Rehabilitated, "Born-Again" Reformers

As a political movement the CR was a total failure; it produced many losers and very few winners. It ruined Mao's position in Chinese history. Lin Biao died as a traitor in a plane crash. The members of the Gang of Four were purged, tried, and sentenced to death only to have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment, while its followers were hounded out of office as "three types of people." Some old revolutionaries were persecuted to death, but the majority of the pre-CR political elite returned to power, leading China in the new direction that Mao had hoped to prevent China from taking when he started the CR. The ordinary Chinese people suffered greatly, coming out of the crisis with profound disillusionment, cynicism, and distrust. Active young participants in the CR became the "wounded generation"—alienated and self-centered individuals without a trace of their earlier idealism.

The enormous human suffering that the CR caused left deep scars on the Chinese people. The chaotic mass movement magnified all human follies; confusion, cruelty, viciousness, deception,

and distrust ran riot. Wondering how the CR could produce such chaos in a nation proud of its long civilization, every Chinese had a share of the nightmare and is now eager to tell his or her horror story.^[1] Arthur Kleinman finds a close link between the socioeconomic and political experiences that the Chinese people underwent and their high rate of mental illness.^[2] For example, he traces the chronic depression of a worker in his late twenties to the deep shame and guilt that he experienced when he admitted what he had not done during the CR because he feared the public security forces. Circumstances forced many people to go against their consciences, and it seems that every Chinese harbors some secret that cannot be confessed even to his closest friends. Even Zhou Enlai, who helped many old cadres by compromising his beliefs and supporting the CR, must have had some painful reflections.

The rehabilitated cadres are the veterans who joined the party almost half a century before the CR. In their youthful and idealistic days they risked their lives by fighting against oppressors—the Nationalists and the Japanese. In their middle age, they eagerly dedicated themselves to the construction of a new China, often acting knowingly or unknowingly as "oppressors, inquisitors, and denouncers in an attempt to achieve a revolutionary transformation of the society."^[3] They ruthlessly wielded the enormous powers of the party-state to suppress what they considered "class enemies." At the beginning of the CR, Deng Xiaoping regarded the students in revolt as "rightists," who, like "snakes in a hole," should be lured out of their hiding places to expose their true nature.

The old leaders were ruthless revolutionaries, willing to sacrifice their personal interests, families, and friends for the sake of the revolution and executing all who were suspected of working for the enemy. Throughout their long careers, each one's life become intertwined with the others', resulting in strong hatreds as well as

[1] For example, Ann Thurston, Enemies of the People (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: State Mutual Books, 1986); Gao Yuan, Born Red (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986).

[2] Arthur Kleinman, "The Interconnections Among Culture, Depressive Experiences, and the Meanings of Pain" (unpublished paper).

[3] Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 148.

close friendships. On many occasions they helped one another because of friendship or a shared ideology, but they also engaged in many deadly inner-party struggles.

In their late middle or old age, these veterans found themselves the victims of still another revolution in the system they had helped build. During the CR, they were subjected to violent physical abuse, forced to parade in the streets with dunce caps on their heads, and do such humiliating menial labor as cleaning toilets. They were imprisoned, interrogated, and tortured by young Red Guards who had not yet been born at the time the cases they were investigating had taken place. Bo Yibo was accused of having collaborated with Yan Xishan, a powerful warlord who had had close ties with the KMT, from 1936 through 1939 and of having surrendered to the KMT in 1934.^[4] In prison he learned that his wife had committed suicide and that his children had been jailed and then sent to one of Mao's thought study classes. Liu Shaoqi, chairman of the People's Republic of China, was condemned as a renegade because he had been arrested three times in his revolutionary career. His wife spent almost ten years in prison. Hu Yaobang, who, unlike the "white" area cadres, had a flawless career record, was luckier; he spent several years at home doing reading that he could not previously afford to do.^[5] Peng Zhen, the tough Beijing mayor (criticism of him had officially started the CR), was sent to a rural area in Shanxi, the province where he had done his underground work twenty years before.^[6] Luo Ruiqing, former deputy chief of staff, attempted suicide, an incident that left him crippled. Other unfortunates, such as Tao Zhu, Chen Yi, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, and He Long, died in disgrace. The fate of provincial leaders was not much better.^[7]

The veterans' children suffered too. Deng Xiaoping's son was permanently crippled. He Long's children served in prison and spent a long time in a Mao's thought study class. They were under great pressure to betray their parents.^[8] Old revolutionaries could not see their children for long periods of time. "When I entered the

[4] Zhengming , October 1980.

[5] Yang Zhongmei, Biography of Hu Yaobang (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharp, 1990).

[6] Zhengming , no. 15, January 1979, 27–30.

[7] Dong Xiang , May 1980.

[8] Ming Bao , 13 November 1978.

room, a boy called me Papa and I could not recognize him. I only recognized him when he told me that he was my son, who had been eight years old when I was taken from my house."^[9]

Most victims of the CR experienced similar stages of maltreatment and rehabilitation. Initally they were subjected to Red Guard interrogation and forced to attend mass struggle meetings with big signboards around their necks or dunce caps on their heads. They suffered many different kinds of physical coercion. Later in the CR they were placed in cow huts or in prisons where they underwent sustained "interrogation" by special investigation teams, managed by ad hoc committees largely composed of followers of the Gang of Four or Lin Biao. They were tortured and persecuted until they made false charges against their former comrades.^[10] Some were such dedicated revolutionaries that they did not yield to torture, but many others succumbed under pressure. The brave ones who did not compromise either died or spent long periods in jail. Some were condemned as renegades and spies. Others were simply pushed aside as "powerholders taking the capitalist road." Some were sent to rural areas with their families.^[11] Others were released from jail and dispersed to various localities when Lin Biao issued his infamous Order no. 1. After Lin's fall, many were allowed gradually to return to Beijing and to recuperate in hospitals.

What went through their minds? No rehabilitated senior cadre has written about his feelings and thoughts. But a few intellectuals and writers have published moving recollections of the period. Ba Jin, for example, felt regret and remorse not only for having failed to foresee the disastrous leftward drift in official policy but also for having personally contributed to the trend. The feeling of emptiness and total disillusionment stayed with him for a long time, causing him frequently to contemplate suicide. After careful objective analysis of both himself and his persecutors, he decided to spend the rest of his life trying to prevent the reoccurrence of any future political persecution in China.^[12]

Old cadres must have had thoughts similar to Ba Jin's. When the

[9] Nanfang Ribao , 5 April 1979.

[10] For instance, Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi reportedly tried to coerce An Zuwen to produce material against Liu Shaoqi.

[11] For instance, see Nanfang Ribao , 18 April 1979.

[12] Ba Jin, "Random Thoughts," published in a series by Huaqiao Ribao since 17 December 1978.

initiators of thought reform and self-criticism were subjected to these same methods, they quickly learned how arbitrary and ineffective the methods could be. They felt that they were framed by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four for political reasons. They saw close comrades languishing in prison because of their refusal to bring false charges against others. And they saw how those willing to collaborate with the Gang of Four gained political power.

Although we do not know what went through the minds of the highest political leaders, we do know how they lived. Deng Xiao-ping was confined to a small house in a Jiangxi military compound. He was allowed to work only part time in a nearby factory: "Every day I went to the factory and worked along with workers for half the day, taking them as my teachers, and learning much. The experience greatly helped me to change my weltanschauung."^[13] In Shanxi Peng Zhen often mingled with ordinary peasants, learning about their living conditions in detail. What he saw was the back-breaking poverty of peasants—the social group who had contributed most to the success of the Communist revolution and for whose sake the revolution had been fought. On his return to Beijing in 1972, Deng Xiaoping traveled to places where he had fought as a guerrilla. He saw that there had been little economic improvement since liberation. The peasants complained to him: "You made revolution and left us. We did not receive much benefit from the revolution. What have you done for us in thirty years?"^[14]

Zhang Pinghua, director of the propaganda department, who lost his job in 1978 as a member of "the two whatevers" group, recalled:

When I made a stop at a commune on my way to Kaifeng in Henan province last year, several comrades of the commune had this to say to me: "How can we be interested in watching model plays after dinner?" [Zhang asked] "Why? If it is not good to have plays to watch, is it any better not to have plays to watch?" [The peasant replied] "When the troupe came to our front door, dinner was rumbling in our belly even before the gongs and drums were beaten. We eat gruel twice a day and dry rice only once. After eating these things, we urinate but do not defecate. How can there be anybody who is still interested in watching plays, Director Zhang?"^[15]

[13] Internal documents relayed by one interviewee in Hong Kong.

[14] "Zhang Pinghua's Speech to Cadres in the Cultural Field," Issues and Studies , 14(12) (December 1978), 97–118.

[15] Ibid.

The rehabilitated cadres learned the hard lesson that propaganda makes sense only after the basic needs of the people have been met.

When these old cadres returned to positions of power in China's ruling structure after Mao's death, they became "born-again" reformers. Having shared common experiences, they formed a coherent group under Deng Xiaoping. This rehabilitated cadre group won one political victory after another over Hua Guofeng's group. There were reasons for them to be such reformers. As victims of Mao's political campaign, they were less constrained by ideological and personal ties with Mao and thus felt less responsible for past decisions.

Most important, they discovered that the sense of crisis and failure in the CCP permeated the entire society to such an extent that the party had to regain legitimacy and support from the people. In a speech given in April 1979, Chen Yun noted that since political slogans, criticism, and struggle had failed to restore the CCP's popularity, the party would not be able to maintain its political power without reforms.

There are three methods for resolving China's increasing problems. The first method is to bring out all the problems, including those in sacred areas, asking people whether or not they want the leadership of the CCP. I think that nobody wants to do this, and it is not worth talking about it. The middle option is to carry out reform [gailiang ], although not thoroughly, which would entail a large-scale readjustment of economic relations. It means to keep the present political structures and principles, while only carrying out minor surgery. Many people agree that this method can work. The third method is to maintain the present situation.^[16]

The experience of having been purged and rehabilitated is the functional equivalent of elite transformation. The old revolutionaries were indeed reeducated by the CR, but not in the way intended by its originator. They saw that the system they had built could lead to disaster and that certain underlying principles, as well as actual practices, which they had strongly advocated or supported at various times, could have devastating consequences for Chinese society. The purge offered them the rare opportunity to look at the

[16] Feijing Yuebao 10(22) (19):92.

political system from the outside—as its victims. The forced exile taught them that China needed economic development. They were compelled to ask themselves a fundamental question: why did a movement for class and human liberation develop into one of the most oppressive systems in Chinese history—what the Chinese Communists call "feudal fascism"?^[17] Ding Ling pointed to the excessive concentration of political power in the hands of cadres with small-group mentalities. Hu Zhiwei, former editor in chief of Renmin Ribao , concluded that "unless 'democracy' inside and outside the party is fully developed, the party's system of centralism will become a 'feudal, fascist, and dictatorial system with feudal authority.'"^[18]

After their return to power, the rehabilitated cadres carried out sweeping reforms, reversing the past trend toward an all-powerful party-state that imposes increasingly tighter controls over society. The reforms affected the very foundation of state power. In the economic sphere, the rural responsibility system reduces the arbitrary power of the party-state and its agents while expanding the areas open to individual decisions and economic rationality.

In the political arena, the regime has endeavored to rationalize, legalize, and institutionalize the structures of the state and party. Rules governing intraparty struggles and policy-making processes now emphasize intraparty democracy and collective leadership. Parallel efforts to separate the party from the government and the economic arena from the political arena have been made. Political control over the population has been substantially diminished, allowing ordinary Chinese citizens a certain amount of legal protection. The participation of the masses has been institutionalized, allowing popular concerns to be articulated through officially sanctioned channels.