The Path to Conflict
Against this background of Roman noninterference in Athenian affairs (or the absence of evidence for such interference) the steps toward conflict between Athens and Rome at the beginning of the Mithridatic War stand out as an aberration rather than the culmination of a long process. In view of the attention that Athens's political crisis at the end of the 90s has recently received there is no need for me to rehearse well-known facts.[44]
[39] Cf. especially Tribal Cycles , 147, where, however, the "revolution" remains a "crisis" of ca. 103 (p. 152); and AJP 59 (1938) 234.
[40] HSCP 83 (1979) 230; cf. 219-20, 229-31.
[41] Cic. De or . 1.82: tamen cum pro consule in Ciliciam proficiscens venissem Athenas, compluris tum ibi dies sum propter navigandi difficultatem commoratus; sed, cum cotidie mecum haberem homines doctissimos . . . pro se quisque ut poterat de officio et de ratione oratoris disputabat. ILLRP 342, lines 5-6.
[42] Lauffer, Bergwerksklaven , 239.
[43] See p. 55 with nn. 45-47.
[44] Cf. Accame, Dominio romano , 165-70; Deininger, Widerstand , 248-55; Candiloro, StudClassOrient 14 (1965) 134-76; Badian, AJAH 1 (1976) 105-28; Habicht, Chiron 6 (1976) 127-42; Bernhardt, PrH , 39-49; Malitz, Historien des Poseidonios , 340-59. See also Desideri, Athenaeum 51 (1973) 249-54.
For our purposes the chief issue is the extent to which Rome directly, by intervention, or indirectly, as a potential ally or enemy of certain factions, played a role in the troubles of the Athenian state around the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 80s.
By the end of the 90s, it is apparent, Athens was experiencing grave political difficulties. From 91/90 to 89/88 Medeus held an unprecedented succession of three eponymous archonships.[45] Some further information is added by the long fragment of Posidonius referring to the Athenian envoy Athenion's embassy to Mithridates' court and his reception in Athens upon his return in 88. Athenion wrote back from Mithridates' court in 89-88 that he had gained such influence over the king that the Athenians would be able "not only to live in harmony, once freed from the debts that were accumulating, but also to restore the democracy and obtain great gifts, both private and public."[46] When he returned in 88 he exhorted the Athenians "not to put up with the anarchia that the Roman Senate had made to prevail until it should deride how we ought to be governed."[47] and spoke of dosed sanctuaries, "parched" gymnasia (i.e., without oil), no assembly in the theater, silent law courts, and the Pnyx "taken" from the demos: even the voice of Dionysus was absent, the Eleusinian temple (
The triple archonship of Medeus is intriguing; but it is not dear why, if he was a kind of tyrant, as is often supposed,[48] he should have chosen as his instrument the eponymous archonship—hardly the most powerful office—rather than the hoplite generalship, as would Athenion, or even the position of herald of the Areopagus, an office already gaining in importance by the end of the second century.[49] Athenion, in his list of civic problems, nowhere complains of a tyranny, Medeus's or anyone else's.
[45] IG II .1713, lines 9-11.
[48] Esp. Badian, AJAH 1 (1976) 107-8, 113; Bernhardt, PrH , 40; Keaveney, Sulla , 79; cf. Ferguson, Klio 4 (1904) 13.
[49] On the herald of the Areopagus, cf. Tracy, HSCP 83 (1979) 227-28; Ferguson, Kilo 4 (1904) 7-8, and Hellenistic Athens , 429 n. 2, 455-56; Geagan, Athenian Constitution , 57-60.
And if Medeus had been tyrant in 89/88, how did Athenion manage to be sent to Mithridates—with public authority, it appears[50] —or to be welcomed back with such enthusiasm?[51]
The debts that were accumulating are represented as preventing civic concord (
What we hear most about, however, is anarchia , which appears to describe a virtual paralysis of political life and civic amenities. This is not, of course, anarchia merely in the technical sense of the lack of an eponymous archon, although there do not seem to have been any incumbent officials at the time of Athenion's return, since he does not have to turn anyone out of office when he and his associates are elected.[55] Perhaps officials were simply not being elected any more (anarchia in a very broad sense). Medeus's repeated tenure of the eponymous archonship may represent a pre-liminary stage in this breakdown: possibly he remained in office because no successor was chosen. In this context, Athenion's expression of hope
[50] Badian, AJAH 1 (1976) 110.
[51] Badian evades the difficulty by postulating Medeus's removal before Athenion's departure (AJAH 1 [1976] 108, 110).
[53] Ath. 5.212d = Posidonius, FGrH 87 F 36, pp. 244-45 = F 253 Edelstein-Kidd, lines 50-51. Badian, AJAH 1 (1976) 107-8, rejects the simplistic notion of "a broad mass of Athenians hopelessly indebted to a small upper class." Bernhardt, PrH , 44-45, concurs but still gives too much weight to what may be only a caricature, based on the conventions of rhetorical invective (on which see Kidd, Posidonius , 865-66, 870).
[54] So Ferguson, Klio 4 (1904) 14 n. 2.
for reinstating (
Rome's role in all of this is, unfortunately, quite obscure. The talk of parched gymnasia, dosed temples, and the abeyance of the Mysteries—matters with which Rome can have had little to do—suggests troubles far beyond the narrowly constitutional. The only evidence that links Rome to Athens's political troubles is Athenion's complaint that the Roman Senate was maintaining the anarchia until it could decide how the Athenians should be governed. This may mean no more than that the Athenians had
[56] It is hard to credit therefore Kidd's view, accepting Posidonius far too literally, that "national religious processions and celebrations like the Eleusinian mysteries, and freedom of speech and criticism were banned" (Posidonius , 877). Athenion's hysterical rantings need not be more than Posidonian slander.
[58] For a similar view, see Candiloro, StudClassOrient 14 (1965) 148-49, who nevertheless sees Roman intervention behind the "dosed temples" and "parched gymnasia" (pp. 153-54, 170). See Badian, AJAH 1 (1976) 106-8, 112-14, for a vigorous assault on the simplistic view, heavily influenced by Posidonius's hostile rhetoric, that Athenion led a party of "radical democrats."
appealed to the Roman Senate for settlement of a political crisis,[59] and that typical Roman dilatoriness in considering the matter, aggravated by the distractions of more important matters such as the Italian war, created a strong popular consensus for taking the matter out of the hands of the Romans and offering it to the solicitous king of Pontus. There is no suggestion that this might provoke Roman reprisals. Athens was not entirely in the shadow of Rome; as a "free city" it was certainly capable of taking its own political decisions.
The popular reception of Athenion's rhetoric, and his election as hoplite general, might easily be supposed to have constituted a sharp break with Rome. Clearly this was the impression Posidonius attempted to convey.[60] But we should think twice. Early in 88, before Pontic forces had put in an appearance not only in Greece or Macedonia but even in the Cyclades, was a most curious time to provoke war. Even Posidonius does not make Athenion call for War against Rome on his return from Mithridates but only dwell with relish on the collapse of Roman power in Asia and the ascendancy of Mithridates.[61] This, on the face of it, is not so much a call to arms as an argument for turning away from Rome and toward the Pontic king for the resolution of Athens's political problems. Scholars have noted with surprise how favorably Athenion was welcomed in 88 by the Dionysiac artists, the beneficiaries of Roman decisions: a sign, therefore, of the depth and breadth of Athenian hostility to Rome by this time?[62] —or perhaps an indication that Athenion had not come to represent hostility to Rome. Posidonius indeed admits that Athenion professed to favor Rome in repeated assemblies; but for Posidonius it was all, of course, a pretense.[63] It is most probable that Athenion was temporizing.[64] Having done nothing
[59] Badian, AJAH 1 (1976) 108, compares the appeal of Halaesa in Sicily a little earlier (Cic. Verr . 2.2.129). Sicily, perhaps, had a greater claim to Rome's attention. The Saguntine request for Roman arbitration of internal stasis before the Hannibalic War may be a more distant parallel (Polyb. 3.30.2).
[60] Kidd, Posidonius , 879-80—too ready, however, to accept Posidonius's slanted presentation. So too Malitz, Historien des Poseidonios , 351.
[61] Ath. 5.213 a-d = Posidonius, FGrH 87 F36, pp. 245-46 = F253 Edelstein-Kidd, lines 72-103.
[62] Kidd, Posidonius , 872; Malitz, Historien des Poseidonios , 348.
irremediable against Rome, but keeping his options open with regard to Mithridates, Athenion probably hoped to emerge on good, or at least passable, terms with whoever prevailed in the extraordinary contest developing in the Aegean world.
A direct collision with Romans came about only when a certain Apellicon was sent out to take over the treasures of Apollo at Delos, perhaps in order above all to finance the restocking of Athens's dwindling grain reserves.[65] That Apellicon had actually expected to encounter hostile action from Romans seems unlikely in view of his failure to take basic military precautions (unless that is only more Posidonian invective). The Athenian authorities had a plausible claim to the Delian treasures and may have had no reason to expect Roman interference; Delos resisted, however, and Apellicon was forced to lay siege. While the large number of Italian resident negotiatores is not to be forgotten, we should also recall that Athenion had made and expelled enemies. Not all of them will have fled to Rome, and those with important Delian connections may have sought to defend them.[66]
Even after the disaster Apellicon suffered at the hands of a Roman prefect, Athens's position in the larger struggle seems to have remained for a time uncertain.[67] Athenion now drops out of sight;[68] it may be that
[66] Athenion's exiles: Ath. 5.214a-d = Posidonius, FGrH 87 F36, p. 247 = F253 Edelstein-Kidd lines 117-45. Flight of Athenian "optimates " to Rome: Cic. Brut . 306.
the failure of Apellicon and the shock of the sudden armed dash with Rome brought about his downfall. Next we hear that Mithridates' general Archelaus, having conquered Delos and other strongholds, handed them over to the Athenians and by this act brought them over to side with the king.[69] This alone shows that the city had not yet openly sided with Mithridates. But both Pausanias and Plutarch go farther: Pausanias says that Aristion, whom Archelaus had sent on to Athens with 2,000 Pontic soldiers and the sacred treasures of Delos, was the one who "persuaded" the Athenians to choose Mithridates over Rome, while Plutarch goes so far as to say that Aristion as tyrant "forced" them to do so.[70] At any rate, it was only with the arrival of Aristion and his Pontic troops that Athens committed itself irreversibly to Mithridates and against Rome.[71] Even in 87, after Aristion's arrival in Athens, Piraeus seems to have been briefly open to the Roman legate Braetius Sura.[72]
The most probable conclusion therefore is that it was the imbalance of power brought about by the crumbling of Rome's position in the East and Mithridates' continued success, not to mention the appearance of Pontic troops while Romans were nowhere to be found, that induced the Athenians finally to make a firm choice, not surprisingly for what seemed at the time the stronger side. But that choice, late as it was, ought not to obscure the signs that Athenian politics were not dominated in 88 by a radical faction bent upon war with Rome in alliance with Mithridates. Athenion and his friends were fishing in dangerous waters, it is true. They played upon resentment at the arrogance of Roman power and popular wonder at the unexpected reversal of fortune it had suffered, and struck a
[68] Whether Athenion and Aristion are one or two persons has recently again become a matter of controversy: Kidd, Posidonius , 884-87, and Bugh, Phoenix 46 (1992) 108-23, seem to me correct to distinguish them, against Malitz, Historien des Poseidonios , 341-43, and Baslez, in Delo e l'Italia , 57, on their identity. Bugh argues plausibly, however, that the Posidonius extract in Athenaeus conflates the two at points.
[69] App. Mith . 28.
[71] Bernhardt, PrH , 47-48.
[72] Piraeus: App. Mith . 29. But see Janke, "Untersuchungen," 53-54, and Badian, "Lucius Sulla," 70 n. 46, who argue plausibly that Appian is mistaken.
sufficiently favorable attitude toward Mithridates to allow Athens to emerge unscathed if the Pontic king proved victorious. But that was nothing new and hardly committed them to an anti-Roman course.[73] Even in 88 Athenian politics were not dominated by attitudes toward Rome but by the traditional imperative of the polis to preserve its independence and freedom of action.[74]