PART III
BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS AND REFORMS

8
The Politics of Rehabilitation

One of the most amazing aspects of the CR is that despite the ten years of chaos and ruthless purging, the majority of the pre-CR elite managed to regain their political power, leading China in a direction that Mao would have regarded as revisionist and capitalist. The return of veteran cadres was possible because there was one principle that even the Maoists did not violate during the CR, namely, not executing the losers in a power struggle. The return of the old guard is also a dramatic illustration of how entrenched the bureaucrats were in China even before the CR and of their remarkable resiliency, two characteristics which will probably not change much in the coming years.

Rehabilitated, "Born-Again" Reformers

As a political movement the CR was a total failure; it produced many losers and very few winners. It ruined Mao's position in Chinese history. Lin Biao died as a traitor in a plane crash. The members of the Gang of Four were purged, tried, and sentenced to death only to have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment, while its followers were hounded out of office as "three types of people." Some old revolutionaries were persecuted to death, but the majority of the pre-CR political elite returned to power, leading China in the new direction that Mao had hoped to prevent China from taking when he started the CR. The ordinary Chinese people suffered greatly, coming out of the crisis with profound disillusionment, cynicism, and distrust. Active young participants in the CR became the "wounded generation"—alienated and self-centered individuals without a trace of their earlier idealism.

The enormous human suffering that the CR caused left deep scars on the Chinese people. The chaotic mass movement magnified all human follies; confusion, cruelty, viciousness, deception,

and distrust ran riot. Wondering how the CR could produce such chaos in a nation proud of its long civilization, every Chinese had a share of the nightmare and is now eager to tell his or her horror story.^[1] Arthur Kleinman finds a close link between the socioeconomic and political experiences that the Chinese people underwent and their high rate of mental illness.^[2] For example, he traces the chronic depression of a worker in his late twenties to the deep shame and guilt that he experienced when he admitted what he had not done during the CR because he feared the public security forces. Circumstances forced many people to go against their consciences, and it seems that every Chinese harbors some secret that cannot be confessed even to his closest friends. Even Zhou Enlai, who helped many old cadres by compromising his beliefs and supporting the CR, must have had some painful reflections.

The rehabilitated cadres are the veterans who joined the party almost half a century before the CR. In their youthful and idealistic days they risked their lives by fighting against oppressors—the Nationalists and the Japanese. In their middle age, they eagerly dedicated themselves to the construction of a new China, often acting knowingly or unknowingly as "oppressors, inquisitors, and denouncers in an attempt to achieve a revolutionary transformation of the society."^[3] They ruthlessly wielded the enormous powers of the party-state to suppress what they considered "class enemies." At the beginning of the CR, Deng Xiaoping regarded the students in revolt as "rightists," who, like "snakes in a hole," should be lured out of their hiding places to expose their true nature.

The old leaders were ruthless revolutionaries, willing to sacrifice their personal interests, families, and friends for the sake of the revolution and executing all who were suspected of working for the enemy. Throughout their long careers, each one's life become intertwined with the others', resulting in strong hatreds as well as

[1] For example, Ann Thurston, Enemies of the People (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: State Mutual Books, 1986); Gao Yuan, Born Red (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986).

[2] Arthur Kleinman, "The Interconnections Among Culture, Depressive Experiences, and the Meanings of Pain" (unpublished paper).

[3] Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 148.

close friendships. On many occasions they helped one another because of friendship or a shared ideology, but they also engaged in many deadly inner-party struggles.

In their late middle or old age, these veterans found themselves the victims of still another revolution in the system they had helped build. During the CR, they were subjected to violent physical abuse, forced to parade in the streets with dunce caps on their heads, and do such humiliating menial labor as cleaning toilets. They were imprisoned, interrogated, and tortured by young Red Guards who had not yet been born at the time the cases they were investigating had taken place. Bo Yibo was accused of having collaborated with Yan Xishan, a powerful warlord who had had close ties with the KMT, from 1936 through 1939 and of having surrendered to the KMT in 1934.^[4] In prison he learned that his wife had committed suicide and that his children had been jailed and then sent to one of Mao's thought study classes. Liu Shaoqi, chairman of the People's Republic of China, was condemned as a renegade because he had been arrested three times in his revolutionary career. His wife spent almost ten years in prison. Hu Yaobang, who, unlike the "white" area cadres, had a flawless career record, was luckier; he spent several years at home doing reading that he could not previously afford to do.^[5] Peng Zhen, the tough Beijing mayor (criticism of him had officially started the CR), was sent to a rural area in Shanxi, the province where he had done his underground work twenty years before.^[6] Luo Ruiqing, former deputy chief of staff, attempted suicide, an incident that left him crippled. Other unfortunates, such as Tao Zhu, Chen Yi, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, and He Long, died in disgrace. The fate of provincial leaders was not much better.^[7]

The veterans' children suffered too. Deng Xiaoping's son was permanently crippled. He Long's children served in prison and spent a long time in a Mao's thought study class. They were under great pressure to betray their parents.^[8] Old revolutionaries could not see their children for long periods of time. "When I entered the

[4] Zhengming , October 1980.

[5] Yang Zhongmei, Biography of Hu Yaobang (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharp, 1990).

[6] Zhengming , no. 15, January 1979, 27–30.

[7] Dong Xiang , May 1980.

[8] Ming Bao , 13 November 1978.

room, a boy called me Papa and I could not recognize him. I only recognized him when he told me that he was my son, who had been eight years old when I was taken from my house."^[9]

Most victims of the CR experienced similar stages of maltreatment and rehabilitation. Initally they were subjected to Red Guard interrogation and forced to attend mass struggle meetings with big signboards around their necks or dunce caps on their heads. They suffered many different kinds of physical coercion. Later in the CR they were placed in cow huts or in prisons where they underwent sustained "interrogation" by special investigation teams, managed by ad hoc committees largely composed of followers of the Gang of Four or Lin Biao. They were tortured and persecuted until they made false charges against their former comrades.^[10] Some were such dedicated revolutionaries that they did not yield to torture, but many others succumbed under pressure. The brave ones who did not compromise either died or spent long periods in jail. Some were condemned as renegades and spies. Others were simply pushed aside as "powerholders taking the capitalist road." Some were sent to rural areas with their families.^[11] Others were released from jail and dispersed to various localities when Lin Biao issued his infamous Order no. 1. After Lin's fall, many were allowed gradually to return to Beijing and to recuperate in hospitals.

What went through their minds? No rehabilitated senior cadre has written about his feelings and thoughts. But a few intellectuals and writers have published moving recollections of the period. Ba Jin, for example, felt regret and remorse not only for having failed to foresee the disastrous leftward drift in official policy but also for having personally contributed to the trend. The feeling of emptiness and total disillusionment stayed with him for a long time, causing him frequently to contemplate suicide. After careful objective analysis of both himself and his persecutors, he decided to spend the rest of his life trying to prevent the reoccurrence of any future political persecution in China.^[12]

Old cadres must have had thoughts similar to Ba Jin's. When the

[9] Nanfang Ribao , 5 April 1979.

[10] For instance, Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi reportedly tried to coerce An Zuwen to produce material against Liu Shaoqi.

[11] For instance, see Nanfang Ribao , 18 April 1979.

[12] Ba Jin, "Random Thoughts," published in a series by Huaqiao Ribao since 17 December 1978.

initiators of thought reform and self-criticism were subjected to these same methods, they quickly learned how arbitrary and ineffective the methods could be. They felt that they were framed by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four for political reasons. They saw close comrades languishing in prison because of their refusal to bring false charges against others. And they saw how those willing to collaborate with the Gang of Four gained political power.

Although we do not know what went through the minds of the highest political leaders, we do know how they lived. Deng Xiao-ping was confined to a small house in a Jiangxi military compound. He was allowed to work only part time in a nearby factory: "Every day I went to the factory and worked along with workers for half the day, taking them as my teachers, and learning much. The experience greatly helped me to change my weltanschauung."^[13] In Shanxi Peng Zhen often mingled with ordinary peasants, learning about their living conditions in detail. What he saw was the back-breaking poverty of peasants—the social group who had contributed most to the success of the Communist revolution and for whose sake the revolution had been fought. On his return to Beijing in 1972, Deng Xiaoping traveled to places where he had fought as a guerrilla. He saw that there had been little economic improvement since liberation. The peasants complained to him: "You made revolution and left us. We did not receive much benefit from the revolution. What have you done for us in thirty years?"^[14]

Zhang Pinghua, director of the propaganda department, who lost his job in 1978 as a member of "the two whatevers" group, recalled:

When I made a stop at a commune on my way to Kaifeng in Henan province last year, several comrades of the commune had this to say to me: "How can we be interested in watching model plays after dinner?" [Zhang asked] "Why? If it is not good to have plays to watch, is it any better not to have plays to watch?" [The peasant replied] "When the troupe came to our front door, dinner was rumbling in our belly even before the gongs and drums were beaten. We eat gruel twice a day and dry rice only once. After eating these things, we urinate but do not defecate. How can there be anybody who is still interested in watching plays, Director Zhang?"^[15]

[13] Internal documents relayed by one interviewee in Hong Kong.

[14] "Zhang Pinghua's Speech to Cadres in the Cultural Field," Issues and Studies , 14(12) (December 1978), 97–118.

[15] Ibid.

The rehabilitated cadres learned the hard lesson that propaganda makes sense only after the basic needs of the people have been met.

When these old cadres returned to positions of power in China's ruling structure after Mao's death, they became "born-again" reformers. Having shared common experiences, they formed a coherent group under Deng Xiaoping. This rehabilitated cadre group won one political victory after another over Hua Guofeng's group. There were reasons for them to be such reformers. As victims of Mao's political campaign, they were less constrained by ideological and personal ties with Mao and thus felt less responsible for past decisions.

Most important, they discovered that the sense of crisis and failure in the CCP permeated the entire society to such an extent that the party had to regain legitimacy and support from the people. In a speech given in April 1979, Chen Yun noted that since political slogans, criticism, and struggle had failed to restore the CCP's popularity, the party would not be able to maintain its political power without reforms.

There are three methods for resolving China's increasing problems. The first method is to bring out all the problems, including those in sacred areas, asking people whether or not they want the leadership of the CCP. I think that nobody wants to do this, and it is not worth talking about it. The middle option is to carry out reform [gailiang ], although not thoroughly, which would entail a large-scale readjustment of economic relations. It means to keep the present political structures and principles, while only carrying out minor surgery. Many people agree that this method can work. The third method is to maintain the present situation.^[16]

The experience of having been purged and rehabilitated is the functional equivalent of elite transformation. The old revolutionaries were indeed reeducated by the CR, but not in the way intended by its originator. They saw that the system they had built could lead to disaster and that certain underlying principles, as well as actual practices, which they had strongly advocated or supported at various times, could have devastating consequences for Chinese society. The purge offered them the rare opportunity to look at the

[16] Feijing Yuebao 10(22) (19):92.

political system from the outside—as its victims. The forced exile taught them that China needed economic development. They were compelled to ask themselves a fundamental question: why did a movement for class and human liberation develop into one of the most oppressive systems in Chinese history—what the Chinese Communists call "feudal fascism"?^[17] Ding Ling pointed to the excessive concentration of political power in the hands of cadres with small-group mentalities. Hu Zhiwei, former editor in chief of Renmin Ribao , concluded that "unless 'democracy' inside and outside the party is fully developed, the party's system of centralism will become a 'feudal, fascist, and dictatorial system with feudal authority.'"^[18]

After their return to power, the rehabilitated cadres carried out sweeping reforms, reversing the past trend toward an all-powerful party-state that imposes increasingly tighter controls over society. The reforms affected the very foundation of state power. In the economic sphere, the rural responsibility system reduces the arbitrary power of the party-state and its agents while expanding the areas open to individual decisions and economic rationality.

In the political arena, the regime has endeavored to rationalize, legalize, and institutionalize the structures of the state and party. Rules governing intraparty struggles and policy-making processes now emphasize intraparty democracy and collective leadership. Parallel efforts to separate the party from the government and the economic arena from the political arena have been made. Political control over the population has been substantially diminished, allowing ordinary Chinese citizens a certain amount of legal protection. The participation of the masses has been institutionalized, allowing popular concerns to be articulated through officially sanctioned channels.

Rehabilitation Policy of the Rehabilitated Cadres

After Deng Xiaoping's second return, the reinstated senior leaders used their positions to bring back increasing numbers of their less

[17] Tang Tsou, Cultural Revolution , 144–88.

[18] Hu Yaobang, "How to Develop Criticism and Self-Criticism in Newspapers," Xinwen Zhanxian , no. 6, 1979, 5.

fortunate colleagues. Hu Yaobang, who had been purged and rehabilitated twice, played a particularly crucial role in rehabilitation politics. He had personal and political reasons to push for thorough reexaminations of all CR-related cases and was also strategically positioned for the task. After being elected to the Eleventh Central Committee, he was appointed deputy director of the central organizational department and vice president of the central party school in August 1977. Two months later, he replaced Guo Yufeng as director of the organizational department.

Sharing with other rehabilitated cadres the view that without a thorough rehabilitation "the party will not be at ease, and the people will not be at ease," Hu Yaobang moved decisively, approaching the complicated matters of investigating all the CR cases and rendering fresh judgments from several different angles. After his appointment as director of the central organizational department, he first reshuffled the cadres in the department.^[19] Then he mobilized more than 100,000 cadres and masses in order to make a comprehensive survey of the task and to develop several hundred model cases (dianxing ). He instructed local authorities to develop their own model cases and then use them as references for actual review. At many party meetings Hu made emotional pleas on behalf of innocent victims. "Some [innocent victims'] bodies have decayed, but the criminal labels of 'spy' are still attached, and their family members are still burdened."^[20]

The victims of the CR tackled the "easy case" first when the resistance of the beneficiaries to reopening the CR-related cases was still strong. Instead of demanding rehabilitation (which presupposed the reversal of past decisions), they advanced the slogan of "implementing the party's cadre policy," stressing the need to correct administrative ills by bringing unresolved cases to an authoritative conclusion.^[21] Since the most obvious reason for an inability to draw conclusions is lack of sufficient evidence concerning whether one committed mistakes or not, it was easy to reach conclusions based on the changed situation without reversing previous decisions.

[19] Renmin Ribao , 1 October 1977.

[20] Zhonggong Zhungyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed., Guanyu Jianguo Yilai de Ruogan Lishi Wenti de Jueyi (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), 474.

[21] Renmin Ribao , 19 January 1978.

The central organization department under Hu's leadership adopted several crucial decisions dealing with different groups that suffered during the CR, but all of them in a broad sense touched on the question of rehabilitation. First, it proceeded to settle five types of cases: (1) those for which no organizational conclusion had been rendered, (2) those involving incorrect conclusions, (3) old cadres who had not yet been assigned to work, (4) persons who had died before investigation was completed, and (5) cases involving problems of relatives, friends, and colleagues of purged cadres.^[22]

On 3 November 1978 the organizational department issued another crucial document entitled "Several Opinions of the Central Organization Department with Regard to Intellectuals," which virtually spelled out all the concrete measures to be taken in rehabilitation.^[23] Reporting that about 40 percent of all CR-related cases in science, technology, and education had been reexamined, the document insisted that "victims of put-up, false, and wrong cases should be exonerated." Even "all those who were labeled as spies [and] reactionary academic authorities" should be vindicated.^[24] In addition, the document ordered that "those who died should be posthumously rehabilitated and their honors restored." All materials in the dossiers of the victims or their relatives were to be cleared; all property seized, bank deposits frozen, wages withheld, and houses forcefully occupied should be returned to the original owners.

After the third plenum, the central organization department issued another instruction, this time concerning old cadres' work. Praising the "historical contribution made by old cadres," it recommended a thorough rehabilitation. In addition to concrete measures to which every rehabilitated cadre was entitled, the documents also specified how work should be reassigned. "Old cadres who can do regular work should be quickly reassigned. Those with ability should be assigned to leadership positions. Cadres who retired during the CR should be given appropriate work, if they so desire." At the same time, it recommended a very lenient

[22] "Guanyu Ganbu Zhengce Lushi," in Zhuzhi Yu Tongxun (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1980). The key points were published in Hong Qi , no. 6, 1978.

[23] "Zhongyang Zhuzhibu Guanyu Zhishifenzi Zhengce de Jidian Yijian," in Zhuzhi Yu Tongxun .

[24] Ibid. It also specified the procedures for rehabilitation.

policy toward old cadres who had made mistakes, detailing special treatment for them, which the retirement (lixiu ) system later incorporated.^[25]

Hu's energetic maneuvers behind the scene were reflected in the official media's handling of the rehabilitation issue. Or one may say that the central leadership—largely dominated by the rehabilitated cadres—intentionally fostered public pressure by widely publicizing the issue of rehabilitation. As early as October 1977, Hu Yaobang managed to have Renmin Ribao publish an article entitled "Rectify the Mistakes Made by the Gang of Four in Cadre Work," which reportedly drew about 10,000 letters of support from readers.^[26] As the issue of rehabilitation continued to figure prominently in the official media, letters requesting reviews of cases poured in. In the two years following the third plenum, Anhui provincial authorities received 1.8 million letters concerning rehabilitation.^[27] One-third of all letters received by Fuzhou municipality during the same period were concerned with rehabilitation.

Since the central organizational department did not have sufficient manpower to investigate and exonerate all wrongly handled cases, reinvestigations were carried out by the unit which had made the decisions.^[28] As a Chinese maxim, "Nobody can use an axe to cut one's own body," aptly indicates, the cadres who had made the original decisions were reluctant to overturn them.^[29] Lower-level leaders were also afraid of reversing decisions made by leaders higher up the ladder. In addition, many Chinese exploited the official policy of rehabilitation to demand a review of their cases. Some people wanted to change the punishment they received ten years ago and even reverse the official decision rendered on disputes among the masses. Others demanded that they be returned to urban areas and have their wages raised.^[30]

Reluctance to pass new verdicts usually meant partial rehabilitation, which frequently left looser ends than the complete denial of rehabilitation. For example, a youth had been convicted as a coun-

[25] "Zhongyang Zhuzhibu Guanyu Jiaqian Laoganbu Gongzuo de Jidian Yijian," in Zhuzhi Yu Tongxun .

[26] Ibid., 1.

[27] Daily Report , 21 October 1981, 1.

[28] "Guanyu Ganbu Zhengce Lushi," in Zhuzhi Yu Tongxun .

[29] Nanfang Ribao , 24 January 1979.

[30] Renmin Ribao , 22 October 1979.

terrevolutionary in June 1977. The same court granted him conditional rehabilitation in 1978 because he had actually done no more than utter "some mistaken words." He was released. However, his original unit accepted him only as a temporary worker and continued to discriminate against him.^[31] One person who had been arrested for having participated in the Tiananmen Square incident was released in December 1977, but the public security bureau that had arrested him refused to acknowledge that the arrest was a mistake. Instead, they simply changed the charge from being a counterrevolutionary to being in possession of a "yellow novel"—Tolstoy's Anna Karenina .^[32]

Many cadres felt that it was unfair to use current standards of right and wrong to judge decisions made in the past. For instance, when some "counterrevolutionaries" demanded rehabilitation on the grounds that they had challenged the Gang of Four, cadres replied:

The Gang of Four were members of the Politburo, and your opposition to them was a direct attack on Chairman Mao. . . . Your criticism of the Gang of Four was in reality a criticism of the CR and of the socialist system. . . . Your revolt against the Gang of Four was a little too early, and it undermined the strategic plan of Chairman Mao. . . . It should be clearly recognized that opposition to the Gang of Four was in violation of the organization principle and hence wrong.^[33]

The only way to deal with such resistance was to change the leadership. After an almost two-month-long debate, the central organizational department adopted "some opinions regarding the readjustment of leadership" on September 1978.^[34] Recommending the complete removal of Gang of Four sympathizers, the document urged that CR victims be promoted to high-level positions (diao xiang ), dislodging "those cadres who lack experience and about whom the masses have many [bad] opinions"—in other words, those who had benefited from the CR. In many places, it was only after the beneficiaries were replaced by the victims that the rehabilitation work started in earnest.^[35] The newly appointed leaders had

[31] Zhongguo Qingnian Bao , 24 October 1978.

[32] Renmin Ribao , 3 August 1978.

[33] Ibid.

[34] "Guanyu Ganbu Zhengce Lushi," in Zhuzhi Yu Tongxun .

[35] Nanfang Ribao , 11 April 1979; Hebei Ribao , 4 September 1980.

no psychological inclination to protect the previous decisions made by purged leaders. The regime also specifically banned the persons who made the original decisions from becoming involved in the reviews of their original cases.

Furthermore, in order to ensure that the official policy of rehabilitation was thoroughly implemented at lower levels, the center dispatched "inspection teams" (composed of about 1,000 cadres from central ministries, the Military Affairs Commission, central organs, and the People's Congress standing committees). Local authorities also organized their own inspection teams (fucha gongzuo ban ) with "cadres who have a very strong standpoint, who can uphold principle in all fairness, and who know history and have work ability." On the other hand, "those individuals who are seriously responsible for producing invented, false, and wrong charges and who are resented by the people" should be removed.^[36] Authorized to "seek truth from facts" by correcting all mistaken cases "irrespective of when the original decisions were made, who made them, and which level of leadership approved them," the responsible teams reviewed the rehabilitation work done at the lower levels. Shanxi province organized special investigation teams involving 5,000 cadres—many of whom were the victims of previous political campaigns—and established five steps in effecting a person's rehabiliation.^[37]

With a more comprehensive rehabilitation program, the official media began to question Mao's decisions. The decision on the Tiananmen Square incident, the most difficult and controversial case, was finally reversed in November 1978, when Lin Jiaohu replaced Wu De. Renmin Ribao published a long and authoritative article entitled, "The Rehabilitation of Trumped-Up Cases in a Historical Context," which argued that large-scale rehabilitation would prevent a total rejection of Mao such as happened to Stalin. In the absence of rehabilitation, discontented people might completely repudiate Mao.^[38]

The article was followed by a flurry of other articles calling for a thorough vindication of the "framed, falsely charged, and wrongly

[36] Zhonggong Zhungyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed., Guanyu Jianguo Yilai de Ruogan Lishi Wenti de Jueyi , 474.

[37] Shanxi Ribao , 31 March 1979.

[38] Renmin Ribao , 15 December 1978.

sentenced." Now thorough rehabilitation was officially regarded as the prerequisite for ending the campaign against the Gang of Four in each unit. The official media began to publish veiled references to Mao's arbitrary purge of many cadres. "If a certain leader made comments on the cases of certain cadres without going through an organizational approval, those comments are just his personal opinions. Those comments not corresponding to organizational principles must be rectified, if incorrect." Mao's responsibility for the radicals' actions was recognized. The Gang of Four was accused of having condemned as "renegades and spies" everyone to whom Mao had simply said, "I do not consider you a good person." Even Mao's personal approval could not prevent reversal of the particular decision. "If the party constitution and the state constitution can be amended, what excuse is there for official documents with mistakes in them to be the basis for defending wrong decisions?"^[39]

By the third plenum, Hu Yaobang had exonerated all cadres under his jurisdiction. Wang Dongxing, who was in charge of the management section of the Central Committee—which in turn handled the cases of high-ranking leaders—was replaced by Yao Yilin, and the units within the management offices dealing with the rehabilitation of cadres were abolished. All cases were transferred to the central organizational department.

The Scope of Rehabilitation

Early in 1978, rehabilitation rather than "implementation of cadre policy" emerged as the predominant issue in the public media. In addition, the scope of rehabilitation expanded.^[40] Several factors aided this trend. Increased criticism of the Gang of Four, which was officially labeled ultraleftist, and the notion that "practice is the sole criterion for empirical truth," implied that many leaders were merely victims of the wrong line. Growing numbers of rehabilitated cadres who assumed leadership at the provincial level aggressively investigated CR-related cases of rehabilitation.^[41]

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., 23 March 1979.

[41] Ibid., 1 October 1977.

After the third plenum, rehabilitation accelerated. In 1979 the official news media carried a number of articles reporting the rehabilitation of and memorial services for those who had died during the CR.^[42] Those alleged to have made mistakes during the CR and those condemned as "renegades and spies" were vindicated.^[43] Finally Liu Shaoqi's case was reversed.^[44] The third plenum authorized Hu Yaobang and Song Renqiong to reinvestigate, and after nine months' work, they concluded that Kang Sheng had falsified the charges against Liu. The fifth plenum (1980) approved the new findings.^[45] On 19 May 1980 the center issued document 25, which revoked the previous decision against Liu Shaoqi, restoring his reputation as "a great proletarian revolutionary leader."

Reinvestigation went far beyond CR-related cases. Those purged during the Socialist Education Movement (1963–1965) (SEM) were also reinstated.^[46] Even decisions made as early as 1961 were canceled. The verdict in the case of the Hu Feng counterrevolutionary group (1955) was reversed on 29 September 1980. The central organization department, probably in a review of all controversial cases since its founding, vindicated Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Huang Gocheng, Li Weihan, Zeng San, and Mao Mingfan.^[47] By 1983, the regime had even reviewed cases decided as far back as the 1940s and 1930s.^[48] Another interesting case involved former Nationalist troops, who, despite their surrender to the CCP, were nonetheless persecuted during the CR together with their children. The political consultative conference demanded that the regime vindicate this group of people.

Another group of ordinary people whose honor was restored were model workers, many of whom had been criticized as "work-

[42] Those who were rehabilitated through this process include Zhang Zhichun, Xu Haidong, Wu Zhifu, Liu Changsheng, Zhang Linzhi, Wang Shiying, Liu Liumin, Liao Loyen, Xu Zufu, Hu Shihkuei, Liu Xiewu, Wang Qimei, Liu Jen, Qhien Bozan, Gao Chungmin, Tian Han, Zhang Wentian, Xu Bing, and Zhang Jingwu.

[43] Revoked were previous decisions on "sixty-one persons" who had allegedly surrendered to the KMT in 1934 and on Peng Zhen, Lo Ruiching, and the "Yang antiparty group." Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Cankao Cailiao , no. 2, 1982.

[44] Renmin Ribao , 19 May 1980.

[45] Feijing Yuebao , 16 September 1979.

[46] Renmin Ribao , 13 January 1979; Beijing Ribao , 15 February 1979; 24 May 1979.

[47] Renmin Ribao , 29 September 1980.

[48] Dangshi Tongxun , February 1985, 16.

er aristocrats with vested interests in the status quo," and "false models, and the black gang's model." Basic-level cadres initially refused to rehabilitate model workers because the masses, not official party organs, had attacked them, and there were no charges from which they needed to be exonerated.^[49]

Seriously affected by the CR were former underground party workers. CR radicals had reportedly organized 339 central and 85 local investigation teams to probe into about 3,600 members of the former Shanghai underground party organization. All ninety-nine former underground party members who had reached the bureau level lost their positions, and sixty-five were arrested and investigated.^[50] A similar fate befell the members of former northeast underground party organizations.^[51]

The most frequently used criminal label attached to ordinary Chinese during the CR was "vicious attackers" (yadu gongji ). Any disparaging remark about Mao's Selected Works and any utterance made out of "temporary discontent and anger" were used as evidence of a "vicious attack" against the party and socialism.^[52] One person was condemned as a counterrevolutionary because he had said, "Jiang Qing's statement 'Defend with weapons and attack with words' promotes armed struggle." Another was jailed because he said, "Lenin said that only the dead and the unborn have not made mistakes." A cadre was condemned as a counterrevolutionary because he had left a space between the party center and Mao when he had written a poster declaring that "whoever opposes the party center and Chairman Mao is counterrevolutionary."^[53]

Rehabilitation affected not only former cadres but also their relatives, colleagues, and friends. The official news media began to criticize the CR's tendency to discriminate against children of disgraced cadres as a "feudal practice." Despite Mao's directive in September 1968 that "serious historical and political problems should not affect children," punishing relatives became a widespread practice and produced such phrases as "children of the

[49] Gongren Bao , 10 September 1979.

[50] Renmin Ribao , 26 April 1979.

[51] Ibid., 5 November 1978.

[52] Beijing Ribao , 11 January 1979.

[53] Wenhui Bao , 19 February 1979.

black gang" and "children of renegades." The offspring of purged cadres were discriminated against when they tried to join the Communist Youth League, enter schools, enlist in the army, or obtain jobs. Moreover, their parents' political problems were entered into their own dossiers. Each unit that rehabilitated cadres was required to notify the children's units of the decisions so that the children's dossier could be corrected.^[54]

Rehabilitation was truly comprehensive. Controversial cases that had occurred before the CR were reviewed in a different and more favorable light. The united front department reinvestigated cases of its own cadres.^[55] Shanxi province revoked its previous decision on "Sanshang Taofeng," a drama that the radicals condemned as an attempt to reverse the CR decision on Liu Shaoqi; the Beijing party committee revoked its decision on "The Three-family Village," which had signaled the beginning of the CR.^[56] Guangdong military region rehabilitated seventy-nine officers whom the Gang of Four had persecuted.^[57]

The people's courts reexamined cases—including death sentences—which they had passed judgment on before. The Shanghai court overturned previous decisions on 2,000 cases, even trying to reconcile couples whose marriages had broken up because of earlier decisions.^[58] According to Jiang Hua, president of the People's Supreme Court, by May 1979, the court systems of twenty-nine provinces had corrected a total of 164,000 wrong and mistaken cases.^[59]

In Yunan province, about 100,000 people were rehabilitated. The Anhui province party committee reviewed about 110,700 pre-CR cases. More than 233,000 concocted, false, and wrong decisions were rectified, and a total of 41,609 persons were reinstated in their former positions. Another 7,466 persons regained their party membership.^[60] The Pijing district in Guangdong province re-

[54] Through this method, Chengdu reported that about 5,200 dossiers out of 5,400 dossiers in the municipality were cleansed. Zhongguo Qingnian Bao , 7 October 1978.

[55] Wenhui Bao , 19 March 1979.

[56] Renmin Ribao , 22 September 1978; 3 August 1979.

[57] Nanfang Ribao , 20 May 1979.

[58] Wenhui Bao , 11 March 1979. As a result, Yangbu district court managed to help eleven cases of divorced couples to resume marital relations.

[59] Nanfang Ribao , 28 June 1979.

[60] Daily Report , 21 October 1981, Q1.

portedly reexamined about 3,900 cases, and three cases alone in Xinping county affected about 22,000 people.^[61] Deng Xiaoping reported that 2.9 million people were rehabilitated, and if one includes relatives and friends, the rehabilitation touched almost 40 million Chinese.^[62] Almost all the controversial cases that the CCP had made since 1949 were overturned. The only known exceptions, at least according to Zhengming magazine, were those of the Guangdong localists.^[63]

Process of Rehabilitation

Rehabiliation involved many steps, each of which required decisions on how the organization should acknowledge its mistakes, compensate victims for their hardships, clear their dossiers, and assign them to new jobs. Broadly speaking, the process of rehabilitating a case involved the following steps.

First, responsibility for checking the correctness of the original decision fell on the unit that had made the decision, regardless of whether or not the disciplined person was still with the unit or requested reexamination. The party committee in each unit often organized one or several rehabilitation committees, depending on need. For instance, the history department of Beijing University, a unit that had produced a large number of rightists in 1957, organized four investigation teams, one each for former students, professors, foreign students, and research associates. A team could be further subdivided to deal with different types of problems.

The rehabilitation committee was generally headed by a deputy secretary and consisted of people who had no part in the original decision. For example, the ministry of culture organized a "rehabilitation committee with persons whose party spirit is strong, whose work style is orthodox, and who are willing to take responsibility for their actions."^[64] Tianjin province mobilized 3,000 cadres to handle rehabilitation, receiving visitors and answering letters. In order to ensure impartiality, two kinds of people were barred from the investigation teams: those who had participated in armed

[61] Ming Bao , 3 July 1978.

[62] Zhengming , 16 January 1980, 11–23.

[63] Ibid., 15 February 1979.

[64] Renmin Ribao , 22 April 1978.

struggle during the CR and put together false cases, and the former leaders of rebel organizations.^[65]

The members of the rehabilitation committee first studied official documents to familiarize themselves with official policy. Then they selected several typical cases as models. One committee chose the following three cases as models: (1) a provincial alternative secretary who had been condemned as the "root of seventeen years of the black line," (2) a director of the united front bureau who had once been arrested by the KMT as a model "historical problem," and (3) a cadre who had been persecuted to death.^[66] Committees usually worked on easy cases first, leaving the most difficult cases for last.^[67]

Sometimes when a person to be rehabilitated had been transferred to another unit, his rehabilitation required the work of many different units. For example, a cadre working in a provincial financial bureau was classified as a rightist and then sent down to a labor farm under the commercial bureau. In 1962 he was reassigned to a provincial department store and then retired in the same year. He had to write letters to many units because each unit passed on the responsibility to another.^[68] In cases where many units had been involved in the original decision, a "combined investigation team" was set up.^[69]

Each investigation team looked into the dossier of any cadre who might need rehabilitation. Investigation teams were allowed access to other dossiers in the course of their work. When the necessity arose, the committee sent out investigation teams to collect more evidence and to interview witnesses.

The party committee discussed each report and gave an organizational decision, which was placed in the dossier. New conclusions often included such statements as "no rightist remarks have been found" and "should not be considered a rightist."^[70] The reasons for the changed outlook were often given. A frequently cited justification for change was that originally

[65] Ibid., 24 May 1980.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Nanfang Ribao , 28 March 1979.

[68] Renmin Ribao , 10 February 1980.

[69] Nanfang Ribao , 12 April 1979.

[70] Ibid., 13 January 1980.

several wrong statements arising from misunderstanding were accepted as evidence of antiparty and antisocialist views, [or] what one said in a free discussion was used as evidence of an antiparty clique, normal criticisms as evidence for attacking the party, what one confessed to the party as evidence of a vicious attack and a counterrevolutionary ideology, different opinions in academic research questions as evidence of anti-Marxism and rejection of Mao's thought, and suggestions to party leaders as evidence of attacking central leaders.^[71]

The party secretary or another similarly responsible person explained the organizational decision, stating the concrete actions to be taken to compensate for the original wrong decision in a heart-to-heart talk. The former victim could raise questions, and leaders were encouraged to be responsive.^[72] Conditions of rehabilitation entailed haggling over such issues as back payment, housing, children's problems, and medical treatment.

The victims who needed health care because of their sufferings during the CR were issued "priority cards [yudai zheng ] for medical treatment." To be eligible, one had to prove that the CR was somehow accountable for one's problem; a certificate from a physician stating that the problem needed continuous medical treatment was also required.

Usually victims were entitled to partial retroactive payment of the wages they had not received during their disgrace.^[73] During the CR, the purged generally received a portion of their wages, though barely enough to cover subsistence. The amount to be paid was negotiable. In some cases, units wanted to deduct the cost of feeding and lodging the victim in confinement or jail. Frequently, people who received back pay were asked to donate some of the money to their unit—sometimes this was even compulsory. Former rightists were not automatically entitled to back payment, but sometimes their salaries were raised by one or two grades to compensate for their loss. Often special arrangements were made for those in dire straits. Shanxi province reported that it had made back payments to about 2,600 original capitalists, Liaoning province to 14,000 nonparty members.^[74]

[71] Renmin Ribao , 23 January 1979.

[72] Wenhui Bao , 19 February 1979.

[73] Ibid., 11 March 1979.

[74] Renmin Ribao , 25 April 1985.

Another matter that had to be negotiated was a person's job assignment. The basic principle was to reinstate former cadres in positions equivalent in status to their previous ones. Hunan province reported that 96 percent of those who were rehabilitated were assigned to positions equivalent to or higher than those they had occupied before.^[75] "Depending on one's political situation, physical condition, and past work experience," some were promoted to higher positions, transferred to equivalent ones, or assigned to less demanding jobs. Those with health problems were allowed to retire.^[76] Former rightists were not automatically entitled to their previous positions, but their new assignments were to be based on ability, physical condition, and the needs of the unit.

When both sides—the party representative and the victim—had agreed on the specific conditions of the rehabilitation package, the case was passed on to the supervisory authorities for approval. Often disagreements arose with the supervisory authorities about how to interpret evidence and what conclusions to draw from it. Since the lower level was responsible for executing the specific conditions of a person's rehabilitation, which required funding, housing, and positions, it resisted pressure from above, for instance, to declare that a particular cadre was "persecuted to death."^[77] Since most workers' cases were much simpler than the cadres', often the approval of the upper echelon was waived. The appropriate unit could finalize the workers' cases, except for those that needed approval by the courts and other units. In some cases just the approval of the cadres in charge of the case was sufficient to close the matter, bypassing the party committee entirely.^[78]

Quite often the implementation of the terms and conditions agreed upon produced tensions among the units involved. As an example let us suppose that a rightist who was expelled from his research unit was sent to a state farm in a different province, where he worked for almost twenty years as a guard. Who is reponsible for him? His original unit wants the state farm to give the former rightist what he is entitled to—including a new job, a raise, new housing, retirement benefits, and help for his children—whereas

[75] Hong Qi , no. 6, 1978.

[76] Renmin Ribao , 16 September 1978.

[77] Ibid., 24 May 1980.

[78] Wenhui Bao , 3 May 1979.

the state farm insists that the research unit should take him back and do whatever it can for him. Eventually the issue has to go up to the provincial level to be resolved.

Organizational department personnel carefully went over all dossiers and removed unreliable CR-related materials. It is, however, unclear what constitutes "unreliable material." Obviously, the category includes "hearsay," evidence collected after the case was decided, and "forced confession."^[79] All materials pertaining to the wrong decisions had to be removed from the dossier, and the new organizational conclusion, with its supporting evidence, was added.^[80] Often material taken out of the dossier was shown to the person before being destroyed. Thus, one could see what had been removed from his dossier, but not what was left. The Chinese news media often complained that not all unreliable materials related to wrong cases were removed from personnel dossiers. The regime made it clear that past political records should not be used as a basis for future politicial discrimination by prohibiting the use of such terms as "former rightist" and insisting that former rightists, and particularly their children, should be treated like anyone else in "promotion, salary raises, wage adjustment, decisions on bonuses, and conferring job titles."^[81]

All confiscated goods were returned. Sometimes monetary compensation was made for lost property. Frozen bank accounts were reactivated and houses returned.^[82] The political consultative conferences cooperated with the central united front department to supervise the return of valuable goods to former owners. Many antiques that had been taken away from people—including paintings and books—were sent to libraries, antique shops, and museums.^[83] From looking at the owner's names on the items, libraries and museums were able to return them. Shanghai received about $6 billion worth of gold and silver objects; about $5.9 billion worth was returned. The various units under Shanghai received about 720,000 confiscated items and 4.4 million books, which were returned to their original owners.

[79] Nanfang Ribao , 8 June 1979.

[80] Shijian (Inner Mongolia), April 1978.

[81] Renmin Ribao , 17 November 1978.

[82] Ming Bao , 30 August 1979.

[83] Renmin Ribao , 15 April 1985.

Each rehabilitated cadre or former rightist received a rehabilitation certificate, which some people hung on their walls.^[84] If the person migrated or fled to a foreign country, the certificate was sent to him.^[85] Copies were also sent to units where the person's spouse or children worked. And each unit organized a mass rally to announce the rehabilitation officially so that every member of the unit would know both that the rehabilitated person had been unfairly treated in the past and that this would no longer happen.

Finally, each unit informed the units where the relatives of rehabilitated people worked. The official policy was to inform "all those who happen to be the rehabilitated cadres' relatives or children, irrespective of where they work, which units they belong to, and regardless of whether they have been affected or not." Frequently cadres working in personnel departments were dispatched to inform relatives and leaders of units where they worked. Those from far away were informed by mail. In some cases, it was necessary to inform family members scattered over more than a hundred units.^[86] A factory in Beijing reported that it had convened twelve rehabilitation meetings and sent our 291 letters to relatives in the process of rehabilitating sixty-nine people.^[87]

Ending the Class Struggle

The idea of class struggle that Mao renewed in 1962, when he disclaimed his previous implication that violent class struggle was over in China, constituted the ideological justification for Maoist radicalism. By politicizing the concept of class, Mao justified the existence of a bourgeoisie even in China, where the ownership of the means of production had been socialized. By the time of the SEM, the term "bourgeois class" in China referred to party leaders who favored policies considered revisionist by Mao. Mao's interpretation of "class" became clearer when his thesis of class struggle underwrote the masses' attack on "powerholders taking the capitalist road" in the party, government, and military during the CR.

[84] For a sample certificate, see Ming Bao , 30 August 1979.

[85] Nanfang Ribao , 15 April 1979.

[86] Renmin Ribao , 16 September 1978; Nanfang Ribao , 6 March 1979.

[87] Beijing Ribao , 12 April 1979.

Later, Zhang Chunqiao systematically elaborated the radical meaning of class.^[88]

The radicals' politicization of what they called class struggle had many undesirable consequences. It further contributed to an increase in the number of "class enemies" that every political campaign since 1949 has fostered. One 135-member brigade in Guangdong province had only one person belonging to the four-category element—landlords, rich peasants, bad elements, and counterrevolutionaries—at the time of land reform, but there were eleven by 1976.^[89] A commune reported that "upon seven occasions altogether class status was reviewed and altered. More and more people became members of the 'four-category element.' " The status of those who had overseas connections was often reclassified, and the person concerned was often given a less desirable designation.^[90] Sometimes original regulations were changed to make obtaining good class status more difficult. For instance, according to 1950 regulations, children under eighteen in 1949 were not to be called landlords like their parents. However, during the SEM the regulation was changed to exempt those younger than six. In some areas, children automatically inherited their deceased parents' status. Beginning with the CR, not only one's own class status but also one's family background—which was determined by the parents' and grandparents' status—was emphasized. Anyone with a bad family background was persecuted. The cadres purged during the CR formed a new category of "class enemies," and the record of their having been purged went into their children's dossiers.^[91] The rehabilitated cadres had another incentive to repudiate Mao's class struggle besides all these abuses—the fact that Mao had purged them in the name of class struggle. Deng Xiaoping publicly criticized Mao's politicization of class:

We oppose the overextension of class struggle. We do not admit that there is a bourgeois class in the party. We also do not admit that under the socialist system, after the effective elimination of the

[88] Zhang Chunqiao, "On Exercising All-Around Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie" (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975).

[89] Ming Bao , 1 April 1979.

[90] Nanfang Ribao , 14 March 1979.

[91] Zhongguo Qingnian Bao , 7 October 1978.

exploiting class as well as the conditions that make exploitation possible, a bourgeois class or any other exploiting class can be produced.^[92]

In addition, waging class struggle was not conducive to economic development, the regime's new goal. The third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress thus promised to "mobilize all positive elements" for economic development while declaring that turbulent class struggle on a large scale had ended. Later Hua Guofeng declared specifically that the landlord, rich peasant, and capitalist classes had ceased to exist in China.^[93] Presently class is defined exclusively on the basis of ownership of the means of production. This strictly economic definition leaves no room for the existence of an exploitative class in China. The regime, however, still refuses to declare an official end to class struggle, reasoning that there are still counterrevolutionaries and foreign agents in China.^[94]

The changed official view on class and class struggle provided the theoretical justification for the abolition of discriminatory class designations. The regime decided first to remove all labels of rightists and then to reclassify most as four-category elements. This measure was intended to "mobilize all positive factors, transform negative factors into positive ones, promote stability and unity, and contribute greatly to the socialist modernizations."^[95] In other words, the regime intended to count on former landlords and rich peasants, who were efficient producers, and on former capitalists, who were able managers, for economic development.

We do not know what proportion of the Chinese population had been given undesirable class designations. The official media estimated that 5 percent of the people were "class enemies," and in 1967 Mao specifically estimated their number to be about 35 million.^[96] According to another source, in 1979 there were about 6 million landlords and rich peasants and half a million capitalists.^[97] All of them, except for some landlords and rich peasants, received

[92] Hong Qi , no. 20, 1981, 27.

[93] Renmin Ribao , 26 June 1979.

[94] Beijing Review , 16 November 1979, 9–13; 23 November 1979, 15–17.

[95] Jiefang Bao , 29 January 1979.

[96] Feijing Yuebao 22(7) (1980):42–47.

[97] Zhonggong Zhungyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed., Guanyu Jianguo Yilai de Ruogan Lishi Wenti de Jueyi , 160–61.

new class labels.^[98] Among 400,000 people who were originally labeled rightists, about 130,000 still carried the label after several readjustments made between 1957 and 1979.^[99]

The decision to abolish "rightist" as a label began to take form early in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping instructed the party not to use it. The organizational, propaganda, and united front departments and the public security and civil affairs ministries jointly convened a meeting from 26 June to 22 June 1978 in Shandong province.^[100] After a heated debate between the "whatever faction" and Deng's group, the meeting approved "Concrete Measures for Implementing the Decision to Remove All the Hats of the Rightists," which apparently decided to make a distinction between correcting (gaizheng ) and granting pardons (zhaimao ). In a "correction," the person who had been mislabeled was entitled to restoration of his party membership, his political honor, and his former salary scale.^[101] For those whose cases had not involved any error, simply removing the label sufficed.^[102]

It seems that the regime first planned to "correct" only the erroneous designations, but later decided to remove the stigma even from genuine rightists. Moreover, there are indications that the center put pressure on local cadres to take a broad view.^[103]

Some basic-level cadres resisted the new measure on the grounds that it constituted a "rightist reversal" and a "repudiation of the achievements of the antirightist struggle." In dealing with cadre resistance, the regime emphasized that the movement was correct and generally properly directed but that some minor errors

[98] Ibid.; Zhongguo Qingnian Bao , 8 September 1979; Zhengming , no. 7, March 1979, 5–8.

[99] "Deng Xiaoping's Report on the Present Situation and Task," Zhengming , March 1980, 11–23.

[100] Presiding at the meeting, Wang Dongxing set up three guidelines: (1) the overall direction of the antirightist campaign was correct, (2) the process of the movement was basically healthy, but (3) there had been some minor mistakes. Zhengming , 1979, 5–8.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Those judging whether a person had been correctly or mistakenly labeled were to rely on the "Notice of Criteria for Classifying Rightists," the document originally used in the 1957 campaign. Ibid.; Renmin Ribao , 23 January 1979.

[103] On 3 January 1978 the central party school reported that thirty-one of ninety-seven rightists were incorrectly labeled, but only twenty days later another article reported that ninety-three of the ninety-seven had suffered from mistaken decisions. Renmin Ribao , 2 January 1979; 23 January 1979.

had been made in its execution. The official media defended the policy, saying it showed the success, not the repudiation, of Mao's policy of transforming rightists. As a result, by November 1978, no more rightists officially existed. The first plenary session of the newly organized disciplinary committee decided to review the implementation of the policy.

How successful was the policy implementation? The answer depends on how one defines its objectives. As far as administrative procedures are concerned, the policy was thoroughly carried out. Each person's dossier contained a note to the effect that he was either no longer considered a rightist or that the original decision calling him one had been corrected. But this left everything in the dossier, causing some people to be quite uneasy.^[104] As for ridding the victims of past political campaigns of their grievances and helping them to dedicate themselves to modernization, the result is less clear. For some former rightists the new policy was not sweeping enough to make restitution for all the suffering they had endured. After all, how could the regime compensate for broken marriages, lost opportunities, and, in some extreme cases, permanent injury? For other former rightists, the removal of the discriminatory label was anticlimactic, after which they had no incentive to work hard.^[105]

After dealing with rightists, the regime immediately proceeded to remove the designations of landlord, rich peasant, counterrevolutionary, and bad element.^[106] Official policy toward them was not as generous as toward the rightists. The labels were not completely abolished, however, because an "extremely small number of those who are stubbornly upholding the CR standpoints and those who are not yet properly remolded" continued to merit them. Only those who met three requirements could have their class labels removed: they must have abided by state laws and regulations, sincerely labored, and not done any "bad things."^[107]

After the publication of the official decision about the four categories in newspapers, the minister of public security, Zhao Zhangbi, elaborated on these conditions in an interview with journalists.

[104] Nanfang Ribao , 11 March 1980.

[105] Tansu , no. 5, 1979, 68–69.

[106] Nanfang Ribao , 29 January 1979.

[107] Renmin Ribao , 30 January 1979.

The "sincere labor" requirement would apply only to those who could perform physical labor. "Bad things" referred to such activities as "engaging in class retaliation," "beating, smashing, and looting," and "carrying out counterrevolutionary or other criminal activities." According to Zhao, an "extremely small number of people who had done 'bad things' when Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were in power" would not be reclassified. At the same time, he emphasized that all who had been called any one of the four categories because of their opposition to ultraleftist policies and the Gang of Four would be reclassified. These included everyone "who promoted private plots and those who challenged the erroneous leadership of the radicals."^[108]

The procedure for examining each case was similar to that used for rightists; it involved both leadership and the masses and required a public announcement. However, in the case of the four categories the masses' opinion carried more weight in arriving at a final decision. The public security bureaus were also involved, and final authority in each case was given to a county-level revolutionary committee. The removal procedure also involved the changing of class status, for instance, from landlord to commune member, in all written records. The class status of a person's children was also similarly changed. Grandchildren of the four categories even had their family backgrounds changed.^[109]

After reclassification, former four-category elements "should enjoy all the basic rights of citizenship as specified in the constitution." No discrimination was to be practiced in such matters as entering schools, obtaining factory jobs, joining the Communist Youth League and the party, and receiving job assignments. The only proper consideration was "political performance."^[110] Like former rightists, reclassified people were not to be referred to in any way by their earlier designation. Even if the reclassified person committed a crime, his former class label was not to become an issue. But no old records were removed from the dossiers.

Most of the former landlords and rich peasants had their designations removed. An example comes from the Huancheng

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.; see also Nanfang Ribao , 11 March 1980.

[110] Nanfang Ribao , 9 February 1979.

commune in Guangdong province (population 5,300 in 1979). At the time of the land reform this commune had 828 landlords and rich peasants. The number had shrunk to 608 by 1965 and to 423 by 1979, and finally only two remained.^[111] In Beijing municipality, of 8,500 landlords and rich peasants, 7,800 had their designations removed. Zhongguo Qingnian Bao reported that only 1 to 2 percent of former four-category elements failed to obtain reclassification.^[112] Another source estimates that only about 50,000 people were still considered landlords or rich peasants.^[113]

By 1984, the remaining four-category elements were further reclassified. According to Renmin Ribao , all remaining four-category elements had their labels removed, including 28,227 landlords, 14,343 rich peasants, 16,260 counterrevolutionaries, and 20,674 bad elements. The regime declared that it had succeeded in educating and transforming about 20 million such people since the foundation of the PRC.^[114]

Another group that regained full citizenship included industrialists and businessmen of the national bourgeoisie. From the beginning the CCP's policy toward them had been relatively lenient, largely because of the small size of the group. Capitalists numbered about 850,000, and of these about 150,000 were big capitalists. The rest were small capitalists, who could draw about lo yuan per month from assets that had been taken over by the government.^[115] There were about 720,000 people in the group called the "national bourgeoisie" in 1956, but the number had diminished to about half a million by 1979.^[116] Even after the "peaceful transformation of industry," former industrialists and businessmen continued to enjoy their wealth; they were allowed a draw a fixed interest of 5 percent on their total verified assets, to retain private property (including houses and bank deposits), and to work as highly paid executives or technicians in the enterprises they had once owned. However, the CR not only brought an abrupt end to these economic privileges, but it also made the

[111] Ibid.

[112] Zhongguo Qingnian Bao , 8 September 1979.

[113] Beijing Review , 21 January 1980, 14–20.

[114] Renmin Ribao , 2 November 1984.

[115] Dangshi Yenjiu Ziliao , 20 November 1984.

[116] Beijing Review , 28 April 1980, 21.

national bourgeoisie vulnerable to political persecution; their private property was confiscated, and interest payments stopped. Many of them lost their jobs or suffered cuts in salary. In 1979, the regime decided to return all property, to repay them retroactively, and to reinstate them in positions where they could fully utilize their skills and knowledge.^[117]

The regime's policy toward overseas Chinese and their relatives in China changed as well. When the radicals were in power, anybody with "overseas connections" was politically suspect. Such unfortunates were discriminated against in school admissions, job assignments, conscription, and recruitment into the Communist Youth League and the Communist Party. Despite the 1963 regulation that all overseas Chinese who had returned to China after the land reform should be reclassified according to their previous class status, in Guangdong province, where many people had overseas connections (there are 150,000 overseas Chinese there), radicals enacted "Six Articles on Handling Cadres with Overseas Connections."^[118] These articles stipulated that no one with overseas connections could become a cadre and that incumbent cadres with overseas connections had to be investigated.^[119] Many such cadres were suspected of being spies, and their houses and rooms were confiscated or occupied by force. In January 1978, the regime announced a new policy toward overseas Chinese; it promised to stop all discrimination, to return confiscated homes, to reopen special shops for overseas Chinese, and to take care of their special needs.^[120] In order to supervise implementation of the new policy, the Office of Overseas Chinese of the State Council set up a reception office, which helped to resolve 13,000 cases.^[121] By 1986, the regime had reportedly made restitution in 33,000 cases from the CR and 10,000 earlier cases, returned numerous houses, and promoted 17,700 overseas Chinese.^[122]

The disciplinary committee reported that the number of cases involving overseas Chinese appealed and reexamined in seventeen

[117] Renmin Ribao , 30 January 1979; 19 March 1979.

[118] Nanfang Ribao , 12 February 1979.

[119] Ming Bao , 20 February 1978.

[120] Ibid., 3 January 1978; 27 January 1978; 29 September 1978.

[121] Renmin Ribao , 16 July 1980.

[122] Ibid., 24 February 1986.

provinces amounted to 3.26 million. The disciplinary committees of twenty provinces received about half a million letters and visits.^[123] Deng and Hu Yaobang have said that rehabilitation and reclassification have affected approximately 10 billion people.^[124]

The work done to remove undesirable class labels and to redress wrongs committed during the CR heralded the end both to the era of class struggle and to the practice of determining political loyalty from a family's economic status in the three years 1946–49. The amazing fact is not that the regime finally decided to end its feudalistic practice, but that it took so long to do so.

[123] Ming Bao , 20 September 1979.

[124] Feijing Yuebao , 22(3) 16 September 1979, 80; Qishi Niandai , 21 June 1980.

9
The Structure of the Cadre Corps

By the time the CCP made the historic decision to shift its main goal to economic development, China had a gigantic cadre corps shaped cumulatively by past policies. As a historical product of guerrilla warfare in the early 1940s, the socialist revolution in the 1950s, the "continuing revolutions" in the early 1960s, and the interelite conflicts during the CR, the existing cadre corps was ill-suited for the new task of the Four Modernizations (the modernizations of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology): it was too large in size, old in average age, low in educational level, ossified in political outlook, demoralized, and factionalized. Through their prolonged and checkered careers, the cadres learned that the best way to preserve their positions in the bureaucracy was to play it safe by refusing to take clear-cut positions on any issue, while cultivating extensive personal networks. Economic reforms and changes in official ideology that allowed a certain amount of individualism offered ample opportunity for cadres to use their formal authority for personal gain. The ordinary Chinese were bitter about the cadres' corruption. "If things continue like this, how can the party be called a Communist party and the state be called a [socialist] state?"^[1]

Deng Xiaoping succinctly summarized the problems of Chinese officialdom:

The bureaucratic phenomenon is the most serious problem for our nation and our party. The major manifestations of bureaucratism are looking down on the people, abusing political power, departing from reality, being separated from the masses, speaking empty words, espousing an antiquated ossified ideology, blindly observing absurd regulations, creating redundant organizations, having more

[1] For the bureaucratic problems, see Zhengming , no. 52, February 1982, 11; Renmin Ribao , 18 September 1980; "Zhang Pinghua's Speech to Cadres in the Cultural Field," Issues and Studies , December 1978, pp. 97–118.

people than needed, avoiding decision-making, not caring about efficiency, irresponsibility, betraying trust, adding red tape, behaving destructively, retaliating against others, suppressing democracy, cheating superiors and subordinates, taking bribes, and accumulating wealth.^[2]

These problems stemmed from the structure of the bureaucracy in which the cadres were operating as well as the characteristics of the cadres themselves.^[3]

The Bureaucratic Setting

As shown in table 30, the bureaucratic machinery that the CCP had developed after 1949 and prior to the reforms was not only gigantic and unwieldy, but also highly stratified, with eight layers from the central government down to an individual in the rural area. Within each level was another set of layers. For instance, between the municipal government and individual workers were five administrative layers including the municipal government, the commission, the bureau, the corporation, and the factory.

Moreover, at each level there were and are several parallel bureaucracies: party, government, military, judiciary, and political consultative conference. Within the party and government, internal structures were further theoretically divided between executives and representative organs: secretaries, several committees, functional bureaus, and party congresses. Government organs at each level had similar units. In addition, about 392,500 industrial enterprises, as well as 1 million business units, were under the jurisdiction of the party-state organs at different levels. Some of them were directly under the jurisdiction of central government units, while others answered to the provincial or local authorities. Many of these units were under dual leadership of the upper echelon's bureau (tiaotiao ) and of the local government (kuaikuai ).

Within the bureaucracy political authority was highly centralized. The Leninist principle of democratic centralism created a pseudo-military command structure, with authority flowing from

[2] Renmin Ribao , 2 November 1981.

[3] For structural problems of the Chinese bureaucracy, see Harry Harding, Organizing China; The Problems of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981).

the Politburo down to the secretary of each party cell. Each level had a well-defined authority, responsibility, and task, but their authorities and responsibilities were not guaranteed by laws and rules. A higher authority could always encroach upon the jurisdiction of the lower level. Despite the various illegal and unofficial means (mainly passive) for resisting the higher authority, the organizational structure effectively allowed authority to flow from the center to the individual level.

All offices and cadres have well-defined rankings (see fig. 2). The uniform wage grade system of 1956 classified all cadres—from central to basic levels—into thirty grades, ranging from the top three grades for party and state chairmen and premiers, to the bottom grades for service personnel in party-state organs.^[4] Although

[4] Workers were classified into eight grades. Technical cadres—school teachers, public health workers, and scientists—had several different sets of wage scales ranging from 1 to 13, or 20. Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renshi Zhidu Gaiyao (Beijing: Beijing Dafue Chubanshe, 1985), 267–313.

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initially designed only for wage scales, the grade system codified the distribution of power and prestige within the gigantic bureaucracy. Each enterprise and business unit had, and still has, a ranking equivalent to some territorial unit. A university may be at the ministry level; in that case it would enjoy the administrative rights of ministry-level units in such areas as personnel, financing, and communication with other units. Usually research institutes corresponded to the county level, and the leaders of such an institute were considered county-level cadres, with all the appropriate privileges.

The immense size and hierarchy of the Chinese bureaucracy accentuated such well-known malaises of any large bureaucracy as leakage of authority, disputes over jurisdiction, displacement of goals, and inefficiency. There were several additional factors unique to the Chinese bureaucracy that further aggravated these problems.

The Chinese bureaucracy monopolizes political authority while not being accountable to anyone—except to top political leaders, who derive their authority from the offices they hold within the bureaucracy. The series of social revolutions—such as land reform, collectivization, the peaceful transformation of industry, and the antirightist campaign—completely eliminated any social force that could check on the bureaucracy. No forums where political issues could be discussed existed outside the party-state apparatus. Although the party-state and other mass organizations could be nominally distinguished, in reality mass organizations existed only as a "transmission belt." Despite the official position that the bureaucracy is the instrument of the proletarian dictatorship, the theoretically dominant groups do not have any direct control over the bureaucracy.

The scope of activities that the bureaucracy regulated was comprehensive and inclusive. In other words, the entire society was bureaucratized. All Chinese belong to a unit (danwei ), each of which is organized to be as self-sufficient as possible ("big and complete, small and complete"—da er chuan, xiao er chuan ). For example, each unit managed a wide range of support facilities for its members, such as dining halls, motor pools, repair teams, hotels, printing shops, health clinics, kindergartens, nursery schools, barber shops, bath houses, and retail shops (see table 31). Approx-

imately 25 percent of all personnel are employed in support services,^[5] but the regime plans to reduce them to 15 percent.^[6] It is said that Chinese universities have almost everything for their members' needs except a cemetery. The unit takes care of "one person's entire life from birth to death, clothing, eating, living, activities, studying culture [wenhua ], and participating in labor; there is nothing that is unrelated to the administration."^[7] Within each unit, the division of labor, specialization, and professionalization of its members are minimal, largely because of Mao's worry that functional specialization would lead to the restratification of Chinese society.

The idea of organizing each unit to be self-sufficient can also be traced back to guerrilla warfare practice. During the war period, state organs, associations, military units, and schools were dispersed in rural areas, moving around according to the changing

[5] Jingji Fazhan Yu Tizhi Gaige , no. 7, 1986, 7–12.

[6] Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 4, 1986, 13.

[7] Zheng Zhi Yu Zhengzhi Kexue (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 1984), 95.

battle situation. Consequently, every unit had to have personnel to take care of the needs of the entire unit.^[8] The practice continued after 1949, largely because of Mao's commitment to egalitarianism, his dislike of the division of labor and functions, his admiration of simplistic collectivism, and the regime's reluctance to use market mechanisms for the flow of information, materials, and service. Moreover, in Mao's, view an organization and a community were indistinguishable. The organization replaced the community (xiang ), the village became the brigade and production team, and the work unit became the basis for the residential community.

Organizing the entire society along the lines of "big and complete, small and complete" results in inefficiency and bloated personnel. For example, when all the printing shops in society are operating two or three shifts, many government printing facilities sit idle. Higher educational institutions cannot increase student enrollment because of shortages in dormitory facilities. Adding one additional car requires a new driver and support, such as housing for his family. Any cadre fired from his job loses all his support base.

In 1983, the Secretariat suggested the socialization of state support works, that is, the transfer of support works to independent enterprises, which will be managed according to economic principles by providing services to other clients. Many, however, are extremely reluctant to give their support work to independent units because "when the service industry in society is not ideal, support personnel are more important than the cadre."^[9]

This kind of organizational structure does not allow much room for individuals to make decisions, but it grants a wide scope of power to the unit. Each unit makes decisions not only on matters pertaining to its tasks, but also on issues relating to the private lives of the unit members from birth to death. Theoretically, members of a unit own the unit. But in reality, it is the unit which owns the members. In turn, cadres who are officially responsible for managing the unit virtually own it.

Collectivization theoretically means collective ownership by peasants, but in reality "collective ownership" means that the collective owns

[8] Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 11, 1986, 16–18.

[9] Jingji Fazhan Yu Tizhi Gaige , no. 7, 1986, 7–12.

us peasants as well as the resources we work on. The cadres who control the collective then do whatever they please with our lives. They behave no differently from the local bullies we heard so much about from the recall-bitterness accounts of our fathers. However, the strongmen of the 1930s and 1940s had no legitimate claim on the peasants, who regarded them as excesses of the traditional society. The cadres, on the other hand, enjoy the total authority given to them by the socialist system. Chairman Mao once said that the scriptures were good, only that they had from time to time been recited by priests with crooked mouths. I wonder about these scriptures; it seems that they have distorted the mouths instead.^[10]

The Chinese bureaucracy was highly politicized. Mao's idea of "politics in command" implies that no area of human activity should be left outside the political realm. Every decision, whether it is political, economic, or social, is of a political nature. Thus, political criteria—rising from the perspective of class struggle—should be used in making decisions. No other consideration, either of ethics or of unique laws governing the specific field, should be taken into account when the decision is made. "Politics in command" provided the bureaucracy with ample justification for the command style of work, which refused to be restrained by any objective law governing separate functional fields.

The combined effect of this hierarchy, inclusive functions, and politicization of the Chinese bureaucracy was minimal lateral contact between units. Most of the coordination and interaction of units on the same level had to be channeled through a superior authority, which administratively allocated most necessary resources, finances, and services to subordinate units, thereby minimizing the need for communications or interactions among units or individuals belonging to different units. In other words, the regime relied on political coordination while neglecting functional coordination and coordination based on exchanges. In turn, the absence of functional coordination further encouraged each unit to pursue self-sufficiency in every aspect, acting like an independent kingdom. Any kind of work that required interoffice coordination

[10] Helen Siu, "Collective Economy, Authority, and Political Power in Rural China," in Myron J. Aronoff, ed., The Frailty of Authority (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1986).

required several months because every office wanted to "research and research" and "discuss and discuss."

In addition, the party ordinarily maintains tight control over administrative as well as other functional bureaucracies, rendering meaningless organizational distinctions among the party, the state, enterprise units, and business units. The party not only has its own bureaucratic hierarchy paralleling the state structure, but it also penetrates every formal organization and institution. Party members hold key positions in government as well as in economic and social organizations. Most cadres, particularly leading ones, were party members subject to party command. Within the party bureaucracy, power gradually became concentrated in the hands of the first secretary, with party committees and congresses acting merely as rubber stamps. When the regime stressed collective decision-making, the bureaucratic system encountered a different kind of problem.

Because of the idea of collective decision-making, numerous meetings are held. But often no decision is made, and even already decided policy is seldom implemented at the lower levels. Middle-level bureaucrats simply copy instructions from above and transmit them below. Documents are numerous, but concrete directives are very few, and the cadres do not understand the situation at the lower levels. Not all staff members attend to their work. When a general meeting of leaders is called, less than half of them attend. Even those who attend are divided in their opinions and engage in endless discussion, so that the problems remain unresolved. As for really handling matters, they just take turns signing their names on the documents and expressing their opinions, so that it takes a lot of time to circulate the documents among them. If something concerns their gains and losses, or if they are held responsible for it, it would take even more time for them to pass the documents from one to another.^[11]

Although power was concentrated at the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and the bureaucracy regulated all aspects of an individual's life, the Chinese political process has never been highly institutionalized. Low-level institutionalization of the Chinese bureaucracy granted the cadres enormous discretionary power,

[11] Xuexi Lundan , no. 2, 1983, 20.

thereby allowing them to employ their personal and idiosyncratic features in performing their official duties.

In addition, some Chinese administrative practices further increased the cadres' power. The official guidelines on any policy have always been broad and ambiguous, leaving a great deal of leeway for leading cadres at each level. Although its intended purpose was to enable the cadres to incorporate the concrete conditions of the localities in the process of policy implementation, they could easily exploit that leeway for personal gain or for local interests.

Moreover, Chinese administrative practice was to keep cadres for a long time in one position—known as the "life-tenure system"—which can be traced back to three factors. First, senior Chinese cadres are the first generation of revolutionaries who believed that "those who contributed to the revolution are justified in becoming cadres." Second, due to the unavailability of employment opportunities outside the inclusive state structure, the regime has no way of disposing of excessive personnel after a reduction in the bureaucracy or of cadres who have finished their terms. Third, the socialist state is responsible for the cadres, regardless of whether they are on active duty or not.

Although such a system provides long-term security and employment, it also produces a waste of talent, frustration, dependency, and a loss of initiative. Serving at one post for a long time may make leading cadres familiar with their own units, but it also helps develop "complicated human networks" involving superiors, colleagues, subordinates, and family members, making it easy for leading cadres to "privatize" their formal authority, while forming a "leading strata" quite separate from ordinary people throughout China.^[12] As Andrew Walder succinctly demonstrates, the leading cadres frequently exploited their formal authority to reward the obedient while penalizing the disobedient, thus developing elaborate patronage networks.^[13]

Even if we assume that many leading cadres have been exercising their formal authority impartially and justly according to the

[12] This is why many family members work in the same unit. Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 7, 1986, 25; no. 6, 1987, 34.

[13] Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

intention of official guidelines, the mere fact that they have jurisdiction on innumerable matters crucially relevant to the daily life of ordinary people indicates that the Chinese masses were highly dependent on administrative decisions. Since power in an organizational setting can be defined in terms of the "structural phenomenon of dependency," whether or not cadres made decisions in line with the wishes and best interests of members of the unit had no bearing on the power imbalance between cadres and the masses.^[14]

Furthermore, there was not much room for individuals to challenge the formal authority exercised by bureaucrats of the party-state in their own units. Any challenge to an individual leader is considered a challenge to the party-state, because, as the work teams during the CR argued, individual leaders could claim to represent the party committee, and the lower-level party committee could claim to represent the higher party authority. Thus, any challenge to a unit leader becomes criticism of that individual leader's unit and is often construed as a challenge to the authority of the party-state. No mechanism to check abuse of power by the cadres has been formalized. Mass participation in political campaigns, leadership participation in labor, and criticism and self-criticism became rituals without having much impact on the operation of the overall structure.

In sum, the structural characteristics of the Chinese bureaucracy were not conducive to the democratization of human relations in China. On the contrary, the unique features of the Chinese bureaucracy allowed the cadres to wield an unprecedented amount of power as agents of the party-state. The cadres were not only the implementors of policy decisions but also the policy formulators in a country where there was no distinction between politician and bureaucrat.^[15] High-level cadres often exercised the formal authority of the party and the party-state and formulated official policies. When the absence of strong leaders such as Stalin or Mao allowed the Leninist Party to make decisions according to "democratic centralism," the preference of the lower level cadres were bound to

[14] Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organization (Boston: Pitman, 1981).

[15] For the distinction between politicians and the bureaucrats, see Joel D. Aber-bach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

influence the policy choices of the party-state. In this process the cadres' experiences, perceptions, and values are bound to be reflected in their policy preferences. In other words, the organizational structure of the Chinese bureaucracy reinforced, rather than modified, the persistent traditional way of thinking on the part of the cadres and the ordinary masses.

It is ironic—and tragic for China—that the CCP's efforts to remove all sources of exploitation and inequality have resulted in the new system of units (danwei ), which probably limits freedom and mobility more than traditional institutions. In traditional China, such diverse institutions as class, kinship, and community, at least, allowed each individual to identify with many different groups. But in socialist China, the practice of organizing each unit—which has its own rankings as ministry-level unit or county-level unit—to be self-sufficient in meeting most of its members' social needs, an interesting combination of the "life-tenure system" with the practice of "unit ownership" has allowed the traditional social networks and practices to enter in the operation of the unit, thus perpetuating the "feudal mentality" of the cadres. As many Chinese scholars insist, this feudal mentality is in part derived from traditional Chinese culture and in part reinforced by the "peasant mentality of the cadres," many of whom are from the poorest groups in the rural areas. But it should also be pointed out that the organizational structure in China has been as much responsible for the feudal mentality of the cadres as resilient Chinese cultural tradition. The most urgent agenda for political reform in China is the development of a new organizational structure which, instead of reinforcing the traditional political culture, will be conducive to producing a modern outlook in cadres. Without the structural changes of "department ownership," the "life-tenure system," and "big and complete, and small and complete," the feudal mentality of the cadres and the ordinary people will continue.

Growth and Distribution of Cadres

To staff this gigantic bureaucracy, China developed about 20 million cadres by 1982 and 29 million by 1988 (see table 32). The size of the cadre corps increased steadily after 1949. In 1958, the ratio of

cadres to citizens was 1:80, but it reached 1:50 in 1982. It grew by more than 370 percent from 1952 to 1982, whereas the number of people working in the administrative sector only doubled in the same period.^[16] The most rapid increase occurred between 1971 and 1973, when the CR rebels were becoming cadres, whereas temporary decreases took place after the 1953 party rectification (for those employed in state and mass organs), the 1957–58 simplification of the administration, and the initial stages of the CR.

Although we do not know how the total number of cadres employed in the states were distributed by party and government organs, the table of organization the regime is setting up indicates that about 14 percent of the total authorized personnel in state organs are party cadres, 5 percent are mass organization, and 5 percent are other.^[17]

The regime has managed successfully to limit the size of the State Council, although its size fluctuates largely with political movements and economic centralization and decentralization.^[18] Nonetheless, the number of cadres at the provincial, district, municipal, and county levels has increased steadily, regardless of the decentralization and recentralization of economic decision-making authority (see table 33). In 1949 the regime decreed that an average-sized provincial government should have approximately 600 cadres spread over twenty offices. But the actual numbers of provincial cadres swelled rapidly. For example, Hubei province had 4,000 cadres by 1961, more than six times the originally approved ceiling; this number increased to 5,692 by the time of the CR and to 8,600 by 1982. The growth was particularly rapid immediately following the purge of the Gang of Four.^[19] By 1983, the authorized manpower ceiling for Hubei increased to 6,000 persons with an eighty-office limit.^[20]

The increase at district and municipal levels paralleled the

[16] The administrative sector refers to the party, government, and mass organizations in the 1982 census.

[17] Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 4, 1986, 10–13.

[18] Guowuyuan Bangongting Diaocha Yanjiushi, ed., Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanlixue Chutan (Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 1984), 45–54. The number of economic enterprises and business units directly under the State Council increased from 1,260 in 1978 to 2,680 in 1981. Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 5, 1987, 27.

[19] Shijian , no. 2, 1982, 16–17.

[20] Shehui Kexue Dongtai (Hubei), no. 11, 10 April 1983.

growth at the provincial level. Before the CR, the first-class organs of the Inner Mongolian municipalities averaged between 500 and 600 people, but by 1982, there were 1,400.^[21] In the early 1950s district governments started with only 100 people in six or seven sections, but by 1985 they had about 1,000 cadres in forty to fifty offices. The pattern at the county level was no different. The Taiku county government had 195 people in 25 units—with only one magistrate and four deputy magistrates—in 1956. However, by 1961, its personnel numbered 431.^[22] The purge and administrative simplification carried out under the official slogan "unified leadership" during the CR reduced the number of county-level government employees to one-tenth of the pre-CR strength in some places.^[23] However, after the fall of the Gang of Four, county governments first regained and then went beyond their pre-CR numbers and in many places doubled their cadre size.^[24]

One of the most important factors in the proliferation of offices and the population explosion among cadres was the expanding role of the party-state, particularly in the economic arena. As China developed into a complex society and the state's functions expanded economically, the number of the organs increased.^[25] For example, offices in the State Council dealing with such administrative works as foreign affairs, political-legal work, and education changed very little over time, but the number of offices in the economic arena fluctuated widely. In 1952, there were thirty-two organs dealing with finance and economics in the State Council, the number increasing to 66 by 1981.^[26] Similar patterns could be seen in Beijing and Shanghai: the growth rate of administrative offices has been quite modest, but the number of offices handling economic questions increased almost 2,000 percent between 1949 and 1982. Social services offices, including education (wenjia ), city planning, and environment, also increased drastically. In 1955,

[21] Xuexi Lundan , no. 2, 1983, 20.

[22] Zhengzhi yu Zhengzhi Kexue , 168–86.

[23] For the impact of the CR on the county-level administration, see Renmin Ribao , 30 March 1968; 19 July 1968; 20 July 1968. See also Zuguo Yuekan , no. 56, 1 November 1968.

[24] Zhengzhi yu Zhengzhi Kexue , 168–86; Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , nos. 4–5, 1986.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Dongyan Lunzhong (Jinan), no. 6, 1984, 27–30.

about one-fourth of county government staff dealt with the economy; the current figure is approximately two-thirds.^[27]

Also China's practice of the "iron rice bowl" system, while failing to set up an effective retirement system until recently, further contributed to the increase in cadres.^[28] Every political campaign increased the number of bureaucrats by promoting campaign activists to cadre positions. And those dismissed from their positions as a result of the campaigns were usually fewer than those newly recruited. Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation policy further aggravated the bloated bureaucracy. As noted, he reinstated all of the dismissed cadres, but he did not thoroughly rid the cadres who had come in during or after CR, partly because he did not want to repeat Mao's mistake of carrying out a large-scale purge and partly because he did not have enough power.^[29]

The Chinese bureaucracy was not only huge in size but also top heavy with "responsible persons." According to the 1982 census, the nationwide total of responsible cadres in party, government, and industrial enterprises and business units came to 8,130,987. This means that 1.56 percent of all employed people in China and 39 percent of the 21 million cadres had managerial duties^[30] (see table 34). Another Chinese source reveals that there were 5.4 million cadres with the rank of county magistrate and deputy magistrate; among them the number of administrative cadres with ranks higher than deputy division director (fu chuzhang ) of a county was about 450,000.^[31] CR rehabilitation further aggravated the situation. Since most of the purged cadres' former positions had been filled

[27] For the numbers of the different types of offices in Shanghai and Beijing in 1949 and 1982, see Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 1, 1986, 3.

[28] Michel Oksenberg, "Exit Patterns from Chinese Politics and Its Implications," China Quarterly , no. 67, September 1976, 501–18.

[29] Zhengzhi yu Zhengzhi Kexue , 168–86.

[30] Responsible persons of the state and other organs included: (1) those at the central level—the National People's Congress, the supreme court, the attorney general's office, the State Council, and all ministries, commissions, bureaus, offices, and other organs; 2) those at the provincial level—people's congresses, people's courts, people's procurators, people's governments, and various departments, bureaus, and other organs; (3) those at the district, municipality, and county levels—people's congresses, people's courts, people's prosecutor, people's governments, and bureaus and other sections. The term "responsible person" in parties and mass organs refers to leading cadres in each sector. Zhiye Fenlei Biaozhun (Beijing: Guojia Tongji Ju, March 1982).

[31] Song Zhending, ed., Dangdai Ganbu Baike (Tianjin: Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), 1405.

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by new people, the regime simply created more deputy positions to accommodate the rehabilitated.

In many departments or units, posts are created to suit the officials, so that there is a great number of deputies and nominal directors. Some bureaus have staffs of only a few dozen people but more than ten directors and deputy directors—in addition to numerous section chiefs, deputy chiefs and office directors. So only a few of the staff members are "secretaries" in charge of concrete work.^[32]

The ministry of metallurgy had twenty-seven vice ministers by 1982.^[33]

As shown in table 35, over two-thirds (68.3 percent) of this rather large group of so-called responsible persons were employed in industrial enterprises and business units; 16 percent were leaders of party organs, the size almost equivalent to the total number of government leaders at the central, provincial, and county levels. But comparing the numbers of leaders at the central and middle levels with those in the party organs may be misleading because the category of leading party cadres included leaders in the enterprises and business units. However, given the fact that a person holding both an administrative and a party position was required to report only one position in the census, the number of reported responsible persons in the party was probably on the low side. It is worth noting that the leading cadres at the middle level—district, municipal, and county—constituted 90 percent of all responsible persons in government organs.

In speaking of individual industries, if one assumes that the ratio of leaders to people in each sector is indicative of the party-state's control over the sector, the weakest area by 1982 was agriculture, where there was only one leader for every 1,000 persons (see table 35). By contrast, almost one-quarter of all those employed in the administrative sector were considered responsible. In other fields, the proportion ranges from 3 percent in construction to 15 percent in service industries. The ratio between leading cadres and workers employed in service industries is misleading as an indicator of the party-state's control, because most of the lead-

[32] Daily Report , 2 March 1982, R4–6; Renmin Ribao , 19 September 1980; 19 September 1980.

[33] Asian Economics (Japanese), no. 53, 6 March 1982, 61.

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ing cadres in that sector were managers. The ratio between all those employed and the party's leading cadres in the service sector was only 0.1 percent, the second lowest after the agriculture sector (0.013 percent). This sector had only one party leading cadre for every 10,000 persons employed, but in the administrative sector, there were 5.5 leading cadres for every 100 persons. These data again support the idea that the party maintained a tight control over the state organ.

In each province studied (table 36), the total number of cadres appears to approximate the number of people employed in the administrative sector, responsible persons, and the technical cadres.^[34] I have tried to identify factors influencing the size of the cadre group in each province, using the T-test. The only significant correlations were between responsible persons as a percentage of the provincial and urban populations (P = 0.003; coefficient = 0.024), and the proportion of students in institutions of higher education (P = 0.045; coefficient = 0.08). Other variables such as gross national product, degree of industrialization, urbanization, level of education, number of hospital beds, and length of highways, railways, and waterways showed no significant correlations with the number of cadres or responsible persons.^[35]

Age

A cadre's age can be considered in two ways: his chronological age and his revolutionary age, that is, how long he has been a party member. Because most postliberation cadres joined the party after graduating from school, there is often no reason to prefer revolutionary age over chronological age because they are usually very close to each other.

The mean age of responsible persons was 44.9 years old (see table 37), which was the second highest mean age among the eigh-

[34] There is some overlapping among these cadres; for instance, some of the responsible cadres might have been counted twice because some of them are employed in all three—the state, party, and mass organs. The same might be true with the technical cadres. Also, one has to deduct blue-collar workers employed in the state, party, and mass organs.

[35] For provincial data, State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China (1983).

ty occupational categories used in the 1982 census (the highest was 55.4 years for those in religious occupations). Responsible persons employed in state organs had the highest mean age (46.6 years) among leading cadres. For those in party and mass organizations it was about 44.6 years. Since the category "responsible persons in party and mass organs" included the Communist Youth League and other mass organizations, the average age of a responsible person in a party organ was likely to be higher than that of his counterpart in a government agency. Leading cadres were 5.5 years older than cadres employed in the administrative sector (including some leading cadres in the sector). The age group of fifty-five and over constituted only 5 percent of all those employed, but about 13 percent of responsible cadres belonged to that group.

The mean age of responsible cadres was twelve years greater

than that of the entire work force. According to one Chinese source, about 36 percent of the 21 million cadres were under 35; cadres belonging to the group between 36 and 45 years old constituted 6.8 million; between 46 and 56, 5.4 million; and 6 percent were above 56.^[36] The number of the last category is close for all cadres who began work before 1949 and who are now eligible for special retirement (lixiu ). Men between 35 and 54, who made up 33 percent of the Chinese work force, occupied 74 percent of the responsible cadre positions. Males who were 25 to 30 comprised 16 percent of all those employed, but they accounted for only 12 percent of cadres in the administrative sector and only 4 percent of "the responsible personnel." Undoubtedly, the cadres, particularly the leading cadres, were older than the general population.

Generally speaking, the generations of cadres parallel the bureaucratic hierarchy. Most of the old cadres who joined the revolution before 1949 are believed to be above grade 18 at the moment. This was due largely to the absence of a retirement system and an emphasis on seniority in personnel management. Because of the absence of an effective retirement system, all those who had previously become officials remained in the bureaucracy. Only death or a purge removed them.^[37] The seniority system helped cadres (presumably with little ability or tangible achievements) to move up further in the hierarchy.

In terms of revolutionary age, the most senior group of cadres was the Long March generation, followed by the anti-Japanese war generation and then by the civil war generation. Members of the Long March generation such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian were all well over seventy and still remained at the highest level in 1982. The anti-Japanese war generation includes Zhao Zhiyang and Hua Guofeng, who joined the party in the late 1930s. Most of the rehabilitated cadres in the central government also joined the revolutionary movement prior to the civil war. If we assume that the average age of the land reform generation was twenty in 1950, most are now in their sixties.

Before the 1982 bureaucratic reforms, the highest positions in the party were held by a gerontocracy. The average age of the six

[36] Song, ed., Dangdai Ganbu Baike , 1405.

[37] Oksenberg, "Exit Patterns."

Politburo members in 1980 was seventy, and the average age of the premier and sixteen vice premiers was sixty-nine.^[38] According to a 1980 magazine article, "In some provinces the average age of secretaries and deputy secretaries is in the sixties; the percentage of district and municipal committees where the leading cadres' average exceeds sixty is over 20 percent." The age problem at the county level was as serious as at the provincial level: "The average age of leading cadres is over fifty-six in a significant percentage of counties. Because of their advanced age, many cadres cannot work eight hours every day; they are often in the hospital for treatment or recuperation."^[39] Nearly two-thirds of the county-level cadres in Beijing were older than sixty.^[40] Yuanping county reported that 614 (44.5 percent) of their 1,378 cadres were between fifty and sixty. Only 130 (9.4 percent) were younger than forty.^[41]

Education

As for the educational background of the 21 million cadres, official Chinese sources reported that as many as 19 percent of them (4 million) were college graduates, and only 40 percent finished junior high school or less.^[42] Another source reported in 1987 that 29 percent of the 21 million cadres have a college-level education (6 million), 26 percent a high-school-level education, and 45 percent an educational level lower than junior high school.^[43] These figures, particularly those for college-level educations, are obviously inflated, since the current official policy of emphasizing education led the cadres to inflate their level. Nonetheless, it is amazing that about one-half of China's cadre corps had educational levels lower than junior high school.

The low level was largely due to a structural problem—the absolute shortage of educated manpower. In 1982 only eight out of 1,000 employees had a college education. When the CCP liberated the

[38] Feijing Yuebao , 10(22) April 1980, 19–22.

[39] Hong Qi , no. 11, 1980, 3.

[40] Beijing Ribao , 27 June 1981.

[41] Zhengzhi yu Zhengzhi Kexue , 168–86.

[42] That 4 million cadres are college graduates is theoretically correct because all college graduates are allocated by the party-state and start their jobs as low-level cadres.

[43] Song, Dangdai Ganbu Baike , 1403.

country in 1949, the total number of college graduates in the entire country was less than 210,000, including the 10,000 who had studied abroad. Between 1949 and 1984, China produced 4.11 million college graduates and 41,800 postgraduates, of whom about 34,000 had been abroad to study.^[44] The CR, according to a Chinese official calculation, cost China about 100,000 postgraduate students, 1 million college graduates, and 2 million graduates of specialized middle schools.^[45]

The scarce resource of educated manpower was not distributed equally by sector, level, or hierarchy. There is a close correlation between age and level of education: the older the person is, the less likely he or she will have a higher-level education (see table 38). Administrative reform intended to tap the educational potential of the younger age groups.

As noted, high-ranking cadres are older than low-ranking ones. Apparently their educational level was also lower. The educational level of cadres employed in party organizations is lower than that of cadres working in state organizations. And the educational level of the leading cadres of the party organizations is particularly low.^[46] The Chinese aptly described the problem as "one high and one low"—high in age and low in education. The fragmentary information we can glean from official news media paints a vivid picture of the problems caused by cadres' lack of education: "There is not a single college graduate among the first secretaries in some provinces, districts, and counties. In some provinces and counties a large number of the top leaders have a cultural level equivalent only to primary school."^[47]

According to 1982 census data, only 6 percent of all employees in the administrative sector had a college-level education, and as many as 19 percent had fewer than six years of formal education. But the 6 percent of the college graduates in administration was 12 percent of all holders of bachelor's degrees that China had pro-

[44] Among them, 9,106 had studied in the Soviet Union. Guanghuai de Chengjiu [Glorious Achievement], (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 2:407.

[45] For educated personnel see Renkuo Bucha 10% Chuyang Ziliao (Beijing: Guowuyan Renkuo Bucha Bangongshi, 1982).

[46] For instance, only 1.2 percent of the intellectuals in Qinghai and 0.9 percent of all intellectuals in China are employed in the party organizations. Shehui Kexue Cankao (Qinghai), 20 July 1986, 11. Eight percent of the leading cadres in state organizations have a college-level education, but only 4 percent of the leading cadres in party organizations have this level of education.

[47] Renmin Ribao , 24 September 1980.

duced since 1949. The overall educational level of responsible persons was lower than those employed in the administrative sector: 5.7 percent of responsible persons were college graduates, and 21 percent of them were high school graduates in contrast to 31 percent of the administrative sector. Of the leading cadres, 71 percent had an educational level of junior high school or below, compared with 60 percent of those employed in the party-state.

Since the responsible persons category included some specialized cadres who had more education than the leading cadres in the administrative sector, the educational level of the leading administrative cadres might be lower than the average educational level of the responsible persons. Among the 450,000 leading administrative cadres at the county level and above, 230,000 (51 percent) had less than a junior high school education.^[48] Particularly low was the educational level of political cadres, especially those at the basic level. According to one source, about 60–80 percent had educational levels lower than junior high school.^[49] It seems that the quality of administrative cadres had not improved very much since 1955, because, according to one estimate, out of 3.8 million administrative cadres in 1955, 4 percent were college graduates, 34 percent had completed junior high school, and roughly 50 percent had fewer than nine years of education.^[50]

Of 260,000 functional cadres (yewu ganbu ) working in economic planning, 21 percent had a college-level education, much higher than the average of the whole cadre crops.^[51] Among the leading cadres of Inner Mongolia's municipalities and counties, only 5.6 percent were college or specialized middle-school graduates. Political cadres at the municipal and county levels were less educated. Among all the standing committee members of Inner Mongolia's municipalities and districts, there were only two college graduates, twenty senior high school graduates, and ninety-six junior high school graduates.^[52] In such economically advanced provinces as

[48] By contrast, 45 percent of 5.4 million cadres of the same ranks, which include functional cadres, had an educational level lower than junior high school. Song, Dangdai Ganbu Baike , 1405.

[49] Guangming Ribao , 22 May 1982.

[50] U.S. Department of Commerce, Administrative and Technical Manpower in the People's Republic of China , International Population Reports, Series P-95, no. 72, Washington, D.C., 1976, 12.

[51] Jingji Jihua Yenjiu , 25 May 1983, 30–32.

[52] Shijian , no. 9, 1982, 19–21.

Zhejiang, the cadres were somewhat better educated: 8.4 percent of standing committee members, county magistrates, and deputy magistrates had a college-level education.^[53] In contrast, Anhui province reported that of the 129 leading cadres in its twelve counties only one was a college graduate (0.7 percent); there were four graduates of specialized middle schools (3.1 percent) and seventeen high school graduates (13 percent). Some districts in the province had no college graduates.^[54]

The situation in the rural areas was worse. According to one estimate, there was one college graduate for every ten communes; and there were an average of 3.7 scientific cadres for every 10,000 peasants. The educational system could not produce enough professionally competent people to replace the existing cadre corps. There were 380,000 state-owned enterprises, but only 20,000 students in all the finance and accounting colleges. Even with a full graduating class (5,000 graduates per year) it would take seventy-six years before there were enough graduates to assign one to every state enterprise.^[55]

The difference in years of schooling for agricultural workers and administrative employees was 4.4 years: 4.0 years versus 8.4 years (table 39). Those employed in the administrative sector tended to have more education than responsible persons, though their 8.4 years was not much greater than that of the responsible persons (leaders) 7.9. And the difference between leading cadres and industrial workers was only 1.2 years, or 7.9 years to 6.7. Scientific researchers and teachers were better educated than responsible persons. They had 13.8 and 10.3 years, respectively.

The cadres' ignorance and poor education made them submissive to superiors, carrying out irrational orders blindly. Although incumbents claimed to have "rich practical experience and familiarity with [their] work," their lack of formal schooling made it impossible for them to raise their "practical experience to the level of scientific knowledge."

Their reliance on experience and their inability to comprehend the internal logic of matters often produced undesirable and unintended consequences. For example, Linzhou district has a large number of

[53] Zhejiang Ribao , 25 November 1983.

[54] Xinxiang Pinglun (Anhui), no. 7, 1980, 5–7.

[55] Renmin Ribao , 24 September 1980.

mountains and its forest is big, and that is to our advantage. But because the cadres did not understand the interdependency of forestry and agriculture, which promoted each other dialectically, and they did not understand the scientific notion of equilibrium in ecology, they carried out a policy of "taking grain as the key" for a long time. The result was the destruction of forests without any rise in grain production. Thus, an advantage was turned into a disadvantage, and weakness replaced strength. At the same time, their low educational level, their limited knowledge, and their narrow views made them slow to accept new things and move away from their ossified ideology. The same conditions made them comfortable with the old work style of issuing an administrative order and then "cutting everything with one knife" in violation of the laws of nature.^[56]

With so little education to go around, it is not surprising that specialized professional knowledge is often wanting. According to Huzhu county in Qinghai province, none of its forty-two cadres in the court system had studied law. Stories of absurd episodes caused by ignorance abound.

[56] Ibid.

10
Preparation for Cadre Reform

After the rehabilitated cadre group managed to make the Four Modernizations the regime's major goal, it became increasingly evident that not only the existing cadre corps (including the rehabilitated cadres) but also Mao's five conditions for selecting cadres were not adequate for the new tasks. Nonetheless, any effort to reform the existing cadre corps was bound to offend the political interests of various cadre groups, including the veteran cadres whom Deng Xiaoping relied on for political support. Therefore, Deng approached the leadership changes cautiously, opting for a realistic alternative, in contrast to Mao's extreme policy, which aimed at bringing about wholesale change in the leadership through the mass mobilization during the CR. He first changed the criteria for personnel management from political loyalty to the ability to further economic development. Departing from the Maoist practice of purging incumbents in order to create vacancies, Deng devised a special retirement system—lixiu —which enabled senior veteran cadres to retire with honor and privileges, and then relied on organizational methods to remove the CR radicals from cadre positions.

Changing Criteria for Cadre Recruitment

Hua Guofeng originally envisioned very limited personnel changes both in the purge of the Gang of Four's followers and in the rehabilitation of the victims of past political purges. While Hua and his group were still in power, official discussion of cadre recruitment reflected Mao's line: the news media continued to uphold his five conditions for revolutionary successors, while arguing that the Gang of Four had distorted Mao's cadre line for their own political gain.^[1]

[1] For instance, see Renmin Ribao , 24 August 1978.

However, after 1978, ability and productivity were frequently mentioned as important qualities for cadres. For instance, Renmin Ribao , on 2 March 1978, proposed five criteria for leaders: (1) support of the pragmatic policy of revolutionary cadres, (2) party spirit, (3) personal integrity, (4) ability, and (5) understanding the real-life conditions of the masses. Commitment to revolution was dropped from the requirements, and the only obvious political criterion was support for the struggle against the Gang of Four. Mao's emphasis on a cooperative spirit and adherence to the mass line was retained, but with a slightly modified sense: requiring cadres to be concerned with the masses' hardships is more specific then merely emphasizing the mass line. The former underscores the masses' real needs, whereas the latter emphasis allowed leaders to impose their own views upon the masses. In addition, new conditions specifically included work ability, party spirit—whatever that meant—and personality. Once this definition became official, it allowed a shift of emphasis from political criteria to work-related ones.

The news media soon became more explicit in saying that cadres had to have functional knowledge. For instance, the "Rules of Inner-Party Life" that the party adopted to guide its members rejected the slogan, "Outsiders can lead insiders," calling instead for every cadre to possess some practical knowledge.^[2] Deng Xiaoping personally endorsed the idea in a speech in January 1980: "Regardless of position, every [cadre] has to have a certain amount of specialized knowledge and work ability in a functional field. Those without such knowledge must study. Those with some amount must continue to study. Those who cannot or are not willing to study must be changed."^[3]

At the same time, the regime stepped up criticism of the Gang of Four for having exclusively emphasized "class status" while discriminating against any cadre with "bad class background," "complicated social relations," or "historical problems." The official decision to do away with the label "rightist" and abolish the term "four bad class elements" made it theoretically possible to recruit cadres

[2] Hong Qi , no. 6, 1980, 2–11.

[3] Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 208–24.

from all sectors of the Chinese population.^[4] While rejecting any political criteria, the new official line attached paramount importance to "ability" and "present performance," which in contrast to "past performance" refer exclusively to the expertise needed for economic development.^[5]

The emphasis on ability inevitably led to questions about the relationship between ability and "seniority" (zige ), which, although not officially sanctioned, was the most important factor in pre-CR personnel managment and in reinstating victims of the CR. The Gang of Four had challenged the emphasis on seniority by attacking veteran cadres as "revisionists." Now, seniority was again regarded as an obstacle to improving the personnel management system. For instance, an editorial in Renmin Ribao , entitled "Eliminate Seniority," rejected seniority as a criterion for personnel management on the grounds that although it reflected wisdom gained from experience to a certain extent, it was not the same as ability.^[6]

By the end of 1979, when the public debate on the slogan "Practice is the sole criterion for testing empirical truth" had substantially undermined Hua's power base, the top leadership felt confident enough to address the problem of aged cadres. The necessity to recruit and promote middle-aged and young cadres to leading positions was first publicly raised by Ye Jianying, the eighty-four-year-old chairman of the National People's Congress, who, as a senior member of the cadres and one who had stayed in power throughout the political upheavals, was known to stand neither wholly with the victims nor wholly with the beneficiaries of the CR.^[7] After Ye's speech the organizational department of the Central Committee convened a month-long conference attended by everyone of importance in the organizational field. Hu Yaobang transmitted Deng's instruction that the aim of organizational work should be changed to fit the task of modernization.^[8]

Although we have no eyewitness accounts of this meeting, it

[4] Renmin Ribao , 17 November 1978; Jiefang Ribao , 29 January 1979.

[5] Beijing Ribao , 27 February 1980.

[6] Renmin Ribao , 28 June 1980; 22 July 1980.

[7] Ibid., 30 September 1979.

[8] Ming Bao (Hong Kong), 29 October 1979.

must have mapped out a rather detailed policy for reforming the bureaucracy. Later Song Renqiong, the new director of the organizational department, explained the intended new policy of changing leadership, using age and formal education as the most important criteria.^[9] Hu Yaobang further elaborated this point by declaring, "[We should] recruit cadres from the graduates of colleges, middle schools, and specialized schools or equivalent ones. [We should] generally not directly select [cadres] from among workers and peasants who have little education."^[10]

Deng endorsed Hu's point in much-publicized speeches. Demanding that party leaders at the various levels select cadres primarily from the forty-to-forty-five-year-old age group, he said, "What do we mean when we talk about people around forty years old? They are the ones who entered college in the late 1950s. It has been thirty years since the founding of the nation. Those who graduated from college in the early 1960s are now forty to forty-five years old."^[11]

In another long speech at a Politburo meeting on 15 August 1980, Deng advanced the slogan of making the cadre corps "better educated, professionally more competent, and younger." Although it was obvious that many of the incumbent cadres could not meet these criteria, he did not include any grandfather clauses. Neither did he claim that there was any virtue in "redness" except for the need to "preserve the four principles"—upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought, the socialist road, the party's leadership, and the proletarian dictatorship.^[12] Deng's speech was sent to the lower levels with a note instructing them to forward their opinions before 15 October 1980. After his speech the news media began discussing ways to make the cadre corps fit Deng's criteria better.

With regard to promotion, the official news media recalled that in the past it had been Deng Xiaoping who had objected to "helicopter" promotions. Therefore, the media argued that promoting younger generations of cadres to leading positions was not the

[9] Renmin Ribao , 9 July 1980.

[10] Ibid., 16 December 1980.

[11] "Deng Xiaoping's Report on the Present Situation and Tasks," Zhengming , no. 29, March 1980, 11–23.

[12] Issues and Studies , 17(3) (March 1981), 81–103.

same as what the Gang of Four had done and that criticizing the Gang's practice did not mean rigidly to observe a step-by-step approach. "With regard to especially outstanding cadres [we] should give them a convenient elevator so they can go up fast."^[13]

Rational though the Deng policy may have seemed for increasing efficiency, it obviously discriminated against most cadres with worker and peasant backgrounds. With little formal education but much experience, they could be considered "reds," but not "experts." Thus, many strong criticisms were raised in the subtle Chinese way. Some delegates to the National People's Congress complained on behalf of those cadres who "had been working hard for several decades" for the regime.^[14] Others warned the reform not to "cut everything with one knife."^[15] Discontented cadres characterized the policy as an attempt to "make those who conquered the world retire" and to "make all cadres from worker and peasant backgrounds step aside."^[16] Some cynics summarized the changes like this: "In the past cadre selection depended on being a 'rebel.' Now cadre selection is based on writing quality [wenzhi , a derogatory term used to refer to feeble intellectuals in traditional China], and worker-peasant cadres are forced to retire"^[17]

Their complaints drew a sympathetic response from Hua Guofeng, who was still premier. In his report to the third plenum of the Fifth National People's Congress, he affirmed the need to reform the existing cadre corps. But, he declared, "we should take the necessary measures to help large numbers of government functionaries and cadres to study full or part time in order acquire and increase the general and specialized knowledge they need for the Four Modernizations. These measures include special schools and training courses for cadres either at their posts or on leave."^[18]

Probably having read the critical responses to his 15 August speech, Deng made many concessions to the old cadres in his speech of 15 December 1980. He added "revolutionization" as one of the goals of reform, promised the flexible application of age and

[13] Gongren Ribao , 25 September 1980.

[14] Renmin Ribao , 16 September 1980; 19 December 1980.

[15] Ibid., 12 September 1980.

[16] Ibid., 16 December 1980.

[17] Qunzhong , March 1981, 37; Lilun Yu Shijian (Shenyang), no. 4, 1981, 48; Wenhui Bao , 14 October 1980.

[18] Renmin Ribao , 15 September 1980.

education requirements, and indicated that implementation of reform would be carried out gradually. More important, he tried to calm the fears of incumbent cadres: "If we depart from our present cadre corps, we will not be able to complete any of our tasks, and it is impossible for us to make cadres younger."^[19]

An article entitled "On the Problems of Strengthening Party Leaders" elaborated on all the points in Deng's speech. First, the article advocated making cadres "revolutionized, better educated, professionally more competent, and young." Second, it conceded that age requirements should and would not be rigidly applied. Third, it made it clear that formal education was not the only criterion for measuring cadres' ability: "If workers and peasants come to have professional knowledge and management ability through self-study and training, they do not naturally fall into the above category" (of those to be dismissed from office).^[20]

Fourth, the article made specific concessions to cadres of the land reform generation. They were promised the opportunity to receive professional training because, "Even if they stop producing in order to study for three years, they still will be able to serve ten more years." Fifth, the article promised the incumbent cadres a greater voice in selecting their successors by endorsing what is known as the "first-enter-and-then-exit" method.^[21] That is, old cadres in positions of leadership would recruit their own successors and train (or watch) them for a while; only when the successors proved their ability (or loyalty to the old cadres) would the old cadres retire. This procedure was designed both to minimize the chances that the CR rebels would become leaders and to dispel the old cadres' doubts about the younger people's ability.

Last, while making concessions to the old cadres, the article took a tougher position toward the younger generation of cadres who had been promoted during the radical period: "We should resolutely remove and expel from the leading bodies those whom the central leading comrades describe as being one of these three types of people: (1) those who rose in rebellion with Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, (2) those seriously influenced by the Gang of

[19] Issues and Studies , 17(7) (July 1981), 101–19.

[20] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1981.

[21] Beijing Ribao , 27 June 1981; Deng Xiaoping supported a similar method. Dangfeng Wenti (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1982), 68.

Four's ideology, and (3) "those who had been involved in beating, smashing, and looting."

The article symbolized an end to the Maoist practice of using exclusively political criteria for the personnel management of cadres.

The Retirement System

China did not have a regular retirement system for cadres. In its early days, the regime had neither an immediate need nor sufficient resources to set up an elaborate retirement system. Its most senior leaders were in their early forties, and the wage system for cadres was not introduced until 1956. The only need then was to care for the wounded and sick cadres discharged from active duty. The regime adopted a series of regulations in a piecemeal fashion to deal with the different categories of sick and disabled people. Eventually, all the scattered regulations were put together into an "insurance system," which offered lump-sum severance payment to the discharged.

In 1978, the regime changed payment to a monthly pension system, which offered 40 to 60 percent of original wages. With this package of retirement benefits, the regime encouraged old cadres voluntarily to retire, glorifying retirement as the last contribution they could make to the nation. Although the official policy may have been sound, retirement was not an ideal option for the veteran cadres at that moment.

First, traditionally, incumbents of official posts are more respected than those who have retired after successful careers. To a certain extent, this is the case in every society, but in China the practice is extreme, as indicated in the proverb, "Those in power were treated as dearly as a beloved father figure, while those out of power became strangers even in the eyes of their own children." Concerned with the future careers not only of their children but also of their grandchildren, veteran cadres were reluctant to lose the personal influence that was needed to secure a better education and jobs for their offspring.^[22]

Second, despite the glorification of retirement, it was not man-

[22] Zhengming , no. 51, January 1982.

datory for everyone. Some could stay on active duty. "Our party is leading such a large nation. In the process of prolonged struggle, the party has produced some leaders who have abundant experiences and who enjoy high prestige inside and outside China. Among such old cadres, some have good health. Having such cadres remain in the leadership positions is in the interests of party leaders."^[23]

Third, the uncertainty of China's political future made retirement a risky option. At that time, voluntary retirement was considered a glorious act, but if a radical faction returned, there would be no guarantee that the promised retirement benefits would continue. Fourth, the fact that retirement was not handled by a central agency—like the Social Security administration in the United States of America—but by one's original unit made retirement more risky. The retirees' future welfare depended largely on the whim of their successors. Last, the old revolutionaries were not psychologically and sociologically prepared for retirement. Accustomed to a collective life centered in their own unit and possessing neither special skills nor personal hobbies, they were afraid of being cut off from their units.^[24]

Consequently, very few cadres retired in 1982, when the regime initiated the administrative reforms, except those who were physically disabled and deputies or low-ranking staff from the middle level of the bureaucracy.^[25] Some old cadres changed their minds after their initial decision to retire.^[26] Others wanted to continue active duty as deputies under the nominal leadership of the young cadres whom they had selected as their successors.^[27]

In order to overcome the reluctance of the old cadres, the regime gradually fattened the retirement benefits by developing a special retirement for the veteran cadres known as lixiu , an abbreviation of lizhi xiuyang , which means "leaving a job to recuperate."^[28] In a

[23] Lilun Yu Shijian , 22 February 1985.

[24] Daily Report , 15 April 82, K16.

[25] During this period only cadres at district, municipal, and county levels retired. Nanfang Ribao , 2 October 1980; Renmin Ribao , 18 November 1979.

[26] Zhongguo Nongkan , no. 12, 1981, 30–31.

[27] Beijing Ribao , 12 March 79.

[28] The practice is also known as changqi gongyang (long-term recuperation), mianzhi xiuyang (removed from active duty to rest), and lizhi xiuyang (leaving position to rest).

strict sense, lixiu is closer to a permanent leave of absence than it is to retirement.^[29] Unlike retirement (tuixiu ) that is applied to all cadres, only a limited number of veteran cadres who met specific requirements were entitled to lixiu . It allowed them to retire with "unchanged political treatment" and "slightly better economic treatment."

The idea of giving special consideration to old cadres who had contributed to the foundation of the Communist regime was not entirely new in China. The 1957 regulation on the "retirement of workers and staff" had a separate section for old cadres who "had started revolutionary work before the second revolutionary war." This group of old cadres was entitled to pensions up to 14 percent more than their regular wages.^[30] In 1958 the regime decided to allow veteran cadres to assume honorary positions so that they could have a long-term leave of absence with full pay. Later, the regulation changed to allow them to retire with full salary.^[31]

In 1963 the Secretariat of the CCP under Deng Xiaoping proposed that old and feeble cadres with the ranks of vice minister and provincial secretary be allowed to retire while still retaining all their political and economic privileges.^[32] The justification for the proposal was that it would facilitate the "cultivation of a new generation of successors" by promoting young cadres to vacancies created by the policy. Two years later, the organizational department issued a tentative regulation that lowered the required bureaucratic ranks to deputy heads at the district level. When the regulation reached the State Council, it further expanded the scope of eligibility to include all veteran cadres who had joined the party before 1937, regardless of their current ranking, and all deputy secretaries who had participated in revolutionary work prior to 1945. However, the proposal was not implemented because of the CR.

In 1978 the regime for the first time set up two different retirement systems: one for cadres and one for workers. Order no. 104 of 1978, "Temporary Regulation on Settling Old and Feeble Cadres," incorporated some of the special consideration the re-

[29] Ming Bao , May 27, 1978.

[30] Chao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renshi Zhidu Gaiyao (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1985), 415.

[31] Ibid., 423, 427.

[32] Ibid., 382.

gime had previously planned to give to the veteran cadres, using two criteria to determine eligibility: work age and bureaucratic rank. The cadres who had joined the revolution before 9 September 1949 had to have the rank of deputy secretary at district level, and those who had started their work before 1945 had to have the rank of county deputy secretary. Low-ranking cadres were entitled to lixiu if they had joined the revolution prior to July 1939.

Large-scale rehabilitation raised the question of how to deal with victims of the CR whose health would not allow active duty, and in November 1978 the central organizational department declared that "senior cadres who joined the revolution during the second civil war" should be allowed to retire with all the privileges of their ranks retained.

Those with financial difficulties should be given extra help. Relatives of old cadres who died should be taken care of. Government organs and party committees at the various levels should set up organs in charge of old cadres' affairs. Organs should be staffed by persons with strong party spirit. The organizational department at the county level should set up organs or assign persons to do the work of the old cadres.^[33]

As the regime embarked on sweeping administrative reforms, the idea of taking care of the needs of veteran cadres developed into a vehicle to induce old cadres to retire, and the scope of eligibility further expanded. In April 1982 the party center formally adopted the "Regulation Regarding Old Cadres' Lixiu ," which the standing committee of the National People's Congress further modified to make more cadres eligible.^[34] When the regulation was finally promulgated on 7 October, eligibility for lixiu was further broadened to include all cadres who joined the revolution during the first revolutionary war regardless of their current bureaucratic ranking. The anti-Japanese war cadres were eligible for lixiu if they held the rank of deputy magistrate, or the eighteenth grade. For civil war cadres, the rank of deputy secretary at the district level, or fourteenth grade, was required.^[35]

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Minzheng bu Zhengce Yanjiushi, ed., Mingzheng Fagui Xuanbian (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 1986), 154.

On 27 November 1982 the central organizational department decided to treat all cadres who were grade 18 or above, but who had not yet held the position of bureau director, as though they were directors. And the personnel labor department rendered an authoritative interpretation that extended eligibility retroactively to cadres of enterprises and business units. As a result, all cadres who had started work before September 1949 and who had attained grade 18 or above were entitled to lixiu .^[36]

In May 1983, the labor ministry issued another regulation which intended to clarify the eligibility of lixiu but actually further widened the eligibility by removing the requirement of bureaucratic rank. Consequently, all those who joined the revolution before 30 September 1949, regardless of their official rank, became entitled to lixiu . Also entitled were former Red Army soldiers, all those who had worked in the liberated areas, and all those who did underground work in the enemy area.^[37] People who had started as workers in factories in the liberated areas before 1949 but who later became cadres were also eligible.^[38] On 7 January 1985 the central organizational department and the united front department jointly issued a "Regulation Concerning Lixiu Problems of the Democratic Personnel." According to this regulation, all people who joined the democratic parties before the first political consulative conferences and who supported the CCP ever since were entitled to lixiu . Old specialists who met specific conditions were also qualified for special treatment after retirement.^[39]

The requirements now for lixiu are: (1) having participated in revolutionary work before the foundation of the PRC, (2) having engaged in full-time nonmanual labor work, and (3) having received payment for work in the form of wages, supplies, or a combination of the two. In brief, anyone who worked full time for the revolution before the foundation of the PRC is now entitled to lixiu . Even former bureaucrats of the Manchu puppet government are eligible if they surrendered to the CCP between 1 January 1943 and 2 September 1945. They are, however, treated as liberation war cadres rather than anti-Japanese war cadres.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., 155–57.

[38] Dangde Shenghuo (Heilongjiang), no. 12, 1983, 15.

[39] Nanfang Ribao , 2 October 1980; Zhibu Shenghou (Beijing), no. 8, 1986, 42.

As to the age requirements for lixiu , the 1982 regulation specified sixty-five for ministers, vice ministers, provincial secretaries, and governors, and sixty for vice ministers, provincial deputy secretaries, and vice governors.^[40] Although not mandatory, the pressure to retire voluntarily was high particularly after bureaucratic reforms started in 1982. As a result of the reforms, some lost their positions while others found themselves with all their opportunities for promotion gone under the leadership of former younger subordinates.^[41] In other cases, incumbents used the strategy of selecting their own successors and then requesting the approval of the upper echelon for them.^[42] Those who voluntarily retired had a better chance of becoming advisers. In some cases, when a newly promoted young head suggested to his former boss—now a subordinate—that he be transferred to another place, the old cadre realized that he had to retire.^[43] However, because of widespread sentiment against forcing old revolutionaries to retire, especially when new salary increases are expected, leaders of each unit are extremely reluctant to pressure old revolutionaries to retire.^[44]

For the actual benefit of lixiu , various practices used in the past were added to make the retirement package attractive. Initially the fringe benefit was less than the perquisites the incumbent already enjoyed. For instance, according to the 1978 Order no. 104, the retirement pension, even for old revolutionaries, amounted to only 60 to 90 percent of their salary.^[45] Gradually, the amount of the pension grew. Official policy now is to guarantee an income slightly higher than the regular salary for retirees, including previous fringe benefits, although the actual amount of the retirement pension for cadres varies depending on their work age.^[46] All grade 14 cadres who joined the revolution before 1948 but who have not

[40] Daily Report , 11 February 1982; Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[41] See, e.g., Zhao Jianming's decision to retire, in Renmin Ribao , 17 February 1982.

[42] Banyue Tan , no. 5, 1983, 6–9.

[43] Renmin Ribao , 2 July 80.

[44] Interviews in China on 28 August 1986.

[45] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[46] The most senior ones—those who started their work before 1937—receive a fourteen-month salary per year; those who joined the work before 1942 are given a thirteen-and-a-half-month salary; those who joined the work before 1945 are given a thirteen-month salary; those who joined the work before 1949 are given the salary of twelve months. Minzheng bu Zhengce Yanjiushi, ed., Mingzheng Fagui Xuanbian .

reached the level of director of a bureau are treated economically and politically as director-level cadres, and all eighteenth-grade cadres—regardless of whether or not they have actually served as county magistrates—will enjoy the benefits of a county magistrate. In addition, retired old revolutionaries are given subsidies for price increases.

Retirees are entitled to housing equal or better than what they occupied as incumbents. Many units build new housing for their retirees. The units without the financial capability to do so request funding, materials, and locations from the housing authority of the upper level.^[47] Housing conditions for retirees thus depend largely on the financial ability of their units.^[48] Politically powerful units and units that generate profits can provide housing that meets the central guidelines specifying different sizes of housing for different ranks of cadres. Generally, it is the military units that can afford to build additional housing for their retired brass in many choice locations. On the other hand, housing conditions in academic units appear to be poor, often failing to meet the standards of national regulations.^[49]

Retirees are given preferential treatment in health care. In addition to medical care covered by public expense (gongfei ), they have priority for newly built and rather luxurious hospitals with the best medical facilities. Many units build new hospitals and allocate a specific number of hospital beds exclusively for retirees.^[50] Some retirees receive monthly allowances for medical expenses. When sick, retirees are authorized to hire nurses at public expense. In addition, retirees have varying degrees of privilege to use automobiles from their original units, depending on their rank.^[51] In some places, retirees are given monthly transportation allowances. Retirees also enjoy the same privileges as incumbents to visit their parents or children with expenses paid by the units. They are even

[47] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 9, 1984.

[48] Daily Report , 8 January 1982.

[49] Harbin Yanjiu , no. 3, 1984, 42.

[50] For various measures taken by Liaoning province, e.g., see Renmin Ribao , 24 September 1984.

[51] Retirees of vice minister and above can use a car for any personal purpose, whereas former director-level cadres can request a car for such specified purposes as going to the hospital or attending official activities. When the unit cannot provide a car, retirees can hire commercial transportation and the expense will be reimbursed by the unit. Dangde Shenghuo , no. 12, 1983, 15.

entitled to subsidies for haircuts. When a retired cadre dies, his family is entitled to all subsidies due cadres of his same rank.^[52]

The regime guarantees that "basic political treatment will not change" even after retirement. In other words, retirees have access to official documents, important political reports, and conferences. Many units set up new reading rooms where retirees can read official documents.^[53] Retired party member cadres often form their own party branches and groups.

The 1978 order originally encouraged retired cadres to move to towns smaller than those they inhabited as cadres—from large urban centers to medium- and sized cities and from medium-sized cities to rural areas. The order was also intended tightly to control any movement of retirees to such large cities as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin by requiring official permission on a case-by-case basis. But the restriction has gradually been relaxed. First, the regime made exceptions by allowing cadres who had worked in remote areas—for instance Qinghai province—to return to interior (neidi ) cities. Then retiring cadres in mountainous and desert areas were permitted to return to provincial capitals where "transportation is adequate and supplies are good." In 1984 the regime authorized cadres who had served in "front areas" to retire to medium- and small-sized cities.^[54]

Dingti (hiring the child of a retiring cadre in the same unit) has not been officially recognized,^[55] but an official regulation allows an old cadre to bring a son or daughter to live with him when he retires.^[56] Since his unit will be responsible for finding a reasonable job for the retiree's offspring, he often manages to find a job for his offspring in his own unit. Among the 570 retired cadres in Harbin, 39 percent of them mentioned dingti as the reason for their retirement.^[57]

Since 1978 a series of regulations gradually evolved to specify how the retirees should be managed. Basically, all retirees are managed by their original unit. An exception is made for retirees who

[52] Minzheng bu Zhengce Yanjiushi, ed., Mingzheng Fagui Xuanbian .

[53] Chao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[54] Renmin Ribao , 6 February 1984.

[55] Interviews in China on 28 August 1986.

[56] Chao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[57] Harbin Yanjiu , nos. 3–4, 1984.

are settled in other provinces; in these cases, management authority is transferred to the personnel or civil affairs bureaus of the local government. Low-ranking military officers are transferred to the jurisdiction of the local government, but all other officers are managed by their original military unit.^[58] Each unit pays pensions from its administrative expenses.

In order to manage the retirees, the regime set up "old cadre bureaus or sections" staffed by full-time cadres within organizational departments and personnel bureaus at all levels of the administrative hierarchy.^[59] Various functional bureaus and enterprise and business units have similar offices. As was the case with personnel management, high-ranking cadres of each unit are managed by the "old cadre offices" of superior units, whereas low-ranking cadres are handled by the personnel bureau of their own units.^[60]

Not surprisingly, the lixiu system has produced many undesirable consequences. It increased the regime's administrative expenditures and set up an ironic precedent, that is, one can earn more when retired than when on active duty. Worse still, the system allowed retiring cadres to take their bureaucratic rank and status into society, thus further contributing to possible stratification of society along the lines of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Although formally removed from official positions, retired revolutionaries continue to exert enormous political influence, some through the advisory system that the regime initiated from the top level down to the county level.^[61] Although advisers are supposed to make only suggestions to the formal authorities, they are bound to exercise an inordinate amount of behind-the-scenes influence. First, in China, where the level of institutionalization is rather low, real power often lies in an individual person rather than in an office. Second, many of the newly promoted leaders often seek advice from retirees, who have had more political experience and more extensive personal connections, and to whom they owe their own promotion. More important, retired old revolutionaries are well organized into advisory commissions, disciplinary commissions,

[58] Renmin Ribao , 18 October 1984.

[59] Ibid., 24 September 1984.

[60] Wenhui Bao , 16 June 1981; Renmin Ribao , 27 July 1981.

[61] Shanxi Ribao , 21 January 1982; Renmin Ribao , 17 February 1982.

or party groups with their own spokesmen, constituting the most powerful political group outside the formal bureaucracy. They are officially encouraged to discuss current problems that they consider important, paying special attention to the selection of future leaders, ideological trends, and corruption, and, when the necessity arises, they convey their collective views to the appropriate authorities or write letters to newspapers.^[62] Their political muscle was dramatically demonstrated in the dismissals of Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao Ziyang in 1989 from the general secretaryship. Although the advisory system seems to be a temporary measure that will come to an end with the disappearance of the "founders," the old revolutionaries headed by Deng Xiaoping still exercise enormous political power.^[63]

The other problem with the lixiu system is that it creates inequality for different generations of cadres and perpetuates the importance of seniority. Using 30 September 1949 as the cutoff date for eligibility to lixiu , although understandable, offers undue advantage to northerners while penalizing southerners, simply because south China was liberated in the last days of the civil war. Also due to the absence of rigorous bureaucratic formality in the chaotic period of the civil war, it is extremely difficult to determine the exact date when a cadre started work. In addition, the lixiu system cannot maintain equity for cadres employed in different units, since under the present system each unit is responsible for taking care of its retirees. The system also raises the question of conflict of interest as the retired cadres seek new employment in units that they previously regulated, further contributing to cadre corruption.^[64]

Despite these problems, the lixiu system was effective in persuading old cadres to step down from their offices. The total number of old cadres who joined the revolutionary work force before 1949 is estimated to be about 2.5 million for 1982. As shown in table 40, only a fraction of them (7,260) had retired by 1982. The number

[62] Renmin Ribao , 17 November 1984.

[63] It is reported that the advisory system at the county level and below has been abolished. But it is also known that advisers at the lower levels simply changed their titles to "inspectors," while continuing to exercise their political influence both formally and informally.

[64] Renmin Ribao , 15 April 1985.

of retirees increased to 21 percent of all old revolutionaries in 1983 and 40 percent by 1984. Total retired cadres in 1982 was only 0.06 percent of all retirees that included blue-collar workers. But the percentage increased to 6.6 by 1985.^[65] This national trend approximated the trend in Liaoning province, which reportedly had 132,000 cadres—33 percent of the 556,777 responsible cadres—who had reached retirement age in 1984. Only 3,300 (2.2 percent) of them retired between 1978 and 1981; the number then increased to 9,130 (6.8 percent) in 1982 and to 50,000 (15 percent) in 1983. Table 40 shows the dates 570 cadres retired—a 10 percent sample of the total 5,700 retired cadres—in Harbin as of September 1984. More than 62 percent retired after 1983. The retirement of old cadres gained momentum only after 1982 when the regime initiated a special retirement package for old revolutionaries. Yunnan provinces had about 33,253 cadres entitled to lixiu ; among them 14,793 have retired, and the rest are expected to retire by 1990.^[66]

[65] Deborah Davis, "Unequal Chances, Unequal Outcomes: Pension Reform and Urban Inequalities," China Quarterly , no. 114, June 1988, 223–42.

[66] Yunnan Sheke Dongtai , May 1988, 17.

As noted, the lixiu system was initially designed for a small number of cadres with high seniority and ranking. However, eligibility gradually expanded to include all veteran cadres who had joined the revolutionary work before the foundation of the PRC. Old cadres who retired before the introduction of the lixiu system are allowed to change their status to lixiu . The evolution of the system clearly shows how a politically influential group forced the regime to broaden the scope of a policy beyond its original intentions. Although the retirement policy may not be a typical case because it involves the most powerful political group, veteran cadres, it may foretell how specific policies will be subjected to the influence of various interest groups in future years.

Purging the "Three Types of People"

During the CR, a large number of rebels joined the party and then became cadres. Those in leadership positions had usually worked as administrative cadres for more than ten years, accumulating rich political experience and building up networks of personal connections (guanxi ) at the basic levels. They may have lost their confidence in the Gang of Four long before its fall, but their former victims would not trust them, since former rebels could develop into a political force to challenge Deng Xiaoping and his reform programs. The Deng group therefore reinvestigated the former rebels in the party rectification. Obviously, Deng's group felt that the two previous screenings of the Gang's followers were not thorough, because they had been conducted at the time when the CR was not yet officially repudiated and Mao's mistakes were not yet exposed.

Unlike the Maoist method of mobilizing the masses, the regime relied on a carefully planned organizational method for investigating the radicals, limiting the scope of the purge to "three types of people." The first referred to CR rebels who "had seized political power 'in rebellion,' rose to high positions, and committed evils with serious consequences"; two constituent elements of this group were rapid promotion through power seizures and evil activities. The second were "factionalists in their ideas," who were defined by three constituent elements: vigorous propagation of radical ideology, factional ties with Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, and continuation of factional activities after the fall of the Gang.

The third included anyone who "had indulged in beating, smashing, and looting during the CR," broadly interpreted to include "framing, making false charges, and persecuting and torturing people to ruin their health." Not only those who had been personally involved in these activities, but also their "back-stage bosses responsible for smashing institutions, seizing files by force, and damaging both public and private properties" fell into this category. The leaders of the mass organizations who "had plotted, organized, and directed violent confrontation that resulted in serious consequences" were also included.^[67]

The regime made a distinction between the "three types of people" and "serious mistakes." Those who had participated in "beating, smashing, and looting" in a "general sense," those who had joined the Gang of Four's network under the influence of leftist ideology, and those who had simply carried out the official line coming down through the Gang's communication channel were considered as having made "serious mistakes." For those who had committed serious mistakes, organizational conclusions would be drawn and "due measures" would be taken. But those who had already been investigated and punished were not reinvestigated. "Ordinary mistakes" were not investigated and did not require any organizational conclusion. The materials relating to "ordinary mistakes" did not enter into one's dossier; they were kept at the rectification office or the office of the core investigation group for the period of rectification.^[68]

Old cadres who had erred during the CR were exempted from the "three types" because they had made "contributions to the people and for the revolution."^[69] Their mistakes were classified as "serious mistakes," but if they had made self-criticisms for their errors, they were not expelled from the party. Also, ordinary party members "who said and did wrong things" were regarded as having made "serious mistakes" or "ordinary mistakes," for which the maximum penalty was delayed registration for party membership. The regime also excluded the public security apparatus from the investigation.^[70] "If the public security field carried out the orders

[67] Beijing Review , 17 October 1983.

[68] Zhibu Shenghuo , no. 13, 1985.

[69] Renmin Ribao , 26 August 1981.

[70] Zhibu Shenghuo , no. 18, 1985.

and directives of the upper echelon according to CR policy, and even if the result was a wrong case, generally speaking the responsibility will not be pursued."^[71] Rural party members and such basic-level party organs as the village (xiang ) and the town (zhen ) were excluded from investigation. Former middle school students were generally not investigated unless there were compelling reasons to do otherwise. Also the factional infighting of the Red Guards was not investigated unless the consequences of the fighting were serious.

In contrast, former Red Guards who had tortured people to the extent of injuring their health and those who had intentionally fabricated charges, falsifying evidence to persecute cadres and masses, were classified as one of the three types.

The basic guiding principle for the investigation was to be "firm and cautious, while not overlooking even one suspect." Mindful of the past abuse of "quotas," the regime insisted that no unit would be assigned quotas for the three types.

With these general guidelines, each unit investigated its own cases under the overall supervision of local party committees. Leaders who were suspected of having special ties with the three types were adjusted before the investigations started. The units that suffered serious damage from the CR and important cases—"cases that affect the entire unit or that involve top leadership"—were investigated first. If a case involved many people working in different units, the unit that the case affected most seriously was responsible for forming a joint investigation team with the others and for collecting materials. Renmin Ribao reported a case that involved forty-four units.^[72]

In order to investigate events that happened more than ten years before, investigations usually divided the CR into several stages, reconstructing each event and analyzing "its start, development, and consequences." Victims' testimony was collected in order to discover those most responsible for an incident. The regime also recommended investigating only "armed struggle" (wu dou ) rather than "struggle by words" (wen dou ).

The last stage of an investigation involved determining whether

[71] Xuanchuan Shouce (Beijing), January 1985.

[72] Renmin Ribao , 31 July 1984.

or not the investigated person should be classified as one of the three types. A final decision on each case was to be made collectively by the party committee.^[73] Party leaders were specifically warned not to be "too lenient" and to take great care to separate those who really deserved to be classified as one of the three types from those who had made a "serious mistake" and those who had made a "general mistake." Any final decision on the three types was submitted to the upper echelons for approval. The three types were then dismissed from their posts and expelled from the party. In addition, some of them were brought to court, even if the legal time limit for prosecution was past.

Despite the regime's stress on the careful collection of evidence and strict interpretations, many investigations were apparently conducted in an untidy and loose fashion. The multiplying factors—specific mistakes and crimes, degree of responsibility, degree of repentence, and political performance after the third plenum—that investigators had to consider, however, obfuscated rather than clarified ambiguities in defining the three-type persons.^[74] Moreover, there was absolutely no guidance on the type of evidence and no rules governing its interpretation. One can, however, notice a departure from past practice on two points. First, the three types were defined by the actual damage incurred to the party and the people rather than by a person's title or membership in a particular faction during the CR. The second and more important point was that the purged did not suffer as much as in the Maoist era. "For those who are expelled but are still fit to serve as cadres, appropriate arrangements will be made; those unfit to serve as cadres should be provided with opportunities to find jobs and earn a living."^[75]

However, the emphasis on consequences rather than on intentions was not much help in determining who fit the three types. It was extremely difficult to distinguish the types from beneficiaries of the CR—including those who did not actively participate in the process but were promoted simply because the large-scale purge in the CR created many vacancies that had to be filled. The ideology

[73] Gongchandangyuan , nos. 11–12, 1985, 46–49.

[74] Zhibu Shenghuo (Shanghai), no. 13, 1985.

[75] Dangde Shenghuo , September 1984, 10.

of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing was an official line at that time, and not many people dared to challenge or refuse to publicize the official ideology. The phrase "beating, smashing, and looting" was as loose as the previous criteria. Most of the killing occurred in the context of factional struggles between rival mass organizations. Depending on how one defines looting, it can be applied to most of the initial Red Guards—largely composed of children of high-ranking cadres, including Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, He Long, and Chen Yi—who had participated in the campaign against the "Four Olds"—old ideas, culture, customs, and habits. Persecution of their fellow classmates from "bad" family backgrounds can be construed as "beating."

Given the complexity of the CR and the ambiguous and contradictory official criteria, party committees at the various levels exercised enormous discretionary power in deciding who should be purged. The universities were usually lenient toward former rebels (now college students), because they kept no detailed records of their past behavior and had not enough manpower to investigate each student.^[76] Investigating the three types of people in enterprises was also difficult because of the large number of personnel changes after the CR.

Basic-level cadres were not eager aggressively to pursue screening the three types. Instead, they adopted the tactics of "dragging, waiting, and avoiding." The cadres had every reason to be evasive. First, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to investigate—not to mention collect evidence and interview witnesses—an incident that occurred almost twenty years before. Many cadres did not want to undermine the stability of their units by reopening wounds and renewing factionalism. Also, they believed that the three types were harmless and powerless "dust in the trace of a wagon wheel."^[77] The official line, however, insisted that they still

[76] Interview in Beijing in 1986.

[77] During the ten years of the CR, former rebels were subjected to several investigations: initially the military investigated them for their connection with "ultraleftists" and "May 16 elements"; immediately after the fall of the Gang of Four, they were again investigated for possible connection with the fallen radicals, although this phase was limited in scope; in 1982, the Deng-Hu group issued order no. 55 to investigate the "three types of people"; the bureaucratic reforms of 1982–83 removed whoever managed to survive until that moment; and finally they were subjected to a new investigation in the party rectification.

posed a dangerous threat because of their skill in mobilizing the masses. Former rebels in sensitive areas such as the organizational, personnel, disciplinary, and legal fields had to be screened with the utmost care.

The evasive tactics devised by the former radicals compounded the difficulties of investigation. In the previous eighteen years many of them had changed their jobs and places of residence, sometimes falsifying their identities. One such case described in Renmin Ribao reported that the personnel dossier of one person had no trace of his activities during the CR. By changing their names, others even managed to "sneak into the third echelon, taking advantage of being young, well-educated, and professionally competent." Others pretended to repent by changing their attitude and behavior "one hundred and eighty degrees" to support the current official line. Some former rebels bought the protection of leading cadres through bribery and other means.^[78] A word from leading cadres that "their works are not bad, and I don't see any taint of their cruelty" was good enough to save them.

Another difficulty concerned how to discern individual responsibility for collective actions. During the chaotic period of mass mobilization, the boundary between legality and illegality and between individual-initiated and organization-sanctioned actions was blurred. Most of the political violence during the CR took the form of group or mass action rather than individual behavior. Moreover, many of them were sanctioned by the official ideology and often carried out through the existing organizational channels. For instance, the military was ordered to intervene in the CR to restore order; in carrying out this task, it frequently resorted to violent means, sometimes inciting one faction to launch violent attacks on others. But during the investigation, the regime tried to hold individuals responsible for the consequences of collective actions. Since most of the current PLA leaders—all party committee members except one in the case of the Chengdu military region—had led PLA units in the task of supporting the left during the CR, very few of them could claim to be completely innocent.

The last difficulty involved dealing with the two factions that split almost all organizations. With regard to the question of which

[78] Renmin Ribao , 8 June 1984.

faction was correct and which was incorrect, the official line held that both factions made mistakes and that factional ties were irrelevant to the investigation of the three types of people. New party secretaries who had nothing to do with the CR were appointed to the units seriously plagued with factionalism. Nonetheless, the lingering influence of factional ties had been particularly noticeable in the personnel management of cadres. Local party cadres used factional viewpoints in investigating the three types, taking a protective attitude toward members of their own factions—by making "the big incident a small one, if their own faction was involved, and making the insignificant matter of major importance, if members of their rival faction were involved."^[79]

As a result, former members of the rebel faction bore the brunt of the investigation. In contrast, the investigation did not often affect former members of the conservative Red Guards, who publicly declared that since they defended the party committee, there was nothing to investigate about them. Most of the conservative Red Guard organizations had been led by the children of former high-ranking cadres, who were now rehabilitated and returned to former power. In fact, some leaders openly pleaded that the activities of the initial Red Guards should not be investigated. "Those who made serious mistakes at the early stage of the CR, but those who made corrections of their mistakes during the middle stage of the CR, should be trusted. But those who tenaciously followed the counterrevolutionary group of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, and those who did bad things, should never be used for important positions."^[80] Many former leaders of the initial Red Guard organizations (such as the sons of Chen Yi and He Long and the daughters of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Song Renqiong) are now working in cozy positions in the state or military units or are abroad for study, whereas their adversaries are probably languishing in jail.^[81]

Despite the initial estimate of 15 percent of party members slated for removal and a Hong Kong observer's speculation that as many as 4 million (4 percent of party members) would be purged, it seems that the total number of people purged as one of the three

[79] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang , 16 April 1984, 20.

[80] Dangde Shenghou , 1984, nos. 9, 10.

[81] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang (Liaoning), 16 April 1984, 20.

types was very small.^[82] Most of the types reported in the official newspapers were accused of having abused their cadre positions to commit such crimes as corruption and rape, in addition to their original mistakes during the CR. By bringing additional charges, the regime portrayed the three types as "bad persons" prone to irregular behavior. There is no way for outside observers to determine the official assertion. But it implies either that the former rebels were condemned when they made additional mistakes in cadre positions or that the regime falsified or exaggerated the additional mistakes to discredit the former rebels morally.^[83]

Although only a small number of people were purged as the three types, a question of fairness persists. Did the investigation use well-defined objective criteria for all suspects fairly and equally? Undoubtedly, those who were condemned still feel that they were unfairly punished.

A less harsh fate for the purged cannot be much comfort for those branded as the three types because, otherwise, they would have been selected as China's future leaders. As the official news media publicly recognizes, the only difference between the three types and the candidates for China's future leadership lies in their political performances during the CR. Both the three types and candidates for the third echelon are young or middle-aged and well educated.^[84] If one had a clean record during the CR, he can enter the ranks of future leaders. But those condemned as the three types lost their current positions, not to mention the chance to be promoted.

Understandably, many of the Red Guard generation are still confused. Some of them are completely disillusioned and alienated from the political process and are searching for a vehicle to express their wounded feelings and painful experiences. The more courageous ones, who are still dedicated to searching for a solution to the Chinese problem, have reached the conclusion that the basic problem with China does not lie with Mao, revisionism, old party leaders, or the innocent youth who threw themselves eagerly into the political movement, but with the political system itself. To

[82] Ming Bao , 5 October 1983; "Zhengdang Shidian Cankao Cailiao," Dangde Shenghuo , 25 July 1983.

[83] Renmin Ribao , 10 July 1984.

[84] Hong Qi , no. 1, 1984, 1.

them China's hopes rest with democracy and a pluralism that will tolerate different views. There is no doubt that as the Communist revolution had been the definitive event of their parents' generation, so the CR was to become the event that politically defined Mao's next generation. China's first revolutionary successors came of age in that tremendous upheaval; the events of those years will color their vision. For many, it has left emotional scars that are not yet healed. But with or without healing, this generation will shoulder China's future.

11
Bureaucratic Reforms

Officially labeled a "revolution in administrative strcuture, but not against any persons," bureaucratic reform started in 1982 when the necessary groundwork was established. The reforms intended ostensibly to streamline the unruly bureaucracy and to make the leading cadres "revolutionized, better educated, professionally competent and younger in age."^[1] A hidden objective was to resolve the succession problem—the question that, according to Deng Xiaoping, would determine the fate of China—by promoting a new group of leaders whose personal interests were tied to the reform policy.

This chapter examines the results of that reform, analyzes the concrete strategy followed by the regime, and discusses the political implications of the sweeping leadership change.

Leadership Changes, 1982–87

The regime carried out leadership reshuffling in the following sequence:

1. It changed the ministers and vice ministers of the central government in May 1982.

2. It readjusted the leadership of the functional departments of the Central Committee—such as the organizational department and the propaganda department—in the summer of 1982.

3. It appointed a large number of new members to the Twelfth Central Committee in September 1982.

4. It reshuffled provincial leadership in 1983.

5. It adjusted the leading bodies at the district and municipal levels (completed in December 1983).

[1] Daily Report , 9 March 1982, K4.

6. It changed the leadership at the county level (completed in September 1984).

7. It reorganized the leadership at the enterprise levels.

8. It initiated the party rectification campaign.

9. It prepared a list of third-echelon cadres.

10. It carried out a second-round readjustment of the leadership at the central and provincial levels in 1985.

11. It promoted a large number of new generation cadres to the highest positions in the Thirteenth Party Congress.

The results of the first-round administrative reforms (1982–84) from the center down to the basic level are tabulated in tables 41 and 42.

The State Council

Administrative reforms strengthened the authority of the premier by ending the practice of placing each vice premier in charge of a specific functional area (xitong ). The number of vice premiers de-

creased from twelve to two, and the new system of "State Council standing conferences" (guowuyuan changwu huiyi ) was introduced. Many commissions (e.g., the State Agricultural Commission) were abolished, some ministries were merged (e.g., the ministries of power industries and of water conservancy), and a few new ministries were established (e.g., the ministries of aviation and of electronics). The bureaus with staff functions were combined, and some of the support functions—such as running nursery schools for the ministry personnel's children and motor pools—were transferred to newly established independent corporations, which would eventually operate on a profit-and-loss principle.^[2]

The reduction of personnel was equally impressive. The total number of ministers and vice ministers—excluding heads and deputy heads of commissions, offices, and agencies—was reduced by approximately 70 percent. The average age of leaders was lowered from sixty-four years to fifty-eight, and those with college-level educations increased from 38 to 59 percent (see table 42). The reorganization also decreased the total number of directors by 40 percent and their average age from 59 to 54, while improving their educational level (those with a college-level education rose from 35 to 52 percent).^[3] Most of those who had assumed leadership positions during the radical phase were removed.

Central Party Organs

Personnel changes in central party organs were less sweeping than in central government organs. According to the statistics of thirteen departments, the total number of directors and deputy directors was reduced by 40 percent, their average age was lowered from sixty-six to sixty-two, and the proportion of those with a college-level education increased from 43 to 53 percent. The heads of bureaus were reduced by 14 percent and their average age lowered from sixty to fifty-four. Those with a college-level education increased from 50 to 56 percent.^[4]

[2] For instance, after merging the ministries of water conservancy and of electric power, the total number of bureaus was reduced from 35 to 16 and the total number of persons from 1,500 to 720. Zhonggong Yanjiu , April 1982, 43.

[3] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renshi Zhidu Gaiyao (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1985), 221.

[4] Ibid.

Twelfth Central Committee

Less than half of the entire Eleventh CC of members elected in 1977 (43 percent) made it into the Twelfth CC convened in 1982. The rate was lower than that of either the Ninth CC (76 percent) or the Tenth CC (62 percent), but higher than the rate of the Eighth CC. However, not all of those who failed to make it into the Twelfth CC were purged; sixty-five members were transferred to the Advisory Commission. Most of the mass representatives (seventy-nine out of ninety-seven in the Eleventh CC) failed to get into the Twelfth CC—except for those who had some credentials in addition to their activities during the CR.^[5] With the Twelfth CC, the idea of having mass representatives in the Central Committee came to an end.

The PLA lost 32 percent (thirty out of ninety-two) of its Eleventh CC members. The total share of the military in the Twelfth CC decreased from 27 percent in the Eleventh CC to 19 percent, a level comparable with the 21 percent of the Eighth CC.^[6] The shared characteristics of the PLA leaders who lost their seats in the CC were (1) deep involvement in the CR when the PLA was ordered to provide military training to the Red Guards, (2) support for industry and agriculture in 1967, and (3) rapid promotion to influential positions in the revolutionary committees and party organizations during the 1968–76 period.

Provincial Organs

Changes in the provincial-level leadership were sweeping. For instance, the total number of provincial party committee members, governors, and vice governors was reduced from 698 (twenty-three persons per province) to 463 (fifteen persons per province), a reduction of 34 percent (see table 41). The average number of provincial party secretaries was reduced in some provinces from fourteen to five (Sichuan and Hunan), and the standing committee mem-

[5] For a detailed discussion of the Twelfth CC, see Hong Yung Lee, "Twelfth Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," Asian Survey 23 (June 1983).

[6] For the military's changing share in the central committee, see Zhonggong Yanjiu , October 1982, 114–21.

bers from somewhere in the twenties to about fifteen, depending on the size of the province. Consequently, provincial leaders with a college-level education increased from 20 to 44 percent (table 42).

The total number of bureaus at the provincial, district, and municipal levels declined from 16,658 (555 per province) to 10,604 (350 per province)—a reduction of 36 percent. The percentage of cadres in these positions with a college-level education increased from 14 percent to 51 percent, whereas their average age was lowered from sixty-two to fifty-five.^[7] One-third of the new leadership was from enterprise, higher educational institutions, or research institutes, and many of them (22 percent in Qinghai province) had professional titles.^[8]

District and Municipal Organs

At these levels, the total number of leaders (including secretaries, standing committee members, and bureau directors) was reduced by 36 percent; their average age was lowered from fifty-eight to fifty. Those with a college-level education increased from 14 to 44 percent and, in the case of Qinghai province, 14 percent of them had professional titles.^[9]

County, Town (Zhen), and Village (Xiang) Organs

Reorganization reduced the average age of county-level leadership from forty-eight to forty-two and produced a leadership composed of forty-, thirty-, and twenty-year-old cadres.^[10] The percentage of college graduates among the county magistrates increased from 18 to 43 and among the county party secretaries, from 4 to 43. More than 80 percent of the counties had either a party secretary or a magistrate who had a college-level education, and 15 percent of them had professional titles.^[11]

[7] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 224.

[8] Ibid., 225.

[9] Ibid. Guizhou Nianjian (Guizhou: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 292.

[10] Those below forty years constitute one-third, and those above fifty were about 14 percent. Ibid.

[11] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 229.

Although the national aggregate figures on reforms at the zhen and xiang levels are not available, Guizhou provincial statistics may well represent the general trend. Guizhou lowered the average age of its zhen -level leaders to thirty-nine and xiang -level leaders to thirty-five. The number of those with an educational level of senior high school and above increased to 42 percent (including a college-level education of 10 percent) at the zhen level, and to 30 percent at the xiang level (including 0.96 percent of college-level education).^[12] However, even after the reform the situation is not ideal because of the shortage of educated manpower.

Enterprises

The regime carried out the reorganziation of key state-owned enterprises twice. The first-round adjustment replaced about 60 percent of the old cadres with new cadres—many of whom did not meet the age and educational specifications that the center set up—as a transitional measure.^[13] The second-round adjustment in 1984 further improved the age and educational structure of the newly constituted leadership at that level: it was comprised of those in their forties (63 percent), those below forty (20 percent), and those above fifty (17 percent), with an average age of forty-five. Reorganization also reduced the total number of leading cadres by one-third (6.3 persons per unit) and increased those with the college-level education by 89 percent.^[14] Most of the newly promoted managers "understand production, science, and technology."^[15]

The quality of the new enterprise leaders managed by district organs (diqu ) was much lower than that of the leadership in key enterprises. For instance, in Guizhou province the average age of leaders of district-level enterprises was fifty-two, and 40 percent had a college-level education. Leadership of county-level enterprises was a little bit lower: the average age was forty-seven, and 35 percent had a college-level education.^[16] The average age of leaders in Guizhou business units at the district level was fifty-two, and

[12] Renmin Ribao , 5 October 1984.

[13] Renmin Ribao , 3 July 1983.

[14] Ibid., 5 July 1986.

[15] Ibid., 1 December 1985.

[16] Guizhou Nianjian (Guizhou: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 292.

those with a college-level education averaged 84 percent.^[17] In county-level business units, leaders' average age was forty-seven, and 60 percent had a college-level education.

In brief, as the regime proudly declared, "after two years of structural reforms, the age, knowledge, and speciality structure of the leading bodies at various levels have improved substantially." According to another official source, about 20,000 young cadres—those "under fifty-five years old and with abundant specialized knowledge and long work experiences"—entered into leadership positions above the county level.^[18]

In addition to the leadership changes examined in the preceding section, the regime prepared a list of "third echelon of cadres"—those from the younger generation already targeted for promotion to specific leadership positions. In other words, it referred not to the pool of qualified candidates from which future leaders would be selected, but to the list of cadres chosen to replace the present leaders at various levels. They were cadres "on reserve." Some of them had already been assigned to leadership positions.^[19] Since even those newly promoted cadres are referred to as the "third echelon," the term is frequently used to refer to the younger, better-educated people in leadership positions.

The idea of a third echelon was apparently the rehabilitated cadres' effort to ensure political stability and continuation of their reform line after they died. "In order to ensure the stability of the state and continuity of the direction and policies of the party and state for a long period of time, it becomes necessary to start building up the third echelon."^[20] In other words, the third echelon was a device to maximize political stability through planned generational change.

Reserve cadres were selected not only for politically important leading positions at each level—such as secretary, governors, and magistrate—but also for all other responsible positions in administrative, functional, and military units—including enterprise and business units.^[21] The regime completed the selection of reserve cadre corps for provinces, districts, and counties by 1986. The PLA

[17] Ibid. Minority cadres were 5 percent with female cadres 3.8 percent.

[18] Liaowang , 5 October 1984.

[19] Renmin Ribao , 29 October 1984.

[20] Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 339.

[21] Gongchan Dangyuan , no. 22, 1985, 31.

also selected its own reserve cadres.^[22] Moreover, "the work of selecting, training, and managing the reserve cadre has been to a certain extent institutionalized."^[23]

Although some on the list had already been promoted to leading positions in each unit, about 70 to 80 percent of the third echelon as of 1986 were assigned to deputy positions, thus prompting some Chinese to name the third echelon "deputies." Presumably, as deputies they would receive on-the-job training and would gradually assume leadership positions when they were ready. Those without much managerial experience were sent to various party schools or to basic-level units to develop "overall leadership" ability. Sichuan and Hunan provinces sent some of their third echelon to Shenzhen city "directly to witness economic reforms."^[24] When the remaining third echelon will move into leadership positions depends largely on "requirements of the work."

Another component of the policy was the allocation of some college graduates to basic units so that they would be trained as future leaders "who have not only education and specialized knowledge, but who would also be familiar with the actual conditions of China and be willing to integrate themselves with the masses."^[25] Probably initiated by Hu Yaobang, these young people were billed as the future leaders of China in the transition between the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries.^[26] About 12,000 college graduates participated in the program, and some have already assumed leadership positions at basic levels.^[27] This practice, however, came to an end in 1986.

As shown in table 43, each province and ministry prepared lists of candidates for key leadership positions at different levels. The total number at each level approximated the number of incumbents, which were probably fixed by regulations. Reserve cadres were even selected for directorships of provincial bureaus. According to an official source, a total of about 100,000 cadres were

[22] Renmin Ribao , 10 September 1983.

[23] The central organizational department set up a young cadre bureau to be responsible for preparing lists of young cadres, constantly supplementing them while dropping those proven to be unqualified. Rencai Tiandi , no. 10, 1985, 26–27.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Renmin Ribao , 15 October 1986.

[26] Rencai Tiandi , no. 10, 1985, 26–27.

[27] Liaowang , 17 November 1986, 1.

selected for the third echelon: approximately 1,000 for the provincial and ministerial leadership positions, 20,000 for jobs at bureau and district levels, and the rest for the county-level positions.^[28]

Table 44 indicates that the average age of the third echelon selected for provincial-level cadres was about forty-five, ten years younger than the incumbents; the average age of those selected for district- and bureau-level positions was about forty; and the average age of those for the county level was about thirty-five.^[29] Most cadres in the third echelon had college-level educations, including those selected for provincial- and district-level leadership positions.^[30] Of the 452 cadres selected for leadership positions in one hundred and twenty-one enterprises under the ministry of coal, 86 percent were below age forty-five, 76 percent had a college-level education, and 70 percent possessed specialized knowledge, that is, had professional titles.^[31] Likewise, Shanghai reported that 90 percent of its 1,500 reserve cadres had a college-level education and 70 percent had career backgrounds as professionals and specialists,

[28] Ibid., 5 October 1984, 10–11; 17 January 1985, 17–18.

[29] Renmin Ribao , 20 April 1984; 11 September 1984; 14 January 1985; 15 November 1984.

[30] Ibid., 20 April 1984.

[31] Ibid., 20 October 1984; 10 April 1984.

mostly in engineering fields.^[32] For example, all of Shanghai's five mayors and deputy mayors were engineers.

Apparently after reviewing the results of the administrative reforms, the regime carried out a second-round readjustment at the central and provincial government levels in April 1984. Instead of an across-the-broad readjustment, the regime replaced those who had survived the first readjustment of 1982–83 with 126 younger cadres. Sixty-three percent of those newly promoted were under fifty, and 80 percent of them had a college-level education.^[33] As a result, the new leadership within each office formed a "ladder-shaped" structure by including those in their sixties, fifties, and forties. The average age was lowered to fifty-three, and the educational level improved: those with college-level educations grew from 43 to 60 percent of all leading cadres at the central and provincial levels.^[34]

After achieving this change in the civilian sector, Deng Xiaoping announced his plan to reduce the size of the military forces by 1 million—approximately one-half of which were officers—by cutting the number of military officers in central military organs and big military regions by 20 to 50 percent. The new military leadership has a ladder-shaped age structure: the central leaders in their sixties, leaders of strategic forces in their fifties, division commanders in their forties, and brigade commanders in their thirties.^[35]

At the fourth plenary session of the Twelfth Party Congress (convened in September 1985), fifty-four full members and ten alternate members (out of 341 elected in 1982) of the Twelfth Central Committee resigned.^[36] After the old cadres were removed, about sixty new cadres were added to the CC. Most of the new members were promoted to key posts in the party, government, and military and then moved into the CC when the meeting was convened. The average age of those newly added to the CC was fifty-seven, and thirty-three of them (60 percent) had career backgrounds in engineering, economic planning, or industrial manage-

[32] Ibid., 19 September 1984.

[33] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , p. 235. Renmin Ribao , 8 September 1985.

[34] Renmin Ribao , 5 October 1985; 9 September 1985.

[35] The average age of regional military commanders was lowered by eight years. Liaowang , no. 27, 8 July 1985.

[36] Renmin Ribao , 17 September 1985.

ment. Most of the newly added made it to the Thirteenth CC with only four (out of sixty) retiring. In contrast, 91 of 152 who had been elected in 1982 retired. Only six of the alternate members who had joined the CC in 1986 retired, whereas 52 out of 98 alternate members elected in 1982 resigned.

By the time the Thirteenth Party Congress was closed in October 1987, Deng Xiaoping had achieved a generational change in China's political leadership, the goal that even Mao had failed to achieve through his CR. Most of the first generation revolutionaries retired, and a new generation of leaders rose all the way to the standing committee of the Politburo, the innermost circle of power.

Tables 45 and 46 compare characteristics of CC member in 1982 with those in the Thirteenth CC in 1987—ministers, provincial party secretaries (the first party secretary system was abolished), and governors. They are the key decision-makers in the Chinese bureaucracy. Several observations can be made in connection with these tables.

First, all ministers, provincial secretaries, and governors have seats in the Central Committee. Unlike the radicals promoted by the Gang of Four to the CC in the Ninth and Tenth CC leaders have solid power bases in the formal bureaucracies of central and provincial organs. Although their prestige among subordinates and their informal power bases are not known, the fact that they hold concurrent positions in the CC and other power organs shows that they can exert substantial political influence.

Second, the average age of the new leaders now entrenched in power organs indicates that most of them joined the revolution in the latter part of the civil war or around the time of liberation. In contrast, except for the few still remaining in government positions, usually as chiefs of central government commissions, the anti-Japanese war generation has largely been removed from active duty. By and large, the majority of the top political elite (who were around twenty-three years old in 1949) belong to the postliberation generation. Some of them may have joined the revolution in the latter stages of the civil war, but those who have college degrees would have been students at that time.

Third, the average age of the four groups is similar, thus indicating that the regime's effort to lower the age at the top level was successful. Particularly amazing is the fact that the average age of

provincial secretaries is only fifty-six, lower than even government ministers. Except in the early stages, during the 1950s when the CCP was developing its institutional structures, top-level Chinese leaders have never been younger.

Fourth, their level of education appears to be quite high, although information is incomplete. It is likely that most of them have college-level educations, although only 100 CC members, sixteen secretaries and governors, and eighteen ministers have been positively identified as such. The new leaders are from the best-educated groups in China.

Fifth, 45 percent of the 1987 ministers, 25 percent of the secretaries, and 33 percent of the governors are engineers. If one adds the people with experience in economics and management, the number of those whose speciality is production increases to 70 percent of the ministers, 32 percent of the secretaries, and 50 percent of the governors. This represents the greatest change from the Maoist era. In contrast, there are only a few cadres with experience in overall political leadership—5 percent of the ministers, 36 percent of the secretaries, and 30 percent of the governors. Virtually none of the leaders has had any in-depth experience in the propaganda field. This illustrates the lessening importance of a political career as the required background for promotion to top leadership positions.

Sixth, only one person among the eighty top leaders has any career background in the military. He is Zhang Aiping, the minister of defense. In the coming years, the new leaders will probably face difficulties in dealing with the military.

Seventh, it is believed that the vice ministers, deputy secretaries, and vice governors, although not included in table 45, are younger than the other groups, as well as better educated—hence more competent functionally.

It is not only at the top level leadership positions of the party-state, but also at the basic levels and in the mass organizations that the technocrats were promoted to leadership positions. About one-half of the delegation to the Sixth National People's Congress had college-level educations, mostly in functional fields. Even the portion of intellectuals increased from 16 percent to 40 percent in the sixth political consultative conference.

According to a survey conducted by the statistical bureau of the

Ningxia autonomous government in 1985, more than one-quarter of all provincial intellectuals were promoted to leadership positions, and a majority of them were engineers and technical personnel.^[37] Another source reports that by March 1983, one-third of all high-ranking intellectuals in seventy-nine central units assumed leadership positions.^[38] Jiangsu province reports that 54 percent of all those who entered leadership positions in its department, municipality, and county levels were intellectuals.^[39] By 1986 about a half million young and middle-aged cadres had been promoted to leadership positions at the county level or higher. This figure equals all the government cadres with similar ranks, or 10 percent of all Chinese cadres with similar ranks.^[40] Most of the newly promoted leaders had studied science and technology. For instance, Shanghai reported that 70 percent of its bureau directors and 61 percent of its county-level standing committee members had majored in the natural sciences.^[41]

In brief, the best term for the newly emerging elite group is "bureaucratic technocrats" because they owe their rise not to any commitment to socialism, but to possession of the knowledge, skills, and expertise that China needs for economic development. They come mostly from the postliberation generation and the best-educated section of the population. About 100 of the 160 Thirteenth CC members have college-level educations, whereas only four out of every 1,000 Chinese have received a similar level of education. Less than half of these have specialities, mostly in engineering and other production-related fields. This is largely due to the shortage of trained experts in the "soft sciences" and to the present stage of China's industrialization, where increasing production is still the major concern. As the political elite, bureaucratic technocrats have two weaknesses. Very few of them have an in-depth knowledge of economics and management—"soft knowledge" in current Chinese terms.^[42] For instance, among 5,000 leaders of large state-owned enterprises, about 84 percent had career

[37] Ningxia Shehui Kexue Tongxin , no. 2, 1986, 8–16.

[38] Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao (Sichuan), 21 July 1985.

[39] Renmin Ribao , 23 October 1986.

[40] Hong Qi , no. 17, 1986, 11.

[41] Jiaoxue Cankao , no. 3, 1988, 18–27.

[42] Shehui Kexue Dongtai (Hubei), 1 June 1984.

backgrounds in science and engineering fields, whereas only 11 percent studied management.^[43] Also, having spent most of their careers as technical staff in functionally specialized organs, they have accumulated very little experience in overall administrative leadership.

Although bureaucratic reform has replaced old revolutionaries with bureaucratic technocrats in leadership positions, it did not have much impact on the age and educational structure of the cadre corps as a whole, simply because of limited educated manpower. As far as the size of the bureaucracy is concerned, the reform is a "total failure," particularly at the provincial level and below.^[44] After the reforms, the overall number of cadres increased from 20 million to 21 million and then to 29 million in 1988.^[45] The increase in cadre size pushed up administrative expenditures from 4.2 percent of the total government budget in 1978 to 6.8 percent in 1982, 7 percent in 1983, and 8 percent in 1985.^[46]

At another level is the fundamental problem of "offices standing like trees in a forest, organizations bloated, numerous layers, unclear responsibilities and tasks, and overstaffed bureaucracy." One Chinese scholar summarized the results of the reform in the following way:

Units that should be abolished are not abolished. On the surface the units are merged; but internally the size has increased. The original personnel have not been reduced; instead, they were internally absorbed. People continue to create works, and as a result, the seignorial and deputy positions are numerous. At lower levels administrative units set up many "general corporations," "leading small groups," and "management offices."^[47]

Some cynics argue that the reforms resulted in "three-too-manys and one-too-fews: more work, more offices, more cadres, but fewer people actually working." The effort to separate the party from the government and to develop a clear hierarchical command structure exacerbated the complexity of the bureaucracy. For in-

[43] Zhongguo Renshi Guanli , no. 7, 1987, 1–7.

[44] Jiaoyan Cankao , 1 February 1986; 15 April 1986.

[45] Huaqiao Ribao , 16 January 1988. For the Anhui provincial situation, see Zhongguo Renshi Guanli , 3 March 1987, 1–7.

[46] Jiaoyan Cankao , 15 April 1985; Renmin Ribao , 7 March 1985.

[47] Lilun Yu Shijian (Shenyang), June 1985, 18–19.

stance, before the reforms county-level authorities had only two systems: party committees and government organizations. But now there are five different sources of authority: party committees, the government, people's congresses, political consultative conferences, and disciplinary committees. As a result, according to China's own description, the bureaucratic structure is heavy at the top, like an "upside-down pyramid. Leading cadres are too many, and those who do actual work are too few."^[48]

The reform also did not change the tendency for each organization to maintain itself as a self-contained unit with a large number of support staff, virtually "owning the cadres" and workers, and practicing the "life-tenure" system.^[49] Overstaffed offices continue to "stand like trees in a forest," forming numerous layers. The phenomenon of "documents and conferences forming mountains and seas" persists. Many cadres still "spend half a day drinking a cup of tea, smoking a cigarette, and reading a paper of internal circulation."^[50]

Reform Strategy

If one follows Samuel Huntington's distinction between blitzkreig and Fabian approaches to reform strategy, the Chinese case approximates the latter.^[51] The regime carried out bureaucratic reorganization and leadership changes slowly but firmly, step by step, level by level, and area by area, employing a bureaucratic method to solve bureaucratic problems. Supplemented by heavy reliance on work teams sent out to lower levels, this organizational approach ensured the maximum influence of the top leaders.

The regime first readjusted the leadership at the central level and then set up a "small group to lead the leadership changes at the provincial level" with Song Renqiong as its head. This group carried out a pilot project in Sichuan province and distributed its results to other provinces as an example.^[52] Accordingly, each prov-

[48] Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 3, 1987, 34.

[49] Jingji Fazhan Yu Tizhi Gaige no. 7, 1986, 7–12.

[50] Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 2, 1978, 5.

[51] Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 346.

[52] Ibid.

ince prepared and submitted its reorganization plan to the central group for approval. The newly organized provincial leadership in turn carried out the leadership adjustment in their subordinate units according to specific guidelines set up by the central authority. They also organized "inspection teams"—staffed by cadres in the personnel field and retired senior cadres—which interviewed potential candidates for the lower-level leadership positions and gathered the masses' opinions of them.^[53]

Instead of aiming at the ambitious and risky goal of replacing all older cadres in each unit at once, the regime replaced them bit by bit, dividing each unit's potential political adversaries and dealing with them one by one. The method of "entrance first, and exit second," according to Deng Xiaoping, and "first adding and then subtracting" (xian zuo jiafa, hou zuo jianfa ), in Hu Yaobang's terms, enabled the regime to reduce the total number of leadership positions in each unit, to remove some incumbents—generally those politically unreliable, physically infirm, or less capable—and then to promote the younger and better qualified. Through this method the regime could first make the newly appointed a majority in each organ and then in the next stage replace those who survived the initial readjustment with younger people.

For reorganizing the local leadership, the central authorities issued several guidelines, which set up overall goals for the reorganization of provincial-, district-, municipal-, and county-level organs. The "Notice Regarding the Opinion of Reshuffling the Provincial-Level Leading Groups" limited the number of provincial secretaries for each province to four to five, set the maximum age of the first party secretary at sixty-five, and stipulated that new leading groups should include "various specialists familiar with the works of industry, agriculture, culture, education, and science and technology."^[54] Limiting the number of secretaries to three to five, the guidelines for municipal-level reforms prescribed that at least 50 percent of the municipal leadership have an educational level higher than senior high school, that none of them exceed the age of sixty, and that those under fifty constitute 50 percent. For

[53] Guizhou Nianjian , 292.

[54] Xingzheng Guanlixue Ziliao Huibian (Hunan: Hunansheng Bianzhi Weiyuanhui Bangongshi, 1985), 50–78.

the district party, the standing committee member system was abolished, one-third of party secretaries and administrative heads had to have a senior high school education, and more than one-third had to be under fifty.^[55] A similar guideline was issued on 1 December 1983 for the county-level leadership: the average age had to be forty-five and one-third had to have a college-level education. Even in selecting third-echelon cadres, the center apparently issued several specific guidelines with regard to requirements for age, education level, functional competency, and political reliability.

The official criteria used in selecting new leaders were commitment to reform, education level, professional competency, and age. Two of the four standards stress ability for cadre selection, whereas emphasis on the young amounts to rejecting the seniority system. Although a virtue criterion is retained, the new official criteria unquestionably marked a drastic departure from past practice by one-sidedly emphasizing political qualifications and seniority. The new standards attach more importance to ability than the Maoists did.^[56]

However, we do not know how much relative weight each of the four standards carried and how they were applied for each individual cadre selected to leadership positions. But the overall results of the bureaucratic reforms allow us to examine the changing weight of virtue, seniority, and ability.

Age and educational standards are both unambiguous and objective criteria. The regime tried to make the age structure of the leadership parallel the bureaucratic hierarchy. In other words, the average age of the lower-level leadership should be less than that of the superior unit. In addition, the regime intended to keep the age structure of a particular leadership group "ladder-shaped" by including old, middle-aged, and young people—a notion similar to the three-in-one formula advocated by the Gang of Four. Thus, the age requirement depended primarily on the leadership position in question.

Table 47 demonstrates small differences in age between those who were removed and those who were newly promoted in 1982. Those who were promoted to the leadership position were younger than those whom they replaced. Many of the old CC members

[55] Ibid.

[56] Renmin Ribao , 7 August 1985.

were transferred to the Central Advisory Commission. But the age consideration was not applied uniformly because some cadres younger than those who stayed in official posts were nonetheless removed. The average age of the CC members who lost their seats was lower than that for those members who survived. None of the Eleventh CC members with the record of rehabilitation failed to make it into the Twelfth CC despite their old ages.

A similar pattern can be observed for those who resigned from the CC in 1985 and those who stayed. Twenty-eight of the fifty-two senior leaders who were in their seventies retired, whereas only six out of twenty-two who were in their sixties resigned. The average age of the retired members was seventy-five. Age was a factor in determining who should stay and who should retire, and seniority ceased to work to the political advantage of the older cadres. Clearly, however, a political factor was also operative. Among the thirty-five senior cadres who had entered the Central Committee at the Eighth Party Congress (all of whom were over seventy), only eighteen retired, whereas seventeen stayed in 1982. Eight of the twelve leaders who survived the CR retired, whereas only ten out of the twenty-three rehabilitated senior leaders resigned in 1982. These figures indicate that the importance of age as a factor in determining who would stay varied depending on a cadre's rank: the higher one's rank, the less important age became; for the lower-ranking cadres, however, age was a crucial factor.

Although the regime heavily publicized "ability" (nengli ) as the

most important standard for personnel management and although Chinese intellectuals were fascinated with the "science of talent," and set up numerous study groups to do research on the topic, in the official media "ability" is only discussed in general terms as a capacity to work "efficiently . . . to finish an assigned task . . . to be 'bold in practical spirit' . . . [and] to make an actual contribution."^[57] Since "ability" can be measured only in relation to the specific task of each organ of the party-state and China has not yet achieved that level of organizational differentiation, "ability" is frequently equated with a much more easily measurable concept: educational level. This approach results in such simplistic views as the following: "the younger, the better," "the more educated the leadership, the better," and "the more persons with professional titles, the better." The regime promoted the educated and functional specialists with such zeal that it created shortages of experts in the fields in which the newly promoted had previously been working.

Professional competency is difficult to measure, particularly for outside observers. However, one can use professional titles and the possession of "practical knowledge" obtained through on-the-job training to determine the weight given to "professional competency" in the bureaucratic reforms. A large number (40 percent) of new ministers and vice ministers promoted in the 1982 readjustment had served as directors and deputy directors of functional bureaus of government ministries. If one includes those who had career experiences in functional departments at the provincial level as well as those with professional degrees—for example, engineers—in this category, the number of persons with long work experiences in a functional field rises to 71 percent. On the other hand, very few members of the State Council had a career background in the party secretaryship. Thirty-seven percent of provincial leaders in 1983 had once served as a director or deputy director of a functional department at the same level, while 29 percent were from secretary positions at lower levels.^[58]

In terms of functional areas, 60 percent of the ministers and vice

[57] Rencai Tiandi , 19 October 1985.

[58] Hong Yung Lee, "Evaluation of China's Bureaucratic Reforms," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , no. 4, 1984, 34–47.

ministers were identified as having work experience in production fields, that is, industry, agriculture, finance, and transportation. Among the subcategories of production, the majority had experience in production rather than planning, and surprisingly few people had work experience in agricultural fields. The number of people with experience in ideological and political fields was quite low: 18 percent among government leaders. In contrast, a high percentage (42 percent) of provincial party secretaries had career backgrounds exclusively in what can be considered political fields, positions in such organizations as the Secretariat, the organizational department, secretary general offices, and party committees at the lower level. Undoubtedly, the regime promoted many specialists without any overall administrative leadership experience to high-level decision-making posts several grades higher than their original ranks.

Although the regime publicly emphasized the importance of "being revolutionized" and insisted that it could be inferred from "one's political attitude and quality, ideological work style, and ideals," the category apparently worked only as a catch-all criterion for political qualifications. More specifically, the term referred to one's willingness to support the political and ideological line of the center, which was in turn often inferred from one's activities during the CR. Those who had enjoyed rapid promotion during the Gang of Four period failed to pass the test of being "revolutionized," in spite of their appropriate age and probable sufficient professional competence. On the other hand, for the group that was promoted during the reform period, evidence that they were not actively involved in past factional politics seemed to be good enough for them to pass the political test. In other words, the political requirement for promotion during the reforms was not a positive but a negative test of loyalty. The Deng group did not seem to demand that cadres be loyal to their group, but it did demand that they not be loyal to other groups such as the radicals or Mao. The Deng group did not need to require positive loyalty, for those cadres who owed their promotion to reform policy would support the group anyway.

In a sharp departure from the Maoist era, the official news media did not suggest that an understanding of Marxism-Leninism, dedication to the mass line, or a willingness to sacrifice

one's private interests should be used as indicators of political qualification. Even the "socialist principle" was infrequently mentioned. When it was, it was broadly interpreted to include any principle that "brings good fortune to the people, develops productivity, or contributes to socialist business."^[59]

This does not, however, mean that political qualifications ceased to be a factor; political factors were also operative. If a cadre was comparatively young, but his political loyalty was questionable (this group consisted mainly of those who had enjoyed rapid promotion before the ascendancy of the Deng group), he was removed or transferred to the less important Advisory Commission.^[60] Age did not help those with questionable political reliability—those who had enjoyed rapid promotion during the radical period. On the other hand, most rehabilitated cadres and all senior leaders who had entered the CC before the CR—including those who managed to stay in the CC up to the Eleventh CC and those who were purged and then rehabilitated to enter that CC—survived into the Twelfth CC or into the Advisory Commission. In contrast, people who first entered the Ninth CC had less chance of surviving than those who were first appointed to the Tenth or Eleventh CC.

Some conservative veteran leaders continue to regard "being revolutionized" as the most important criterion. "Those with virtue but without ability can be politically trusted. But unfortunately they cannot be given important responsibilities. It is dangerous to place those with ability but without virtue in key positions, because they can use their ability for bad purposes."^[61] By contrast, reformers tended to downgrade the importance of "being revolutionized," almost equating it to the ability to carry out reforms. Decision-makers therefore could readily exploit the ambiguity of the term to select whoever shared their own political views.^[62]

For a while the regime publicized the "pioneer type of personality"—the person with the courage and determination to challenge any such obstacles to reforms as "the old way of thinking, the unnecessary existing regulations, inertia, resistance, and

[59] Qunzhong , 13 February 1985, Dangde Shenghuo , no. 2, 1985, 5.

[60] Hong Yung Lee, "Evaluation."

[61] Renmin Ribao , 2 October 1982.

[62] Lilun Yu Shijian , 6 August 1986.

foot dragging."^[63] The official media also defended newly promoted reform-minded younger leaders (whom the old cadres criticised as "arrogant, impatient, and subjective") on the grounds that "thinking independently and persisting in the correct view is not arrogance."^[64] Praise of the pioneer type—reminiscent of the Gang of Four's "rebel spirit"—has recently disappeared from Chinese publications.

In addition to shifting emphasis from virtue to ability, the regime has made a great effort to broaden its search for the best qualified candidates. It has pledged to "end the past practice of searching secretly for candidates within each unit [by] completely disregarding the boundary between state-owned and collectively-owned, party members and nonparty members, regular college graduates and the self-educated." In order to discover "hidden talent," the provincial leaders frequently sent out inspection teams, and also divided the search among themselves.^[65]

Another method employed to broaden the search was to instruct lower-level units to submit names of possible candidates for positions at the upper levels. For instance, the central organizational department asked each province to recommend promising cadres.^[66] This method, if widely used, will allow the provincial leaders some input into the selection of central leaders. In fact, whether it is due to this process or not, many provincial leaders recently moved to central government positions.

The selection of new leaders was supposed to be a complex process involving many different parties in order to ensure a broad search for high quality. According to the official formula, the procedure for selecting reserve cadres involved "strict observation of new criteria for each cadre, adherence to the mass line, screening by the organization department, collective discussion of the matter by the party committee, and final review by the organization office of upper echelons."^[67]

Party leaders were told not to rely exclusively on personnel dossiers, but rather personally to conduct heart-to-heart talks with

[63] Renmin Ribao , 14 September 1984; Sichuan Ribao , 6 April 1983.

[64] Qunzhong , 31 February 1985; Renmin Ribao , 18 November 1984.

[65] Renmin Ribao , 20 November 1984.

[66] Ibid., 15 February 1985.

[67] Liaowang , 17 November 1986, 1.

candidates, to watch them at work, and to solicit opinions from those who knew the candidates personally.^[68] In some cases, the decision on one cadre required interviews with as many as sixty persons, including "superiors, colleagues, subordinates, school classmates, chauffeurs, service personnel, and family members, as well as his political opponents during the CR period."^[69] In addition, a public opinion poll was quite frequently used. For instance, the Anhui provincial party committee surveyed the opinions of more than 6,000 cadres and masses to draw candidates for provincial-level positions. Out of the several hundred candidates selected according to the poll scores, careful evaluation and screening finally produced twenty cadres for provincial top-level positions.^[70]

However, despite these efforts to broaden the search for talent, retiring cadres still exerted enormous power in selecting their own successors. Furthermore, there is ample reason to believe that nepotism has been widespread in personnel management. First, the official criteria were too broad and ambiguous, and candidates meeting the official criteria regarding age and education were too numerous. Second, involving diverse groups in the selection process and listening to divergent views tended to make the incumbents' opinions more decisive in the final selection.^[71] The regime's effort to formalize the evaluation of cadres by developing a multitude of criteria did not reduce the discretionary power of the incumbents. The frequently reported method of "public opinion polls" was ineffective because only decision-makers had access to the outcome of these polls, and there was no way of knowing whether the results were reflected in the actual cadre selection.

Retiring cadres frequently abused their authority despite the warning not to use their "personal feelings of like or dislike" or "whether or not a candidate complies with their personal views." "When recommending young cadres, a few old cadres do something not in line with the principle, or in obvious violation of the party principle, thereby creating controversy among colleagues and the people." Many incumbents selected their successors from

[68] Ibid., 20 November 1984.

[69] Ibid., 20 April 1984.

[70] Liaowang , 17 November 1986, 1.

[71] Ibid., 7 August 1985.

relatives, friends, and others whom they knew well, thus suffering from "the diseases of impression" and allowing "those who are close to the leadership to flourish."^[72] According to a Chinese maxim, "a dwarf general recruits only dwarf soliders"; thus, submissive comformists among the "better educated and younger in age" had a better chance for promotion.

Understandably, ordinary Chinese were not happy with the policy of allowing retiring cadres to choose their successors as an inducement to retire, labeling the practice "the director responsibility system" (shouzhang fuze zhi ), which was not much different from the feudal succession symbolized in Mao's statement—"with you in charge, I am at ease."^[73] The practice may turn out to be a costly concession for the Leninist Party organization because it encouraged the further "privatization" of official positions by officeholders, resulting in more fragmentation of the party's authority—which economic reforms have already substantially weakened.^[74]

In brief, the evidence indicates that the regime relied largely on such objective and universal criteria as age, educational level, and professional competency in making personnel changes. This use of nonpolitical and achievement-oriented criteria marked a sharp departure from the Maoist stress on virtue, which was open to subjective interpretation to such an extent that it gave rise to what Andrew Walder calls "principled particularism."^[75] This time the merit-based criteria were universal, but their application gave decision-makers a chance to incorporate their personal preferences. According to another Chinese maxim, "age is treasure, education helps, but the supporter is the most important," indicating that the regime skillfully made use of the particularistic application of universal criteria in order to mollify incumbent old revolutionaries and to consolidate the reformers' power base while bringing about fundamental changes in the cadre corps.^[76] As a result of the particularistic application of the universal criteria, some social groups benefited from the reform while others did not.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Jing Bao , 10 July 1985; Renmin Ribao , 9 June 1985.

[74] Lilun Naican , no. 5, 1986.

[75] Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

[76] Zhengzhi Yu Xingzheng Yanjiu , November 1985.

The losers are the middle or low-ranking administrative cadres who are fifty to fifty-five years old, those who started their careers at the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy in the 1950s when they were in their early twenties.^[77] As the requirements for cadre recruitment and promotion shifted to educational achievement and professional knowledge, it became obvious that this group of cadres—generally known as the "jack-of-all-trades campaign cadres"—had nothing to count on. They possess neither the necessary education level nor any special knowledge.^[78] They are not liberation cadres who participated in the civil war and hence are entitled to lixiu ; nor do they have the ability to contribute to the Four Modernizations. Worse still, they are too old according to the official age requirement. Thus, they consider themselves stuck in a "stopped elevator," "ships anchored in a harbor," or "trains stopped at the last station."

They try, however, to defend themselves by insisting that the practical knowledge that they accumulated during their prolonged careers should not be overlooked and that although their "biological age is old," ideologically they are not old. Since they have solved most of their family problems, such as raising children and getting them married, they are at the best stage in their life to concentrate their energy and attention on their work without being distracted by personal problems. Their hero is Chen Yun, who flatly declared, "Realization of the Four Modernizations should depend on the party's leadership. Some people are saying that most of our cadres are the cadres of 'medicine for all diseases.' According to my view, we cannot achieve the Four Modernizations without these cadres who are jacks-of-all-trades. We should not belittle the role of such cadres."^[79] Nonetheless, the campaign cadres are losing their position and influence, although they still constitute a major portion of China's middle-level cadres. Even if they manage to remain in their positions, none of the campaign cadres has managed to reach the top level. On the whole, the top-level leadership has

[77] For this type of cadre, see Dangde Shenghou , no. 12, 1983, 38–39; no. 13, 1983, 38–42.

[78] Some science and technical cadres in the middle-age bracket feel that they have no chance of moving up; they believe in "self-survival and self-dying." Renmin Ribao , 27 May 1985.

[79] Dangde Shenghou , no. 13, 1983, 42.

jumped over several generations of cadres, from the Long March generation to the postliberation generation.

The groups that have most conspicuously benefited from the new policy are the children and the former secretaries of high-ranking cadres, as well as former leaders of the Communist Youth League.^[80] It is easy to understand why children of high-ranking cadres have benefited most from the system.^[81] First, it was their parents who selected their own successors and who have access to information at the top level. Sometimes high-ranking cadres used their retirement as leverage to gain the appointment of their children to appropriate positions, although the dingti system was not officially applicable to cadre positions. Alternatively, they could use their extensive personal network by offering reciprocal favors to other decision-makers.

Most of the children of cadres could meet the official requirements of age and education. Since older cadres currently retiring are about sixty-five years old, their children fall within the forty-to-fifty-year-old age bracket. Their children were born in the Yanan period, and they finished their secondary education before 1966. Some of them went to the Soviet Union in the 1950s for further studies. In addition, these children meet the political requirements. Many of them participated in the CR at the initial stage, but they soon became targets of the mass movement as radical rebels led by children from less desirable classes rose to power. Thereafter, they were subjected to various types of political persecution during the Gang of Four era. Because of these hardships they are generally wary of excessive political struggle and disapprove of ideological orthodoxy. Furthermore, retiring cadres know that they will not be betrayed, politically or otherwise, if their children succeed them.

Political Implications

The bureaucratic reforms succeeded in replacing the revolutionary cadres with bureaucratic technocrats who are qualitatively differ-

[80] As criticism of the special privileges of the children of high-ranking cadres spread, the regime prohibited them from assuming important leadership positions without the approval of the center. Renmin Ribao , 2 February 1986.

[81] Jiushi Niandai , September 1985.

ent from their predecessors in terms of political experience, socialization, and value orientation. This rise of technical experts marks an end to the Maoist era associated with the former revolutionaries—originally recruited from the least educated and poorest segments of the population for guerrilla warfare. It also signals an end to the Maoist practice of selecting political leaders for their revolutionary potential rather than for the expertise needed to develop a modern society. Because they were chosen to help China's industrialization, bureaucratic technocrats have an incentive to continue the merit-based recruitment policy.

During Mao's era the revolutionary cadres possessed political power, whereas intellectuals with skill and knowledge functionally indispensable to the modern industrial society were not only completely excluded from political power but were also persecuted as the "stinking ninth category." To Maoist radicals, intellectual class interests were incompatible with those of poor peasants, and their knowledge enabled them to raise critical questions about the Maoist revolutionary approach. Although the CCP's bias against intellectuals originally came from Mao, it was largely supported by members who were recruited from the less educated and poorest sectors of the population. During the Maoist period, among the educated only ideologues whose major task was to manipulate Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought flourished politically.^[82] Not only did this practice end with the advent of the reforms, but also for the first time in Chinese history, a social group possessing the knowledge and skills necessary for modernization came to power.^[83]

Presently, bureaucratic technocrats are not completely free to exercise their political authority. Some newly promoted specialists feel that they are not given enough political authority and freedom to utilize their expertise.^[84] Old cadres continue to exert political influence: a few of them still remain in the Politburo and Secretariat; others have seats in the Central Advisory Commission; and the

[82] Among many absurd episodes of ideologues imposing their simplistic political criteria on educated sectors during the CR, the most revealing is that the Gang of Four rounded up about 613 professors in a surprise raid and then subjected them to a written test on politics and official ideology. Not surprisingly, only thirty-five passed. Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983.

[83] Huntington, Political Order .

[84] Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 21 July 1985.

bureaucratic revolutionaries are still well entrenched at the middle and lower levels. The old guard's political muscle was dramatically demonstrated in the dismissal of Hu Yaobang from the general secretaryship and the recent decision to recentralize economic authority.

Nonetheless, interference by old revolutionaries is a transitional phenomenon that will decline as time passes. Unlike Eastern European countries where technical specialists were gradually coopted into state organs dealing only with economic affairs, Chinese technocrats have infiltrated the highest political offices such as the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CCP.^[85] In addition, conservative leaders such as Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo were apparently not deeply involved in the selection of the new cadres. Even if they did have the power to select their own successors, to find someone who could have balanced the political and ideological requirements with the prerequisites of economic development would have been impossible. Moreover, there is ample indication that the bureaucratic technocrats are becoming more assertive vis-à-vis the old revolutionaries. The public media initially urged the old cadres to help the new generation of cadres "get on the horse and then see them sent off." But now, the slogan has changed to "help them to ride the horse and let them manage by themselves."

It is uncertain whether the bureaucratic technocrats have the leadership ability or political acumen to lead China through the multitude of contradictions inherent in these rapid social changes, while achieving unity among themselves, particularly when the senior leaders, now working as a centripetal force, disappear. Having been placed in political positions by rapid promotion that skipped several grades, many bureaucratic technocrats lack leadership experience. Some are simply unqualified for their political positions, and others are afraid of taking responsibility and so look to the revolutionary cadres to decide complex matters.^[86] Furthermore, among the bureaucratic technocrats there are many different groups with different policy preferences. To make mat-

[85] Ibid.

[86] Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 8 September 1985, 32–39; Renmin Ribao , 12 August 1985.

ters even more complicated, bureaucratic technocrats are supposed to work collectively, but the new leaders have not yet mastered the technique of reaching consensus among specialists in different fields. Already there are signs of policy disputes among the bureaucratic technocrats, for example, on price reforms.

The important point to remember, however, is that unlike the old revolutionaries who split over the fundamental goals of the regime, the technocrats agree on basic goals but disagree on the method to achieve them. This trend of viewing policy differences among themselves as a technical matter rather than as a matter of principle will confine the disruptive consequences of inner-elite conflicts.^[87] The promotion of technocrats to political positions is not based on their proven leadership ability but on the belief that their rigorous scientific training will enable them to grasp any problem in its totality and to find the solution through an analytical approach.^[88] It is hoped, therefore, that as time passes, the bureaucratic technocrats will expand their horizons from those of specialists to those of generalists or will combine their in-depth speciality with a broader view, in the manner of the Chinese figurative expression of "T-shaped knowledge," thereby acquiring political wisdom and insight.^[89]

Perhaps the most difficult question concerns the bureaucratic technocrats' ideology and leadership style. There is absolutely no data bearing on the direct implications of this issue, but much indirect evidence indicates that they are critical of the existing ideology. For instance, the ideological commitment of cadres since 1980 has been declining, and the younger generation is more critical of the socialist ideology than the old generation.^[90]

Three factors will probably determine the political value and leadership style of the bureaucratic technocrats. Their long experiences in bureaucratic settings will have fostered an organizational mentality, but the technical work they engaged in before will also

[87] For this point, see Jean Meynard, Technocracy (London: Faber & Faber, 1965), 134.

[88] For technical training and leadership capability, see Ezra N. Suleiman, Elites in French Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[89] For the issue of unqualified bureaucratic technocrats, see Ganxu Ribao , 28 September 1985; Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli , no. 12, 1986, 17–18.

[90] Hong Qi , no. 17, 1988, 11–12; Xinxiang Pinglun , no. 7, 1982, 13–14; Diaocha Yu Yanjiu , no. 12, 1986, 11–13.

have preserved an outlook derived from their professional training. Moreover, their own understanding of the role of political leaders will affect their actual behavior. Although it is obvious that bureaucratic technocrats as political leaders will experience cross-pressures between the demands of their professional backgrounds and their political role, there is no way of knowing the relative weight of these factors. However, if one uses Frederic Fleron's distinction between "cooptation" and "recruitment" as a measure of determining their outlook, the bureaucratic technocrats were co-opted rather than recruited. According to Fleron, those coopted into the political elite after serving a long time in a specialized professional position tend to bring their professional attitude to the new political roles.^[91]

One point is very clear. The bureaucratic technocrats have a better understanding and better qualifications to deal with such prerequisites of industrialized society as functional specialization, coordination of various parts, rational decision making, and problem solving. Moreover, as Thomas Baily argues, all "technical intelligentsias" are pragmatic in the sense that they resent the bureaucratic rules that have constrained their work in the past, attach priority to "getting the job done," and view ideology not as a dogma but as something to be interpreted flexibly for the economic goal.^[92] Similarly, it seems that bureaucratic technocrats in China share a relative indifference to politics and ideology, accompanied by the urge to get on with the accomplishment of professional tasks.^[93] Thus, they will probably prefer structured and orderly environments, opting for technical and piecemeal rather than comprehensive political solutions to China's problems.

Compared with old revolutionaries, the new leaders are more self-confident, less dependent on the party for guidance, urban-oriented, forward- and outward-looking, and with minimal emotional ties to or understanding of the rural peasants.^[94] At the same time, the new leaders also lack personal moral integrity and com-

[91] Frederic Fleron, "Representation of Career Types in the Soviet Political Leadership," in R. Barry Fareell, ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), 123–38.

[92] Thomas Baily, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 85.

[93] Ibid., 262.

[94] Xueshu Jiaoliu (Heilongjiang), no. 2, 1982, 38.

mitment to the Communist ideology that the old revolutionary cadres possessed. In the eyes of old revolutionaries, this quality has caused the widespread corruption and abuse of political authority for private gain by the new generation of leaders.^[95]

Being pragmatic does not mean being politically liberal. As "intelligentsia" rather than "critical intellectuals," using Alvin Gouldner's terminology, the new Chinese leaders are authoritarian in their political outlook and will utilize their expertise to improve and maintain rather than innovate and change the existing system.^[96]

Yet, a caveat: the new leaders are co-opted precisely because they promised to create new institutions and to promote economic development at a time when the old Maoist system was being thoroughly discredited. In this sense, they are quite different from the Brezhnev generation in the Soviet Union and the technical intelligentsia of the Eastern European countries who were recruited by the old leaders to run the existing system more effectively.^[97] The bureaucratic technocrats' lack of ideological commitment will help them to push for structural reforms.^[98] Moreover, in contemporary China, age and level of education are closely correlated with support of reforms: the younger and better educated are more likely actively to participate in reform efforts.^[99] The reason is simple: the better educated are more innovative, less persistent in old habits, and more cost-efficient, thereby benefiting more from reforms. In addition, the bureaucratic technocrats know that their political future is inextricably tied to the success of the Four Modernizations. Since the political ideology has been discredited and the party's charisma is fading, the bureaucratic technocrats must build legitimacy by delivering the promised economic benefits to all the Chinese people.

[95] Ningxia Shehui Kexue Tongxin , no. 2, 1986, 8–16.

[96] Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979).

[97] Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988).

[98] For the relationship between level of education and willingness to take risks, see Zuohao Zai Zhishifengzi Zhong Fazhan Dangyuan Gongzuo (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1985).

[99] For the relationship between education and attitude toward reforms, see Xueshi Yu Shijian , May 1985, 5.

12
Rebuilding the Party

Since Mao's death, the CCP has taken a series of measures designed to restore its credibility and legitimacy. As noted, it has rehabilitated the victims of past purges, reversed some past decisions, and upgraded the quality of the cadre corps. More important, it has critically appraised its past record in "The Resolution on Historical Questions."^[1] The party's willingness publicly to "correct its own mistakes," however, proved to be insufficient to regain the people's confidence. By the time the regime started the party rectification in 1984, the CCP was still so demoralized, factionalized, and confused that "the crisis in faith" had to be publicly discussed.^[2] Because of disenchantment and alienation, the ordinary Chinese person was apathetic and cynical, while the courageous openly declared their intention to "cut ties" (juejiao ) with the party.^[3] The intensive ideological education, careful screening, and reregistration of each party member in the three-year rectification campaign from 1984 to 1986 did not improve the party's organizational capability. When Deng Xiaoping wanted to suppress the student movement in 1989, he realized that the military, not the party, was the only reliable instrument for such purposes.

This chapter analyzes, first, the existing structure of the party membership; second, the new recruitment policy; third, the party's effort to revitalize itself through the rectification campaign; and, last, the basic dilemma facing the Leninist Party as it tries to lead China to economic development while maintaining its Leninist tradition.

[1] For the document, see Beijing Ribao , 6 June 1980, 10–39.

[2] Wenhui Bao , 13 June 1980; Beijing Ribao , 31 January 1980.

[3] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 1, 1984, 18; Zhengdang yu Jiandang , 16 April 1986, 26.

Characteristics of Party Members

As of 1985, the Chinese Communist Party had about 42 million members in 2.57 million branches.^[4] Organized by geography and function, party branches exist in every locality and functional unit, except in places (such as government ministries) where the party core group (dangzu ) exercises leadership. Most of them are male, and the percentage of females ranged from 13.5 percent in Sichuan province to 12 percent nationwide.^[5]

Distribution

As table 49 demonstrates, most party members are peasants: 17.77 million (45.5 percent). Despite the impressive statistics they are still underrepresented: only 0.4 percent of the total peasant population are party members. In contrast, 8.8 percent of all Chinese workers are party members. The membership rate in the military is quite high; if one assumes that the total PLA strength is 4.2 million, almost of half of all those in uniform are party members. If one

[4] Nongmin Ribao , 4 December 1985.

[5] Renmin Ribao , 1 December 1983; Sichuan Ribao , 30 June 1984.

takes into account the difference between enlisted men and officers, it is very likely that almost all officers are party members.

About 9.9 million party members (25.5 percent) are unaccounted for. In all probability, the remaining group consists of party members among cadres. If so, the membership rate among administrative cadres (12 million) is 83 percent. This estimate approximates Zhao Ziyang's report that 69 percent of all cadres in the state organs are party members and that the rate of membership is much higher among the leading cadres of the state organs.^[6] Inner Mongolia reports that all provincial-level leading cadres, all mayors and deputy mayors (except for two) in twelve municipalities, and all magistrates and deputy magistrates (except for two) in 100 counties are party members. Among directors and deputy directors of the approximately 100 bureaus that are directly under provincial supervision, only fourteen are nonparty members, and nine of these are newly retired.^[7]

The percentage of party members among specialists is reportedly 3.09 million (7.8 percent), which constitutes only 13 percent of all specialists (26 million in the 1982 census). Another source reports that about 23 percent of 10.18 million functional cadres were members in 1983.^[8] At 23 percent, the party membership rate is higher than in other occupational groups, but much lower than among administrative cadres.

Distribution of party members among the functional areas varies from sector to sector.^[9] The membership rate is higher in the industrial sector, for instance, than in educational institutions. Membership among high school and middle school teachers is only 8 percent, whereas it ranges from 25 to 40 percent in industrial enterprises.

In individual enterprises, the membership rate varies greatly from factory to factory. On the whole, the rate is higher in heavy industry than in light industry. For instance, only 4.1 percent of workers in the Shanghai Seventeenth Textile Factory are party

[6] Renmin Ribao , 17 March 1989.

[7] Shijian , no. 6, 1982, 8–10.

[8] In 1981, the total number of those who were specialized technical people (zhuanye jishu ganbu ) was 8.35 million, 1.85 million (22.2 percent) of whom were party members. Zhongong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai Zhishifenzi Zhong Fazhan Dangyuan Gongzuo (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1985), 65.

[9] Gongchandangyuan , nos. 11–12, 1985, 22.

members, whereas almost 66 percent of workers in the Sea Transportation Companyare reportedly members (see table 50). The low level of party membership in the textile factory can be attributed to the fact that the majority of workers in this sector are female—a group with a low rate of membership. The second lowest rate was found in the Shanghai Department Store—also composed of female workers. Within each factory, the membership rate of management is almost three times higher than that of workers, and the difference appears to be growing. In the Anshan Steel Mill (dangang ) and in the Daqing Oilfield, two of every three management cadres are party members.

Table 51 reflects the changing emphasis in the regime's recruitment policy. The rate of membership among production workers reached its highest point (26 percent) in 1978, probably reflecting the Gang of Four's leftist recruitment policy, whereas the rate in 1981 dropped substantially to 17.9 percent. The current party membership rate among production workers is likely to be lower than the indicated figure. The percentage of technical personnel has been rising steadily, thus indicating that the Gang of Four's anti-intellectual policy did not affect a technocrat's chance to join the party. What is most striking is the fluctuation of party membership among management personnel. Undoubtedly due to the leftist policy of the CR, the percentage among them reached the lowest point (43.5 percent) in 1978, but it increased to 67.2 percent by 1981. At the moment, it is likely that the percentage has increased among management cadres, as well as among technical cadres. It is worth noting that the ratio of party membership to management personnel has been consistently higher than that of any other category.

Among intellectuals, the membership rate varies depending on the age group. For instance, 48 percent of older intellectuals (those who graduated from college before 1949) are party members, whereas only 20 percent of those who graduated from college between 1950 and 1966 are members in Shanghai.^[10] Twenty-five percent of those who graduated from college after 1978 are members. Two factors account for this variation. First, age is closely related to professional ranking. In the past few years, the regime has endea-

[10] Zhongong Zhongyang Zuzhibu, ed., Zuohao Zai , 183.