The "Two Whatevers" and "Practice"

The fundamental differences between the beneficiaries and victims of the CR were brought into sharp focus by the seemingly innocuous question, what constitutes the criteria for determining truth? The beneficiaries took the position that "whatever Chairman Mao said and decided" should be upheld, whereas the rehabilitated emphasized "practice" (shijian ) as the "sole criteria for empirical truth."

The beneficiaries coined the phrase "the two whatevers" (liang ge fanxi ) to use as "the basic weapon" for rejecting demands to reinstate Deng Xiaoping and to reverse the decision about the Tiananmen Square incident.^[40] By contrast, pragmatic Deng Xiao-

[37] For instance, see ibid., 14 April 1978 for the several investigations carried out by the Nanjing municipal party committee.

[38] Renmin Ribao , 13 May 1978; 20 January 1979.

[39] They were (1) thorough investigation of those who joined the Gang of Four to seize power, (2) criticism of the Gang's revisionist line, (3) readjusting the makeup of the leadership group by expelling Gang followers, (4) complete rehabilitation of cadres who had suffered as a result of false charges or mistaken or wrong decisions, (5) restoration of the good traditions of the party, and (6) unity and stability. Renmin Ribao , 5 January 1979.

[40] Dangshi Tongxun , no. 2, 30 January 1983; Cankao Ziliao , 24 March 1963.

ping (who reportedly declared even before the CR that regardless of whether it is black or white, any cat that catches a mouse is a good cat) had many reasons to stress "practice." Even before his official rehabilitation, he allegedly objected to "the two whatevers" view in his letter to the party center.^[41] No sooner had he been rehabilitated than he publicly argued that the essence of Mao Zedong's thought was to "seek truth from facts."

The final showdown between "the two whatevers" and "practice" views took place at a work conference organized to discuss the upcoming third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress (held from 10 November to 15 December 1978). According to official Chinese sources, Hua Guofeng initially objected to the idea of convening the conference, and when the meeting was held, he tried to limit discussion to economic questions. Once the meeting began, however, many veteran leaders demanded that "some historical problems" be discussed. For instance, Chen Yun argued (in his speech to the northeastern group) that prior to discussing economic issues, some remaining historical cases should be resolved. "Without resolving these questions, there is no way of unifying the entire people." In particular, he raised questions about six cases: (1) the case of sixty-one counterrevolutionary people including Bo Yibo, (2) the central organizational department's seventy-seven decisions made in 1937 and the wrong decision made in 1940 about the "two political systems," (3) the problems of Tao Zhu and Wang Hoshou, (4) the Peng Dehuai problem, (5) the Tiananmen Square incident, and (6) the question of Kang Sheng. Other veteran cadres followed Chen Yun by tabling a motion to discuss the "January Power Seizure," the "February Adverse Current," the "Campaign to Criticize Deng," and even the question of the CR and Mao himself. The heated debate between the two groups lasted thirty-six days—"the longest meeting after the fall of the Gang of Four"—finally adjourning after deciding that everybody would be allowed to speak freely on these issues at the third plenum.^[42]

The third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, which some Chinese regarded as the "Second Zunyi Conference" (Mao emerged as the supreme leader of the CCP after the first Zunyi Conference

[41] Daily Report , 24 August 1981; Renwu , no. 1, 1982, 10.

[42] Dangshi Tongxun , no. 2, 20 January 1983.

in 1935), was a watershed in many regards. It adopted economic development as the regime's ultimate goal, while promising not to use mass movements as a means to implement policy. At the meeting, the balance of power tilted toward the rehabilitated cadre group, and Deng Xiaoping emerged as the number one leader. Old cadres like Huang Kecheng, Wang Renzhong, Hu Yaobang, and Yang Shangkun regained not only their honors but also important government and party positions. Hu was elected to the Politburo and appointed third secretary of the disciplinary committee. By contrast, although many beneficiaries retained their seats on the Politburo or the Central Committee, they lost other powerful and influential positions.

In retrospect, Hua Guofeng's chance of survival was always slight. The purge of the Gang of Four, whose ideology was further left than his own, exposed him to political pressure from the right. Once their common enemy was overthrown, Hua's group did not have the leverage to keep the old cadres behind him. Although the survivors initially made efforts to bring Hua's group and the rehabilitated cadres together, they chose the rehabilitated over the beneficiaries when they were forced to make a choice, because the beneficiaries lacked deep personal ties among themselves—ties that would have reinforced political ties. Many of them had not even had work relations before being promoted to leading positions at the center, and after Mao's death they did not have any patron to bind them together. Without such informal ties, no beneficiary was willing to risk his chance to survive individually by backing another.

Neither did the beneficiaries have enough time to develop a broad power base in the party-state bureaucracy, although some had support in the provinces from which they originally came (e.g., Hunan for Hua Guofeng, Henan for Qi Denggui). Their relation to military leaders at central and local levels was very tenuous. In addition, they could not resort to mass mobilization, the method that the radicals used for inner party struggles. Moreover, they did not even have any mass constituency to mobilize (because most Chinese people were thoroughly disenchanted with the CR). The beneficiaries, therefore, pursued the strategy of defense and compromise, yielding to the pressure of their adversaries on issue after issue. In turn, the rehabilitated effectively used a guerrilla strategy

of nibbling at the beneficiaries' power base and then finally destroying them as a coherent political group. The rehabilitated cadres, with more political experience, a stronger power base in the bureaucracy, and higher prestige positions, were destined to win once Deng Xiaoping was reinstated for the second time.