To Have and Have Not "d0e13967"

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Yarnell, Retired Adm. Harry, 25 , 201

Yonai Mitsumasa, 77

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1. Richard Barnet, The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), 17, 19. The Club of Rome study was published as Donella Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: University Books, 1974).

2. A classic in this genre is Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975); see also Nazli Choucri, Michael Laird, and Dennis Meadows, Resource Scarcity and Foreign Policy: A Simulation Model of International Conflict (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972). For a wide-ranging and critical analysis of the literature and its application to twentieth-century history, see Ronnie Lipschutz, When Nations Clash: Raw Materials, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1989).

3. Lenin described the struggle for raw materials as a product of late capitalism, which drove nations toward imperialism and war. Serious examination of raw materials issues and U.S. policy has thus often been left to Marxist scholars. See, for example, Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) and Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

4. Donald Sherk, The United States and the Pacific Trade Basin (San Francisco: The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1972), 41.

5. Ibid., 12, 42; Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1940 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), Table I.

4. Donald Sherk, The United States and the Pacific Trade Basin (San Francisco: The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1972), 41.

5. Ibid., 12, 42; Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1940 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), Table I.

6. Ethel Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade of the United States (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 16. Much of the tin shipped

from Malaya was actually mined in the Dutch East Indies or Thailand and only smelted in British Malaya.

7. Rupert Emerson, "Dutch East Indies Adrift," Foreign Affairs 18 (July 1940), 736-737; "Mineral Resources of the South Sea Countries," Far Eastern Review 46 (January 1940), 38-41.

8. Hiriam Farley, "America's Stake in the Far East: Trade," Far Eastern Survey V (July 29, 1936), 149.

9. E. Janeway, "The Americans and the New Pacific," Asia 39 (February 1939), 109-113.

10. Stanley Hornbeck memorandum, "Economic and Strategic Importance of the Far Eastern Area," June 14, 1940, in box 414, Stanley Hornbeck papers, Hoover Institution. For more on this memorandum, which was a reprint of an article by Robert Burnett Hall from Geographical Review , see Chapter 3.

11. For discussions of mercantilism and international relations, see Richard Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace (New York: Nichols Publishing Co., 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

12. A few relatively obscure studies—particularly those written soon after the events themselves—are exceptions to this rule. The conservative Asian specialist George Taylor declared in 1942, "There has never been any question but that the United States would fight when its vital interests were at stake. Free access to the raw materials of Southeast Asia has always been a vital interest. When Japan was ready, therefore, to seize Southeast Asia and monopolize for war purposes the strategic products of that area, it went without saying that the United States had to block her, by force if necessary. The very fact that Japan struck the first blow shows that she know America could not be indifferent to the fate of Southeast Asia." See Taylor, America in the New Pacific (New York: Macmillan, 1942), 36. For a more complete statement of this theme, see his appendix in G. F. Hudson and Marthe Rajchman, An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics (New York: John Day Co., 1942). For less explicit suggestions of the same argument, see T. A. Bisson, America's Far Eastern Policy (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Bitter Heritage (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1967), 22. More recently, Rogers Spotswood argued, "When the importance of Great Britain's survival as a bulwark against the Axis suddenly was realized in Washington, the economic value of Southeast Asia quickly assumed a new importance in the thinking of American leaders." Unfortunately, he was also

convinced that "American economic interests in Southeast Asia were minimal" and thus made no effort to examine the vast literature on raw materials from that period. See Rogers Spotswood, "Japan's Southward Advance as an Issue in Japanese-American Relations, 1940-1941" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1974), 16-17.

13. Paul Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 200.

14. Proceedings of the Lake Kawaguchi Conference on Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941 (July 1969), mimeograph.

15. Frederick Marks III, Wind Over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 10-11, 47-49, 52, 76. Marks also sees a general desire to protect British interests in Asia (93-94).

16. Norman Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 51; also "Nomura in Washington: Conversations in Lieu of Diplomacy," in Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (eds.), Pearl Harbor Reexamined (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 108.

17. David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 59.

18. Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance , 248; Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 29-30, is representative of Iriye's argument in several books. Michael Barnhart sees "a strong economic component" to the "clash of visions for East Asia" that set Washington and Tokyo at odds. Citing Utley and Iriye as the best guides to U.S. motives, he sees the "principle of 'international cooperation' and the Open Door" as the core of the Roosevelt administration's interests. Michael Barn-hart, Japan Prepares for War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 272. Waldo Heinrichs avoids any direct analysis of U.S. interests but points to a "Wilsonian faith in collective security and the appeal to principle in successive American protests against Japan's unlawful action." He also grants in passing that Roosevelt "was anxious to deter an attack on Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, which he regarded as vital because of their resources and British supply in the Middle East." Waldo Heinrichs, Threshhold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 37, 134.

19. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962); Lloyd Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

See also Robert Freeman Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942," in Barton Bernstein ed., Towards a New Past (New York: Random House, 1968), 232-262, and the essays by Williams and Gardner in David Horowitz ed., Corporations and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review, 1969), 71-104, 105-142.

20. Jonathan Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937-1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), xii, 5, 68, 85-87, 178, 181. Although deficient in its examination of U.S. motives, Utley's book is an excellent and valuable analysis of bureaucratic decisionmaking.

21. Deborah Miner, "United States Policy Toward Japan 1941: The Assumption that Southeast Asia was Vital to the British War Effort," (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1976). She rightly notes, however, that when other scholars acknowledge the importance of Southeast Asia, they "do not probe into the rationale behind the assumption" (10).

22. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 531: "In short, to gain a national consensus for fighting fascism overseas, Roosevelt could not discriminate between Germany and Japan; both had to be opposed at the same time." Among other problem with this line of argument, as we shall see, is that far from yielding to public pressure, the administration was desperately searching in December 1941 for ways to convince the public to support military action against Japan in Southeast Asia.

23. Abraham Ben-Zvi, The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 94, 32.

24. Ben-Zvi's work is one of the more systematic attempts to look at the interests and worldview of competing cliques of policymakers; the Williams school also keeps fundamental interests at the focus of its attention.

25. John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Doubleday, Garden City, 1982), xv.

26. Some readers may note the substantial weight put on the views of one secondary official, Stanley Hornbeck, who was Secretary of State Cordell Hull's chief adviser on the Far East. Hornbeck's irritating style should not be confused with lack of bureaucratic clout. For evidence of his influence, see footnote 72 in Chapter 3. Of course, my thesis rests on the expressed views of many policymakers other than Hornbeck.

1. For a contemporary discussion of the significance of these trends, see Arthur Upgren, "Geographical Directions of United States

Foreign Trade: A Study in National Interests," Council on Foreign Relations Memorandum E-B15, June 28, 1940. See also the section later in this chapter on the Council's role in postwar planning.

2. Jacob Viner, "National Monopolies of Raw Materials," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 595-600.

3. I. F. Stone, Business as Usual (New York: Modern Age, 1941), 28.

4. Quoted in Magdoff, Age of Imperialism , 49-50. For a similar assessment, see Percy Bidwell, Raw Materials: A Study of American Policy , (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1958), 1-2.

5. Quoted in Laurence Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 24.

6. Fortune 20 (September 1939), 82.

7. After U.S. marines occupied the Philippines in 1898, President McKinley decided to retain the islands as a colony in part on the basis of investigations of their mineral wealth. See Benjamin Williams, Economic Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: McGraw Hill, 1929), 373. Also note the State Department's exertions to oppose a German monopoly on the world's available potash, a material needed for fertilizers and other chemicals. Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 108-109.

8. H. Foster Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1927).

9. Congressional Record 84 (April 25, 1939), 4747-4748.

10. William C. Redfield, Dependent America (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1926), 17.

11. Bryan to Ambassador Page, November 12, 1914, in Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, hearings, Munitions Industry (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936), 8258-8262.

12. Associates in International Relations, Department of Social Sciences, Raw Materials in War and Peace (West Point: U.S. Military Academy, 1947), 86-87.

13. U.S. Army, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials . Service Forces Manual M104. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 10; Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 86-87.

14. Redfield, Dependent America , 18. Cf. Address of Dr. George Smith, director of U.S. Geological Survey, at January 6, 1922, conference of Council on Foreign Relations, "Mineral Resources and Their Distribution as Affecting International Relations."

15. James Gould, Americans in Sumatra (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 97-99; Oliver Lawrence, "The International Control of Rubber," in W. L. Holland, ed., Commodity Control in the Pacific Area

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), 402-408, 412; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Notes on Raw Materials in the Far East and Pacific Dependencies (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1933), 15-18; K. E. Knorr, World Rubber and its Regulation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945); B. Wallace and L. Edminster, International Control of Raw Materials (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1930), Ch. VI; Brandes, Hoover , 85-86.

16. Quoted in Brandes, Hoover , 71.

17. Cited in Gould, Sumatra , 98. For more on his position, see Herbert Hoover, "America Solemnly Warns Foreign Monopolists of Raw, Materials," Current History 23 (December 1925), 307-311.

18. Lawrence, "Control of Rubber," 413.

19. According to one study of international cartels, the "great political and economic repercussions aroused [by] the Stevenson scheme . . . [were] still mentioned even in 1945 . . . as a reason why the United States public should resist all kinds of international marketing controls." Ervin Hexter, International Cartels (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1945), 284.

20. Harry Whitford, "The Crude Rubber Supply," Foreign Affairs 1 (June 15, 1924), 613-621. For more on the concern over U.S. dependence during this period, see Bain, Ores and Industry , 21-22; C. K. Leith, "The Political Control of Mineral Resources," Foreign Affairs 3 (July 1925 ), 541-555; C. K. Leith, "Mineral Resources of the Far East," Foreign Affairs 4 (April 1926), 433-442; Josiah Spurr, "Steel-Making Minerals," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 601-612; Viner, "National Monopolies," 595-600.

21. Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937) 38, 87.

22. Ibid., 38. Coconut shells were important because they produced the highest-quality charcoal used in gas-mask filters. For other important evaluations of U.S. dependency during the early 1930s, see C. K. Leith, World Minerals and World Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1931); Mineral Inquiry, Elements of a National Mineral Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933). This study, conducted by various members of the Council on Foreign Relations, seems to have been an outgrowth of the famous Inquiry following World War I, many of whose leaders later founded the CFR. See also Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1934).

21. Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937) 38, 87.

23. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, hearings and report, The Tin Investigation (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935).

24. Staley, Raw Materials, 118 .

25. C. K. Leith, "Mineral Resources and Peace," Foreign Affairs 16 (April 1938), 522-523.

26. C. K. Leith, "Role of Minerals in the Present War," Mining Congress Journal 26 (November 1940), 34-38.

27. C. K. Leith, "Strategic Minerals in War and Peace," Science 93 (March 14, 1941), 244-246.

28. Stark to FDR, November 12, 1940, President's Secretary's File (hereafter "PSF"): Plan Dog, Roosevelt papers, Franklin Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park.

29. House Committee on Military Affairs, hearings, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 109, 110, 115.

30. Ibid., 212-213. The Committee on Military Affairs, in its final report to Congress, concluded no less forcefully that the United States lacked "certain raw materials essential to the needs of the armed forces of the Nation and to the well-being of the civilian population in event of war" and would "find itself at a grave disadvantage in the event that war or other emergency should close the sea lanes or block the normal sources of supply." Congressional Record 84 (April 25, 1939), 4749.

29. House Committee on Military Affairs, hearings, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 109, 110, 115.

31. Army and Navy Munitions Board, The Strategic and Critical Materials (Washington: Army and Navy Munitions Board, 1940).

32. G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), viii-ix. He wrote further, "On the whole, the total United States imports of mineral origin in 1937 constituted about one-sixth of the total value of all imports; but of this one-sixth more than 40 percent was in the strategic group, and more than 20 percent in the one metal tin. This illustrates rather pointedly the exaggerated importance of this small group of a dozen materials, and explains to some extent their indispensable character in our present-day industrial life." Roush worked in the Commodity Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and was a major in the Staff Specialist Reserve, U.S. Army. His book won an award from the Society of American Military Engineers.

33. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 6; Office of Emergency Management, Materials for Defense (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941). See also "The Facts About Chromium," Far Eastern Review 37 (April 1941), 140, 143. Chromium was considered at one time the highest-priority material. See memorandum of conversation between Feis, Clayton, et al., 811.20 Defense (M)/865 1/2, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. Hereafter cited by decimal file and record group.

34. Alvin Barber, "Philippine Chromite Now a Factor in World Market," Far Eastern Survey 8 (March 1, 1939), 58-59; Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States ,

1940 , 168. On the Philippines chromium potential, see U.S. Tariff Commission, United States-Philippine Trade , Report no. 118, 2nd series (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937).

35. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 8. See also "Manganese and Preparedness," Mining and Metallurgy 21 (October 1940), 453-455.

36. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce , 167.

37. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 11.

38. Ibid., 9. On the great significance of abaca, see also H. J. True-blood (EA) to Hornbeck (PA), March 4, 1941, 811.20 Defense (M)/2218, RG 59, National Archives.

37. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 11.

38. Ibid., 9. On the great significance of abaca, see also H. J. True-blood (EA) to Hornbeck (PA), March 4, 1941, 811.20 Defense (M)/2218, RG 59, National Archives.

39. Robinson Newcomb, "The United States and Southeast Asia's Strategic Products," Far Eastern Survey 8 (April 12, 1939), 88.

40. M. Kerbosh, "Some Notes on Cinchona Culture and World Consumption of Quinine," Far Eastern Review 36 (April 1940), 156-160.

41. Lt. Col. Herman Beukema and Lt. Arnold Sommer, "Dependence of U.S. Economy on Raw Materials from the Far East," Amerasia 3 (May 1939), 108.

42. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 19; Sir Lewis Fermer, "Burma's Mineral Resources and the War," Far Eastern Review 36 (April 1941), 124-127. See also Jonathan Marshall, "Opium, Tungsten and the Search for National Security, 1940-1952," in William O. Walker III ed., Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 89-116.

43. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 18.

44. Newcomb, "Strategic Products," 89.

45. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 18. See also December 2, 1941, memorandum from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in Leo Pasvolsky office file, box 2, RG 59, National Archives; Adolph Bregman, "Tin," Iron Age 146 (July 4, 1940), 29-31; "Tin and Preparedness," Mining & Metallurgy 21 (September 1940), 412-413.

46. Colonel Rutherford testimony, House Committee on Military Affairs, hearings, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials , 129; William Fox, Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement (London: Mining Journal Books Ltd., 1974), 57-61; Norman Gall, Bolivia: The Price of Tin, Part I: Patino Mines and Enterprises (New York: American University Field Staff, 1974), 12-13. Sidney Ball observed, "The optimist might hope that Latin America, in the future, will furnish us with ore for from a quarter to a third of our consumption, provided we had smelters to treat it. For the rest, we must look elsewhere. The tin situation is critical." Engineering & Mining Journal 141 (September 1940), 39-41.

47. Army and Navy Munitions Board, memorandum to Industrial Materials Department, Advisory Commission to Council of National Defense, September 13, 1940, in entry 8, package 3, Rubber Survey Committee papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

48. George B. Emeny to W. W. Knight, Jr., July 16, 1941, 345.13413 C, RG 179, Records of the War Production Board, National Archives.

49. Indeed, the United States imported as much as 60 percent of the entire world output of rubber. Munitions Board, Critical Materials , 15.

50. William Christians and Otis Starkey, "The Far East as a Source of Vital Raw Materials," Annals 215 (May 1941), 84-85.

51. Munitions Board, Strategic Materials , 15-16.

52. Besides those already cited, see J. C. de Wilde and George Mon-son, "Defense Economy of the United States, An Inventory of Raw Materials," Foreign Policy Reports 16 (November 15, 1940), 202-212; Adolph Bregman, "Non-Ferrous Materials and Strategic Position," Iron Age 145 (January 4, 1940), 98-100; G. A. Roush, "Strategic Mineral Supplies," Military Engineer 30 (September-October 1938), 370-374; August Maffry, "Strategic Materials in United States Import Trade," Survey of Current Business 20 (December 1940), 10-15; "Strategic Materials: 14 Items Essential to National Defense Must Be Imported in Whole or in Part," Barron's 20 (May 20, 1940), 6; "Essential Defense Materials," Barron's 20 (June 3, 1940), 6; Robert Burnett Hall, "American Raw Material Deficiencies, and Regional Dependence," The Geographical Review 30 (April 1940), 1977-186, "America's Material Interests in the Far East Are Vital," Baltimore Sun , November 29, 1941. This latter article was particularly noted by Secretary of State Hull; see Leo Pasvolsky office file, box 2, in RG 59, National Archives. More optimistic accounts include "U.S. Dependence on Far East Discounted," Baltimore Evening Sun , July 20, 1940, and "Experts Say This Hemisphere Can Produce Defense Materials," Baltimore Evening Sun , July 4, 1940.

53. Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, hearings, Construction of Certain Naval Vessels (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 23. Other Navy officials discussed these issues even more bluntly. Rear Admiral Woodward wrote a column for the New York Journal American on February 23, 1941, entitled, "Philippines and U.S. Trade Routes Doomed if Japs Take Singapore."

54. Senate Naval Affairs Committee, hearings, Nomination of William Franklin Knox (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 9.

55. Japanese plans for a New Order have been widely analyzed and described. For a good summary of Japan's position, see the articles of

Akira Iriye reprinted in Esmonde Robertson, ed., The Origins of the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1971), especially 254-261, 269-271.

56. Andrew Roth, Japan Strikes South (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), 47-48, 2-3.

57. Address by Raymond Geist, May 21, 1941, Department of State Bulletin , May 24, 1941.

58. Stanley Hornbeck, "Japan Versus the United States," September 16, 1941, box 145, Stanley Hornbeck papers, Hoover Institution.

59. For evidence of the administration's deep concern, see 1940 Department of State Bulletin , 29-42, 63-81, 97-109, 176-186, 206-214, 25-245, 390-397, 461-464, 473-479, 506-510.

60. League of Nations, The Network of World Trade (Geneva: League of Nations, 1942), 87-88.

61. Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade , 11.

62. League of Nations, World Trade , 126.

63. Ibid., 80.

62. League of Nations, World Trade , 126.

63. Ibid., 80.

64. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce , Table I.

65. Kate Mitchell and W. L. Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1939 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 16.

66. Address by Grady to the National Foreign Trade Council, July 31, 1940, Department of State Bulletin , August 3, 1940, 84-85.

67. Address by Raymond Geist, May 2, 1941, Vital Speeches 7 (August 1, 1941), 632.

68. Department of State Bulletin , April 6, 1940, 364; Franklin Roosevelt, message to the National Foreign Trade Convention, July 25, 1940, in Report of the Twenty-Seventh National Foreign Trade Convention (New York: NFTC), 346-347.

69. Speech by Will Clayton, "The World Cotton Situation," reprinted in Frederick Dobney, ed., Selected Papers of Will Clayton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 53-54. Clayton prefaced these remarks by saying, "This much seems certain: If the dictators win this war, the United States must embark on a preparedness program of colossal proportions. That means, among other things, an economic, and to some extent, a political revolution in the United States."

70. Edgar Smith, "Foreign Trade and the Free Enterprise System," speech of July 31, 1940 to Second General Session of the 27th Convention of the NFTC, in box 306, Hornbeck papers.

71. Emeny, Strategy of Raw Materials , 17.

72. Miner, "United States Policy," 61-62. First on the British War Department's list of "Far Eastern interests which we must do our utmost to defend in the event of war with Japan" were "essential sea

communications" (Chiefs of Staff Committee, "The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention Against Us," July 31, 1940, PREM3 156/2, Public Records Office, London).

73. "General Strategy Review," July 31, 1941, cited in Miner, "United States Policy," 272; cf. Memorandum from First Sea Lord, "Essential Imports from the Far East," August 8, 1941, cited in ibid., 277. For more on British view of Singapore's importance, see minutes, memoranda, and cables in "Admiral Ghormley" folders of ComNavEu file, Operational Archives, Navy Yard, Washington D.C.

communications" (Chiefs of Staff Committee, "The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention Against Us," July 31, 1940, PREM3 156/2, Public Records Office, London).

74. Churchill to Roosevelt, February 15, 1941, in Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings and Exhibits XIV, 3452-3453. (Hereafter PHA Hearings or PHA Exhibits.)

75. For example, Churchill authorized a buildup of troops and aircraft in Malaya after the August 8, 1940, War Cabinet meeting. See War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS(40)676, F4144/193/61, Public Records Office.

76. Kate Mitchell, "Japan's Southern Drive Faces Obstacles, Amerasia 5 (June 1941 ), 139-140. See also Michael Greenberg, "Malaya—Britain's Dollar Arsenal," Amerasia 5 (June 1941), 144-151; Ernest Hauser, "Britain's Economic Stake in Southeast Asia," Far Eastern Survey , 6 (December 22, 1937, 283-288; Denis Weaver, The Battle of Supplies (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., n.d.).

77. Alexander Kiralfy, "American Pacific Strategy," Asia 39 (November 1940), 567-569.

78. "Navy Reaches Out in Pacific With Eyes on Aid to Britain," Newsweek , January 13, 1941, 33-34.

79. Stark to FDR, November 12, 1940, PSF:Plan Dog, Roosevelt papers.

80. James Herzog, Closing the Open Door (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 116. British representatives explained these considerations in more detail at an unofficial, private conference on "Anglo-American Cooperation in the Pacific" held on December 7-8, 1940 and attended by representatives of the U.K., Canada, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies, and the United States. In response to a question as to why the British wanted more aid in the Pacific instead of the Atlantic, they gave two answers: "Admittedly the situation in Europe is precarious. Britain requires full American aid. But it is essential to Britain's success in Europe that the war be prevented from spreading to the Pacific. The Far East is vital to the British war effort, particularly in the Near East. Australian manpower and materials are immediately important in the Mediterranean; in a long war the contribution of the Pacific Dominions, the Far Eastern colonies, and India may be decisive. Strategically the function of Singapore is to block Japan from

the Indian Ocean. Once British communications are disrupted by the Japanese Navy, the British may be lost in the Near East for lack of supplies. If this happens, the blockade of Europe is broken. American aid in the Pacific is essential, therefore, to prevent Germany and Italy from joining hands in the Near East with Japan in the Far East to break the back of British resistance." E. C. Carter, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, sent a copy of the transcript to Hornbeck, to be distributed through the Department. See box 460, Hornbeck papers.

Hull, in a discussion with Halifax, speculated about the possibility of a vast domino effect: "I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel." See Hull's memorandum of conversation in Department of State, Peace and War (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 710-711.

Note that some administration officials also feared the consequences to Britain if Japan sent its surplus raw materials to Nazi Germany, reinforcing the Axis war effort. See Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Far East, 1940 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), Volume IV, 232-233. (Hereafter these volumes are cited as FR .)

81. Many experts both at the time and subsequently believed the public awoke too late to the magnitude of the crisis. Commenting on the persistently widespread belief that the United States was invulnerable to blockades owing to its self-sufficiency, the U.S. Military Academy's Raw Materials in War and Peace observed: "The folly of such views, revealed in the train of events down to VJ-Day, was clear at least to American experts who were concerned with the problem of our raw materials resources in World War I. Unfortunately, the fallacy of our self-sufficiency persisted in popular opinion so strongly and for so long as to hamper seriously our preparation for the emergency precipitated by World War II. The heavy and needless cost of atonement for such errors of judgment and forethought has ushered in a more realistic examination of the nation's materials resources present and future" (80). The Armed Service Forces manual Strategic and Critical Raw Materials , similarly lamented that "It is a common form of misinformation long employed by propagandists, publicists, and wishful

thinkers to assure the American public that we have no vital needs which cannot be supplied within our own borders. Such misinformation is not only potentially harmful to our highly industrialized economic system, but it is a menace to the institution of an adequate program for war" (11). See also the discussion in the section on stockpiling.

82. Cyrus Peake, editorial, Amerasia 1 (May 1937), 100.

83. Statement of Senator Walsh, Congressional Record 83 (April 1938), 5518.

84. Naval Expansion Program , Senate report 1611, 75th Congress, 3rd session, April 18, 1938, 3-4. In hearings before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in 1938, Navy Secretary Claude Swanson enumerated the many raw materials for which the United States was dependent on foreign sources and said, "It is necessary that we be able to defend the trade routes . . . for American ships to go in order to bring back the necessary raw materials." Senate Naval Affairs Committee, hearings, Naval Expansion Program (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), 384.

85. Vital Speeches 7 (November 15, 1940), 75-76. See also his News Reel Address in New York City, September 18, 1940, in box 449, Horn-beck papers. In a letter to Hull on July 25, 1939, Hornbeck noted, "Admiral Yarnell has made for himself during this his last detail, in the Far East, a magnificent record. Our own [Foreign Service] officers, American and foreign civilians in the Far East, the 'foreign' press, and even the Japanese Navy, have given repeated testimony to the respect in which he is held and the admiration with which those near him have viewed his upholding of the traditions and the prestige of the United States in connection with the performance of the functions which have appropriately been his." Box 449, Hornbeck papers. See also the praise given Yarnell in Evans Carlson to Miss LeHand, January 23, 1941, PHA Exhibits, XX, 4282-4283.

86. Fortune 21 (January 1940), 79.

87. Fortune 21 (April 1940), 92.

88. Ibid., emphasis in the original. One businessman at the conference was moved to argue, "I believe that our foreign-trade policy should be based almost entirely upon our need for materials that we do not produce in this country, such as rubber, coffee, tea, silk, and other items. Our desire for these products rather than the pressure to sell our products abroad should be controlling" (104).

87. Fortune 21 (April 1940), 92.

89. "America's Raw Material Needs: The Potential Availability of Strategic Supplies," The Index 20 (Winter 1940), 86-87.

90. Watson address, July 30, 1940, in box 306, Hornbeck papers. Watson used tin as an example of a vital import. "Tin is very impor-

tant in our manufacturing," he said, "because, in our great canning industry we have to import all of the tin we use. We import 34% of the world's production of tin." See also Report of the 27th National Foreign Trade Convention , 352.

91. Business Week , August 1940, 52.

92. Fortune 22 (April 1941), 90.

93. Fortune 24 (July 1941), 75.

94. Time , September 16, 1940, 45. See also Capt. Po-shen Yen, "The Economic Factor of American Far Eastern Policy," China Monthly II (April 1941), 15-17, 19; "Man in the Street Drives U.S. Stake in N.E.I.," China Weekly Review , October 26, 1940, 259-260. For a more elaborate popular discussion of the strategic resources of Southeast Asia, see Wilbur Burton, "The Dutch East Indies: Vital Resources," The Living Age CCCLIX (November 1940), 263-267. Daily newspapers also followed up the story of U.S. dependence on Far Eastern raw materials. The Washington Evening Star , for example, published a five-part series on U.S. dependence in May 1940 based on the Munitions Board study. (Copies of these articles may be found in the Hornbeck papers, box 403.) Other editorials and articles from major newspapers are cited later in the text. The Europe-oriented Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies also turned its propaganda efforts toward the Far East question. In a pamphlet by Livingston Hartley, the committee argued that Japan could greatly damage the British war effort by cutting off supplies of raw materials and men (from Australia and New Zealand) if it seized the strategic port. As the pamphlet pointed out, Japan could also weaken the United States by cutting off its supplies of rubber and tin and ultimately become a military threat to the United States. See Livingston Hartley, "Singapore," Hornbeck papers, box 389.

95. On the views of these public opinion leaders and regional elites, see Council On Foreign Relations, Some Regional Views on our Foreign Policy, 1941 , especially 30-31, 119, 137, 162, 178. It shows that elites generally recognized Japan's threat to vital raw material sources in Southeast Asia and favored a more militant foreign policy. The regional viewpoints expressed in this CFR study are those of members of the Committees on Foreign Relations located in strategic metropolitan centers throughout the country, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Cleveland, St. Louis, Detroit and Chicago. The membership of these organizations reflected an upper-class and professional bias; top businessmen were most heavily represented. Other examples of statements by internationalist opinion makers include Mark Ethridge, "The Economic Consequences of a Hitler Victory," address before the Retail Merchants Association of Louisville, January 21, 1941, in Inter-

national Conciliation 370 (May 1941), 558-559; Charles Woolsey Cole, "International Economic Dependence," monograph for Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, in International Conciliation 369 (April 1941), 242; John Oakie, "Today We Need Access to Eastern War Materials," and John Condliffe, "We Must Keep China and the Indies Within the World's Free Trade Area," both in San Francisco Chronicle , June 30, 1941.

96. Miriam Farley, "America's Stake in the Far East Trade," Far Eastern Survey 5 (July 29, 1936), 169-170. See also her pamphlet, America's Stake in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council, 1936).

97. Robert Barnett, America Holds the Balance in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council, 1940), 21.

98. Henry Douglas, "Japan's Expansion," China Today , March 1940.

99. Robert Aura Smith, Our Future in Asia (New York: Viking Press, 1940). Smith worked with the New York Times through 1941. The theme of his book might be summed up in his sentence, "The South China Sea is the battle-ground for our future in Asia." He dealt at great length with Southeast Asia's raw materials reserves and with U.S. needs and concluded that the United States must fight to protect its lifelines to Southeast Asia. Also see his "Japan Forces America's Hand," China Monthly 1 (December 1940). Trade expert Ethel Dietrich observed that the loss of trade from the Far East would burden U.S. consumers in a host of ways that went well beyond the loss of militarily strategic materials: "Other commodities vitally important to American industries, if not themselves war necessities, include bristles, coconut oil and copra, jute and kapok, shellac, perilla oil, pyrethrum, soya beans, tapioca and tung oil, over 75 percent of which come from these countries. Among the food imports, tea, pepper and spices come almost wholly from Southeastern Asia. Medical supplies include, in addition to quinine, camphor, menthol, agar-agar and nux vomica" (Dietrich, Far Eastern Trade , 170.) Other books include Claude Buss, War and Diplomacy in Eastern Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1941): "The United States would be in an industrial predicament if a war should cut off the stream of imports from the land of the setting sun" (510), and Mark Gayn, The Fight for the Pacific (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1941), ch. 18, "Treasure Box of Asia."

100. A number of these are quoted in later chapters on diplomacy.

101. Stone, Business as Usual , 29.

102. Hanson W. Baldwin, United We Stand (New York: Whittlesey House, 1941), 87. For a sample refutation of this line of argument, see R. Veatch, "South America as a Source of United States Strategic Materials," March 21, 1940, in box 56, Feis papers.

103. Justus Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 169-170.

104. "Did you know that the Western Hemisphere by itself possesses all the materials necessary for American industry in war or peace?" in Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted , 169 (no. 17, August 8, 1941). In another document, issued as Japan was seizing southern Indochina, the committee repeated, "A threat to the rubber and tin supply line is not the emergency that the President and General Marshall are talking about. American boys need not die for old Dong Dang." ("Did you know that Congress is being asked to declare a national emergency whose nature is unknown?" no. 12, July 24, 1941, in Ibid., 365.)

105. Ibid., 172.

106. On the early history, see Whitney Shepardson, "The Early History of the Council on Foreign Relations," privately printed, in Shepardson papers, Roosevelt Library; "Report of the Committee appointed by an informal meeting of persons attached to the British and American peace delegations at the Hotel Majestic on May 30th, 1919," in box 329, Hornbeck papers.

107. Hamilton Fish Armstrong speech, quoted in CFR, "Proceedings at the Opening of the Harold Pratt House," April 6, 1945.

108. The most substantial published work on its influence is Laurence Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations & United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). Its chapter 4 deals cogently with the issues raised here.

109. Lester Milbraith, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in James Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 247.

110. Joseph Kraft, "School for Statesmen," Harper's Magazine , July 1958, 64.

111. Quoted in Kraft, "Statesmen," 67. Feis and Stimson both published books through the council. Roosevelt was not himself a member, but many of his close friends were, including council president Norman Davis, one of his most trusted advisers. Roosevelt founded the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, which helped finance the council. (See grants list in box 58, Arthur Sweetser papers, Roosevelt Library.) Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong later became president of the foundation. Roosevelt even lived next door to the council's headquarters in New York. See Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Peace and Counterpeace: From Wilson to Hitler (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 439.

112. In a single year, the journal published C. K. Leith, "The Political Control of Mineral Resources," Foreign Affairs 3 (July 1925), 541-555; C. K. Leith, "Mineral Resources of the Far East," Foreign Affairs 4 (April 1926,) 433-442; Josiah Spurt, "Steel-Making Minerals," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 601-612; Jacob Viner, "National Monopolies of Raw Materials," Foreign Affairs 4 (July 1926), 595-600. Among its books were Council on Foreign Relations, Mineral Resources and Their Distribution As Affecting International Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1922); H. Foster Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1927); Mineral Inquiry, Elements of a National Mineral Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933); and Staley, Raw Materials . See also Eckes, Global Struggle , 38, 53.

113. Council on Foreign Relations, The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, 1939-1945 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1946), 2-3; Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of-rice, 1949), 19-22; Kraft, "Statesmen," 67. Breckinridge Long recorded in his diary for January 4, 1940, "It is all to be be secret, and if anything is known about it, it is to be given the color of economic activity in support of the Trade Agreements program" (Fred Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966], 51). The head of the council's postwar planning group was Norman Davis, Roosevelt's close friend and foreign policy adviser. Other key figures included Johns Hopkins University president and geographer Isaiah Bowman, a former member of President Wilson's team in Pads; Allen Dulles, then an attorney with Sullivan and Cromwell; and Harvard economist Alvin Hansen.

114. Mallory letter to Eugene Staley, September 18, 1945, CFR file, box 2, Bay Region IPR papers, Hoover Institution.

115. See minutes of May 2, 1942, meeting of the Division of Special Research in box 85, Hull papers, Library of Congress; Hull's letters to Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Isaiah Bowman, July 30, 1945, in box 54, Hull papers; and Hull memo to Gray, April 14, 1944, box 85, Hull papers.

116. Winfield Riefler, quoted in council discussion paper T-A14, June 17, 1941.

117. E-B27, "Economic Trading Blocs and Their Importance for the United States," February 15, 1941.

118. E-B34, "Methods of Economic Collaboration: Introductory. The Role of the Grand Area in American Economic Policy, July 24, 1941.

119. E-B31, "Intra-Bloc Preferential Tariff and Other Devices for Encouraging Economic Integration," March 7, 1941.

120. E-B12, "A Pan-American Trade Bloc," June 7, 1940; P-A12, discussion re effects of Russia's entry into the war, June 25, 1940; E-B17, "The Resources of Germany and the United States," June 28, 1940; E-B18, Supplement II, "The Future Position of Germany and the United States in World Trade: A Western Hemisphere-Pacific Area Economic Bloc," September 6, 1940; E-B27, "Economic Trading Blocs."

121. E-B34, "Methods of Economic Collaboration."

122. William Diebold Jr. comment, in T-A14, June 17, 1941.

123. E-B31, "Intra-Bloc Preferential Tariff."

124. T-B8, "Political Regions of Eastern Asia," May 20, 1940 [prepared by Owen Lattimore]. For Roosevelt's glowing praise, see his letter to Chiang Kai-shek, June 23, 1941, in PSF:China, FDR papers.

125. E-B26, "American Far Eastern Policy," January 15, 1941. See Pasvolsky note to Hull, January 28, 1941, in box 75, Hull papers.

126. Ibid. This strategy of confining the conflict to China was fore-shadowed by study group reports from late 1940, which envisioned the country as serving as "fly paper" for Japan's Imperial Army: "If Japan is to be deterred from a southward thrust (without a very remote and difficult naval war by the United States), it must, therefore, be forced to devote greater resources of manpower, material, and shipping to its struggle against Nationalist China. By assisting the Chinese to intensify their resistance to Japanese conquest the United States might help so burden Japan that its reserves of shipping, material, and manpower would not be adequate to embark on the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies and of Singapore" (T-B20, "Aid to China," October 11, 1940). For the "fly paper" analogy, see T-B22, "Alternatives of American Policy Toward Russia," December 9, 1940.

125. E-B26, "American Far Eastern Policy," January 15, 1941. See Pasvolsky note to Hull, January 28, 1941, in box 75, Hull papers.

127. T-A14, June 17, 1941, discussion of Lattimore's memo, Coordination of American Policy in the Far East. Many CFR studies and discussions were quite sympathetic to Japan, seeing it as a preeminent organizing power in the postwar Asian economy, an ally in supplanting European influence and a worthy trading partner. See CFR Study Group, "Do Bases for a Real Peace Exist Between the United States and Japan?" November 3, 1941; E-B33, "The Economic Organization of Peace in the Far East," June 20, 1941. Riefler pointed out that "from a strategic point of view it would be wise to bring Japan into the Grand Area by making her dependent on our market rather than building up the Far East as an autonomous region" (E-A16, May 17, 1941). Another study assumed that "Japan will play a leading role in that peace because of her position in the Far East and in the world. . . . Basically, Japan must secure a commercial role commensurate with her importance as an economic power" (E-B33).

1. Staley, Raw Materials , 89.

2. Joint Board No. 324, letter to Franklin Roosevelt from Secretary of the Navy Swanson and Secretary of War Dern, May 29, 1934, box 56, Feis papers; memorandum by Claude Swanson, November 24, 1934, 811.24/1021 RG 59, National Archives; Feis memo to William Phillips, June 4, 1934, F.W. 811.24/1027, RG 59, National Archives.

3. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), Volume I, 457-458; Herbert Feis, Seen from E. A . (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 9-11. The failure of the British to comply proved a sore point in U.S.-British relations and in American public opinion. Because the tin producers were operating far below capacity during the Depression, and because the British could not afford to pay back the debts directly in scarce foreign exchange, the State Department felt its own solution was best. The British, of course, preferred not to pay anything at all and realized that large U.S. stockpiles would undercut any future producers cartel.

4. Proposals for stockpiling had come as early as the mid-1920s from a group organized by C. K. Leith and the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America. It declared that "a wise national policy should in general favor the free use of foreign sources of supply of minerals which we do not have in adequate quantities, in order to conserve our own resources," because "if we long continue on our present policy of exploiting our resources to the utmost, regardless of their limitations, some of them will be soon exhausted, making the United States entirely dependent upon other countries for these materials in times of peace—and dangerously dependent in times of war." Quoted in Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 40.

5. Henry Wallace, "Science and the Military," New Republic , February 3, 1947, 27.

6. Hull, Memoirs , I, 624; Herbert Feis, "The State Department's Activity for the Purpose of Safeguarding the United States Against the Rubber Shortage in the Event of an Emergency," May 22, 1942, in box 85, Hull papers; and in papers of Herbert Feis, Library of Congress (hereafter called Feis report).

7. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 7-8. Of all State Department officials, Feis spent the most time dealing with raw materials questions. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton & Co., 1969), 170.

8. Hull to Roosevelt, May 29, 1935, 811.24/1034, RG 59, National Archives.

9. The list of members is in container 115, Henry Hopkins papers, FDR Library.

10. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 6.

11. U.S. Army, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials , 17.

12. Ibid.; Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 89.

13. Ibid. Small additional funds were appropriated in later years to add to the Navy's stockpiling program. See U.S. Army, Strategic and Raw Materials , 17.

11. U.S. Army, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials , 17.

12. Ibid.; Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 89.

13. Ibid. Small additional funds were appropriated in later years to add to the Navy's stockpiling program. See U.S. Army, Strategic and Raw Materials , 17.

11. U.S. Army, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials , 17.

12. Ibid.; Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 89.

13. Ibid. Small additional funds were appropriated in later years to add to the Navy's stockpiling program. See U.S. Army, Strategic and Raw Materials , 17.

14. Congressional Record , March 28, 1939, 3401.

15. Quoted by William O'Neil, president of General Tire & Rubber, in Houston Post , November 14, 1944. At least some executives shared Hull's concerns. See J. J. Blandin's letters to Charles Cooke, November 2, 1938 and April 11, 1939, in box 4, Charles Cooke papers, Hoover Library.

16. Department of State, Peace and War (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 431-432.

17. Feis memorandum, October 21, 1938, box 5, Feis papers.

18. 811.24 Raw Materials/11, RG 59, National Archives; cf. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 8n. Many other reports are quoted in Feis report, 4-8 and enclosures.

19. Quoted in Department of State, Peace and War , 63.

20. Ibid. Bernard Baruch claims to have originated the idea; see Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), 301. Hull had earlier opposed such barter arrangements because they directly contradicted the principles of multilateral trade embodied in his Trade Agreements program. See Hull's letter to Senator Harrison on June 6, 1939, in which he expressed grave concern over the inadequacy of U.S. supplies but refused to condone state barter arrangements. See Department of State, FR, 1939 , I, 852-853. Hull finally changed his mind because "the amount of money Congress was willing to appropriate was far from sufficient to assure us an adequate reserve of strategic materials" (Hull, Memoirs , I, 625). On all of these questions, see Feis, Seen from E. A ., 38-43. On the negotiations, see also FR , 1939, II, 234-266.

19. Quoted in Department of State, Peace and War , 63.

21. Rubber Reserve Company, Report on the Rubber Program 1940-1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), 14; Office of War Mobilization, Rubber, First and Second Reports of the Inter-Agency Committee on Rubber (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946).

22. "The President Urges Immediate Appropriations for the Purchase of Strategic War Materials," in Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1941), 94-95.

23. For Hull's expression of concern, see his memo in FR, 1940 , II, 250. On Morgenthau's views, see ibid., 257.

24. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 55-58; Bascom Timmons, Jesse Jones: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), 301-302.

25. Welles to Roosevelt, May 1, 1940, cited in FR , 1940, II, 253-255. Welles was apparently inspired by a memorandum by Roy Veach, "United States Position in Rubber, Tin and Quinine," April 26, 1940, which emphasized the urgency of stockpiling in light of the unstable conditions in the Far East. Copy in box 85, Hull papers.

26. "Scramble for Strategics," Engineering and Mining Journal 141 (June 1940), 32; "A Billion for Strategics," ibid., 70.

27. Adolf Berle to Admiral Land, May 20, 1940, FR, 1940 , II, 259-60. Berle was requesting that Land, Chairman of the U.S. Maritime Commission, expedite the shipping of rubber and tin from the Far East.

28. Transcript of conversation, May 16, 1940, in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Morgenthau Diary (China) , Volume I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), 151; FR, 1940 , II, 253-255; Feis, Seen from E. A ., 56-80. Feis notes that Roosevelt sent back his approval to Welles and instructed the acting secretary to inform the director of the budget, the federal loan administrator, and the secretary of the treasury of plans to use the RFC as a purchasing agency.

29. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 436-445. President Roosevelt sent Henry Grady, president of American President Lines and assistant secretary of state for economic affairs from 1939-1941, to Southeast Asia to organize the purchase of minerals for the Metals Reserve Company. See Henry Francis Grady, "Adventures in Diplomacy," 1953, type-script, in Grady papers, Hoover Library.

30. Jesse Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), 396-397; Timmons, Jesse Jones , 301-302; Rubber Reserve Company, Report , 14; Office of War Mobilization, Rubber ; U.S. Army, Strategic and Raw Materials , 17.

31. Russell McBride, "Strategic Buying Planned," Engineering & Mining Journal 141 (July 1940), 33-34.

32. Timmons, Jesse Jones , 303; Feis, Seen from E. A ., 64-65.

33. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 402-406; Timmons, Jesse Jones , 304-306. Bernard Baruch claims that "Jones demonstrated no great sense of urgency, either in stockpiling natural rubber or in pushing the development of the synthetic rubber industry." But it seems likely that Baruch, an even greater empire builder than Jones, simply felt jealous of his rival's position (Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years , 301). For Stettinius's point of view, see his letter to Roosevelt, September 12, 1940

in OF [Office File] 3, Roosevelt papers, and his letter to Jones, November 25, 1940, in box 327, Hopkins papers. For a good history of rubber programs, see A History of the U.S. Government's Natural and Synthetic Rubber Programs, 1941-1955 , manuscript prepared by Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 1948-1955, in box 204, Jesse Jones papers, Library of Congress; also Civilian Production Administration, Bureau of Demobilization, "Rubber Policies of the National Defense Advisory Commission and the Office of Production Management, May 1940 to December 1941," Historical Reports of the WPB , no. 28, April 25, 1945, 570.2 R, Records of the War Production Board, RG 179, National Archives.

34. For more information on this subject, see John Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 122-129. Another useful source, revealing the true purpose of the China loans, is Robert Barnett, "Opening E1 Dorado With a Loan," Amerasia 4 (April 1940), 72-75.

35. Federal Loan Agency press release FLA-48, September 25, 1940, in box 52, Hornbeck papers.

36. Washington Star , December 22, 1938.

37. Memorandum, November 20, 1939, in Senate Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary (China) , I, 52-53. See also "Tung Oil," Far Eastern Review 36 (February 1940), 76-77.

38. Memorandum from Harry Dexter White to Henry Morgenthau on the "Tin Loan, "November 22, 1939, in Senate Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary, (China) , I, 54.

39. Memorandum of November 20, 1939, in ibid.

40. Ibid.

38. Memorandum from Harry Dexter White to Henry Morgenthau on the "Tin Loan, "November 22, 1939, in Senate Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary, (China) , I, 54.

39. Memorandum of November 20, 1939, in ibid.

40. Ibid.

38. Memorandum from Harry Dexter White to Henry Morgenthau on the "Tin Loan, "November 22, 1939, in Senate Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary, (China) , I, 54.

39. Memorandum of November 20, 1939, in ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Federal Loan Agency Press Release FLA-48, box 52, Hornbeck papers; Jesse Jones to Roosevelt, November 30, 1940, in OF 150, Roosevelt papers; Comments of Franklin Roosevelt, in Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 1940 , 587-595.

42. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 439, 444-450; Stone, Business as Usual , 26-27. Another example of such "enlightened self-interest" was Roosevelt's suggestion to the Departments of State and the Treasury that the United States buy large quantities of strategic materials, such as manganese, chromite, mercury, platinum, and asbestos, from the Soviet Union, in return for which the USSR would grant military loans to China. The sum Roosevelt had in mind was $200 million for this three-cornered deal. Ultimately the plan fell through because State opposed cooperation with the Soviet Union. Blum, Years of Urgency , 347; Senate Judiciary Committee Morgenthau Diary (China) , I, 181-2, 191-2 208-216, 225-231, 233-235; Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , September 25 and 28, 1940, 132.

43. Emerson, "Dutch East Indies Adrift," 740.

44. Testimony before Senate Military Affairs Committee, Strategic and Critical Materials , 52-53. For a comparison of stockpile objectives to actual deliveries, see memo of Gordon Arneson, Bureau of Research and Statistics, War Production Board, to C. K. Leith, January 27, 1941, WPB 112.01 R, RG 179, National Archives.

45. K. E. Knorr, Tin Under Control (Stanford: Food Research Institute, 1945), 183.

46. Rubber Reserve Company, Report , 14-15.

47. Eckes, Jr., Global Struggle , 101.

48. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , January 3, 1940, 240.

49. The Rubber Situation (report of the Baruch Committee), House Document No. 836, 1942. See also Office of Emergency Management, Materials for Defense (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941): "We could, by a heroic effort, build more huge factories for the manufacture of synthetic rubber, but it is doubtful if that could be done rapidly enough to compensate us for the lack of crude rubber in case our supply was suddenly stopped. Rubber men . . . point out that synthetic rubber produced in, say, 1944 would be of little use to our defense production effort in 1942." Copy in WPB 111B, RG 179, National Archives.

50. Jesse Jones to William Knudson (OPM), June 25, 1941, WPB 112.1C, RG 179, National Archives.

51. See notes in box 56, Feis papers.

52. Henry Kanee memo to Stephen Early, March 8, 1939; Kanee, "Memo for the files," March 9, 1939; Kanee memo to Louis Johnson, March 15, 1939; Johnson memo to Franklin Roosevelt, June 14, 1939, in OF 25, Roosevelt library; also D. W. Bell (Bureau of the Budget) to Hull, March 13, 1939, 811.24 Raw Materials/54, RG 59, National Archives.

53. Eliot Janeway, Struggle for Survival (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968), 26.

54. Roosevelt press conference, 645-A, May 23, 1940; Eckes, Jr., Global Struggle , 76, 78.

55. Quote from Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 8; Beukema and Sommer, "Dependence of U.S. Economy," 102-103.

56. Engineering and Mining Journal 142 (July 1941), 32-33.

57. Congressional Record 87 (October 30, 1941), 8335.

58. The political pressures against excessive preparations for war were so strong in the United States that before the 1940 election, in the face of near unanimous opinion by his experts that economic defense measures were essential, Roosevelt downplayed all moves for

stockpiling. See William Langer and S. Gleason, The Undeclared War 1940-1941 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), 195-212; Baruch, Public Years , 281; as an example of the way FDR had to promise never to fight in the Pacific, see "Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks at Buffalo, New York, November 2, 1940," in Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 1940 , 541-543. For the State Department's similar fears in 1937, see Feis, Seen from E. A ., 38.

59. Congressional Record 84 (April 25, 1939), 4750.

60. Ibid., 4768.

59. Congressional Record 84 (April 25, 1939), 4750.

60. Ibid., 4768.

61. "Strategics and Politics," Engineering and Mining Journal 141 (April 1940), 32. See also Janeway, Struggle , 26. As Feis put it, "It was the period of belief that the Government should scour the Dakota hills for tin before buying it from Malaya, and that our poor supplies of manganese should be used up before we brought it from elsewhere" (Seen from E. A ., 37).

62. Congressional Record 80 (August 2, 1939), 10859. In late 1941 he was still complaining: "Mr. Chairman, every time the matter of strategic materials comes before the House of Representatives we see this same old fight that is raging here today, the fight between the producers of low-grade materials in the United States and those who really wish to procure those materials in the interest of national defense. Every time the fight is made to prostitute national defense in the interest of sectional advantages." He continued, with reference to the manganese lobby, "It is a fact that during the days of the World War, when the price of manganese rose to unprecedented heights, we never were able to produce over 20 percent of what we need in this nation. The same thing applies to all of these strategic materials. The would-be producers, the promoters and representatives from mining sections, have made extravagant claims, but these claims have produced very little of these badly needed strategic materials. The same story applies to all of them. . . . It is essential that we get these materials and that we no longer get promises. We can no longer run mills making automobiles on promises; we can no longer operate on promises of rubber; and if we are to make high-grade tool steel, we must have tungsten to make it; and if we are to make certain grades of steel, we must have chromium; and we must have manganese if we are to turn out any steel at all." Congressional Record 87 (October 7, 1941), 7708. See also Senate Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary (China) , I, 33-35, regarding the debate between elements in the administration and in Congress over whether to purchase manganese ore from domestic or foreign sources. Several pages of quotes from outraged senators and representatives appear in response to moves to purchase the ore from foreign mines—clear evidence of the power of the manganese interests.

63. Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter 140 (December 8, 1941), 5.

64. Congressional Record 87 (October 7, 1941), 8335-8336.

65. Quoted in Refrigerator Engineering 42 (September 1941), 159-160; cf. Langer and Gleason, Challenge , 181-182, 191.

66. Baruch, Public Years , 301-302.

67. On U.S. dealings with the rubber and tin restriction committees, see FR, 1939 , I, 858-905, 928, 933 (rubber) and 867-868, 900, 906-947 (tin); FR, 1940 , II, 261-288 (rubber) and 288-300 (tin); FR, 1941 , I, 492-507 (rubber) and 507-530 (tin).

68. Oliver Lawrence, "International Tin Restriction," in William Holland, ed., Commodity Control in the Pacific Area , 380-385; James Gould, Americans in Sumatra (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).

69. Holland, Commodity Control , 386-387; Knorr, Tin , 137.

70. Holland, Commodity Control , 391.

71. Knorr, Tin , 146-148; Holland, Commodity Control , 398.

72. Knorr, Tin , 171-175.

73. Ibid., 177.

74. Ibid., 180-181.

75. Ibid., 179; Gould, Sumatra ; Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 437.

72. Knorr, Tin , 171-175.

73. Ibid., 177.

74. Ibid., 180-181.

75. Ibid., 179; Gould, Sumatra ; Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 437.

72. Knorr, Tin , 171-175.

73. Ibid., 177.

74. Ibid., 180-181.

75. Ibid., 179; Gould, Sumatra ; Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 437.

72. Knorr, Tin , 171-175.

73. Ibid., 177.

74. Ibid., 180-181.

75. Ibid., 179; Gould, Sumatra ; Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 437.

76. Knorr, Tin , 183; "Tin Container Industry's Sales Show Big Increase on Heavier Army, Civilian Demand," Wall Street Journal , July 7, 1941.

77. K. E. Knorr, World Rubber and its Regulation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), 101, 105, 108; Gould, Sumatra , 102. Also see articles by E. G. Holt and Warren S. Lockwood, "How International Rubber Restrictions Came About," Asia 35 (June 1935), 327-331, and "The Rubber Control Scheme at Work," Asia 35 (July 1935), 422-427.

78. Knorr, World Rubber , 129; Feis, Seen from E. A ., 26-27.

79. Knorr, World Rubber , 130.

80. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 24, 28-29.

81. Rubber prices in New York shot up 16.7 cents a pound in August, reaching 24 cents in September. See Feis, Seen from E. A ., 48-49; Knorr, World Rubber , 135.

82. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 49-50. Knorr comments: "From what is known of the deliberations of the IRRC it appears that it was ever prone to underestimate future absorption and was afraid of a sudden turn of the market that might cause a drop in price while stocks were high.

"Thereafter, until Japan conquered the major rubber-growing areas of Malaysia, the rubber-supply situation was dominated by an unexampled increase in United States rubber consumption for civilian use and the endeavor of the United States government to build up a large stockpile of this strategic material in case the imminent war emergency materialized." (136)

83. Timmons, Jesse Jones , 303-304; Feis, Seen from E. A ., 73-75.

84. Timmons, Jesse Jones , 304-305.

85. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 399.

86. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 84-85.

87. Wall Street Journal , July 22, 1941. Russia's stockpiles were depleted because Great Britain had tried to embargo sales of rubber to it while the Nazi-Soviet pact was in effect. See also Feis, Seen from E. A ., 80.

88. Stone, Business as Usual , 27.

89. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 399-400; on the policy of sending Army transports to Singapore to load up with rubber, see Long's conversation with Feis, February 15, 1941, in Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 180. See also Clayton memorandum, April 24, 1941 in Dobney, Papers of Will Clayton , 60-61, for a discussion of the transportation crisis, and Berle to Land, May 20, 1940 in FR, 1940 , II, 259-260, for an early discussion of the problem. Berle noted in May 1940: "The real reason why rubber is not moving eastward from the East Indies—we may need the rubber very badly if the Japanese cork the bottle there—is that our American ships, which are subsidized to the gullet, would rather carry jute at a fifty cent rate than rubber at a thirty-six cent rate" (Beatrice Berle and Travis Jacobs, eds., Navigating the Rapids 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973], 316-317). Clayton, the deputy federal loan administrator, was in charge of the importation of strategic and critical materials and ran the foreign buying operations of the Metals Reserve Corporation, the Rubber Reserve Company, and the Defense Supplies Corporation. He recounted the events of late 1941 to his daughter Ellen in 1947 in a recorded interview: "Before we got into the war I was buying, in August, 1941, all sorts of stuff from the Philippines, Malay Straits, Dutch East Indies, Australia, North Caledonia [sic]. We couldn't get enough ships and the stuff was piling up out there. Rubber and tin were two very critical things—coming over the Pacific, going through the Panama Canal, going up East Coast by ship. [Harvard Professor William Elliot] at the War Production Board was working with me in August to get all this stuff in. We were sure to get into war with Japan any time and we had to get all this material in before. To do this we decided to have them unload the ships on the Pacific Coast which would save a 30 day trip but cost more. We then had to ship the West Coast by rail—rubber to Akron, tin to Pittsburgh. Then those West Coast ports got blocked with these things, because the railroads couldn't take them away fast enough. The next 6 months this transportation cost 30 to 50 million dollars extra." Dobney, Papers of Will Clayton , 67.

90. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars , 371-372.

91. Congressional Record 87 (October 7, 1941), 7692.

92. Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 93.

93. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 75-76.

1. William Neumann, "How American Policy in the Pacific Contributed to War in the Pacific," in Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1953), 242-243.

2. Ienaga Saburo, The Pacific War: World War H and the Japanese, 1931-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 37.

3. Henry Stimson and William Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harpers, 1948), 234.

4. Ibid., 243-244. See also quote from Herbert Hoover in Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1944), 25.

3. Henry Stimson and William Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harpers, 1948), 234.

4. Ibid., 243-244. See also quote from Herbert Hoover in Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1944), 25.

5. Neumann, "American Policy," 248-249; A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938), 446-448.

6. Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Comintern Pact," in James William Morley (ed.), Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935-1940 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

7. Sumner Welles pulled together the group within the Far Eastern branch. Their December 5, 1938 memorandum, "Steps of a Positive Character Which the United States Might Take Against Japan in Retaliation for Japan's Injury to American Rights and Interests in China: Examination Thereof," is in box 1, Leo Pasvolsky office file, RG 59, National Archives. See also Laurence Salisbury (FE), "America's Economic Policy in the Far East," January 30, 1939, 793.94/14667 1/2, RG 59, National Archives.

8. George Gallup, "American Institute of Public Opinion Surveys, 1935-38," Public Opinion Quarterly 2 (July 1938), 389; Gallup, "American Institute of Public Opinion—Surveys, 1938-1939," Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939), 599. A propaganda piece by the California Committee on Pacific Friendship suggests why some residual admiration for Japan remained: "Japan has never harmed us. Japan is not threatening us. Japan has treated us better than any other world power in the matter of paying debts, courtesy to our visitors and residents, and never attempting to meddle in our affairs. Japan is the only world power that has paid back all sums borrowed without delay or default on a single penny. If we are going to answer this fair treatment

of us by enmity, no incentive is left for any country to treat us well in the future." Quoted in Neumann, "American Policy," 231.

9. Sherk, Pacific Trade Basin , 42. It is difficult to estimate China's share precisely because of Japan's control of Manchuria and the port of Kwantung. The United States sold $289 million worth of goods to Japan in 1937 but less than $90 million to China; even the Philippines offered a greater market than China. Furthermore the United States had a trade surplus of about $84 million with Japan but a deficit of almost $54 million with China proper. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce .

10. U.S. investment in China amounted to only $132 million in 1935, compared to $387 million in Japan, according to Department of Commerce figures from William Lockwood, Jr., "America's Stake in the Far East—II: Investments," Far Eastern Survey (August 12, 1936), 182. Total U.S. investments in China had never surpassed $250 million. See C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 332-333. For more figures on U.S. investments in China and Japan, and for a discussion of Japan's superior record of repayment on U.S. loans, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, China and Japan , Information Department Papers No. 21 (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938), 114, 121. On investment in the Philippines, see Helmut Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), 11, and Catherine Parker, "The Philippines as an American Investment," Far Eastern Survey (September 25, 1940), 222.

11. America First Committee Speakers Bureau, "To what extent does our economic life depend on foreign trade?" 1941, in Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted , 152.

12. Griswold, Far Eastern Policy , 469. Admittedly, government officials have often have gone to great lengths to protect modest investments by influential corporations; consider the State Department's strenuous exertions on behalf of U.S. oil companies in Indonesia in the 1920s. As Harold Quigley argued, "While it would seem that an approximate total investment of $160,000,000 in these enterprises [U.S. businesses in China] would exert a negligible leverage upon American policy it must be presumed that our insistent reaffirmation of the 'Open Door' doctrine is directly related to these interests. In themselves and in their importance to trade they compose a considerable stake requiting protection from local and outside infringement." At the same time, however, these investments did not convince Washington to rethink its cautious, almost timid policy toward Japan in the 1930s. See Harold Quigley, The Far Eastern War 1937-1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), 40-41.

13. Useful studies include: John Masland, "American Attitudes Toward Japan," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1941), 160-165 [hereafter Annals ]; Masland, "Commercial Influences Upon Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1941," Pacific Historical Review 11 (September 1942), 281-299; Peter Hoffer, "American Businessmen and the Japan Trade," Pacific Historical Review 41 (May 1972), 189-206; Roland Stromberg, "American Business and the Approach of War," Journal of Economic History (Winter 1953), 58-78; Mira Wilkins, "The Role of U.S. Business," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History , 341-376. It is interesting to note that Masland, a critic of economic explanations of U.S. policy in the Far East, hints at the significance of imports from Southeast Asia when he admits, "The Netherlands East Indies assumed considerable importance as a source of tin, rubber, and other strategic materials" (Masland, "Commercial Influences," 284). Southern cotton interests, which were particularly dependent on the large market Japan provided, formed an especially unified lobby opposing retaliation against Japan. Will Clayton, the nation's greatest cotton industrialist and an important political figure, wrote Sen. Alben Barkley on February 23, 1940, protesting moves to limit U.S. trade with Japan—despite his voluntary refusal to trade with the European Axis powers. "I am sure it is unnecessary to point out to you," he wrote, "that American cotton would be the greatest sufferer from any serious interruption of trade between this country and Japan." See Dobney, Papers of Will Clayton , 47. See also Amerasia II (November 1938), 458-461 for a discussion of the pro-Japan bias of certain southern cotton journals.

14. William Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 216-217.

15. Tyler Dennett, "Alternative American Policies in the Far East," Foreign Affairs 16 (April 1938), 392. In this article, Dennett expressed serious concern that the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia could mean direct material losses to the United State. For a counterargument about Japanese-occupied China, predicting serious consequences to the U.S. economy if trade with it dried up, see Nathaniel Peffer, "Would Japan Shut the Open Door in China?" Foreign Affairs 17 (October 1938), 37-50.

16. Hoffer, "American Businessmen," 194-195; Masland, "Commercial Influences," 289, 293-294.

17. Fortune 22 (September 1940), 114. See also the statement of Nelson Johnson in Gardner, New Deal Diplomacy , 141-142.

18. Hoffer, "American Businessmen," 202, 204.

19. Larry W. Moses, "Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: The Battle of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol," Journal of Asian

History 1 (1967), 64-85; Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," in Morley, Deterrent Diplomacy , 115-178; Ienaga, The Pacific War , 82.

20. Adolf Berle, Jr., recorded in his diary for September 14, 1937, that although Roosevelt and Hull wanted very much to keep the United States out of war, Roosevelt showed great concern that "the Japanese were getting ready to seize the Island of Hainan which lies half way on the road to Singapore and which accordingly would threaten both French Indo-China and also the British trade route." Thus, when a year and a half later Japan did move into Hainan, the Administration's concern was quite understandable. See Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 135-136.

21. Hull, Memoirs , I, 628. For further evidence of the administration's strategic anxieties about Hainan, see Grew to Hull, March 31, 1939, in box 329, Hornbeck papers.

22. Ch'ao-Ting Chi, "Far Eastern Notes," Amerasia 1 (July 1937), 236. He noted, "Recent events indicate that control of Hainan Island is definitely an immediate objective of Japan's policy of southern expansion." See also "Growing Interest in Hainan Mainly Strategic," Far Eastern Survey 7 (August 24, 1938), 203-204. As early as 1936, Japan's navy began drawing up contingency plans to seize Borneo's oil fields. See Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," in James William Morley, ed., The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 241.

23. Andrew Roth, Japan Strikes South (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), 16.

24. Ibid., 16-17. When Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, was informed of Japan's move by the counselor of the Japanese embassy, his first reaction was to remark that "the Sinnan Island Group appeared to be very near to the Philippine Islands" (FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 277).

23. Andrew Roth, Japan Strikes South (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), 16.

25. Hull, Memoirs , I, 628.

26. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 4-5, 280-281.

27. Hull, Memoirs , I, 630. See also Tracy Kittredge, "Joint Strategic Planning, 1937-40," 41-43, in box 30, Kittredge papers.

New York Herald Tribune , January 26, 1939.

29. New York Herald Tribune , January 19, 1939.

30. Washington Evening Star , March 6, 1939.

31. Erle Dickover (Batavia) dispatch no. 274, June 27, 1939, 811.24 Raw Materials/221, RG 59, National Archives.

32. Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 230 (June 27, 1939 diary entry).

33. Henry Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1936), 138.

34. Stark to Richardson, March 15, 1940, in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 932. See also Neumann, "American Policy," 255-256. Quick action was taken in the autumn, probably as a result of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which relieved pressure on the Soviet Union's western front and effectively stymied any plans by Japan to invade Siberia. In fact, the State Department worried that the pact would force Japan to "limit its ambitions to the south. But the more its ambitions there were realized, the greater would be the menace to the Philippines and to the legitimate strategic and commercial interests of the United States in the southern reaches of the Pacific." Sumner Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East," Harper's 202 (February 1951), 32.

35. Stark to Richardson, March 15, 1940, in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 932. Note also the Navy's viewpoint expressed in Stark to Richardson, January 18, 1940: "I have a letter from Tommy Hart [Commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet], just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch [former Commander in chief of the United States Fleet], and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning" (PHA Exhibits, XIV, 923).

36. Minutes of February 21, 1940 JB Meeting, cited in Kittredge, "United States Neutrality Policies . . ." in box 29, Kittredge papers.

37. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 255; Stark to Richardson, April 8, 1940, PHA Exhibits, XIV, 933.

38. Jun, "Southern Strategy," 243-246.

39. New York Times , April 14, 1940, and April 15, 1940.

40. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 281; New York Times , April 16, 1940.

41. New York Times , April 17, 1940.

42. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 81.

43. Feis, Seen From E. A ., 55.

44. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 282.

45. For instance, in a public response to a later Japanese expression of "increased concern" for the fate of the Indies, Hull declared that in view of his April 17 statement, "commitments and expressions of intention to respect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies cannot be too often reiterated" (FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 285). Undersecretary of State Welles stressed Hull's April 17 message and other affirmations of the status quo principle in an address before the Cleveland

Foreign Affairs Council in September ("Our Foreign Policy and National Defense," Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1940, 243).

46. On April 19, the San Francisco Chronicle ran a front-page column on the problem by Royce Briar and an editorial inside praising Hull's statement: "This is to the good. The Dutch are admirable people. Also, their East Indies are the source of rubber and tin we must have for industry or national defense. Without them some of our factories would shut down and daddy would not get any more pay checks. Also there would be no tires on the car to take mother to the peace meetings."

47. Washington Star , April 18, 1940; New York Times , April 18, 1940, and April 19, 1940. The French complained that Japan would soon be in a position to "menace French positions in New Caledonia, which has one of the richest nickel deposits in the world, it was pointed out" (New York Times , April 18, 1940).

48. Iron Age , May 16, 1940. The department's release said, "Richly endowed climatically and geologically, the Netherlands Indies ranks among the world's most important sources of rubber, tin, petroleum, sugar, coconut products, vegetable oils, tobacco, spices, and fibers, and one noted for a variety of minor tropical products which have become increasingly important in the markets of industrial countries. Practically a world monopoly is held in the production of quinine, while the special trade significance of many other products enhances the importance of the Netherlands Indies as a source of articles of present-day commerce; kapok for upholstering and other fibers for cordage manufacture, tanning and dyeing materials, palm oil for the preparation of soaps and margarine, cassava products for food and sizing purposes, flavoring extracts and raw materials for the manufacture of medicines" See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, press release, "The Netherlands Indies," April 19, 1940, in box 311, Hornbeck papers; also reprinted in Amerasia 4 (May 1940), 121-122.

49. Iron Age , May 16, 1940; minutes of May 24, 1940, Business Advisory Council meeting in box 110, Hopkins papers.

50. Feis, Seen from E. A ., 56. For more on the administration's concern for raw materials, see William Langer and S. Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), 587-588. In a memo to the Interdepartmental Committee on Strategic Materials, May 15, 1940, Feis wrote, "Recent events have convinced virtually everybody of the urgent necessity of trying to augment our stocks of these materials. The necessity rests not only on the needs of our fighting forces in the event of a war emergency, but on the needs of indus-

try. Shortage of supplies would greatly upset our whole economic situation" (box 302, Hopkins papers.

51. Roosevelt press conference, 645-A, May 23, 1940. A copy of his speech to the Business Advisory Council and transcript of the meeting are in PSF: Harry L. Hopkins, Roosevelt papers. The council was not persuaded; it passed a resolution calling "in the strongest terms at its command" for a hugely expanded stockpiling program. "The international situation," they insisted, "will not permit continued delay and obstruction to this permanent strategic reserve without prejudicial and possibly very dangerous effect upon our national security." Two years later, with the country at war, Stanley Hornbeck expressed doubts as to whether the lessons of German raw material conservation could be applied at home: "It is believed that any . . . assumption that this country could within a few months or even within a few years readjust its economy along such lines [as] . . . that achieved by the Germans would lead to highly disappointing and very unfortunate consequences. . .. None but Germans, in Germany and under the Nazi system, can do what the Germans are doing. None but Japanese, in Japan and under the prevailing militant militaristic system of Japan can do what the Japanese are doing. . .. [O]ur national economy and our private economy are and long have been different from those of the Germans or the Japanese . . ." See Hornbeck to Colonel Cortier, April 7, 1942, box 263, Hornbeck papers.

52. T. A. Bisson, "America's Dilemma in the Far East," Foreign Policy Reports (July 1, 1940), 105-106.

53. "Japanese Comment on US Naval Maneuvers," US Naval Attache (Tokyo) report, April 26, 1940, Naval Attache Tokyo file, II, PSF:Documents N, Roosevelt Library.

54. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , 588.

55. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 260.

56. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 933-934.

57. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 938.

58. PHA Exhibits XIV, 940-942, 943-950. For the debate within the administration, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 316 (May 21, 1940 entry).

59. FR, 1940 , IV, 19. But on May 13 Frederick Moore, a U.S. journalist hired by the Japanese "in an advisory capacity by the Japanese Embassy" and long associated with Japanese officials, reported to a U.S. official that the Japanese were "prepared to go" in the direction of the Netherlands East Indies and seemed "unwilling to believe that we would act in event of their moving on the Netherlands East Indies" (FR, 1940 , IV, 16). Nor did Hornbeck agree with Grew that the Japa-

58. PHA Exhibits XIV, 940-942, 943-950. For the debate within the administration, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 316 (May 21, 1940 entry).

nese leaders recognized the United States' willingness to fight rather than lose the Indies. See ibid., fn 35.

60. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 288; Hull, Memoirs , I, 893.

61. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 46.

62. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 66. Arita made his speech just as the Japanese were undertaking a major military buildup on Hainan involving thousands of troops and many aircraft. Chinese officials felt Japan was capable of launching an attack from Hainan toward Indochina or the Netherlands East Indies. See Johnson to Hull, July 4, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 23.

63. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 68.

64. See June file, box 461, Hornbeck papers. Hornbeck also prepared a similar memorandum on June 24 consisting of a summary of Rupert Emerson's article, "Dutch East Indies Adrift."

65. June 15, 1940 memorandum in box 414, Hornbeck papers. Emphasis in original.

66. June 15, 1940 memorandum in boxes 414 and 461, Hornbeck papers.

67. Congressman John McCormack inserted it into the Congressional Record 88 (August 13, 1941), A3913, and the article was quoted in C. F. Remer, "American Interest in the Economic Future of the Pacific," in Mayling Soon Foundation, America's Future in the Pacific (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1947), 49. The Hornbeck quote and reprint are in his June 14, 1940 memorandum, in boxes 414 and 461, Hornbeck papers.

68. Historian James Thompson notes that "it was the Hornbeck memorandum, usually addressed to the secretary and undersecretary, that was the chief internal carrier of policy continuity toward the Far East" (Thompson, "The Role of the State Department," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History , 88). Stimson called Hornbeck "the foremost expert in the State Department" on Far Eastern affairs (Stimson diary, September 11, 1940). Sumner Welles called him "one of the ablest men with whom I have ever been associated in the State Department" (letter to Colonel Langhorne, September 12, 1950, in Horn-beck papers). Joseph Ballantine, another State Department official involved in policy toward Japan, said, "Hornbeck, with his disciplined mind, his clarity of thought, his fertility in useful ideas for dealing with questions presented, and his ripe experience, was invaluable in our deliberations" (Ballantine autobiography, chapter 10, "Prelude to Pearl Harbor," in box 1, Ballantine papers, Hoover Library). On Hornbeck's great influence throughout the administration, see also Kenneth McCarty, Jr., "Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Far East, 1931-1941" (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Duke University, 1970); Jonathan Utley,

"The Department of State and the Far East, 1937-1941," (Ph.D dissertation, University of Illinois, 1970), 9; Spotswood, "Japan's Southward Advance," 86-88. For opposing evidence, see Breckinridge Long's diary for October 9, 1940, in Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 139. Long told Hull that Hornbeck's influence extended too far outside the department and should be curbed, especially given "the lengths to which his rather violent mentality will lead him." Hull apparently agreed and noted that he would seek more advice from Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. However, on key matters such as the importance of Southeast Asia to the national interest and tactical issues such as the need to aid China to keep Japan's troops bogged down, there was widespread consensus.

69. The Japanese also demanded that the French hand over all Chinese silver on deposit in French banks in Tientsin. The French authorities agreed, and Japan assumed de facto control of the city on June 20. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 50-52; Hull, Memoirs , I, 896. Note that aid to Chungking via Indochina was ended completely by July 11 (FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 94-95; FR, 1940 , 30-31).

70. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 86.

71. Memorandum by Grew, June 24, 1940, in FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 88-89.

72. The influential Asahi daily announced a similar line, with particular reference to Southeast Asia (Roth, Japan Strikes South , 53).

73. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 92, 94.

74. Hornbeck to Wells, June 25, 1940, box 493, Hornbeck papers.

75. Hull, Memoirs , I, 896-899.

76. Barnhart, Japan Prepares , 159-175; Jun, "Southern Strategy," 247; Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact, 1939-1940," in Morley, Deterrent Diplomacy , 207-211.

77. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 107.

78. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 946. For other samples of Navy opinion, see memo prepared for Stark, Marshall, and directors of the War Plans Divisions of the Navy and Army, "Decisions as to National Action," in box 30, Kittredge papers.

79. Memorandum of conversation by Grew, June 10, 1940, in FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 69-70.

80. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 282.

81. Richardson testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 297.

82. PHA Exhibits, XVI, 1989-1996; also in box 461, Hornbeck papers. On July 24, Stimson sent Morgenthau a copy of this memo. See Stimson diary, July 24, 1940. For more on Hornbeck's views, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 316 (May 21, 1940 entry); Horn-beck memo to Welles, July 24, 1940, box 155, Hornbeck papers. See

also Hornbeck memo, "Reflections on the Situation in Europe, the Situation in the Far East . . ." June 17, 1940, box 309, Hornbeck papers.

83. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 289.

84. FR, 1940 , IV, 381-383.

85. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 95-100.

86. Ibid., 101; Hull, Memoirs , I, 900-901. When the Yunnan-Indochina railroad was closed, all tungsten shipped out of China came over the Burma Road. See Harry Holmes, Strategic Materials and National Defense (New York: Macmillan, 1942), 39. On December 3, 1941, Roosevelt wrote Hull and Welles a memorandum showing that keeping the Burma Road open was as much in the United States' interest as in China's, as two-thirds of U.S. tungsten came out through that route. He told them: "I think it is well worthwhile that this aspect of closing the Burma Road should be brought out. The Burma Road is China's life-line for goods going in but it is also a very important lifeline for our very much needed tungsten and tung oil." Elliott Roosevelt, (ed.,) FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 , Volume II (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), 1249.

85. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 95-100.

87. Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact, 1939-1940," 285.

88. Hull, Memoirs , I, 894.

89. Press release issued by the White House on July 2, 1940, Department of State Bulletin , July 6, 1940, 11.

90. Morgenthau diary (unpublished), v. 284, 122; v. 286, 86ff; v. 287, 151ff, 163-164; v. 173, 287, Roosevelt Library; Stimson diary, July 18, 19, 24, 26, 1940; Julius Pratt, Cordell Hull , Volume II (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), 469—470; Wells, "Roosevelt and the Far East," 33; and Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 299. For an excellent account of the bureaucratic maneuvering over licensing, see Utley, "Department of State," 97-100.

91. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 218-219; Roth, Japan Strikes South , 58.

92. FR, 1940 , IV, 59.

93. Ibid. 60, 63.

94. Ibid., 63-64; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903.

92. FR, 1940 , IV, 59.

93. Ibid. 60, 63.

94. Ibid., 63-64; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903.

92. FR, 1940 , IV, 59.

93. Ibid. 60, 63.

94. Ibid., 63-64; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903.

95. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 289-291.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

96. FR, 1940 , IV, 65.

97. Ibid.; see also Welles to Murphy (at Vichy), August 7, 1940, 66, etc.; Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to Hull, August 7, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 67; see also Grew to Hull, August 9, 1940, ibid., 69-70.

98. Matthews to Hull, August 27, 1940, ibid., 86-87.

99. Reed to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 92-93; Hull, Memoirs , I, 903; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, FR, 1940 , IV, 93; Johnson to Hull, September 3, 1940, ibid., 93-94.

100. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 291-293.

101. The British government actually encouraged Washington to make this decision, figuring that the U.S. naval presence in the Pacific would relieve pressure on Singapore and allow the British to focus all their resources in Europe and the Middle East. See Miner, "United States Policy," 36-37.

102. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 64; Washington Post , September 5, 1940.

103. Hull, Memoirs , I, 903-904; Roth, Japan Strikes South , 65.

104. FR, 1940 , IV, 106-107.

105. Washington Post , September 11, 1940.

106. Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era , Volume II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1228; Department of State, Peace and War , 571-572.

107. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 221-222.

108. Pratt, Cordell Hull , 470-471. At this point, Hornbeck once again fought off all attempts to shift part of the fleet away from Hawaii. See memos in PHA Exhibits, XVI, 2001-2013. Advocates of a cautious response had to weigh the possibility, raised by one Japanese admiral, that Japan could survive an embargo better than the United States could survive the ensuing loss of Southeast Asia, "when she will no longer be able to obtain rubber and tin" (Rear Adm. Gumpei Sekine [sic], quoted in U.S. Naval Attache [Tokyo] report no. 131-140, September 5, 1940, in PSF: Documents N. Naval Attache Tokyo, v. II, Roosevelt papers.

109. Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact," 238-240.

110. FR, 1940 , IV, 131; FR, Japan 1931-1941, , II, 294-296.

111. Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1940, 253.

112. Furthermore, the French already had about ninety unused U.S. planes stationed in Martinique, which the Vichy Government refused to release to Indochina. Hull, Memoirs , I, 907; FR, 1940 , IV, 146-147.

113. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 222-223; New York Times , September 26 and 27, 1940. Utley notes that the China loan had been approved in July 1940 but was slow to be disbursed owing to bureaucratic infighting over where the money should come from (105).

114. Breckinridge Long noted in his diary on September 28, 1940, after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, "And so we go—more and more—farther and farther along the road to war. But we are not ready to fight any war now—to say nothing of a war on two oceans at once—and that is what the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo agreement means. Nor will we be ready to fight any war for eighteen months in the future" (Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 132).

115. The wording of the pact is from Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 111; the

Asahi quote is from David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1971), 728-729.

116. Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1940, 251.

117. Stimson diary, September 27, 1940.

118. Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor , 122n.

119. Los Angeles Times , September 28, 1940.

120. Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 34.

121. FR, 1940 , I, 658. See also Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 340-342.

122. Washington Post , September 28, 1940.

123. San Francisco Chronicle September 28, 1940.

124. October 1, 1940 memorandum, box 4, Hornbeck papers; Stimson diary, October 1-2, 1940.

125. The New York Times , in an editorial on September 26, argued for more aid to China instead: "There is only one real check upon Japan's freedom of action and that is the stubborn opposition of the people and the Government of China. So long as this opposition continues, Japan cannot use her full power elsewhere. But the moment Japan has crushed China's resistance, that moment Japan is wholly free to embark upon aggressive action in any other part of the Pacific area; against Indo-China; against the Philippines; against the Dutch East Indies, source of raw materials of the utmost importance to us; against Singapore, the eastern outpost of the British Empire."

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

126. Nancy Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 330-331.

127. Ibid., 331-332.

128. Ibid., 333.

129. Ibid., 334.

130. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 7, 1940, 136.

131. Ibid., 912; FR, 1940 , IV, passim (October).

130. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 7, 1940, 136.

131. Ibid., 912; FR, 1940 , IV, passim (October).

132. Miner, "United States Policy," 52.

133. Stimson to FDR, October 12, 1940; quoted in Leonard Baker, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970) 115; cf. Stimson diary, October 12, 1940.

134. PHA Hearings (Richardson testimony), I, 265-266. Richardson claimed that Roosevelt told him, "if the Japanese attack Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies, we would not enter the war; that even if they attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes, and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we could enter the war" (PHA Hearings, I, 266). Admiral Leahy, who participated

in the conversation, could not remember Roosevelt uttering such a statement but concluded that it was possible and that the president was despondent over the public's disinclination to fight. Roosevelt himself, Leahy insisted, would have gone to war to protect the Philippines if given the chance. See Leahy testimony, PHA Hearings, I, 356-357.

135. FR, 1940 , IV, 180; 185-186.

136. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , November 7, 1940, 150-151.

137. Stimson diary, November 6 and 12, 1940.

138. FR, 1940 , IV, 211.

139. December 1940 file, box 461, Hornbeck papers.

140. On its wide distribution, see accompanying papers in ibid. The State Department sent it to Roosevelt (see PSF:State Deptarment, June-December 1940, Roosevelt Library; also Gardner, New Deal Diplomacy , 145, and Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 309n). Lauchlin Currie's favorable comments appear in box 389, Hornbeck papers; Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 370; and Grew to Hull, February 7, 1941, in PHA Hearings, VI, 2917-2919. Wells liked it enough to send it off to Westmore Wilcox, Jr., who was convinced. See Wilcox to Welles, April 2, 1941, 740.0011 PW/241, RG 59, National Archives. Hornbeck also showed the memorandum to a number of appreciative business leaders in the Council on Foreign Relations, including Allen Dulles and T. W. Lamont (see boxes 151 and 272, Hornbeck papers). The only negative comments Hornbeck received came from General Marshall, who sent a short note to Stimson complaining that the memo did not sufficiently emphasize the Atlantic. Hornbeck responded in typical fashion with a twenty-page rebuttal, sent to Stimson on June 9, 1941. Copies of both can be found in boxes 389 and 462, Hornbeck papers.

139. December 1940 file, box 461, Hornbeck papers.

141. Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1255-1257.

142. FR, 1941 , IV, 6-8; also in PHA Hearings, II, 632-633. An almost identical letter, again drafted by Hornbeck, was sent by Roosevelt to Francis Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, on December 31, after Sayre had written expressing his fear that "any day Japan may start moving southwards." See E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters , II, 1093-1095, and miscellaneous folders, box 525, Hornbeck papers.

143. December 19, 1940 instructions, cited in Miner, "United States Policy," 78.

144. Joseph Ballantine, "Far Eastern Affairs," November 22, 1940 lecture to Naval War College, in box 127, Hornbeck papers.

145. Hull, Memoirs , I, 905.

1. Hull, Memoirs , II, 982.

2. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 89-91.

3. FR, 1941 , V, 1. Various export restrictions and other commercial obstacles forced Japan to turn to Thailand for rubber, tin, and even some rice.

4. Ibid., 5.

3. FR, 1941 , V, 1. Various export restrictions and other commercial obstacles forced Japan to turn to Thailand for rubber, tin, and even some rice.

4. Ibid., 5.

5. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 91-92; FR, 1941 , V, 12..

6. Ibid., 10, 15.

5. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 91-92; FR, 1941 , V, 12..

6. Ibid., 10, 15.

7. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 92.

8. FR, 1941 , V, 14.

9. Ibid., 16-17, 20.

8. FR, 1941 , V, 14.

9. Ibid., 16-17, 20.

10. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 93. See also "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Acceptance by the Governments of Thailand and France of the Proposal by the Japanese Government For Mediation in the Border Dispute Between Thailand and French Indo-China, January 24 1941"; "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning Japanese Delegation for the Armistice Conference Between Thailand and French Indo-China, January 29 1941"; and "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Armistice Agreement Between Thailand and French Indo-China, January 31, 1941" in [Japan] Board of Information, Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations (Tokyo, 1941), 3-5.

11. FR, 1941 V, 29.

12. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 133; Hull, Memoirs , II, 984.

13. FR, 1941 , V, 55.

14. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 303-305.

15. Grew cable, February 7, 1941, in Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 371.

16. February 1 diary entry, in Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 369.

17. This discussion of the private diplomacy of Drought and Walsh is based largely from the following sources: R.J.C. Butow, The John Doe Associates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974); John Boyle, "The Drought-Walsh Mission to Japan," Pacific Historical Review 34, 141-161; Ladislas Farago, The Broken Seal (New York: Random House, 1967), ch. 14; Lewis Strauss, Men and Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), 123-126; FR , 1941, IV, 14; Hull, Memoirs , II, 984-985.

18. FR, 1941 , IV, 14; Farago, Broken Seal , 175.

19. Hull, Memoirs , II, 984-985.

20. FR, 1941 , IV, 21-22. The exchange on this subject between Roosevelt and the State Department may also be found in PHA Exhibits, XX, 4284ff.

21. Farago, Broken Seal , 176.

22. FR, 1941 , IV, 21-22.

23. February 5 memorandum in FR, 1941 , IV, 22-27; also found in PHA Exhibits, XX, 4289-4291.

24. FR, 1941 , V, 61-62.

25. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 95-96.

26. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 176.

27. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 95-96.

28. FR, 1941 , V, 77. The French authorities also denied U.S. requests to purchase raw materials in Indochina but gave Japan (and Germany) free access to its resources. This action aggravated the crisis facing U.S. leaders. Ibid., 66-68.

27. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 95-96.

29. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long (February 11 and 17), 177, 182. Hull, Memoirs , II, 985-986, cited these chances as his low estimate.

30. Stimson diary, February 10, 1941.

31. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 387-388.

32. Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1307; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 139ff.

33. On his approval (and instigation) of the meeting, see Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1307. Grew informed the department of the conversation on February 14—see FR, 1941 , IV, 37-39. No reprimand was ever sent back. Furthermore, on February 26, Grew told Matsuoka of his approval of Dooman's message and handed him a copy of the conversation record. He must have had approval from the State Department to do this. See Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War , 326.

34. Hull, Memoirs , II, 988; FR, 1941 , IV, 39-40.

35. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 96; New York Times , February 20, 1941. See also Washington Star editorial, February 13, 1941, on Japan's threat to the "incalculable wealth" of the region.

36. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 96-97. See also "Statement of the Spokesman of the Board of Information Concerning Alarming Reports With Reference to the East Asiatic Situation, February 18, 1941" in [Japan] Board of Information, Official Announcements , 8-9.

37. Department of State Bulletin , February 22, 1941, 211.

38. FR, 1941 , V, 103-105.

39. FR, 1941 , V, 102.

40. Roth, Japan Strikes South , 99-102. See also, "Joint Communique of Japan, France and Thailand Concerning the Conclusion of the Mediation, March 11, 1941" and "Statement of the Foreign Office Concerning the Conclusion of the Mediation, March 11, 1941," in Board of Information, Official Announcements , 15-19.

41. These conversations, aimed at finding a feasible settlement for the Pacific area, continued with a short break in July until late November.

42. Hull, Memoirs , II, 989.

43. FR, Japan, 1931-1949 , II, 397.

44. FR, 1941 , V, 115-118. Lauchlin Currie, Roosevelt's adviser, reported after visiting China that "all of the people I talked to who had been trained in Japan or who claimed to know the Japanese thought that, being so methodical, they would consolidate their positions in Indochina and Thailand, construct air and supply bases before moving on Singapore, and would move on Singapore before venturing to take the Dutch East Indies." See his "Report on Some Aspects of the Current Political, Economic and Military Situation in China," March 15, 1941, in FR, 1941 , IV, 91.

45. FR, 1941 , V, 121.

46. Testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, PHA Hearings, IX, 4272-4278. Ingersoll was sent to London as director of the Navy's War Plans Division. All understandings reached with the British during these conversations were superseded by ABC-1. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific (Boston: Little Brown, 1948), 49.

47. PHA Exhibits, XV, 1487; Morison, Rising Sun , 49-50. The quotation (reprinted in Morison) is taken from the minutes of the conference.

48. For the whole text of the agreement, see Exhibit 49, PHA Exhibits, XV, 1485-1542. Quote is from ibid., 1491-1492. The same passage noted, "Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention" (ibid., 1491). For the relevant text from "Rainbow 5," see Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXXII, 70-71.

49. Testimony of Admiral Turner, Hart Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XXVI, 265. The admiral explained, "While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific. . .. The United States believed that our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific" (ibid., 266).

47. PHA Exhibits, XV, 1487; Morison, Rising Sun , 49-50. The quotation (reprinted in Morison) is taken from the minutes of the conference.

50. PHA Exhibits, XV, 1511-1512.

51. On the administration's approval of ABC-1, see Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 168; also, testimony of Admiral Stark, PHA Hearings, V, 2391. The Singapore agreements, known as ADB (for American-Dutch-British conversations), are reprinted in PHA Exhibits, XV, 1551-1584; see also Morison, Rising Sun , 53-56. On the importance of these later conversations, Herbert Feis writes that "this Singapore report left one lasting mark on American official thinking and planning.

The conferees defined the geographical limits on land and sea beyond which Japanese forces could not be permitted to go. ... They drew the line at which, in their judgment, military resistance against Japan was dictated. When in December next, Japanese warships and troop transports were reported on their way south to an unknown destination, Stark and Marshall advised the President to declare these limits, and to warn Japan that we would join the fight if they were passed. Had not the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, this line would have become the boundary between war and peace" (Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 170.

52. Farago, Broken Seal , 182.

53. Ibid., 183; see also FR, 1941 , IV, 123.

52. Farago, Broken Seal , 182.

53. Ibid., 183; see also FR, 1941 , IV, 123.

54. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 398-402. Many specific terms were cited, but those mentioned here were salient.

55. Hull, Memoirs , II 993.

56. FR, 1941 , IV, 136. Hornbeck wrote his analysis on April 7 based on his knowledge of the April 5 draft.

57. Ibid., 124-125.

56. FR, 1941 , IV, 136. Hornbeck wrote his analysis on April 7 based on his knowledge of the April 5 draft.

57. Ibid., 124-125.

58. FR, 1941 , IV, 150-152.

59. Ibid., 944; "Statement of the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, April 13, 1941," in Board of Information, Official Announcements , 29-30; Hull, Memoirs , II, 993.

58. FR, 1941 , IV, 150-152.

59. Ibid., 944; "Statement of the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, April 13, 1941," in Board of Information, Official Announcements , 29-30; Hull, Memoirs , II, 993.

60. Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 382 (April 22 diary entry).

61. Knox address, in box 268, Hornbeck papers. See also T. W. Lamont's address, "China and the Dictators," to Economic Club of Detroit, April 28, 1941, Hornbeck papers, and New York Herald Tribune , April 29, 1941.

62. Hull, Memoirs , II, 994-995; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 407-408.

63. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 407-409.

64. Nomura to Tokyo, April 17, 1941, in Department of Defense, The "MAGIC" Background of Pearl Harbor , Volume I (Washington: Department of Defense, 1978), 41.

65. Robert J.C. Butow, "The Hull-Nomura Conversations: A Fundamental Misconception," American Historical Review 65 (July 1960), 822-836.

66. Hull, Memoirs , II, 996-997; FR, 1941 , V, 132-136.

67. Hull, Memoirs , II, 997.

68. FR, 1941 , V, 138-139.

69. FR, 1941 , IV, 168.

70. FR, 1941 , IV, 191. Hornbeck believed Japan's pledges would be worthless in any case.

71. Department of State, United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 [China White Paper] (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 26-27. In early 1941,

the United States was sending about 4,000 tons of supplies to China each month. By November, this figure had risen to 15,000 tons.

72. Hull, Memoirs , II, 997. Hull was aware of increasing Japanese pressure on Indochina. See FR, 1941 , V, 144-146.

73. "Contents of the Convention and the Agreement, May 6, 1941," Board of Information, Official Announcements ; for an analysis of the agreement, see U.S. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, "Survey of Indo-China" (R&A No. 719), second edition, September 24, 1943, 38.

74. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 419, 422; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1000. As to Japan's "peaceful nature," Hull knew from Grant that the Japanese were planning a coup d'etat in Thailand to install a friendly government there (FR, 1941 , V, 150).

75. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1002.

76. Welles's covering letter to Roosevelt can be found in FR, 1941 , IV, 208; the actual excerpt from Grew's diary (along with the Welles letter) is in box 188, Hornbeck papers. It was first distributed throughout the State Department on May 19. The original diary entry is on pages 4904-4909, Grew papers.

77. Memorandum, May 14, 1941 (revised May 22), boxes 188 and 425, Hornbeck papers. Grew read the memo "with keen interest" (Grew letter to Hornbeck, June 17, 1941, Grew papers).

78. Marshall to Stimson, May 20, 1941, cited in Miner, "United States Policy," 210-211.

79. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service , 386. "In these opinions the Navy under Admiral Stark concurred . . .; the Pacific Ocean had for years been the Navy's assumed area of combat."

80. Stimson diary, April 24, May 5 and 6, 1941.

81. Miner, "United States Policy," 199, 231.

82. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service , 387; Morison, Rising Sun , 57.

83. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long (June 4, 1941), 202-203.

84. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1007; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 454-455.

85. Most of these later discussions centered around China, but the fate of Southeast Asia remained an unresolved issue (see FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 482). Hull realized well that Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere program "envisage[s] the placing of areas in the southern Pacific, including the Philippine Commonwealth, under Japanese economic and political hegemony" (FR, 1941 , V, 177). Hull's suspicions of Japanese intentions, and particularly his anxiety over China, were not new, as indicated by his February 5 letter to Roosevelt. Nonetheless, they owed much to the constant barrage of Hornbeck's memoranda; see, for example, his May 15 memo to Welles in FR, 1941 , IV, 192-193, and another written May 26, 1941, box 52, Hornbeck papers.

Secretary Hull heard similar arguments from the Chinese ambassador, Hu Shih. The old Chinese scholar understood that Americans were aiding his country less from sympathy than self-interest. In a letter to Hull on May 26, Hu Shih argued, like Hornbeck: "So far two things—and two things only—have prevented Japan from going to the aid of her European partners: First, the war in China has bogged down her millions of troops and service men and has tied up hundreds of ships for the transport of troops and for keeping these troops supplies. And, secondly, the presence of the American fleet in the Pacific has made Japan hesitate either to carry out her 'southward advance', or to raid the commerce and cut the supply lines for the British Commonwealths as well as for China. I am reasonably sure that, as long as China fights on and a sufficiently strong portion of the American fleet is maintained in the Pacific, there will not be active and effective Japanese assistance to the Axis powers in the Pacific. But, if Japan is freed from her war in China or from the danger of being effectively flanked by the American fleet, then no amount of appeasement, nor any Japanese pledge can stop Japan from playing the role of an active partner of the Axis powers and completely cutting off Australia and New Zealand from participation in the war in Africa and Asia, as well as effectively intercepting all material supplies from the United States and Canada"(FR, 1941 , IV, 225-227).

86. FR, 1941 , V, 141-142. U.S. leaders worried that the Dutch might accede to Japanese demands (FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 233, 250).

87. FR, 1941 , V, 174.

88. Ibid., 178.

87. FR, 1941 , V, 174.

88. Ibid., 178.

89. FR, 1941 , V, 178, 169-170.

90. Ibid., 206.

91. Ibid., 180-181, 186-188, 188-189, 192, 235.

89. FR, 1941 , V, 178, 169-170.

90. Ibid., 206.

91. Ibid., 180-181, 186-188, 188-189, 192, 235.

89. FR, 1941 , V, 178, 169-170.

90. Ibid., 206.

91. Ibid., 180-181, 186-188, 188-189, 192, 235.

92. FR, 1941 , IV, 276-277.

93. Ibid., 279.

92. FR, 1941 , IV, 276-277.

93. Ibid., 279.

94. Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 78; see also Nagaoka Shinjiro, "The Drive into Southern Indochina and Thailand," in Morley, The Fateful Choice , 236.

95. Ike, Japan's Decision , 80.

96. Ibid., 81-82.

95. Ike, Japan's Decision , 80.

96. Ibid., 81-82.

97. Memorandum by Joseph Ballantine to George Renchard, of the Secretary's Office, July 5, 1941 in FR, 1941 , IV, 291.

1. Hornbeck reported on July 5 that the best intelligence reports agreed that although Germany was pressuring Japan to enter the war

against the Soviet Union, Japan intended instead to consolidate and expand its position in Indochina (FR, 1941 , IV, 290).

2. Captain Schuirmann to Welles, July 9, 1941 in FR, 1941 , IV, 298-299.

3. Hull, Memoirs , II.

4. FR, 1941 , IV, 299. Chinese intelligence, which Chiang sent to FDR on July 8, confirmed these estimates (FR, 1941 , IV, 1004).

5. Foreign Office minutes, July 7, 1941, F8054/8054/61, Public Records Office, London.

6. FR, 1941 , IV, 288. Sumner Welles argued along similar lines to Harry Hopkins on July 7. See Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1950), 403.

7. PHA Exhibits, XII, 1.

8. Matsuoka (Tokyo) to Washington, July 2, 1941, ibid., 2; also in Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " Appendix II, 56-57. This cable was not decoded until August 8, however.

7. PHA Exhibits, XII, 1.

8. Matsuoka (Tokyo) to Washington, July 2, 1941, ibid., 2; also in Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " Appendix II, 56-57. This cable was not decoded until August 8, however.

9. Barnhart, Japan Prepares , 264-266, notes that some naval officers were willing to give diplomacy more time and that some in the Imperial Army still hoped to shift the direction of Japan's expansion against the Soviet Union.

10. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 228-229.

11. PHA Exhibits, XX, 4363; FR, 1941 , V, 213-214, 220. Darlan informed Ambassador Leahy on July 15, 1941, that Japan would soon occupy bases in southern Indochina, preparatory to moving south. When he met Darlan and Petain again on July 19th, Leahy delivered a message from Washington to the effect that "if Japan was the winner, the Japanese would take over French Indo-China; and if the Allies won, we would take it." See William Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 44.

12. FR, 1941 , IV, 329.

13. PHA Exhibits, XII, 2. The State Department also knew that Ambassador Nomura himself was utterly frustrated with his government's bad faith. The uncompromising Japanese foreign minister, in fact, considered the embassy to be shot through with "fellow travelers" who "willingly allowed the United States to mold your opinions." See Nomura cable to Tokyo, July 14, 1941, and Matsuoka cable to Washington, July 14, 1941, in Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " Appendix II, 73, 77.

14. New York Times , July 17, 1941, and July 18, 1941; Wall Street Journal , July 18, 1941.

15. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 522; FR, 1941 , IV, 334-335.

16. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1013.

17. Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " Appendix II, 450-451. This cable was translated July 24.

18. Ibid., 1013-1014; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 525.

17. Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " Appendix II, 450-451. This cable was translated July 24.

18. Ibid., 1013-1014; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 525.

19. Department of State, Peace and War , 127; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 342.

20. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy , 48.

21. Department of State, Peace and War , 127; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 342. 503.

22. Wall Street Journal , July 24, 1941.

23. FR, 1941, IV , 340-341.

24. Department of State Bulletin , July 26, 1941, 71-72.

25. Barnet Nover, a columnist for the Washington Post , wrote on July 25 that if Japan seized the Netherlands East Indies, it "would make this Nation dependent, in turn, on Japan's good will for certain indispensable supplies such as rubber and tin. That is why action against Japan is called for at once." Royce Briar of the San Francisco Chronicle explained the same day that the U.S. stake in opposing Japan's southward expansion was "a rational self-interest in our supplies of rubber and tin." The New York Times editorialized on July 24: "The Japanese Government must be made to understand clearly that aggressive action on its part in any one of three possible areas—Siberia, the Netherlands Indies or Indo-China—will be met by prompt retaliation on the part of the United States. In Siberia this interest is geographical: only a few miles of open water separate Siberia from American territory in Alaska. . .. In the Netherlands Indies our interest is economic: most of our tin and rubber, commodities indispensable to us in times either of war or peace, come from these islands and the surrounding area; with the Netherlands Indies in unfriendly hands, both our national defense and our peacetime commerce would be jeopardized. In Indo-China our interest is strategic." The editorial concluded: "Any action by Japan that threatens a legitimate American interest in the Far East should be met at once by efforts on our part to deal Japanese finance and industry and trade a deadly blow."

26. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 528-529. Roosevelt cabled Hopkins in London on July 26, 1941 to relay news of the proposal to Churchill. The president wrote that Japan's response would probably be unfavorable, but he offered the deal anyway in order to make "one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to South Pacific." See E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters , II, 1189-1190.

27. On his own, Grew had decided to speak with the Japanese foreign minister, Admiral Toyoda, "not only [to] make sure that Admiral Toyoda had clearly understood the full purport of the proposal but that I should also exert every ounce of my own influence to secure it acceptance." The ambassador was shocked to find that the foreign minister knew nothing of the plan, which Nomura had hardly men-

tioned in his reports back to Tokyo. Nomura was immediately instructed to send a complete report, but by then the embargo and freeze were in effect. See Grew diary entry for July 27, 1941, in Ten Years in Japan , 411-412. Even so, Japan probably would not have accepted the proposal, as it granted them nothing they did not already have and would have prevented them from pursuing their course of expansion. Roosevelt's chief intent, probably, was to expose the false pretenses behind Japan's foreign policy.

28. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 317-318.

29. New York Times , July 26, 1941; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 266-267. The embargo actually overcame resistance by the Japanese Navy to pursuing its southward advance, which now saw the Indies as a vital source of its own raw material needs (Chihiro Hosoya, "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-US Relations, 1938-1941," Journal of Peace Research (1968), 97-115). Within the United States itself, the freeze order also seemed to portend war. Roosevelt put the Philippines on a war footing on July 26 (Washington Post , July 27, 1941). News of the Japanese seizure of Indochina and the resultant freeze caused sharp advances on the commodity markets—a sign of expected trouble. Wall Street Journal , July 26, 1941; see also National City Bank of New York, Economic Conditions, Governmental Finance, United States Securities , August 1941; and "Threat to Far Eastern Supplies," Barron's 21 (August 4, 1941), 6.

30. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 245, 246-247; Washington Post , July 29, 1941.

31. New York Times , August 2, 1941; Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 248. Much of the responsibility for making the embargo total, possibly without Roosevelt or Hull intending it so, rests with Dean Acheson. See Irvine Anderson, Jr., The Standard Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 178; Barnhart, Japan Prepares , 232; Utley, Going to War , 153-156.

32. Department of State, Peace and War , 88.

33. "Gallup and Fortune Polls," Public Opinion Quarterly 4 (March 1940), 114. On the administration's cautious attitude, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 233 (August 4, 1939 entry) and Ickes, Secret Diary , 96.

34. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 81. A few days earlier, Long noted that it would be a mistake to provoke Japan, because the Navy's inability to mobilize far from the United States' shores "lays bear the route to the Dutch East Indies" (Long diary, April 5, 1940, in Long papers, Library of Congress).

35. This episode has been described above, but see Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East," 33. See also Dooman's statement to Ohashi,

supra. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 92-93; Blum, Morgenthau Diaries , 350-353; State Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary (China) , I, 351-352.

36. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 10.

37. Ibid., 150.

36. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 10.

37. Ibid., 150.

38. E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters , II, 1077.

39. Ickes admitted the possibility that Japan would attack the Netherlands East Indies if cut off from U.S. petroleum products. See Ickes, Secret Diary , III, 132, 299, for his views in 1940 and pages 537, 543-548, 552-560 for his correspondence with Roosevelt in June. Roosevelt's reply is printed in the Ickes diary, 567-568, and in E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters ,II, 1174. T. A. Bisson commented on the discrepancy between the great hostility shown by the administration to Tokyo and its refusal to embargo oil to Japan: "[T]he Administration firmly resisted considerable popular pressure for an embargo on oil shipments, which remained high despite the reduction in exports of other war materials. In June an oil shortage threatened to develop on the east coast of the United States. . .. To meet this situation, exports of petroleum products were placed under the license system on June 20 and an embargo was imposed on shipments from east coast ports except to the British Empire, Egypt and the western hemisphere. No restriction was placed on shipments from the west coast. These regulations did not, therefore, seriously interfere with the Japanese trade, except in the case of Pennsylvania lubricating oil. Further evidence that the United States was handling Japan with gloves was seen in the omission of any reference to Japan in the President's speech of May 27 proclaiming a national emergency, and in the failure to include Japan in the general order of June 14 freezing the assets of Axis nations in this country" (Bisson, America's Far Eastern Policy , 121-122).

40. Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East," 202; see also Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 227.

41. Hornbeck memorandum, July 16, 1941 in box 145, Hornbeck papers.

42. PHA Hearings, V, 2384.

43. Ibid., 326.

42. PHA Hearings, V, 2384.

43. Ibid., 326.

44. FR, 1941 , IV, 325.

45. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 527-528.

46. Ibid., 531.

45. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 527-528.

46. Ibid., 531.

47. Department of State Bulletin , July 26, 1941, 72. The Volunteer Participation Committee was a civilian defense organization. Roosevelt's statement is reprinted in most collections of official foreign policy documents from this period. Its official quality may also be gleaned from Acheson, Present at the Creation , 25, and Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 23.

48. Looking back on the debate, Joseph Grew noted that he had opposed sterner measures against Japan in 1940. "In those years we were certainly not in such a position [to go to war], either morally or physically, for it might have meant fighting a two-ocean war with a one-ocean navy. I felt through those years that the term of 'appeasement' to characterize our policy was inadequate. It seemed to me to be a policy of plain common sense. Later, when Japan began to surround the Philippines and to threaten our own and Great Britain's life-lines in the east, and when we were at least getting ready in our country for what might come, I took the position that embargoes should then be applied, as our own national security was being menaced." Grew letter to Richard Gurley, October 5, 1943, Grew papers, Houghton Library.

49. Telegram translated August 4; PHA Exhibits, XII, 9.

50. Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1284.

51. Hull, Memoirs , I, 270.

52. See FR, 1941 V, passim, for information on Japanese troop movements threatening Thailand; Exhibit 33, PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1346-1384.

53. Stimson diary, August 8 and 12, 1941; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service , 387-388.

54. Memorandum by Cecil Gray, assistant to the secretary of state, August 2, 1941, in FR, 1941 , IV, 358-359.

55. On the various "routes" used by the China lobbyists, see FR, 1941 , V, "The Undeclared War," passim. For more on the lobbying effort, see J. M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 145. For a typical cable from Lattimore, see FR, 1941 , IV, 361-362.

56. Hornbeck memorandum to Welles, July 31, 1941, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

57. FR, 1941 , IV, 358-359. See also Blum, Morgenthau Diaries , 380.

58. FR, 1941 , V, 260.

59. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , 549-50; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1016.

60. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1016.

61. FR, 1941 , I, 347-348. The U.S. military was in full agreement with the civilians on this course. General Miles argued on September 23 that "forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area, and also the hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact." See Hornbeck memorandum, September 30, 1941, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

62. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , 552-553.

63. Ibid., 553.

62. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , 552-553.

63. Ibid., 553.

64. Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, II, 423; Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 439.

65. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 556-559.

66. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1022.

67. Hornbeck memorandum, August 21, 1941, box 188, Hornbeck papers.

68. Stimson diary, August 9, 1941. He reported this directly to Hull.

69. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1022. On Grew's reaction to the proposal, see Waldo Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), 339-350.

70. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1022.

71. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1024; Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, II, 425. Hornbeck argued along somewhat similar lines in a memorandum written on September 5, "The chief danger attendant upon the holding of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister is that if such a meeting is held there must emanate from it an agreement. The only kind of an agreement that could possibly be arrived at would be an agreement in most general terms. Such an agreement would not (in the light of what we know of this country's attitude and policy and of what we are now given regarding Japan's attitude and policy) represent any real meeting of the minds of the people of the two countries thus committed by it" (FR, 1941 , IV, 425-428).

72. Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, II, 425; Stimson diary, October 6, 1941.

73. FR, 1941 , IV, 426; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1024. A number of memoranda by Hornbeck specifically emphasized this point.

74. Hornbeck memorandum, September 5, 1941, "Reasons which make disadvantageous any personal meeting between the President and Prince Konoye," in box 145, Hornbeck papers.

75. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1024. Or, as the secretary put it during the Pearl Harbor investigation, such a meeting "would have a critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese" PHA Hearings, II, 425.

76. Hornbeck memorandum, September 5, 1941, "Reasons why it is contrary to the interests of the United States to enter at this time into any agreement of a general political nature with Japan," in box 145, Hornbeck papers; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 718.

77. PHA Hearings, V, 2092. The estimate was prepared by Hayes Kroner, and entitled "Japanese-American Relations." See PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1357-1359. Cf. Stimson diary, October 6, 1941.

78. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1026-1027.

79. Ike, Japan's Decision , 129-133. This decision was reaffirmed at the September 6 conference (ibid., 133-163). The policy of southward advance was reaffirmed at this meeting.

78. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1026-1027.

79. Ike, Japan's Decision , 129-133. This decision was reaffirmed at the September 6 conference (ibid., 133-163). The policy of southward advance was reaffirmed at this meeting.

80. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 608-609; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1028-1029.

81. Ike, Japan's Decision , 135-I36 ("The Minimum Demands of Our Empire to Be Attained Through Diplomatic Negotiations with the United States [and Great Britain], and the Maximum Concessions to Be Made by Our Empire").

82. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1028.

83. Ibid., 1029.

82. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1028.

83. Ibid., 1029.

84. FR, 1941 , IV, 497-499.

85. Examples may be found in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

86. FR, 1941 , IV, 436-441.

87. Quoted in Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 710.

88. FR, 1941 , IV, 459-461.

89. See for example Hornbeck's memorandum of October 22, citing portions of this Gauss dispatch, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

90. FR, 1941 , IV, 478-480.

91. These points are confirmed by Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 721. See also the following memoranda and communications: Grew to Hull, August 14, 740.0011 PW/448; Reed to Hull, September 11, 740.0011 PW/518; Reed to Hull, October 3, 740.0011 PW/551; Grew to Hull, October 10, 1941, 740.0011 PW /560, RG 59; Leahy to Hull, September 29, FR, 1941 , V, 298-299; Leahy to Hull, October 2, ibid., 302-303; Reed (Consul at Hanoi) to Hull, October 3, ibid., 305-306; Grew to Hull, October 8, ibid., 315; Leahy to Hull, October 8, ibid., 313-314; Leahy to Hull, October 11, ibid., 317; Reed to Hull, October 14, ibid., 319; Peck to Hull, October 15, ibid., 320-322; Reed to Hull, October 17, ibid., 329-330; Browne (Consul at Saigon) to Hull, October 29, ibid. Browne pointed out that in the preceding two weeks Japan had put into Indochina more than 30,000 new troops (mostly into the south), as well as all kinds of new military equipment. The building of airfields, barracks, and other structures was moving ahead rapidly, as if in preparation for an invasion to the south. Also see Browne to Hull, November 3, ibid., 332. Hornbeck contrasted Japan's continuing encroachments on Indochina with the administration's position that it should withdraw as a precondition for better relations with the United States. "While Japanese 'moderates' . . . are still carrying on conversations with the United States envisaging the possibility of some significant settlement between Japan and the United States, while these representatives declare that the Japanese Government is in accord with the principles to which the United States is

90. FR, 1941 , IV, 478-480.

committed," he wrote, "a new Japanese move of aggression is now ordered by the Japanese Government" (FR, 1941 , IV, 493-494). Horn-beck went so far as to argue that Japan's hedging of its obligations toward its Axis partners proved that Japan could never be trusted to live up to its commitments. See Hornbeck memorandum, September 27, 1941, box 463, Hornbeck papers. Hull felt the same way. "This Government finds it especially difficult at this time to reconcile the reported Japanese actions in Indochina with recent declarations of high Japanese officials that Japan's fundamental policy is based upon the maintenance of peace and pursuit of courses of peace," he wired Grew on October 2. Hull to Grew, October 2, FR, 1941 , V, 304-305.

92. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 660.

93. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 3, 1941. PHA Exhibits, XII, 51. The ambassador did believe, however, that it should not "be considered as an absolutely hopeless situation."

94. See text of the 57th Liaison Conference, October 4, 1941, in Ike, Japan's Decision , 179-181. Bishop Walsh described the Japanese reaction when news of Hull's October 2 reply came in: "With some difficulty, the protagonists of peace in the Japanese government . . . had held Cabinet, army, navy and all the other elements in line, or at least in quiescence, pending the conclusion of the negotiations. . .. Many, both in the civil government and the army, now think that the deception goes back to the beginning, that is to say, that the American government wanted only to draw them out in order to gain time, and to get a statement of their policy in order to condemn it. . .. After the receipt of the message it was very difficult to make any one in the Japanese government believe in the sincerity of the American government" (FR, 1941 , IV, 527-539).

95. Hornbeck as usual took a vanguard position, declaring even that an apparent diplomatic victory with regard to China would really produce a defeat in Southeast Asia: "If the Japanese troops were withdrawn from China now in consequence of a diplomatic arrangements distinguished from a physical and material failure to make good their effort of conquest, the withdrawal would be made only for the purpose of preparing for a bigger and better assault a) upon some other region now and b) upon China at a later date." See Hornbeck memorandum, October 14, box 145, Hornbeck papers.

96. United Press news flash from Tokyo, October 17, 1941, quoted in Hornbeck memorandum, October 18, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

97. Memorandum of R. E. Schuirmann, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 419.

98. Stimson diary, October 16, 1941.

99. Tokyo to Washington, #698, in PHA Exhibits, XII, 81.

100. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 22, 1941, ibid.

101. Tokyo to Washington (unnumbered), ibid., 82.

99. Tokyo to Washington, #698, in PHA Exhibits, XII, 81.

100. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 22, 1941, ibid.

101. Tokyo to Washington (unnumbered), ibid., 82.

99. Tokyo to Washington, #698, in PHA Exhibits, XII, 81.

100. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 22, 1941, ibid.

101. Tokyo to Washington (unnumbered), ibid., 82.

102. Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori complained to Sir Robert Craigie in late October that the United States was deliberately foot-dragging to draw out the negotiations, which Japan could not continue for long. E. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War , 178-179.

103. PHA Exhibits, XII, 90.

104. Ibid., 92-93.

103. PHA Exhibits, XII, 90.

104. Ibid., 92-93.

105. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 704.

106. Ike, Japan's Decision , 208-239.

107. PHA Exhibits, XII, 100; Tokyo to Washington, November 11 (#762) and November 15 (#775), ibid., 116, 130; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1057.

106. Ike, Japan's Decision , 208-239.

107. PHA Exhibits, XII, 100; Tokyo to Washington, November 11 (#762) and November 15 (#775), ibid., 116, 130; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1057.

108. Tokyo to Washington, November 4, 1941 (#726), PHA Exhibits, XII, 94-96.

109. "Instances Since the Outbreak of the Present Hostilities in China in which Japanese Statements of Policy Have Proved Unreliable," October 11, 1940. Prepared with Alger Hiss. Leo Pasvolsky of-rice files, box 1, National Archives.

110. The Japanese plan did not explicitly bar U.S. aid to China; it provided only for no U.S. interference in the peace negotiations between Japan and China. But Hull knew that Japan really meant "no aid" in place of "no interference." In one telegram to Nomura, for instance, the Japanese government explained: "[I]t goes without saying . . . that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China (This promise includes cessation of activies for aiding CHIANG)" (Tokyo to Washington, November 10 (#755), pt. 1, PHA Exhibits, 107-108). In part 2 of the message cited above, Japan's leaders reaffirmed that if the United States was of the intention "of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal" (Ibid., 108).

111. The correspondence on the "imminent" Japanese attack on Kunming began on October 28 and is reprinted in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1078ff. The letter quoted here is in ibid., 1476-1478. Cf. Stimson diary, November 4, 1941.

112. On November 5, after a conference with Hull, Marshall, and Stark, Stanley Hornbeck drafted a memorandum with these considerations in mind: "Suppose that . . . by virtue of a break-down in Chinese morale . . . Chinese resistance to Japan were to cease. Japan would then be relieved of the entanglement of her 'China Incident' and would be in a position to turn her fleet and whatever else she still possesses of capacity for military adventuring into new moves either southward or northward or eastward. Should it not be a constant object of British

and American political, economic and military strategy to keep China's moral and material capacity to resist Japan at a high enough point to ensure against a termination of Chinese resistance?" (PHA Hearings, III, 1395). The Japanese minister of embassy, Wakasugi Kaname, summed up the U.S. position on China in a cable to Tokyo on October 29, 1941: "The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the aforementioned 'peace on the Pacific' issue. On the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United States. It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are working on the Treasury Department in particular and the United States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between Japan and the United States. Since China is entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure." See Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 29, 1941 (#1008), in PHA Exhibits, XII, 86-87.

113. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 708-710. Perhaps to gain more time, Hull also suggested bringing an influential representative of the Chinese government into the talks, to help promote friendly relations with Japan and speed a peace settlement. The effect would also have been to reduce Chinese suspicion of U.S. motives.

114. Ibid., 717-718.

115. Quote from Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 304.

116. Tokyo to Washington, November 16, 1941, PHA Exhibits, XII, 138.

117. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1062-1063; Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 233.

118. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 755-756.

119. Washington to Tokyo, November 20, 1941, #1147, pts. 1&2, PHA Exhibits, XII, 161-62.

120. Tokyo to Washington, November 24, 1941, #821, ibid., 172. An official Japanese analysis of this final plan reaffirms the contention that Japan required a cessation of U.S. aid to China: "Regarding the above proposal, the Secretary of State contended that it was impossible for the American Government to accept the item 4 of our proposal and cease aiding the Chiang Kai-shek regime unless Japan clarified her relations with the Tripartite Pact and gave assurances regarding

119. Washington to Tokyo, November 20, 1941, #1147, pts. 1&2, PHA Exhibits, XII, 161-62.

her adoption of a peaceful policy, and that the President's offer to act as 'introducer' of Sino-Japanese peace was predicated upon Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. Thereupon, the Japanese Government instructed the two Ambassadors to request reconsideration by the American Government, pointing out to the Secretary of State that, in case direct negotiations were opened between Japan and Chungking through 'introduction' by the President, the continuation of aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime by the United States, the peace introducer, would constitute an interference with the realization of peace, and that the American contention was therefore inconsistent"("Summary of the Japanese-American Negotiations, December 7, 1941," in [Japan] Board of Information, Official Announcements , 95).

121. On November 18, 1941, Nomura actually cabled his government suggesting that it agree to return to the pre-July status quo; the reply came back the next day: "[T]he internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored." A MAGIC translation of this cable was available on November 20 (Tokyo to Washington, November 19, #798, PHA Exhibits, XII, 155-156).

122. Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5370-5371; see also Hull, Memoirs , II, 1070. Herbert Feis's insight into the collapse of Japanese-American negotiations should also be kept in mind: "Even if Japan was genuinely ready for reform, the repentence had come too late. The situation had grown too entangled by then for minor measures, its momentum too great. Germany-Italy-Japan had forced the creation of a defensive coalition more vast than the empire of the Pacific for which Japan plotted. This was not now to be quieted or endangered by a temporary halt along the fringe of the Japanese advance" (Herbert Feis, "War Came at Pearl Harbor: Suspicions Considered," Yale Review 45 (Spring 1956).

123. Department of State, Peace and War , 802-807; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 757ff. The British government approved of Hull's negotiating position: "The Foreign Office agreed with Mr. Hull's firmness in insisting that nothing should be conceded to Japan except in return for definite Japanese action. They doubted whether the Japanese would withdraw from Indo-China on the terms put forward by Mr. Kurusu, but the offer would be worth considering if it were not accompanied by unacceptable conditions. We should have to take care to avoid any suggestion of abandoning China; it therefore seemed better not to make even limited economic concessions until an understanding had been reached about an ultimate settlement in China." E. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), 179.

124. For further evidence, see memo of conversation, December 5, 1941, FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 774.

125. Stimson diary, September 12, October 6, 7, 28, 1941; also Stark to Kimmes, PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1064-1065.

126. The timing on this draft is still unclear. The State Department claims Roosevelt prepared it after November 20; however, Langer and Gleason (Undeclared War , 872) suggest that it was ready by November 17.

127. FR, 1941 , IV, 626; PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1109. Earlier that month Roosevelt had toyed with a different formulation. Stimson shot it down: "He was trying to think of something which would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to that: first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feet that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington Conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into such an arrangement." See Stimson diary, November 6, 1941.

128. Secretary Morgenthau began work on a draft on November 17 (see FR, 1941 , IV, 606-613). His proposals were long and unwieldy. The Division of Far Eastern Affairs took up the idea on November 19th (ibid., 621-625; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1072).

129. For the various drafts of the modus vivendi , see FR, 1941 , IV, 627-630, 635-637, 637-640, 642-644, 645-646; final draft, 661-665.

130. Ibid., 645-646.

129. For the various drafts of the modus vivendi , see FR, 1941 , IV, 627-630, 635-637, 637-640, 642-644, 645-646; final draft, 661-665.

130. Ibid., 645-646.

131. Admiral Stark and an assistant to General Marshall saw the draft on November 21 (PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1106).

132. FR, 1941 , IV, 640.

133. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1170.

134. FR, 1941 , IV, 652-653.

135. Senate Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary (China) , I, 530; FR, 1941 , IV, 660-661. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau received a copy of this communication, passing it along to Hull and Roosevelt on November 26. Stimson also passed it along. On that morning, Stimson recorded in his diary, "Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over—to tell them that he has no other proposi-

tion at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition—when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above—that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose"(Stimson diary, November 26, 1941). A similar message reached the White House via the Lattimore-Curre route; see PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1160.

136. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1300; Winant to Hull, FR, 1941 , IV, 665.

137. Hornbeck autobiography, box 497, Hornbeck papers. Actually the State Department knew of Churchill's views before the final telegram came in at 12:55 A.M. on November 26. The actual decision to dump the modus vivendi was made by Hull and Hornbeck on November 25.

138. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1081.

139. FR, 1941, IV , 665-666.

140. Stimson diary, November 26, 1941.

141. Hull offered the ten-point plan merely as a final summary of the U.S. position, as a record for posterity and not in the hopes of peace. Roosevelt told Stimson that although the State Department had closed up the negotiations, "they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull." Stimson "found out afterward that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position." (Stimson diary, November 27, 1941).

142. Ibid. Actually, Hull may have hoped to further delay Japan by some relaxation of economic pressure, but hardliners such as Hornbeck won out. Hull to Hornbeck, November 28, 1941, box 49, Hull papers.

1. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 259.

2. Testimony of Admiral Turner, Hart Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XVI, 263-264, 267. See also testimony of Admiral Newton, ibid., 340-341; also Morison, Rising Sun , 56.

1. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 259.

2. Testimony of Admiral Turner, Hart Inquiry, PHA Exhibits, XVI, 263-264, 267. See also testimony of Admiral Newton, ibid., 340-341; also Morison, Rising Sun , 56.

3. FR, 1941 , V, 254-256.

4. Churchill to General Smuts, November 9, 1941, reprinted in Churchill, The Grand Alliance , 593.

5. Exhibit 22-C, PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1275-1291; quote from 1279-1280.

6. See p. 188 herein; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 556-559.

7. Stimson diary, August 19, 1941.

8. Cited in Raymond Esthus, "President Roosevelt's Commitment to Britain to Intervene in a Pacific War," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 50 (June 1963), 32.

9. Gerow to Marshall, November 3, 1941, in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1066-1067.

10. "Minutes of Meeting (Joint Board)," November 3, 1941, ibid., 1062-1065.

9. Gerow to Marshall, November 3, 1941, in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1066-1067.

10. "Minutes of Meeting (Joint Board)," November 3, 1941, ibid., 1062-1065.

11. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1061-62; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1057; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor , 302. Note that any advance south of the 10th parallel was explicitly viewed as a threat to Singapore. See Stark memo to Roosevelt, November 27, 1941, in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1083.

12. Stimson diary, November 7, 1941; Stimson testimony, PHA Exhibits, XI, 5420.

13. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1058.

14. Ibid. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox gave the first of these speeches on November 11, when he described the nature of Japan's threat in the Pacific and the chance that "at any moment war may be forced upon us" (Department of State, Peace and War , 785).

13. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1058.

15. On efforts to strengthen the defenses of the Philippines, see Stimson testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5420-5421; Stimson diary, November 10, 1941. The poison gas episode is from Stimson diary, November 21.

16. Tokyo to Washington, November 22, 1941, #812, in PHA Exhibits, XII, 165.

17. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1083. Hull's hopelessness has already been described by his comment to Stimson on November 27 that he had "washed his hands of it." Note also his statement to the British ambassador on November 29 to the effect that "the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and . . . the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy" (Department of State, Peace and War , 816-817).

18. Stimson diary, November 27, 1941; also, Stimson testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5423.

19. Stimson diary, November 27.

20. Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, November 27, 1941, FR, 1941 , IV, 667.

21. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1406; also Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " IV Appendix, 117. On Roosevelt's decision to send out the theater warnings, see Stimson testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5423.

22. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1328; also quoted in dispatch by Stark, November 28, 1941, in ibid., 1407; PHA Hearings, XI, 5424; PHA Hearings, III, 1032-1033; and Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " IV Appendix, 119. The final line clearly undermines conspiracy theories that the administration was prepared to lose the fleet at Pearl Harbor in order to get the country into war.

21. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1406; also Department of Defense, "MAGIC, " IV Appendix, 117. On Roosevelt's decision to send out the theater warnings, see Stimson testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5423.

23. Stimson testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5426; Stimson diary, November 28, 1941.

24. Stimson diary, November 28, 1941.

25. See recollections of Harry Hopkins, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 428.

26. Stimson diary, November 28, 29, 30, 1941.

27. FR, 1941 , IV, 675-678.

28. Ibid., 678-680.

27. FR, 1941 , IV, 675-678.

28. Ibid., 678-680.

29. A copy of the editorial, with a note of Hull's request for a check of its many figures by his Far Eastern Affairs branch, is in Leo Pasvolsky office file, box 2, RG 59, National Archives.

30. Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 380 (December 1, 1941 entry). Hornbeck seems to have first prepared an intermediate draft based almost entirely on those submitted by Knox and Stimson; see PHA Exhibits, Exhibit 161A, XIX, 3520-3533. The style of the State Department draft is that of Hornbeck; see also, FR, 1941 , IV, 689 fn.

31. FR, 1941 , IV, 689-697.

32. Stimson diary, December 2, 1941.

33. Influential media, however, continued to frame the growing conflict in terms of "tin and rubber." See for example, the editorial "Spotlight on Singapore," New York Times , December 3, 1941, and "If War Reaches the Pacific," Barron's 21 (November 17, 1941), 6.

34. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 386.

35. Washington embassy to Foreign Office, December 1, 1941, PREM3 156/5, Public Record Office; Anthony Eden memo to War Department, December 2, 1941, ibid.; Woodward, British Foreign Policy , 186-187.

34. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 386.

36. Woodward, British Foreign Policy , 187. See also S. W. Kirby, Singapore: the Chain of Disaster (London: Cassell, 1971), 109-111, 122-123.

37. S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan , Volume I (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), 175; G. Herman Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942 (Adelaide: The Griffen Press, 1957), 462-463.

Brooke-Popham was "the most important military figure in Malaya." See Creighton testimony, PHA Hearings, X, 5086.

38. PHA Hearings, X, 5082-5083.

39. PHA Exhibits, Exhibit 40, XIV, 1412; Husband Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), 113.

40. Stimson diary, November 25, 1941; Stimson testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5421-5422.

41. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1407.

42. Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley (Rtd.), "The Strange Assignment of USS Lanikai," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 83 (September 1962), 71-84. Tolley was captain of the Lanikai , the only vessel actually sent out under this order from Roosevelt. Tolley believes the president ordered this mission to create a casus belli, as do all of the early revisionists who base their contention on the reasoning of Frank Keefe in the Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 266-P. See also the exchange in United States Naval Institute Proceedings 89 (October 1963), 125-129, and Kemp Tolley, Cruise of the Lanikai (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1974).

43. Ingersoll testimony, PHA Hearings, IX, 4251-4254. For other discussion on this incident, see Ibid., II, 955ff; III, 1248; V, 2190; VI, 2670, 2873; X, 4807. The Lanikai had a dead radio—making it of no use at all for "reconnaissance." See United States Naval Institute Proceedings 89 (October 1963), 125-129.

44. Tolley, Lanikai , 73-74.

45. Toland, Infamy , 291-292.

46. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 785-786. The message was delivered 10:30 P.M. December 7 (Tokyo time). See Grew, Ten Years in Japan , 497.

47. Testimony of Commander Schultz, PHA Hearings, X, 4662.

48. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 428; c.f. Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), 379f. Stimson felt much the same way. He recorded in his diary for December 7: "When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging" (Stimson diary, December 7, 1941).

1. A. J. Muste, "Where Are We Going," in Nat Hentoff, (ed.), The Essays of A. J. Muste (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 236. (I

am indebted to Noam Chomsky for pointing out that passage.) Muste put things baldly, but he was not alone. In 1942, Newsweek business editor Milton Van Slyck called the conflict "essentially one of minerals," between "haves" and "have-nots" (cited in Eckes, Jr., Global Struggle , 84.) In 1940, the National Policy Committee, which was one of several propaganda arms for the Council on Foreign Relations and which included such State Department officials as Stanley Hornbeck and Leo Pasvolsky, convened a postwar planning committee that concluded that only an Anglo-American condominium could enforce peace, much as Rome had centuries earlier. "They own half the earth; they carry on two-thirds of the world's trade; they have control of more than fifty percent of every essential material and practically all of the world's gold; their armed strength as well as their economic strength is such as to give them a clear-cut preponderance," the committee observed. One central aim of this Pax America would be to overthrow the autarkic economic system of the 1930s. "To function, modern industry requires supplies and markets over wide areas. If we are not to undergo a revolutionary recasting of economic life, we must recognize the failure of the autarchic experiment and the need for a reinterpretation of the idea of sovereignty as a condition of peace." See memorandum no. 9 of the Special Committee on Steps Toward a Durable Peace, 1940.

2. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 32. Keohane does not endorse simplistic theories that assume a hegemonic state can ensure either economic or military order.

3. Emeny, Strategy of Raw Materials , 174.

4. Raymond Vernon, Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the Quest for Oil and Ores (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 1-2.

5. A. W. Griswold, "The United States and the Far East," paper presented to the Conference for Instructors on "The Bases of American Foreign Policy," April 28-30, 1939, pamphlet edition (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1938).

6. Owen Lattimore, "American Responsibilities in the Far East," Virginia Quarterly Review 16 (Spring 1940), 162. Probably hundreds of articles were written in magazines and newspapers from 1939 to 1941 protesting the administration's failure to embargo trade with Japan.

7. Charles Yost memo, April 9, 1941, FR, 1941 , IV, 805-806.

8. "Policy in Regard to the Far East," March 15, 1935, box 196, Hornbeck papers.

9. Laurence Salisbury memo, January 30, 1939, 793.94/14667 1/2, RG 59, National Archives.

10. Grew diary, November 1940, in Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1232-1233.

11. Stimson to Roosevelt, December 20, 1941, in PSF Box 1, Roosevelt papers; also in Stimson diary, December 20, 1941.

12. FR, 1935 , III, 855-857.

13. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long (September 9, 1940), 129.

14. Stimson diary, November 29, 1940. See also Berle to Hull, December 15, 1941, box 49, Hull papers; Joseph Ballantine autobiography, 210, box 1, Ballantine papers.

15. Stimson diary, July 18, 1940. Roosevelt himself told the White House Correspondents' Association on March 15, 1941, that aid to China was geared to keeping Japan's army "busy and more or less tied up" so it could not "move southward in full force" (text of Roosevelt's address in box 52, Hornbeck papers). Even without access to all the documents, early analysts were able to discern this strategy clearly enough. See, for example, Bisson, Far Eastern Policy , 123.

The strategy was mapped out at the 1939 conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, where it was "emphasized that if economic sanctions are effective, they will inevitably force the nation affected to adopt some form of retaliatory measures in self-defense. In the case of Japan, they might take the form of . . . an attack on Netherlands India, Malaya or Indo-China in an effort to secure at least a partial replacement of American supplies, especially oil. It was suggested by some that in such an event, the United States might feel compelled . . . to go to the defense of the Philippines and the colonial areas of Southeastern Asia. In view of this possibility, certain members expressed the view that Japan would be unlikely to undertake new and costly military adventures so long as China continued to put up effective resistance. If, therefore, the United States wished to avoid the risk of provoking a Japanese attack on the countries of Southeastern Asia, the surest method was to accompany economic measures against Japan with really substantial aid to China"(Mitchell and Holland, Problems of the Pacific, 1939 , 103).

Dean Acheson voiced similar views that year. In a speech at Yale on "An American Attitude Toward Foreign Affairs," he said: "In the Far East the prophylactic measures take the form of hindering and creating deterrent hazards to the Japanese domination of Asia and the elimination of the white populations from the South Seas. To state the means by which this can be done requires technical knowledge to which I cannot pretend. One obvious objective is to strengthen resistance to the Japanese and weaken their striking power. Whether it is practicable to get necessary material to the Chinese through cooperation with powers upon their borders and to cut off supplies from the

Japanese, I do not know. Neither do I know the risks involved. But practicality and risk are the factors which should govern. Another objective is to create a menace to imperialistic adventure in the South Seas. Naval men can enlighten us as to whether strong bases in the Philippines and Guam are practicable means to this end." See Dean Acheson, Morning and Noon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1965), 272-273.

16. "In Greater East Asia," Fortune 23 (April 1941), 89.

17. Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1368.

18. "There are evidences of a growing feeling among the Chinese," Ambassador Gauss reported to Hull, "that the American-British policy of aid to China is designed for the purpose of maintaining Chinese resistance to Japan in order that America and Great Britain may not have to engage in hostilities in the Far East" (FR, 1941 , IV, 396). By making little pretense to the contrary, one U.S. intelligence analysis argued, the aid program did not accomplish its full objective: "American aid to China has been based on self-interest, not sentiment. The first two loans, for instance, were purely commercial deals. Later assistance has seemed to be directed chiefly at keeping China in the war to check Japan. This has been well-calculated realism. It would be a mistake to assume that it has seemed otherwise to the Chinese. In short, the American program has lacked a certain higher realism; little has been done to hearten Chinese morale or to bolster the democratic cause within China." See "American Aid to China," Far Eastern Study No. 21, U.S. Office of Coordinator of Information, Research and Analysis Branch, Far Eastern Section, n. d.

19. Hiss memorandum, box 462, Hornbeck papers.

20. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), 288-289.

21. The participants were Henry Wallace and Senators Alven Barkley, Charles McNary, Tom Connolly, Warren Austin, Hiram Johnson; Speaker Sam Rayburn; and congressmen Sol Bloom and Charles Easton (Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 432-433). The text of Roosevelt's statement is in PHA Exhibits, XIX, 3503.

22. Schroeder, Axis Alliance , 100-101.

23. David Lawrence, in the San Francisco Chronicle , September 30, 1940.

24. John Stewart, "U.S. Exports to Manchukuo Reach New High," Far Eastern Survey (March 29, 1939), 82-83. For another optimistic analysis, see Roy Akagi, "Future of American Trade with Manchukuo," The Annals 211 (September 1940), 138-143.

25. Gen. Robert E. Wood, "Our Foreign Policy," address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 4, 1940 (reprint in

pamphlet form). The same point was made tellingly in an editorial, "The South China Sea and Our Raw Materials," Commercial and Financial Chronicle 151 (November 30, 1940), 3138-3141. For a general overview of isolationist responses to the economic threat of the Axis powers, see Justus Doenecke, "Power, Markets, and Ideology: The Isolationist Response to Roosevelt Policy, 1940-1941," in Leonard Liggio and James Martin, eds., Watershed of Empire: Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1976), 132-161.

26. Miner, "United States Policy," 132-134. Miner acknowledges that civilian planners did not share this view (292). The U.S. Staff Committee consisted of Gen. Stanley D. Embick, Gen. L. T. Gerow (chief of the War Plans Division of the U.S. Army), Col. Joseph T. McNarney, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Adm. Robert Ghormley, Capt. Alan G. Kirk, Adm. Kelly Turner, Capt. DeWitt C. Ramsey, and Lt. Col. Omar T. Pfeiffer.

27. Miner, "United States Policy," 337, 343. See also discussion of ABC-1 accords above.

28. Nathan Rosenberg, "Innovative Responses to Materials Shortages," American Economic Review 63 (May 1973), 111-118; Julian Simon, Population Matters: People, Resources, Environment and Immigration (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 67-77; Stephen Moore, "So Much for 'Scarce Resources,'" Public Interest (Winter 1992), 97-107; Jerry Taylor, "The Growing Abundance of Natural Resources," in David Boaz and Edward Crane, eds., Market Liberalism: A Paradigm for the 21st Century (Washington: CATO Institute, 1993), 363-378.

29. Many of their critics in the isolationist camp, moreover, argued that the United States could cope with supply disruptions not by letting prices freely adjust supply and demand but by imposing even tighter regimentation over the economy—an outcome neither the administration nor the business community was prepared to accept except in a wartime emergency. See Doenecke, In Danger Undaunted , 22.

30. In the spring of 1942, the chief economist at the Bureau of Mines, Elmer Pearson, said Japan's attacks had been devastating. "The shutting off of supplies of tungsten and antimony from China, and of tin, manganese, and chromite, as well as rubber, manila fiber, and other non-mineral commodities from Southeastern Asia, already constitutes a serious loss to the United Nations, and if the anticipated pincer movement on the Indian Ocean isolates the Asiatic Continent, we face the loss of more important sources of manganese and chromite, strategic mica and flake graphite" (Eckes, Jr., Global Struggle , 83-84).

31. "Far Eastern Shipments Curtailed by War in Pacific," Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter 140 (December 15, 1941), 3, 51.

32. Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge said, "Pearl Harbor shocked us into the recognition of widespread shortages resulting from cartel restrictions. Plant capacity in many industries which could have been built and operating in this country were not in existence, because cartels had prevented its construction. Strategic products, materials and processes which were absolute necessities to our defense were under cartel restrictions. These shortages and deficiencies had to be made good; new processes and techniques which cartels had pigeonholed had to be freed and applied under the severe pressure of war needs" (Office of War Information release, March 17, 1945, box 440, Hornbeck papers). For other postmortems stressing the impact of Far Eastern supply losses, see Harry Holmes, Strategic Materials and National Defense (New York: Macmillan, 1942) and M. S. Hessel, et al., Strategic Materials in Hemisphere Defense (New York: Hastings House, 1942).

33. Radio appeal on the scrap rubber campaign, June 12, 1942, in Public Papers of the President , 1942, 270-271; Presidential Press Conference no. 832, June 12, 1942, in Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972, v. 19, 384-386.

34. Leo Crowly, administrator of Foreign Economic Administration, to Roosevelt, February 7, 1944, in OF 510, Roosevelt papers. The need for natural rubber in addition to the synthetic substitute was also emphasized by Isador Lubin, the White House statistician, in a memorandum to Harry Hopkins, April 23, 1942, in box 327, Hopkins papers.

35. Joseph Grew speech to Overseas Writers Organization, March 1, 1945, box 183, Hornbeck papers.

36. Associates in International Relations, Raw Materials , 51-52.

37. Secretary of State to embassy in the Netherlands, May 16, 1947, in FR, 1947 , VI, 924. A 1948 CIA assessment took the same line: "The growth of nationalism in colonial areas . . . has major implications for US security, particularly in terms of possible world conflict with the USSR. This shift of the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens the probable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access to vital bases and raw materials in these areas in the event of war." Cited in Lipschutz, When Nations Clash , 121.

38. Quote from Eckes, Jr., Global Struggle , 152. For further discussion of strategic materials as a guiding interest in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, see National Security Council NSC 48/1, "The Position of the United States With Respect to Asia," December 23, 1949, in Department of Defense, United States: Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), book 8, xvi, 248-249, 261-262; NSC 124/2, June 25, 1952, in ibid., 470-471, 523, 526.

39. Department of State, Indochina: The War in Southeast Asia , October 1951, 2.

40. Letter from J. D. Small, chairman of the Munitions Board, to Jess Larson, administrator of the General Services Administration, January 5, 1951, in House Government Operations Committee, hearings, Investigation of United States Government Contracts for the Purchase of Tungsten in Thailand (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 32.

41. President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), I, iv.