The Myth of Zaikai Omnipotence
Zaikai , in literal translation, means the financial world, but it also means
[5] Ibid., p. 52.
[6] Ibid., p. 56. Italics added.
something much broader, and at the same time more specific. Although writers have had difficulty arriving at a generally agreed upon definition for it, the zaikai has been credited by many with unparalleled powers over Japanese politics.
In his acceptance speech after defeating Kono Ichiro in the 1965 LDP presidential election, former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku made a famous slip of the tongue. He started out by saying: "On this occasion zaikai 's . . . ," then stopped and rephrased it: "On this occasion the people's support . . . "[7] To many people, "zaikai 's power over the conservative party," as one group of Japanese commentators put it, "is absolute."[8] "In fact, Japan's politics and economy cannot move even one step if the wishes of zaikai are ignored. To put it another way, if zaikai decides it wants something, it can get practically anything."[9] In the view of Chitoshi Yanaga, "zaikai 's power of life and death over governments has been dramatically demonstrated time and again. Candidacy for the premiership is unthinkable without its tacit approval, and the prime minister's days are numbered if his policies or methods no longer meet with its approval."[10]
All of this suggests rather awesome power for zaikai . But Yanaga goes on to say that zaikai is really not a coherent group: "Zaikai , however, is by no means a monolithic structure. . . . The diversity of attitudes, motives, and interests that characterize zaikai has made the cooperation of the larger key organizations (Keidanren; Nikkeiren—Japanese Federation of Employers' Association; Keizai Doyukai—Japanese Committee for Economic Development; and Nissho—Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry) indispensable in achieving consensus and in presenting a united front on issues and problems."[11]
The United States Department of Commerce study of business-government relations in Japan makes a similar point about the role of these key organizations in harmonizing zaikai views. Unfortunately, it adds to the confusion by mistakenly referring to zaikai as a discrete group like the Industrial Problems Research Council (Sanken—the Sangyo[*] Mondai Kenyukai[*] ):
[7] Quoted in Editorial staff, "Shinshusho[*] tanjo[*] " [The making of a new prime minister], Bungei shunju[*] , special August 1972 ed., p. 92.
[8] Editorial staff, "Keidanren: Zaikai kenryoku no sohonzan[*] " [Keidanren: The headquarters of zaikai power], in "Nihon zaikai no genjo[*] " [The present situation of Japan's zaikai ], special issue of Zaikai tenbo[*] , January 1, 1967, p. 23.
[9] Ibid., p. 22.
[10] Yanaga, Big Business , pp. 32–33. A similar view is expressed in a recent Japanese publication: "In the real meaning [of the term] the greatest, most powerful pressure group is zaikai whose desires it is taboo for the political world and the bureaucracy to reject. In legislation as well as in administration, zaikai demands, which might be thought totally unreasonable, are all accepted. Moreover, no matter what occurs, it does not give up any rights it has won." Yamamoto Masao, ed., Keizai kanryo[*] no jittai [The real facts of the economic ministries] (Tokyo, 1972), p. 22.
[11] Yanaga, Big Business , p. 33.
In their fairly frequent informal discussion meetings Sanken and zaikai focus on the major issues confronting Japanese society, as well as Japan's economy. The many different points of view, motives, and interests of these business leaders tend to be harmonized within the councils of the Keidanren and the other major federations. . . . Moreover, the harmonization process, besides providing a national consensus for big business, helps Sanken and zaikai members transcend the narrower interests of the corporations, banks, and organizations with which they are affiliated for a more national perspective on these issues.[12]
As these quotations suggest, the meaning of zaikai is shrouded in considerable conceptual confusion. Part of the reason for the confusion is that the term has a number of meanings in Japanese. Although literally it means the financial world, it sometimes refers to the entire economic community or businessmen generally, as when people talk of zaikai, seikai (political world), or gakkai (academic world). But zaikai , as commonly used, refers to something more specific than the entire business community. According to one author, it refers to the relatively small number of leaders of the business world who "hold the line of communication to the political world";[13] in the words of another, to those business leaders who "engage in and control economic activities for the benefit of the capitalist system and political activities to maintain the present political structure. . . . " [14] The term is sometimes used to refer to individuals and at other times to the place where these individuals meet. Suzuki Yukio has suggested that zaikai is the place where business leaders function as a power elite.[15]
Translating zaikai as the business elite or the business world's power elite does not quite convey the Japanese flavor of the term. Other countries have business elites but only Japan has zaikai . At the base of the distinction seems to be the fact that the men who make up this elite in Japan spend an extraordinary amount of time in so-called zaikai activities (zaikai katsudo[*] )—activities that are not directly related to their own companies, but which seek to represent the interests of the business community as a whole.
[12] Kaplan, Japan, The Government-Business Relationship , pp. 36–37.
[13] Yamaguchi Hiroshi, "Kakufuku senso[*] Ka Nihon zaikai" [Japan's zaikai in the Tanaka-Fukuda war], Zaikai , July 15, 1972, p. 117.
[14] Hirata Masami, "Zaikai no kenryoku keisei ko[*] " [The structure of zaikai power], Zaikai tenbo[*] , January 1, 1967, p. 14.
[15] Suzuki Yukio, Seiji o ugokasu keieisha [Businessmen who influence politics] (Tokyo, 1965), p. 28. Professor Yanaga defines zaikai rather dramatically, and I believe inaccurately, as follows: "In journalistic usage it more often than not refers to the leaders of big business, particularly to leaders who have the support of the powerful economic organizations—the closed circle of organization-based, power-wielding activists. . . . Zaikai also denotes the place where the craving for political power is openly expressed and gratified—that hypothetical arena in which big business influences the government, or even society as a whole. Most frequently identified with the term zaikai are the top executives of four big-business organizations . . . and executives of the Japan Industrial Club whose board of directors consists of the presidents of the key organizations and the elder statesmen of business, industry, and finance." See Yanaga, Big Business , p. 32.
Zaikai , as the term is commonly used, might be defined as the group of major industrial and financial leaders who spend a significant portion of their time in activities that relate to the economy in general and the society at large, generally through active participation in one or more of the four major economic organizations.
Not all leaders of large industry are considered zaikai members (zaikaijin ). Many of the leaders of firms affiliated with the former zaibatsu are not active in zaikai and most of the postwar self-made men—like Matsushita, Honda and Idemitsu—are considered outside the zaikai . On the other hand, some of the leading zaikai members are not leaders of major industries. Uemura Kogoro, for instance, the president of Keidanren and the man referred to as the "prime minister of zaikai " is not even a businessman, but a former bureaucrat who has been with Keidanren since the founding of the organization.[16]
Virtually all those generally regarded as zaikai members are elderly men who have been in top leadership positions for almost the entire postwar period. The average age of the vice-presidents of Keidanren, for instance, is seventy-three, and President Uemara is seventy-nine. The zaikai can be characterized as the business community's group of elder statesmen, a group of extremely capable business managers[17] that has led Japan through reconstruction and high economic growth and has dominated her major economic organizations. When people talk of big business's influence in Japanese politics, they are largely talking of the influence of zaikai , the elder statesmen who seek to represent the interests of the business community vis-à-vis the government, the public, and in the international arena.
It is one thing to argue that zaikai has been a potent force in Japanese politics. It is another to argue, as so many do, that zaikai has "life and death" powers over the government. Such a position ignores those occasions when zaikai has been unable to have its way. Instances of zaikai 's inability to control the LDP presidential election, for instance, are as evident as instances where zaikai has allegedly manipulated the election. Zaikai was unsuccessful in forcing Hatoyama's resignation before he normalized relations with the Soviet Union; was unable to bring about a Kishi victory over Ishibashi upon Hatoyama's retirement; could not prevent Sato from running against Ikeda when Ikeda ran for a third term;[18] and most recently was unable to prevent Tanaka from winning
[16] For a brief description of Uemura's background and leadership style see my article, "Organizational Leadership in Japan's Economic Community," Journal of International Affairs 26.2(1972): 181–182.
[17] In Japan, as in the United States, there has developed in the postwar period a separation of management from ownership. The men in zaikai are not for the most part capitalists in the classic sense, but professional managers.
[18] Ikeda defeated Sato, but tremendous pressure was put on Sato not to make a contest. Information on this incident and other aspects of zaikai 's political activities were provided by Fujii Heigo, vice-president of the Nippon Steel Company in an interview on July 25, 1972.
over Fukuda in the 1972 LDP presidential race. Zaikai has been influential in LDP politics, but this influence has varied with time and issue.
Tanaka's success in the LDP presidential election represents a particularly strong challenge to the thesis of zaikai omnipotence. Tanaka won the election in spite of big business, and not because of it. Even if, by election day, many zaikai members supported Tanaka, or more commonly, adopted an attitude of "equal distance" (tokyori[*] )[19] from Tanaka and Fukuda, this was because they had realized the futility of continued support for Fukuda and not because they had changed their minds about whom they would like to see succeed Prime Minister Sato.[20]
Nonetheless, believers in zaikai omnipotence cling to the notion that zaikai was responsible for Tanaka's victory, or at least, that it could have prevented the victory if it had been determined to do so. Some writers, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, argue that the zaikai met several months before the election and decided to shift its support from Fukuda to Tanaka. Another commonly heard view was that zaikai had conceived and brought about the alliance between the Tanaka and Ohira[*] factions. In this way zaikai was able to use "reliable" former-bureaucrat and Ikeda-disciple Ohira to keep "unpredictable" Tanaka in line. Similarly, it was zaikai that "dispatched" LDP-member Ishida Bakuei to join the Miki Takeo faction as Miki's "chief of staff" to restrain Miki from continuing his alleged one-sided position on the China-normalization question.[21] Finally, since "the more than ten billion yen in hard cash that flew around [the LDP presidential election] all came from zaikai , now it is the turn for the new government to receive its 'bill' from zaikai ."[22] All of
[19] This was a term that Fujii Heigo takes credit for having coined to express zaikai 's neutrality in the last days of the "Tanaka-Fukuda war" (Kakufuku senso[*] ) over the LDP presidency.
[20] The resignation of Prime Minister Tanaka in December 1974, some observers have argued, was due to zaikai pressure. But Tanaka never had the support of the zaikai . In 1972 he was able to overcome zaikai opposition to his candidacy because he was widely regarded within the LDP as being capable of restoring greater popular support to the party. If Fukuda had instilled a similar confidence, it is hard to imagine that Tanaka would have been successful no matter what tactics he may have employed in an effort to win the party presidency. By the fall of 1974 it was clear that Tanaka had not been able to reverse the tide of declining LDP support; that he had fallen in personal popularity to a point unprecedented by any former Prime Minister; and that the excesses of the Tanaka led LDP Upper House election campaign in the summer of 1974 and the aftermath of charges of unethical if not illegal financial dealings had turned him into a major liability for the party. It then moved with remarkable speed to remove him from office. Big business leaders may have played a role in hastening his departure but they were able to do so by riding a tide of broad based, popular opposition to Tanaka. It was the opposition parties, the press, and most importantly the general public dissatisfaction with Tanaka that turned the LDP against him and brought about his downfall.
[21] These arguments were made in an article by the editorial staff of Bungei shunju[*] , Japan's most widely circulated monthly magazine. See "Shinshusho[*] tanjo[*] ," pp. 92–106.
[22] Ibid., p. 97.
this makes interesting reading but is more in the realm of fantasy than political analysis.[23]
Among the advantages of the power-elite approach to the study of politics is that no amount of evidence can disprove the theory that an elite rules, and that even the lack of evidence can be used to support the theory. Evidence contradicting the model is dismissed either as related to issues with which the business elite is not really concerned,[24] or as further proof of big-business skill in concealing its infamous role—further substantiation that big business, indeed, is the invisible hand manipulating politicians and politics.