enemy and ourselves, thus leading us to isolation.^[120]

There was a scale for designating political loyalty of an organization ranging from pro-Japanese "one-face" to pro-Communist "one-face." Most of the CCP's mass organizations at this stage were mild affairs with "two-faces," having some sort of understanding with both the puppet and the die-hard forces.^[121] The Lienchuanghui, a landlord organization, as well as pao-chia , were used on such basis. Teng Tzu-hui warned against the kind of intolerance displayed by the Communists in the early phase of the war, and he counseled that "[we] must use native Communists [t'u-kung ] to deal with native die-hards."^[122]

Mao has stated that it takes three or four years to build a good Communist base.^[123] Indeed, the Fourth Division spent three years, until mid–1944, to gain the upper hand in the area against native opposition. In the meantime, one sees little evidence that the division engaged in the kind of aggressive action undertaken in Chin-Ch'a-Chi against the Japanese forces. Most of the energy of the division was absorbed in the political task of peasant mobilization. With determination and care, it took the old social order apart piece by piece and rebuilt it. At bottom the task was coeval with the making of new men out of often unwilling peasants. Until that was accomplished, the division's military prowess, organizational discipline, and political leadership gave it only a slight edge over native opposition.

The persistence of local opposition to the Communists in the Huaipei area as late as 1943 is quite surprising. This was based on a loose ad hoc coalition of armed landlords under a rather inferior regional leadership. One wonders whether the CCP could have penetrated the area at all had the Kuomintang been in a position to exercise direct leadership over it. This case also confirms my earlier finding that the

[119] "Teng Tzu-hui t'ung-chih . . . ," p. 9.

[120] Li Jen-chih, "Ssu-Ling-Sui . . . ," p. 24.

[121] "Teng Tzu-hui t'ung-chih . . . ," p. 8.

[122] Ibid. , p. 9.

[123] SW , V, 81.

choice of Communist bases was made on strategic grounds.^[124] If social support for Communist rule was absent, that was disregarded. Social support was something to be created by first destroying the old social order.