The Need for Reconciliation

If members want Congress to enact narrow distributive legislation, providing dams, roads, post offices, and other items of direct electoral benefit to members, the committee system of Congress is perhaps uniquely well suited for their purposes.^[6] The passage of pork-barrel legislation can occur through a decentralized committee system because little explicit coordination is required and enforcing bargains is not a problem. Norms of reciprocity and universalism—"you pass my pork-barrel bill, and I'll pass yours"—largely take care of the problem of coordination.^[7] The informality of this mode of coordination is indicated by the following exchange on the Senate floor during the debate on the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, a bill known as the "Park Barrel" bill because it provided for so many new projects in so many states.

"Is there any state other than Kansas that did not end up with a park?" asked Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan.

"Did we leave you out, Bob?" asked Sen. James Abourezk, D-S.D., chairman of the Energy Subcommittee on parks and the floor manager of the bill.

[6] By "direct" benefits, I mean those provided to identifiable persons, benefitting specific constituencies—and also specific members of Congress. "Indirect" benefits are received, not in the form of a monthly check, but through a reduced deficit, for instance. Reducing direct benefits to individual A may provide an indirect benefit to individual B.

[7] Donald Matthews, "Folkways of the United States Senate," American Political Science Review 53 (Dec. 1959): 1064–1089. Barry Weingast, "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," American Journal of Political Science 23 (May 1979): 245–261. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, "Political Preference for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization," American Journal of Political Science 25 (Feb. 1981): 96–111.

"I have two more years in my term," noted Dole, as laughter continued in the chamber. Sen. Clifford P. Hansen, R-Wyo., also on the subcommittee, offered Dole a little sympathy. "It is my understanding that six states—five others—did not make it." "I appreciate that," replied Dole. "We will have a meeting later."^[8]

This brief colloquy illustrates a form of coordination without central control, wherein Dole serves notice that he expects his turn will come, within two years.

The need for coordination in distributive politics is diminished by the convenient fit of narrow policies within the jurisdictions of single committees, obviating the need for intercommittee negotiations. Enforcing implicit bargains is not a source of difficulty; it is not normally a problem to get the Interior Committee to approve new parks or the Public Works Committee to recommend new public works. If anything, it is disproportionately to the benefit of members of these and other committees to report such legislation. The problem has more often been holding them back than stirring them to action.

Broader policies—such as reducing deficits, restraining spending, and enacting consistent fiscal policy—are not well served by a committee system.^[9] In large measure these goals can be attained only by altering or curtailing existing distributive policies. Doing so involves a

[8] CQ Almanac, 1978, pp. 704–705.

[9] "The rules of germaneness and of jurisdiction make intercommittee agreements difficult to arrange except in special circumstances. The informal practices of both chambers still discourage members from involving themselves in legislation considered in other committees." John Ferejohn, "Congress and Redistribution," in Making Economic Policy in Congress, ed. Allen Schick (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. 1983), p. 135.

direct cost, and only indirect benefits, to constituents. Such policies span numerous or even perhaps all committee jurisdictions. Under these circumstances, the easy informality that allowed Dole to joke about the absence of a park for Kansas—and to assume that he would get one before the next election—must be replaced by more explicit, formal coordination. Broad legislation that overlaps several committees' jurisdictions or policies whose success depends on simultaneous, coordinated actions by multiple committees do not move well through the fragmented structures of Congress. Logically, logrolling can occur in a downward direction; it is entirely conceivable that the indirect benefits of cutting a series of programs will exceed the direct costs. But legislation enacting such an exchange will be able to pass only under special circumstances.

The problem of spending restraint in Congress can be understood as a problem of collective action. When one member must endure the sacrifice of a program dear to his or her district so that all members may benefit from deficit control, he will demand that other members make similar sacrifices. One committee will be reluctant to cut programs in its jurisdiction without an assurance that other committees are doing likewise. Senator Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, explicitly raised this issue in 1985. "The Finance Committee," he wrote, "will meet its responsibility for achieving $51.2 billion in savings … IF ALL OTHER MAJOR COMMITTEES CAN MEET THE SPENDING CUTS TOTALS REQUIRED OF THEM ."^[10]

[10] Senate Budget Committee, First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget FY 1986, S. Rept. 99-15, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (USGPO, 1985), p. 165; emphasis in the original. The savings Packwood refers to are those recommended by the Office of Management and Budget.

Even when spending restraint is desired by members of Congress and when they are willing to exchange direct benefits to their districts in order to cut the deficit, legislators will not necessarily be able to enact deficit reduction measures. Deficit reduction legislation will normally succeed only when there is a structure to facilitate intercommittee bargaining and when the agreements so reached can be enforced. Success at cutting the budget has come in the past several years because the reconciliation procedure overcomes these defects of normal congressional organization. It is inconceivable that Dole, or Packwood, or any committee chair, would say, "Okay. I'll cut my programs this year because I know you will cut yours next year." That degree of trust does not exist in Congress. An informally coordinated reciprocity works well only when it distributes benefits, not costs.