Political Organization:
The Minimalist Implementation Pattern

Having looked at the major limitations upon implementing maximalist organization patterns, we shall now examine the alternative forms of organization more appropriate to current African circumstances and values. If, for the time being, political, economic, and social conditions make the adoption of classical federalism somewhat improbable, it follows that decision elites will have to avoid the reconciliational middle and move toward one of the polar extremes: unitary government or loose, interunit arrangements. The first alternative has appeal at the state level, as it enhances governmental capability, but because of territorial fears over the centralized power it engenders, it is not a realizable means of uniting currently sovereign states at the regional, continental, or extracontinental levels. Consequently, it is the second, looser (or minimalist) alternative that presently offers the widest scope for institutional experimentation in the present international system.

At the outset one is struck by the wide array of limitedpurpose multilateral arrangements that have dotted the African scene. We analyze these at three levels: the regional level (i.e., the East African Community), the continental level (i.e., the Organization of African Unity), and the extracontinental level (i.e., the African, Caribbean, and Pacific—ACP—Group). What makes them similar is their creation by prolonged negotiation,

their equality of membership rights, their acceptance of extensive territorial initiative and autonomy, and their limited but specific organization functions. They are created and maintained by a negotiating process that often stresses important concessions to the least cooperative bargaining partner or partners—a process largely akin to that which Ernst B. Haas depicts as "accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator."^[20] To be sure, the intercessions of a secretarygeneral may lead to more flexible negotiating stances, with the bargaining partners reaching compromises by "splitting the difference," but in the main these loosely structured, minimalist arrangements represent a pragmatic response to the reality of sovereignty on the international scene.

Because current African circumstances necessitate that region-building be achieved by a process of prolonged negotiation, it is hardly surprising that the resulting structures sometimes prove to be ineffective as problem solvers. By their extensive concessions in the formative stages to territorial initiative, they create subsequent difficulties for those members of the elite committed to achieving organization purposes. At critical junctures, then, the logic of creating and maintaining these low-cost, loosely structured arrangements comes into conflict with the goals of joint action. All too often these new institutions lack the capacity to secure rational-choice objectives and must therefore go through periodic revisions in light of the new realities.

Functionalism:
The East African Community

Behind the approach adopted by the 1967 Treaty for East African Co-operation is an acceptance of a kind of supranationalism

[20] On the three types of compromise in international relations, see Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," in International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 95–96, and Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 111. Another example of such accommodation occurs in Article 6 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States where, despite great variation among partner states in size of population and gross national product, it was provided that each member state would have two representatives on the Council of Ministers.

which falls short of a fully integrated system.^[21] The structure set up by the treaty reflects a careful balancing of state responsibilities and regional economic, administrative, and technical cooperation. State interests are fully recognized and protected in all Community activities. Concessions to national interest are apparent, for example, in the various measures agreed upon to balance and promote industrial development among the partner states. The headquarters of various East African agencies that had long been concentrated in Nairobi were decentralized, each member state securing two of the main headquarters bodies. The East African Railways and East African Airways Corporation remain in Nairobi; Posts and Telecommunications and the East African Development Bank are assigned to Kampala, and the East African Harbours Corporation is sited at Dar es Salaam. The headquarters of the Community itself is allocated to Arusha, Tanzania. Though such a dispersion of activities entails considerable expense, it is justified as a form of aid to the less industrialized partners and a stabilizer for the whole arrangement. Other such stabilizing institutions set up under the treaty include a transfer tax (which may be imposed by any partner state with a deficit in its total interunit trade in manufactured goods on items imported from a member with which it is in deficit) and the East African Development Bank, which seeks, through a reallocative process, to promote balanced industrial development throughout the region as a whole.

In addition, decisions of the East African Authority—the highest executive organ of the Community—require the unanimous consent of the three heads of state. Unanimity is also mandatory for actions of the Common Market, Finance, Economic Consultative and Planning, Communications, and Research and Social Councils, whose membership consists of the three ministers for East African affairs (one nominated by the government of each state) and an equal number of other ministers from the constituent units. Territorial equality of

[21] These sections draw upon materials in Donald Rothchild, "East African Community: Experiment in Functional Integration," Africa Report 13, no. 4 (April 1968): 42–46, and his "From Hegemony to Bargaining," pp. 408–15.

representation is also a prominent feature of the East African Legislative Assembly, a body composed of the Chairman of the Assembly, the Secretary-General and Counsel to the Community, the three East African ministers, and twenty seven members (nine from each country) appointed by the partner states. Only peripherally is state sovereignty challenged by the treaty provisions. Doubtlessly, such realism facilitated the acceptance of the pact; at the same time, however, it circumscribed these institutions by limiting their capacity to cope with unforeseen conflicts.

The Challenge to the Institutional Experiment

The main challenge to institutional viability in East Africa came with the 1971 Uganda coup d'etat. Following Major-General Idi Amin Dada's assumption of power in Uganda, Tanzania and Uganda became enmeshed in a protracted struggle which had political, administrative, and military ramifications. Although border skirmishing did break out, the fighting remained small in scale. Even so, the very fact of hostile military engagements dramatized the existence of disintegrative forces at work in the Community organization. Not only did military encounters become the justification for a Uganda decision to sever air, water, and telecommunications links temporarily with Tanzania, but they raised real questions as to institutional effectiveness and survival.

The political and administrative difficulties arising from this bilateral conflict appear in the struggles over appointments, appropriations, communications and transportation links, and the functioning of the East African Authority. Tanzania's faithfulness to the former president of Uganda, Milton Obote, led almost inevitably to a refusal to recognize the new military regime and to participate with General Amin at meetings of the East African Authority. This executive crisis cast a shadow over Community operations, for appointments to high Community office required the joint agreement of the three East African heads of state sitting together. After Zarubarberi Bigirwenkya's term as secretary-general expired in March 1971, the organization struggled on for two months without an administrative head and finally resolved the crisis by quietly appointing a Kenyan, Charles Maina, to the office without the usual endorse-

ment of the East African Authority in formal session. Moreover, Tanzanian officials questioned Amin's right to replace Ugandans holding such Community posts as director general of East African Harbours Corporation or director general of East African Airways Corporation without first securing the consent of the partner states.

Intermeshed with the crisis over appointments was that involving the finances of the Community. The East African Community Appropriations Bill 1971–72, which provided an annual budget of £10 million toward the running of the General Fund Services, required passage by the East African Legislative Assembly, followed by the unanimous assent of the three heads of state. Consequently, when President Amin indicated that he would not sign the appropriations bill unless he was satisfied as to Tanzania's cooperative spirit (as shown by its willingness to allow Ugandan nominees to take up their Community assignments in Tanzania), the transnational system was gravely threatened. In Article 66, the treaty had specifically provided that in the event that an appropriation act had not come into effect by the first day of the new financial year, the East African Authority could authorize payments out of the general fund, provided that these monthly payments did not exceed one-twelfth of the total appropriation of the previous financial year and that such authorizations did not extend beyond September 30 of the new financial year. Thus it was a matter of considerable relief when, following a round of separate bilateral talks with President Kenyatta in Nairobi, measures aimed at a normalization of East African Community relations were announced in November 1971. In his private discussions with Kenyatta, Nyerere agreed that he would approve Uganda's nominees to the Community. After Kenyatta had relayed this confirmation to Amin in a telephone conversation, the general responded swiftly by signing the appropriations bill and lifting the ban on two highranking Tanzanian nationals serving the Community in Uganda.^[22] Thus Kenyatta's personal intervention has proved

[22] In particular, see the discussions in Uganda Argus (Kampala), November 22, 1971, p. 10; and Daily Nation (Nairobi), November 23, 1971, p. 1.

crucial in ending the immediate crisis over appropriations and appointments. He had revealed once again the critical importance of leadership skill in managing conflicts affecting supranational organizations.

By assuming the mantle of a third-party mediator, then, Kenyan leaders were able to surmount state-centered demands in the period following the Uganda coup. However, despite this commitment in principle to the Community system, the centrifugal pulls of separate statehood worked a hardship on organizational efficiency. Thus Edwin Mtei, the new Community secretary-general, said, soon after assuming office in 1974, that the political climate and the morale of the Community staff were some of the factors contributing to the financial difficulties faced by a number of the Community corporations.^[23] And a Ugandan member of the East African Legislative Assembly, W. Senteza-Kajubi, warned that the survival of the Community depended on the East African Authority's assembling. "Just [as] there can be no marriage by correspondence," he asserted, "so there can be no authority by correspondence. The three heads of states . . . must meet physically if the community's survival is to be guaranteed.^[24]

In December 1974 the costs of organization increased as the Tanzanian government announced a temporary ban on heavy vehicles using roads in the northern part of the country. This announcement brought Kenyan-Zambian trade to a standstill and caused bitter protests on the part of Kenyan officials over alleged treaty violations. Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, Kenya's new foreign minister, strongly protested the Tanzanian initiative and went on to criticize as well the alleged expulsion of 10,000 Kenyans from Tanzanian border areas. Subsequent retaliations followed as roads were closed on the Kenya side of the border and a Tanzanian official employed by East African Harbours Corporation was told to leave Kenya on short notice.^[25] Then, in 1975, as relations began to deteriorate noticeably and promi-

[23] Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 15, 1974, p. 5. Also see his comments to the Kenya Press Club in ibid., August 2, 1974, p. 3.

[24] Ibid., June 14, 1974, p. 5.

[25] Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Cultural Series 2, no. 12 (January 15, 1975): 3450–52.

nent Kenyan leaders began publicly to question the desirability of maintaining intercountry linkages, the East African Authority set up a new commission to review the treaty arrangement. What this commission will be able to salvage in the way of effective interunit coordination remains to be seen.

The difficulties involved in operating the common services in the face of such political tensions were broadly based. A number of the common services faced a crisis of performance as measured in terms of profitability. East African Airways, which showed a cumulative loss of Shs. 102,100,100/- in its operating account on December 31, 1972, was rescued in part by a decision the following year under which the three partner states would each contribute Shs. 23,000,000/- to finance the activities of the Corporation.^[26] As changes were made in management accountancy procedures and services, the Corporation was able to announce improvements in load factors and profitability for the period that followed. But if East African Airways was largely able to overcome its performance difficulties by late 1973, other services were beginning to reveal serious problems of their own. Long profitable East African Harbours Corporation incurred a loss of Shs. 41,000,000/- in 1972, a reversal of fortune explained in part by a fall in operating revenues of Shs. 28,600,000/- at a time when total expenditures increased Shs. 12,400,000/-.^[27] The 1972 annual report of the East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation showed substantial operating profits (Shs. 54,000,000/-) offset by heavy losses incurred through write-offs of missing equipment (Shs. 10,800,000/-) and uncollected telephone bills (Shs. 62,100,000/-).^[28] And the East African Railways Corporation, staggering under an overdraft of Shs. 44,364,700/-, has been unable to meet payrolls on time, to maintain a training school, to purchase equipment, and to provide the services expected of it.^[29]

[26] Ibid., June 26, 1974, p. 5, and November 28, 1973, p. 1.

[27] Ibid., June 4, 1974, p. 4.

[28] Ibid., May 21, 1974, p. 6.

[29] Ibid., January 29, 1974, p. 3. The Railways had an accumulated deficit of nearly £8 million from 1970 and 1971. East African Standard (Nairobi), July 27, 1973, p. 8.

In part at least, this decline in corporate viability reflected state-centered demands as well as organizational strains arising from separate political interests. The desire for decentralized responsibility found various outlets in the post-Uganda-coup period: from the decentralization of stores in the East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation to the dismantling of the East African Income Tax Department. In addition, an already difficult financial situation was complicated by the unwillingness of administrators in the three states to transfer funds to interterritorial use. "The Community," contends Alan Rake, "struggles against the militant national interest of its partner states. The struggle goes on at all levels, from the little men who block legitimate transfer of funds, to the supreme Community Authority itself formed by the three heads of state."^[30] Thus in late 1973 and early 1974, the East African Railways Corporation was gripped by a financial crisis brought on in part by difficulties in transferring funds from the three territorial accounts. Even though the corporation had an overdraft of Shs. 44,346,700/-, the director general of the corporation noted that, as of January 12, 1974, there were nearly 41 million shillings in credit in the territorial accounts.^[31] After further delays, the three partners reached an agreement under which each would pay 18 million shillings to clear outstanding overdrafts,^[32] but not before revealing the extent to which decentralized decision-making complicated efficient supranational budgeting and allocation. At roughly the same time, the East African Posts and Telegraphs Corporation (EAPT) was placed in financial difficulties by the refusal of its Kenya and Tanzania offices to transfer funds to the corporation headquarters in Uganda. In this instance, a crisis was averted when the Finance Council of the Community intervened and ordered the two territorial offices to transfer certain specified funds for operational purposes.^[33] Clearly the costs of decentralized

[30] Alan Rake, "Can East Africa Take the Strain?" African Development 8, no. 10 (October 1974): p. 18.

[31] Daily Nation (Nairobi), January 18, 1974, pp. 1, 32.

[32] Daily Nation (Nairobi), January 23, 1974, p. 24.

[33] £995,000 in the case of Kenya and £550,000 for Tanzania. Rake, p. 18.

responsibility were proving extremely high in terms of organization efficiency.

Macro-regional Alliance:
The Organization of African Unity

In turning to the continental level, one again sees a process in motion where the political dynamics surrounding the creation of an institutional arrangement—in this case, the Organization of African Unity—act to limit its effective performance of collective tasks. The OAU Charter, forged by the African heads of state and government at the Addis Ababa summit conference in 1963, represented as much in the way of structure as could be achieved at that time by means of direct bargaining. To be sure, political pan-Africanism was an important factor in promoting common elite values and aspirations; it contributed significantly to the overcoming of the fragmentation of the continent into the "high politics" Casablanca group and the "low politics" Monrovia and Brazzaville groups. But if pan-Africanist doctrine went far in bridging the deep chasm in the approaches to integration, it did little to clarify the true pathway to unity. As Diallo Telli, the first administrative secretary-general of the OAU, declared: "Pan-Africanism has never succeeded in developing a body of identifiable socioeconomic and political philosophy, nor has it succeeded in evolving a structural framework within which to operate on a continuing basis."^[34] Thus, by the tenets of pan-Africanism, either the supranationalism of the Casablanca powers or the intergovernmental approach of the Monrovia and Brazzaville powers was theoretically valid, hence the necessity of interstate bargaining and accommodation to determine where the points of convergency lay.

The bargaining process of 1962 and 1963, which culminated in the Addis Ababa summit meeting of 1963, resulted in policies largely favorable to the Monrovia-Brazzaville minimalist position. The essential features of the Addis compromise are described by W. Scott Thompson and Richard Bissell as follows:

The organization was in effect the result of an ingenious bargain between the radicals, led by Sékou Touré, and the moderates, led by

[34] Diallo Telli, "The Organization of African Unity in Historical Perspective," African Forum 1, no. 2 (Fall 1965): 17.

the Emperor of Ethiopia. The radicals were given the form of African unity in the organization's aspirations; and the moderates and conservatives, who insisted that the OAU not assume supranational functions, were given the substance: that the OAU make the sovereignty of the African state its first principle.^[35]

Although the preamble left ajar the door to further integration efforts by declaring that the African states were resolved to reinforce links by establishing and strengthening common institutions, by its vagueness on the issue it presented little actual threat to the majority of states bent on maintaining a minimalist structure. In part, this political defeat for the radicals was compensated for by concessions on the principles adopted in Article III of the charter; whereas the first five principles (the sovereign equality of member states, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the condemnation of political assassination and subversive activities) were responsive to the claims of the Monrovia powers, the principles on decolonization and nonalignment were concessions to the strong feelings of the Casablanca grouping.^[36]

The way in which the African moderates and conservatives were advantaged by the bargaining outcomes can be seen in the charter's provisions for collective tasks, integration strategies, and organization structure. As noted above, the Addis bargain climaxed the Monrovia effort to gain African acceptance for the traditional norms of interstate relations.^[37] Although applicable only to OAU member states, such principles as noninterference and respect for the integrity of sovereign states represented the triumph of order over change in international affairs. In the debates on the charter, several speakers from the moderate or conservative powers, such as Chad's Francois Tombalbaye,

[35] "Legitimacy and Authority in the OAU," African Studies Review 15, no. 1 (April 1972): 19.

[36] See the discussion in Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity and its Charter (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 15, 34.

[37] Yashpal Tandon, "The Organization of African Unity as an Instrument and Forum of Protest," in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 1178.

made pointed reference to the need for regularizing relations among independent countries.^[38] And following the formation of the OAU, further efforts were made by these states to legitimize the existing international order. Among the most important of these was the 1964 resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on border disputes among African countries; by declaring that all member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing at independence, the OAU went a long way toward validating the status quo.^[39] It is noteworthy, in this regard, that when Kenya publicly rebuffed President Amin's claims to some one-third of its territory, governmental officials cited their fidelity to the OAU Charter, "whose paragraph 3 of Article III calls on member states to solemnly affirm and (leclare their adherence to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State.^[40]

But for all the emphasis on gaining full acceptance of the existing African order, the OAU founding fathers were in broad agreement on the need for change—so far, at least, as it affected Africa's trade relationships with the outside world (see the discussion of ACP-EEC bargaining below), and continuing pockets of colonialism and racialism on the continent. For Nigeria's highly pragmatic prime minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, there could be no accommodation with such unequal relationships. At its formative conferences as well as in its later actions, then, the OAU members closed ranks in principle on the southern African question, supporting a series of resolutions in the organization as well as at the United Nations condemning such practices and seeking to mobilize international action against the wrongdoers. A content analysis of available documents from 1900 to 1968 showed racial-colonial affairs to be second from the top in frequency of references, and, within that category, included emphasis on such objectives

[38] Addis Ababa Summit, 1963 (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information, 1963), p. 37.

[39] AHSG/Res. 16, as quoted in Cervenka, Organization of African Unity, p. 94; also see the dliscussion in Zdenek Cervenka, "The Settlement of Disputes among Members of the Organization of African Unity," Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 2 (2 Quartal 1974): 126–27.

[40] Weekly Review (Nairobi), February 23, 1976, p. 3.

as the application of sanctions against South Africa, condemnation of Rhodesia, increased financial contributions to the special fund for the Liberation of Africa, support for African freedom fighters, revocation of South Africa's mandate over South-West Africa, independence for all colonial territories in Africa, the application of economic sanctions against Portugal, and so forth.^[41] In this regard it is significant that when the "Declaration on the Question of Dialogue" was adopted by the Heads of State in 1971, it was agreed that "any action to be taken by Member States in regard to the solution of the problems of colonialism, racial discrimination and Apartheid in Africa, must be undertaken within the framework of the Organization of African Unity and in full consultation with the Liberation Movements of the territories concerned.^[42] However, it should be noted that this declaration did not stop Liberia's President Tolbert, for instance, from acting as a host to South Africa's prime minister, John Vorster; this highly personal initiative occurred outside the OAU framework and pointed up important differences between the moderates and militants on the proper role that the macro-regional alliance should take in dealing with the Southern African question.

Strategy of Integration

Bargaining outputs also show that the OAU moderates were advantaged with respect to integration policies. Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah got little support at Addis Ababa in his appeal for a maximalist federal type of arrangement. Instead, speaker after speaker at the summit conference referred to the need for "gradual" change, "realistic formulas," and "flexibility." "It seems to us," Ivory Coast's president, Felix Houphouet Boigny, declared, that "our ardent quest for unity must be matched by the greatest discretion, and at the same time by the will to proceed by progressive stages,

[41] Paul Saenz, "The Organization of African Unity in the Subordinate African Regional System," African Studies Review 13, no. 2 (September 1970): pp. 208–10.

[42] The Declaration is included in Colin Legum (ed.), African Contemporary Record 1971–1972 (London: Rex Collings, 1972), p. C3. In April 1975, a special OAU session in Dar es Salaam adopted a policy allowing African leaders, at the request of liberation groups, to make contacts with South African interests. This policy was subsequently upheld by the heads of states and governments, although they rejected "dialogue" as such. See Weekly Review (Nairobi), August 11, 1975, p. 9.

applying positive solutions to concrete problems, and leaving it to what I will call the 'dynamism of unity' to settle later on those questions which may still divide us today."^[43] And it was this view of the integration process which ultimately triumphed. Even though Nkrumah persisted in the years immediately after the Addis Ababa summit conference in his effort to launch a union government of Africa, the moderates successfully defeated each proposal he advanced toward this end.

Structural Arrangement

Finally, the Addis bargain produced an organization structure conducive to the interests of the moderate and conservative powers. What emerged from the negotiating sessions was not a supranational but an intergovernmental organization with limited capacity for effective collective action.^[44] A minimalist structure was established which protected the equal rights (but not the equal duties) of the members.^[45] An examination of the three principal organs—the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat—shows the OAU restricted in its capacity for effective action by a membership that takes pains to guard its sovereign equality.

The supreme organ of the OAU, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meets at least once a year to "discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to co-ordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the Organization." In addition, it is empowered to review the structure, functions, and acts of all organs or specialized agencies created under the charter.^[46] Each member state is represented in assembly deliberations by its head of state and government or a duly accredited representative, and at these sessions each has an equal vote. Decisions are made by a two-thirds vote of the total membership of the organization, although, in procedural matters, a

[43] Addis Ababa Summit, 1963, p. 54. Also see T. O. Elias, "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity," American Journal of International Law 59, no. 2 (April 1965): 245.

[44] Telli, "Organization of African Unity," p. 21.

[45] Thus, T.O. Elias notes that member states "are required to contribute to the budget on the basis of the United Nations assessment, which is related to their unequal national incomes, and not on the basis of equality," "Charter," p. 251.

[46] Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Article VIII.

simple majority of all member states suffices. Such a heavy majority on substantive matters makes agreement on controversial questions difficult;^[47] in addition, the autonomous powers of the member states are safeguarded by the limited nature of the legal obligations that these resolutions impose upon members. As Zdenek Cervenka observes, the emphasis on the sovereignty of member states and the failure to create an organ with effective disciplinary power leads to the conclusion that "within the context of the Charter of the Organisation, resolutions would be recommendations to the Members of the Organisation."^[48]

Minimal commitment on the part of the membership is also shown by an examination of the structure and powers of the Council of Ministers. The council, which consists of the foreign ministers or a duly accredited alternative, meets at least twice a year. In its capacity as an unofficial "cabinet" to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the council is entrusted with the responsibility for preparing assembly conferences and for implementing assembly decisions. In addition, Article XIII of the charter provides that "it shall coordinate inter-African co-operation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly and in conformity with Article II(2) of the present Charter." At its sessions, each member state has one vote, and resolutions are determined by a simple majority of the members of the council. It should be noted, however, that such resolutions are recommendations only, and therefore impose no legal obligation upon the membership of the OAU.^[49]

Finally, the charter provided for a General Secretariat, to be directed by an administrative secretary-general. Although the administrative secretary-general was given broad administrative powers, limits were placed on his individual initiative from the outset. "The founders of the OAU," states James H. Polhemus, "had not sought to create a strong international secretariat, but rather the organisational minimum." ^[50] Like the secretary-

[47] John Markakis, "The Organisation of African Unity: A Progress Report," Journal of Modern African Studies 4, no. 2 (October 1966): 149.

[48] Cervenka, Organization of African Unity and its Charter, p. 45.

[49] Ibid., p. 51.

[50] James H. Polhemus, "The Provisional Secretariat of the O.A.U., 1963–64," Journal of Modern African Studies 12, no. 2 (June 1974): 293.

general of the League of Nations or the United Nations, he was to give administrative support to the assembly and the council, not to be a crisis manager. Yet, despite all efforts to restrict the activities of the administrative secretary-general, he has tended nonetheless to cast a larger silhouette upon the African scene than the founding fathers had intended. As a consequence, the somewhat controversial Diallo Telli ran into difficulties in his 1972 bid for a third term in office; the election of his successor, Nzo Ekangaki, was "widely interpreted as a move by the organisation to ensure that the Secretariat [was] headed by a man who [would] confine himself to administering the organisation, instead of concerning himself with political matters as well."^[51] Even so, Nzo Ekangaki was himself to run into difficulties. As informed African opinion reacted negatively to an oil consultancy agreement he signed with the London and Rhodesia Company (Lonrho), Ekangaki decided to take the prudent course of resignation.^[52] The episode serves as further evidence of the limits placed on the administrative secretary-general's initiative.

The Consequences of a Minimalist Structure

Although a minimal structure may have been as much as could be achieved by direct bargaining, certain consequences for policy-making proved inescapable. To be sure, the very existence of the Organization of African Unity led to a variety of beneficial outcomes: the mediation of border conflicts, the coordination of policies at the United Nations, moral and material assistance to the liberation movements, the coordination of policies on handling refugees, and the establishment of norms of African interstate relations. In the decade after its establishment, the OAU officially acted as a valuable forum for the discussion of five conflicts: Algeria-Morocco, 1963; Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya, 1964–1967; Congo (Leopoldville), 1964–1965; Rwanda-Burundi, 1967; and the Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970. Its role

[51] B. V. Mtshali, "Mr. Secretary—General - an Official, or a Politician?" Times of Zambia (Ndola), July 8, 1972, p. 6.

[52] Ekangaki, charged an editorial in the Daily Nation of Nairobi, "usurped the powers of sovereign states in signing the agreement" (June 4, 1974, p. 6). It seems probable that Ekangaki's criticism of member states for failing to pay dues may also have contributed to his undoing. See George Bennett, "Ekangaki out, Eteki in," African Development 8 (August 1974): 19.

as manager in a crisis proved important in at least three of these disputes. Thus J. S. Nye concludes that, in terms of unweighted successes, the organization helped to isolate three conflicts, to stop hostilities in one of the four relevant cases, to abate the conflict in two instances, and to provide one permanent settlement.^[53] Although ineffective in dealing with internal conflicts within member states (the Sudan, Uganda, Angola), the OAU was useful in its role as conciliator in conflicts among member states.^[54] Moreover, by providing an arena for African diplomatic activity, the organization offered an important opportunity for the achievement of joint purposes in various political, economic, technical, strategic, and sociological fields.

Yet the minimal structure agreed upon at Addis Ababa created some difficulties in performance as well. The need for a machinery of economic planning and coordination, effective extraction of fiscal resources, judicial settlement of disputes, and administrative enforcement of decisions became apparent in the first decade of the organization's life. Denied the means of effective control of conflict as well as economic and military coordination, it is not surprising that the OAU proved unable to rise to the challenges it set for itself in the charter. Moreover, such collective tasks as decolonization and the elimination of remaining evidences of racial discrimination on the continent were frustrated by insufficient organizational capacity. "As with all international organisations," comments Colin Legum, "the OAU tends to produce policies unsatisfactory to militants."^[55] This is certainly true for the ending of colonialism and racialism. Lack of diplomatic support for the 1965 recommendation on breaking ties with Britain over its ineffective handling of the Rhodesian rebellion was the cause of considerable embarrassment, for in the final analysis, only nine members carried out the recommendation. In this respect, Yashpal Tandon's assessment makes much sense:

The influence of the OAU on Britain was necessarily minimal. . . . It is conceivable that if all the African Commonwealth states, including

[53] Nye, Peace in Parts (n. 2 above), p. 159.

[54] Ibid., pp. 155–60, 172.

[55] "Africans Back War on White South," Observer (London), May 27, 1973, p. 7.

Nigeria and Malawi, had acted in concert in severing diplomatic relations with Britain or in threatening to disrupt the Commonwealth by leaving it, they might have made of themselves a much more powerful pressure group. It is unlikely, however, that they would have necessarily been able to push Britain into resorting to force against Rhodesia.^[56]

Similarly, lack of solidarity on economic and military matters greatly curtailed organizational effectiveness in coping with the southern African challenge. Over the years, resolutions have been passed which called on all the world's powers to deny facilities to ships and aircraft going to or coming from the white-dominated states in the south, to boycott their goods, and to place sanctions against exports to these territories. In November 1973 a major breakthrough seemed to be in the making as the Arab chiefs of state, responding to an OAU appeal, announced a halting of oil exports to the white-dominated lands in Southern Africa. However, the effect of these economic measures has been far short of decisive, with the result that many African leaders have come to look upon forcible military action as the only sure means of transforming the situation.

Nevertheless, the OAU has had no easy time in bringing its members together for military purposes. Its Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa has been unable either to unite the various nationalist groups engaged in the liberation struggle or to secure adequate financial resources from its membership. In recent years, the OAU had run into severe financial difficulties; in April 1974, Secretary-General Ekangaki complained that a number of member states were not meeting their financial obligations on a regular basis. As a result of these nonpayments, contributions by member states had come to represent less than 50 percent of the 1974 draft budget.^[57] Although the Liberation Fund is not joined to the regular budget, it suffers in the same way from the failures of its membership to pay regular contributions. Thus of $634,800 promised to six liberation groups in the period 1967–68, the

[56] Yashpal Tandon, "The Organization of African Unity as an Instrument and Forum of Protest" (n. 37 above), p. 1171.

[57] Ekangaki explained that, among others, five all-African organizations made donations amounting to $600,000. Daily Nation (Nairobi), April 3, 1974, p. 1.

Liberation Committee was actually able to spend only $77,164.^[58] Such a level of expenditure was compatible with a significant political, not military, involvement in the liberation struggle. A more dynamic initiative clearly entailed increased organization capacity - that is, a move from an intergovernmental to a supranational body. For the time being, however, such a change seems precluded by the bargaining process inherent in the relations of Africa's sovereign states.

Extraregional Bargaining Party:
The ACP Group

Finally, to turn to integration at the extracontinental level (the ACP group of countries), we see a contrast here with the two minimalist examples already discussed: the most limited in organizational terms is the most effective in achieving collective purposes. In part, this outcome is explained by the functionally specific nature of their program. As Ernst B. Haas contends, "Functionally specific international programs, if organizationally separated from diffuse orientations, maximize both welfare and integration.^[59] In part, it is also explained by the process of negotiations that unfolded over time. Thus, in a series of bargaining encounters from the 1963 agreement on the Yaoundé convention to the 1975 ACP-EEC accord, a series of mutual (albeit unequal) adjustments took place. One agreement became the model for the next—that is, the Yaoundé Association became the model for Nigeria's agreement with the EEC in 1966; the Nigerian convention (although stillborn) provided the basis for subsequent negotiations between the EEC and the East African states; the first Arusha agreement (of 1968, which was never ratified by all the EEC member states before its expiry date) was similar in most respects to the second Arusha agreement (which was concluded in 1969 and came into force on January 1, 1971), and these experiences, taken together, provided the springboard for the ACP-EEC negotiations that fol-

[58] See the estimates in Yashpal Tandon, "The Organization of African Unity and the Liberation of Southern Africa," in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), Southern Africa in Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 255.

[59] Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (n. 20, above), p. 47. For an analysis of possible trade effects deriving from EEC association, see A. D. Ouattara, "Trade Effects of the Association of African Countries with the EEC," IMF Staff Papers 20, no. 2 (July 1973): 449–543.

lowed. In this ongoing process, expanded choice was possible because the bargaining partners, each of whom possessed a functionally specific international program of its own, could move stage by stage toward an improving pattern of relationships. We shall return to this important subject in our conclusion.

The Unequal Exchange of Yaoundé I

The initial bargaining encounter, which resulted in the Yaoundé convention, pitted extremely unequal rivals against one another. The eighteen African Associates, many of whom remained structurally dependent on Europe after independence, were at a poor vantage point from which to bargain over substantive details with the rich and powerful European Common Market nations. They could make appeals for generosity, but they could not bring major concessions. The one-sidedness of the exchange is made clear by I. William Zartman's assessment of the African position at the bargaining table:

The Africans' greatest strength was their weakness. Their underdevelopment gave them the substance for appeals to the Six. It also gave them an excuse for not offering greater concessions. It was the source of their warnings. By putting their fate in the Europeans' hands . . . they maximized the chances of making the obligations stick, and of achieving greater results - no matter how limited—than if they had engaged in a hard bargaining process with nothing to bargain with.^[60]

The consequences of this bargaining weakness on the part of the eighteen associated states can be seen in the concessions they agreed upon in the Yaoundé convention. In securing assured access to EEC markets for their products and a pledge of development aid totalling $800 million over the period 1964–1969, the eighteen accepted Europe's right to levy taxes on tropical imports, the omission of a "most favored nation" clause, and the principle of "reciprocity," under which the Six gained a distinct advantage over other industrial states in their markets. Even though the associated states were permitted to raise tariffs, to impose other restrictions on European imports in order to further their development, to protect their infant

[60] I. William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 64.

industries or to contribute to their budgets, this preference for products from the European Community represented a much resented freezing of the status quo. An unequal international division of labor was perpetuated, with the African associates exporting commodities and importing finished products from their traditional trading partners. For Kwame Nkrumah, "the limited neo-colonialism of the French period is now being merged in the collective neo-colonialism of the European Common Market which enables other States, hitherto outside the French preserve, to profit by the system."^[61]

Exchanges with Commonwealth Africa

A number of Commonwealth African countries, fearful that the EEC's common external tariff would hold down their expanding trade with Europe, sought means for ensuring commercial advantages without the alleged political costs of association.^[62] In 1966, Nigeria and the EEC reached an association agreement aimed at "promot[ing] an increase of trade between the Community and Nigeria and thus contribut[ing] to the development of international trade."^[63] The agreement, following the example of Yaoundé in many of its provisions, guaranteed access to European markets for Nigerian exports, with the exception of four products—cocoa beans, peanut oil, palm oil, and plywood—which would be subject to import quotas based on Nigerian exports of these items to the Six in the period 1962–1964. Unlike Yaoundé, however, the association made no provision for economic aid. In return, Nigeria agreed to eliminate customs duties and charges as well as quantitative restrictions on twenty six products imported from the EEC states. Although these items represented less than 2 percent of total Nigerian imports, and although Nigeria retained certain rights to reimpose tariffs and quantitative restrictions on these

[61] Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 19.

[62] For evidence that Nigerian fears were unwarranted, see Olasupo Ojedokun, "The Changing Pattern of Nigeria's International Economic Relations: The Decline of the Colonial Nexus, 1960–1966," Journal of Developing Areas 6, no. 4 July 1972): 546.

[63] Federal Republic of Nigeria, Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1966), Art. 1.

products to protect developmental and fiscal needs, these provisions on reciprocity were to cause considerable resentment in this leading African state. In the end, however, it was France and Luxembourg which failed to ratify the agreement (presumably for political reasons), ^[64] and the association proved stillborn.

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Nigerian-EEC negotiation was its contribution to the ongoing interactional process between Africa and Europe. Fearful of a significant loss of trade unless their exports secured the same preferences as those accorded the Yaoundé group,^[65] the East African countries held three rounds of negotiations with the EEC, resulting, in 1968, with the first Arusha agreement. Again great pains were taken to avoid the political implications of associate status. As with its Nigerian predecessor, the association agreement had the specific objective of promoting trade between the partner states of the East African Community and the EEC. Although access was secured for a broad range of East African exports, the delegations from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania were disappointed over the insertion of quota provisions on coffee, cloves, and tinned pineapples, and over the inclusion of provisions giving preferential treatment to a list of fifty-nine products from "the Six."

In the final analysis, the first Arusha agreement failed to gain the necessary ratification from all the EEC members and expired on May 31, 1969, the same date as the Yaoundé convention then in existence. Nevertheless, it did manage to provide the model for the second Arusha agreement, which was signed on September 24, 1969, and came into force on January 1, 1971. Under the terms of the revised association agreement, the EEC suspended customs duties on most East African products in exchange for preferential treatment for

[64] For a discussion of the reasons for French resistance to the proposed trade agreement with Nigeria, see "Nigeria and the French," West Africa, May 8, 1965, p. 503. As to the complications arising from the Nigerian civil war, see Zarrtman, Politics of Trade Negotiations, p. 93.

[65] M. N. Kotomari, "East Africa's Association with the EEC," a paper presented to the Universities of East Africa Social Sciences Conference, Makerere University, Kampala, December 1971, p. 6.

some fifty items in the East African market. The agreement also applied annual quotas to East African exports of coffee (56,000 tons), cloves (100 tons), and tinned pineapples (860 tons). East Africans were certainly disappointed over the concessions on quota restrictions and reciprocity, but their general attitude, as expressed in an editorial in the Nationalist, was to "make the best of it."^[66] Further marginal gains occurred in 1972 when the representatives of the East African Community and the EEC agreed to revisions in the association agreement. In these Nairobi talks, the Europeans agreed to double the export market for duty-free tinned pineapples and to make further reductions in the levy on maize; meanwhile, the East Africans agreed to cut the charge on movement certificates for coffee exported to the EEC member states by more than one-third.^[67] A series of policy decisions were being realized which had the effect of expanding opportunities for both bargaining partners.

As the Arusha agreement and the second Yaoundé agreement of 1969 both ran their courses, the stage was set for a full-scale scrutiny of the extracontinental relationship. For one thing, the European core had been enlarged to include Britain and two others. For another, the French-speaking African associates had become increasingly restive under the existing arrangement. The Yaoundé associates were generally disappointed with the 1969 negotiating outcomes: Europe's refusal to include a "most favored nation" clause, its right to levy taxes on tropical imports, and its allegedly ungenerous aid commitment ($800 million over a five-year period). African leaders were well aware that the Yaoundé convention had done little to produce trade. EEC imports (mostly primary products and raw materials) from the Yaoundé states had fallen from 3.5 percent to 2.4 percent of total EEC imports in the period 1959–1969, and the decline in trade terms had made EEC economic assistance roughly half as valuable as had been anticipated during the 1969 negotiations.^[68] By 1973, President Leopold Senghor of

[66] Editorial, Nationalist (Dar es Salaam), July 11, 1969, p. 4. Also see D. Wadada Nabudere, "The Arusha Association Agreement with the European Economic Community," Eastern Africa Law Review 6, no. 2 (1973): 145–74.

[67] East African Standard (Nairobi), February 23, 1972, p. 17.

[68] Patrick Gilkes, "Africa Looks for a Better Deal with the EEC," Times (London), October 15, 1973, p. 16.

Senegal, one of the staunchest defenders of the Yaoundé concept, was urging that the next convention take into account both the deterioration of the terms of trade (caused partly by European inflation) and the need for stabilization of export earnings in the developing countries.^[69] The stage was set for a careful probing of all existing relationships.

The Emergence of ACP Cooperation

As the next round of talks on EEC-African relations approached, the environment for negotiations shifted noticeably. Not only had both the Third World and its European rivals become acutely sensitive to the shortage of raw materials, but the African states had come to acquire a unity of purpose previously unknown. African leaders showed greater awareness than ever before of their contribution to European development. As Wenike Briggs, Nigeria's federal trade commissioner, declared with respect to Africa's bargaining position: "It is most unlikely that Europe would say 'No' to Africa, its raw materials and its markets. . . . It is not easy for her to turn to another region and have ready replacements. . . . Let us draw up a platform of co-operation worthy of Africa and see if Europe will turn it down."^[70] Africa would continue to provide its raw materials, but it expected a proper quid pro quo. In addition to this awareness of resource indispensability was a bargaining strength based on the emergence of a common front. Africa, in Nzo Ekangaki's words, "offer[ed] to negotiate with Europe as one block and not in piecemeal groups."^[71] Its ability to make good on this offer, and in the end to bring forty six African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries together, greatly enhanced its ability to influence bargaining outcomes.

In large part, it was Britain's entry into an enlarged EEC which set the stage for a new African initiative on extraregional trade relations. Protocol 22 of the Treaty of Accession listed twenty "associable" Commonwealth ACP states and offered them a choice of three types of relationships with the EEC:

[69] Roger Berthoud, "Senegal Leader Urges EEC Link for 19 Commonwealth States," Times (London), March 22, 1973, p. 6.

[70] African Development 7, no. 9 (September 1973): 7.

[71] Nzo Ekangaki's ten-point platform for the African-EEC talks is reprinted in Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1973–74 (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1974), p. C20.

associate status, a convention of association (such as the Arusha agreement), or a trade agreement. Although Mauritius immediately opted to become an associate under the second Yaoundé convention, the remaining nineteen hesitated, seeking a formula that would assure them access to traditional European markets without the reverse obligations of association. Their search for alternatives led to a series of meetings in the winter and spring of 1973, largely under OAU auspices, which went far in harmonizing the objectives and procedural tactics of the African states. In May 1973, at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, the African Associates and Associables agreed upon an eight-point program. These points, adopted later that month by the OAU heads of state in Addis Ababa, included the following guiding principles:

(1) Non-reciprocity for trade and tariff concessions given by the EEC;

(2) extension of a non-discriminatory basis toward third countries of the provisions on the rights of establishment;

(3) revision of the rules of origin to facilitate the industrial integration of Africa;

(4) revision of the provisions concerning the movement of payments and capital to take account of the objective of monetary independence in African countries;

(5) the dissociation of EEC financial and technical aid from any particular form of relationship with the EEC;

(6) free and assured access to EEC markets for all African products, including processed and semi-processed agricultural products whether or not they are subject to the common agricultural policy of the EEC;

(7) the guaranteeing to African countries of stable, equitable, and remunerative prices in EEC markets for their main products;

(8) agreements concluded with the EEC should not adversely affect intra-African cooperation.^[72]

At Lagos, in July 1973, the OAU states went further toward securing effective unity by nominating Nigeria's trade commissioner, Wenike Briggs, as the spokesman for the African group at the forthcoming Brussels talks and by requesting that the

[72] West Africa, July 23, 1973, pp. 991–92.

OAU secretary-general set up a secretariat in Brussels to service the African team. Such continuing OAU involvement in the EEC-ACP bargaining encounters was of critical importance. By legitimating these negotiations, the OAU helped to overcome the reluctance of the nonassociated states to take part in a process they viewed as having furthered collective neocolonialism under the Yaoundé agreements.

EEC-ACP Negotiations

At the bargaining table in July 1973, the nine EEC states sat down to negotiate with what were finally to be forty six ACP countries. The ACP group included the eighteen Yaoundé associated states, thirteen Commonwealth African countries, six other African countries (Liberia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Equitorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and the Sudan), six Commonwealth Caribbean countries (Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana, Grenada, Trinidad, and the Bahamas), and three Commonwealth Pacific Ocean states (Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa). This number created a critical mass of ACP members sufficient to ensure sorne measure of mutual adjustment. Such a change in relative bargaining strength was apparent as early as the Brussels talks of July, for Wenike Briggs quickly took the initiative and called for a new agreement based on the eight principles set forth at Abidjan. ACP's unity of purpose and effective leadership put the somewhat disunited EEC states at an initial disadvantage, and what followed were long delays on the European side in responding to the ACP position briefs.^[73]

The main issues dividing the two bargaining rivals were those on reciprocity, guaranteed access for African commodities and raw materials, stabilization of export earnings, industrial cooperation, and the size of the European Development Fund. On some of these issues, European spokesmen seemed quite flexible. As early as April 1973, the European Commission, in an effort to improve its commercial relationships with the African states, proposed a plan for stabilizing their income from exports of certain selected products to the community. When outlining the original scheme, M. Jean-Francois Deniau, the commissioner responsible for development and cooperation, observed that what the commission had in mind was a form of

[73] For statements as to Africa's frustration over these delays, see the Times (London), October 19, 1973, p. 10.

insurance based on the norm of receipts for each product. The community, he explained, would bridge the gap between the reduced receipts and the norm of receipts during bad times.^[74] Later, in the 1975 Lomé convention, it was provided that any of the ACP countries depending for more than 7.5 percent of their export earnings on these specified products (among them sugar, peanuts and peanut oil, cotton, cocoa, coffee, bananas, tea, and iron ore) would be eligible for financial support from a 375 million Units of Account (or undevalued U.S. dollars) fund set up under the Stabex scheme. And in the case of the twenty four least developed countries in the ACP group, a mere 2.5 percent drop in export earnings from these products would qualify them for help under the plan.^[75] In its first year of operation, a financial ceiling of 75 million U.A. (approximately $90 million) was set up under the Stabex scheme; the sums paid out to various ACP recipients under the scheme were as shown in Table 21.

The European Commission also showed itself to be favorably inclined toward the African position on the issues of reverse preference and rules of origin. In regard to the first, their thinking was no doubt influenced by the limited importance of the African export market. The entire export market of the Yaoundé states came to only 2 percent of EEC sales to all noncommunist countries, hardly enough to warrant a protracted struggle for reciprocal tariff concessions.^[76] Therefore, at the August 1974 EEC-ACP negotiations at Kingston, the European Commission accepted the principle of nonreciprocity; henceforth most ACP agricultural and industrial products would gain free access into EEC markets without making any provision for return concessions for European goods imported into the ACP countries. Furthermore, the European Commission eased the provisions dealing with the rules of origin on ACP exports

[74] Roger Berthoud, "Plan to Give African States Stable Incomes," Times (London), April 6, 1973, p. 8.

[75] EEC-ACP Convention of Lomé, reprinted in the Courier, No. 31 (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, March 1975), Title II, Ch. 1.

[76] West Africa, July 2, 1973, p. 883. On this, see also the statement of Dr. Robert Ouko, the East African Minister for Common Market and Economic Affairs, in Daily Nation (Nairobi),November 21, 1973, p. 5.

to EEC markets. Under the old agreements the EEC had applied highly restrictive rules as to the proportion of value added in the ACP countries; now, under the Lomé convention, ACP industrial activity would be given a boost by a reduction in the proportion of value to be added and by initiatives in the form of joint industrial ventures and the granting of soft loans for industrial projects.^[77]

Clearly the Kingston meeting marked a major turning point. With general agreement reached on such basic issues as nonreciprocity, income stabilization, rules of origin, and industrial cooperation, it remained to arrive at an agreement on the technical details of defining rules of origin, the terms of the stabilization scheme, and EEC farm protectionism, as well as to settle such issues as the level of aid and the price of sugar. Up to the very end, the two sides were far apart on the issue of economic assistance over the five-year period. The ACP called for the establishment of a European Development Fund with some 8,000 million Units of Account at its disposal; the EEC countered by offering 3,000 million, which proved to be close to the 3,550 million Units of Account (2,625 million as European Development Fund grants and loans at low rates of interest, 390 million as loans from the European Investment Bank, 375 million as funds for the stabilization of export earnings, and 160 million as assistance to dependent territories and departments overseas) finally agreed upon.^[78] The aid amounts were less than satisfactory to some of the African Associated States because of the effects of inflation and the expansion in the number of recipients. The final aid package seemed more acceptable to these countries, however, when it

[77] West Africa, August 5, 1974, p. 953.

[78] For a discussion of the divergence of positions on the issue of financial assistance, see Carl A. Ehrhardt, "ACP Countries Seek Association with EEC," Aussen Politik 25, no. 4 (1974): 395–97. In an instance of external actor facilitation of African integration it was declared that approximately 10 percent of the total financial resources provided as community aid for economic and social development of the ACP states would be used to support regional projects. EEC-ACP Convention of Lomé, Title IV, Article 47, Sect. 2. On a similar role in United States aid policy, see Donald Rothchild, "America's Regionalism-in-Aid Policy," East Africa Journal 5, no. 4 (April 1968): 17–20.

was realized that populous Nigeria would not be drawing on the European Development Fund. On sugar, French and Belgian opposition to guaranteed access of 1.4 million tons of Commonwealth sugar to the EEC was largely overcome by British determination to assure continued access for her traditional suppliers. According to the last-minute agreement worked out in Brussels, Britain agreed to pay the relatively high price of $260 a ton until the end of 1975, with prices being adjusted afterward to reflect the level of world market prices.

The nine EEC and forty six ACP states had successfully reached a five-year agreement of global proportions. In the hard bargaining that ensued, Europe made concessions to the LDCs in order to assure access to markets and resources vital for her continued well-being. And if the ACP countries failed, as a consequence of their unequal bargaining strength, to secure all their objectives, a series of decisions was in process of unfolding which offered some possibilities for expanded choice in years to come.