The Three-Thirds System
There were debates in the CCP about whether to have such an institution at all and what its purpose should be. Very early in the war Mao opposed a popular representative institution in the Communist bases by castigating the idea as "parliamentarism."[34] The Chin-Chi-Yü District, under P'eng Te-huai's control, experimented with a so-called "One-half system" (erh-i-chi ) in late 1939, though details are not known.[35] Mark Selden notes quite correctly the affinity between the Three-thirds system and Chiang Kai-shek's order, toward the end of the first united front, to restrict the Communists in any important organ of the government and the Kuomintang to one-third.[36] It is possible that Mao co-opted the idea from his opponents and put it to his own use. It was probably for this reason that there were disagreements about its purpose. The first known application of the Three-thirds system took place in the Suite and the Lungtung Sub-districts of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, with Mao's blessing.[37] These areas fell to the CCP's control in the spring of 1940. Land revolution could not be carried out as in the more established part of the border region, and the landlords remained in force. The Three-thirds system was used to appease them. But there was much more to it than that. It was put to a use whose thoroughly modern character is astounding.
The system expanded democracy in the sense in which the term is understood nowadays: simple increase of participation by the masses in public affairs. Yet it increased the power of the government and the Communist party over the people at the same time. Neither mass participation nor increased government power alone can adequately explain the Three-thirds system. The two were fused together in a unique combination: democratic centralism.[38]
It went without saying that the Three-thirds system reflected the CCP's confidence in having its way in well-consolidated bases. In this sense, the system was only a formal concession to the proclivities of
[34] Selected Works , II, 67, 73. This was in November, 1937.
[35] Li Hsüeh-feng, Ken-chü-ti chien-she yü ch'ün-chung kung-tso [Base construction and mass work] (December, 1940) (BI), p. 45. This report concerned the Chin-Chi-Yü District. It was accompanied by a brief introduction by P'eng Te-huai who extolled it as "the basic final sum-up of peasant mass work during the three years of resistance," Ibid. , p. 1. Li Hsüeh-feng's concern in the report was that the rent and interest reduction campaigns were resulting in too rapid transfer of land ownership, Ibid. , p. 3 ff.
[36] Yenan Way , p. 162.
[37] Ibid. , p. 163. See Selected Works , II, 418, for Mao's support for it.
[38] For further discussion of this interpretation of the concept of "democratic centralism," see Kataoka, "Political Theory of the Great Leap Forward," Social Research , Spring 1969, pp. 93–122.
the non-Party elements. Of the enlightened gentry and the national bourgeoisie, Mao said,
We unite with them not because they are a political force to be reckoned with nor because they are of any economic importance (their feudal landholdings should be handed over with their consent to the peasants for distribution) but because they gave us considerable help politically during the War of Resistance. . . .[39]
In co-opting and mustering their "help"—so that they would carry out the Party's decisions "gladly and whole-heartedly"[40] —the CCP was not unilaterally relinquishing its power but was trying to increase it. It is in this sense that the CCP's modernity stands in contrast to the Kuomintang.
The Three-thirds system served one purpose vis-à-vis the intermediate groups in the White areas and quite another vis-à-vis the border regions. In the border regions, it is again possible to draw a distinction between the functions served by border region political councils in relatively urbanized areas such as Yenan and the functions of the councils down in the villages. As it moved down into the rural areas, the Three-thirds system took on quite a revolutionary character.
Vis-à-vis the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the Three-thirds system was geared to a specific campaign after 1940. As I have noted, the Sixth Plenum of the Kuomintang's CEC decided to call the national assembly in November of 1940. But the December Incident intervened, and the convocation of the assembly was put off. In March, 1941, the Kuomintang announced that the assembly would be postponed until the end of the war.[41] In early 1940, the CCP decided to launch a campaign to "urge constitutional government." Associations for Promotion of Constitutional Government were formed in the Communist bases.[42] In the context of this campaign, it was timely for the CCP to carry out local and regional elections in its own areas on the basis of universal franchise. These elections were evidently designed to point up the "democratic" character of border region governments in contrast to "one-party dictatorship" in Chungking.
Border region councils were the showcase of democracy, and the CCP took care to elect to them non-Party personages of as prominent a background as possible. To have even a sprinkling of independent and progressive men of literary or civic renown added a tremendously
[39] Selected Works , IV, 209.
[40] Ibid. , II, 419.
[41] Collected Wartime Messages , II, 562.
[42] "New–Democratic Constitutional Government," Selected Works , II, 407–416. Editorial comment states, "Comrade Mao Tse-tung here exposed Chiang Kai-shek's deceit, wrested the propaganda weapon of 'constitutional government' from his hands and turned it into a weapon . . . ," Ibid. , p. 407.
benign air to the "anti-Japanese political power."[43] The sophistication of the CCP's approach to the intermediate groups was indicated by a directive of the Propaganda Department in October. It contained carefully drawn up instructions for wooing the intellectuals to the Communist side:
We ought to realize the importance of cultural personalities and rectify the backward mentality of some comrades in the Party to belittle, loathe, and mistrust [them]. . . . We should realize that a cultural personality with considerable social position, prestige, and skill in some art and its product often has very great influence internally and externally.
We ought to use every means to guarantee the spiritual, material, and other necessary conditions for their literary production. . . .[44]
At about the same time, another directive instructed the Party organizations to exploit the Kuomintang's "exclusionism" which left many youths frustrated. It named a dozen or so well-known civic leaders as the target of wooing. It sounded as though the CCP was feeling their pulses individually.[45]
It was easier to postulate democratic centralism theoretically than to practice it. The working of border region councils was an uneasy compromise between democracy and centralism. Some councils acted as mere rubber stamps. For instance, from the Huaipei Su-Wan Border Region, the following "lesson" was reported:
Generally speaking, in parliamentary debate and legislation every legislator ought to compete for time and opportunity to speak. This ought to be recognized as his right. In elections, every legislator, party, and group exhaust energy in competition. . . . This right is inalienable. . . . But there are still many people who have never competed to raise their hands to this day. And why is it that some members of our council still need "mobilization" and "encouragement" before they agree to speak up and run for elections?[46]
[43] See the series of biographical columns on the members of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region political council in Chieh-fang jih-pao , November 3–19, 1941.
[44] Chung-Kung chung-yang hsüan-ch'uan-pu kuan-yü k'e-k'ang-Jih ken-chü-ti ch'ün-chung ku-tung kung-tso shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department directive concerning mass agitation work in each anti-Japanese base] (BI).
[45] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü ch'üan-kuo chiao-yü-hui k'e-hsiao-p'ai-pieh hsiao-t'uan-t'i tui-chan t'ung-i chan-hsien kung-tso ti shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive concerning the expansion of national united front work in the small factions and small organizations in the educational circle of the country], Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 476–479.
[46] Liu Tzu-chiu, "Huai-pei Su-Wan pien-ch'ü ti-erh-chieh ts'an-i-hui ti ching-yen chiao-hsün" [Experiences and lessons of the second political council of the Huaipei Su-Wan Border Region], Fuhsiao (the 4th Division, New Fourth Army), May, 1943, p. 62.
Lin Po-ch'ü, the chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, criticized some Communist members for abusing the method of "inviting" the intermediate groups to the council. They said, "The Three-thirds system is just a way of display to create a good impression on the outside. . . . Just bring in some celebrities to make up the number!" Lin warned that "putting numbers together" was "Left deviation," while conceding the need for "invitation."[47]
It would be a mistake to assume that the political process in the councils was simply rigged from behind to disguise the CCP's dictatorship. The intent of the Party was no less than to fabricate "spontaneous" support. In pursuing this goal, it leaned over backward. At the same time, many members of border region councils were articulate and independent men. They endorsed the CCP insofar as it supported the Three People's Principles and the resistance against Japan. A summing-up report of the first Hupeh-Honan Border Region assembly (March, 1943) stated:
We ought to study the Kuomintang's statutes in detail. Many intermediate persons still regard the Kuomintang's statutes as orthodox. With respect to the important ones, such as the Compendium of Civil Laws and the Elementary People's Rights , we must improve our skill in citing the revolutionary passages in order to solve various legal disputes.[48]
After the councilors and officers for the second council were elected in Shen-Kan-Ning in 1941, according to Lin Po-ch'ü, a dispute arose among the CCP members as to the power and competence of the council.[49] The statute which enacted the council empowered it to be a legislative organ: it was authorized to elect the chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and the Higher Judicial Yuan; to supervise administrative officers; to pass the government budget; and to legislate.[50] But the administration apparently had veto power.[51] Some Communist members set forth a "two power theory" on the basis of "parallel existence of legislature and administration" (i-hsing ping-li ), or a "two and a half power theory" whereby the judiciary was to
[47] "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi ti ching-yen chi ying-kai ch'i chiu-cheng ti pien-hsiang" [Experience of the Three-thirds system in the border region and how to correct its bias] (report to the senior cadre conference in March, 1944), Ibid. , December, 1944, pp. 8–9.
[48] "O-Yü pien-ch'ü ti-i-tz'u k'e-chieh jen-min tai-piao ta-hui ti ch'ing-hsing chi ch'i tsung-chi" [The situation of the Hupeh-Honan Border Region's first people's representative assembly and its conclusion], Ibid. , April, 1943, p. 55.
[49] "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 11.
[50] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , pp. 56–57.
[51] This was the case in the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü Border Region. See Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 92.
enjoy semi-autonomy alongside the legislature and administration.[52] Jen Pi-shih also revealed that some people advocated the "theory of uninterrupted elections" to preserve democracy. He maintained that the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region was already a democracy, yet these people felt that the Communist party was the ruler and that a real democracy in which the people are free to do as they like was far away.[53] Such "misunderstanding," according to Lin Po-ch'ü, stemmed from the failure to distinguish the Three-thirds system from the soviet system, or bourgeois–democracy from New Democracy. He argued that the council and the administrative organs were both "organs of political power" under the formula: "unity of legislature and administration" (i-hsing ho-i ).[54] The dispute concerning the power of the council was not settled until the senior cadre conference in Shen-Kan-Ning in 1942.[55]
Apparently the CCP was having some discipline problems as it adopted the policy to eliminate sectarianism. Its solution was to draw a sharp distinction between the class stand of the Party and its external relations or "severity within the Party and leniency without."[56] This was the line laid down by Mao in a major directive, "On Policy," in December of 1940.[57]
The Three-thirds system and the general election at the hsiang level in the rural areas were not purely political reforms.[58] They had organic connection with social and economic revolutions that had been in progress since the establishment of the Communist bases. Turning the general election into an occasion for stepping up the land revolution to the higher stage was Mao's intention. This was implied in the republication of "An Investigation of Hsinkuo" under the new title, "Rural Surveys," with a new preface and a postscript in April, 1941.[59]
The republication of the document was apparently intended to match Wang Ming's republication of his Two Lines of 1931 under the new title, Struggle for the More Complete Bolshevization of the Chi -
[52] Lin Po-ch'ü, "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 11.
[53] "Kuan-yü chi-ke wen-t'i ti i-chien" [My opinion concerning several problems], Fuhsiao , April, 1943, p. 9.
[54] "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 17.
[55] Ibid. , p. 11.
[56] In the directive of July 7, 1940, in Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 75.
[57] Selected Works , II, 441–449.
[58] According to Lin Po-ch'ü, the "intermediate" groups were always more numerous than the "progressive" groups (i.e., the poor peasants and hired laborers) in councils of the hsien class or above, while the latter were dominant at the hsiang level. "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 7.
[59] "'Nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a' hsü-yen"; "'Nung-ts'un tiao-chi'a' pa," Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 289–292. By this time, incidentally, Mao was looking forward to the Seventh Party Congress. See Ibid. , p. 289.
nese Communist Party , in July, 1940. Mao stressed repeatedly in the preface and the postscript that the substantive policy laid down in "Rural Surveys" was not applicable to the resistance period as a "tactical line."[60] He thus implied that strategically there was a parallel between the land revolution of the civil war period and that of the resistance period. Mao's message seems to have been that the land revolution in the resistance period had reached the stage which corresponded to the land investigation stage in the civil war period, for which Mao wrote the original document. He was reminding his audience that the election campaign of 1941 under the Three-thirds system was comparable to the land investigation drive which preceded the Second National Soviet Congress and which created a large turnover in soviet personnel at all levels.
"The entire border region carried out a re-election from below upward," reported Lin Po-ch'ü.[61] In keeping with democratic centralism, the election was preceded by sending down of propaganda teams into the countryside to mobilize the peasantry. One district in Shen-Kan-Ning was saturated by 115 teams and 881 workers.[62] A voter turnout of 80 percent was secured in Shen-Kan-Ning as a whole and 95 percent in Suite, Ch'inchien, and Yench'uan.[63] The latter figure may indicate the relative intensity of the CCP's efforts in the peripheral areas. The result, as revealed in statistics from this and the Chin-Chi-Yü District, was stunning. Two-thirds of the incumbent officials at the hsiang level were voted out and replaced by new ones. In Yenan hsien 113 were re-elected to the hsiang level administrative commissions while 185 were newly elected. Among the 61 hsiang chiefs, 41 were new faces. In Anting hsien 70 percent of hsiang and township officers were newly elected. In Suite 1,001 incumbents were voted out.[64]
The reform in the Chin-Chi-Yü District fell behind. The "formalism" of mass organization between 1940 and 1941 is blamed today on restraints imposed by P'eng Te-huai,[65] though the presence of the central army had as much to do with it. By 1942 in any event, the policy was reversed, and the quickened pace of social and political change was reflected in the class distribution of local officials in the T'aihang District. The Fifth Special District in She, Lin, and Tz'uwu hsien had gone through a "reorganization" in 1942. Of the 821 officials in twenty-five villages (ts'un ) after that, only 6 were landlords. (See Table 8.) Of the 598 officials in the Third Special District in Wu-
[60] Ibid. , pp. 289, 297.
[61] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , p. 88.
[62] Yenan Way , p. 165.
[63] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-chü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , p. 88.
[64] Ibid .
[65] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 94.
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hsiang, Yüshe, and Hsiangyüan hsien , only 39 were landlords. Most of the rich peasants in both cases could very well have been the so-called "new rich" (hsin-kui ) rather than former rich peasants. The landlord officials were obviously "enlightened gentry" who met the conditions set by the CCP. The former officials, who had stayed in office under watchful eyes of the CCP and mass organizations, were reduced in their economic status and finally swept out of office in the election of 1942.