3
The King's Man
Early in the summer of 1554 the Infante Don Carlos, a boy of nine, was brought to the Castilian town of Benavente. There he awaited his father, Prince Philip, who would pass through en route to La Coruña and thence to England and his marriage to Queen Mary. The town had been richly decorated in preparation for this royal reunion and farewell. As they entered Benavente the members of the infante's 's household were impressed by the great houses, some of them "very sumptuous," that lined the main street. They were particularly pleased by the facades of the houses on the right-hand side, which had been decorated with "very finished and beautiful effigies, in the style of medallions." On the upper level were depicted the emperor, Prince Philip and Don Carlos; below them were six portraits of court luminaries, including, in a central position, a likeness of Ruy Gómez de Silva.[1]
This was a striking indication of the public stature of the newly married Ruy Gómez. Evidently the count of Benavente and the leading citizens of his town numbered the Portuguese courtier among the handful of men closest to Philip. Only certain knowledge of the prince's partiality to Ruy Gómez could have induced them to have his portrait placed alongside those of men of much nobler lineage, like the count of Feria and the marquis of Pescara. His position was secure, at least to the extent that no one would openly question that he belonged in such company. This evidence is borne out by the events of the 1550s, for as Philip assumed the kingship of his far-flung realms, Ruy Gómez de Silva became ever more clearly his chief minister and confidant.
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The ink was barely dry on his own marriage contract when Ruy Gómez de Silva set out for Portugal in the summer of 1553 to conclude a match between Prince Philip and the Portuguese Infanta María. That Ruy Gómez was entrusted with such a mission reflects the prince's confidence in him as well as his obvious qualifications as an emissary to the court of Lisbon. The negotiations were slowed, however, by wrangling over the dowry. Still, the marriage had nearly been agreed in August 1553 when Philip became aware of the opportunity presented by the accession of Mary Tudor to the English throne. The prince quickly and rather clumsily suspended the Portuguese negotiations and thus freed himself to seek the hand of the English queen.[2]
The arrangements for the English marriage were made in the subsequent fall and winter by representatives of the emperor's court in Brussels, most notably the imperial ambassador in London, Simon Renard. Neither the prince nor his advisers actively participated in the negotiations. Philip's misgivings about the match are well known, but, as an obedient son, in the end he resolved to play the part the emperor had assigned him. Nevertheless, he delayed half a year (purposely, in the view of many observers) before finally leaving Spain for England in mid-July 1554.[3]
Ruy Gómez de Silva was a member of the entourage that accompanied Philip to England, along with the other prominent household officials—Alba as mayordomo mayor, the caballerizo mayor Don Antonio de Toledo, the chaplain Fray Alonso de Castro—and a sizable portion of their staffs. A considerable number of grandees also elected to make the trip, doubtless attracted by the liberal ayudas de costa Philip promised all members of the retinue, and encouraged by the consideration that those who remained in Spain would be cut off from other forms of the prince's patronage.[4] Philip anticipated that his entire entourage would amount to about 3,000 people and 1,500 horses and beasts of burden. He seems to have regarded this as a rather austere following: "I am persuaded to take only the members of my household since, being few in number, it will be that much more possible to govern and get along according to the custom of the natives."[5]
This question of adaptability to English ways troubled a Spanish observer in London in early 1554. Don Juan Hurtado de Mendoza advised the bishop of Arras that Philip "must bring no soldiers, and
only such courtiers as are prepared to be meek and long-suffering."[6] This was a tall order, given the temperament of the Castilian nobles. Not surprisingly, friction between the Spaniards and their hosts in England was considerable. Some felt slighted because the English household appointed by Mary had usurped many of their customary duties at Philip's side. Ruy Gómez de Silva complained that "if any of our number attempts to perform any service, they [the English staff] take it ill and do not wish to allow it to be done." The bulk of the household brought from Castile were left stranded along Philip's route inland and were not even present at the wedding in Winchester.[7] Obviously they were resentful at this exclusion from the festivities. One Spaniard grumbled that even Alba, the mayordomo mayor, was not being allowed to fulfill all of his duties. When the king dined in public, attended by Englishmen, the duke "did hand him the napkin, but did not act as master of the household nor carry his staff of office."[8]
The same writer expressed scorn for the great English lords. Pembroke and Arundel passed for "the greatest men of the realm at present, though their incomes are not more than 25,000 ducats."[9] This accusation was perhaps based on wishful thinking inspired by jealousy rather than on factual knowledge. Ruy Gómez de Silva was more concerned that the Spaniards would fail to impress the English with their grandeur. In late July he wrote Francisco de Eraso about his impressions of the English character and his anxieties on this score:
Most seasonable was the grant of the Kingdom of Naples that His Majesty made to the King [Charles V gave Philip Naples and the Duchy of Milan as a wedding present[10] ] and, as such, they [the English] have greatly appreciated it here. It was opportune because the greater the prospect of receiving more favors, the more content they are. Upon my faith, even though interest is a powerful motive in all lands, it is nowhere in the world stronger than here, where nothing is done well except with cash in hand. We have all brought with us so little money that, if they tumble to the fact, I do not know if we will escape alive; at the very least, we will be without honor, since in their disappointment they will flay us mercilessly.[11]
There is no further reference to the penury of the Spanish courtiers, but this condition, combined with their worries that the English household rendered them superfluous and compounded by linguis-
tic difficulties, must have left the Spaniards anxious and uncomfortable during much of their stay.
They also feared for their personal safety and lamented the lawless nature of the English in terms reminiscent of the complaints of subsequent English travelers in Spain. "There are plenty of robbers on the roads here," wrote one Spaniard,
and they have attacked several persons, among them a servant of Don Juan Pacheco, the marquis of Villena's son, from whom they stole 400 crowns and all the gold and silver objects he had with him. Not a trace has been found of all this property nor of four chests belonging to His Highness's household, though the Queen's Council do take certain precautions.
He concluded sadly that "the wise thing to do here is to imitate the English and go home early."[12] Ruy Gómez also took up this theme and compared the English with the Spanish brand of thievery. "There are some great thieves among them," he remarked to Eraso, "and they rob in plain view, having the advantage over us Spaniards that we steal by stealthy contrivance and they by main force."[13] Later in the summer it proved impossible to arrange suitable accommodation for all of the Spanish courtiers at Hampton Court, and the queen was apprised "that certayne disorderes hath risene in lodgeing of sundrye noblemen and gentlemen of the kinges trayne."[14] A joint committee of English privy councilors and Spaniards, including Ruy Gómez, determined to house part of the entourage in the neighboring countryside, at least in part "to protect them from the rapacity of the people."[15] Despite this attempt to alleviate friction the Spanish courtiers remained very uncomfortable; one wrote that "we are all desiring to be off with such longing that we think of Flanders as paradise." Many of the aristocrats who had accompanied Philip—among them the duke of Medinaceli, the marquises of Pescara and Las Navas, and the Netherlandish count of Egmont—applied for and received permission to leave England for the emperor's court. By 17 August only the key household officials, Alba and Ruy Gómez in particular, and the counts of Feria and of Olivares, remained as major figures at Philip's side. Joined by Don Pedro de Córdoba, these men seem to have comprised Philip's unofficial Spanish council thereafter.[16]
The shared discomfiture of the remaining Spaniards did not put an end to internecine rivalries. The ordinary strife of ambitious
courtiers was complicated by the presence of another divided court at the emperor's residence in Brussels. Philip, though he now was king of Naples, duke of Milan and consort of England in his own right, was still clearly subordinate to his father.[17] At the same time the emperor's ill health (and intimations of his abdication) turned the thoughts of his servants to the coming reign and to strategies for enhancing or perpetuating their own influence within it. The intrigues of the time are confusing, not least because much of the pertinent documentation was lost,[18] but the courtiers, in England and Flanders alike, seem to have divided into two basic groups. One tendency was represented by the duke of Alba at Philip's court and, less overtly, by the bishop of Arras in Brussels. These seasoned courtiers seem to have staked their fortunes on a perception of Philip as a weakling who would be overawed by their experience and thus easily dominated. They counted on the notion that Philip's filial devotion would extend to his father's preferred counselors, and they probably believed that they would be even more indispensable to a young king. They desired and expected continuity in the personnel of government and the distribution of power at court. The other group, prominently including Ruy Gómez de Silva in England and Francisco de Eraso at the imperial court, acted on what may have been a more subtle appreciation of Philip's character. Their program was to exploit his resentment at the condescension of his father's servants and to build his confidence, hoping that Philip in power would be grateful to those who had helped him to assert his independence. They were the party of change, desiring the establishment under Philip of a new ministerial team, dominated by themselves.
A close analysis of all the personalities involved and of their positions on tangled issues of policy would not suit present purposes.[19] Instead, the focus here will be on the means by which Ruy Gómez secured the ascendancy over Philip that he enjoyed in the first years of the new reign. Although Ruy Gómez had enjoyed close personal relations with Philip at least since the late 1540s, his role in the actual operation of government had remained limited. In England, as previously in Castile, his principal rival for preeminence among the prince's entourage was the duke of Alba. Charles V, realizing his son's misgivings about the English marriage and hoping to avoid a repetition of the poor impression made by Philip during his tour
of the northern kingdoms five years before, had entrusted Alba, as mayordomo mayor , with the task of maintaining discipline among the Spanish courtiers in England. "I implore you," wrote the emperor, "to take the measures you deem fitting to gain reputation and maintain the good opinion" of the English people.[20] In particular the emperor charged Alba with keeping an eye on Philip: "Duke, for the love of God, see to it that my son behaves in the right manner; for otherwise I tell you I would rather never have taken the matter in hand at all."[21]
Despite recent attempts to rehabilitate Alba, there is no reason to question the verdict of the Venetian ambassador who described the duke as "presumptuous, swollen with pride, consumed with ambition, given to flattery and very envious. . . . He is not well-liked at Court, for many there deem him heartless and imprudent."[22] Such a man seems a poor choice to appoint as a watchdog for a mature prince, jealous of his dignity and prerogatives. The emperor was not unaware of the duke's character. A decade previously he had warned Philip against becoming too dependent on Alba, who
claims extravagant things, and attempts to swallow up all that he can, despite having appeared crossing himself, very humble and otherworldly. Observe, son, that he will place himself near you who are younger. You must guard against placing him or other grandees in the inner circle of government, since he and they will proceed by all possible means to get their way from you, which will cost you dearly later.[23]
Charles proved an apt prophet, and Alba's haughty demeanor angered the prince even as a youth.[24] The duke grew no more tactful as Philip matured and became increasingly conscious of his regal status. Alba habitually addressed Philip, even when the latter had become king, as "son." This condescension was not made more palatable by the duke's explanation that it was a sign of his great personal affection for Philip.[25] The proud prince was prepared to accept paternal guidance from Charles V alone.[26]
As a young man Philip had far less personal contact with Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, the bishop of Arras, but nonetheless he conceived a dislike for him as well. At least in the 1550s Arras was less bluntly patronizing toward Philip than was Alba; it has been justly noted that "he did not hesitate to stoop to the lowest forms of flattery in order to curry favour." Still, the prince remained cool toward
him, and many years were to pass before Arras (Cardinal Granvelle from 1561) was valued by Philip as he had been by Charles V. Arras enjoyed both a keen intelligence and a very high opinion of himself, and he may well have initially alienated Philip by condescending to him in 1549 during the prince's painful progress through the Low Countries. That the prince disliked Arras should not be surprising; the arrogant bishop had made many enemies during his precocious rise to power.[27]
One such enemy was the secretary Francisco de Eraso, who was Arras's principal rival at the court of Brussels by the time of the English marriage. The power struggle between these two men, envenomed by a bitter personal enmity, persisted for more than a decade and left its marks on Philip's policy in the Netherlands and elsewhere.[28] Eraso had strengthened his position vis-à-vis Arras by maintaining access to Charles V during the emperor's severe illness and depression in 1553 and early 1554—for months, Charles effectively refused to see anyone except the secretary and his sister Mary.[29] The canny secretary had also begun to exploit, to Arras's detriment, a rift between the bishop and his countryman Simon Renard (both were franche-comtois ), which arose in part from their conflicting claims to credit for arranging the English marriage.[30] Meanwhile, looking ahead to the inevitable succession, Eraso had cultivated an alliance with the one man at Philip's court whose long-term interests most neatly dovetailed with his own—Ruy Gómez de Silva.[31] Even before the English match Ruy Gómez and Eraso had schemed to minimize Arras's influence over Philip.[32]
Arras and Alba also shared an obvious common interest in maintaining their influence through the transition between reigns.[33] Both men could count on continuing to prosper under Charles but might face different circumstances under Philip. In Alba's case, arrogance seems to have dulled the recognition that things might change when Philip came to power. Arras made some attempt to woo the prince—or at least to rehearse for the leading role he envisioned for himself in the coming regime—by adapting to Philip's well-known predilection for Spanish ways and interests. Alone among the emperor's Burgundian intimates, Arras went to the trouble to learn Castilian and began to expound an hispanocentric vision of the empire similar to Alba's. These gestures failed to win the prince's affection and succeeded only in straining relations between Arras and the Bur-
gundian and Flemish courtiers, who were already arrayed in ethnic mistrust of the Castilian heir-apparent and his peninsular advisers.[34] Alba hardly tried and Arras failed to overcome the personal traits that had alienated the prince. At the same time, neither the duke nor the bishop was as well situated to know and exploit the prince's feelings and resentments as was Ruy Gómez, who assisted at Philip's dressing and undressing and slept in his antechamber, nor were they as close to the emperor in his last years as was Eraso.[35] In any case, Alba and Arras did not work together to maintain their positions half as effectively as Eraso and Ruy Gómez toiled to supplant them. For the most part these senior counselors seem to have assumed that power over Philip was their due and would fall into their hands like a ripe fruit. They were mistaken, and they did not comprehend until it was too late that Eraso and Ruy Gómez had darted in to snatch the prize from their grasp.
During Philip's first stay in England (July 1554 to September 1555) Eraso and Ruy Gómez de Silva labored assiduously to project a positive image of Philip's behavior and acumen in his sensitive role as Mary's consort. In contrast to the more pessimistic dispatches of Renard and others and to his own private observations on the Spaniards' reception in England, from the very outset of the English sojourn Ruy Gómez sent glowing reports of Philip's actions to Brussels:
The Queen is very happy with the King, and the King with her; and he strives to give her every possible proof of it in order to omit no part of his duty. . . . [T]he best of it is that the King fully realizes that the marriage was concluded for no fleshly consideration, but in order to remedy the disorders of this Kingdom and preserve the Low Countries.[36]
and
his [Philip's] dealings with the English lords are such that they themselves say that England has never had a King who has so rapidly won the hearts of everyone. . . . I believe what they say because of what I see of His Highness's actions towards them. In every letter he writes, His Majesty [Charles] should not fail to praise his son for this nor to urge him not to tire in such behavior, for it is certain that he [Philip] knows how to behave marvellously if he so desires.[37]
In another passage Ruy Gómez lauds Philip's treatment of Mary and incidentally gives a glimpse of his own intimacy with his master, who must have been telling tales out of school:
He skillfully amuses the Queen and well knows how to pass over her defects from the standpoint of the carnal sensibility. He maintains her in such happiness that, in truth, the other day when they were by themselves she very nearly spoke loving endearments to him, and he responded in kind.[38]
Clearly these words of praise were meant for the emperor's ears and wider circulation at court. In the same vein, Ruy Gómez contended a few weeks later that Philip's arrival in London had quieted the inhabitants' unrest, attributed rather dubiously to their resentment at being denied the presence of their beloved king.[39]
In these months rumors circulated widely that the emperor meant to retire soon.[40] His work habits had become extremely lackadaisical, with his secretary for Italian affairs complaining that Charles had refused to resolve individual petitions from the peninsula for nearly four years.[41] By September Arras seems to have believed that Charles had in fact decided upon abdication.[42] Although he had been very close to Charles during his illness and thus was alert to the emperor's weariness, Eraso was less certain that the retirement was imminent, and Ruy Gómez, hearing the rumors, excoriated the secretary for keeping him and Philip in the dark. It appears, however, that Eraso was correct—Rodríguez-Salgado concludes that "abdication gradually emerged in the course of 1555 as the most suitable option"[43] —and the allies continued to act on the assumption that Charles would delay his abdication until he was convinced that Philip was competent to assume his responsibilities. The emperor's charge to Alba to watch over Philip clearly demonstrates that he had serious reservations about his son's aptitude for governing northern European subjects.[44] The prince's comportment in England would be eagerly studied by his tired father for signs that he could conscientiously lay down his regal burdens. Therefore, Ruy Gómez and Eraso set out to present Charles with evidence of his son's competence. At the same time, other courtiers, like Arras, might find themselves better served were the abdication postponed as long as possible.[45] Via Ruy Gómez, Eraso had received assurance that Philip would retain him in a major administrative
post;[46] others had no such guarantees. The dynamics of this situation—complicity between Eraso and Ruy Gómez, the mounting success of their campaign on Philip's behalf, the emperor's paternal and self-interested desire to think well of his son's capabilities and Arras's discomfiture over this issue—are illustrated in a letter from Eraso to Ruy Gómez of 29 November 1554. The secretary had recently been in England carrying despatches from the court; upon his return to Brussels he informed Ruy Gómez that
I made a verbal report to the Emperor of such things as seemed to me essential in praise of our master [nuestro amo , i.e., Philip], touching upon the skillful manner in which he conducts himself and manages all affairs, and the care and steady tenacity with which he negotiates, and the rapid resolutions and decisions he makes, and his excellent desires and designs and their execution insofar as it lies within his power, and the prudence with which he handled the religious question. . . . I told likewise of the peaceful state of affairs that prevailed over there, and of how beloved and well-liked the King is, by the illustrious and the commons alike, and of the good treatment that he accords everyone, as well as the fact that he has acquired much credit for his management of justice.[47]
The reference to Philip as "our master" is suggestive, given that Eraso had for years been one of the emperor's closest advisers.[48] Charles V's response to the secretary's paean must have been deeply gratifying to these allies who so clearly had cast their lot with Philip:
His Majesty [Eraso continues] heard all these things very attentively and with singular satisfaction, and he was even more content that the King should enjoy such great credit with the Queen, and that everyone knows it to be so, and that he goes out among the public very freely and they marvel at this, which is one of the reasons why they hold him in such esteem. Finally, having gone over all this with His Majesty, he responded that he gave great thanks to God for the favor shown him in this, and that truly the King had changed greatly.
This triumph was made more delicious by the opportunity to repeat this happy report to some of his adversaries at the court:
And at this point the Queen [Charles's sister Mary], M. de Prats [Praet] and the bishop of Arras came in, and His Majesty ordered that I should repeat for them the points I had made; and even though the speech was in "coarse Castilian" ["çafio castellano"] I emphasized everything in such a manner that I think there was no lack of comprehension of that which suits us.[49]
Presumably the emperor stood by, beaming with paternal pride, while Eraso clearly relished the telling. One can imagine that Arras viewed this scene with a sinking premonition of his future and had to struggle to mold his features to the proper cheerful aspect. Resentment at Burgundian condescension resonates in Eraso's remark about "coarse Castilian." It was sweet indeed that Philip's Spaniards were winning the struggle for Charles's heart and that Eraso should be there to break the news to the haughty courtiers.
Eraso also reported that he had sung Philip's praises widely in the governing circles of the Netherlands and assured Ruy Gómez "that the King enjoys here so great a reputation and such positive opinion that they desire nothing better than to see him here, and that he should govern them, and I think it is necessary [that he should]."[50] This seems a dubious proposition, and it is unlikely that either Eraso or Ruy Gómez were so taken in by their own propaganda as to believe that the Netherlanders awaited Philip with eagerness. More likely this claim was meant to bolster Philip's ego. As will be seen, Ruy Gómez de Silva was in the habit of showing Eraso's letters to Philip; part of the allies' game was, of course, to offer the prince proofs of their devotion, while simultaneously strengthening his confidence and resolve.
This campaign of encomiums for Philip was effective and incidentally helps to illuminate the nature of the alliance between Ruy Gómez and Eraso in the mid-1550s. Although the two men had corresponded for several years,[51] it is difficult to imagine that their bond was one of personal affection. Since they operated at two separate and widely removed courts, they cannot have met often nor spent a great deal of time together. Moreover, Eraso's personality was notoriously harsh and unpleasant.[52] Consonance of policy views might provide an explanation of their alliance, except that the correspondence between the two men in this period is seldom focused on large issues or ideology. Instead, it seems clear that the Eraso-Ruy Gómez entente was firmly based on the perception of mutual self-interest and mutual usefulness. Both were extremely ambitious, self-made men in ardent pursuit of royal favor and the power and wealth it could bring. And, in certain obvious ways, they could help each other while simultaneously helping themselves.
Ruy Gómez de Silva was extremely close to Philip, and the French ambassador in England deemed him "the person by whose
judgment [the prince] was chiefly guided."[53] Philip's advancement could only mean an access in his own position and influence. In the waning years of Charles's reign, though, the rise of Ruy Gómez de Silva was structurally blocked. Despite his pleas he received no special favors from the emperor at the time of his marriage (and no other imperial mercedes have come to light). Thus it was very much in his interest to proclaim Philip's readiness to govern. Eraso, a strong voice at Charles V's court, could broadcast these advertisements for the prince (and, incidentally, for his sumiller[54] ) where they would do the most good. Moreover, Ruy Gómez de Silva had little experience in administration or government. If he hoped to play a major role in affairs of state, he would need the guidance of an experienced ally within the bureaucracy. For protection in these tangled affairs of state, wrote Ruy Gómez, "I need Your Grace's shield and sword."[55]
In turn, Eraso stood to gain from Ruy Gómez's influence with Philip. The secretary, of undistinguished hidalgo origins, had served the emperor since 1523 but had attained a significant post only in 1546. In 1554 he was in his mid-forties. The course of his career, particularly its disgraceful latter stages, indicates that he was motivated by a greedy drive for power and wealth.[56] Already in 1557 the Venetian Badoero, perhaps confused but more likely punning, referred to him as Secretary "Crasso."[57] In many ways Eraso was a perfect example of one style of Habsburg bureaucrat, of what has been described as "the predatory, arrogant, avaricious secretary of the new age."[58] Eraso was hardly the man to go quietly into retirement at the peak of his long climb simply because Charles V chose to relinquish power. Moreover, Eraso nursed long-standing grudges against other powerful figures at the imperial court, including Arras, Juan de Figueroa and Gonzalo Pérez, who had for years scorned his abilities and obstructed his rise.[59] It was unlikely that he would gain satisfactory revenge while Charles ruled, since the emperor was a master at balancing and massaging the massive egos of his counselors. If, however, Eraso could gain a privileged foothold with the new king, all might be very different, and his former tormentors might find the tables turned. Better than any other member of the prince's entourage, Ruy Gómez could secure for the secretary a pledge of Philip's future favor.
A letter of 12 August 1554 illustrates well what Ruy Gómez de Silva could do for Francisco de Eraso. Ruy Gómez wrote:
His Highness has seen your letters and was very glad to hear the news you sent me in them. By the way, I showed him [one letter in particular] . . . in order to be able to speak about you and see how he feels about you. I do not think he lacks desire to show you favor and keep you in your honorable position. Do not fail to make up your mind as to what you want, and I will see what can be done for you.[60]
This was not an isolated episode. A month later, for example, Ruy Gómez reported that "I showed Your Grace's letter to the king, and His Highness was not content to see just that one but demanded to read all the others as well."[61] These letters neatly illustrate what would always be the basis of Ruy Gómez's influence with Philip. In an early modern monarchy private access to the ruler was power: the favorite could set part of the agenda during his daily conversations with the prince and could turn the discussion to topics that aided his friends and harmed his enemies. Ruy Gómez once claimed that "I have never interfered in nor spoken about any matter that lies outside my métier, which is to dress His Highness in his jacket."[62] This seeming self-deprecation throws a thin veil over the possibilities inherent in such a relationship: a trusted favorite could furnish his master's mind even as he clothed his body.
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The pro-Philippine campaign soon began to bear fruit. On 7 December 1554 one of the first crucial steps toward abdication was taken when Charles wrote to Philip praising the behavior that Eraso had described. The emperor urged his son to come to the Netherlands as soon as possible. Such a visit, which Charles had previously discouraged, was a necessary preliminary to the turnover of power.[63] Philip had been emboldened, perhaps by Eraso's glowing reports of his repute in the Low Countries, to press harder for permission to come to his father's court; in the meantime Charles had gained a better impression of his son's abilities.[64] No less than the emperor, the allies Ruy Gómez and Eraso must have been heartened by Philip's growing assertiveness in these months. In addition to express-
ing his desire to take a hand in Flemish affairs, Philip had begun to complain that the imperial court was not showing him proper deference in matters relating to his states of Naples and Milan.[65] The prince was clearly developing the temperament of a king.
Mainly because of the hopes aroused by Mary Tudor's false pregnancy,[66] Philip's journey to his father's court was delayed until September 1555. In the interim Ruy Gómez de Silva and Francisco de Eraso were entrusted with primary responsibility for maintaining communication between the two courts at London and Brussels. Ruy Gómez made three trips to Brussels at Philip's behest between December 1554 and August 1555. During the same period Eraso made the opposite journey at least twice. The two allies managed liaison between the courts as preparations went on for Philip's journey to the Netherlands and Charles's abdication. By March 1555 Arras was forced to entrust requests for favors from Philip to Ruy Gómez.[67]
One reason for Ruy Gómez de Silva's increasing prominence was that the duke of Alba was ordered away from Philip's court in the early months of 1555. The prince, asserting his sovereignty over Naples and Milan, ordered Alba to take up the government of Italy, which was being threatened by a French army.[68] William Maltby has interpreted this appointment as the result of an intrigue masterminded by Ruy Gómez, who stood to benefit from the removal of his rival. Maltby does not, however, explain just how Ruy Gómez managed this coup.[69] The surviving evidence does not allow certainty, but a plausible scenario of these events can be sketched. Contrary to Maltby's image of Alba accepting the bitter cup of command in Italy against his own inclinations and out of a sense of duty to his clientele and to the dynasty, it appears that Alba's own ego and ambitions propelled him into this assignment, with hardly a nudge from Ruy Gómez de Silva.[70]
What emerges from the diplomatic correspondence is that in the fall of 1554 and the ensuing winter there was a bitter competition for the appointment to command in Italy involving three principal claimants—Ferrante Gonzaga, Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, and the "reluctant" duke of Alba. The open jockeying began when Gonzaga, governor of Milan since 1546, appeared in the Netherlands in the fall, eager to dispel criticism of his administration and to solicit subsidies and rewards for his service. Rodríguez-Salgado
suggests that Alba was behind the allegations of corruption leveled against Gonzaga in 1553, which would seem to weaken the case for the duke's disinterest. In October Gonzaga crossed to England to pay court to Philip and seek a vote of confidence for the continuance of his tenure at Milan.[71] Meanwhile, at the imperial court, conflict had arisen between Gonzaga and the duke of Savoy, whose principality was under French occupation and who desired the Milanese command for himself. Gonzaga returned to the Continent at the end of October, having been richly feted but promised nothing. Savoy journeyed to England to press his own claims at the end of the year.[72] Resolution of these conflicting claims posed a tricky problem for the emperor's servants, compounded by the fact that Philip had proclaimed his desire to make decisions concerning Italy for himself. Still, Arras had not internalized this latter fact, and he encouraged the merry chase of the claimants to London as a means of buying time for the emperor to make a decision on the choice of a commander.[73]
It would appear that Alba's appetite for preferment was further piqued by the parade of contestants through London. By lavishing attention on Ferrante Gonzaga during his October visit, Ruy Gómez de Silva may have played a part in exciting Alba's jealousy and interest. Alba's temperament was not such as to view with equanimity displays of favor toward another captain. Moreover, his family had extensive interests in Italy. In any case, Alba was complaining of boredom in England and lobbying Philip for the command at least by late November.[74] By the end of the year Philip was determined to entrust Alba with unprecedentedly broad powers in the peninsula, but the emperor continued to balk, in part from distrust of Alba and also to avoid shabby treatment of his longtime comrade Gonzaga. The public decision on the post was thus postponed until late February, when, with apparent concurrence between Charles and Philip, it was granted to Alba. Still, Charles did not sign Alba's commissions until April.[75] This turn of events clearly outraged Gonzaga and allegedly disgusted Italian opinion, but it also provided a solution for several outstanding problems.[76] The rivalry between Gonzaga and Savoy had made it impossible to appoint either of them without offending the other's supporters and thus sowing discord among pro-imperial elements in northern Italy at the very moment of a serious French threat.[77] The choice of Alba posed the risk
of offending all Italian opinion but allowed pacification of the other rivals on relatively equal terms. Savoy's disappointment was allayed by the offer of the government of Flanders and by imperial support for a grand match with the duchess of Lorraine.[78] Gonzaga, whose potential disaffection was a less serious threat to Spanish interests (but perhaps of greater personal concern to the emperor), was first threatened with disgrace if he did not step aside and then fobbed off with cash and praise. The case that Alba openly competed for the Italian command is reinforced by the evidence of Gonzaga's lasting enmity toward the duke and also by the fact that he demanded compensation for the loss of his governorship in the form of Alba's post as mayordomo mayor in Philip's household. This demand was rejected, and Gonzaga had to content himself with a variety of gifts and subsidies, the promise of prestigious lodgings in the palace, and vague assurances that he stood next in line for a major military post.[79]
Another problem was resolved by the despatch of Alba to Italy. The presence of the imperious duke in England had become an irritant to Philip and indirectly a threat to the success of the pro-Philippine campaign of the prince's allies. This is the import of Ruy Gómez's letter to Eraso of 15 April 1555, which is cited by Maltby as his principal evidence of an intrigue against Alba. For reasons that will emerge, however, this letter can be regarded as a relatively straightforward account of events, rather than as the hypocritical poison-pen missive that it appears to Maltby.
In the letter Ruy Gómez de Silva claims to write on Philip's behalf in order to apprise Eraso of the prince's fears regarding Alba's probable behavior when he reaches Brussels on his way to Italy. "You are to know," he wrote,
that the Duke, after having thrown himself at the King's [Philip's] feet, as I told you, in order to secure these appointments, now that he has attained them asserts that he is being made to take them, complaining in every quarter that he is not being treated according to his deserts. In all this, he uses his accustomed skillful arguments in order to draw the water to his own mill. . . . As for the Duke's interests, the King says he has got away with more than there was any good reason to give him.[80]
Still, Alba had complained bitterly about "the scanty favour that is shown him," even though he had received about 40,000 ducats for
his services in England. Eraso needed to know the truth in order to be able to counter Alba's laments at the imperial court.[81] Beyond this, there was reason to fear that Alba would try to destroy the image of Philip's competence as a ruler that had been so painstakingly fostered by the allies:
The King says that the Duke may intimate that affairs in England are not being handled with all due care. As for this, the King remarks that he has not wished to conclude certain business before having got the Duke out of this country, because he, his friends and his wife have permitted themselves to say that once the Duke had left everything would go to ruin, he having been the mainstay in all these matters and the King not being equally vigilant. As they have been talking like this here in the King's Court it is quite possible that they will do the same when they reach the Emperor's, and if everything that had to be accomplished had been terminated before the Duke left, he would have been able to attribute all the merit to himself. Therefore, the King decided to wait until the Duke was out of the way, although the Duke greatly insisted, again and again. This is what the king wishes me to write to you, begging you to take particular care to keep him informed of what happens.[82]
Ruy Gómez also feared a personal attack:
Now that the Duke has spoken to me about the appointments to Naples and Milan . . . and has assured me that he is eternally obliged to me for them, I am afraid that when he sees his Majesty [Charles], he may not treat me as tenderly as he is accustomed to do. . . . Therefore I implore you to do what you can to protect me, for I certainly am afraid of him. He is a dead shot.[83]
This letter would seem to clarify several points about Alba's appointment. The duke had lobbied for the position and had enlisted Ruy Gómez to help his candidacy with Philip.[84] At the same time Alba's behavior, particularly his tendency to claim the credit for all achievements, had rankled the prince. Philip's desire to be rid of an overweening adviser surely was a major factor in the decision to give Alba his desired appointment. Alba's departure from England was by no means unwelcome to Ruy Gómez de Silva, but it is difficult to see in this situation the clear-cut intrigue against Alba posited by Maltby. The further charge, lately resurrected by Maltby, that Ruy Gómez and Eraso conspired to deprive Alba of adequate funds during his Italian tenure,[85] is still less tenable. The evidence cited for this purported deprivation—"an act of irresponsibility border-
ing on treason," according to Maltby—comes above all from Alba's letters. As any reader of the Epistolario can attest, the duke never ceased to complain about his finances in the most bitter terms; surely this evidence must be taken with a grain of salt. In addition, although Eraso was very much involved in disbursements in the period of Alba's tenure in Italy, Ruy Gómez de Silva had no official position in the financial bureaucracy until 1557, near the end of the duke's viceregal term. Moreover, Maltby produces no evidence of collusion between Ruy Gómez de Silva and Eraso on this matter, despite his contention that these allies plotted to deny Alba the wherewithal to defend the king's interests in Italy. To the contrary, the most recent study argues that Eraso was more Alba's victim than vice versa and that neither he nor Ruy Gómez could possibly have controlled all of the persons and institutions responsible for remittances to the duke. It would seem more logical and more just to analyze Alba's problems, insofar as the duke's complaints had foundation, in terms of the increasingly straitened circumstances of the Crown finances. Throughout the monarchy in those years, royal obligations far exceeded the capacity of the treasury.[86] Ruy Gómez himself provides eloquent witness to this financial strain: "More money we must have though it cost us the very blood in our veins," he exclaimed in December 1554. "May God cradle our affairs in His hands, since we no longer know how to hold anything in our own."[87]
Faulty interpretation on these points is primarily the result of the unfounded belief that the bitter enmities between Philip's advisers that emerged later in the reign were fully developed in the period prior to Charles V's abdication.[88] A great deal has been written on the topic of the struggle of factions led by Ruy Gómez de Silva and the duke of Alba at the court of Philip II. There is abundant evidence that deep divisions within Philip's Council of State became clearly delineated in the first years after the emperor's abdication and thereafter played a major role in politics. One must be careful, however, not to project too far back in time the sharp rift and personal venom between the king's principal counselors that pervaded the court in the late 1550s. The phenomenon that truly polarized the court—the elaboration and intensification of animosity between Ruy Gómez de Silva and the duke of Alba—postdated the period of Philip's sojourn in England.
Maltby argues plausibly that even before 1550 Alba was "a true
caudillo , a soldier with a large political following." He was the head of an old and wealthy family, whose members were well positioned in the church, the military and at court. But no such case can be made for Ruy Gómez's influence, at least outside the court, despite Maltby's contention that "by the 1550s his following equalled that of Alba." Maltby relies on the dubious theory that, by virtue of his marriage, Ruy Gómez de Silva somehow became the political head of the Mendoza family.[89] No evidence exists to support this notion. Moreover, even were it true, this clan leadership would have been of little use to Ruy Gómez during Philip's stay in England. While Alba could count on the support of kinsmen and friends at both of the northern courts, few members of the putative Mendoza network had come to England with Philip or were in Flanders with Charles. Insofar as Ruy Gómez had a functional clique in this period, it consisted of Eraso and perhaps Diego de Vargas in Brussels and the count of Feria in England. None of these men can plausibly be associated with the Mendoza clan; nor, more important, is there any evidence that they regarded Ruy Gómez as their chief rather than as their ally. In more ways than one, Ruy Gómez de Silva was alone with Philip during the English sojourn.[90]
And that—his relationship with Philip—was of course the basis of his influence. In fact until 1555 and formally until Philip formed his own Council of State in 1556, Ruy Gómez's position was strictly that of a favorite and an informal "household councilor."[91] Alba, on the other hand, was a true counselor of state, a man of wide experience and stature throughout the monarchy. He was the emperor's adviser and could believe, with some justification, that Charles had given him a commission to oversee Philip's affairs. Ruy Gómez, the friend and valet of the prince, shone only by virtue of the latter's reflected glow. Until Philip was king the two men were not overt rivals for the directing hand in affairs of state. Their competition prior to Philip's accession was essentially limited to the sphere of the household, where both had been officials since 1548. Even there, Alba held the senior post of mayordomo mayor .
It may be presumed from his collusion with Eraso, and it became abundantly clear later, that Ruy Gómez de Silva had aspirations to act as a major figure in government as well as in the household. Before the formation of Philip's Council of State, however, Alba could not (and could not justly be expected to) regard as a serious
competitor a man so far beneath him in lineage and station, a man who, moreover, had no experience or official status as an officer of government. On the contrary, Alba seems to have regarded Ruy Gómez as a useful conduit to the prince and as a potential ally. This is borne out by the fact that before and during his tenure in Italy Alba wrote repeated friendly letters to Ruy Gómez de Silva, relating the news and asking for favors and intercession with Philip.[92] In Carande's words, Alba saw Ruy Gómez de Silva as "su confidente cerca de don Felipe."[93] The surviving evidence reveals that Alba's civility was reciprocated by Ruy Gómez.[94] Of course, the good faith that underlay this apparent cordiality must not be overestimated. Certainly Ruy Gómez sought to become a power in the state as well as the household, and an increase in his influence would necessarily come at the expense of Alba, among others. Moreover, as was seen above, Ruy Gómez was critical of Alba's character and motives in his letters to Eraso. On 6 June 1555 he went further and denounced Alba to Eraso as "a great rogue."[95] Nevertheless, the fact remains that in these final months of Philip's apprenticeship the relationship between the future rivals was free of public animosity. The clash of factions had not yet emerged. Alba, who had a substantial clientele, was seemingly unaware of any need to direct it against Ruy Gómez de Silva, who as yet had no grand following of his own. This situation, however, would be altered drastically during Alba's tenure in Italy. Although it cannot be demonstrated that Ruy Gómez orchestrated the duke's appointment as viceroy, there can be no doubt that he exploited the opportunity afforded by Alba's absence.
Alba's biographer, on uncertain evidence, argues that by late 1554 the duke was Philip's "chief spokesman" and had "assumed the dominant role" in Spanish policymaking in England.[96] At least that Alba believed this to be the case may be inferred from Ruy Gómez's letter quoted above. There is in fact little reason to believe that any of the Spaniards played a considerable role in English affairs. Philip himself and Simon Renard had the ear of the queen, who was the only effective instrument of Habsburg influence. The few Spanish counselors who remained were handicapped by their unpopularity with the populace and by their undoubtedly shaky understanding of English politics.[97] Among them only the count of Feria and perhaps Ruy Gómez could speak English at all.[98] Despite a recent charge that his ignorant advice harmed Philip in his relations with the English, Ruy Gómez seems at least to have gotten along well
with some of the English aristocrats, notably Charles Lord Howard of Effingham, and he won a prize from the queen's hand in a joust on 4 December 1554.[99]
All in all, though, Alba, Ruy Gómez de Silva and the rest of the band of Spaniards who remained with Philip seem to have stood on the sidelines of English affairs. Their principal role was to provide Philip with companionship and to handle his communications with Brussels. Ruy Gómez played an important part on both counts from the outset of the stay in England; and once Alba was gone, he was indisputably the most active of Philip's advisers. As noted above, he made repeated trips to the Continent on the prince's business. Important correspondence from Brussels was routed to Philip through him. On 23 August 1555, for example, Arras wrote Ruy Gómez regarding the state of military affairs in Flanders. "I wished to inform you of what was happening," Arras concluded, "in order that you might report to the King and making sure that you will do this I am not writing to him."[100] Ruy Gómez still had no formal position outside his household office[101] but clearly was regarded as a de facto minister of state. Ruy Gómez also managed the arrangements for Philip's departure from England in September 1555. At the final stage he had six ships outfitted in Calais and returned with them to Dover, where he met Philip and a sizable English retinue. Despite fears of French mischief the royal crossing was made without incident on 4 September 1555.[102]
Thereafter events moved swiftly, and with them the trajectory of Ruy Gómez's ascent. Once Philip arrived in the Low Countries the complex process of Charles's abdication was set in motion. On 26 September 1555 the emperor issued orders for the Estates-General and the leading officials of the Netherlands to convene in Brussels in the following month. Before this assembly, on 25 October, Charles turned his title to rule in the Low Countries over to Philip. Much less ceremony attended Philip's investiture as king of Castile, Aragon and Sicily on 16 January 1556. Charles simply handed the acts of abdication for the Spanish crowns to Francisco de Eraso. This was strangely fitting, in light of the efforts made by Eraso and Ruy Gómez de Silva to clear the way for Philip's elevation. Over the next few months Charles divested the remainder of his hereditary territories. Without clear authority to do so, the emperor made Philip and his heirs perpetual vicars of the Italian lands of the Holy Roman Empire in March 1556. The Franche-Comté was made over to Philip
on 10 June. Power in the empire (and in 1558 the imperial dignity itself) went to Charles's brother Ferdinand.[103]
Having received his patrimony, Philip II set about to organize his government. The king chose to revive as a key institution of government the Council of State, which his father had reduced to an honorific and inactive body.[104] Philip named his councilors of State shortly after his assumption of the Spanish crowns in early 1556. Ruy Gómez de Silva was one of the dozen or so men from throughout Philip's lands elevated to the council.[105] The choice of councilors was doubtless dictated by several considerations. Some names—Ferrante Gonzaga, Andrea Doria—were included primarily as a nod to the honor of men whose loyalty, rather than their advice, was crucial to the new king. The bulk of the list, however, reveals an attempt to forge a unified ruling institution comprising, on the one hand, the principal advisers inherited from the previous reign and, on the other, the key figures among Philip's own men, primarily officers of his household. The outstanding members of the first group were Alba, Arras, the duke of Savoy and Don Juan de Figueroa. Among the second were Ruy Gómez de Silva, Don Antonio de Toledo, the count of Feria and a rather surprising choice, the obscure Gutierre López de Padilla, one of the king's mayordomos and identified by Cabrera de Córdoba as a friend and client of Ruy Gómez.[106] The council was rounded out with men who had caught Philip's eye as good administrators or diplomats—Don Bernardino de Mendoza, skilled in naval and financial affairs, Don Juan Manrique de Lara, who had been ambassador at Rome, and the count of Chinchón, a man who was to rise steadily for decades in Philip's service and estimation.
While Philip II governed from Brussels in 1556 and 1557 six of these men emerged as the true Council of State. Ruy Gómez de Silva, Mendoza, Arras, Feria, Manrique and Don Antonio de Toledo met twice daily (in the mornings until noon and again from 2:00 P.M. until dark) to debate the principal affairs of state. Ruy Gómez seems to have been the principal minister, a situation underlined by the fact that the meetings of the council were often held in his lodgings.[107] Thus Ruy Gómez had gained a lofty position in the mechanism of state to complement his personal influence with the king. At the same time his ally Eraso had been promoted to a position of power unrivaled among the secretaries, who actually transacted the business of government. Along with his constitution of
a Council of State, Philip had reshuffled secretarial appointments. Eraso emerged as secretary of Finance (Hacienda ) and of the patronage bureau, the Cámara de Castilla, as well as secretary to the administrative Councils of Inquisition, Orders and Indies.[108] His ally Ruy Gómez must indeed have put in a good word for him, and the secretary had reason to be well pleased. His position allowed him to sit in on meetings of the Council of State and to have a major voice in a wide range of policy decisions, as well as giving him tremendous influence in the granting of state patronage and of the encomiendas of the military orders. Now he could truly act upon his predisposition to enrich himself, aid his friends and harm his enemies.[109]
Nor could Ruy Gómez de Silva complain about the preferment shown him by Philip. Despite its prestige and attendant power, the position of councilor of State carried no stipend, while the relatively small allowance he received as sumiller de corps was mostly earmarked for entertainment expenses.[110] Philip II soon made good this deficiency. In February 1556, at Antwerp, the king granted Ruy Gómez the town of Eboli, in the southern Italian principality of Salerno.[111] The revenues of the town, 1,958 Neapolitan ducats per year, were granted to Ruy Gómez to make up the shortfall in the 3,000 ducats per year promised to the estate of Mélito by Charles V.[112] At this point no title was attached to the grant. Badoero reported that "Don Ruy Gómez . . . does not call himself Duke [of Eboli], but is addressed by the title of Excellency."[113]
In March 1556 Ruy Gómez was favored with the grant of the encomienda of Herrera in the Order of Alcántara. Eraso as secretary in charge of the patronage of the orders countersigned the king's gift, and Ruy Gómez was invested with his new and lucrative encomienda in a ceremony at a Brussels monastery on 7 April.[114] Both his political position and his economic position were further enhanced on 30 January 1557, when Philip II named him contador mayor of Castile and the Indies.[115] In this position, Ruy Gómez stood (along with the two other contadores mayores ) at the top of the financial administration of the Castilian sphere of the monarchy. Some of his duties and activities in this post will be examined in the next chapter. As contador mayor he also enjoyed a small salary and more substantial dues (derechos ) amounting to more than 531,000 maravedís (1,416 ducats) per years.[116]
Thus the efforts of Ruy Gómez de Silva and Francisco de Eraso
to bring about the abdication of Charles V and the accession of their "master," Philip II, paid rich dividends as soon as the new reign began. Through the grateful patronage of Philip II the allies gained preponderant positions in the councils and the financial administration. They received new honors, incomes and salaries in addition to the personal financial opportunities presented by their offices. Still, victory had not been total. Philip had not seen fit to dispense entirely with the trusted counselors of Charles V. Once Philip announced the composition of his Council of State, Arras was able to drop the pretense, adopted in the period of the abdication, that he hoped to retire to his estates. The bishop remained an active member of the government. Nevertheless, he was not trusted or consulted by Philip as he had been by Charles, and increasingly his influence was restricted to the internal government of the Netherlands, where he served as chief adviser to Savoy, the governor.[117] According to the Venetian ambassador, Ruy Gómez de Silva was disappointed that Arras retained even these vestiges of his former influence.[118] Alba had also been granted a seat on the Council of State, but, absent in italy, he had little say in the central administration in the first years of the reign. Upon his return the duke would find that Ruy Gómez had grown into a serious rival indeed. Alba's dismay at finding another man ensconced in what he believed to be his rightful position as first minister would touch off the personal and factional conflict of the late 1550s and 1560s.[119]
Ruy Gómez de Silva and Eraso were Philip's men, and as such they won great advancement at the outset of the reign. Nevertheless Philip, though still young, was already in many respects the Prudent King. He was willing to exalt his own creatures over his father's counselors, but he refused to place his government entirely and irrevocably in the hands of the allies who had served him so well. Old counselors, men of experience and now clearly rivals of the upstarts, were kept in the wings to provide the king with a check against domination by the men he had elevated. Ruy Gómez de Silva had extended his sphere of influence from the household to the halls of government; now he would have to maintain his position at the pinnacle of Philip's administration. The supplanted counselors stood ready to topple him, and they were soon joined by younger men on the make. In his turn, Ruy Gómez de Silva would find that staying on top could be just as difficult as climbing.