PREFACE

In 1983 the Harvard Nuclear Study Group published Living with Nuclear Weapons, an authoritative statement of mainstream thinking about nuclear war and peace. Late that year, at the initiative of Gordon Fellman, the Boston Nuclear Study Group was formed with the original intention of answering the Harvard book. Our approach at that time was broadly sympathetic to the American anti-nuclear war movement's analysis of the nuclear problem, emphasizing dangers associated with new "destabilizing" weapons and defensive systems and the arms race generally, and hence advocating a halt to the arms race, weapons reductions toward "minimum deterrence" in the short run, and general nuclear disarmament whenever it might become possible.

On the verge of writing our rebuttal, we began to doubt whether, in following the well-worn paths of many nuclear analysts before us, we had really been asking the right questions. It seemed that perhaps the Harvard group and its critics were offering a misleading picture of the nuclear problem. We decided to put our writing on hold and reexamine the nuclear literature and nuclear-age history in the light of our new doubts and conceptions.

This study led us to the conviction that in fact the nuclear debate, in the United States and elsewhere, largely focuses on a set of marginal issues and with only a few exceptions ignores the real risk factors for nuclear war. This book is a statement of what we found.

William Schwartz did the writing and took the lead in formulating many of the book's ideas. Charles Derber collaborated intensively with

him in developing the book's thesis, conceiving the arguments of each chapter, and thoroughly revising the manuscript. In many ways, their constant dialogue and debate made this book what it is.

With the indispensable assistance of Patrick Withen, W. Schwartz conducted the literature review and historical research on which the book is based. Derber and W. Schwartz interviewed several dozen high and mid-level U.S. nuclear planning officials in the Pentagon, in the National Security Council, and on Capitol Hill. They also interviewed a number of former senior U.S. officials as well as peace movement leaders and scholars in Washington, New York, and Boston.

The group as a whole met weekly for several years and played a crucial role throughout the project. Only through our lengthy discussions did the idea for this book take shape. The group subjected conceptual outlines, and later chapter outlines—prepared by W. Schwartz—to continual challenge and debate. The members of the group also reviewed every chapter and suggested many important revisions. Derber, Fellman, Gamson, and M. Schwartz (no relation to W. Schwartz) each contributed $2,500 of personal funds to help support the project. The group provided a friendly but critical forum for the development of ideas that from the beginning were unsettling to us and to many others. This book reflects an exciting collective effort, all too rare in the academy today.

Naturally, within the group there remain many differences of emphasis and, in a few areas, of substantive position. We chose not to highlight these; our main purpose is to stimulate public debate through a clear and simple presentation of a new point of view. For the same reason we have tried to write a book that any literate, motivated person can read. We do not pretend to offer an academically exhaustive, definitive, or final analysis of the nuclear danger and the remedies for it.

We owe a great deal to those few thinkers, some of whom are mentioned in the introduction and throughout the text, who have had the courage and insight to challenge what has become conventional wisdom about the nuclear problem. This lineage dates all the way back to Bernard Brodie, author of the first and in many ways still the most perceptive study of the nuclear question. We owe a particular debt to George Rathjens, whose authoritative critique of what we call "weaponitis" influenced us greatly. We are also indebted to Noam Chomsky, whose writings and detailed comments on the manuscript were invaluable, and to the other scholars and activists who launched the idea of the "deadly connection" within the American peace movement.

For reviewing drafts or providing other encouragement and criticism, we also thank Gar Alperovitz, Michael Klare, Lynn Eden, Len Ackland, Robert Tucker, Bob Borosoge, Mark Sommer, Steven Kull, Paul Joseph, Hugh DeWitt, Randy Kehler, Randy Forsberg, Paul Walker, Marinel Mobley, Robert Jervis, Michael Howard, Bruce Birchard, and Ping Ferry. To all those who were interviewed in confidence and remain anonymous, we express our appreciation. The views presented here are, of course, solely our own.

We also thank the many family members and friends, too numerous to name, who kept us sane and smiling. For financial contributions we thank Ping Ferry, Sid Shapiro and the Levinson Foundation, the Tides Foundation, Carol Guyer, the Stern Fund, and Boston College. For providing space and collegial support, we thank the Boston College Department of Sociology and its students, staff, and faculty. We owe much to Beth Jacklin, Eleanor LeCain, and our other friends and office mates at the Exploratory Project on the Conditions of Peace. For publishing an earlier (March 1986) account of ideas that bluntly challenge some of its most basic premises, we thank the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and its editor, Len Ackland.

At the University of California Press, we thank our editor, Naomi Schneider, for aggressively sponsoring the publication of the manuscript; Steve Rice, Mary Renaud, and Betsey Scheiner for gracious and expert editorial work; and Amy Klatzkin for superb copyediting.