PART I
POLITICAL ELITES OF THE PARTY-STATE

2
Recruitment of Revolutionaries: The Future Political Elites

Originally founded by a handful of intellectuals, the CCP struggled for almost three decades in pursuit of political power, frequently adjusting its revolutionary strategy to fit the changing political environment. During this period, the party's perception of its environmental constraints and its main task at a given moment largely determined the criteria used for membership recruitment. After the urban-oriented revolutionary strategy supported by Moscow failed miserably, Mao shifted the focus of membership recruitment to the rural peasant. The task of fighting the invading Japanese and its concomitant united front strategy enabled the party to recruit its members from diverse social groups—including intellectuals and the middle peasants, who worked their own land without hiring laborers.^[1] But with Mao's assertion of ideological orthodoxy in the Yanan rectification campaign and the initiation of land reform as a preparation for the forthcoming civil war, the previous tendency of stressing class background in cadre policy reemerged, intensifying until Mao's death in 1976.

This chapter, which surveys the growth in the number of CCP members during the revolutionary period, helps us understand the process by which the revolutionary elites who dominated Chinese politics after 1949 were recruited.

[1] "Intellectuals" in China refers to those with some education, in contrast to those with no formal education. Initially, all those with a middle school education were called intellectuals. But as the number of educated people increased, the term came to refer to those with a college education. Because of the limited number of college graduates in China, the term "intellectual" is also used to refer to those in certain occupations—usually those with professional careers. Although intellectuals do not constitute a class in a strict sense in China, they are treated almost like a class.

During the Great Revolutionary War

The CCP was born out of the crises that China encountered in the 1920s. Concerned with China's survival in the face of foreign pressure, warlordism, and social disintegration, thirteen intellectuals, representing fifty-seven members of the various regional Marxist groups, set up a national organization of the Communist Party.^[2]

These thirteen were from the best-educated group in China at the time. Five of them had studied abroad, and all but two, who were high school graduates, had college-level educations. They were very young, with an average age of twenty-nine. None of them appears to have studied natural sciences, concentrating instead on the humanities and social sciences, so that they resembled Lasswell's "symbol manipulators." Although there is little available background information on the fifty-seven original party members, a Chinese source reports that all but four of them were intellectuals.^[3] Thus, the founders of the CCP belonged to the May 4 generation of intellectuals who had been searching for the solution to China's political, economic, and social problems.^[4]

Although they learned from Marxism-Leninism the importance of organization as a tool for their political actions, the founders did not quite know how to create a revolutionary party. The platform of the First Party Congress (1921) was vague and broad: it did not require any specific class background for membership. "Anyone who is willing to accept the party's platform and policy and agrees to be loyal to the party" could join the party with an introduction from a party member.^[5] Even members of bourgeois parties had

[2] Cao Yunfang and Pan Xianying, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang Jiquan Fazhan Shi (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Dangan Shi, 1984), 11–20.

[3] For "symbol manipulators," see Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965). Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 2, 1981, 65; Zhonggong Dangshi Cankao Ziliao , 1982, 5:163. Another Chinese source reports that the CCP had fifty-three members when it was founded. The occupations of forty-seven of them were as follows: seven professors and teachers, seven editors and reporters, one lawyer, one leftist KMT member, six primary school teachers, thirteen college students, five middle school students, and two workers. Zhu Chengjia, ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu Lunwen Xuan (Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 1:212.

[4] Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History (New York: Free Press, 1981).

[5] Zhongguo Gongchandangzhang Huibian (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1979), 1–4, 41.

only to sever their ties to join the Communist Party. Instead of the probation period adopted later, the rule specified two months of investigation.

But when the Second Party Congress decided to join the Third International in 1922, the party made requirements for membership more strict in order to make itself a "proletarian revolutionary party."^[6] Admission of any candidate from outside the working

[6] The resolution adopted at the Second Party Congress declared: "We are neither lecturing intellectuals, nor fanatic revolutionaries. We don't want to enter universities, research institutes, or libraries. Since our party is the fighting party of the proletariat, we have to go to the people and organize a 'mass party.'" Zhonggong "Dangde Jianshe" Yuanshi Wenjian Huibian (Taipei: Sifa Xinzhengbu Diaochaju Bianyi, 1979), 2:15.

(table continued on next page)

(table continued from previous page)

class now had to be approved by the central organs; workers could be admitted by district party committees.^[7] Later the CCP further tightened up the recruitment procedure. Joining the party required two letters of recommendation from members of longer than six months' standing. The application procedure required the approval of two additional upper-level organs—one from the local committee and another from the district (qu ) committee. Also introduced was the idea of a probationary period: three months for laborers, six months for nonlaborers.^[8]

[7] Ibid. 1:43.

[8] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 2, 1981, 69.

Socioeconomic conditions, however, were not conducive to a working-class party. Despite the rapid spread of the workers' labor movement in 1922–23, when the Third Party Congress was held in June 1923, it was still a party of disgruntled intellectuals: although 25 percent of party members were workers, none held a leading position in the party.^[9] When the second plenum of the Third Party Congress was held on 24 November 1923, the number of party members had increased by merely 100 persons in the preceding five months.

After the first united front with the Kuomintang (KMT), the CCP's recruitment policy changed: the party decided to make itself "a true mass party" by rapidly expanding its membership. Accordingly, the probation period was reduced to one month for workers and peasants and a mere three months for intellectuals.^[10] Chen Duxiu was particularly enthusiastic about the new policy direction. Declaring that "not increasing the number of party members is a kind of sabotage and a counterrevolutionary activity," he developed a plan to bring the number of party members to 40,000 by the Fifth Party Congress. A recruitment quota was set up for each area.^[11]

The new direction in the recruitment policy coincided with the Nationalists' northern expedition and the May 13 movement. Between 1925 and 1927, party membership jumped from 950 to 58,000 (see table 2). As can be seen in table 3, the increase was largely due to an influx of workers, who constituted the majority of all party members in 1926 and 1927, while the percentage of peasant party members declined.^[12] The surge also reflected a successful military operation by the Nationalist northern expedition forces. As the Nationalist forces approached and the warlords' forces disintegrated, peasants began to rise against the landlords—totally spontaneously according to Mao's famous "Hunan Report," but more probably with the help of revolutionary organizations and army

[9] Ibid.

[10] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 49; Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 3, 1982, 37.

[11] Ibid., 49.

[12] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 2, 1983, 38; Harold Isaacs reports that more than half of the party members—53.8 percent—were workers at the time of Zhiang's coup. Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 440.

officers. In any case, the CCP was in a position to mobilize the peasants and exploit their enthusiasm. The CCP made the greatest gains in those areas captured by the northern expedition forces. In Hunan, which Nationalist forces entered in July 1925, the CCP's membership registered a quantum leap from a mere 702 in October 1925 to 4,570 by December 1926, and then to 13,000 by July 1927, with a recruiting average of 100 new members per week.^[13]

Chiang Kai-shek, probably alarmed at the CCP's rapid spread in areas his troops had liberated from the warlords' forces, moved against the CCP when his troops entered Shanghai in April 1927. His coup almost completely destroyed the party's previous four years' work, reducing CCP strength from 57,000 to 10,000.^[14] Seriously affected were worker party members; their share of the total party membership dropped to about 10 percent, and no single healthy party branch remained among industrial workers.^[15] Despite the party's renewed efforts to recruit them, the percentage of workers in the party steadily decreased. By 1929 workers accounted for only 3 percent of members, and by 1931 the figure was approaching zero (see table 3).^[16]

The CCP responded to Chiang's "double cross" with an extreme leftist policy closely paralleling the Comintern line. Qu Qiubai, the newly elected leader, blamed Chen Duxiu's rightist opportunism for the disaster and decided to make the party "Bolshevik" by replacing the nonproletariat intellectuals in the leadership with members from worker and peasant backgrounds.^[17] Quotas of cadres with working-class backgrounds were instituted for each level of the party organs. The party began to attach primary importance to class background (jieji chengfen ), favoring workers while downgrading the role of the intellectuals who had founded the party.^[18] As contemporary Chinese historians argue, "rightist op-

[13] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 2, 1982, 32.

[14] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiangyi (Liaoning: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 57.

[15] Isaacs, Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution , 440.

[16] Shin Wujun, Zhonggong Dangde Jianshe Lilun Zhi Yanjiu , M.A. thesis, National Political College of Taiwan, 1978, 264.

[17] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 76.

[18] At that time some party leaders reportedly insisted that "since intellectuals are no longer useful, [it is therefore necessary to] completely restructure the party [by] removing [intellectual leaders]." Shin, Zhonggong Dangde , 297.

portunism" was replaced by the equally erroneous "leftist adventurism."^[19]

Even after the Sixth Party Congress (PC) held in Moscow deposed Qu Qiubai for his "leftist adventurism," the leftist tendency continued, moving in an even more radical direction. The party constitution adopted by the Sixth PC increased the importance of class background in joining the party.^[20] Depending on class backgrounds, different numbers of recommendations were needed: one for workers; two for peasants, artisans, intellectuals, and low-ranking staff persons; and three for high-ranking officials of the various organs. The congress also decided to concentrate its recruitment effort on industrial workers in order to reconstruct party organs in industrial areas. As a result, "many intellectuals with abundant practical experience such as Liu Shaoqi and Yun Daiying" were replaced by workers.^[21]

Whether or not it was because of the stress placed on recruiting workers and peasants or other reasons, the CCP rapidly regained strength after the Sixth PC. By 1930, the party had recovered from the 1927 setback with 60,000 members.^[22] This rapid recovery was largely due to new membership in the Soviet area, over which the party center, now dominated by Li Lisan, did not have control. But the party was also recovering in urban areas. The labor movement was reactivated in major cities like Shanghai, Tianjin, and Wuhan, and the total number of worker branches increased to 229.^[23] According to Li Lisan's report, in the latter six months of 1929, the party recruited 13,000 workers.^[24]

The party, however, was still far from having the numbers needed to stage urban uprisings. On 22 March 1932 Li Lisan issued an order, which specified the minimum quota of workers for each province to recruit during April and May. Local party organs were instructed to report recruitment results by June 1930, with a reminder that their work would be evaluated by their fulfillment of the

[19] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 72.

[20] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 1, 1986, 53.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 104.

[23] Zhonggong Dangshi Jianyi , 76.

[24] Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gongren Yundong Wenjian Xuanbian (Beijing: Dangan Chubanshe, 1984), 2:9.

quota.^[25] Li's effort proved futile when his effort to initiate "an urban uprising and concentrated Red Army attacks on the big cities" ended in disaster.^[26]

Though criticizing Li Lisan, the new leadership, which was dominated by twenty-eight Chinese students who had just returned from training in the Soviet Union, basically continued his policy, attaching even more importance to class background and adding "international standards" to their program in order to recruit more industrial workers, as in the Soviet Union. Among peasants, only "hired laborers and poor peasants" would be considered for party membership. Wang Ming, the leader of the returned student group, relied on an organizational approach to supervising recruitment work and set up "inspection teams," which frequently visited the lowest level branches, gathering information, helping lower-level cadres, and supervising the cadres' implementation of official policies. Each party member living in an industrial sector was required to recommend at least one person for the party every month with the aim of bringing worker membership to about 10 percent of the total party membership.^[27]

In his desire to recruit more industrial workers, Wang Ming stepped up discrimination against intellectuals. He suspected that the majority of the central Soviet's leading bodies were in the hands of intellectuals. In an allegedly ruthless purge of intellectuals (which included executing fifteen hundred people), Zhang Guotao publicly declared, "If worker cadres make mistakes, the party can understand; but if intellectuals make mistakes, the punishment should be tripled." Kang Keqing succinctly recaptures the mood of the time: "Only if you have a fountain pen in your front pocket do you face the danger of being persecuted as an intellectual; only if you wear eyeglasses do you encounter difficulties."^[28]

In retrospect, the party's strategy of focusing exclusively on

[25] Ibid., 26–30.

[26] On 10 June, the CCP Politburo adopted the now famous resolution, "The new revolutionary tide and victory in one or a few provinces." Zhonggong "Dangde Jianshe," 3:87–98.

[27] Ibid., 2:122–82.

[28] Fuyang Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao , no. 4, 1984, 32–41.

industrial workers and utilizing them for armed uprisings was doomed to failure. Even if Chinese workers had acted as an ideal proletariat from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, willing to forego immediate economic interests for long-term political ones, conditions in China were still not favorable for an urban revolution. The size of the working class was too small, and the Nationalist repressive capability in urban sectors was too strong. Such CCP leaders as Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Wang Ming, however, had largely overlooked this simple point either because of their orthodox view of Marxism-Leninism or because of the Comintern's domination. For them, Marxism-Leninism operated as "an ideology acting as a higher authority, which stripped individuals of freedom in action except that of submission to it."^[29] In brief, they pursued an unrealistic option dictated by a Soviet interpretation of Marxism, while overlooking a feasible alternative based on actual conditions in China.

Mao's Strategy and the Anti-Japanese War

Mao was developing a different strategy based on the concrete conditions of China's reality: because of a paucity of industrial workers Mao focused recruitment on peasants. This shift raised theoretical and practical problems. First, the CCP was not powerful enough to revise the tenets of Marxism-Leninism to fit China's reality and pressure from the Comintern to conform continued. Peng Zhen lucidly described the CCP's dilemma:

According to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, "the party should be reformed on the basis of an industrial branch," "only the industrial branch can be the foundation of the party," "the street branch [jiedao zhibu ] is only an auxiliary organization." If we want to follow these principles, what should we do? We cannot afford not to have any organizations. Our branches should be organized according to administrative areas. Villages are the primary units of our revolutionary bases, and they are everywhere.

[29] Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 92.

What could be done? Peng answered:

Therfore, we cannot automatically guarantee the social background [shehui chengfen ] and the class character of our party by relying on branch organizations. Only by relying on the class backgrounds of the leaders of the branches, making the workers, the hired laborers, and the poor peasants a majority among the branch members, and educating those branches, can we ensure [the class nature of our party].^[30]

Second, even if the peasants—the poor peasants—had already demonstrated ample revolutionary potential in their willingness to revolt against the existing order, there were obvious basic differences in both economics and politics between industrial workers and peasants. Mao resolved this problem by emphasizing political and ideological education for the peasants. Through education, peasants would obtain a "proletarian political consciousness," thereby transcending their peasant mentality. The Confucian tradition of emphasizing education thus reinforced the CCP's practical need to instill peasants with workers' political consciousness. But despite the enormous stress placed on political education, the CCP very much remained a party imbued with a peasant mentality throughout Mao's era.

There is not much information about Mao's policy on party building during the time he spent in Jinggangshan and Jiangxi, the period from 1927 to 1935. Nonetheless, we know that party growth was quite rapid. By 1930, almost one-third of the 300,000 party members were in Mao's central Soviet area. Although we do not know the precise class composition, it is obvious that most of these 100,000 members were peasants, including some middle peasants. According to a contemporary Chinese historian, during this period Mao changed the party from a "proletarian party to a mass party" by recruiting "a large number of members from revolutionary elements among the peasants and petty bourgeoisie."^[31]

The fact that Mao allowed many middle peasants to join the party can be indirectly substantiated by the change in his land re-

[30] Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji Bianqu Dangde Gongzuo He Juti Zhengce Baogao (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1981), 200.

[31] Ma Jipin and Zhou Yi, eds., Mao Zedong Jiandang Sixiang Yu Dangshi Yanjiu (Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 167.

form policy. In Jinggangshan, Mao initially followed the Comintern's hard line on that subject. The land reform law of December 1928 declared the confiscation of all lands and put them under state ownership. Every peasant, regardless of sex and age, was given an equal amount of land to cultivate, though not to own. Land sale was strictly prohibited.^[32] This radical policy was modified in Jiangxi. The new land reform law confiscated land only from landlords and clans. Moreover, the new policy promised "not to strike down the rich peasants, and not to cause any loss to the middle peasants." It recommended mere adjustment, "using the original cultivating land as a basis, and adding more and taking less." Even in implementing this adjustment, "the rich and middle peasants were allowed to keep good land for themselves, and less fertile lands were given to others."^[33] For this rich peasant line and "narrow empiricism," Mao was criticized by—and eventually lost power to—the twenty-eight returned students.^[34]

As shown in table 2, CCP membership suffered a major setback in the mid-1930s when the CCP was forced by the Nationalists' fifth encirclement campaign to embark on the Long March. Altogether, 300,000 started the march, but just over one-tenth (40,000) arrived at Yanan. This group of dedicated Communists, "steeled by the epic experiences of the Long March," proselytized with amazing success during the anti-Japanese war. Under Mao's leadership, it eventually became strong enough to defeat the Nationalists.

Many factors contributed to the CCP's success, and many Western scholars have advanced different explanations depending on their theoretical perspective.^[35] Mao, however, attributed the success to the "three treasures": the united front, armed struggle, and party organization.

The past eighteen years' experience tells us that the united front and the armed struggle are the two basic weapons with which to defeat the enemy. The united front means a united front of armed struggle.

[32] For Mao's policy see Zhonggong Dangshi Jiangyi , 75.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Zhu Chengjia, ed., Zhonggong Dangshi , 2:324–26.

[35] Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); Lucian Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

The party organization is the heroic soldier who, using two weapons, can defeat enemies. The three are interrelated.^[36]

The united front not only relieved the CCP base areas from Nationalist military pressure, but it also legitimized the party as a de facto government in the "red" areas. The Japanese strategy of advancing rapidly with their forces, while leaving only small garrisons to hold urban areas, created a power vacuum that the CCP's guerrilla forces could easily exploit. By 1939, the number of soldiers in the Red Army jumped from 40,000 to 500,000, controlling 150 counties inhabited by a total population of about 100 million.^[37]

The CCP had to set up a new power structure in these newly liberated areas, but it did not have enough reliable party members and cadres. To deal with this shortage of manpower (renhuang ), the party decided to expand as rapidly as possible by admitting "activists during the anti-Japanese war—workers, hired laborers, leftist intellectuals in urban areas, and leftist KMT officers." Admission procedures were also relaxed. For instance, the probation period for workers and hired laborers was abolished, and it was reduced to one month for poor peasants and artisans and three for leftist intellectuals, lower-level employees (xiao zhiyuan ), and noncommissioned officers of the KMT. Others had to go through a six-month probation period, although this could be shortened, depending on the circumstances.^[38] The new policy enabled various base areas to increase their membership as rapidly as possible.^[39]

The united front led the CCP to moderate its land reform policy even further. In Yanan, the party decided not to confiscate rich peasants' property, and in the case of redistribution, rich peasants were entitled to the same share as poor or middle peasants.^[40] Even landlords with family members in the Red Army were exempted from confiscation.^[41] At other revolutionary bases such as Jin-Cha-Ji,

[36] Shin, Zhonggong Dangde , 306. Also for the united front policy, see Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 59.

[37] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 161.

[38] Hunan Shida Xuebao , March 1985, 25–29.

[39] For the CCP's resolution of March 1938 to "recruit party members on a large scale," see Zhonggong "Dangde Jianshe," 2:192.

[40] Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 97.

[41] Ibid., 99.

a policy of "reducing rents and interest rates" eventually replaced land reform, allowing landlords to continue to exist.^[42] The moderate land reform policy made it possible for middle peasants and rich peasants to join the party.

The CCP also changed its mind about intellectuals. To correct the "erroneous view" that "intellectuals can remain revolutionary only for three days and that recruiting them is very dangerous," the party decided to recruit intellectuals on a large scale. Insisting that the Chinese revolution was also anti-imperialist (a position that appealed to intellectuals), the decision, reportedly drafted by Mao, flatly declared that "without the participation of intellectuals, a Chinese revolution is impossible to achieve."^[43] Party members recruited in 1938 were known as the "38-style cadres," a group that included a large contingency of intellectuals.

The CCP's united front policy appealed to patriotic Chinese intellectuals, many of whom had migrated to Communist-controlled areas in order to fight the Japanese. The party welcomed them "as long as they are pure, firm, and willing to accept hardship, regardless of age, sex, occupation, and educational level." Many of them eventually joined the party.^[44] Among the intellectual groups migrating to Yanan during this period, the best known is the December 9 group, which derived its name from the December 9 student movement in 1935 that protested Chiang Kai-shek's policy of "first eliminating the Communist bandits and then resisting the Japanese invasion."^[45] As the best-educated people in the CCP, many members of this group rapidly moved up the hierarchy after 1949. Women members of the group later married such party leaders as Lin Biao and He Long. However, when the CR started, the group suffered greatly because of its complex relations with the KMT before the move to Yanan.

During the united front period, the CCP decided to obtain the release of party leaders in Nationalist prisons. On instruction from the central authorities, Liu Shaoqi authorized these leaders,

[42] For the details of the rent and interest reductions in Jin-Cha-Ji border areas, see Xu Yi, ed., Jin-Cha-Ji Bianqu Caizheng Jingjishi Cailiao Xuanbian (Tianjin: Nakai Daxue Chubanshe, 1984), vol. on agriculture, 1–244.

[43] Hunan Shida Xuebao , March 1985, 25–29.

[44] Dangshi Tongxun , March 1984, 46.

[45] John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1921–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

through secret channels, to write false confessions, which the Nationalist authorities demanded as a precondition to their release. Many of these leaders later became important, but they too were attacked during the CR for having surrendered to the KMT.^[46]

The Red Army was instrumental in building up the party quickly. From the beginning it was organized to fight as well as to propagate the party line and to mobilize the masses. To ensure that "the party controls the gun," it had penetrated the military.^[47] According to a Chinese source, all officers above the rank of battalion commander—90 percent of company and platoon leaders and 20 percent of all regular soldiers—were party members by the beginning of the anti-Japanese war.^[48]

After tightening its control, the CCP relied on the military to expand the party. As early as 1930, Mao flatly declared that since "the experience of the Red Army is richer than that of the local party," they "should therefore endeavor to help local party committees and train local party cadres." When the Eighth Route Army left Yanan to penetrate the territories occupied by the Japanese, Mao specifically told Chu De, the commander, that the "Sino-Japanese war is the best opportunity for our party to expand. Our policy is to spend 70 percent of our efforts on expansion, 20 percent on our compromise [with the KMT], and 10 percent on fighting the Japanese."^[49]

When a Red Army unit entered an unfamiliar village for the first time, it usually employed the following methods to establish a new power structure and party branch.^[50] First, military representatives used "administrative methods" by ordering the leader of the village to convene a villagewide mass meeting. Even though he was appointed by the KMT, the leader was compelled to call for a mass meeting and formally to introduce Red Army representatives. The representatives would explain the need to set up a mass organization against the Japanese. Sponsorship by the power elite in each locality helped to legitimize the representatives and to break the ice

[46] Shin, Zhonggong Dangde , 304.

[47] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 145, 167.

[48] Ibid., 144.

[49] Shin, Zhonggong Dangde , 306.

[50] Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji , 134–44. Subsequent quotations are from this source.

in establishing contact with the masses. According to the CCP, this method was necessary because of "the peasants' dependency and conservativism" prior to their mobilization.

Second, membership in the anti-Japanese organization was open to almost anyone in the village, including "speculators, class enemies, and alien elements [yiji fenzi ]," because "the task facing the party was enormous and urgent, whereas the available manpower was very limited."

Third, the CCP representatives skillfully nursed the anti-Japanese organizations, letting them gradually take over functions previously performed by village leaders, which created a "dual power structure." The official guidelines contained specific instructions to avoid the forcible removal of the village leader; instead, he was to be drawn into the anti-Japanese mass organization so that whatever legitimacy he had could be transferred to it.

Fourth, once the umbrella anti-Japanese mass organization had set up offices in charge of different projects, party representatives kept a careful eye on the active workers, hired laborers, and poor peasants who appeared to have the trust of the masses and who demonstrated leadership ability. Once potential candidates were selected, the party representatives told them to set up peasants' and workers' associations. Naturally, when these organizations were formed, the activists assumed leadership.

Fifth, the representatives led the associations to discuss current socioeconomic conditions in the village, often explaining Marxist theory along with CCP's policy on these problems. These specialized associations eventually demanded reduced rents, increased wages, and shorter working hours. As class-conflict-related issues arose, some of the former activists from the economically better-off groups withdrew. Vacancies were filled by persons with good class backgrounds whose interests were tied to the CCP program.

Sixth, those original leaders with questionable motivations and backgrounds were replaced by more reliable elements who had proven their activism, dedication, and leadership ability. This replacement ensured that each mass organization—including the original united front organization—would operate as the party wished.

Seventh, in selecting the cadres, the most reliable people were

approached, tested, and given the option of joining the party. If they responded positively, they were groomed as members. After joining the party, each person was sent to a higher level to receive training. Then, he or she was returned to the native area to recruit other members.

In this way, the CCP developed layers of organizations. At the outer rim was the anti-Japanese association, whose membership was open to all; then came the peasants' and workers' associations, with membership largely determined by economic position. At the core was the party branch, which the CCP staffed with carefully selected people from a hired laborer or poor-peasant background. The party branch controlled mass organizations through the cadres. In building up these layers, it exploited the prestige and ability of the existing elite to establish mass organizations, while taking over the organizations by introducing more reliable elements and getting rid of unreliable ones.^[51]

As a result of this program, CCP membership grew at an amazing rate in the first few years of the second united front. The total number of members increased by twenty times in a mere three years—from 40,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940.^[52]

There is not much information on the class composition of the mass organizations and party branches. What fragmented information that is available, however, indicates that although poor peasants dominated party branches, rich and middle peasants were tolerated in both the united front organization and the formal government structure, which was staffed by equal numbers of communists, noncommunist leftists, and middle-of-the-roaders (a structure known as the 3:3:3 system). Table 4 breaks down the social and economic backgrounds of low-level government functionaries elected through the 3:3:3 system.

Table 4 shows that the higher one goes up the administrative hierarchy, the more educated people, rich peasants, and middle peasants were elected. Also, the table indicates a crude correlation between the level of education and class background; undoubtedly

[51] Ibid.

[52] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 139, 161; Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji , 142.

the rich and middle peasants were better educated.^[53] In contrast to the heavy representation of the rich and middle peasants in the elected government position, hired laborers and poor peasants constituted a majority in the party membership.

Table 5 gives credence to Yang Shangkun's report that poor peasants made up between 60 and 83 percent of the entire party and that intellectuals constituted about 5–10 percent—even 25 percent in some units.^[54] One must also notice the significant presence of middle peasants. However, when the CCP intensified the class struggle after 1945, the middle peasants' chances of joining the party diminished.

[53] Shaan-Gan-Ning Bianqu De Jingbing Jianzheng (Beijing: Jiushi Chubanshe, 1982), 113.

[54] According to Yang Shangkun, only 2 percent of party members were female. Zhonggong "Dangde Jianshe ," 1:104.

Although politically reliable, most hired laborers and poor peasants were illiterate or had a minimal education, which prevented them from becoming cadres. The majority of cadres, particularly at the county level and above, were composed of intellectuals. Chen Yun, director of the central organization department, reported that, as of November 1939, "eighty-five percent of the middle-echelon cadres of the party and government are intellectuals. During the anti-Japanese war [we] absorbed some intellectuals, and later the political cadres, except for the old Red army, relied on that group, who were from these 38-style cadres."^[55] Table 6 also indicates that middle peasants had a better chance of joining cadres at the county and district levels, while the percentage of poor peasants dropped from 72.5 percent at the branch level to 10 percent at the county level.

Local cadres during the anti-Japanese war were made up of two groups—intellectual cadres at the middle level and poor-peasant cadres largely limited to the lower level. One official document of the Shaan-Gan-Ning border government reports on the problems of these two groups:

More than 90 percent of the district- and village-level cadres were activists in the local area. They are very familiar with local conditions, can maintain good relationships with the ordinary people,

[55] Chen Yun, Chen Yun Wenxun , 145. Quoted in Fuyang Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao , no. 4, 1984, 32–41.

and usually carry out their responsibilities. But their level of education is very low and their attachments to place and family are very strong.

Most of the county-level cadres were of peasant origins; the proportion of those with primary school and junior high school educations came to about 40 percent; they have had much experience with the practice of revolutionary struggle, but their theoretical level is low, and their cultural level is insufficient. They often work from the narrow perspective of empiricism and cannot handle new, complex situations; they lack innovative attitudes because they have been working in the same positions for long periods of time.

The report continues:

More than 70 percent of the district cadres are revolutionary young intellectuals; they are rich in fresh perception, enthusiastic about their work, and active. Unfortunately, they lack practical experience as well as the attitude of seeking truth from the facts. On the whole, the cadre corps are good, but there remain some problems with corruption, particularly at the district, county, and village [xiang ] levels.^[56]

When the general political and military situation worsened around 1940, the CCP responded with a policy of retrenchment; its recruitment strategy shifted from "emphasizing quantity" to "emphasizing quality," with the slogan of "firmly and cautiously, paying attention to details" as if "carving with care." At the same

[56] Shaan-Gan-Ning Bianqu , 113.

time, the party started to attach increasing importance to class background in its recruitment. This was not a surprise because even during the heyday of the united front, Marxist bias had persisted. Many CCP leaders, particularly those closely associated with the twenty-eight returned students, had insisted that the ratio between workers and peasants in the party should increase. Knowing that most intellectuals joined the party because of its resistance to the Japanese rather than its commitment to the socialist revolution, they stressed the need to cultivate "intellectuals from poor economic categories" for cadre positions.^[57]

Another reason for the renewed emphasis on class background was a practical one, although it was based on Marxist assumptions. The CCP had already formed the habit of relying on class background to determine loyalty—a practice that continued until the recent past. Party leaders knew that landlords, merchants, and rich peasants were cooperating with the party because of its coercive power. Despite their outward support of the CCP, these classes hoped for its failure. When the base area was vulnerable to infiltration by enemy agents and the final battles with the Japanese and the Nationalists were yet to come, the political loyalty of members to the party was crucially important.

The party thus adopted a "Resolution Regarding the Investigation of Party Members' Class Background" in November 1939.^[58] In order to consolidate the party, the resolution called for it to check the class background of members very carefully, expelling all alien elements (yiji fenzi ), landlords, rich peasants, merchants, speculators, and enemy spies. Various localities reported the expulsion of between 2 to 3 percent of their members.^[59] Party members with a middle-peasant background were reassigned from party leadership positions to other mass organizations, while poor-peasant members were promoted to branch leadership. Intellectuals from areas controlled by either the KMT or the Japanese ("white" areas) were also subjected to careful scrutiny by the party. Through this method, Dingbei county reduced the percentage of middle-peasant

[57] Zhonggong "Dangde Jianshe ," 1:210–15.

[58] Ibid., 195–205.

[59] Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji , 158.

members in the party branch leadership from 70 to 24 percent and Tang county from 50 to 24 percent.^[60]

By 1943, the CCP had launched a counterattack and recovered many base areas, resuming party expansion.^[61] When the collapse of the Japanese military became imminent, the CCP convened the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945. Attended by 547 delegates, the congress symbolized the triumph of the CCP, which had expanded from 40,000 members after the Long March to 1.2 million, powerful enough to challenge the KMT. It also epitomized Mao's personal victory: his peasant-oriented strategy was vindicated. The congress decided, among other things, to expand party membership as fast as possible and eventually to have an open party construction in the liberated areas.^[62]

During the Civil War

In the four years between 1945 and 1949, when the CCP was engaged in its final battles with the Nationalists, membership jumped from 1.2 million to over 4.4 million. This increase was due to the party's conscious decision to push its growth as rapidly as possible. That decision may or may not indicate that the CCP was expecting a military confrontation with the KMT. However, by the time the CCP decided to carry out land reform in May 1946, it had certainly realized that military confrontation was unavoidable. The party must have calculated that land reform would create social groups that would support it in the forthcoming civil war. Land reforms also enabled it to recruit a large number of activists. Together, party expansion and land reform were intended to strengthen the party's mass base for the civil war, which put an end to the united front and intensified class conflict.

The party publicly declared its new criteria for membership:

The anti-Japanese war is already over, and now class struggle will become the important issue. . . . What kind of people should be recruited? In recruiting new members, special attention should be

[60] Ibid., 155–56.

[61] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 170.

[62] For the composition of delegates to the Seventh CC, see Peter Vladimirov, Yenan Diary , cited in Shin, Zhonggong Dangde , 327.

given to class backgrounds. The main targets are workers, coolies, hired hands, poor peasants, and young intellectuals who have determination, are politically pure, and have actually participated in the struggle. Since today's struggle is mainly a democratic struggle against feudalism, the conditions are not the same as during the anti-Japanese war. Therefore, our party's class background should be more pure. But this does not mean that all with good class backgrounds can join the party. Only those proletariats and semiproletariats convinced of the need for struggle can join the party.^[63]

Party documents gradually rounded out the criteria for membership. The first prerequisite was "pure class background," as stated above.^[64] The second requirement was a clean history—no one who had joined the KMT or collaborated with the Japanese, for example, was eligible. Good class background alone was no guarantee, however, for even people with such backgrounds collaborated with the Japanese or the KMT. The third condition was political expression as proven in various mass struggles—"class struggle, struggle against the enemy, struggle against renegades, and struggle for production." Among soldiers, "those who have proven themselves in investigating deserters and renegades," that is, those who had betrayed their friends to the party, were considered more desirable.

Three groups of people were never to be recruited. In the first were people with undesirable class backgrounds, lumped together with those who had served in either the Manchu puppet government set up by the Japanese or the KMT. The second group included members of religious groups. The third group consisted of those who had been making a living "in immoral ways"—speculators, hooligans, and opium smokers.^[65]

As usual the required procedure for joining the party differed according to class background. The probationary period was six months for workers, coolies, hired hands, poor peasants, and the urban poor; one year for middle peasants, white-collar workers, free professionals, and intellectuals; and three years for others.^[66] Party members on probation could not act as sponsors, but because

[63] Jiandang (Harbin: Heilongjiang Danganshi, 1984), 82–83.

[64] Ibid., 19.

[65] Ibid., 91–92.

[66] Zhongguo Gongchandangzhang Huibian , 48.

of the shortage of old party members, reliable new members with good class backgrounds could be authorized to recommend new recruits. Candidates with desirable class backgrounds were approved by a district party committee; the others had to be approved by county-level party committees.

The rapid increase in the number of party members was largely due to large-scale recruitment in Manchuria. When the party adopted the policy of "defending the south and expanding to the north," the CCP dispatched 100,000 troops with 20,000 cadres headed by one-quarter of the Politburo to Manchuria.^[67] Eventually, they established party networks throughout Manchuria, thus increasing the total size of party membership to 3 million by 1948.

The national trend of the growth rate varied year by year during the period from 1945 to 1949. The low growth rate of 1946 reflected the uncertainty about the CCP's future strategy and the fluid political situation. However, once the CCP shifted its land policy from "reducing rents" to "distributing land to the tillers," party building gained momentum. The expansion slowed down in 1947 when the party launched a rectification campaign. By 1949, when the CCP was sealing its victory, it started openly to recruit new members for the first time. An approximate 1.2 million new members were admitted in the final year of the civil war.

Fluctuation in party expansion largely corresponds to the stages of land reform in Manchuria. In the first stage, from December 1945 to June 1946 (i.e., before the beginning of land reforms), the Heilongjiang provincial party committee adopted a strategy of "careful and controlled development," because the main task at that moment was the struggle against renegades; land reform had not yet started. Originally, 301 cadres—including some nonparty members—entered the area right after the Japanese surrendered. In the first year they recruited 618 new party members, mostly from military and municipal organs. This left the vast rural areas without any party organizations or members.^[68]

The second stage started right after the June 1946 conference, which decided how land was to be distributed. The provincial par-

[67] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 184.

[68] Of 618, 289 were in the military, 223 in municipal organs, and 106 in rural areas. Jiandang , 50–53.

ty committee moved to set up party organizations as fast as possible, sometimes even circumventing existing regulations. It sent work teams of 933 members to rural areas where there were no party members. The work teams recruited 2,566 new members (in 206 branches) to act as "seeds" in developing the rural party organizations. In other areas, the party expanded more rapidly. Songjiang province reports that membership increased by 600 percent in the four months after the May 4 decision. During this period, many individuals made extreme efforts to gain new members: one cadre recruited 140 people in three months, averaging 1.5 persons per day.^[69]

The third phase of recruitment started after October 1946 when

[69] Ibid. After 1945, the CCP set up five provinces and one special municipality. They were Songjiang, Hejiang, Heilongjiang, Nenjiang and Suijiang (later, Mudanjiang) provinces. By 1954, all of them were combined into the present Heilongjiang province.

the campaign to "cook raw rice" started. In this campaign, hired hands and poor peasants became the dominant political force, and activists from their class were recruited on a large scale by a policy of "actively and cautiously increasing party members" initiated by the Heilongjiang provincial party committee. In the Beian district, 260 old party members recruited 2,141 new ones, many of whom were immediately promoted to leadership positions. In the entire province, a total of 11,842 new members was promoted to cadres, bringing the total number to 22,387.

In the fourth stage, between November 1947 and January 1948, the movement began dividing the land. During this period, party recruitment temporarily stopped, and rectification started. After finishing the distribution of land, the recruitment drive resumed.^[70] Before the beginning of open party building in August 1948, the total number of members had increased to 8,154—a 50 percent increase compared with the previous figure—and every county, district, and village had established a party branch.^[71]

The last phase was open party building. By August 1948 when the Red Army was winning the civil war, the party felt safe enough to begin membership recruitment openly so as to set up party branches in every village by March 1949. This time, not the work teams, but the county and district party committees took responsibility for recruiting members and setting up basic organs.

The open party building followed well-defined stages. First, the party launched a vigorous propaganda campaign to dispel all kinds of erroneous views.^[72] Then the county and district party committees set up a plan for recruitment and trained "organization persons" (zuzhi yuan ) whose main job was to interview and evaluate candidates for party membership.

In mass meetings, party leaders explained the purpose of open party building. Then anyone who was interested in joining the party made a self-report (zibao ), in which he reported his own candidacy. The public then discussed the qualifications of those who had nominated themselves. If they passed the public debate, they were finally screened and approved by the appropriate party

[70] Ibid., 86–105.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji , 142.

organs. About one-quarter of the self-nominated candidates were accepted.^[73]

During the four years between 1945 and 1949 the party grew dramatically in Manchuria. A small number of old members recruited new ones with amazing speed. In Mudanjiang province, sixty old members who had moved into the area recruited 4,000 new members, who totaled 0.45 percent of the population in the area.^[74] In Nenjiang province, 772 old members recruited 16,254 people (or 0.6 percent of the total population). Heilongjiang was reported to have recruited 9,768 new members in the three months from September through November 1948, 8,774 of them in 517 rural party branches.^[75]

To ensure that party branches were set up in every village, a recruitment quota for each area was usually assigned.^[76] The counties in the Jinsui base area were instructed to increase party membership by 33 percent in three months.^[77] Each area authorized individual members to recruit a certain number of people.

Not surprisingly, use of the quotas for party expansion had many undesirable consequences. In some areas lower-level units blindly tried to meet the quota by accepting unqualified persons. Some units tried to overpass "internally decided targets" and "complete the work before the timetable," thereby sacrificing standards of quality. Since only members could recruit new members and many localities did not have any branches, there was much corruption and inefficiency. If a recruiter was corrupt, his new members would often be unfit for membership. One party member who had concealed his class background was made chairman of a peasants association because of his activism during the land reforms. When the party told him to recruit seventy new members, he personally recruited forty persons, including a "policeman, a spy, and a former bandit."^[78] One of his relatives also recruited twenty candidates, many of whom were unsuited for membership. Recruiters tended to look for candidates only among personal ac-

[73] Jiandang , 33.

[74] Ibid., 232.

[75] Most of the information in the following discussion is from Jiandang , and from experiences of Party building in the former five provinces.

[76] Jiandang , 44.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji , 142.

quaintances or people with whom they had something in common. For instance, some members only recruited new members from the same province. One member from Shandong province recruited only Shandong people, and when there were no more hired hands and poor peasants to recruit, he approached "bad elements." Some people followed the organizational ties of the anti-Japanese associations, and when there were no good people in the anti-Japanese associations, they accepted bad ones. Others recruited only school classmates and colleagues.^[79]

Moreover, even those recruited from the good classes did not have the appropriate "political consciousness" in the eyes of the Chinese leaders. They suffered from a "peasants' diffused conservativism." Some members flourished economically after the land reforms and wanted to become rich. Such thinking weakened the party members' ties to their classes. It was hoped that rectification would solve all these problems.

Moreover, as the land reform movement developed, it directly threatened the interests of cadres from the exploiting class, whereas the poor peasants' demand for land increased.^[80] The well-known case of Pingshan county was typical. There, pressure from the peasants forced the party to purge its local party. Pingshan was an old liberated area, but the local leadership was allegedly under the control of "liu-mang , landlords, and rich peasants," who resisted the poor peasants' demand for a thorough redistribution of land. Even work teams sent down by the higher level could not resolve the conflict between the poor peasants and the local party committee. Eventually, the committee had to be reorganized in a public meeting where nonparty poor peasants were allowed to participate.

From the beginning, the party knew that rapid expansion would introduce many undesirable elements. It instructed local committees to use the "wave style" in recruiting members: to "recruit some, immediately train them, and then recruit another group." This pattern of expansion, immediately followed by a rectification campaign, was a well-established procedure.

On 17 July 1947 a meeting chaired by Liu Shaoqi reviewed land

[79] Ibid.

[80] Jiandang , 79.

reform works and decided to carry out the rectification. Mao agreed. Its objective was to check "class backgrounds, ideology, and work style," while consolidating organization, ideology, and work style.^[81] Party members from such exploiting classes as landlords, rich peasants, and degenerates were to be expelled.

Among these three objectives, determining class background was the easiest task for lower-level party leaders to carry out. Various methods were used. "In some areas, the determination of class status was based on individual report and public discussion; in other areas, each individual was required to write down his class background on the form; in other areas, the decision was made at a meeting where poor peasants participated."^[82]

Once their class status was determined, party members with undesirable class backgrounds were under great pressure, even though the official policy was supposed to take into account their actual political performance. By contrast, those with desirable class backgrounds demanded revenge on the other classes. Some units under the leadership of poor peasants advanced such simplistic slogans as "organize the poor peasant party members into a 'small group of poor peasants,' unify the middle-peasant cadres, and attack the cadres of the landlord and the rich peasant class," and "poor and hired peasants conquered the world, and they will control the world." As has happened many times in China, once the official policy was set, social groups with vested interests in the policy pushed it to an extreme.

Thus, a leftist tendency appeared, pushing land reform in a radical direction by violating the rights of the middle peasants and emphasizing class background over political performance. Deng Xiaoping reportedly wrote a letter to the center, pointing out that class background should not be overstressed in party rectification; instead, "standpoint" should be considered. Deng also said that in some areas party members from the landlord and rich-peasant classes were being indiscriminately expelled. Mao agreed with this view by publishing "On Our Current Task," which criticized the leftist trend.^[83] Central party leaders allegedly corrected the leftist

[81] Cao and Pan, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang , 199.

[82] Jiandang , 84.

[83] Ibid.

tendency but did not uproot it. They could not do so because the leftist tendency originated from hired-laborer and poor-peasant backgrounds, the political elite, and for this reason the leftist tendency reasserted itself again and again.

Legacy of the CCP'S Revolutionary Experiences

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the party's major expansion took place only when it had strong military forces to protect its operation.^[84] The CCP's membership grew rapidly during the first united front in the areas which the KMT forces physically controlled, and then in the Jiangxi Soviet area, where the party set up a state within a state. After the Long March, the enhanced military capability of the CCP, operating in the power vacuum created by the Japanese invasion, facilitated a large increase in party membership. During the civil war, the party again expanded most rapidly in Manchuria, which it controlled militarily. This reliance on the military to create a political atmosphere conducive for implementing party policies has had a long-term effect on Chinese leaders' view of political power.

The crucial role played by the military, however, does not diminish the organizational skill and capability that party leaders demonstrated. Without superb organizational capabilities, party leaders could not have exploited the political, economic, and social grievances of various classes and groups in China while adjusting their programs and policies to the changing situation. As Roy Hofheinz rightly concludes, neither "contextual" nor "motivational" theories that do not take into account the behavior of the Chinese Communists themselves can explain the success of the CCP.^[85] Without the flexible and skillful leadership of the party, whatever revolutionary potential Chinese society had would have remained as mere potential.

One of the CCP's remarkable organizational capabilities was its

[84] For the latest publication on this issue, see Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986).

[85] Roy Hofheinz, "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington, 1969), 3–77.

adaptability to the changing socioeconomic conditions of China and its ability to restructure itself in line with a new task. When the pre-Mao era leaders insisted on building the proletarian party exclusively on the working class, their policy was doomed from the beginning, not because of any logical flaws in Marxism-Leninism, but because they overlooked China's concrete conditions. Under Mao's leadership the party shifted its focus to rural problems, adopted a mild land reform policy, and recruited party members from a broader segment of the population. The united front allowed the party to utilize the expertise and knowledge of intellectuals while minimizing the potential resistance of landlords and rich peasants. However, when the CCP renewed class warfare in rural areas for land reform in 1946, it shifted the focus of recruitment to poor peasants and hired hands, while discriminating against intellectuals, most of whom came from the well-to-do social class. In this sense, the revolution was made by the counter-elite rather than "coming by itself" out of the structural conditions of China.^[86] Any explanation of the CCP's success in political revolution has to take into account Mao's role in selecting a "feasible alternative" revolutionary strategy.

The most amazing organizational skill that the CCP leadership demonstrated during this period was not their success in building a dedicated revolutionary party along Leninist principles, but their masterful development of several layers of organization that still kept the party at the core. They set up the anti-Japanese mass organizations, peasants associations, workers associations, and other types of mass organizations, while maintaining the party's control over them through dedicated party members. By keeping the membership requirements for each mass organization broad and general, but preserving the strict requirements for its membership, the party mobilized different social groups, while maintaining control over them. This concept of a layered organization appears to be at the heart of Mao's political strategy; even when he stressed the need to be "unified with 95 percent of the people," the implicit assumption was that a core leadership existed. Although the notion of auxiliary organizations first came from Lenin, Mao

[86] Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

used it very effectively, thereby compensating for the deterministic thread of thinking in original Marxism.

These layered organizations helped the CCP achieve two seemingly conflicting tasks in eastern and central China during the anti-Japanese war: building an effective administrative hierarchy at all levels while allowing peasants at the basic level to seize power almost spontaneously from the traditional local elite, the two concomitant processes that, according to Yungfa Chen, eventually led the CCP to its final victory.^[87] They also provided the CCP with the organizational channels necessary for effective use of the mass line, mass mobilization, and mass campaigns.

By the time the CCP captured political power, it had accumulated thirty years of revolutionary experience with almost 4.5 million seasoned party members. Most were poorly educated young people from the most disadvantaged social groups.^[88] For instance, among 18,903 party members in Heilongjiang province, the family background of 21 percent was worker, 49 percent hired hand, and 25 percent poor peasant. These three categories comprised 95 percent of the party membership.^[89] Fifty-one percent of the Heilongjiang party membership was illiterate, and 23 percent "could barely recognize the characters," the sum of the two amounting to 74 percent. Those who had attended primary school constituted 23.4 percent, whereas only a mere 2.4 percent attended middle schools.^[90] The overall educational level of CCP members in 1949 was much lower than that of their counterparts in the Soviet Union in 1927.^[91]

Although we do not have national aggregate data showing the percentage of party members holding cadre positions, it is fair to assume that the rate was very high at that time and that those without official positions became cadres after 1949. For instance, in a Heilongjiang county with 600 party members, the "cadres-party members" constituted 95 percent.^[92] These figures are extremely

[87] Chen, Making Revolution .

[88] Among all the party members of Heilongjiang, 37 percent belonged to the 18–25 age group and 54.4 percent to the 25–40 age group. Jiandang , 59.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Jerry Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), 28.

[92] Jiandang , 119.

high for a time when only 0.65 percent of the rural population and about 0.2 percent of the urban population were party members.^[93]

Heilongjiang may be an extreme case. However, in every sense, the party members were from the least educated and the most disadvantaged social groups in the rural area. Nonetheless, they served the party well when its main task was fighting a guerrilla war. The type of leaders needed by the party at that time was a heroic, selfless guerrilla fighter dedicated to the cause, rather than an educated professional with specialized knowledge or administrative skills. An effective guerrilla commander had to take care of all the needs of a given base area's members by mobilizing the support of the available sources. The peasant youth could readily provide these leadership qualities.^[94]

To summarize, the type of leadership, the policy goals of the CCP, the organizational setting, the techniques of mass line and mass mobilization, and the practice of recruiting political leaders from poor peasants—all these factors complemented one another in helping the CCP to achieve its political victory in 1949. However, some of these factors, ironically, turned out to be constraints when the CCP faced its new task of state building and economic development. Among the many revolutionary experiences that influenced the CCP's political process after the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the most obvious continuity consisted of the former revolutionaries who first founded the new regime, then ruled China for the next thirty years, most remaining as generalists, except for a few working in the economy.^[95]

[93] In 1948 already 40–45 percent of all cadres in Heilongjiang province were party members. Ibid.

[94] James Scott identifies geographical isolation, pervasive personal ties, the absence of a division of labor, self-reliance, millenarian idealism, and egalitarianism as prominent features of a peasant society. "Hegemony and the Peasantry," Politics and Society , no. 3, 1977, 267–96.

[95] Of course, there were exceptions. For instance, Yao Yiyuan and Zhao Ziyang became experts on economics and finance. For those who developed a speciality in economics, see Kenneth Liberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Energy Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986).

3
Staffing the Party-State, 1949–66

This chapter analyzes various social groups that were recruited for the party and the state bureaucracy in terms of "virtue," "ability," and "seniority"—the three criteria that the CCP claims to have used—and the implications of the cadre policy for the political process. To the party, "virtue" meant political loyalty and reliability—one's commitment to Marxism-Leninism as well as to the Leninist principle of the party—which were frequently inferred from one's class background, political history, social relationships, and family background. In addition, political loyalty has also been assumed from political activism and support for a particular policy line at a given moment.

During the guerrilla war period, "ability" referred to the capacity to mobilize people for the specific political task of fighting a guerrilla war. After 1949, despite the functional requirements of managing urban sectors and developing the economy, the CCP by and large continued to use the old idea of ability, although it was usually measured in terms of educational level as well as performance not only in specific functional work but also in political leadership. "Seniority" was based on when a person joined the party or revolutionary movement. Unlike virtue and ability, seniority has never been officially recognized as an important criterion in personnel management. But it has been the most important factor in China, more important than in any other bureaucratic organization, because seniority symbolizes both proven political loyalty and accumulated "practical experiences."

Although the specific meaning and relative weight of the three criteria have changed, often becoming the focus of inner elite conflict, the overall trend has been for the CCP to increasingly stress virtue, while downgrading the relevance of ability in personnel management. The trend reflected the continuing rural orientation of the revolutionary elite who founded the new regime and the

CCP's failure to adjust its cadre policy to the requirements of economic development and modernization after its successful political revolution.

Staffing the Party-State Apparatus

The party approached the task of setting up a power structure in the newly liberated areas as it had previously dealt with the problem of setting up a new base area: it dispatched cadre groups that worked as "frames"—nuclear groups—and supplemented their strength with cadres recruited locally.^[1] Once these cadres (commonly known as "southbound cadres") moved into a newly liberated province, they were usually reinforced by local underground party members, as well as by local guerrilla forces. When the People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved to the front, some units—known as "localized forces" (zhuli difang hua )—were usually left to be used locally. However, the combination of all these groups was not sufficient to administer the vast liberated areas. For instance, in Hunan province there were about 15,000 civilian cadres with about one division of the PLA to govern its population of 18 million.^[2]

Despite the heavy reliance on military personnel, the CCP encountered a keen shortage of qualified personnel to fill 2.7 million positions when the People's Republic of China was founded. The problem was particularly serious at the local level.^[3] The CCP drew from six different groups to ameliorate the cadre shortage.^[4] They were (1) existing cadres generally known as "old cadres," (2) young high school or college graduates, (3) activists from mass movements such as land reform (most of them came from the worker and peasant classes), (4) old nonparty intellectuals who

[1] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renshi Zhidu Gaiyao (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1985), 102–4.

[2] Hunan Dangshi Tongxun , no. 1, 1985, 15.

[3] Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problems of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 36.

[4] For the recruitment of cadres the regime made a distinction between "absorption" (xishou ) and "recruitment" (luyong ). Absorption implied those who were automatically qualified for the cadre positions, whereas recruitment implied selection from a large group of people. The two groups of people who were absorbed into the cadre ranks were graduates of colleges and high schools and demobilized soldiers. Recruitment of cadres was made from worker and peasant activists as well as from unemployed people in the society. Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 20.

were scattered throughout the society, (5) demobilized PLA men, and (6) selected officials from the former Nationalist government.

We do not know how much each of these groups contributed to the total cadre pool. Even though Harding reports that only 750,000 old party members were qualified, a larger number of them must have eventually landed cadre positions.^[5] The total number of college graduates in 1950 was only 40,000, so their contribution cannot have been great.^[6] The number of available intellectuals was also very small: China had produced only 210,000 college graduates between 1923 and 1949, and only 10,000 of these had studied abroad.^[7] About 100,000 of these older intellectuals were sent to special "people's revolutionary universities" for political education between 1950 and 1952, and others were given ideological training in short courses.^[8]

Since the combination of the three groups was not sufficient to remedy the shortage of cadres, the CCP relied heavily on former Nationalist government officials. They must have constituted the largest proportion of the cadre class immediately after liberation, particularly in low-level technical positions.^[9] Since their political loyalty was dubious, their recruitment could only have been a temporary one. Relying on these groups, the regime set up a basic structure, and by 1952 the cadre shortage was somewhat alleviated.^[10] By the mid-1950s, the Chinese cadre corps was composed of several different groups, each of which had different degrees of seniority, ability, and virtue.

The first group was the old cadres, the most senior group who had "conquered the world." Their political reliability was unquestionable, but their average educational level was not high; the highest-level group included intellectuals who had joined the movement during the anti-Japanese war, but many of the middle-and lower-level cadres were from "desirable class backgrounds" and had relatively little education. For ability, all the old cadres

[5] Harding, Organizing China , 35.

[6] Ibid., 36.

[7] Zhongqing Shehui Kexue , no. 3, 1985, 42; another Chinese source reports the figure to be 180,000, Shehui Kexue Cankao , 20 July 1986, 11.

[8] Harding, Organizing China , 37.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., 38.

could claim the "long practical experience" of fighting a guerrilla war.

The old cadres were also divided into two smaller groups: those from the "red" areas, also known as "southbound cadres," who constituted a majority of the old cadres, and those who had done underground work or fought the guerrilla war in the "white" areas. Since most underground work was done in a person's native area, these people were "native cadres," and their educational level was much higher than that of their red-area counterparts, whom they considered as "outsiders." Former underground workers also tended to have more complicated relations with the KMT; some had been arrested; others had close contacts with KMT authorities. Their class backgrounds and "complicated historical problems" made them easy prey for a politically motivated investigation in the early 1950s. The campaign against "localism" eventually weakened their power in local politics.^[11]

On the whole, the old cadres occupied leading positions at every level of the party-state organs down to the county. They were also heavily concentrated in such politically powerful positions as secretary of the party committee. Even old cadres with little education—gong nong bing —landed leadership positions at the county and commune levels. Thus, after a careful study of local leadership, Michel Oksenberg concluded that "the generation which seized power during the early years of the revolution continued to monopolize the center of power at the local level, at least until the start of the CR."^[12]

The second group, officials retained from the old regime, could claim neither seniority nor virtue, and very few of them were allowed to join the party. Their only reliable asset was their ability. Even those who were kept were mere functionaries within specialized organs. A series of campaigns, including the Three Antis (sanfan ), directed against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism, and the Five Antis (wufan ), aimed against bribes, fraud, tax evasion, and those in the business community who were leaking state eco-

[11] For this reason, many of the "localists" joined the rebel faction during the CR.

[12] Michel Oksenberg, "Individual Attributes, Bureaucratic Positions, and Political Recruitment," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 155–57.

nomic secrets, eventually removed these officials from office, and by 1956 most of them had been dismissed.^[13]

The third group consisted of old intellectuals. Some, with national fame, received honorary positions because they had been targets of the CCP's united front policy. Others were assigned to specialist positions where they could utilize their expertise. Old intellectuals could not claim virtue or seniority, but they possessed knowledge that the regime needed, and it helped them to survive in functional positions.^[14]

The fourth group consisted of young intellectuals—the new high school and college graduates at the time of liberation—who joined the southbound teams or were assigned to cadre posts right after liberation. Many of them came from undesirable classes, but they could claim that the old bourgeois ideology had not influenced them as much as it had the old intellectuals. Most of them were assigned to functional fields of the party-state structure. Almost thirty years later, the few members of this group with the right family background, political attitude, and connections emerged as national leaders.

The fifth group was made of demobilized soldiers. Generally, the military preferred to discharge only those not suitable for their needs—such as female officers, former KMT officers who had voluntarily surrendered to the CCP, and those "old in age, physically weak, and low in cultural level," although sometimes "young intellectuals and specialists" whom key industrial projects needed were transferred as well.^[15]

Reassignment was uniformly managed by the center. Every year the military set up a plan to discharge a certain number of PLA men, and then the Military Affairs Commission coordinated the task with the civilian government to allocate the number of persons to each local authority, which assigned people to appropriate posts. When an army officer was transferred to the civilian sector, he was entitled to a post equivalent to his military rank in terms of salary, level, and fringe benefits.^[16] Since military seniority was

[13] Ezra Vogel, "From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The 'Regularization' of Cadres," China Quarterly , no. 29, January–March 1965, 36–60.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 20–34.

[16] For a comparison of the ranks of military personnel and civilian cadres, see ibid.

based on the date of enlistment and seniority was transferrable, former soldiers could usually claim high seniority. Their political loyalty had been tested on the battlefield, and their contribution to the final defeat of the KMT forces was readily recognized. Many of them were party members of long standing, but they were generally poorly educated.^[17] Given these strengths and weaknesses, it is not surprising that many demobilized soldiers were assigned to coercive organs and to political positions that required only low-level technical competence, such as the political department in a factory.^[18]

The largest pool for political cadres was that of worker and peasant activists. They were politically reliable because they were recruited from the poorest sector, which had benefited most from the Communist revolution. But their lack of education was a drawback. Nonetheless, the regime justified their promotion to cadre positions for the reason that "once on the job, their rich practical experience and firm class standpoint enable them to learn administrative practice quickly."^[19] This group filled vacancies at the lower levels, usually serving in their native locality. Their career pattern leading to the cadre position was first as an activist in the mass movement, then joining the party, and finally occupying a leadership position in a new party-state institute.

Among virtue, ability, and seniority, seniority was clearly the most important factor, which in turn reinforced old cadres' dominance at not only national but also municipal- and county-level politics. For instance, according to Ying-mao Kau, 68 percent of the Wuhan municipal elite were party members; 83 percent of the party members had joined before 1949; over one-half of the elite (58 percent) were revolutionists who had made their careers in the Communist movement before the beginning of the third revolutionary civil war; only 18 percent of them had any technical training.^[20] While old party members monopolized key positions within the bureaucracy, the rank and file of the party expanded rapidly.

[17] Oksenberg, "Individual Attributes."

[18] Ibid.

[19] Harding, Organizing China , 20.

[20] Ying-mao Kau, "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949–65," in Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics , 216–67.

Party Membership Recruitment

During the last stage of the civil war, party membership jumped from 1.3 million (in 1946) to almost 4.5 million by the time the CCP proudly declared the founding of the new state in 1949. Membership increased to 5.8 million, and 250,000 party branches were organized by 1951^[21] (see table 2).

The rapid expansion compromised the quality of new recruits.^[22] In addition, there was a need to spread party membership evenly in all localities because the heaviest concentration was in central-north China (hua bei )—almost one-third of all party members. The CCP decided in March 1951 to expel "bad elements" and educate party members with Communist ideology to achieve "purity and quality and to improve the combat capacity of the party."^[23] The qualifications of all party members were carefully checked against official guidelines, which specified the types of people to be expelled as well as eight requisites for party members that were more stringent than those of the 1945 party constitution.^[24] Consequently, 328,000—about 5 percent of party members—were expelled.^[25]

When the rural cooperativization drive started, party leaders decided to accelerate membership recruitment in rural areas to prepare for the forthcoming agricultural collectivization. Hunan province reportedly recruited 120,000 peasants—an astonishing 42 percent of all its party members—in 1956. Most peasants recruited during this period were activists of "unified purchase" or "backbone elements" of the agricultural cooperation movement, and

[21] Although rural members constituted the majority (3 million), the PLA ranked first in terms of the ratio between the total number of people employed and party members in a given sector (1.6 million party members were in the military). Seven hundred thousand party members were employed in state organs, whereas workers accounted for only 200,000 members. Wang Yifan and Chen Mingxian, Zhongguo Congchandang Lice Zhengdang Zhenfeng (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 123; Zhonggong Dangshi Cankao Ziliao (Renmin Chubanshe, 1974), 87.

[22] For the quality problems of party members, see Wang and Chen, Zhongguo Congchandang .

[23] Ibid., 87; Shenhui Kexue Cankao (Qinghai), 30 September 1984, 2–7. For the official resolution on party rectification, see Zhonggong Dangshi Cankao Ziliao , 121.

[24] For the types of persons to be expelled and the requirements of members, see Zhonggong Gongchang Lice Zhongyao Huiyi Ji (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 2:13–15.

[25] Zhibu Shenghuo (Beijing), no. 1, 1984, 19.

almost all of them—95 percent in some cases—were classified as poor peasants at the time of the land reform.^[26] After joining the party, new members led collectivization movements and then assumed leadership roles in the newly established cooperatives.^[27]

The party had also expanded rapidly in urban areas, particularly in industrialized areas where few members existed before 1949, in preparation for the socialist transformation of industry. For instance, in the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, only 2,800 people joined the party between 1950 and 1953; but the party admitted 72,000 workers (90 percent of whom were youths) in 1953–54 alone.^[28] The city of Zhengzhou reported that the number of party members among construction workers increased fourteenfold in one year. As was the case in rural collectivization, new party members led the peaceful transformation of industry and eventually landed cadre positions in enterprises. "Model workers, advanced workers, and pioneers in technology" were also accepted in order to effectively promote technical innovation.

The party also admitted a fair number of intellectuals immediately after 1949 when their cooperation was indispensable, particularly in propaganda, education, culture, and the arts.^[29] The introduction of the first five-year-plan further accentuated the need for the cooperation of intellectuals. Therefore, the regime adopted a lenient policy of "unifying, educating, and transforming intellectuals." The CCP granted the class status of "staff" to those who worked in big organizations and "laborer" to self-employed professionals (e.g., reporters, artists, and athletes) on the grounds that they earned their income by selling their labor.^[30] Even "those who are receiving high salaries, such as engineers, professors, and specialists, are also classified as staff."^[31] Only a small number of intellectuals were classified as "reactionary" or "national bourgeoisie." Consequently, some intellectuals managed to join the party and to become cadres after undergoing ideological reform.^[32]

[26] Daily Report , 28 February 1956, AAA25.

[27] Ibid., 6 July 1956, AAA14; 16 December 1954, AAA22.

[28] Ibid., 2 July 1954, AAA6.

[29] For the occupational distribution of about 2 million intellectuals, see Zhongqing Shehui Kexue , March 1985, 42–48.

[30] Renda Fuyin , February 1985, 53.

[31] Ibid.

[32] For a survey showing intellectuals' attitudes toward the CCP, see Zhongqing Shehui Kexue , March 1985, 42–48.

However, the CCP gradually tightened its control over intellectuals. Many of them became the target of mass struggle in such political campaigns as the Three Antis, the Five Antis, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, opposing America and aiding Korea. The CCP's continuing emphasis on class background, the imposition of official ideology, and the nationalization of educational institutions were bound to clash with the intellectuals' propensity to be critical and independent. The campaign against Hu Feng, a prominent literary figure, for his alleged counterrevolutionary views served as a chilling warning, particularly to intellectuals in creative fields.

As the morale of intellectuals gradually deteriorated, Zhou Enlai found it necessary to improve their political position in 1956. Declaring that 80 percent of intellectuals supported the CCP and that they constituted a "formidable force in the socialist construction program," he urged the party to improve their living and working conditions as well as their political status.^[33] Endorsing Zhou's suggestion, An Ziwen, director of the organizational department, instructed lower-level party committees "first to accept famous specialists and authorities, and then investigate their qualifications," while criticizing lower-level party leaders' reluctance to admit intellectuals as an expression of fear on the part of those members without any education.^[34] Consequently, the proportion of intellectuals to the total number of party members increased from about 12 percent in 1956 to about 15 percent in 1957 (see table 8). In Hunan the total number of intellectuals admitted to the party during the first five months of 1956 amounted to 1 percent of total party membership, and 21 percent of the 1956 new recruits in Beijing were intellectuals.^[35]

Between 1953 and 1956, the number of party members took another quantum leap. By the time of the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, membership had grown to 10 million, almost two party members for every 100 Chinese, an increase of nearly 1,000 percent from

[33] Current Background , no. 376, 7 February 1956, 7.

[34] Keyan Pipan , nos. 4–5, 1968, in Hungweibing Ziliao Xianbian (Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1980), vol. 2, 0587; see also Guangdong Shengwei Zuzhibu, ed., Zai Zhishifenzizhong Fazhan Dangyuan (Guangdongsheng Renmin Chubanshe, 1956).

[35] Daily Report , 10 April 1956, AAA36; Survey of China Mainland Press , no. 1325, 10 July 1956, 19.

1945. Compared with this national trend, the increase of members in the areas liberated during the last stage of the civil war was even more dramatic.^[36] Most of the new recruits were young people.

We have no comprehensive demographic information that shows the composition of party members recruited in the first surge of recruitment after the founding of the People's Republic of China. Data from Zhejiang province may adumbrate the national trend (see table 9).

The composition of those recruited in Zhejiang between 1949 and 1957 approximates the pattern of composition of the entire party as reported at the Eighth Party Congress (see table 8). The percentages of workers and peasants are very close to the national figures. Table 9 indicates that 11.3 percent of the newly recruited were government employees. Although we do not have any information on the total number of cadres in the province, 27,000 must have constituted a large portion of all government employees at that time.

In sum, party membership increased substantially after the founding of the People's Republic of China. From 1949 to 1957, the number of cadres almost tripled—from 2.9 million to 8.1 million (see table 32). By 1956, about 63 percent of those who belonged to

[36] From the date of its liberation to 1956, Qinghai recruited 41,609 party members (2.1 percent of its total membership), 5,944 new members per year on average. Shehui Kexue Cankao , 30 September 1984, 2–7.

the party had been recruited after liberation. Most of them were recruited during mass movements, which exclusively relied on political criteria (including class background). Their revolutionary potential was impressive; most of them came from classes that had little reason to protect the old society, and they proved their loyalty to the party by demonstrating activism in various campaigns. But a basic weakness was a low level of education and a lack of specialized knowledge—the basic requirements for leading a nation toward industrialization and rapid economic development. However, those party members without cadre positions expected their political virtue to be rewarded with such positions.

The Antirightist Campaign

By the time of the Hundred Flowers campaign during the mid-1950s, however, the need for new cadres had decreased, thus intensifying the conflict among the various social groups for cadre positions.^[37] At the same time, the bureaucracy was hopelessly

[37] About the increasingly severe competition for upward mobility among university and middle school students, see Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Susan Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategy in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982).

overstaffed, and many cadres had no specific work to do.^[38] The campaign to "simplify the administrative structure and to reduce the number of cadres" further heightened tensions within the Chinese bureaucracy, tensions that had been building up since 1949.

Harding identifies four areas of conflict at the time of the Hundred Flowers campaign: (1) between local cadres and "outsiders," (2) between the educated and noneducated, (3) between junior and senior cadres, and (4) between party and nonparty officials.^[39] These tensions usually overlapped in any one case; however, the main conflict was between virtue and ability, the first represented by a majority of the party members, who had less education, and the second by intellectuals, who tended not to be party members. As noted, nonparty member cadres owed their positions to their ability; native cadres were better educated than "outsiders," junior cadres better than senior ones, and nonparty officials better than those who belonged to the party.

In fact, the party had been stepping up discrimination against nonparty member cadres as the total pool of members increased after 1949. By 1957 total party membership had reached the 12.7 million mark (see table 2), almost a threefold increase from 1949. Once the party came to have a large reservoir of its own members, it probably tried to fill cadre positions with new members—who expected to be rewarded with tangible benefits—while making a genuine effort to increase party member cadres' technical competence through short-term training programs.^[40]

[38] For a detailed study of the administrative simplification, see Gongfei "Xiafang" Wenti De Tuishi (Taipei: Diaochaju, 1958). The monograph reports:

In the thirteen provincial corporations in Qinghai, 73 percent of cadres on the average had nothing to do. For example, there is one accountant who fills in only one accounting form in a day; another manages only food coupons; another is in charge of the tickets for getting haircuts. Managing the bath tickets needs one full-time person, and managing furniture requres another. As a result, male workers wander around the streets, and female workers do needlework.

Guangdong province reported that in some commercial corporations, the ratio of cadres to workers was 13:12. In some colleges and high schools, the teacher-student ratio was 1:1 (39).

[39] Harding, Organizing China , 145–47; Ying-mao Kau, "Urban Bureaucratic Elite," 236.

[40] Dazhong Bao , 25 August 1957.

The proportion of nonparty cadres probably declined steadily after 1949. By 1957, about 60 percent of cadres were party members, a substantial increase from the estimated 13 percent in 1949.^[41] Moreover, party members dominated leading positions, whereas those nonparty members who managed to hold their positions saw their administrative authority diminish because they had no access to information allowed only to party members.^[42] The increasing domination of member cadres can be noted in the changing official formulas for the united front strategy. Before 1949, the party insisted on the proportion of 3:3:3; in 1956 Zhou Enlai was urging that at least one-quarter of government jobs be given to nonmembers.^[43] If in 1956 2 mil on nonparty cadres did hold 25 percent of all government positions, party member cadres numbered 6 million, and there were probably another 6 million members who did not hold cadre positions. The conflict between the better-educated nonparty member intellectuals and party member cadres surfaced in the Hundred Flowers campaign.

When the intellectuals were induced to air their grievances in the Hundred Flowers campaign, they vented their rage on the dictatorial power of the party-state, particularly its tight monopoly of authority over cadres and its increasing emphasis on virtue. They charged that party cadres considered themselves made of "uncommon stuff" while looking down on nonparty people as knowing nothing of politics.^[44] Although they agreed with the CCP that cadres should be appointed on the basis of virtue and ability, they disagreed with the party on what they meant, rejecting the official practice of regarding party members as uniquely virtuous. To them, virtue, as defined by the party, meant "absence of talent."^[45] They were bitter about the old cadres whom they regarded as tubaozi , "without education and devoid of virtue," relying instead on their "seniority to eat unearned rice." The CCP was also accused of having put officials retained from the Nationalist era in the "freezer" as "materials to be preserved," but with the ulterior intention of

[41] Qinghai Ribao , 15 August 1957; Nanfang Ribao , 17 August 1957.

[42] Frederick Teiwes, Politics and Purge in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), 260.

[43] Wenhui Bao , 24 September 1957.

[44] Teiwes, Politics and Purge .

[45] Qingdao Ribao , 14 September 1957.

dumping them as "waste." After experiencing "eight years full of difficulties, and difficulties without end," the retained officials did not "have any hope."^[46]

The party's initial response to the intellectuals' charge was rather subdued and defensive. To the criticism that party members lacked virtue, the official news media rather lamely argued that "true virtue" referred to such qualities as "unlimited loyalty to the proletarian class and the socialist task, a high degree of organizational discipline, and lofty political qualities"—all qualities the old revolutionaries presumably possessed.^[47] The official media defined ability in a similar way: it was the ability to fight guerrilla wars and to lead mass campaigns against class enemies.

Furthermore, it seems that the party pleaded for understanding about the difficulties inherent in managing personnel matters.

When we promote those from worker-peasant backgrounds, they [rightists] accuse us of "solely emphasizing background"; when we promote old cadres, they criticize us of "exclusively relying on seniority"; if we promote cadres with strength in functional ability, they blame us for "overemphasizing ability at the expense of virtue"; they oppose the promotion of politically reliable cadres who lack vocational ability, calling them "water barrel cadres"; if we promote female comrades, they accuse us of being engaged in "skirt relations," pointing out the few wives of leading cadres; if we promote cadres from the lower level, they charge us with egalitarianism; if we promote those from the upper level, they insist that we officials protect one another. They object to others being promoted once in five years. But when they themselves are promoted once a year, they continue to complain that their talents are wasted. On the one hand, they criticize those loyal to the party and the party leaders as "following a leadership line" and "docile dogs." On the other hand, they praise liberals resisting leaders for their determination to struggle for and uphold truth.^[48]

However, once the antirightist campaign began, the defensive tone changed to harsh denunciation. Mao reversed Zhou Enlai's estimate made one year before by insisting that 80 percent of intellectuals were "bourgeois intellectuals."^[49] Deng Xiaoping played a

[46] Ibid.

[47] Guangxi Ribao, 1 August 1957.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Mao Zedong Xuanji (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1977), 5:484.

key role in the antirightist campaign. In his "Report on the Rectification Movement" delivered at the third extended conference of the Eighth Party Congress, he declared that intellectuals belonged to the bourgeois class because of their family backgrounds and the type of education they received. This represented a drastic shift from the past practice of emphasizing that most intellectuals earned wages. Party members who had spoken out against the party were condemned as spokesmen for the bourgeois class who had entered the party "surreptitiously." Accepting the view that the antisocialist political ideology of the intellectuals came from their class background rather than from the possession of any objective knowledge, Deng advocated training "proletarian intellectuals" and "revolutionary specialists" by promoting young workers and peasants to carry out the tasks usually performed by the intellectuals.^[50]

Following Deng's reports, the center issued specific criteria for defining rightists. The basic criterion was whether or not a person opposed socialism, but how to determine intention was undefined, leaving room for abuse.^[51]

Rectification mainly affected intellectuals in party and government organs above the province and municipality levels as well as in "business units"—such as educational institutions, research units, newspapers and the publishing industry, literature and art groups, and public health organizations. Many informants insisted that during the campaign higher authorities sent down a quota of rightists to each unit, and each unit in turn had to meet the quota, even by manufacturing rightists if none was found. The way to detect a rightist was by first checking the records of speeches and then by mobilizing the masses to recall questionable statements, speeches, and problems. Through these methods, the CCP produced about half a million "rightists," which represented 10 percent of all intellectuals.^[52] Probably those who earned the rightist

[50] Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Dangshi Yanjiushi, ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Cankao Ziliao (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1979), 8:635–66.

[51] For the official criteria used for selecting rightists, see ibid.

[52] Harding, Organizing China , 149. According to Frederick Teiwes (Politics and Purge ), between 15 and 40 percent of the leadership of the democratic parties and between 2 and 3 percent of the members of the CCP itself were labeled rightists during the antirightist campaign. The label, in many cases, was not removed until after Mao's death.

stigma were the most outspoken, independent, and honest intellectuals. After the antirightist campaign, no one dared to challenge the party.

On the other hand, the ferocious opposition to perceived rightists that a large number of party members demonstrated is understandable when one looks carefully at the basic structure of the party. More than half of the twelve million party members had been recruited after 1949. Many of them were from worker or peasant backgrounds with little education, and they obviously owed their positions to political loyalty. As the beneficiaries of the new order, through land reform and the socialization of industry, they knew very well that without the Communist Party they would not have risen so far. Thus, they were genuinely eager to defend their interests and reacted violently when intellectuals criticized the party. In this sense the campaign symbolized the peasant mentality not only of Mao but also of the party as a whole. The antirightist campaign has been called the peasants' challenge to intellectuals.^[53]

The Hundred Flowers period was the last time the issue of member versus nonmember cadres was publicly aired. With the antirightist campaign, it seems that the Chinese people accepted the party's prerogative over personnel management and the domination of party cadres in all leadership positions. The process of extending political power over other functional fields is best exemplified by the concurrent appointments of top party leaders to professorships at various universities.^[54]

After the Antirightist Campaign

Party member recruitment came to a standstill during the Hundred Flowers period, but it resumed immediately after the antirightist campaign. As was the case with the preceding movement, the groups targeted for recruitment were those who had proven themselves in the previous antirightist campaign.^[55] Heilongjiang province reportedly acquired 6.4 percent and Guizhou province 10

[53] "Discussion of 1957," in Qingnian Lundan (Wuhan), 1985.

[54] For instance, Tao Zhu, Kang Sheng, Zhou Yang, and Ko Qingxi were appointed to professorships at universities and colleges.

[55] Daily Report , 1 July 1959; 11 July 1959.

percent of their total party membership in this manner.^[56] A particularly sought-after group were women: Zhejiang province recruited 10,500—27.2 percent of all women members—in 1959.^[57] The recruitment drive continued throughout the Great Leap Forward period. During the euphoric period in which the party sought to build an immediate socialism—known as the "Communist wind"—the party again resorted to quotas for basic units. As a result, "the recruitment work was sloppy, and some localities blindly pursued quantity, thus lowering the quality of the party members."^[58]

Despite the antirightist movement, the official line continued to emphasize a balance between ability and virtue.^[59] Obviously China needed able cadres to carry out the economic development that the Eighth Party Congress had promised. However, the party changed its policy to combining the "red" and "expert" in each cadre by training experts from the peasant and worker classes instead of relying on party member cadres for virtue and the intellectuals for ability. Liu Shaoqi instructed the party to "cultivate a large number of cadres, raise their ability, and promote the specialization of cadres."^[60]

The leftist tendency of the Great Leap Forward, however, pushed aside the moderate leaders' efforts to create "proletarian experts." During that period, the built-in anti-intellectual bias among cadres from worker and peasant backgrounds reasserted itself, frequently equating intellectuals with their former exploiters.

The class background of intellectuals is not good, their social relations are complicated, and their ideology is backward. Although their living conditions in the old world were not as good as the capitalists', they were much better than the workers'. The workers are the only creators of values, but intellectuals exploit them just as the capitalists do.^[61]

When the Great Leap Forward resulted in disaster, Mao withdrew from the front line, while Liu Shaoqi renewed the effort to

[56] Survey of China Mainland Press , 26 August 1959, 6.

[57] Daily Report , 9 March 1959, C3.

[58] Shehui Kexue Cankao , 30 September 1984, 2–7.

[59] Dazhong Bao , 14 May 1958.

[60] Renmin Ribao , 1 May 1958.

[61] Zhongqing Shehui Kexue , March 1985, 42–48.

"raise the technical and scientific level of the cadres and to promote cadres with special expertise to the leading posts." Under his leadership, the party decided to stop the recruitment and to carry out a "fresh registration."^[62] At the same time, Zhou, who had been desperately trying to provide adequate working conditions for specialists by guaranteeing five-sixths of their working hours for their speciality, organized the Guangzhou conference in 1962.^[63] Realizing the essential functions that experts and specialists perform in running a modern society, moderate leaders were ready to co-opt intellectuals into the party-state apparatus. But this effort did not last. Instead, the CR began.

As the crisis generated by the Great Leap Forward came to a close, Mao, coming out of semiretirement, advanced the slogan "Never forget class struggle." By 1964, as China's ideological dispute with the Soviet Union intensified, Mao advocated the cultivation of "millions of revolutionary successors." "This is a matter of great, extremely great, importance, a matter of life and death for the fate of the party and the nation." Revolutionary successors had to be (1) real Marxist-Leninists, (2) revolutionaries, (3) proletarian politicians who could be one with the majority of the people, (4) models in practicing the party's democratic centralism, and (5) modest, aware of the danger of being arrogant, and good at self-criticism.^[64]

Mao did not mention anything relating to ability. None of the five conditions, which were exclusively related to virtue, touched upon the essence of Leninism—party spirit. Instead, Mao strongly emphasized three abstractions: Marxism-Leninism, revolution, and the masses. With the new criteria for revolutionary successors, the party embarked on a policy of "actively, and cautiously absorbing new party members on a comparatively large scale" by means of the Socialist Education Movement (SEM). Qinghai province recruited 10,530, the largest group of new members ever admitted in

[62] Shehui Kexue Cankao , 30 September 1984, 2–7.

[63] For the radicals' criticism of the Guangzhou conference, see Xiju Zhanbao , 24 June 1964. Enjoying the new freedom, some party intellectuals such as Wu Han and Deng To published articles subtly satirizing Mao's "petty bourgeois fanaticism," criticism which later started the CR.

[64] Renmin Ribao , 4 July 1964.

one year.^[65] Another source estimated that about 2.2 million were recruited during this period.

By the time of the CR, party member cadres completely dominated the party-state. Oksenberg reports that almost 100 percent of even county-level and district-level cadres were party members—90 percent at the multivillage level, 83 percent at the village level, and 60 percent at the subvillage level.^[66] Kau reports a similar situation among the Wuhan municipal elite: the old party members dominated the higher echelons of the municipal bureaucracy. Party member cadres monopolized politically influential positions, whereas cadres without party membership—who possessed 93 percent of all technical and professional skills in the bureaucracy—languished in functional placements, which had neither influence nor prestige.^[67]

Political Implications of the Cadre Policy

After founding the new regime in a 1949, the former revolutionaries continued to recruit cadres largely through mass campaigns, using the methods of centrally assigned recruitment quotas, recruiting large numbers in groups—known as the "wave style," and party rectification. Immediately after 1949, when the CCP faced the urgent tasks of setting up a new state, restoring social order, and reviving the war-shattered economy, the founding fathers of the new regime tried to balance virtue and ability in selecting cadres. At that time the CCP adopted a pragmatic and lenient policy toward intellectuals in order to utilize their functional expertise and political support. Once the CCP succeeded in solving such immediate urban problems as controlling inflation and launching the first five-year plan, the delicate balance between competency and political loyalty gradually shifted in favor of the latter. The intellectuals' criticism of the party's cadre policy and the subsequent antirightist campaign decisively tipped on the side of

[65] By the end of 1966 Qinghai had a total of 77,665 party members, 3.3 percent of the population. Shehui Kexue Cankao , 30 September 1984, 2–7.

[66] Oksenberg, "Individual Attributes," 180.

[67] Ying-mao Kau, '"Urban Bureaucratic Elite."

political reliability. The practice of looking at class background to gauge political attitude continued until Mao's death.

The radical faction led by Mao was largely responsible for the anti-intellectual bias that persisted in the new China. But the bias also had a deeper root: it reflected the diffused sentiment of the rank and file of party members and the cadre corps at that time. When land reform started in 1946, peasant cadres challenged the intellectual cadres because they were from the well-to-do social classes. When competency was briefly emphasized for the selection and promotion of cadres during the first five-year plan, many of the former guerrilla fighters complained bitterly because their contribution to "conquering the world" was not fully appreciated and because their guerrilla war skills were no longer needed—"the heroes have no place to use their weapons." During the antirightist campaign, top party leaders could easily mobilize the former revolutionaries as well as newly recruited party members to crush the demands calling for increased attention to professional competency, thus making it possible for "the old heroes to have a place to use their weapons."^[68]

The class-based cadre policy made it impossible for the political elite to maintain a proper balance between social revolution on the one hand and economic construction and nation building on the other. The cadre policy was less dysfunctional in the rural areas where the regime's task was rather simple and the educational level of the cadre corps was not particularly low compared with that of the average rural population. But in urban areas, the educational level of the cadres was not much higher than that of the urban population they governed, although urban efforts required more sophisticated, diverse, and specialized knowledge. Moreover, the experiences of the revolutionary elite were less relevant to the efficient management of urban areas.

Not only did the CCP recruit its cadres from social groups that were ill-equipped to act as "proctors," but it also failed to train them for the complexities of economic development and management in modern society, as Stalin did in the Soviet Union during

[68] From interview in Beijing in 1986. For fragmented data on the class background of lower-level cadres immediately after the establishment of the PRC, see Zhongnan Junzhengweiyuanhui Tugai Weiyuanhui Diaocha Yanjiushi, Zhongnanqu Yibaifenzhi Diaocha (Wuhan: Diaocha Yanjiuchu, 1953), 322.

the 1930s.^[69] Consequently, the educational level of the top elite during the 1950s was actually lower than that during the Jiangxi period of the early 1930s. For instance, according to Derek Waller, about 31 percent of the Jiangxi elite had a college-level education, whereas only 26 percent of the Eighth Central Committee members had a similar level of education.^[70] Intellectuals constituted 14 percent of all CCP members in 1957, whereas the same category amounted to 43 percent of the Polish Communist Party in 1960.^[71]

In the early 1950s Chinese leaders tried to improve the cultural and technical standards of the existing cadre corps by setting up an "intensive middle-school program specially designed for the workers and peasant cadres" as well as cadre training institutes. China had about 347 cadre training institutes—34 managed by central organs and 313 by provincial and municipal governments.^[72] By 1956, 1.27 million cadres had received training in their specialized fields and in basic political theory. All remaining cadres were scheduled to receive similar training by 1962. In addition, existing educational institutions organized special classes for cadres on active duty.^[73]

Training efforts, however, had substantially declined by the time of the Hundred Flowers campaign and gradually came to an end as the overall political orientation shifted. First, the center gave jurisdiction over cadre schools to the provinces and municipalities. Then, by August 1961, it was decided to stop cadre training for three years, and many school facilities were used for other purposes. In 1964, the regime finally closed the remaining training institutes.^[74]

In reflecting on what went wrong with the Chinese political sys-

[69] Stalin systematically trained children from the working class into "proletarian experts." After the great purge of the first generation of revolutionaries in 1930, he promoted them to leadership positions. Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a new Elite, 1928–1939," Slavic Review 38 (September 1979): 377–402. Also see her Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[70] Derek J. Waller, "The Evaluation of the Chinese Communist Political Elite, 1931–56," in Robert Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972).

[71] Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 34.

[72] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 59–98.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

tem he himself helped build, Lu Dingyi, former director of the propaganda department, candidly attributed Maoist radicalism to the low educational level of the cadre corps.

[At the beginning of the liberation we] should have sent some party members [from peasant and worker backgrounds] to receive an education—not short-term training, but a regular college education. If [we had followed] that way for ten or twenty years, it would have been very good for our construction. Not pushing for that idea was largely my responsibility. That was a big mistake.

If a mistake has been made, it is better to recognize it. I am a graduate of Jiatong University, but I have worked for a long time in propaganda, education, and cultural fields, and I have not paid special attention to the importance of intellectuals. That was a great mistake! Any army without culture [wenhua ] is a stupid army. Without culture, how can one know what a democratic legal system is and thereby avoid promoting feudalistic [policies], such as promoting backyard furnaces to the extent of cutting down trees and stressing grain to the extent of eliminating sideline farming? [The lack of culture] led to blind commandism at the top level and to blind compliance at the lower level; both of them are equally ignorant. Ignorance led to the persecution of the intellectuals.^[75]

Having been recruited from the poorest sector of society, the Chinese cadre corps did not have a power base independent of the party-state, nor any vested interests such as wealth, prestige, or political influence to protect. They derived whatever they possessed exclusively from the bureaucratic positions they held in the state apparatus. In this respect, the Communist elites were quite different from traditional elites, who came mainly from landlords and wealthy families and who had their own social and economic interests to defend. At the same time, as scholar-officials appointed by the imperial court after passing the civil service examination, traditional elites also represented the state's authority. Their dual role helped maintain the balance between society and state.^[76]

Although the party-state recruited its cadres from the lower classes, most of them have acted more or less as agents of the state rather than as representatives of their class. The idea of state

[75] Minzu Yu Fazhi , no. 4, 1983, 3.

[76] Siku-kai Lau, "Monism, Pluralism, and Segmental Coordination: Toward Alternative Theory of Elite, Power, and Social Stability," Journal of the Chinese University of Hong Kong , 3, no. 1, 187–206.

bureaucrats representing the concrete interests of specific social groups has never been legitimized in China. Despite the notion of the party as the "vanguard," the CCP condemned those who were sensitive to the perceived interests of the masses for making the mistake of "tailism," a pejorative term for blindly following the lead of the masses, even though urging the cadres to practice the mass line and mass mobilization.^[77] As a result, instead of serving as a channel for the perceived interests of the Chinese masses as originally intended, the mass movement and mass mobilization became mere tools for implementing the radical policy chosen for ideological reasons.^[78] Furthermore, even though their economic interests lay with private farming, the basic-level rural cadres who had obtained their positions because of their poor-peasant background and political activism during the land reform faithfully carried out the collectivization policy. This clearly demonstrates that political interests were more important than economic ones as far as the bureaucrats were concerned. In other words, positions within the bureaucracy rather than economic interests largely dictated the political behavior of the cadres.^[79] As a result, the cadres were more responsive to their superiors in the party-state than to the particular class from which they were recruited.

Although the former revolutionaries set up a state structure ostensibly modeled after the Soviet's, the Chinese party-state was more centralized and with less structural differentiation and routinization. (For a detailed discussion of the structure, see chapter 9.) For the sake of making a socialist revolution, the party deeply and completely penetrated not only all the auxiliary mass organizations but also the state apparatus, imposing "monistic" leadership and thereby losing the flexibility that the layered organizations had previously offered. At the same time the party-state was never fully institutionalized to the extent of effectively regulating the behavior of each officeholder. Consequently, the group of cadres occupying

[77] Chalmers Johnson, "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 1:397–447.

[78] Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), xiiv.

[79] For the distinction between class position and class situation, see Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist Class," in Robin Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social Science (London: Collins, 1972).

political office represented the party-state more realistically than did the abstract notions of political structures, offices, and roles. This means that the political elite's values, habits, and style, which derived from their social characteristics and previous revolutionary experiences, had a deep influence on the evolution of the political institutions and their actual operation. As a result, distinguishing between the authority of the offices and that of the occupants is a difficult task in the party-state.

Subject to the personnel decisions of their superiors, the cadres were hierarchically organized according to well-defined ranks—which were initially devised for a salary scale but eventually became social status symbols. Although the cadres did not have any discretionary power over the "value premise"—which was Mao's prerogative as the guardian of official ideology—they enjoyed a substantial amount of discretionary power over the "factual premise."^[80] They were selected on the basis of political loyalty rather than competency and expected to use political criteria, which were open to subjective interpretation by the decision-makers, rather than any other functional criteria. The extensive personal networks existing among the old cadres and the Maoist pressure for constant contact with the masses made it difficult for the revolutionary cadres to operate exclusively on an impersonal basis. General rules and guidelines that in other bureaucracies operate to circumscribe the behavior of the occupants of office were vague and frequently couched in ambiguous ideological terms that allowed varying interpretations. In short, the cadres were expected to play the role of revolutionary leaders mobilizing the masses for social revolution rather than efficient and effective administrators.

The cadre system that the CCP developed immediately after 1949, including the practice of recruiting cadres from the most disadvantaged social groups on the basis of their loyalty as proven in political campaigns, buttressed the CCP's attempt to consolidate its own political structure through social transformation. Free from any external restraints encountered during the revolutionary era,

[80] For the distinction between the two, see Herbert Simon, "Decision-Making and Administrative Organization," in Robert K. Merton, ed., Reader in Bureaucracy (New York: Free Press, 1967), 185–94.

the party-state initiated a series of social revolutions that completely eliminated any social force that could have raised political demands or worked as a check on the ever-expanding party-state; ideological campaigns, quite often backed by coercion, broke the will of any of the Chinese people considering resisting the revolutionary changes.^[81] Each of these campaigns, which generated many activists recruited to fill cadre positions, further consolidated the party-state's domination over society.

Land reform brought an end to the political influence of the landlord class, which had frequently played the role of "guardian of society" when the traditional state adopted policies adverse to its interests. The collectivization of agriculture shifted control over economic resources from individual peasants to the state, thus depriving society of resources with which to challenge the party-state's authority. A continuous effort to equalize peasant incomes and an artificial intensification of class struggle in the rural areas prevented any peasant group from gaining substantial economic resources.

The peaceful transformation of industry deprived the capitalist class, which had never developed much political influence, of any control over resources, while absorbing some of them individually into the state apparatus as managers of enterprises. The introduction of the material allocation system through the state plan politically emasculated the urban population, making it completely dependent on the state for its income. As a result, individuals lost control over such crucial decisions as savings, consumption, labor allocation, occupational choice, and physical movement across administrative boundaries.

Workers in state enterprises are owners in theory, but they have never been allowed to exercise any substantive influence even in factory management. That was the case with the "one-man management system" of the early 1950s, as well as "the manager responsibility system under the leadership of the party committee" during Mao's era.^[82] Even when the Workers Mao's Thought prop-

[81] Tang Tsou, "Reflections on the Formation and Foundation of the Communist Party-State in China," in his Cultural Revolution , 259–334.

[82] For the change from the first to the second, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

aganda teams were sent to higher learning institutes during the CR, it was the military rather than the workers who exercised real power.

Intellectuals do not constitute an independent class, but because of their education and training they can provide the regime with the educated manpower necessary for industrialization and modernization. At the same time, in many societies intellectuals tend to acts as critics of the existing social and political order. This has been particularly true in modern China. Nonetheless, a series of campaigns after 1949 undermined their social prestige and political influence. Worst of all, the state extended its control over all "business units" and brought professional associations under its control, thus transforming what had been individual, practicing professionals into members of bureaucratized organizations. Finally, the antirightist campaign of 1958 muzzled outspoken intellectuals and blacklisted almost 10 percent of the intellectual population, thus ending the active political role that Chinese intellectuals had played since the May 4 movement. Thereafter, neither a social group that could check for the abuse of political power by the party-state nor a forum where political issues could be discussed existed.

There are cultural as well as historical reasons for the CCP's reliance on the political power of the party-state to initiate social change. Unlike the case of Western Europe, the state as an institution with an active role has never been problematic in China, Japan, or Korea, where the origin of the state—regardless of how one defines it—can be traced back several thousand years. Particularly in China, with its long tradition of centralized bureaucracy headed by an emperor, the state's existence has been historically, intellectually, and culturally accepted.

The personal experiences of senior party leaders reinforced the cultural tradition. The Communist movement from the beginning viewed a powerful state with overwhelming political power as a solution to the incessant internal civil wars among the warlords and to the external pressure from the imperialist powers. China's acceptance of Marxism-Leninism further contributed to the rise of the powerful party-state. From the beginning, Marxism-Leninism appealed to Chinese radical intellectuals as a political ideology rather than as scientific laws governing social development. Mao's

sinification of Marxism-Leninism—or "creative integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China," to use the official Chinese phrase—can be summarized as the politicization of Marxism-Leninism. The fact that the CCP came to power only through a full-scale civil war against the Nationalists also favored a dominant state.^[83]

In retrospect, although they successfully defeated the Nationalists, the founders lacked the wisdom needed to maintain a proper balance between social revolution on the one hand and economic construction and nation building on the other. Nor did they demonstrate the ability to build an efficient party-state that could continuously adapt to new situations and perform the complex task of coordinating many specialized functional units in a modern society.

The failure is largely due to Mao's radicalism. As was the case with Wang Ming, who accepted the dogmatism of Russian Leninism, Mao's thought, which had resolved the basic problems of the Chinese revolution, also put the Chinese elite in a straitjacket after 1949.^[84] As a contemporary Chinese historian argues, "for a long period, Comrade Mao lived in China's backward countryside. He did not understand modern, socialized, large-scale industry. This caused him to sink, with regard to the question of socialist economic construction, even more into subjective utopianism marked by impatience for quick success."^[85]

Stressing the rural orientation of Mao cannot explain the question of why he had so much power.^[86] The root of the Maoist ultraleftist tendency should therefore be traced back to the cadre corps that the regime created after 1949. Largely from the lower

[83] For an attempt to explain the post–1949 policy in terms of the preceding revolutionary experiences, see Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[84] His experiences in the Yanan period remained central to his way of thinking, even after liberation when they were not as relevant. See Johnson, "Chinese Communist Leadership."

[85] Stuart Schram, "The Limits of Cataclysmic Change," China Quarterly , no. 108, December 1986, 612–24.

[86] By "rural orientation," I mean the tendency to view political processes in moral and ethical terms with millenarian expectations, to reject functional specialization and a market mechanism, and to emphasize self-sufficiency and distribution over production. For the peasantry's political outlook, see James Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," Politics and Society , no. 3, 1977, 267–96.

rungs of society and without many vested interests to protect, cadres could be readily co-opted into the party-state apparatus and induced to act as the state's agents in its encroachment upon society. In their political outlook the cadres retained the peasants' viewpoint while remaining ignorant of the complex requirements of modern industrialized society. Whenever such pragmatic leaders as Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai attempted to adjust the cadre policy to such prerequisites of modernization as functional differentiation, specialization, professionalism, and routinization of administrative procedures, the powerful party, with its large number of uneducated members accustomed to political movements, resisted the changes with Mao's encouragement. Instead, the former guerrilla fighters—largely recruited from among poor peasants—sustained the mass mobilization even to run the economy, bringing their "small producers' mentality" and "guerrilla mentality" to the complex problems of managing a modern industrialized complex society.^[87] In this sense Mao's peasant mentality represented rather than shaped those of the majority of cadres, who, according to Liao Gailong, one of the best-known party historians, "not only worshiped authority, but also corrupted the party with egalitarian thinking."^[88] An extreme historical irony is that it was precisely Mao's success in mobilizing the peasants that later proved to be the basic limitation to China's political development.

[87] Qingnian Lundan , no. 2, 1985, 92–98; Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 114–22.

[88] Schram, "Limits of Cataclysmic Change."