2
Being and Time, Sections 72-77

A. On the Run

In Being and Time Heidegger elucidates the structures and activities of Dasein that make it possible for Dasein to be in a world. In the conventional metaphysical fashion, Heidegger develops a hierarchical order of these structures according to different degrees of primordiality. Within this hierarchy, the level of historicality is the most primordial one, that is, historicality is the ultimate level. In accordance with this hierarchical order, Heidegger unfolds a drama, the drama of Dasein's historicality. Again in quite a conventional fashion, the drama consists of three acts. There is a first act, in which the necessary conditions of the dramatic conflict are set up. In the second act, a critical situation emerges that calls for a dramatic solution. In the third act, finally, we witness the solution of the crisis Heidegger recommends. This third act of the drama is section 74. In this sense, the entire book Being and Time , as Rockmore says, «as a whole culminates in» the section on historicality.^[1] The privileged position of section 74 within the hierarchical as well as the dramatic order shows that, indeed, as Rockmore puts it,

Heidegger's conception of ontology commits him, as a condition of thinking through the problem of the meaning of "Being," to a political understanding of human being, that is, to an idea of the person as mainly inauthentic but as possibly authentic in a concrete fashion. The very concern with fundamental ontology requires a political turn since an authentic thought of Being can only arise on the basis of concrete authenticity. Heidegger's concern with the problem of the meaning of Being is not apolitical; nor is it indifferent to theory and

practice in virtue of its concern with the Seinsfrage . Rather, the concern with "Being" is itself intrinsically political.^[2]

In chapter 1, I examined two of the three parts of the solution of the drama presented in section 74, the first part, the «anticipatory resoluteness» (BT 434; SZ 382) and then the end of the third part—the passage on erwidern and Widerruf—and the entire third part. As I have already shown there, the solution of the drama consists in authentic Dasein stepping out of the world in which it has been living so far as ordinary Dasein and then turning back to this world and canceling it. It does so because it has been called upon by the past to rerealize the past, which has been pushed aside by the world in which Dasein as ordinary Dasein has been living, and the past cannot be rerealized without ordinary Dasein' s world being canceled. This motif suggests that Heidegger's concept of historicality is informed by a temporalized version of a metaphysics of falling and recovering. There was a state in which the origin was properly realized. However, then a development began in which the world of the Daseine fell away from that state. A new world emerged in which the origin is no longer present or is present only in a distorted way. At some point in this downward plunge, the origin raises its voice and demands that the Daseine disavow and destroy the new world and replace it with a world in which the origin is once again properly present.

As to the metaphysical aspect of this theory, one must keep in mind several important points, however. Traditional metaphysics—maybe with the exception of Plato in Syracuse—and, for that matter, Christianity never presumed to fully realize the origin here on earth. Heidegger's metaphysics definitely transgresses this limit of traditional metaphysics. Furthermore, one must keep in mind that in the twenties of this century fundamental ontology and metaphysics were definitely not the only philosophical options. That is not to say that Heidegger's philosophy was prone to Nazism because of the old metaphysical motifs continued in his philosophy. Rather, Heidegger revitalized a radicalized or distorted version of metaphysics at a time when there was certainly no need for doing so. Furthermore, we could also leave out the notion of metaphysics. For, as will become clear in chapter 3, Heidegger's concept of historicality is identical with the right-wing one of history and politics. As to the genesis of this latter concept, however, it doesn't seem very reasonable—to me at least—to regard it as a manifestation of the epoch of metaphysics in the way Heideggerians use that term. Moreover, as I will explain in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, one must keep in mind that the right-wing concept of history is not teleological in the same sense the development of a plant through its different phases might be considered teleological. There is nothing in the new world, which is now canceled, that is necessary for the proper rerealization of the origin. Correspondingly, there is nothing in the new world that deserves to be preserved in the world of the

properly realized origin. If it happens that the world of the properly realized origin takes on features of the world that is canceled, this is merely a matter of convenience and generosity on the part of the origin. In this section of this chapter 2, I examine several more general concepts of Heidegger's in Being and Time —those of origin, primordial temporality, authenticity, and whole-ness—and their dynamics in regard to the concept of historicality. In section B, I take up passages and concepts from Division One of Being and Time^[3] as well as from the section on historicality preceding section 74—those of the work of ambiguity and the different meanings of the terms «world» and «history»—by means of which Heidegger makes clear that, indeed, at the-beginning of section 74 we are in the second part of the drama of historicality. In section C, I show that in the second part of section 74—the section on heritage, fate, etc.—the second part of the drama is briefly summarized and the third part begins to unfold whose end in the third part of section 74 I have already discussed in chapter 1.

In section 73 Heidegger develops what he calls «the ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein's historizing» (BT 429; SZ 378); section 74 is entitled "The Basic Constitution of Historicality" (BT 434; SZ 382). De facto, Heidegger develops authentic historicality in this section. In the last paragraph of section 74, Heidegger leads into section 75 by saying that we have to study «Dasein's inauthentic historicality» (BT 439; SZ 387) in order to complete the exposition of the ontological problem of history. Thus, in section 75 ("Dasein's Historicality, and World-History," BT 439; SZ 387) he elucidates inauthentic historicality. Already from this brief outline we might expect that in the entire passage Heidegger describes something like a crisis, a in the Greek sense, namely, a separation or a decision or the decisive turning point in a political development or in the course of a disease. The combatants—political parties opposed to each other or the «forces of life» versus the «forces of death»—are pitted against each other in the decisive battle. Within ordinary Dasein's historizing as developed in section 73 there is a more or less hidden potential or conflict that gives rise to the two opposite modes of Dasein, its authentic and its inauthentic historicality. This is the aspect I want to focus on.

However, a few preliminary remarks are necessary. In the first four paragraphs of section 72 («All our efforts . . . when we learn not to take problems too lightly,» BT 424-425; SZ 372-373), Heidegger exposes the problem of the «'connectedness of life'» (BT 425; «"Zusammenhang des Lebens",» SZ 373). In the next three paragraphs («What seems 'simpler' . . . 'between' birth and death will break down,» BT 425-426; SZ 373-374), he characterizes the ordinary interpretation of the connectedness of life. In the two paragraphs after that («Dasein does not fill up . . . ontological understanding of historicality,» BT 426-427; SZ 374-375), he presents his concept that «Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along » (BT 427; «erstrecktes Sicherstrecken,» SZ 375) as the proper approach to the problem of the connectedness of life. He then

continues toward the formulation of his thesis that Dasein «exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being {im Grunde seines Seins }» (BT 428; SZ 376), and outlines what is to follow. The sections 72-77, and especially the first four paragraphs of section 72, are replete with references to inauthentic Dasein and authentic Dasein and to «Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole» («das eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins»), «its authentically Being-a-whole » («seines eigentlichen Ganz-seins »), or «Dasein's totality» («Daseinsganzheit,» «Ganzheit des Daseins»). Moreover, Heidegger uses «ursprünglich» («primordial») several times.

«Ursprünglich» is an adjective to the noun «Ursprung» (origin) (whose abstract noun, «Ursprünglichkeit,» as Hildegard Feick rightly says in her Index to Being and Time, «runs through» the entire book^[4] ). It has been pointed out often enough that Heidegger understands Dasein neither as a substance nor as a subject, each of which has being independent of its activities and relations to others. Rather, Dasein is a set of structured activities, or motions, that already include the Being-with-others. For that reason, many interpreters claim that Being and Time is not a philosophy of origin; a claim that depends entirely on how one defines such a philosophy. I agree with those who maintain that from Division Two on (BT 274ff.; SZ 231ff.), if not already earlier, the discourse on Dasein's activities gets overdetermined by what one cannot help calling a kind of philosophy of origin, along the lines of a Neoplatonist or, for that matter, Christian discourse on the relation of the One and the many.

Heidegger uses «ursprünglich» («primordial»), or its comparative form «ursprünglicher,» in reference to his project, that is, his interpretation of Dasein as well as in reference to the object of his interpretation. An interpretation is the more «ursprünglich» the more «ursprünglich» its object is (SZ 231ff.; BT 274ff.). Concerning the claim that Being and Time is not a philosophy of origin, it is often pointed out that «Ursprung» or «ursprünglich» has a new meaning in Heidegger completely different from the traditional one. Ursprung is no longer a primary being essentially at rest and out of which other beings originate. Rather, Ursprung is the original leap, the first leap, as an activity that no longer depends on an Ursprung in the traditional sense. Consider, however, the following passage: «If, therefore, we demonstrate that the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality {nicht ursprünglich und vielmehr entspringend aus der eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit}, then, in accordance with the principle, "a potiori fit denominatio ", we are justified in designating as "primordial time " {ursprüng-liche Zeit } the temporality which we have now laid bare» (BT 377; SZ 329). As the reference to a sentence developed within metaphysical ordo-thinking already indicates, this statement assumes a hierarchical structure. Here the Ursprung as a leap is the emergence of the time that is accessible to Dasein's common sense. This leap, however, presupposes something out of or from which it emerges and without which it could not emerge, namely, authentic

temporality. Because of this ranking, Heidegger labels authentic temporality «ursprüngliche Zeit,» that is, primary, primordial time, the first, or origin out of which other beings or structures and activities «entspringen» (arise).

To be sure, this first principle, or origin, is not a substance at rest. Rather, it is the structure of the basic activity by means of which Dasein is open to other beings, the basic act of transcendence; it is this structure and this activity itself. Furthermore, this «ursprüngliche Zeit» temporalizes itself in the «equiprimordiality» (BT 378; «Gleichursprünglichkeit,» SZ 329) of the three ecstases past, present, and future. However, all this, as is well-known from Neoplatonism and Christian philosophy, can easily go hand in hand with ordo, with a hierarchy of several entities that, in this or that way, entspringen (arise) from the first origin. One finds in Heidegger also the ambivalence concerning what entspringt from the first origin in this kind of philosophy of origin. On the one hand, what entspringt is the manifestation of the origin itself. It is the origin's way to realize itself and to rule over its manifestations.^[5] On the other hand, what entspringt from the origin removes itself, or deviates, from the origin. As the power of the origin weakens, the origin loses its ruling power until finally what ist entsprungen, has jumped out of/from the origin comes close to being nothing or even covers up its relation to the origin and that origin itself. Being and Time is rich in sentences about this double aspect of what ist entsprungen from the origin.

Heidegger may have chosen «entspringen» because of the ambiguity inherent in the verb itself. It denotes the aspect of manifestation, of strength and ruling of the origin over its manifestations, just as water entspringt (from) its source and is thus the manifestation of this source or is this origin itself. For pointing to the water flowing out of its source one also says, «The source entspringt»; that is, the flowing water is the source itself in its process of manifestation. At the same time, however, what entspringt (ent-leaps, ent-jumps), leaps out of and leaves the dominion of the origin just as a rivulet silts up as soon as the source has exhausted itself and vanished. This is the other aspect of entspringen, namely, a separation from the origin. The German prefix «ent» often indicates an act of separation. In section A of chapter 1, I already mentioned the acts of separation inherent in an Entscheidung (Ent-separation, decision, Ent-parting) and in Entschlossenheit (resoluteness).

There are many German words consisting of the prefix «ent-» and a verb indicating movement; generally they refer to a separation or loss and emphasize that, at least from the vantage point of the origin, of what is left behind, the separation is involuntary or illegitimate. Something «ent-gleitet (ent-glides, ent-slides, ent-slips, escapes) meinen Händen,» that is, it «slips from my hands.» Some inconsiderate remark «ent-gleitet,» or «ent-fährt (ent-drives, escapes) meinem Mund, meinen Lippen,» that is, «slips from my mouth, my lips.» Some fact «ent-zieht (ent-draws, ent-pulls, ent-tucks, escapes) sich meiner Kenntnis (knowledge),» that is, «it is unknown to me.» Or something

«ent-schwindet (ent-dwindles, ent-wanes) meinem Blick,» that is, «vanishes from my sight.» Or, using the perfect participle of «entspringen,» namely, «entsprungen,» one might say, «However, the flea ist mir wieder entsprungen» as the ending of a story about the unsuccessful hunt for a flea in which I had already grasped the critter between my fingers, but it managed to jump away. Similarly, prisoners who have escaped from jail are referred to as «die entsprungenen Häftlinge.» Of course, these prisoners do not want to be seen again by the origin, the place they came from and its agents. They want to hide themselves and their relation to the origin from the origin itself, from other Daseine, and from themselves as well insofar as by their flight from prison they maintain that this origin has no claim on them. In this regard, one might also point to the composite of «ent-» and the root of the verb discussed in section A of chapter 1 above, namely, «ent-laufen» (ent-run). Dogs, slaves, teenagers, and prisoners «entlaufen ihrem Herrn, ihren Eltern, dem Gefäng-nis,» that is, «run away from their master, their parents, the prison» and thus «ent-ziehen (ent-draw, ent-pull, ent-tug, ent-haul, escape) sich deren Herrschaft,» that is, «put themselves out of their control, domination.» The prisoner's jailbreak is referred to as «sie sind dem Gefängnis entsprungen» or «sie sind aus dem Gefängnis entlaufen.» (they have jumped out of prison, have escaped prison). On the news you might hear that «die entsprungenen Häftlinge sind immer noch auf der Flucht,» or «die entsprungenen Häftlinge sind immer noch flüchtig» (The escaped prisoners are still on the run).

In section 68, in the subsection entitled "The Temporality of Falling {des Verfallens}" (BT 396; SZ 346), Heidegger uses these terms to characterize the temporality of the ordinary and inauthentic mode of curiosity, and he puts «entspringen» in quotation marks (rendered in the translation as single quotation marks) to indicate the sense of the forbidden leaping away. I will quote only some of the several occurrences of «entspringen» with quotation marks in this context: «The Present 'arises or leaps away' {"entspringt"} from the awaiting which belongs to it, and it does so in the sense of running away from it, as we have just emphasized {in dem betonten Sinne des Entlaufens}. . . . This 'leaping away' {Das "Entspringen"} is rather an ecstatical modification of awaiting, and of such a kind that the awaiting leaps after {nachspringt } the making-present» (BT 397-398; SZ 347).^[6]

This «nachspringt» means that curiosity cannot catch, cannot keep up with, what it wants to catch. Thus, what curiosity wants to catch entspringt curiosity; that is, it backs out of curiosity' s grasp and its memory: «In the 'leaping away' {Im "Entspringen"} of the Present, one also forgets increasingly» (BT 398; SZ 347)- Going back to the entsprungene or entlaufene (escaped) prisoners, one might say that if they manage to escape the police, they have managed «sich dem Blick der Polizei zu entziehen» (to hide from the police's sight). As to death, authentic Dasein, as already quoted, «will go right under the eyes of Death» (BT 434; SZ 382). Ordinary and inauthentic Daseine, however, behave

like these escaped prisoners: «As a mode of temporalizing, the 'leaping-away' {"Entspringens"} of the Present is grounded in the essence of temporality, which is finite . Having been thrown into Being-towards-death, Dasein flees—proximally and for the most part—in the face of this thrownness, which has been more or less explicitly revealed {flieht . . . vor . . . dieser . . . Geworfenheit}» (BT 399; SZ 348).^[7] Thus, it flees its «Ursprung»: «The Present leaps away from {entspringt} its authentic future and from its authentic having been, so that it lets Dasein come to its authentic existence only by taking a detour through that Present. The 'leaping-away' of the Present—that is, the falling into lostness—has its source in that primordial authentic temporality itself which makes possible thrown Being-towards-death {Der Ursprung des "Entspringens" der Gegenwart . . . ist die ursprüngliche, eigentliche Zeitlichkeit selbst}» (BT 399; SZ 348).^[8]

The tone of this passage is highly derogatory. In my brief digression on the several uses of «ent-,» I left open whether the prisoners might manage to escape the police. Heidegger, however, presents the actions of curiosity as very clumsy and not promising of a successful outcome. At the same time, the last sentence quoted shows that Heidegger, as Guignon rightly points out, works with the old model of a «mythos of pristine beginnings, a time of "falling," and a final recovery of origins» (HC 141).^[9] Heidegger could have used a different vocabulary, for instance, «sich entwickeln aus,» «entstehen aus,» «sich konkretisieren als,» «sich ableiten yon,» «sich darstellen als,» or something similar. However, that terminology would not have allowed him to phrase his project rhetorically in terms of basic motifs of metaphysical thinking; that is, in terms of an origin that is left behind or forgotten in an illegitimate act, so to speak, and that demands obedience, punishes the leap away from it, and brings Dasein back to its origin. To summarize, what entspringt (arises) from something as from its origin is a manifestation of the origin, or even the origin itself. At the same time, however, it is a weak manifestation of, a desertion or apostasy from, and a distortion of the origin. It covers up its relation to the origin and pretends to be something in its own right. It is this double aspect of what entspringt combined with what is also familiar from Neoplatonism and Christian philosophy, namely, the demand to represent in thought and in one's conscience the relation to one's origin in an undistorted manner that taints the sphere of ordinary Dasein's historizing with that twilight that is critical and calls for a decision. Ordinary Dasein is living in the twilight of arising from and depending on a past that, at the same time, this ordinary Dasein denies. Thus, the origin, the past, calls upon ordinary Dasein to no longer deny its origin but to acknowledge it in present Daseine, in the sphere of the «they,» and to struggle for its revitalization in the sphere of Being-with-others.

Heidegger was no Platonist or Neoplatonist. Neither was he a believer in the official God of the Catholic Church. When he wrote Being and Time , he

had already sich entzogen dem (withdrawn from) Catholicism (Entziehungskur = detoxification treatment).^[10] Being is essentially temporal. There is no eternity, no being beyond time. This, however, does not prevent Heidegger from, so to speak, temporalizing the basic structures of metaphysics. As I have already suggested in chapter 1 and as I will elaborate also in this and the following chapters, the One Heidegger assumes is the Volksgemeinschaft, which is within time and whose sempiternity is in danger. A similar usage of temporalized metaphysics can be found in his treatment of Ganzheit (being a whole). In his discussion of death in sections 46-53, Heidegger refers to the metaphysical concept of Ganzheit of temporal beings as it was developed based on the distinction between eternity (beyond time) and time or temporal beings. A temporal being has achieved Ganzheit if it has realized all the characters it is capable of realizing or has to realize due to its nature. However, it does not do this prior to its death. In and after death, however, as Heidegger rightly points out, this being no longer exists, at least those who do not believe in the immortality of the soul say that it no longer exists. Thus, one might expect Heidegger to give up Ganzheit (so to speak, to leap out of metaphysics into postmodern fragmentation) or to develop a concept of Dasein that allows for Dasein's continuous striving for Ganzheit but that does not require that this Ganzheit of Dasein, as the primordial existentiale, already preexists Dasein's endeavor to achieve it. However, Heidegger temporalizes Ganzheit, which in this case means that Ganzheit is always already present within Dasein's being, to the effect that achieving Ganzheit does not mean to produce something new but rather to get in touch with something already given.

Ordinary or inauthentic Dasein covers up its origin, death, and thus does not achieve Ganzheit, whereas authentic Dasein does achieve it by bringing itself into the proper relation to its origin, to death, which is then no longer covered up. By doing so and by relating itself to its «real» origin, that is, to «heritage» and «destiny» (BT 435f.; SZ 383f.), Dasein enters the state of «Eigentlichkeit» («authenticity») or «eigentliche Existenz» («authentic existence») in which it no longer vacillates. All those who maintain that, as «Ursprünglichkeit» in general, «Eigentlichkeit» in particular does not mean primarily a state but rather an activity, namely, Dasein' s activity of appropriating the structures at work in its existence, can hardly claim that Heidegger has chosen his terms carefully. For, as I already discussed in section A of chapter 1 with regard to «Entschlos-senheit» («resoluteness»), the German suffix «-keit,» or «-heit,» indicates a state or condition. For instance, «Beweglichkeit» (mobility, the condition of being able to be moved [by oneself], movableness; also used metaphorically) is that state—or in Aristotelian terms, —that enables one to move oneself or be moved by others easily. Looking at German translations of Plato or Aristotle from any period shows that words with the suffix «-keit,» or «-heir,» (Gerechtigkeit, Schönheit, Tapferkeit, etc.) are used as translations of Plato's ideas or, in terms of Aristotle's Categories , as translations of instances of sec-

ondary substances or of one of the other nine categories whenever Aristotle abstracts from their being present within a primary substance. Heidegger could have used other expressions. He could have said, «die Tätigkeit des sich zu Eigen Machens» (the activity of appropriation), «das Sich-zu-eigen-machen» (ditto), «die Aneignung» (the appropriation) or something similar, or he could have commented on Eigentlichkeit in terms of these phrases. Thus, if he had wanted to focus on an activity, his terminology is completely misleading. It is thus more likely that «Eigentlichkeit» refers primarily to a state or habit and only secondarily to the activities necessary to achieve this state or those concomitant with it.^[11]

B. Anschwellender Bocksgesang

At the beginning of section 73 Heidegger points to an ambiguity in the term «history» («this term may mean the 'historical actuality' {"geschichtliche Wirklichkeit"} as well as the possible science of it»), stating that «we shall provisionally eliminate the signification of 'history' in the sense of a "science of history" (historiology)» (BT 430; SZ 378). That is, in sections 73-75 Heidegger is talking about Dasein's historical actuality, and only in sections 76-77 does he discuss the science of this historical actuality. If Dasein's authentic historicality is characterized by the act of repetition, we might expect that inauthentic Dasein does not repeat. This is implied in section 74 and is explicitly stated in the penultimate paragraph of section 75 («In inauthentic historicality, . . . the "they" evades choice. Blind for possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, . . . it seeks the modern. But when historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 'recurrence' of the possible, and knows that a {die} possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition» [BT 443f.; SZ 391f.]).^[12] If «repetition» and «the modern» make up a clear contrast, we might say that to perform a «repetition» and to seek the «modern» are the outcome of the crisis that is potentially present within ordinary Dasein's historizing. Heidegger likes metaphors of vertical movement («Fallen, fall,» «Absturz, downward plunge»), and in terms of spatial imagery, he would see authentic Dasein moving upward, inauthentic Dasein moving downward. We move upward only if we have to bridge a distance to a higher level. Thus, ordinary Dasein has already fallen and is still falling. However, it does so in a different way than inauthentic Dasein. In a horizontal image, authentic Dasein would move backward while inauthentic Dasein proceeds forward along the time line. Heidegger's vertical image might be inappropriate because it is too reminiscent of the metaphysical framework of time and eternity and of the efforts of metaphysical philosophers to transcend time and to return to, or assimilate themselves to, the One, or God. The horizontal image isn't appropriate either because even for the Heidegger of sections 72-77 «time goes by,» and no

Dasein can physically move backward in time. However, we can remove the flaw from the horizontal image and, at the same time, integrate the temporalized vertical image, that is, its temporalized hierarchical structure, if we assume that the return to the past is not a physical but rather a mental step—one toward the past as present in the present time and which will lead to the past being rerealized in the future.

However, I would like to briefly touch upon two additional points before discussing sections 72-77. In section 73 Heidegger says that a particular «world is no longer» (BT 432; SZ 380), and in section 74 he characterizes the «possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way of interpreting Dasein today» in the following way: «These possibilities have mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity; yet they are well known to us» (BT 435; SZ 383).^[13] By «world» («Welt»), Heidegger means the third of the four senses of the word developed in sections 14ff. The first two refer to entities that are not Daseine and to their being (BT 93; SZ 64). In the third meaning, the term signifies «that 'wherein ' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. "World" has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification. Here again there are different possibilities: "world" may stand for the 'public' we-world, or one' s 'own' closest (domestic) environment {Umwelt}» (BT 93; SZ 65). A world in this sense is not something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. Rather, it is the result of all those practices of Dasein, or of a group of Daseine, that enable them in their average everydayness to encounter other beings within a framework or within a horizon that relates all these beings to each other and to the Dasein and provides them with significance for the Dasein or for a group of Daseine. Or a world is that entity, or Being, that determines how Daseine can encounter other beings. As he says a few pages later, «the world itself is not an entity within-the world; and yet it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as 'there is' a world can they be encountered and show themselves, in their Being, as entities which have been discovered» (BT 102; SZ 72). These worlds can and, in fact, do change. However, according to Heidegger, all these worlds share some basic structures that make a world as such possible. For this, Heidegger uses the term «worldhood» («Weltlichkeit»), the fourth meaning of «"world",» namely: «the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood . Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special 'worlds' may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in general» (BT 93; SZ 65).

In the remaining chapters of Division One, Heidegger elaborates the existentiales that make a world possible.^[14] With reference to situations such as a craftsman hammering in his workshop or a writer writing books at his desk, Heidegger develops the existentiale «involvement and significance» (BT 114ff.; «Bewandtnis und Bedeutsamkeit,» SZ 83ff.). As to the second point—the «possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way

of interpreting Dasein today»—in chapter 4 (BT 149ff.; SZ 113ff.) he emphasizes that Dasein is not a subject existing independently of others but rather that «Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with» (BT 156; SZ 120). To be sure, in his analysis of the mode of the «they» (BT 163ff.; SZ 126ff.) Heidegger is not necessarily contemptuous of that mode. Each group of Daseine needs the mode of «they» as the «who» of Dasein. Heidegger acknowledges this, for instance, in his analysis of the craftsman. There is nothing wrong with the craftsman living in the mode of the «they,» and there might not be anything wrong with Heidegger's analysis except that Heidegger's description leaves out the average everydayness of the work of workers. However, already in his analysis of the «they,» a tone of crisis can be heard, of some unstable and critical situation, that the «they» covers up. Consider the following: «Overnight, everything that is primordial {Alles Ursprüngliche} gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. . . . The "they" is there alongside everywhere [ist überall dabei], but in such a manner that it has always stolen away whenever Dasein presses for a decision {wo das Dasein auf Entscheidung drängt}» (BT 165; SZ 127).

At the same time, Heidegger hints at a «eigentliche Verbundenheit» (SZ 122 to «become authentically bound together,» BT 159) in contrast to the everyday modes of being. His tone becomes more urgent in chapter 5, section B. Here, Heidegger elaborates on the existentiales of section A as they are present in average everydayness, that is, he elucidates «the everyday kind of Being of discourse, sight, and interpretation» (BT 210; SZ 167). In the entire section B, and especially in section 37, entitled "Ambiguity" ("Die Zweideutigkeit"), one can hear what a German writer, drawing on Heidegger, recently has chosen as the title of an essay in which he announced his turn to the political right, namely, "Anschwellender Bocksgesang."^[15] There is a buzzing sound in the air announcing something else, something new. Several times, Heidegger speaks of «what "they" have surmised and scented» concerning possible «deeds» (BT 218; «was man ahnte und spürte . . . Tat,» SZ 173). However, by «disguise or distortion» (BT 219; «Verstellung und Verdrehung,» SZ 175), «the publicness of the "they"» (BT 210; SZ 167) performs a double operation. It neutralizes possibilities for the Dasein, notably those of «taking action and carrying something through» (BT 218; SZ 174) by stamping them «as something merely subsequent and unimportant» (BT 218; SZ 174). Thus, in effect, it «becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine {echtem} understanding, and what is not» (BT 217; SZ 173). At the same time, however, the publicness of the «they» disguises this difference itself or, more important, presents as «genuine» or authentic what is not, and presents as inauthentic what is genuine, or authentic: «Everything looks as if it were genuinely {echt} understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom {im Grunde} it is not; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is» (BT 217; SZ 173). Furthermore, «It

{curiosity} seeks novelty only in order to leap from it {abzuspringen (which is, so to speak, the comparative to the negative side of entspringen, J. F.)} anew to another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth. . . . not tarrying alongside what is closest. . . . {It} seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters» (BT 216; SZ 172).

All this is more than, so to speak, the regular fallenness of everydayness in the workshop of the carpenter, and thus Heidegger labels it «Verfallen» (SZ 175; «"falling",» BT 219 with the note referring to two other notes on the difference between «Fallen» and «Verfallen») and sees it as a «"downward plunge " [Absturz]» and «turbulence [Wirbel]» (BT 223; SZ 178).^[16] Regarding the cause of this intensification of «fallen» into «verfallen,» Heidegger merely says that this is «a primordial kind {ursprüngliche Seinsart} of Being of Dasein» (BT 210; SZ 167). Anyway, on the most ursprünglich level of historicality, it turns out that those possibilities of deeds for authentic Dasein that the «they» scents and covers up can be found only in the past. Since in these passages Heidegger identifies the past with a vanished world, one might summarize this by saying that up to t₁ a world w₁ was present. After t₁ , w ₁ begins to vanish, and at t ₂ , it has already almost completely vanished. It is at this point t₂ that Heidegger situates ordinary Dasein's historizing, and historicality. To be sure, according to Heidegger's concept of Dasein and world, no Dasein can live without this or that word. Thus, one might say that from t₁ on, a different world, w₂ , has begun to emerge that is more or less fully developed at t₂ , and in which ordinary Dasein is living. Living in w₂ , ordinary Dasein looks back to the time before t₂ .

Heidegger finds four «significations {Bedeutungen}» (BT 431; SZ 379) in the ordinary understanding of history. His aim in presenting these four significations is to point out that «'the past' has a remarkable double meaning» (BT 430; SZ 378) and «the remarkably privileged position of the 'past' in the concept of history» (BT 431; SZ 379). The first signification «may well be the pre-eminent usage» (BT 430; SZ 378). Something is regarded to be history in the sense of «something past » when we say «that something or other "already belongs to history". Here 'past' means "no longer present-at-hand", or even "still present-at-hand indeed, but without having any 'effect' on the 'Present'"» (BT 430; SZ 378). However, the saying, «"One cannot get away from history"» (BT 430; SZ 378), indicates the opposite, namely, that the past has some claim and effect on us. Thus, Heidegger finds a «remarkable double meaning»:

We have in view that which is past, but which nevertheless is still having effects. Howsoever, the historical, as that which is past, is understood to be related to the 'Present' in the sense of what is actual 'now' and 'today', and to be related to it, either positively or privatively, in such a way as to have effects upon it. Thus, 'the past' has a remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an

earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time; and in spite of that, it can still be present-at-hand 'now'—for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a 'bit of the past' is still 'in the present'. (BT 430; SZ 378)

The second meaning of «history» as past is «derivation [Herkunft ] from such a past» (BT 430; SZ 378), the third focuses on the difference between history and nature (BT 430f.; SZ 379), and the fourth is «whatever has been handed down to us {das Überlieferte als solches } . . ., whether it is something which we know historiologically {historisch erkannt}, or something that has been taken over as self-evident, with its derivation hidden» (BT 431; SZ 379).

Heidegger summarizes these four meanings by saying «that history is that specific historizing of existent Dasein which comes to pass in time, so that the historizing which is 'past' in our Being-with-one-another, and which at the same time has been 'handed down to us' and is continuingly effective, is regarded as "history" in the sense that gets emphasized» (BT 431; SZ 379). Ordinary Dasein, however, is not capable of realizing the specific way in which the past is past as well as present within ordinary Dasein's present time. Characterizing «what is primarily historical . . . Dasein» and «secondarily historical . . . equipment ready-to-hand . . . but also the environing Nature as 'the very soil of history'» (BT 433; SZ 381), Heidegger says that one can show «that the ordinary conception of 'word-history' arises precisely from our orientation to what is thus secondarily historical» (BT 433; SZ 381). Ordinary Dasein treats past Dasein as present-at-hand of which it maintains that it no longer exists and that, as present-at-hand, it is no longer of any significance for ordinary Dasein's present. Against this reduction of the past to a vanished past without any significance for the present, Heidegger utilizes his concept of «world»:

What is 'past'? Nothing else than that world within which they {items of equipment} belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a concernful Dasein who was-in-the-world. That world is no longer. But what was formerly within-the-world with respect to that world is still present-at-hand. As equipment belonging to a world, that which is now still present-at-hand can belong nevertheless to the 'past'. But what do we signify by saying of a world that it is no longer? A world is only in the manner of existing Dasein, which factically is as Being-in-the-word. (BT 432; SZ 380)

And he refers back to his concepts «da-gewesen » or «Gewesenheit, » which he has developed in section 65:

However, can Dasein be past at all, if we define 'past' as 'now no longer either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand '? Manifestly, Dasein can never be past, not because Dasein is non-transient, but because it essentially can never be pres-ent-at-hand . Rather, if it is, it exists . A Dasein which no longer exists, however, is not past, in the ontologically strict sense; it is rather "having-been-there "

[da-gewesen ]. . . . It may be shown further that when one designates a time as 'the past', the meaning of this is not unequivocal; but 'the past' is manifestly distinct from one's-having-been {Gewesenheit }, with which we have become acquainted as something constitutive for the ecstatical unity of Dasein's temporality. This, however, only makes the enigma ultimately more acute; why is it that the historical is determined predominantly by the 'past', or, to speak more appropriately, by the character of having-been, when that character is one that temporalizes itself equiprimordially with the Present and the future? (BT 432f.; SZ 380f.)

Heidegger solves this enigma in section 74. However, he does so not by showing that gewesenes Dasein, the past, does not determine the present at all, but rather by showing that gewesenes Dasein is present in, and determines, ordinary Dasein's present in a much stronger way than ordinary Dasein is able or willing to admit. It is not necessary to see in Heidegger's «da-gewesen» his ironic appropriation of Hegel's «"gewesen"»^[17] and of Hegel's insistence that the Wesen has to realize itself to understand this point. Whatever merits Heidegger's analysis of death and birth might have—on the level of historicality death and birth obviously have the function of guaranteeing that the past is not only, in this or that way, ontically present within ordinary Dasein's present but rather co-present as the ontological origin of ordinary Dasein's present. Heidegger writes:

Understood existentially, birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no longer present-at-hand; and death is just as far from having the kind of Being of something still outstanding, not yet present-at-hand but coming along. Factical Dasein exists as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein factically exists, both the 'ends' and their 'between' are , and they are in the only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as care . Thrownness and that Being towards death in which one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in this unity birth and death are 'connected' in a manner characteristic of Dasein {In der Einheit yon Geworfenheit und flüchtigem, bzw. vorlaufendem Sein zum Tode "hängen" Geburt und Tod daseinsmäßig zusammen}. As care, Dasein is the 'between'. (BT 426f.; SZ 374)

Ordinary Dasein does not acknowledge the presence of the past, or of what-has-been-there (Gewesenheit), in ordinary Dasein's present. Or, it scents the presence of what-has-been-there and the latter's call for a deed, but it works on all these ways of the past's presence only in order to neutralize them and to keep them reduced to something present-at-hand, that is, to something that has no significance for Dasein. In this way, it renders them unrecognizable, insignificant for only as long as it is able to do so can ordinary Dasein continue in its way of life. This is the critical situation that calls for a decision. Some Daseine will break through ordinary Dasein's work of ambiguity, will

recognize the possibilities covered up by ordinary Dasein as the authentic ones, and will turn them against ordinary Dasein. These Daseine become authentic. Other Daseine, however, will continue to try to get rid of the past, of what-has-been-there, and its presence in ordinary Dasein's present, and thus they will become inauthentic.

C. The Crisis

It is important to note that the movement of authentic Dasein starts not from a point somewhere beyond and independent of ordinary Dasein but rather from within ordinary Dasein's world. As discussed above, in section 74 Heidegger begins with «vorlaufende Entschlossenheit» (SZ 382; «anticipatory resoluteness,» BT 434). He points out that the act of resolutely running forward into death guarantees «only the totality and authenticity of one's resoluteness» and that the possibilities of authentic existence cannot be gathered from death (BT 434; SZ 383). However, these very possibilities are present in the very same world in which ordinary Dasein lived before it resolutely ran forward into death. Resolutely running forward does not disclose a new world. Rather, it simply enables authentic Dasein to see the same world with new eyes, to see through and no longer go along with the work of ambiguity ordinary Dasein has performed. As Heidegger explains:

As thrown, Dasein has indeed been delivered over to itself and to its potentiality-for-Being, but as Being-in-the-world . As thrown, it has been submitted to a 'world', and exists factically with Others. Proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the "they". It understands itself in terms of those possibilities of existence {Es versteht sich aus den Existenzmöglichkeiten} which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way of interpreting Dasein today. These possibilities have mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity {durch die Zweideutigkeit unkenntlich gemacht}; yet they are well known to us. The authentic existentiell understanding is so far from extricating itself from the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us, that in each case it is in terms of this interpretation {aus ihr}, against it {gegen sie}, and yet again for it {für sie }, that any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in one's resolution. {Das eigentliche existentielle Verstehen entzieht sich der überkommenen Ausgelegtheit so wenig, daß es je aus ihr und gegen sie und doch wieder für sie die gewählte Möglichkeit im Entschluß ergreift. } (BT 435; SZ 383)

These sentences mark the beginning of the crisis at the end of which authentic Dasein will subjugate itself to the past («erwidert»), and will cancel the sphere of ordinary and inauthentic Dasein («Widerruf»). Thus, in this opening movement with its three steps «aus,» «against,» and «for» the sphere of inauthentic Dasein, the second and third steps anticipate the sentences on erwidert and Widerruf. By choosing its hero, Dasein turns «against» the sphere

of ordinary Dasein and destroys the world of ordinary Dasein that, for authentic Dasein, has become inauthentic after Dasein has resolutely run forward into death. That authentic Dasein does so «for» inauthentic Dasein is the conservatives' and rightists' understanding of their «Berufung» (vocation), another noun containing «Ruf»; the implication was that the right-minded Daseine will save the «they» by destroying the world of the «they» and by replacing it with one that is ensouled by the properly present origin. Thus, «against» and «for» seem to be clear. However, «aus» and, correspondingly, the phrase «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us {überkommenen Ausgelegtheit}» (to which «this interpretation {aus ihr}» refers) are ambiguous. «Aus» has several meanings. It can mean «out of» in the sense of «to get out of this place»—I go «aus dem Haus,» that is, I leave the house. Thus, Heidegger's «aus» may mean the place or the possibilities authentic Dasein will leave. In this case, the phrase «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» refers only to a subset of all possibilities present within the world of ordinary Dasein, namely, only to those ordinary Dasein practices as its own positive possibilities. I'll call these «inau-thentic possibilities.» However, these are not the only possibilities available to Dasein. Rather, there are all the possibilities that have been «made unrecognizable» by ordinary Dasein and that, therefore, ordinary Dasein doesn't recognize as significant possibilities anymore. Instead ordinary Dasein distances itself from those «unrecognizable» possibilities by keeping them reduced to something present-at-hand. Since these are the possibilities authentic Dasein will seize, I'll call them «authentic possibilities.»^[18] A second meaning of «aus» is «out of» or «from.» I take an apple aus, that is, out of, a basket. In this sense, the phrase «way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» would define, so to speak, a pool containing the inauthentic as well as the authentic possibilities, and the «aus» would indicate that authentic Dasein takes from this pool its possibility or heroes. This too, fits the sequence «aus,» «against,» and «for.» Authentic Dasein selects «aus (from)» the pool containing authentic as well as inauthentic possibilities. Authentic Dasein acts «against» either the inauthentic possibilities or against the entire pool as this strange mixture within which the authentic possibilities as part of the pool have been made unrecognizable by ordinary Dasein (or it acts «against» the way in which the authentic possibilities are present for ordinary Dasein, that is, it cancels the work of ambiguity performed by ordinary and inauthentic Dasein). Authentic Dasein acts «for» the inauthentic possibilities in the sense mentioned above, and/or for the authentic possibilities. Or, authentic Dasein acts «for» the entire pool since it acts for the sake of the present world. In any case, it also and mainly acts for the past since authentic Dasein is struggling for the sake of the authentic possibilities and the past's rebirth. In all these renderings, the world in which ordinary Daseine live and which they try to keep unambiguous is in fact freighted with possibilities, the

resolute grasping of which leads to the destruction of ordinary Dasein' s world. Both meanings of «aus» are meanings of the Greek , , as well, and the second meaning of «aus,» «from,» already comes close to a third meaning of aus as the main meaning of the Greek , . By definition, a principle is that aus (out of, from) which the other beings come, while it itself doesn't come out of/from anything else as Aristotle says in Physics 1:5, 187 a 27-28, and it is that aus which something consists (ibid., 1:7, 190 b 17-20).

This polysemous particle «aus» renders the entire section 74 difficult. However, before discussing this in detail, I would like to remind readers that, as the second of the long quotes from Guignon I presented close to the beginning of chapter I, section B, already shows, Guignon and I agree that Heidegger's concept of historicality contains a move against the present. Both Guignon and I regard this to be the content of the sentence about disavowal (Widermf). For me and maybe also for Guignon, this move against the present is also indicated by the «against» («gegen») of the sentence discussed from the beginning of this section on. Consider the following passage in section 74 shortly after the one quoted at the beginning of this section:

Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' {"vor-läufige"} possibility driven out. Only Being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from {reißt aus} the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly {Behagens, Leichtnehmens, Sichdrückens}—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals ]. This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen {Damit bezeichnen wir das in der eigentlichen Entschlossenheit liegende ursprüngliche Geschehen des Daseins, in dem es sich frei für den Tod ihm selbst in einer ererbten, aber gleichwohl gewählten Möglichkeit überliefert }. (BT 435; SZ 384)

(Note in passing that the German expression «sich drücken» especially is extremely derogatory.) One might wonder whether authentic Dasein can go back to the possibilities characterized by «comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly.» One might imagine that some person experiences some event and behaves in such a way that Heidegger might call this proper resoluteness. After this experience, however, he goes on as usual. Nonetheless, his attitude toward his possibilities has changed. He will no longer grumble about his fellow citizens or himself, but he will be thankful to God, destiny, or whomever that he is still alive, and he will appreciate and enjoy life. Thus, he will see his ordinary life, though nothing has changed externally, «with new eyes.» Or, consider many philosophers, especially in late antiquity (if they may count as authentic Daseine). They maintained to know better than

the many; they knew that the gods, or God, were not what public opinion considered them to be. Those philosophers nevertheless followed the public practices with the private caveat that, philosophically, they didn't agree with these possibilities. Or, the phenomenon of camp might point to the possibility that one indulges in exactly the same things and activities as inauthentic Dasein; however, through a special «kick» one has given one's attitude, one signals one's distance and authenticity. However, the tone of the quoted sentence as well as the sequence of «aus,» «gegen,» and «für» and the passage on disavowal show that, according to Heidegger, authentic Dasein will not return to the possibilities ordinary and inauthentic Dasein have chosen; on this Guignon and I agree. (Thus, the «aus» in «snatches one back from . . . » indicates, as the tone of this sentence already suggests, not a provisional but rather a final «out of this place» with no possibility of return.)

«Überkommene Ausgelegtheit» («the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us») is the first of a series of four concepts in section 74. It is followed by «Erbe» («heritage»), «Schicksals» («fate»), and finally by «Geschick» («destiny,» which is explained in terms of «Gemeinschaft, des Volkes,» «community, of {the } people»). In sections B and D of chapter I, I mentioned Birmingham's interpretation of the sentences on erwidert and Widerruf. According to her, authentic Dasein does nothing but negate or distance itself from possibilities offered by the past and does not identify itself with any possibility proposed by the past. From the perspective of this interpretation of «erwidert» and «Widerruf,» one might feel tempted to interpret the sequence from «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» to «Geschick» in the same way, all the more so since obviously right from its beginning this passage is pervaded by a strong sense of «aus» as «out of this place,» «out of this possibility.» She quotes completely from Macquarrie and Robinson's translation the passage beginning with «But if fateful Dasein,» containing the sentence, «destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates,» and ending with «Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free» (BT 436; SZ 384), and comments on it as follows:

Two points must be noted. First, when Heidegger writes, "our fates have been guided in advance," he means no more and no less than that Dasein is always already implicated, immersed in historical happenings and events. Second, the event of destiny emerges only in the shared (Mitgeschehen ) realm of speech and action. The event of destiny is situated in the Augenblick , which we have seen is an historical conjunction of traditions, discourses, and practices. The taking over of destiny is located, taking place only by acting with and upon the actions and discourses of others through communication and struggle: "But if fateful Dasein , as being-in-the-world, exists essentially in being-with-others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny (Geschick). This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people [Volk]" (SZ, 384/436). This passage calls into question any interpretation of the "we"

(Mitgeschehen ) as the "we" of a homogeneous totality. Indeed, this passage suggests that Heidegger thinks Volk only in terms of Mitgeschehen : the heterogeneity of historical actors who constitute the event of destiny through their critical, agonal response to historical possibilities.

There is here a clear distinction between destiny and tradition. The critical response (Erwidert ) to shared historical possibilities frees the historical space of destiny to be something different from what has been. (TP 30; after this she quotes the passage on erwidert and Widerruf and comments on it as quoted above in section B of chapter I.)

Her usage of «fate» seems unclear. Either she means by it all those traditions in which each Dasein is always already implicated and with which authentic Dasein breaks since authentic Dasein has an «agohal response to historical possibilities» (TP 30) and «disrupts identity and continuity . . . refuting the notion of history as a continuum» (TP 31). Or she means that fate is the critical response itself to the tradition in which each Dasein is implicated. Similarly, Birmingham's use of «destiny» («Geschick») isn't quite clear. It is either the event that, constituted by the Daseine, turns against tradition (and fate) and excludes it, or it is tradition (and fate) itself in its moment of being overruled by the struggles of different Daseine.

However, even prior to a discussion of possible differences between the terms, native speakers of German would intuitively say that both Schicksal and Geschick designate something that cannot be overruled by a Dasein. These terms do not name something that by definition gets overruled or is the event of overruling itself. Though some Dasein might manage to avoid its fate for some time, its fate will ultimately «es einholen,» catch or get hold of it. Furthermore, speakers of German would also say that it is not the Dasein—nor a group of Daseine—that constitute destiny or fate but rather the other way round: destiny and fate determine the Dasein. There is not the slightest hint in the entire passage indicating that Heidegger uses the notions of destiny and fate ironically, or that he uses them in a meaning different from their meaning in everyday language and in philosophical language. Instead, he uses them precisely the way they were used by conservatives and right-wingers at the time (see chapter 3). Thus, he did not mean that Dasein overrules destiny and fate or that destiny is the break with any tradition. (If he had wanted to advance an argument like the one Birmingham reads into this passage, he might have used his term «co-historizing,» but then he would not have commented on this in terms of «und bestimmt als Geschick .») Furthermore, in ordinary language «wird frei» (becomes free) refers to something that exists prior to this becoming free and that remains free after becoming free. Again, Heidegger would not have used this phrase (or would have used it only with a further comment) if he had wanted to describe an event that is constituted by several Daseine in such a way that it takes place just to disappear again or to eliminate tradition and fate. Furthermore, Birmingham does not explain in

what way her statement «historical actors who constitute the event of destiny» can be seen as not contradicting one of Heidegger's sentences she herself quotes, namely, «Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates» (BT 436; «Das Geschick setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen,» SZ 384). One might pass over these flaws in her interpretation of this passage, or perhaps Birmingham might justify them in some way. However, as I will show in this section, the idea that «destiny» in Heidegger is an event disrupting any identity and continuity can be maintained only with utter disregard for the context of this passage.^[19]

Guignon is more moderate insofar as, according to him, authentic Dasein ultimately identifies itself with possibilities offered by the past, or tradition—though, in the end, the difference may not count for much, since Guignon believes that what Dasein chooses is determined not by some offer of the past but by the utopian ideal of the choosing Dasein. He also does not distinguish among the four terms in Heidegger's series of «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» and «fate, » « heritage,» «destiny, » which is explained as «community, of {the} people»; to him they all seem to be merely different names for the one pool from which authentic Dasein can draw its choice. Consider, for example, the following passage contained in the second of the long quotes presented close to the beginning of section B of chapter I: «The present can be seen as deformed or defective only in contrast to an understanding of the potential built into our heritage and the truest aims definitive of our destiny» (HC 138). Here, «heritage» seems to be equivalent to «überkommene Ausgelegtheit.» Turning back to «überkommene Ausgelegtheit,» authentic Dasein recognizes that among other possibilities there is something—in Guignon's words, built into this «überkommene Ausgelegtheit»—that authentic Dasein, in contrast to the inauthentic one, will choose. Thus, «heritage» is the «überkommene Aus-gelegtheit» itself viewed from the perspective of authentic Dasein, which regards it as the pool from which it can draw its choices, whereas ordinary and inauthentic Daseine don't realize the different possibilities within the «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» since they don't turn back and don't look at it in the light of some utopian ideal, or they do so but decide to stick to their possibilities. Or consider a passage prior to this:

As thrown, Heidegger reiterates, Dasein "understands itself in terms of those possibilities which 'circulate' in the 'average' public away {sic !} of interpreting Dasein today" (BT , 435). There is no exit from the understanding of things deposited in the public language and embodied in the practices of our current world. But, in the context of this discussion of historicity, Heidegger points to a different manner in which we might encounter those public possibilities. As authentic, he says, one can encounter them as a "heritage" (Erbe ). Dasein's resoluteness "discloses current possibilities as from the heritage which resoluteness, as thrown, takes over " (BT , 435). (HC 135)

This seems to be the same idea as in the earlier quote with «built in.» «Heritage» is the same as «überkommene Ausgelegtheit,» the only difference being that authentic Dasein regards «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» as the pool, and thus as heritage, from which it can and must make its choice, whereas inauthentic Dasein does not turn back to the pool and does not make a choice. Yet, even if Guignon distinguishes between «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» and the other concepts, he regards—as I explained in section B of chapter I—the past as the pool that contains several possibilities, none of them binding in itself but each receiving its meaning only in the light of a utopian ideal.

However, there is a big difference between «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» on the one hand and «heritage,» «fate,» and «destiny» on the other.^[20] Maybe already «heritage, but certainly «destiny» is no longer identical with «überkommene Ausgelegtheit,» but is rather that possibility that authentic Dasein catches, or by which it is caught, and that Dasein in the next step turns against the «überkommene Ausgelegtheit,» that is, against the world of ordinary Dasein. In other words, «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» contains the inauthentic possibilities as well as the authentic ones. Destiny, however, is no longer this pool containing both kinds of possibilities. Rather, it comprises only the authentic possibilities, the specific choices authentic Daseine have selected from the pool and in the name of which they will turn «against» ordinary Dasein and its mode of interpreting and being in the world, that is, against «überkommene Ausgelegtheit.» Thus, destiny is no longer some neutral pool, filled with a plurality of possibilities, but a reality that imposes itself onto Dasein and does not leave Dasein any choice; it does not allow Dasein to distance itself from it. Not to see this difference between überkommene Ausgelegtheit on the one hand and destiny on the other might indeed turn Heidegger's concept of historicality into a politically neutral one or, perhaps, even into a philosophy of Riß, as Birmingham puts it (TP 37). However, to see the distinction Heidegger made here is to realize that, as I will show in chapters 3 and 4, Heidegger used «destiny» the way it was used by the political Right.

I said, «but certainly destiny» because there is some ambiguity about «heritage,» or at least the impression of ambiguity since Heidegger seems to use the preposition «aus» («in terms of the heritage {aus dem Erbe} which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over» [BT 435; SZ 383]) in the same meaning he uses «aus» in the sentence on «überkommene Ausgelegtheit.» However, «aus» in the phrase with «heritage» acquires a new meaning due to the different character of the container of possibilities to choose from. Those who can listen to language as Heidegger does already expect the new meaning once they read the word «heritage» as the new word for the container to choose from, especially since Heidegger says in the same sentence that authentic Dasein «discloses» (BT 435; «erschließt,» SZ 383) the relevant possibilities.^[21] Those who are not that good at listening to language realize the new

meaning at the latest after reading the entire paragraph beginning with the sentence on heritage. To put it differently, similarly to his punning on «Wieder,» «erwidert,» and «Widerruf,» in the entire passage with its several «aus» Heidegger is punning on the different meanings of «aus» which are the same as the different meanings of the Greek word . He does so because in this way the master of listening to language is again able to situate his project within the different meanings of a prominent preposition in the Greek language; the language that is «along with German . . . (in regard to its possibilities for thought) at once the most powerful and most spiritual of all languages» (IM 57; EM 43). In the passage beginning with «in terms . . ., against it, and yet again for it,» these different meanings enable him to switch from «aus» as «from which,» or «out of which,» to «aus» in the sense of «that out of which something consists» so as to establish heritage, destiny, and fate as that entity to which authentic Dasein has to subjugate itself since the former is its origin, is what provides Dasein with its identity and stability^[22]

Heidegger writes: «The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over {aus dem Erbe, das sie als geworfene übernimmt}» (BT 435; SZ 383). In chapter 1, I already pointed out the contrast between Guignon's interpretation and mine. Guignon understands the past here as something whose seeming unity is dissolved by the different Daseine interpreting it in the light of their various utopian ideals. As I will elaborate in chapter 4, when Guignon applies his interpretation to political choices, the conclusion is that different Daseine choose different heroes who oppose each other and who struggle against each other. One Dasein chooses a communist hero, another a liberal, and so on. Needless to say, in the realm of politics every one is everyone else's opponent or foe. Thus, according to Guignon, «heritage,» or «community, of {the} people,» is in itself not a determining factor. Rather, resoluteness reveals that heritage in itself entails several contradictory possibilities, and different authentic Daseine will choose different heroes from those possibilities. These choices are not determined by the heritage but by the different utopian ideals.

In contrast, my interpretation is that «heritage» and «community, of {the } people» present a strongly unified entity that imposes itself onto the authentic Dasein. This unity leaves room for, and requires, several different ways of being in it—in Heidegger's terms, different Schicksale (fates). However, these different Schicksale, or the different Helden, do not oppose each other or struggle against each other but are united by the common heritage or Volk (and thereupon fight against ordinary and inauthentic Daseine). The power of the origin is that it allows and requires several different members who do not oppose each other but are united by and within the unity of the origin. That this idea of past and heritage is at work in section 74 and not Guignon's is shown already by the passage under discussion. To be sure, the phrase «aus

dem Erbe » looks like the phrase «aus den Existenzmöglichkeiten» or «aus ihr.» Furthermore, in both cases the «aus» designates some sort of pool from which authentic Dasein can make its choice. However, the pool is no longer the same. This is clearly indicated by the formulation as well as by the steps following it. It is indicated by the formulation itself insofar as the «aus» designates exclusively something from which authentic Dasein chooses, whereas in the context of «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» the «aus» has the double meaning of «from which (one chooses)» and «(the place) out of which (one gets by the choice) and against which (one turns one's choice).»

The same is shown by the following sentence on «everything 'good'» and «'goodness'.» Heidegger writes: «Wenn alles "Gute" Erbschaft ist und der Character der "Güte" in der Ermöglichung eigentlicher Existenz liegt, dann konstituiert sich in der Entschlossenheit je das Überliefern eines Erbes» (SZ 383f.). Macquarrie and Robinson translate: «If everything 'good' is a heritage {Erbschaft}, and the character of 'goodness' lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage {Erbe} constitutes itself in resoluteness» (BT 435). The translation is inaccurate or at least misleading in three ways. Today it might require some effort to recognize the meaning of Heidegger's sentence. However, at Heidegger's time probably no one familiar with the political discourse of the conservatives and right-wingers would have had much difficulty. First, in the first part of the subordinate clause the translation has an indefinite article in front of «heritage» while the German «Erbschaft» has neither a definite nor an indefinite one. Second, the translators use the same word, namely «heritage,» as in the sentence with «in terms of {aus } the heritage {Erbe }.» However, while in the sentence with «in terms of {aus } the heritage » Heidegger uses «Erbe,» in the subordinate clause with «everything 'good'» he uses «Erbschaft.» The usage of «Erbe» and «Erb-schaft» in German is somewhat intriguing. Both notions can be used interchangeably. If both occur in the same sentence or context as they do here in Heidegger, the speaker most of the time wants to make a distinction between two perspectives. An individual or group A inherits some X from B. Since in Being and Time «heritage» is used for the German «Erbe» as well as «Erb-schaft,» I avoid in what follows the notion of heritage and call X «estate.» The estate is handed down by B to A. In German, B is said to «hinterlassen eine Erbschaft,» to bequeath an Erbschaft, to A, and A is said to «ein Erbe zu empfangen,» to inherit an Erbe, from B . That is, from the perspective of B the estate is called an Erbschaft while from the perspective of A the estate is called an Erbe. However, the notions are also used the other way round. To elaborate the second usage, by definition a proletarian leaves nothing behind besides his or her children. Other people leave an Erbe, an estate, to their children. Each of the children «macht/bekommt/erhält/tritt an eine Erbschaft,» inherits his or her, as I translate, «inheritance,» that is, his or her share in the estate. Thus, a property is labeled an Erbe, an estate, when one focuses on

the identity of an estate over several generations or when one looks upon the act of handing down from the perspective of its respective owner, while the same property and Erbe is called Erbschaft when one looks upon the act of handing down from the perspective of the heirs of an estate.

Heidegger employs the notions in the second way. Resoluteness discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existence «in terms of the heritage { aus dem Erbe }» (BT 435; SZ 383). This Erbe contains «the possibilities that have come down to one» (BT 435; SZ 383), of which Heidegger speaks in the next sentence. That is, the Erbe comes from the past and contains possibilities that come down to us from the past. Coming from the past, the Erbe is an estate and can be taken over by authentic Daseine. Heidegger introduces this latter perspective in the relative clause: «in terms of the heritage {aus dem Erbe } which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over {übernimmt}» (BT 435; SZ 383). Since, from the perspective of the Daseine that take it over, the Erbe can be called an «Erbschaft,» Heidegger uses «Erbschaft» in the sentence beginning with «If everything 'good' is a heritage {Erbschaft}» (BT 435; SZ 383). This step from «Erbe,» estate, to «Erbschaft,» inheritance, is reasonable, for after introducing the estate as well as the one who takes it over it is useful, if not even necessary, to focus on the relation of the heirs to the estate they inherit. The passage is a good instance of the power of a principle, be it Plato's ideal state, an Aristotelian form, a conservative Gemeinschaft, a right-wing Volksgemeinschaft, or «the proletariat.» It is one and the same Erbe that provides for different slots, different Erbschaften. The different heirs to one and the same estate know that they owe their property to the same estate, and they don't fight against each other but work for the preservation and benefit of the estate and of the group owning the estate. This is the conservative idea of Erbe, and Erbe functions that way as long as family values and a good sense of the value of traditions are still in place. As I will discuss in chapter 3, in the passage on destiny and fate Heidegger rephrases the same relation of the one to the many in terms of destiny and fate. Destiny is the Erbe that provides for and requires several individual slots, fates, in order for it to be faithfully transmitted and actualized by several Daseine. The Daseine know themselves to be united in their common destiny and committed to preserve and actualize their destiny. This requires that they are willing to fight against a common enemy of their Erbe. In order to express the common relation of the different Erbschaften («Wenn alles "Gute" Erbschaft ist,» SZ 383) and their commitment to one and the same Erbe, Heidegger gathers the different Erbschaften under the short title «alles 'Gute'» (SZ 383; «everything 'good',» BT 435) and subsumes them under the singular «Erbschaft» without any article.^[23] The English translation, however, definitely contributes to Guignon's interpretation of section 74. For by translating both «Erbe» and «Erbschaft» with the same word, «heritage,» and by adding an indefinite article before «Erbschaft» Heidegger's «Erbe» can be

equated with the «überkommenen Ausgelegtheit» (SZ 383; «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us,» BT 435). Both are the same, the only difference being that, in contrast to inauthentic Dasein, authentic Dasein looks upon «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» as a pool containing several possibilities for its choice. On this account, each of these possibilities can indeed be labeled «a heritage» (BT 435), one estate among many different estates. In this way, the unity of the estate in Heidegger is dissolved into a multiplicity of different and opposed small estates, as it were. In fact, none of them is even an estate any longer. For, according to Guignon, none of them is in itself binding for authentic Dasein as the latter's choice depends on its utopian ideal. By using «Erbe» in the singular and by reducing «everything 'good'» to «Erbschaft» in the singular, however, Heidegger emphasizes the unity of the estate and the obligation for the heirs to take it over. This becomes more clear if one considers the other aspects of the sentence in question.

In the subordinate clause, Heidegger makes a clear distinction, de-cision, or separation. He makes a statement on «everything 'good',» namely, that «everything 'good' is heritage {Erbschaft}.» From the sentence that everything «good» is Erbschaft it follows logically that nothing that is not Erbschaft or that has no Erbschaft is good. In addition, the sentence that everything «good» is Erbschaft does not allow the inference that the Erbe only contains good possibilities. However, the second part of the subordinate clause—the phrase «and the character of 'goodness' {Güte} lies in making authentic existence possible» (BT 435; SZ 383)—is obviously meant to establish by definition, or by listening to language, that the Erbe exclusively contains good possibilities^[24] Quite obviously, Heidegger makes a distinction between what is good and what is not good, and he makes this distinction in terms of the notion of Erbe. The notion of Erbe qualifies some possibilities as good—all those that are inherited, are Erbschaft, since they are a share in the Erbe—and disqualifies others as not good, namely, all those that don't partake in the Erbe. In addition, this distinction corresponds to the distinction between authentic Dasein on one side and ordinary and inauthentic Dasein on the other. The good possibilities are chosen by authentic Dasein, and the bad ones are those in which ordinary and inauthentic Daseine live. One has to take over the Erbe, since this is the only way of acquiring something good and thus of being good. Furthermore, the distinction quite obviously takes up the distinction with regard to «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383), namely, that this way contains the inauthentic possibilities as well as the authentic ones. Ordinary Dasein has no access to the Erbe and is therefore not good. Or rather it prevents itself, or is prevented by the «they,» from access to the Erbe since the «they» covers up by the work of ambiguity the authentic possibilities; the ones in which the Erbe is present. It is only upon becoming authentic that Dasein has access to the

Erbe and becomes good. Thus, the notion of «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383) and the notion of «heritage» in «in terms of {aus } the heritage {Erbe }» (BT 435; SZ 383) are not identical. The former contains all the available possibilities, namely, the inauthentic as well as the authentic ones. The latter, however, contains only the authentic possibilities. By drawing on the authentic possibilities, authentic Dasein will act «against» (BT 435; «gegen,» SZ 383) «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383); that is, authentic Dasein will replace the possibilities or the world of ordinary and inauthentic Dasein with authentic ones, with the authentic world.

The difference between «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» and the «heritage {Erbe }» (BT 435; SZ 383) is further elaborated in the second part of the subordinate clause, namely, the phrase «and the character of 'goodness' {Güte} lies in making authentic existence possible» (BT 435; SZ 383). «Goodness» sounds like the abstract noun for «good.» In Platonic terms, something is good because it partakes in goodness. According to my experience, English readers tend to assume that Heidegger has in mind here something like an idea of the good, derived from Plato or another philosophical tradition; an idea that serves as a criterion for evaluating political constitutions and the empirical political life in a given society. Though Guignon doesn't discuss this sentence, he might have had it in mind. Authentic Dasein has its specific utopian ideal, because authentic Dasein assumes this ideal is the best, fits best the idea of the good (or is itself the good). With the idea of the good and its utopian ideal in mind, authentic Dasein turns back and realizes that «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383) is the «Erbe» that contains several possibilities (BT 435; SZ 383). It screens all these possibilities in order to pick out the one that fits its utopian ideal and thus the idea of the good best. It chooses this possibility and rejects all the others. In this way, Guignon might have found textual support for his distinction between an utopian ideal and the various possibilities included in the «Erbe»; a distinction that at the same time makes readers identify the «Erbe» authentic Dasein takes over (BT 435; SZ 383) with «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383). However, Heidegger does not make such a distinction between a pool containing various possibilities and a universal criterion enabling authentic Dasein to screen the pool and to reject all but one possibility. The German word «Güte» normally doesn't denote a universal criterion for ethical and political choices. (It can be said, for instance, that the «Güte» of an action consists in realizing a «Gut,» a good, a value; in that case, however, the criterion is the Gut, and the action has Güte only because it conforms to that criterion.) Rather, «Güte» often denotes a certain property that only things that are an Erbschaft have and that things that are not Erbschaft lack.^[25] Thus, in the second part of the subordinate clause Heidegger further elaborates on

the notion of Erbe and its obligatory character and does not make a distinction between Erbe and a criterion in the light of which the Erbe loses its obligatory power.

As was said, the entire sentence reads: «If everything 'good' is a heritage {Erbschaft}, and the character of 'goodness' {Güte} lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage {Erbe} constitutes itself in resoluteness {dann konstituiert sich in der Entschlossenheit je das Überliefern eines Erbes}» (BT 435; SZ 383f.). Note that in the main clause Heidegger returns to the word «Erbe» (estate). In resoluteness the handing down of the Erbe constitutes itself. Only authentic Dasein has access to the Erbe. By obeying the call to turn back to the Erbe, Dasein no longer covers up the Erbe. Instead, it acknowledges its Erbschaft, that is, its share in the Erbe, and becomes authentic and good, whereas all those ordinary Daseine that don't listen to the call become inauthentic Daseine and remain deprived of any good. (Perhaps it can be said that ordinary Daseine are deprived of any good, while inauthentic Daseine are evil.) In this way, the handing down of the Erbe constitutes itself. Note that Heidegger does not say that heritage constitutes itself, but that «the handing down of» the Erbe «constitutes itself.»^[26] This is a further indication that Heidegger quite self-evidently assumes that Erbe, destiny, and fate exist prior to the one who receives, or takes over, the Erbe, destiny, or fate. As I will show in chapters 3, 4 and 5, this is the common understanding of these notions in everyday language as well as in philosophical texts. For conservatives and rightists, destiny or fate governed history, while liberals and leftists maintained that destiny and fate were notions without reference, and that, instead, reason or the means of production governed history. According to Heidegger, Dasein becomes authentic only through receiving the Erbe as its Erbschaft. Furthermore, in resoluteness the handing down of the Erbe constitutes itself. If Heidegger had left out the first claim and if, instead of the second one, he had said that in resoluteness the Erbe or an Erbe constitutes itself, one might have thought that he talks about an act in which someone establishes out of the blue, as it were, a new tradition for the following generation. However, since Heidegger says that only an Erbschaft makes authentic Dasein possible and that in resoluteness the handing down of the Erbe constitutes itself, Erbe exists prior to authentic Dasein and prior to the moment in which the handing down of the Erbe constitutes itself, as is already implied in the notion of Erbe. According to Birmingham, in section 74 authentic Dasein breaks with each and any tradition. If Heidegger had wanted to say this, he would certainly not say that only an Erbschaft makes authentic Dasein possible. He would also not say that authentic Dasein is about the handing down of the Erbe. Finally, he would not use a sentence whose grammatical subject is not authentic Dasein but rather the handing down of the Erbe. «Konstituieren» means «to set up, to establish, to form, to compose.» Not only Heidegger would say that, quite

literally, it means—like the Latin verb constituere, con-statuere—«to place at some location, to put together, to put together/to join several things at some location.» Thus, «sich konstituieren» means «to put oneself together, to place and join one's parts at some location.»

One can hear on the news a sentence such as: «Heute hat sich in Bonn der neue Bundestag konstituiert» (Today, the newly elected parliament has constituted itself in Bonn); or, «Heute trat in Bonn der neue Bundestag zu seiner konstituierenden Sitzung zusammen» (Today, the newly elected parliament assembled for the session in which it constituted itself). (Note that the second sentence even contains two formulas of «putting itself together.») Three points are important about such usages of «sich konstituieren.» First, the new parliament doesn't come out of the blue. Rather, its members only gather because they have been elected and thus have the right and the duty to work for the new parliament. They do not break with any tradition but rather continue a tradition, for the new parliament succeeds the preceding parliament and was elected according to the rules of the old parliament. (Even if, after a revolution, a «ver-fassungsgebende Versammlung sich konstituiert» [a constitutional assembly constitutes itself], it does so only because it was preceded by deliberations and decisions to constitute a verfassungsgebende Versammlung.) Second, though the individual members represent their electorate, they must not work for the private advantage of themselves or their electorate but rather for the well-being of the state and the German people. Third, in light of the first two points the phrase «sich konstituieren» means that an entity that exists prior to its constitution but does so in such a way that it cannot yet fully act comes out into full existence in order, to put it somewhat sloppily, to step out and «get the job done,» as Patrick Ewing and his colleagues used to say. (They say so not because they gather spontaneously but rather because their employer makes the team put itself together, actualize itself, at a certain time to play the Chicago Bulls. The Bundestag exists prior to its constitution as the new Bundestag; according to Aristotle, the productive power included in the male seed, the form, exists prior to the moment in which it begins to work, that is, to inform female menstruation; the explosive power in a bomb exists prior to the moment the bomb explodes; the bomb couldn't explode without the material capable of exploding, and the material is present in order to be capable of exploding at the requested time; several recently developed bombs explode upon contact between two or more materials in the bombshell; that is, the bomb puts its parts together, as the new Bundestag does when its members assemble in Bonn. For an Aristotelean the species puts its parts, a male being and a female being, together to come out again as a newborn individual of the same species. In other words, the phrase «konstituiert sich» (constitutes itself) borrows its intelligibility mainly from the traditional metaphysical logic of potentiality and actuality. The new Bundestag is the «actualization» of the Bundestag, the latter being an entity that has «potential existence,» and this potential existence in

turn presupposes a prior actual Bundestag or a verfassungsgebende Versammlung. However, the new Bundestag exists only because the Bundestag intends its actualization as the new Bundestag, as each entity existing in potentiality «strives for» actuality. Something that exists in potentiality is not nothing; rather your capacity to practice medicine exists in you and it «strives for» being actualized or actualizing itself, that is, you strive to work as a physician.) In cases such as the Bundestag its individual members have the duty to make it happen that the Bundestag comes out of its potential existence so as to work in actuality.^[27]

Incidentally, what Heidegger means can best be explained by a phrase Reiner Schürmann uses in the acknowledgment of his 1987 book Heidegger: On Being and Acting —From Principles to Anarchy : «While working on the original French edition {published in 1982} of this study, I published several sections in the English language. These pieces not only suffered from being taken out of their systematic context, but all of them were also preliminary versions, later reworked. Nevertheless I wish to thank the directors of the following publishing houses and journals for their permission to resettle in its native habitat material first printed in diaspora.»^[28] Indeed, the publication of Heidegger: On Being and Acting establishes a new tradition of Heideggerian scholarship and thinking. However, it doesn't come out of the blue. Rather, the new tradition established by the publication of the English book has already existed prior to its establishment through the publication. For it has existed as the French original, Le Principe d'anarchie: Heidegger et la question de l'agir , and as some papers published here and there in English journals. In addition, it has already existed even in Heidegger's writings, since Schümann's book is an interpretation of Heidegger's writings. Thus, no new Erbe or tradition is established through the publication of the English book. Rather something that has already existed prior to the publication of the English book enters a context in which it has previously been absent, and it begins to have an influence in that context. Or it was already present in that context but only as the few papers here and there in various English journals behind which only those who already knew the French original could recognize the whole project. In the publication of the English version the whole project, so to speak, puts itself together, gathers itself, constitutes itself, out of its fragmentary existence scattered into the various papers living in the diaspora. It is similar in Heidegger. By definition, the Erbe exists prior to its heirs. As long as the prospective authentic Dasein has not yet made the choice, the Erbe exists only in a scattered way, namely, in some possibilities hard to recognize. For ordinary Dasein has covered up by the work of ambiguity all the ways in which the Erbe is present in the world of the «they.» In authentic Dasein's choice, the Erbe constitutes itself; that is, it puts itself together out of its dismembered parts, and enters a context in which it has been previously absent or in which it has been present only in a scattered way.

According to postmodernists, modernists would say that Schürmann wanted to replace the discourse on Heidegger prior to 1987 with his book, while post-modernists themselves would say that Schürmann wanted to «enrich» the existing discourse on Heidegger. Be this as it may in Schürmann's case—the phrase «gegen» (SZ 383; «against,» BT 435) already indicates that in Heidegger the Erbe is polemical against the world of the «they.» As I already elaborated in chapter I, at the end of the drama authentic Dasein even cancels the world of the «they» in order to rerealize the past or the Erbe.

Why does Schürmann say that the English papers were printed in the diaspora, and that the publication of the English translation resettles them in their native habitat? I don't know whether, for Schürmann, missionaries live in a diaspora or not. However, even if they do, after successful conversions the missionaries and their church don't resettle themselves in their native habitat. Rather, the missionaries have «conquered» new land—in Schürmann's case, the English readers—for their church in addition to the native habitat of their church and its members—in Schürmann's case, the French original of his book and the French audience. According to the strict notion of diaspora, the original habitat was indeed lost, because one was driven out of it by an enemy that has taken over the native habitat. In that case, Schümann would present the expansion of the original territory as an act in which one regains the lost original territory, and prior to which one had no territory at all, since the original territory was lost. Why does Schürmann present his missionaries from French territory into the English language as though their native habitat, the French site, had been destroyed and taken over by an enemy? Only on this assumption can the English papers be said to be resettled in their native habitat through the publication of the English book. Schürmann's Heidegger in Heidegger: On Being and Acting is, so to speak, a very «cool,» a very Foucauldian Heidegger. Still, in Heidegger: On Being and Acting as well as in his posthumously published work^[29] Schürmann remains faithful to the basic tenet of Heidegger's philosophies from the thirties on; the fascination of «the Greeks» shared by many German intellectuals since Winckelmann. In the pre-Socratics, Being was present in the primordial way. With the beginning of metaphysics, Being withdraws. From that moment on, Being as well as the humans are, so to speak, in the diaspora, and only a few individuals, Meister Eckhart or Hölderlin, have an experience of Being in its primordial way. However, their writings are covered up by the work of ambiguity. At the end of metaphysics, primordial Being raises its voice, and it is possible and necessary to repeat the primordial experience of Being in the pre-Socratics. Schürmann's commitment to this crucial feature in Heidegger is obviously the reason for his peculiar attitude toward the fortune of his book on its way into the English language. However, the same motif is already present in Being and Time , though with different actors. As was mentioned above, in the drama of the entire book Being and Time at the end of Division

One, in large parts of Division Two, and at the beginning of section 74 ordinary Dasein has fallen away from its original world and is living in a new world. In addition, the constant strife for something new, for the modem, plus the forgetting of what was left behind are the mark of curiosity practiced by ordinary and inauthentic Daseine. Ordinary Dasein looks forward without looking backward and without taking over the Erbe. At the end of chapter 3, it will be clear that ordinary Dasein has fallen away from Gemeinschaft (community) and is living in Gesellschaft (society). At some point in the downward plunge away from community, community, the Erbe neglected by ordinary Dasein, raises its voice and demands to be recognized. Prior to this moment, the Erbe has remained, so to speak, in the background or in the diaspora; it has been present only as the possibilities covered up by ordinary Dasein's work of ambiguity. Thus, the Erbe exists prior to all ordinary Daseine, those that become authentic as well as those that become inauthentic. In addition, the Erbe is not identical with «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383). Rather it is the estate «in terms of {aus }» (BT 345; SZ 383), or from which, authentic Dasein receives its appropriate share, inheritance, and which is only one set of all the possibilities in the pool of «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383), namely, all those possibilities that ordinary Dasein covers up to go on living in its fallen world, in Gesellschaft, and in the possibilities coming along with Gesellschaft. The Erbe provides authentic Daseine with identity and thus enables them to «become authentically bound together» (BT 159; «eigentliche Verbundenheit,» SZ 122) or to have «primordial Being-with-one-another» (BT 219; «das ursprüngliche Miteinandersein,» SZ 174). Being authentically bound together through their common origin, the Erbe, the authentic Daseine don't fight «against» (BT 435; SZ 383) the Erbe or each other. Rather they fight «against» (BT 435; SZ 383) ordinary Daseine and inauthentic Daseine; that is, against all the Daseine that live in «deficient modes of solicitude» (BT 158; SZ 120).^[30] The being-with-one-another of the «they» is the opposite of «[being] authentically bound together» (BT 159; SZ 122): «Being-with-one-another in the "they" is by no means an indifferent side-by-side-ness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of "for-one-another" {Füreinander}, an "against-one-another" {ein Gegeneinander} is in play» (BT 219; SZ 175).^[31] Being authentically bound together, the authentic Daseine fight «against» (BT 435; SZ 383) the ordinary and inauthentic Daseine and the world in which the ordinary and inauthentic Daseine live; that is, the authentic Daseine fight against «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383) in order to replace that world with one in which the Erbe is properly rerealized. The authentic Daseine do so «for» (BT 435; SZ 383) «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383) since through the

repetition of the Erbe not only the Erbe but also the ordinary and inauthentic Daseine are resettled in the native habitat, in world w₁ as I called it above, since world w₂ is a diaspora from the viewpoint of w ₁ . Thus, the sentence that in authentic Dasein's choice «the handing down» of the Erbe «constitutes itself,» means that the Erbe has existed prior to all the ordinary Daseine; that it «puts itself together» out of its scattered existence as fragments covered up by the work of ambiguity; that it enters a context in which it has previously not been present, or in which it has been present only as scattered and inactive fragments; and that it begins to be active in that context as a unified force and power. The Erbe doesn't enter the scene without authentic Daseine taking it over. However, by being called upon and by uniting themselves and subduing themselves to the Erbe the authentic Daseine become the means, or the missionaries, of the Erbe. Appropriately, they are no longer the subject of Heidegger's sentence. Instead, they are just the site on which and through which «the handing down of» the Erbe «constitutes itself» (BT 435; SZ 383). That the handing down of the Erbe puts itself together means that the Erbe enters the scene and becomes active. Thus, the ultimate subject is the Erbe, as it becomes even more clear in the following sentences.^[32]

As I already pointed out, in the following paragraphs Heidegger determines the Erbe as destiny and fate. In the passage on the Erbe he says that authentic Dasein acts «against» (BT 435; SZ 383) «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» (BT 435; SZ 383). In the penultimate sentence of the passage on destiny and fate, Heidegger adduces the appropriate noun. He says that «only in communicating and in struggling {im Kampf} does the power of destiny become free {wird frei}» (BT 436; SZ 384). As I already pointed out, the phrase «wird frei» («becomes free») does not mean that something is created anew but rather that something previously in bonds, so to speak, becomes free. In terms of the prisoners I talked about in section A of this chapter, ordinary Dasein has run «aus» («out of» in the sense of «illegitimate flight») Gemeinschaft, w₁ . In the new world of ordinary Dasein, in w₂ , the ordinary Daseine have imprisoned the remnants of w ₁ or all the missionaries of w₁ occurring at the time of the Bocksgesang preceding the end of w₂ . Some ordinary Daseine, however, listen to the call of the imprisoned Daseine and of destiny speaking through them. These Daseine and the prisoners are the authentic Daseine; those who understand themselves «in terms of {aus } the heritage » (BT 435; SZ 383) the «aus» in this case indicating the source of their identity and strength. Through the heritage, the prisoners and the Daseine that have liberated them become authentically bound together, and they take up the fight «against» the «they,» against Gesellschaft, which has imprisoned the messengers of destiny. They do so not for the sake of selfish interests but as missionaries of the Erbe.^[33]

Even Guignon might admit that, at this point, «heritage» is not just «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» («the way of interpreting Dasein which has

come down to us,» BT 435; ST 383) viewed from the perspective of authentic Dasein but only the authentic possibilities that thereafter are turned against «überkommene Ausgelegtheit.» However, this passage cannot be reconciled with his assumption that authentic Dasein maintains distance to the past so that it can reject some possibilities and choose others. Note that already here the subject has changed. Like the passage on repetition I discussed in section C of chapter I, the first sentence of this paragraph has, if not a Dasein, then at least a resoluteness (of a Dasein) as its subject («The resoluteness {Die Entschlossenheit} in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses . . ., » BT 435; SZ 383). In the sentence, «If everything 'good' . . . the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness,» however, the «handing down of a heritage,» and by this, «heritage» is the active subject that imposes itself onto authentic Dasein. Thus, by this point, the Dasein that at the beginning seemed to be highly active since it ran forward becomes passive in the sense I explained in regard to the notion of Entschlossenheit in section A of chapter I. As a result of this change, in the following sentences one cannot find anything indicating Dasein's sovereign ability to reject some offers of the past, much as one might like to. Heidegger insists that heritage brings Dasein «into the simplicity of its fate » (BT 435; ST 384), that heritage enables or even forces Dasein to unequivocality by which «every accidental and 'provisional' {«vorläufige»} possibility {is} driven out»^[34] (BT 435; ST 384) and that in all this Dasein gets its «Ziel schlechthin» («goal outright») (BT 435; ST 384). All this, of course, in this paragraph as well as in many others in Being and Time , is intended as the opposite of ordinary and inauthentic Dasein, which chooses now this, now that, and indulges in «comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly» (BT 435; SZ 384). Furthermore, death, and heritage, «pushes {stößt}» and «snatches» authentic Dasein «back from {reißt aus . . . zurück}» (BT 435; ST 384) the possibilities ordinary Dasein indulges in. All this rules out the idea that authentic Dasein has a conversation with the past in which it rejects several offers and adopts others. Thus, what Heidegger says is the opposite: authentic Dasein has no choice, so to speak, to deliberate with heritage. Rather, heritage catches Dasein and puts it under heritage's command.

Thus, what authentic Dasein does is execute the act of separation. Dasein, or heritage, , de-cides, separates. In the twilight of ordinary Dasein there are inauthentic possibilities, and there are authentic possibilities the latter being covered up by ambiguity. Authentic Dasein draws on the latter. It chooses «aus (from)» all the possibilities in the twilight those that have been made unrecognizable by ordinary Dasein, and it does so in order to get «aus (out of)» ordinary Dasein and its world and to then turn its choice «gegen (against)» ordinary Dasein and its world. This ambiguity of «aus» in the passage on «überkommene Ausgelegtheit» is, as I have discussed, resolved in the first passage on «heritage» insofar as Heidegger there uses «aus»

exclusively in the sense of that from which authentic Dasein draws its choice without leaving this place it has reached in its decision and choice. Correspondingly, the «aus» in the passage on «Being-free for death» snatching «one back from {aus}» the endless possibilities of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly (BT 435; SZ 384) exclusively means «to get out of» those possibilities without ever returning to them. Heritage is that place «aus (from)» which the authentic possibilities are derived that ordinary Dasein covers up. As such heritage is the site that provides authentic Dasein with identity and the strength to turn the authentic possibilities «against» ordinary Dasein's world. This site, heritage, imposes itself onto authentic Dasein and enables authentic Dasein to resolve the twilight of ordinary Dasein into the opposition between authentic Dasein living in heritage and inauthentic Dasein living outside the realm of heritage.

The last sentence of that paragraph also shows that it is heritage that catches Dasein and not the other way around. That sentence explains the notion «the simplicity of its fate » and summarizes the entire paragraph. It reads: «Damit bezeichnen wir das in der eigentlichen Entschlossenheit liegende ursprüng-liche Geschehen des Daseins, in dem es sich frei für den Tod ihm selbst in einer ererbten, aber gleichwohl gewählten Möglichkeit überliefert » (SZ 384). Macquarrie and Robinson have translated this as: «This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen» (BT 435). The relative clause at the end, «in dem . . . üiberliefert » («and in which . . . yet has chosen»), is rather cryptic. German speakers know that it can be difficult to find the antecedent a personal pronoun or reflexive pronoun refers to if several nouns of the same gender as the pronoun occur in the context. Usually only minor measures are required to avoid such inconveniences for the readers. The personal pronoun «ihm» in «ihm selbst» («to itself») is the dative masculine and neuter personal pronoun. «Dasein» («Dasein's»), «Tod» («death»), and «dem» (the «which» in «in which,» referring to the neuter «das . . . Geschehen des Daseins») are all masculine or neuter (that is, none are feminine in which case the dative personal pronoun would be «ihr»). Thus, the dative object «ihm» in «ihm selbst» («to itself») can refer to «dem» (which refers to «Geschehen,» that is, «primordial historizing»), or to «es» («itself») (which refers to «Daseins»), or to «Tod» («death») as well. Heidegger could easily have avoided this inconvenience for the reader. He could have just replaced «ihm selbst» with «dem Tod,» «diesem selbst,» or «diesem,» «dem Dasein selbst,» «sich selbst (to Dasein itself),» or «dem Geschehen selbst,» if he had wanted the dative object of handing down to be clear and unambiguously refer to «death,» «Dasein,» or to «primordial historizing.» However, he chose the enigmatic «ihm.» The translators have chosen to refer «ihm selbst» to the Dasein (the «to itself» in «in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death»). Guignon, I suppose, read the sen-

tence in the light of later ones in section 74, which I discussed in chapter 1, particularly the one with «kann, sich selbst die ererbte Möglichkeit üiberliefernd » (SZ 385; «by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited ,» BT 437) as well as in the light of his interpretation of the sentence with «erwidert » (SZ 386; «reciprocative rejoinder, » BT 438). If Dasein hands something down to itself, that is, if Dasein is the active subject as well as the recipient of this handing down, Dasein is active and regards everything from its own vantage point. Thus, Guignon reads the relative clause as an anticipation of Dasein's capacity to freely choose out of the several possibilities offered by the past the one that fits its particular utopian ideal. In fact, up to and around the middle of the nineteenth century, one could have said, «Dasein überliefert sich ihm selbst,» if one wanted to refer the dative personal pronoun to «Dasein.» However, in such cases Heidegger seems to use the current «sich,» as a sentence at the beginning of the paragraph in question shows («Die Entschlossenheit, in der das Dasein auf sich selbst zurückkommt,» SZ 383; «The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself,» BT 435). Since, therefore, Heidegger did not write «dem Dasein selbst,» nor «sich selbst,» the phrase «ihm selbst» cannot refer to Dasein. Since death doesn't provide Dasein with authentic possibilities (BT 434; SZ 383), one can rule out the case that Heidegger wanted to say that Dasein hands itself down to death. Therefore, one is left with «primordial historizing» and thus with «fate» and «heritage» to which Dasein hands itself down. Clearly, then, this sentence and indeed the entire paragraph anticipates what is later on explained in terms of repetition, including the switch to «sich überliefern» as subjugation, which I discussed in section C of chapter 1.

However, perhaps Heidegger intentionally left the sentence open to several interpretations. In this case, one would have not only Guignon' s notion of the choosing Dasein. Within the context of the entire section 74, the sentence would still anticipate the step concerning Dasein's subjugation to the past. Or perhaps Heidegger wanted to express within his syntax and grammar that Geschehen he is talking about. In this case, the «ihm selbst» would be, so to speak, the Whitsuntide of heritage, fate, death, and Dasein. However, even based on this assumption, one cannot find anything in this paragraph that indicates Dasein's autonomy and independence toward the heritage in Guignon's sense, much as one would like to. In fact, this aspect that, theologically, might be designated as Whitsuntide is operating implicitly in the entire sentence whether one relates «ihm selbst» to one of the three nouns or to some, so to speak, grammatical supersubject resulting from the movement described in the entire paragraph and its last sentence. Despite the objections regarding Heidegger's usage of «sich,» one might reasonably refer «ihm selbst» to «es» (= «des Daseins»). However, this Dasein is then no longer the choosing Dasein at the beginning of its choice. Rather, it is the Dasein as transformed by the choice, or, in Heidegger's terms, it is the «ursprüngliche, unverlorene . . . Erstrecktheit der ganzen Existenz» (SZ 390; «the whole of existence stretched

along . . . in a way which is primordial and not lost» BT 442) that has to be grasped and achieved by the empirical Dasein in order for the latter to become authentic. As was mentioned, Heidegger could have written «sich selbst» to refer to Dasein. (In order to avoid a possible inconvenience for the readers in regard to the dative object and the accusative object, he might have rearranged the words, and he might have used an «an» with the accusative: «in dem es, frei für den Tod, sich an sich selbst in einer ererbten, aber gleichwohl gewählten Möglichkeit überliefert.») However, this would not have sufficiently emphasized that he is talking here about three different aspects of Dasein or about three different Daseine in one and the same Dasein. The «Dasein» («es»), the subject of the relative cause, is Dasein on its way to authenticity. On this way, it hands «itself» («sich»), the accusative object, down; the «itself» refers to Dasein as ordinary Dasein or to Dasein as the Dasein that, as each Dasein, is open for both authenticity and inauthenticity (BT 68; SZ 42f.). It hands itself down «to itself» («ihm selbst,» the dative object); as to itself in the sense of «the whole of existence stretched along . . . in a way which is primordial and not lost» (BT 442; SZ 390). The expression «ihm selbst» is a somewhat pathetic formula indicating the radical difference between Dasein prior to its choice and Dasein after the choice. Dasein can achieve authenticity or «the whole of existence stretched along . . . in a way which is primordial and not lost» (BT 442; SZ 390) only by being snatched «back from» (BT 435; «aus . . . zurück,» SZ 384) the «they» and by being brought «into the simplicity of its fate » (BT 435; SZ 384).^[35] Thus, Dasein hands itself down to fate and what fate entails, namely, heritage, which makes fate possible. The phrase «ihm selbst» designates the slot destiny has allotted to a given Dasein, and which that Dasein has to take over in order to become authentic. As the terminology already indicates, there is an aspect of violence in this; however, it is a purifying violence. «To have fate,» as Heidegger puts it in the following paragraphs, is a good state, and it was a desirable state for all those young people in the Youth Movement whom I mentioned in section A of chapter 1 and to whom I will refer again in chapter 3. Anyway, what on the level of «being-towards death» (BT 279ff.; SZ 235ff.) was «coming back to itself» as nullity reveals itself on the more «ursprüngliche» level of historicality as identification with and subjugation to a fate representing heritage and all the richness contained in it. In the entire section 74, Heidegger is not talking about a free choice, that is, a choice in which the subject chooses freely and remains free and autonomous during and after the choice, as the bourgeois subject claims to be in his acting and choices since the subject is subject only to reason but not to tradition, destiny, or fate. Rather, Heidegger talks about a choice that transforms Dasein. He clearly indicated this also by the «gleichwohl» («yet») in «yet has chosen» (BT 435; ST 384). Though freedom of individual choice is no longer an issue in authentic Dasein, the choice has been Dasein' s free choice since, after all, the Dasein ran forward into death. As I will explain in more detail in chapter 3, in these passages Hei-

degger calls upon the bourgeois subject to replace its framework of mason, subjectivity, individuality, and autonomy with that of fate and community. However, this replacement has to be an act of bourgeois autonomy itself, otherwise authentic Dasein would be haunted by a bad conscience. In other words, the resignation of the autonomous subject must be an act of the autonomous subject himself, otherwise it would be too «they»-like, too ordinary, and too proletarian. This act of subjugation to heritage and, as it turns out, to Volk, however, is—in its structure—nothing other than the notion of sacrifice demanded by the extreme Right or fascism.

Authentic Dasein does not leave the world of ordinary Dasein, and it does not criticize the world of ordinary Dasein from a vantage point beyond ordinary Dasein's world. Rather, authentic Dasein turns around, or reevaluates, ordinary Dasein's world from within this world. Or it turns ordinary Dasein's world upside down. Authentic Dasein recognizes that the possibilities that «have mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity» (BT 435; SZ 383) are, once the work of ordinary Dasein is seen for what it is, the authentic possibilities that bring authentic Dasein into the proper relation to its origin, to heritage, destiny, and Volksgemeinschaft. With this activity authentic Dasein produces a separation between the Daseine. In the next paragraph Heidegger clarifies this difference in terms of that between the Daseine that have fate (the authentic Daseine) and those that do not (the inauthentic Daseine):

Dasein can be reached by the blows of fate only because in the depths of its Being Dasein is fate in the sense we have described {weil es im Grunde seines Seins in dem gekennzeichneten Sinne Schicksal ist }. Existing fatefully in the resoluteness which hands itself down {Schicksalhaft in der sich überliefernden Entschlossenheit existierend}, Dasein has been disclosed as Being-in-the world both for the 'fortunate' circumstances which 'come its way' and for the cruelty of accidents. Fate does not first arise from the clashing together of events and circumstances. Even one who is irresolute gets driven about by these—more so than one who has chosen; and yet he can 'have' no fate {Durch das Zusammenstoßen von Umständen und Begebenheiten entsteht nicht erst das Schicksal. Auch der Unentschlossene wird von ihnen und mehr noch als der, der gewählt hat, umgetrieben und kann gleichwohl kein Schicksal "haben"}. (BT 436; SZ 384) ^[36]

Several points are noteworthy here. First, far from being something a Dasein creates or changes or breaks, «fate» exists prior to the Dasein and demands the latter's subjugation. The point is not how to create or break fate. Rather, the problem is whether a Dasein accepts, opens itself for, hands itself down to, subjugates itself to, or sacrifices itself to fate—which is what authentic Dasein does—or whether a Dasein denies fate and continues trying to evade it—which is what ordinary, and therefore inauthentic, Dasein does. Second, this passage shows that fate, and thus heritage, is all-pervasive. Even the inauthentic Dasein

that believes itself to be outside of the realm of fate has to acknowledge that it is «im Grunde seines Seins» («in the depths of its Being») fate and heritage. In the passage following this, Heidegger, in his peculiar way, makes clear what is implied already here, namely, that ordinary Dasein's world is dependent on heritage and Volksgemeinschaft, that is, that the way from w₁ to w₂ , as I called it before, is by no means one in which w₁ and its origin, i.e., Volksgemeinschaft, is completely annihilated; rather, «in the depth of» (BT 436; SZ 384) world w₂ the origin of w₁ remains present or, at any rate, begins to represence itself in the Bocksgesang. Ordinary Dasein has not left behind heritage and Volksgemeinschaft, it has merely fallen away from them and has made unrecognizable all those ways in which the «real» origin remains present within the verfallene world of ordinary Dasein. Thus, there is only one world. Ordinary Dasein's world is not a new world but just a verfallene version of a world in which the origin is properly present. Authentic Dasein understands this and reestablishes the origin in an undistorted way so that as a result authentic Dasein «so erst der Gewesenheit ihren eigentümlichen Vorrang verleiht» (SZ 386; «for the first time imparts to having-been its peculiarly privileged position,» BT 438). Thus, we have an asymmetrical situation. Ordinary Dasein claims that its world is independent of the one vanished in the past. Authentic Dasein, however, claims that this is not at all the case. Rather, according to authentic Dasein, ordinary Dasein's world is just a verfallene version of the world of the past and has to be canceled to make room for the reestablishment of that past world. ^[37] Third, there is an ambiguity in the sentence «und kann gleichwohl kein Schicksal "haben"» (SZ 384; «and yet he can 'have' no fate,» BT 436). This sentence may mean that it is impossible for inauthentic Dasein to have fate. It may also mean that inauthentic Dasein is not capable of having fate. And it can mean that it is possible that inauthentic Dasein does not have fate, since it evades fate. It has no fate, but it should have one, since «in the depths of its Being» (BT 436; SZ 384) it is fate. Thus, one might infer that what Heidegger means is that inauthentic Dasein can be forced to have fate, that is, in the struggle for the rerealization of the past authentic Dasein can force inauthentic Dasein into its fate, which inauthentic Dasein by itself cannot, or does not want to, reach. This is in line with my interpretation of «Widermf» and of the «gegen» and «für» as an activity of authentic Dasein in which it replaces inauthentic Dasein's world for the sake of the latter. In the paragraphs on conscience, this motif is anticipated in the sentence: «Das entschlossene Dasein kann zum "Gewissen" der Anderen werden» (SZ 298; «When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others,» BT 344).

As this shows, the separation that authentic Dasein carries out, namely, that between authentic Dasein and ordinary Dasein—which in this separation becomes inauthentic Dasein—is a situation that calls for what is termed «Kampf» («struggle») in the subsequent passage. In this part, I have discussed the emergence and the unfolding of the crisis. In the twilight there emerges

the anschwellende Bocksgesang that calls for the separation. In contrast to ordinary Dasein and inauthentic Dasein, authentic Dasein sees the present in the light of «Heute» («"today"»), realizes that there is a dangerous situation, and relates itself to the «heritage.» In so doing, it produces the separation between the Daseine that have fate and those that do not, i.e., the inauthentic Daseine. In the next step authentic Dasein realizes that its heritage and destiny is the Volksgemeinschaft, which calls it into struggle. I will discuss this step in chapter 3. After this, authentic Dasein hands itself down to the Volksgemeinschaft and recognizes what is at stake in the struggle. This is the passage on repetition I discussed already in chapter 1. Finally, authentic Dasein reaffirms its subjugation to the past and to the Volksgemeinschaft and begins the struggle, that is, the cancellation of the world of inauthentic Dasein. This is the passage on erwidert and Widerruf I discussed in chapter 1. There, the phrase «was im Heute sich als "Vergangenheit" auswirkt» (SZ 386; «that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past',» BT 438) refers to «überkommenen Ausgelegtheit» (SZ 383; «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us,» BT 435) as follows: «that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past'» is the remnant of «the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us» after authentic Dasein has made the separation. By seeing the Volksgemeinschaft as the suppressed origin in and of the possibilities that ordinary Dasein has made unrecognizable in its work of ambiguity, authentic Dasein realizes that it has to cancel the world of inauthentic Dasein, that is, «that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past'» (BT 438; SZ 386) in order to make possible the rebirth of a Gemeinschaft, community, in which its origin, the Volk, is properly present.

By the end of chapter 3, it will be clear that what authentic Dasein destroys in the name of Volksgemeinschaft is the Gesellschaft, that is, liberal society and the political institutions coming with it. As I will show in the following chapter, for Scheler at the beginning of World War I «our German fate took its stand before us,» and he heard «just one single answer resounding from all German souls» (PPS 11). Heidegger demands that authentic Dasein «erwidert» (SZ 386) the call of the past. Scheler urges us to «hear God's call for a turning back» (PPS 646). What Heidegger labels «that which in the "today", is working itself out as the "past"» (BT 438; SZ 386) is called by Scheler «rubbish {Abfall, literally "fall-down-and-away-from"}» (RE 166; UW 140). In the kairos of World War I and the Weimar Republic, «we» recognize that our Gesellschaft is rubbish, a fall-down-and-away-from Gemeinschaft. What Heidegger calls «a disavowal» (BT 438; SZ 386) occurs in Scheler as the demand that Europe «expels from its blood like a foreign poison» (PPS 153) Gesellschaft. «We» have to destroy Gesellschaft in order to rerealize Gemeinschaft.