Salient Aspects Of The Promotion Process

The Multitrack System

We have already seen that the Japanese civil service employs a closed multitrack system. There are four readily identifiable tracks based on the level and type of the entrance examination taken by the civil servant. Track 1, which can be equated with the elite track, is open to those who have passed the type-A higher civil examination (type I since 1985) or its equivalent. Track 2 is open to those who have passed the type-B higher civil-service examination (abolished in 1985) or its equivalent; we shall label it the quasi-elite track. Those who have passed the intermediate civil-service examination (type II since 1985) are launched on track 3, which can lead to middle-level positions in the Japanese bureaucracy. Track 4 is reserved for those who have passed the lower civil-service examination (type III since 1985); these are the men and women who will perform the routine tasks of the Japanese government at lower levels.

As noted in the preceding chapter, however, the most meaningful distinction may be found between the elite track on one hand and all the others on the other. Although civil servants on the quasi-elite track are regarded as part of kyaria (career civil servants), along with those on the elite track, their status is not equal. The vast majority of the civil servants who are known as nonkyaria (noncareer) actually remain in the civil service longer than the elite bureaucrats.

It should also be recalled that it is by no means impossible for nonkyaria civil servants to rise to the level of section chief and even beyond. In fact, most ministries seem to have a few section-chief positions reserved for their exceptionally capable nonkyaria employees.^[1]

Table 18 presents some data on the relative size of each track. Note that the data pertain only to administrative service I positions. Inasmuch as the breakdown between types A and B of the higher civil-service examination is available for new appointees only, the table is based on the latter. As we can see, both the number and proportion of track 1

[1] For profiles of nonkyaria civil servants who have attained the position of section chief or higher in selected ministries and agencies, see the series on "Nonkyaria no sekai" [The World of Noncareer (Civil Servants)], Kankai , Apr. 1983-Feb. 1984.

(higher A) appointees have remained rather small. On the average, only about one in twenty new appointees in any given year is launched on the elite track. The smallest category, both in absolute and relative terms, however, is track 2 (higher B). Whereas the type-A (or type I) higher examination, the gateway to track 1, encompasses the whole gamut of specialties, numbering twenty-eight, the type-B higher examination, until it was abolished in 1985, covered only four fields of specialization: law, economics, civil engineering, and library science. The last-named field was available only in the type-B examination.^[2] Track 3 (intermedi-

[2] Jinji-in, Komuin hakusho , 1985, p. 23.

ate) has steadily increased in size over the years, accounting, as of 1986, for I out of 6.3 new civil servants in administrative-service I positions. Not surprisingly, the largest category is track 4 (lower), which has absorbed about 60 percent of the new civil servants throughout the period.

The category of "evaluation" needs to be discussed briefly. Strictly speaking, this is not a separate track, for it encompasses civil servants who are equivalent in status to those in all four tracks. In 1985, for example, the National Personnel Authority certified 88 new appointees who had not taken any examination as "equivalent" to type-I graduates and 10 others as "equivalent" to type-II graduates. The former consisted of 47 doctorate holders, 17 holders of master's degrees, and 24 physicians, and all of the latter were holders of master's degrees.^[3]

On the other hand, a small number of the civil servants who are hired through "evaluation" do take examinations that are described as "equivalent to the regular [civil service] examinations." In 1985 a total of 304 candidates took such examinations at the type-I level in such fields as shipbuilding, nuclear engineering, biology, forestry, textiles (sen'igaku ), design (ishogaku ), archaeology, and history of architecture. Twenty-nine of the candidates passed their respective examinations and were hired by eleven different agencies and ministries. In 1985 also, 77 out of 613 applicants were hired as intermediate-level civil servants in the same manner.^[4] Although all of these civil servants are legally entitled to the same treatment as graduates of the civil-service examinations at their "equivalent" levels, it is doubtful that the legal stipulations are faithfully implemented. With rare exceptions, only those who pass the type-I civil-service examination have the privilege of launching their careers on the elite track.^[5]

[3] Ibid., 1987, p. 45. It should be noted that, strictly speaking, physicians in Japan do not hold doctorates; their medical degree is officially called "Bachelor of Medicine" (igakushi ). Some physicians, however, earn postgraduate degrees—e.g., Doctor of Science in Medicine (igaku hakase ).

[4] Ibid., pp. 42-44.

[5] For a story of one such exception, see "Kanryo shusshin seijika genzan: Fujin no chi'i kojo kakeru" [Interview with Bureaucrats-Turned-Politicians: Gambling on the Improvement of the Position of Women], Kankai , Nov. 1985, pp. 88-96. The subject of this interview article is Kubota Manae, a Socialist member of the House of Councillors. She was hired by the Ministry of Labor in 1951, a year after her graduation from Keio University's Law Faculty. Although she had not taken any civil-service examination, she was treated as an elite-track civil servant; she retired as a division chief in 1982 and was elected to the upper house of the Diet in the following year. However, she lost her bid for reelection in 1986. See Asahi shinbun , 8 July 1986. In her interview with the Kankai magazine, she attributed her successful career in the bureaucracy to "luck."

Salience Of Seniority

Another striking characteristic of the promotion process in Japanese bureaucracy is the role played by the year of entry of civil servants (nenji ). Typically, recruitment occurs once a year, hence those who enter in the same year on the same track in effect become members of the same class. In a few instances, however, recruitment has occurred twice a year, thus giving birth to two separate classes in the same year. In all cases, however, the year of entry is believed to be all but controlling insofar as advancement on the career ladder is concerned. That is to say, members of the same nenji in a given ministry are promoted to the next higher level at roughly the same time until they reach that of assistant section chief (kacho hosa ).^[6]

From then on, further advancement is contingent upon a combination of factors, of which seniority is but one. Those who are left behind usually resign. Finally, when one of the lucky survivors who have climbed nearly to the top reaches the peak of his civil-service career, namely, the position of administrative vice-minister (jimu jikan ), all of his remaining colleagues in the same entering class resign. In so doing, not only do they spare both themselves and the new vice-minister the awkwardness of substituting hierarchical relationships for erstwhile ties of equality, but they also clear the path for the advancement of their kohai (juniors or members of the succeeding entering classes).

The general pattern sketched above, however, needs to be qualified. First, because not all positions at the same level arc equal in importance, differentiation is bound to occur from the early stage. As we shall see shortly, service in certain key positions early in one's career enhances the probability of one's outdistancing the other members of one's cohort in the race toward the coveted title of administrative vice-minister. Second, the unwritten rule that one shall resign when one's classmate reaches the final destination is far from sacrosanct. In the 1945-83 period, the rule was violated at least once in all the twelve ministries. In the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, deviations from the rule occurred seven times, and both the Finance and Foreign Ministries witnessed five exceptions to the rule. In many cases, however, classmates of the newly promoted administrative vice-minister who did not

[6] Tashiro Ku, "Nihon gyoseikan kenkyu, VIII: Gyoseikan no shoshin kanri, i" [A Study of Japanese Public Administrators, Part VIII: Management of Their Promotion, 1], Kankai , May 1982, p. 73.

resign were either assigned to or had already been occupying positions as chiefs of "external bureaus" (gaikyoku chokan ). That is to say, they were outside the regular chain of command of the ministries concerned and hence were not subject to direct supervision by the administrative vice-minister. In the case of the Foreign Ministry, this took the form of service as an ambassador abroad. In fact, it is a well-established pattern in the Japanese diplomatic service for an outgoing vice-minister to be appointed to a major ambassadorial post. This ensures that several senior ambassadors at any given time shall serve under their kohai .^[7]

In the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the top two civil-service positions the administrative vice-minister and the vice-minister for international affairs (tsusho sangyo shingikan )—are usually occupied by members of the same class, and both resign simultaneously.^[8] In the Ministry of Justice, the administrative vice-ministership is not the terminal career position but a stepping stone to other, more prestigious positions. Although the ministry hires graduates of both the higher civil-service examination and the judicial examination, it is the latter who control the levers of power. Differentiated by the year of graduation from the Judicial Training Institute, nearly all of them are public prosecutors. Known as ateken , their supremacy in the Justice Ministry is sometimes described as "prosecutor's imperialism" (kenji teikoku shugi ). The highest position attainable by them is that of prosecutor general (kenji socho ), and the administrative vice-minister is several rungs below that position. Given all this, the appointment of a

[7] For data on the administrative vice-ministers of the twelve ministries and other agencies during the postwar period, see the series on "Jimu jikan kenkyu" [A Study of Administrative Vice-Ministers], Kankai , Jan. 1982-June 1983. For additional data on the Foreign Ministry, see Nagano, Gaimusho kenkyu , pp. 92-96, Nagano, Nihon gaiko no subete , pp. 297-300, and Nagano, "Kankai jinmyaku chiri: Gaimusho no maki," pp. 40-54. A particularly notable example of deviation from the general rule is the case of Sunobe Ryozo, who succeeded his kohai (a member of the 1941 entering class) as administrative vice-minister in the Foreign Ministry. A member of the 1940 class, Sunobe had previously served as ambassador to the Republic of Korea; his tenure as vice-minister lasted from July 1981 to January 1983.

[8] Nawa Taro, "Jimu jikan kenkyu: Tsusansho" [A Study of Administrative Vice-Ministers: The Ministry of International Trade and Industry], Kankai , Mar. 1982, p. 130. In 1987 the two top positions were occupied by members of the 1955 class: Fukukawa Shinji (AVM) and Kurota Makoto (vice-minister for international affairs). Both were born in 1932 and graduated from Todai's Law Faculty in 1955. Showa 62-nenban Tsusho Sangyosho meikan [Directory of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1987 Edition] (Tokyo: Jihyosha, 1987), pp. 3-4; Seikai kancho jinji roku 1987-nenban , p. 452.

new administrative vice-minister does not precipitate a wave of resignations by his classmates.^[9]

The "Elite Course"

As noted, the basic pattern of progression for elite-track civil servants remains the same until they reach the level of assistant section chief, that is, for the first ten years or so. Most ministries try to give their future leaders on-the-job training through the policy of rotation. In the Ministry of Finance, for example, the first six or seven years are set aside for such training (minarai kikan ). Although experience varies from individual to individual, most first-year trainees are assigned to a particular section where they are initiated into the mores of the "Okura [Finance Ministry] family."^[10] They are expected to run errands for superiors and perform all sorts of routine, even menial, tasks.

During the second year, the trainees are likely to be assigned to one of the local tax offices to learn about the practical side of internal revenue and finance as "inspectors" (chosakan ). Third-year trainees turn their attention to more theoretical matters, devoting their full time to study either in Japan or abroad. Next, they are exposed to substantive work of the ministry in Tokyo, eventually being promoted to subsection chiefs (kakaricho ). In the fifth or sixth year comes the capstone of the trainee's career—appointment as chief of a local tax office (zeimushocho ). Besides entailing a fair amount of prestige and power, this provides the trainees with the first real opportunity to test their mettle. How they handle themselves in this leadership position will be closely monitored by their superiors in Tokyo.^[11]

[9] Seto Shuzo, "Jimu jikan kenkyu: Homusho" [A Study of Administrative Vice-Ministers: the Ministry of Justice], Kankai , Nov. 1982, pp. 66-75; Ikeda Toyoharu, "Kankai jinmyaku chiri: Homusho Kensatsucho no maki" [Who's Who in Government: The Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor's Office], ibid., Mar. 1981, pp. 30-41. In 1986, whereas a 1951 graduate of the Judicial Training Institute (JTI) served as the administrative vice-minister of the Justice Ministry, a 1947 JTI graduate occupied the post of prosecutor general. Three other persons in the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office and all the chief prosecutors in the eight Higher Prosecutor's Offices had more seniority than the vice-minister. The preceding information was culled from Seikai kancho jinji roku 1987-nenban , pp. 311-22.

[10] Sakakibara, Nihon o enshutsu suru shin kanryo-zo , pp. 39-41. This book is based on Sakakibara's participant observations. I shall present more details on the on-the-job training of Finance Ministry bureaucrats in the next chapter.

[11] Takamoto Mitsuo, Okura kanryo no keifu [The Genealogy of Finance Ministry Bureaucrats] (Tokyo: Nihon Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1979), pp. 49-51. Fragmentary evidence suggests that appointment as local tax chief can occur as early as the trainee's fifth year and as late as his seventh year. Some trainees are not given this opportunity at all, whereas others are given the privilege twice in a row. See Showa 62-nenban Okurasho meikan [Directory of the Finance Ministry, 1987 Edition] (Tokyo: Jihyosha, 1986).

The second hurdle awaits the bureaucrat at the level of assistant section chief (kacho hosa ). Some bureaucrats are elevated to this level immediately upon completion of their training period. Others must undergo a few more years of apprenticeship. An assistant section chief must display competence in a wide range of activities: research, negotiation, and drafting bills and policy proposals. Those who receive high marks during their days as assistant section chiefs are given choice assignments when they are sent either abroad or to the field in the next round. Such "desirable" locations as embassies and consulates in industrialized democracies in America and Western Europe as well as major cities in Japan are said to be reserved for them.^[12]

The bureaucrat encounters the third hurdle when he reaches the level of section chief after about ten years of service as assistant section chief or its equivalent in a number of different sections and units. In addition to demonstrating skills in research, negotiation, and legislative drafts-manship, as mentioned earlier, a section chief is called upon to engage in coordination, provide leadership, deal with personnel matters, and be knowledgeable about a wide range of matters. The manner in which one meets such a multiplicity of challenges will help determine one's chances of advancement in subsequent years. The verdict will come when a handful of classmates are picked as chiefs of the three core sections in the minister's secretariat (kanbo sanka )—the secretarial section, the documents section, and the research and planning section—and as chiefs of the principal section in each bureau, usually called the general affairs section (somuka ). For those who are passed over, the prospect of promotion to the position of bureau chief in the ministry proper becomes rather dim, which in turn implies that they may no longer be in the race to become administrative vice-minister.^[13]

A review of the career patterns of fifty persons who have served as administrative vice-ministers in ten ministries reveals that forty-one (82 percent) had previously served as chief of either core sections in the secretariat or the principal section of a bureau. The pivotal role of kanbo sections is suggested by the fact that thirty-two persons (62 percent) had served as their chiefs. Of these, twenty-two had eventually become chiefs of the secretariat (kanbocho ). Twelve others in the sample had

[12] Takamoto, Okura kanryo no keifu , pp. 52-54.

[13] Ibid., pp. 54-63. All eight persons who held the position of bureau chief (including chief of the minister's secretariat) in the Finance Ministry in late 1986 had served as chiefs of either "core" sections in the minister's secretariat or principal sections in bureaus. All but one had also served as assistant chiefs of such sections. Showa 62-nenban Okurasho meikan , pp. 11, 40, 55, 61, 68, 81, 87, and 97.

also served as kanbocho , bringing the total number of former administrative vice-ministers with kanbocho experience to thirty-four (68 percent). All told, only six had not served in any of three key posts—kanbo section chief, chief of the principal section of a bureau, and kanbocho .^[14]

It should be stressed that the relative position of the secretariat in the internal structural hierarchy of a ministry or an agency is not uniformly high. It is only in those ministries and agencies that have adopted the system of a "grand secretariat" (dai kanbocho sei ) that its chief outranks the chiefs of all bureaus (kyokucho ). Examples include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Transport, and Construction. As will be explained shortly, however, the Ministry of Construction has a dual hierarchy, one pertaining to administrative officials (jimukan ) and another to specialists (gikan ), hence the chief of its secretariat does not necessarily outrank chiefs of technical bureaus. In other ministries the secretariat is on a par with a middle-level bureau. In a few ministries, notably the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the secretariat is at the bottom of the pecking order.^[15]

Regardless of its position in the hierarchy, however, the work of the secretariat is intrinsically important. The well-known phenomenon of "sectionalism" tends to foster rivalry among bureaus within most ministries, as is suggested by such phrases as "there are bureaus but no ministry" (Kyoku atte sho nashi )^[16] and "the bureaus that resemble 'independent kingdoms'" ("dokuritsu okoku" no yo na kakukyoku ).^[17] This underscores the importance of coordination; the parochial interests and perceptions of the various bureaus must be adjusted and harmonized to further the goals of the ministry as a whole. Externally, the task of representing the ministry vis-à-vis politicians, the Diet, and interest groups must also be performed by a unit with a broad, ministry-wide perspective.

[14] These statistics were culled from the biographical sketches of fifty former administrative vice-ministers in Watanabe Yasuo, "Komuin no kyaria" [The Career Patterns of Civil Servants] in Tsuji Kiyoaki, ed., Gyoseigaku koza, dai 4-kan: Gyosei to soshiki [Lectures on Public Administration, vol. 4: Public Administration and Organization] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1976), pp. 193-98.

[15] Kyoikusha, Kanryo [Bureaucrats] (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1980), p. 76. An assessment of the relative rank of the secretariat can be obtained by reviewing the year of entry of incumbent officials as well as the career patterns of administrative vice-ministers. See the long-running series on "Kankai jinmyaku chiri" [Who's Who in Government] in Kankai , Jan. 1981-, as well as the series on administrative vice-ministers cited earlier.

[16] Ishii Masashi, "Kankai jinmyaku chiri: Okurasho no maki" [Who's Who in Government: The Ministry of Finance], Kankai , Oct. 1981, p. 45.

[17] Hashimoto Goro, "Kankai jinmyaku chiri: Koseisho no maki" [Who's Who in Government: The Ministry of Health and Welfare], Kankai , Dec. 1981, p. 39.

These pivotal roles are performed by the secretariat. Consequently, chiefs of its key sections dealing with general affairs, personnel, and budget need to be exceptionally well-qualified. Their duties expose them to the whole gamut of problems and issues confronting their ministry, challenging them to exercise and develop skills in compromise, negotiation, and a judicious balancing of diverse interests. In a word, a stint as a core section chief in the secretariat both broadens and tests the civil servant. Those who emerge from such experience with their reputation either intact or enhanced are marked for still weightier challenges thereafter.^[18]

In short, the preceding discussion suggests that the promotion patterns of Japanese higher civil servants are affected by a number of factors: (1) nenji , or the year of entry; (2) the preentry record, notably grades received during university days and in the higher civil-service examination; and (3) the postentry record. The latter two are related, for an initial assignment to a core unit hinges to a large extent on the preentry record; such an assignment in turn affords the civil servant opportunities and challenges that are a cut above those provided by routine assignments. Creditable or outstanding performance in preferred posts has a snowball effect, allowing the civil servant progressively to build up his credentials. Being assigned to an important project also enables the civil servant to come into contact with senior persons in strategic places; getting to know them and, better yet, making favorable impressions on them will be definite assets in his future advancement.^[19]

Jimukei Vs. Gijutsukei

Elite-track bureaucrats can be broadly divided into two groups: jimukei (administrative group) and gijutsukei (technical group). Those belonging to the former are known as jimukan (administrative officials), and

[18] It is extremely rare for a civil servant without previous experience as a section chief to be appointed as chief of one of the key sections in the secretariat. A random review of the career patterns of those who have served as chiefs of core sections in the secretariats of the various ministries suggests that they typically have behind them six to nine years of experience as "ordinary section chiefs" (hira kacho) . See Nihon kankai meikan [Who's Who in Japanese Government], vol. 33 (Tokyo: Nihon Kankai Johosha, 1981), and Seikai kancho jinji roku 1988-nenban .

[19] On the importance of being given challenging assignments, consult Ono Mitsuru, "Jimu jikan kenkyu: Kensetsusho" [A Study of Administrative Vice-ministers: The Ministry of Construction], Kankai , Dec. 1982, pp. 81-82. Criteria of good performance vary from ministry to ministry. In MITI they are said to include (1) ability to generate new policy proposals, (2) skill in translating the above into the language of legislation or regulations, (3) ability to do the necessary nemawashi ["root-binding" or preparatory work], (4) leadership ability, and (5) ability to promote intraministerial harmony. Nawa, "Jimu jikan kenkyu: Tsusansho," p. 132.

those affiliated with the latter as gikan (technical officials). Although this dichotomy is largely a function of one's academic background, strictly speaking, it is the field of specialization chosen in the higher civil-service examination that places an official in one of the two groups.

Those who choose—that is, are tested in—public administration, law, economics, psychology, education, and sociology are generally headed for careers as jimukan , and those who opt for any of the remaining fields are expected to become gikan . There being no formal educational requirements in the civil-service examinations, in terms of either the level of educational attainments or fields of study, it is theoretically possible for a candidate with technical background, such as agriculture, engineering, or the natural sciences, to choose public administration, law, or economics as his field of specialization. Given the highly competitive nature of the higher civil-service examination, however, such a candidate would need an extraordinary amount of preparation in order to succeed.

If we examine the distribution of higher civil servants at the entry level by their fields of specialization, we find that gikan outnumber jimukan by considerable margins. Whereas the proportion of jimukan has remained relatively stable at or near the 40-percent mark, there has been some notable change in the internal composition of gikan . The proportion of engineers and natural scientists declined from 50 percent in 1962 to 31 percent in 1980, but that of specialists in agriculture doubled during the same period, from 14 to 28 percent.^[20] That such change occurred at a time when the relative importance of agriculture in the Japanese economy was steadily declining may seem odd. On the other hand, the number of people involved is quite small. More important, if agriculture has declined in importance as measured by its share of gross domestic product and by the proportion of people engaged in it, its political significance, albeit on the wane, has by no means diminished.^[21]

[20] For relevant statistics, see "Showa 41-nendo kokka komuin saiyo jokyu (koshu, otsushu) shiken gokakusha no saiyo jokyo" [The Situation Regarding the Hiring of Those Who Passed the National Higher Civil Service Examination (Types A and B) in 1966], Jinji-in geppo , 196 (June 1967): 10-16; Jinji-in, Nenji hokokusho , 1971-1986 (Tokyo, 1972-87).

[21] The contribution of agriculture, forestry, and fishing to Japan's gross domestic product declined from 6 percent in 1970 to 3.2 percent in 1985. More dramatic is the decline in the proportion of the total labor force engaged in agriculture and forestry from 24.3 percent in 1965 to 9.6 percent in 1980. Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau, Statistical Handbook of Japan, 1981 (Tokyo: Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau, 1981), pp. 27 and 105; Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Statistical Handbook of Japan, 1987 (Tokyo: Japan Statistical Association, 1987), p. 26. The agricultural lobby demonstrated its political clout in 1986 when it successfully blocked the government's attempt to reduce the official purchase price of rice by 3.8 percent. In 1987, however, the government succeeded for the first time since 1956 in adopting a plan to reduce the official purchase price of rice by 5.95 percent. Asahi shinbun , 6 Aug. 1986; 2 and 4 July 1987.

What is of primary interest to us, however, is the phenomenon of unequal promotional opportunities for jimukan and gikan . Inasmuch as direct statistical evidence is not available, we shall examine data—provided in table 19—pertaining to the fields of academic specialization of the civil servants who have already attained the position of section chief or above. It is safe to equate those whose fields of academic specialization were law, the humanities, or the social sciences with jimukan and the remainder with gikan . Whereas only about four in ten elite-track bureaucrats at the entry level are jimukan , seven or eight in ten senior bureaucrats (section chiefs or above) turn out to be jimukan . To put it differently, the roles of the majority and the minority are reversed as the upper rungs of the promotional ladders are reached, with gikan turning into the minority. Table 19 also shows that the proportion of gikan among senior bureaucrats has not changed much during the past three decades, hovering around 23 to 25 percent. Among jimukan , on the other hand, the proportion of those who have studied law has

declined slightly, although they still constitute an overwhelming majority, whereas the proportion of those who have majored in the humanities and social sciences has increased appreciably.

A study by Tashiro Ku of 139 civil servants who were occupying the position of bureau chief in 1981 revealed that only 26 (18.7 percent) of them had majored in technical subjects in college. Fifteen had studied engineering, 6 medicine, and 5 agriculture.^[22] Table 20 examines the situation at the summit of the bureaucratic pyramid. If we look at the core ministries only, we find a virtual monopoly of the top career post by jimukan . Of the four exceptions, one is not really an exception, because the person in question is a jimukan in terms of his bureaucratic career notwithstanding his graduation from Todai's faculty of agriculture. Hence there are only 3 gikan among the 52 persons who served as administrative vice-ministers in the core ministries during the seven-year period. All three are, in fact, beneficiaries of a unique system based on a custom that decrees the alternation of the top bureaucratic post in the Ministry of Construction between jimukan and gikan . This unwrit-

[22] Tashiro Ku, "Nihon gyoseikan kenkyu, V: Gyoseikan no kyaria keisei katei, 3," p. 73.

ten rule has been scrupulously observed throughout the postwar period.^[23]

In the periphery—that is, such agencies as the Science and Technology Agency, the National Land Agency, the Environment Agency, and the Economic Planning Agency—the proportion of gikan rises to 29 percent. However, with a few exceptions, these agencies tend to be overshadowed by the core ministries in terms of both prestige and power.

In sum, although it is no longer as blatant as it used to be, the prewar bias against technical officials in Japanese bureaucracy has by no means vanished. It is plain that so far as promotional opportunities are concerned, administrative officials continue to enjoy a distinct edge over their technical counterparts.

Todaibatsu?

In the preceding chapter we noted that the University of Tokyo is the single largest source of both successful candidates in the higher civil-service examination and those who are actually hired by the various ministries and agencies each year. Given this, one should not be astonished to learn that the numerical preponderance of Todai graduates continues in the higher echelons of Japanese bureaucracy. But because the progressive diminution of the number of positions in the bureaucratic pyramid dictates an unequal distribution of rewards in the promotion process, the real question is whether graduation from Todai makes any difference in the process.

Table 21 provides some statistics that bear on the question. First, the overall proportion of Todai graduates among higher civil servants has remained quite high throughout the postwar period. It has ranged from a low of 58 percent (1986) to a high of 73 percent (1954). The proportion of Todai men among the higher civil servants in 1937 was 73 percent.^[24] Second, although the proportion remained relatively stable until the early 1970s, it declined appreciably by the mid-1980s. Third, with a few exceptions, the proportion of Todai graduates is correlated

[23] Ono, "Jimu jikan kenkyu: Kensetsusho," pp. 76-78; Kobayashi Ken'ichi, "Kankai jinmyaku chiri: Kensetsusho no maki" [Who's Who in Government: The Ministry of Construction], Kankai , Sept. 1982, pp. 32-41; Kawana Hideyuki, "Kankai jinmyaku chiri: Kensetsusho no maki," ibid., Mar. 1987, pp. 42-56.

[24] Inoki, "The Civil Bureaucracy," p. 296. Inoki analyzed the biographical entries of 1,377 higher civil servants in the 1937 edition of Jinji koshin roku [Who's Who].

with position level. That is to say, the higher the position level, the greater the proportion of Todai graduates.

There are three exceptions to this pattern: level 1 in 1949, level 2 in 1954, and level 2 in 1986. The 1949 data reflect the combined effects of the purge of higher civil servants under the Occupation and the Occupation's policy of encouraging the recruitment and promotion of non-Todai graduates.^[25] The reversal of order between levels 2 and 3 in 1954 and between levels 3 and 4 in 1986 needs to be understood in the context of what level 3 really signifies. The positions of division chief (bucho ) and assistant division chief (bu jicho ) encompassed by this level do not fit neatly into the hierarchical ordering of ranks. Although divisions are technically below the level of bureaus, the former exist only in exceptional cases. Moreover, in terms of the seniority and grade level of incumbents, division chiefs are in some cases on a par with

[25] Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan , pp. 74-77.

senior-level section chiefs or junior-level assistant bureau chiefs. Hence it is not unreasonable to ignore level 3 altogether in ascertaining general patterns of progression between levels.

As we saw in chapter 4, the number-two position in terms of university background is occupied by Kyoto University. In 1937, Kyodai provided 9 percent of higher civil servants.^[26] Kyodai's share, during the postwar period, was as follows: 1949-59: 5.5 percent; 1972-73: 7.2 percent; and 1986: 10.5 percent.^[27] Table 22 further illustrates the dominance of the two top universities in the upper rungs of Japanese bureaucracy. Note that, unlike the preceding table, this one pertains only to those civil servants who occupied positions of administrative vice-minister (jimu jikan ), bureau chief (kyokucho ), and section chief (kacho ) in twenty-three government ministries and agencies in 1986. It excludes others who occupied equivalent positions but did not carry the titles mentioned above. Nor does it include those who held the title of division chief (bucho ).

[26] Inoki, "The Civil Bureaucracy," p. 296.

[27] For the sources of these statistics, see table 20.

Aside from confirming the general patterns discussed above, the table shows that the elitist complexion of Japan's higher civil service is accentuated when Kyodai is added to the picture. The two universities together account for seven in ten higher civil servants overall, and their share of the pot increases to 89 percent at the bureau-chief level and to 95 percent at the vice-ministerial level. If we add up all law graduates in the table, we find that they account for 60 percent of the total, which is about the same as Todai's overall share. In other words, this table confirms the reality of the twin phenomena--dominance of both elite-university graduates and law graduates (hoka banno ).

To conclude from the preceding discussion that the top reaches of Japanese bureaucracy remain the exclusive club of alumni of the top two universities, however, would be a mistake. As table 23 shows, graduates of other universities do manage to reach the summit from time to time. Two of the three exceptions in the core are graduates of Kyushu University, one of the former imperial universities. The third, a graduate

of Okayama University, served as the administrative vice-minister of MITI from June 1984 to June 1986. The four universities represented in the periphery are Tohoku, Kyushu, Keio, and Tokyo Bunri Daigaku. Like Kyushu, Tohoku is a former imperial university, whereas Keio is a top-rated private institution of higher learning. In sum, five of the seven exceptions are graduates of universities that are "first-rate" (ichiryu ) by Japanese standards. If reaching the top is one's objective, then having proper academic credentials appears to be a necessary condition, albeit by no means a sufficient one.

The domination of the highest civil-service positions by graduates of the two top universities constitutes one of the striking continuities between the prewar and postwar periods. In the 1949-59 period, Todai provided 83.7 percent of the administrative vice-ministers, and Kyodai provided the remainder.^[28] Table 23 shows that the picture has changed but marginally: Todai's share of administrative vice-ministerial positions in both the core and the periphery during the 1981-87 period was 83 percent--all but identical with the situation two or three decades earlier. What has changed is that, because of inroads by other universities, Kyodai's share has declined from 16.3 percent to 10 percent. In a word, although the elitist trend continues, the duopoly of Todai and Kyodai has begun to crumble slowly but surely.