Two
The Implantation of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State

1. The Background to the 1966 Coup

The June 1966 coup in Argentina had been discussed and promoted openly for at least the preceding year.^[*] On June 28, the commanders in chief of the army, navy, and air force decided to act, and General Julio Alsogaray and his escort forced President Illia to leave the House of Government. There was almost no "opposition to the coup within the armed forces, and there was practically no civilian attempt to prevent it. It became clear in the following days that, except for the unseated Radical party, some minor parties and a substantial part of the university community, the coup had the approval of most of the population^[†] and of nearly all social organizations.

[*] As La Nación put it: "The coup is discussed with familiarity, as if it were inevitable. The only uncertainty is its likely date, for which there exists a wide range of possibilities" (June 5, 1966). Among the sources worth consulting for open discussion (and promotion) of the coup are the weeklies Primera Plana, Confirmado, Panorama , and Análisis , beginning about a year prior to June 1966. Important dailies such as La Prensa, Clarín , and La Razón contain references that are only slightly more veiled. For an account of the conspiracy and the events of the day of the coup, see Extra , "Lo que nunca se contó," June 1979. Not a single news publication of more than minimal circulation came out in support of the Radical government.

[†] A poll taken in Greater Buenos Aires soon after Illia was ousted revealed that 66% of those questioned approved the coup while only 6% opposed it. Furthermore, 73% felt that the national situation would improve, 17% believed it would stay the same, and only 9% thought it would deteriorate ("A y C Investigación," July 4, 1966, mimeo). Because of the small sample and incomplete information about the methodology employed, these figures should be viewed with caution. According to another survey, 77% of the respondents in Greater Buenos Aires responded affirmatively to the question: "Do you believe

This reveals an important difference between the Argentine case and its Brazilian and Chilean counterparts: the 1966 coup had the support, or at least the acquiescence, of a considerable part of the popular sector, and was endorsed by a majority of political and union leaders. Moreover, it had the backing of the Peronists and of Perón himself.^[*] To these and other actors, the coup seemed to be a necessary move against an ineffectual and unrepresentative government that had become the passive accomplice to widespread disorder, not an attack on the popular sector, its organizations, and its channels of political expression.

Since I have analyzed the background of the 1966 coup in other works,^[1] the present discussion of the topic will be limited to those antecedent factors that continued to shape the situation once the new government was installed. In comparative perspective, one such factor stands out: the relative mildness of the crisis and the proportionately reduced threat to the prevailing social order at the time when the BA (bureaucratic-authoritarian state) was implanted. The moderate character of this crisis and threat did not prevent the emergence of public policies, social and economic consequences, and patterns of opposition typical of all BAs. It did, however, permit the early appearance of tensions and conflicts, and certain economic successes, which appeared later or not at all where the BA was implanted in the context of a more extreme crisis and threat.

To get a better picture of the conditions under which the 1966 Argentine

[*] that the revolution of June 28 was necessary?" (Correo de la Tarde , July 6–12, 1967, pp. 1, 12; sample of 1,000 persons interviewed in the federal capital, methodology unknown). In addition, all of the media applauded the coup, and influential political journalists were lyrical in their enthusiasm. Mariano Grondona, for example, wrote: "The nation and the caudillo go forth among a thousand crises in their search to be united until, for better or worse, they celebrate their mysterious matrimony" (Primera Plana , June 30, 1966, p. 3); and Bernardo Neustadt declaimed: "After Onganía there is nothingness. The void, the ultimate abyss…. Onganía has recently proved his effectiveness. His authority. His leadership. If he imparted order to a fading army, why not to a country? He can and he should. He will" (Extra , August 1966, p. 4).

[*] Among those who issued statements in support of the coup were Francisco Prado (secretary-general of the CGT) and the major union leaders; cf. La Nación , June 30, p. 8, July 1, p. 7, and July 2, p. 14, 1966. Some of these statements, such as the one made on June 30 by the CGT (text in Santiago Senén González, El sindicalismo después de Perón [Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1971], 95–99), were cast in terms as vitriolic in their condemnation of the previous government as they were optimistic with respect to the one just implanted: "The chaotic social, political, and economic situation gave rise to the failure of constituted power, the lack of authority, and the total bankruptcy of [the government's] representativeness. Once again the chaos has engulfed those responsible for it. Once again a government has fallen victim to its own ideas." For Perón's initial reactions to the coup, which were laudatory but more cautious, La Nación , June 29, 1966, p. 11.

BA was implanted, let us examine the economic situation prior to the 1966 coup. During 1964 and 1965, the only complete years of Radical government, the GNP grew by an impressive 10.3% and 9.1%, while per capita consumption increased by 10.0% in 1964 and 7.4% in 1965. These 1964 and 1965 growth rates, which should be viewed in the light of the depressed baseline of 1962 and 1963 (when GNP changed -3.1% and -3.9% respectively), were not sustained into the first half of 1966, when GNP recorded a practically zero rate of growth. However, the impressiveness of economic growth under the Radical government indicates that it is not in this area that its downfall can be accounted for.^[*] But the performance of other economic variables shows that the general situation was not as bright as these growth rates suggested. As can be seen in Table 2, gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP decreased markedly during Illia's term. Public investment as a percentage of GNP underwent a similar decline, especially the productive investments that appear in national accounts statistics as destined for "economic sectors." Movements of international capital also registered a negative trend: the net balance of long-term loans (measured in current United States dollars) totaled $2 million in 1964, $4 million in 1965, and -$105 million in 1966 (most of it before the coup), while the net balance of short-term capital flows was -$39 million in 1964, -$177 million in 1965, and -$76 million in 1966.^[†]

Turning from these overall indicators to the state's economic institutions, it is clear from Table 3 that a large fiscal deficit was still present even after the post-1964 recovery of current income and tax revenues.

Despite the impressive GNP growth, the data just examined show clear signs that the economy was faltering.^[‡] By the first half of 1966 it

[*] Inflation was quite high under the Radical government (1963: 24.0%; 1964: 22.1%; 1965: 28.6%; 1966: 31.9%). However, this did not represent a substantial change from the earlier years of the decade (1960: 27.1%; 1961: 13.7%; 1962: 28.1%), and in 1959 inflation had reached a peak of 113.9% (Ministerio de Economía [or Hacienda—the name changes], Boletín Trimestral de Estadística , various issues).

[†] Likewise, direct foreign investment, after reaching rather high levels in the preceding years (US$209 million in 1959, $112 million in 1960, $133 million in 1961, and $86 million in 1962), came virtually to a standstill under the Radical government (US$35 million in 1963, $34 million in 1964, $6 million in 1965, and $2 million in 1966) (Ministerio de Economía, Informe Económico 1970 , IV Trimestre [Buenos Aires, 1971], and FIEL, Indicadores de Coyuntura , various issues).

[‡] Furthermore, the reserves of the Central Bank in the month preceding the coup amounted to US$209 million, less than the imports of two months. The foreign reserves held at the end of the preceding years were US$558 million in 1961, $222 million in 1962, $375 million in 1963, $272 million in 1964, and $301 million in 1965. It should be pointed out that the relative stability of this variable under the Radical government was achieved through a sharp decline in capital goods imports (BCRA, Boletín Estadístico , various issues).

was definitely on a recessive path. But as was suggested above, trends in these economic variables do not go far in accounting for the 1966 coup. The emergence of this BA is best understood from the standpoint of the crises of government, regime, and accumulation that gathered momentum after the 1955 overthrow of President Juan Perón. The military government that was consolidated after the 1955 coup implemented vindictive policies against Perón and Peronism (or Justicialism, as Perón's movement was also called). As a result of these policies, the economic situation of most of the popular sector declined. Unions (most of them controlled by Peronists) were subjected to recurrent harassment and to unsuccessful attempts to divide them or to deliver them into the hands of non-Peronist unionists. Laws were passed prohibiting Peronists from running candidates and from conducting party activities. In 1963, after a coup terminated the civilian government of Arturo Frondizi and rival military factions had engaged in a series of armed confrontations, the Radical government of Dr. Illia was elected with a mere twenty-five percent of the vote cast, as massive numbers of Peronists abstained or cast blank ballots. Immediately thereafter, nearly all organizations of the urban and Pampean bourgeoisies mounted a strong attack against the new government, which just as quickly found itself at loggerheads with the unions and the Peronists.

At no time after 1955 did the Argentine regime succeed in absorbing Peronism's electoral strength, which amounted to at least the first plurality of the vote. As was demonstrated by Frondizi's ouster, even the possibility that Peronism might win an election—including a non-Presidential one—was sufficient to provoke a coup. The electoral proscription of Peronism, given its enormous influence within the popular sector, badly corroded the legitimacy of the regime and the authority of the elected governments of the 1955–66 period. But the regime's inability to absorb Peronism had deeper causes.

Electoral proscription left the unions as the main organizational bulwark of Peronism and reinforced the weight of the working class within the movement.^[*] Once closely tied to the state apparatus, the unions, still under Peronist leadership, had attained by 1958 considerable autonomy from it—despite, and partly because of, three years of government attempts to weaken or capture them. The electoral pact between Perón and Frondizi which allowed the latter to win the 1958 presidential election marked the point at which this autonomy was consolidated. As

[*] White-collar unions and their middle-sector constituents were not incorporated (or reincorporated) into Peronism until the late 1960s and early 1970s. The unions' acquisition of decisive weight within the Peronist movement occurred in the great urban centers.

president, however, Frondizi failed to comply with many terms of the pact, and in 1959 the unions launched a great wave of strikes. These strikes, and the repression with which they were met, were key aspects of a turbulent period that culminated in 1962 and 1963 in the overthrow of Frondizi and in combat between rival factions of the armed forces. By this time the unions and their national-level organization (the CGT) had become important political actors in their own right. In the context of a nearly stagnant economy^[*] and a succession of ineffectual governments operating under the constant threat of a military coup, the unions gave powerful voice to the demands of the popular sector. Strikes, street demonstrations, and strident manifestos were the main vehicles of those demands, though union leaders also displayed considerable skill—and we shall return repeatedly to this crucial point—at pragmatic negotiation.^[2] These union actions resulted in economic benefits for the rank and file, but gains won by the workers were canceled by inflation and unfavorable government policies, perpetuating a cycle that led, again and again, to massive mobilizations in support of the union leaders' demands.^[3] A more enduring consequence of this turbulent cycle of activity was that union leaders were able to gain control of important resources for their increasingly complex and bureaucratized organizations (and, in more than a few cases, of personal benefits for themselves). The actions of these leaders, together with the high preexisting activation of the popular sector, gave rise during the 1955–66 period to dramatic confrontations between the unions and successive governments, exacerbating the economic fluctuations and the political troubles of the period.^[†]

[*] During 1959, 1962, and 1963 the GNP actually declined.

[†] Several years later, a union leader formerly affiliated with Vandorism (a union alignment we shall examine in due course) described these tactics in the following terms: "Actually, there could not have been an organ better suited [than the union] to a working class guided by its defensive mentality, since the ultimate goal [of the union] is negotiation. Certainly, in the light of the economic crisis and political instability in which the country found itself, there was no reason why this negotiation had to be institutional: the union can resort to the strike, but also to financing political parties, and to factory occupations. This transition [from] its own means—the strike—to less familiar ones—the political struggle—to still others, such as factory takeovers, which imply subverting the capitalist order, should not be misunderstood. It [was] the correlation of forces, the conjuncture, that [determined] the specific tactic to be used in pursuit of an unchanging goal: the defense of the gains made under Peronism. If there is one attribute by which this zig-zag movement can be characterized, it is realism: a narrow realism, if you will, serving the interests of a political pressure group, but in no way a 'utopian' view that [would have led the unions to break their ties to] institutions and social forces and adopt a position of extreme intransigence" (Miguel Gazzera, Los Libros 9 [July 1970]: 4). See also Miguel Gazzera and Norberto Ceresole, Peronismo, autocrítica y perspectivas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Descartes, 1970).

Union leaders forged a complex relationship with Perón, who had been in exile since 1955, as they became what he often called "the backbone of the Movement." Though each was dependent on what the other contributed to the movement's popular support and vitality, both Perón and the union leaders attempted throughout the 1955–66 period to subordinate and even eliminate the role of the other. Despite these conflicts, however, union leaders and most of the rank and file shared with Perón an ideology that proposed a "more just" and socially balanced version of capitalist development. Perón, the fitful Peronist party, and the union leaders stood as firmly against "communism" as they did against "liberal," laissez-faire, and antistatist ideas. Likewise, their main social base did not articulate anticapitalist goals. The main hope of most of the popular sector lay in a Peronist government that would put the country back on the capitalist, nationalist, and statist path that had been cut short by the, 1955 coup. The fundamentally economistic stance of most leaders and members of the Peronist unions promoted recurrent alliances with various fractions of the bourgeoisie; this goes a long way toward explaining why the 1966 Argentine BA was implanted in the context of a relatively low-level threat.

But if the ideology and goals of the popular sector and its leaders made for a comparatively mild threat, the situation also contained a number of elements that were deeply disturbing to the bourgeoisie and its allies. To begin with, the unions were quite effective in translating their frequent and often disruptive demands into economic advantages for their social bases and their own organizations. Efforts to "normalize" the economy (to which we shall return) repeatedly met strong resistance from the popular sector—articulated mainly through the unions—which forged alliances with regional and bourgeois sectors also adversely affected by those attempts. These efforts at economic normalization and the resistance they provoked contributed greatly to an epileptic pattern of economic growth.^[4]

The capacity of the unions to press effectively for their demands was regarded by many as the fundamental obstacle to economic stabilization and development. Accordingly, the bourgeoisie and most of its organizations demanded, with increasing urgency after 1955, that successive governments "depoliticize" the unions (i.e., isolate them from the popular support they enjoyed through their affiliation with Peronism) and deprive them of their considerable resources. The bourgeoisie felt that the only way to guarantee their key class interest of preserving satisfactory

conditions of capital accumulation was to thoroughly "domesticate" the unions.

However—and this was the second matter of grave concern—the demands of the bourgeoisie and their allies fell upon very weak governments. Attempts to normalize the economy through recessionary policies aimed at lowering inflation and alleviating balance-of-payments crises were countered by great waves of strikes and popular mobilizations. Apparently overwhelmed by widespread "disorder," the civilian governments of the 1958–66 period found themselves perpetually on the verge of a coup. In the short run (and the always imminent coup made the long run irrelevant), the only way to eliminate this disorder was to satisfy a significant part of the demands that generated it. But this implied "demagogically" canceling normalization policies, ensuring a return to severe fluctuations in the major economic variables. One important consequence of this pattern of recurrent, massive, and often successful popular mobilizations was that, although popular sector leaders remained explicitly committed to capitalism, the popular sector itself was viewed by the bourgeoisie and its allies with increasing trepidation.

A third matter of concern for the dominant classes was that the governments of 1955–66, born with the original sin of the electoral proscription of Peronism and obliged repeatedly to attempt economic normalization, could not but antagonize the popular sector. But when elections approached and Peronist votes could not be ignored (since, even if Peronism was banned, Perón and/or the union leaders could deliver their votes to other parties), and when concessions had to be made to dampen social disorder, those same governments could not but antagonize the bourgeoisie. This is one of the main reasons why many called with increasing insistency for the installation of a new state and regime—not just a new government—that would be strong enough to subordinate or atomize the popular sector and the unions, and at the same time independent of the mechanisms that raised the unsolved enigma of the electoral strength of Peronism. The amorphous movement made up of Perón's leadership, the unions, the intermittent Peronist party, and the popular sector (which together, in the words of the Peronist leader John W. Cooke, constituted the "curse of bourgeois Argentina") had to be, once and for all, "put in its place."

To understand the factors that precipitated the 1966 coup and that continued to have an effect thereafter, it is important to examine the policies with which the Radical government attempted to weaken and

eventually divide Peronism.^[*] The Radical government's attempts to supervise (and in some cases manipulate) electoral procedures within the unions, as well as to control the use of their funds, drew sharp criticism from union leaders. Moreover, despite the Radicals' promises that Peronism would be allowed to present candidates in future elections, it was clear that the high command of the armed forces was not prepared to allow the Peronists to gain access to important government posts.^[†] Too, very much alive in the army and the air force were old populist illusions of a "union of the pueblo and the armed forces" that would promote many social and economic policies dear to the Peronists. These illusions represented an attractive possibility to the Peronist leaders (especially unionists), who were engaged in serious conflicts with the Radical government and who knew that the electoral route to government remained closed for them. Such considerations encouraged these leaders to place themselves in the vanguard of the opposition to the Radical government, and to participate actively in promoting the 1966 coup.^[‡]

Partly because of these factors, and partly because the weakness of the Radical government encouraged aggressive demands, the unions increased their strike activity during Illia's presidency. Street demonstrations were also called frequently, but most threatening of all was the Plan de Lucha (battle plan) launched by the CGT with a wave of workplace occupations in July and August of 1964. The newspapers reported a total of 1,436 occupations during these two months,^[§] and in

[*] The attempt to weaken the Peronists was vital for the Radicals since they faced the typical dilemma of the period: if they banned Peronism, their government would lose all legitimation and would be placed at the mercy of the armed forces (whose motivations the Radicals had every reason to suspect). But if they did not proscribe Peronism, there was a strong likelihood that the Peronists would win elections and—as had happened with Frondizi—that a coup would bring down their government.

[†] The military faction defeated in 1962–63 was avowedly anti-Peronist. But it soon became clear, as we shall see, that anti-Peronism was not the exclusive domain of that faction, and that the victorious group was far from united on this issue as well as on others.

[‡] For accounts of such participation see, for example, Primera Plana, March 22, 1966; and, on the eve of the coup, "Quienes sí/no están con el golpe?" Primera Plana, June 28, 1966, p. 6. The active role of many union leaders in promoting the coup was widely discussed in reasonably well-informed circles.

[§] See the Methodological Appendix for additional information on these data. Since the daily newspapers lacked space to give an account of every episode, the figures clearly underestimate the total number of occupations. Raúl H. Bisio and Héctor Cordone, in "La Segunda Etapa del Plan de Lucha de la CGT. Un episodio singular en la relación sindicatos-estado en la Argentina" (Buenos Aires: CEIL, 1980, mimeo), note that the CGT estimates of the number of occupations that took place in successive waves between May 21 and July 24, 1964, differ substantially from those of the government, but in both cases the figures are impressive. According to the CGT, 11,000 occupations involving a

quite a few instances workers held hostage executives of the firms they took over.

The demands of the CGT, though they displayed the economistic features already noted, were aimed at creating a climate of disorder that would help bring about a coup. Despite rather obvious connivances between union leaders and the armed forces, several aspects of the 1964 actions were cause for serious concern among the bourgeoisie and the leading periodicals. First, by taking control, in a massive and coordinated stroke, of most of the country's industrial plant, the working class had demonstrated a formidable capacity for action. Second, such actions could be interpreted as a revolutionary exercise that might be restaged in pursuit of goals very different from those expressed by the CGT. Third, and no less threatening, was the spontaneity with which the rank and file frequently went beyond the instructions of national union leaders, as was demonstrated by the taking of hostages and by instances where the workers for brief periods kept the factories they occupied in operation. Together, these aspects of the 1964 actions seemed to demonstrate that the situation could easily evolve toward something far worse than the existing impediments to capital accumulation.

The Radical government ignored the calls of the bourgeoisie and most of the media for the use of all-out repression to regain control of the factories. It opted instead for the slow procedure of asking for court injunctions to clear the plants. This choice was influenced by Illia's firm belief in due process of law. But it also reflected his awareness that by ordering a military evacuation of the factories he might precipitate a coup or at least make his government the captive of armed forces less interested in sustaining it than in finding the right moment to remove it. But in choosing this option the Radical government lent further credence to arguments that it could not guarantee the most fundamental aspects of public order.

The concerns of the bourgeoisie were expressed in several ways. Negative expectations and uncertainty concerning the timing of the coup and the policy orientations that might emerge from it were reflected in various forms of speculative behavior. Such behavior was manifested in a sharp rise in quotations for the dollar on the futures

[*] total of 3,913,000 workers occurred during this period, while the government, which made no estimate of the numbers of workers participating, came up with a figure of 2,361 occupations. It should be noted that an undetermined number of plants were taken more than once.

market and on the black market.^[*] The figures cited earlier for the movements of international capital also manifest this surge of speculative activity.^[†] The thirty-day interest rate for U.S. dollars on the futures market is seen in the following monthly averages:^[5]

Most of the media and the organizations of the upper bourgeoisie reiterated tirelessly that the government, although it could not itself be accused of subversive aims, was, through its passivity, lack of authority and inefficacy, the unwilling but effective promoter of dangers that went far beyond mere disorder. The Radical government and, more generally, the various regimes and governments that had existed since 1955, having shown themselves incapable of absorbing the electoral weight of Peronism and of keeping the unions and the popular sector in line, seemed condemned to foment "subversion."^[‡]

Although the massive actions of 1964 were not repeated in 1965 and 1966, numerous incidents continued to take place, some of which again

[*] The extraordinary increases in these quotations during the months immediately prior to the June 1966 coup provide an eloquent testimony to the feeling (at least among those segments of the upper bourgeoisie and financial speculators who have easy access to this market) that the end was near. For discussion of these premonitions and their relation to the turmoil in the foreign exchange market, see Economic Survey, June 7, 14, and 21, 1966.

[†] It should be stressed that this is not a study of the Radical government and cannot, therefore, provide an evaluation of its policies. Considering the hostile environment created from the beginning by the armed forces, the bourgeoisie and the unions, and the no less hostile stances of important political forces (such as Desarrollismo, inspired by ex-President Frondizi, and a large part of Peronism), the Radical government achieved some notable successes, both in several areas of economic policies and in its efforts to restore democratic rights and guarantees. However, its capacity to make and implement policy was overwhelmed by the enormous constellation of forces that converged to promote the 1966 coup.

[‡] The entrepreneurs with whom I talked at the time or interviewed later considered the participation of union leaders in promoting the 1966 coup as the epitome of how absurd and dangerous the situation had become. It seemed to them imperative to put an end to the Radical government, and even more important to halt the series of "weak" and "demagogic" governments which had been endured for too long. But these goals required a coup, and the contacts between union leaders and some currents within the armed forces provoked serious concern among those entrepreneurs about the direction the coup might take.

culminated in the occupation of factories.^[*] On top of these incidents came some violent clashes in various regions of the country, particularly in the province of Tucumán.^[†] In an effort to appease the unions and gain a foothold within the popular sector, the government enacted legislation providing for automatic monthly cost-of-living adjustments for wages and salaries. It also tried to gain congressional approval of a law that would have greatly increased job security. Decried by the leading periodicals and the upper bourgeoisie as the ultimate example of demagoguery, the latter legislation was debated inconclusively by Congress in sessions fraught with incidents that did little to enhance the already low prestige of that institution and of politicians in general. The introduction of price controls further antagonized the bourgeoisie, while a number of nationalistic policies (involving restrictions on the expatriation of capital, foreign exchange controls, and some decisions affecting oil-producing activities^[‡] provoked the hostility of transnational capital and of the domestic sectors linked to it.

As if this were not enough, provincial elections in 1965 showed that Radicalism remained incapable of competing electorally with Peronism, even if—as was the case in the province of Mendoza—the Peronist vote was divided between two slates of candidates, one backed by union leaders and the other by Perón. The results of the 1965 elections seemed

[*] Partly as a reaction to these events, the organizations of the upper bourgeoisie in the first half of 1966 sharpened their criticism of the alleged "unrestrained statism" in the Radical government's economic policies and the government's "passivity" in the face of the "wave of subversion." See the statements of the ACIEL, the UIA, the SRA, the CAC, and the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange in La Nación, April 16 and 23, May 6, 10, 11, 13, and 14, and June 5, 1966. The CGT chimed in with its own criticisms of the government (La Nación, April 1, 1966, p. 14) and a June 6, 1966, national work stoppage on the heels of numerous strikes involving such crucial occupational sectors as judicial employees, municipal employees, public transportation, airline, postal, telecommunications and railroad workers, and teachers and professors.

[†] In response to these events, the upper bourgeoisie and the leading periodicals expressed fear and hostility. After asserting that "general disorder" prevailed in the country, La Prensa remarked that "there is practically no constituted authority that functions to safeguard public tranquility and individual security. Threat is the rule, and is easily converted to violence…. Industrial plants, business offices, schools, and public offices are regularly transformed into garrisons or fortresses by rebellious groups protesting delays in the payment of wages and salaries one day, and disagreeing with an administrative decision or expressing solidarity with the perpetrators of earlier outrages the next" (June 6, 1966, p. 8). On the presumed subversive implications of this situation see La Nación, January 13, March 17 and 24, April 21, and June 2, 11, 19 and 26, 1966; Primera Plana, January 10 and 17, March 31, and June 17, 1966; Confirmado, January 6, March 10 and 24, May 26, and June 2 and 23, 1966; and Economic Survey, February 1 and 15, March 22, and June 7, 1966. These and other publications unequivocally promoted the coup.

[‡] The major decision involving the oil sector was the cancellation of contracts concluded during Frondizi's presidency with United States oil companies.

to indicate that unless the Peronists were again banished from the electoral arena, the future of Radicalism would be to prepare the way for a Peronist presidency—precisely when the principal social base of Peronism had begun to raise, through the Plan de Lucha and its offshoots, the spectre of a crisis of social domination. A Peronist victory, moreover, would assure a pivotal role to Perón himself, who remained totally unacceptable to a substantial part of the dominant classes and to the armed forces.

A brief recapitulation is in order. The threat existing prior to the 1966 coup was undoubtedly perceived as much greater than it actually was. This perception was exaggerated still further by those who manipulated public opinion in order to promote the coup. Nonetheless, we must reconstruct the events from the point of view of those who experienced them. By 1966 much of Argentine society perceived the events we have discussed as expressions of a crisis that—beyond its government, regime, and accumulation dimensions—had begun to show a dangerous potential for the "subversion" of social domination. These impressions were accentuated by a government that appeared unable to contain the popular activation that was gathering momentum as Peronists, unions, and much of the popular sector expressed their hostility not just toward the Radical government but toward a regime that denied them access to government through the electoral process. The support these actors gave to the 1966 coup expressed not only their rejection of that regime but also their hope that the new state would be based on an alliance in which the economic and corporate interests of at least the unions would play a larger and more consistent role.

The relatively low intensity of the threat that precipitated the 1966 coup, together with the widespread support the coup received, seemed to offer a golden opportunity for a national reconciliation. Its only requirement seemed to be that the little that remained of an ill-fated semidemocracy be retired from the scene. Winners and losers alike believed that they had won.

2. Currents within the Armed Forces

The way in which the Argentine armed forces intervened on June 28, 1966, must be understood in the light of their own history following the overthrow of Perón. Between 1955 and 1963, factionalization paved the way for repeated coups and internal putsches and provoked a marked

relaxation in military discipline. This factionalization gave rise around 1962 to a "professionalist" reaction aimed at restoring the armed forces' cohesion, increasing its operational capacity, and equipping its officers to approach social problems from the standpoint of the national security doctrines newly in vogue on the continent. These aims reflected the view that dissension within the armed forces stemmed from repeated interventions into national politics, from alliances with political parties and civilian groups, and from the choice of goals subordinated to those established by civilians. To remedy this situation, the professionalists proposed that the armed forces place themselves above politics, intervening only when circumstances (which they reserved the right to define) posed an "imminent danger to national security."^[*] This "return to the barracks" implied, in the turbulent period that followed the overthrow of President Frondizi, that the electoral system would be allowed to survive, albeit constrained by the ban on Peronism. The professionalist reaction against the most politicized officers culminated in the armed conflicts of 1962 and 1963, which resulted in a decisive victory for the former. Because their position implied a break with the golpismo of the defeated faction (which was intent on immediately eliminating the regime of parties and elections), the professionalists came to be known as "legalists"—a term whose irony became apparent soon afterward. The victory of the professionalists paved the way for new elections in 1963, which brought the Radicals to government after a Peronist abstention.

The army, in which Commander in Chief Lt. General Juan Carlos Onganía had achieved undisputed leadership, emerged from the armed clashes of 1962–63 clearly dominant over the navy and the air force. Under Onganía's command, the armed forces largely achieved the professionalists' organizational goals and temporarily suspended the pattern of frequent interventions and plots against the government. But if in so doing the armed forces declared themselves above politics, they by no means placed themselves outside of politics. The ongoing political crisis and the Radical government's lack of social support kept alive the possibility of a coup. But now that the armed forces were reasonably reunified and committed to the doctrine of national security, any future coup would be decided upon and executed through formal lines of command. The armed forces retained a vivid memory of the costs and uncertainties brought on by their previous factionalization. This memory

[*] The consummate expression of this position is the speech by Lt. General Juan C. Onganía made in, of all places, West Point, New York (La Nación, August 6, 1964, p. 1).

was expressed in a commitment to avoid situations that might again dissolve the lines of command and precipitate armed confrontations. Onganía was known to be a firm adherent of this view: jeopardizing the hard-won unity and discipline of the armed forces could mean the collapse of the one institution that had managed to "organize itself" in the midst of the factionalism, turmoil, and "hierarchical disintegration" prevailing in society and in the civilian state apparatus.^[*] We shall hear echoes of these themes in the chapters that follow.

The experience of the armed forces in the years prior to the 1966 coup had other consequences that influenced the direction of subsequent events. First, if their factionalization had resulted from direct interference in party politics and in the daily conduct of government, then similar risks seemed to be entailed by intervening once again, dismantling the constitutional system and delaying its restoration indefinitely. The government installed by the 1966 coup sought to prevent this by appointing civilians to the highest levels of government, including all of the national ministries and secretariats, and (together with retired military officers) to top positions in the provinces and state enterprises. The idea was that the armed forces would be the "backbone of the revolution," but would "neither govern nor co-govern." Their participation was formally limited to certain nonexecutive organizations of which only the commanders in chief and a few especially designated officers were members.^[†] Officers on active duty were prohibited from exercising any executive function of government^[‡] and from interfering in the daily conduct of government affairs.^[§] For Onganía, such policies had the desirable effect of increasing his autonomy from the armed forces, but the main reason this military government was so little militarized had to do with the interpretation that Onganía and many of

[*] The concern with avoiding new factionalization played a key role in the timing of the coup. Important elections, scheduled for 1967, would once again pose the dilemma of whether or not to proscribe the Peronists; the June 1966 coup sought to head off this dilemma and the divisive effects it would have had within the armed forces; cf. O'Donnell, "Modernization and Military Coups."

[†] These organizations were the National Council on Development (CONADE), the National Security Council (CONASE), the National Council on Science and Technology (CONACYT), the Armed Forces General Staff, the Secretariat of Information (SIDE), and the military junta. None of these organizations was formally part of the executive branch.

[‡] An exception was made with regard to the railroads. It was believed—mistakenly—that a team of officers on active duty would be efficient enough to ameliorate the railroads' catastrophic deficit.

[§] The ministers and secretaries I interviewed stated that they were under orders from Onganía to report to him any pressure or personal request from active-duty members of the armed forces.

his fellow officers placed on the recent history of the armed forces. We shall see, however, that the resulting isolation of General Onganía from his colleagues generated increasing dissatisfaction among the latter, particularly after 1969 when the armed forces had to suppress spectacular popular uprisings in Rosario and Córdoba.

A second consequence of the recent experience of the armed forces was that many of its officers saw what they regarded as their successful reorganization as a model for orienting the new government's goals and criteria. They believed they had eliminated their own factionalism, first, because they had reestablished an institutional order based on hierarchically defined lines of authority; second, because each component of the armed forces confined itself to its area of specialization; and third, because all members shared general views and goals which, when attained, would fully satisfy, with no genuine reason for conflict, the interests of everyone, irrespective of the position and function that each occupied in the whole. This self-image scarcely corresponded to reality; but the important point is that it was generalized to society as a whole, in the statements of Onganía and in various important military documents of the period, as we shall see. To ward off the collapse the armed forces had narrowly averted, it was now the nation that had to be saved from factionalism and conflict, from "politicization," and from its own "crisis of authority."

But a third consequence of what took place in the armed forces during the early 1960s involves the continuity within its ranks of discrepant ideological tendencies. The officers who triumphed in 1963 agreed on a "return to the barracks" in order to preserve their institution, but this did not rule out important disagreements regarding a number of issues that could not be avoided after the 1966 coup. To understand this point we must turn to an examination of the main currents existing within the professionalist military of 1966.^[*]

What I shall henceforth term the paternalist current was prominently represented by Onganía and was highly influential in his entourage, in the Ministry of the Interior (the ministry in charge of political affairs), and among an unknown but certainly important proportion of the members

[*] Since this discussion is based on public statements and on my interviews with high-ranking officers, it is difficult to determine the support for these currents among the lower ranks. All evidence suggests that the younger the officers the more likely they were to support the paternalists or nationalists rather than the liberals (currents that are discussed below). But the preferences of the younger officers did not prevent the liberals, in the period being studied, from by and large controlling the armed forces, with the exception of the air force which remained a stronghold of the nationalists.

of the armed forces. Admirers of Francisco Franco, close to traditionalist currents within the Catholic Church, and for the most part of middle-class provincial origin, the members of this current held views that corresponded closely to the "authoritarian mentality" described by Juan Linz.^[6] Although their corporatist outlook was shot through with organicist metaphors, it fell short of a fascist ideology thanks to a conservatism impregnated with hostility to all forms of political mobilization and to the dream of restoring the social integration of a mythical patriarchal past. Conservatives or, better, traditionalists, their ideal society would be as alien to mass politics as to big business. Reluctant to accept capitalism, profit, and big corporations, they believed that in the long run these could be superseded by a less prosaic and selfish social system. Meanwhile the pueblo, the ultimate beneficiary of their efforts, would have to wait, confident and disciplined, until their tutors had created the conditions under which such a new system might emerge. The paternalists, advocates of "order," "authority" and depoliticization, wore a modern stripe in their fascination with técnicos (technocrats) who, they felt, would take care of one of the more urgent but, in the paternalists' view, ultimately not too important sides of the government: the economy. These técnicos seemed to be the bearers of a cool rationality that apparently supported (and this was the source of the paternalists' fascination with them) the paternalists' denial of the inherently conflictual character of most social issues.

A second, "nationalist"^[*] current within the armed forces resembled the first in many respects, but it is important not to confuse the two. Both were authoritarian and corporatist, but while the paternalists favored an "apolitical" and "demobilized" society, the nationalists hoped to achieve their goals by building and manipulating mass movements. The nationalists nurtured dreams of a union between the pueblo and the armed forces, viewing the former as an atomized mass incapable of generating its own leaders and ready to be mobilized behind an ideology affirming the "genuinely national" in its sharp rejection of "communism" as well as of "liberal," "individualistic," and internationalist patterns of capitalist growth. The nation they wished to construct required a strong state apparatus, more active economically than the one envisioned by the paternalists and better disposed to repress in good conscience. The size and predominantly foreign character of big business

[*] I use the terms nationalists and liberals (the latter for the current discussed below) with some misgivings, as both have connotations that are not consistent with their usage in this book. I trust that the reader will be careful to note the meanings I give them here.

evoked the hostility of the nationalists, who saw in the "national entrepreneurs" the political and economic base for a nationalist version of capitalism. Moreover, the nationalists hoped—with clearly fascist overtones—to combine corporatism and the authoritarian mobilization of the pueblo, by means of a movement, not a party, that they would control from the government. The proponents of this late and decidedly authoritarian flowering of populism were to discover that the pueblo was unwilling to mobilize within the limits they wished to impose, and that the local bourgeoisie, too weak in some of its fractions and too penetrated by transnational capital in others, was unwilling to play the crucial role they had assigned it in the "national revolution."

The "liberals" comprised a third current within the armed forces. I ignore the social origins of the non-leadership members of this current, but it should be noted that, unlike their nationalist and paternalist peers, those who led this current during the period we are studying—General Julio Alsogaray, General Alejandro Lanusse, and many of their close associates—came from the urban upper class. The liberals, in contrast to the nationalists and paternalists, were not provincial in their origins and outlook. Their friends and social connections were likely to be oriented toward the upper bourgeoisie and its entourage of lawyers, economists, publishers, and intellectuals. They considered themselves true democrats and were skeptical of the pronouncements of allegiance to democracy that from time to time their nationalist and paternalist colleagues felt obliged to make. From the liberals' point of view, the imposition of an authoritarian state was a lamentable necessity that did not rule out the ultimate restoration of political democracy, albeit in a form insulated from the "demagogic" irruptions that had characterized the pre-1966 period. Unlike the paternalists and nationalists, the liberals were unreservedly pro-capitalist and had a much better grasp than the other currents of the workings of a capitalist economy. They had nothing against big business; to the contrary, it formed part of their civilian milieu. The military liberals and the upper bourgeoisie cultivated their mutual relationship with a keen awareness of its importance to both of them. Not surprisingly, the liberals were, as we shall see, the only secure source of military support for those who took charge of the economic policies of the BA.

A fourth current, probably with more participants than the others, remained in the background. It consisted of careerist military unaffiliated with the above-mentioned currents. While hardly congenial to the liberals' outlook, those who belonged to this group were always alert to,

and prepared to follow, the changing distribution of power within the armed forces.

This sketch of ideologies and tendencies within the armed forces will come into sharper focus as we examine the ways in which they interacted with other factors during the 1966–73 period. One peculiarity of the Argentine case is that during this period each of the three major military currents occupied the presidency: the paternalists with Onganía in 1966–70, the nationalists with Levingston in 1970–71, and the liberals with Lanusse in 1971–73. These currents converged to put an end to the semidemocracy prevailing from 1955 to 1966 and to inaugurate a new state and regime aimed at achieving, in an unspecified period of time, a broad set of goals that included restoring "international respect" to Argentina, "modernizing" the country, "assuring national unity," "promoting the general welfare," and "redirecting the nation on its road to greatness."^[7]

Onganía, who held great prestige in the armed forces and projected an image of authority and sobriety that seemed especially suited to the times, was the obvious choice to lead this undertaking. His appointment to the presidency attested to his skills as a military leader, but the decision to exclude the armed forces from direct participation in the government prevented him from exercising this military leadership. In fact, the elevation of the most prominent representative of the paternalists to the highest governmental position enabled the liberals to achieve significant control within the armed forces. Of the members of the liberal current, General Julio Alsogaray and his brother Álvaro^[*] played a particularly active role in promoting the coup and in shaping the decisions made immediately thereafter. The influence of liberals was apparent in the "Acts of the Argentine Revolution," particularly in the sections (in Appendix 3) devoted to "Economic Policy" and "Labor Policy."^[8] The content and language of these texts, in spite of some ambiguities, reflected their liberal origins, especially in their emphasis on free enterprise and private initiative and in their affirmation of constitutional democracy as the ultimate goal of the authoritarian interlude.^[9] The contrasts between these documents and those authored later by Onganía and his associates underscore the ideological distance separating the liberals from the paternalists.

[*] Álvaro Alsogaray had served as Economy Minister during the presidencies of Frondizi and Guido (1958–63). The short-lived and largely unsuccessful economic policies he implemented under each government provoked deep recessions and sharp declines in wages and salaries and did little to establish his popularity.

The commander in chief of the army at the time of the coup was General Pascual Pistarini, an officer with little influence. He was replaced in December 1966 by Julio Alsogaray, who was later relieved of command after a series of conflicts with Onganía. In terms of military prestige and civilian support, the obvious choice to succeed Alsogaray as commander in chief was another liberal, General Alejandro Lanusse. Lanusse played a central role in the overthrow of Onganía and in the selection and subsequent removal of Onganía's successor, General Marcelo Levingston. Lanusse himself served as president during the last phase of the "Argentine Revolution," which was marked by the search for a negotiated agreement with the political and social forces that the 1966 coup had sought to exclude.

The conflicts among these military currents added momentum to the problems faced by this BA. They also provide insight, by way of the contrast between the paternalism of Onganía and the liberalism of Castelo Branco and his group,^[10] into important differences between the Argentine and Brazilian cases. But it is important to emphasize here (and to substantiate in the following chapters) the relationship between the comparative mildness of the threat that preceded the implantation of the 1966 Argentine BA and the early emergence of sharp conflicts among the major currents in the armed forces. One advantage of studying the Argentine case of 1966 is that it enables us to examine these conflicts and the ideological differences that underlie them. In cases of high previous threat, though, those conflicts and differences still exist. Following the initial period of the BA, which is characterized by efforts to impose order and to normalize the economy, such differences surface once again, regardless of whether the process culminates in the collapse of the BA or in the achievement of what its supporters view as important successes.^[11] But the later and less pronounced emergence of internal conflicts in cases implanted under more extreme conditions of crisis and threat provides a good comparative benchmark against which to assess how and to what degree such conflicts determine political processes after the BA is installed.

3. Paternalist and Liberals

The "Argentine Revolution" began with the announcement that it would persist for as long as it took to "modernize" the country, to "reunite Argentina with its destiny," and to eradicate the evils of the 1955–66 period, which were said to include inflation, sluggish economic

growth, acute social conflict, corruption, "sectoral egoism," "subversion," "lack of faith" and the absence of "spiritual cohesion" among Argentines, and the "inorganic," "unrepresentative" character of civilian organizations. Society had to be integrated and "amalgamated" with a state apparatus that would be transformed into an "effective" set of institutions. To this end, it was necessary to begin by imposing "order." Once achieved, this "order," bursting with the fruits of economic growth, would allow for an equitable distribution of goods and opportunities. Still later, once a stable and legitimated system was in place, it would permit the restoration of "political activity." The workings of this new order would be nurtured by the "genuine representativeness" of the "basic organizations of the community.^[12]

These goals were to be achieved in three stages. The first, "economic" stage would be devoted to imposing order and repairing the worst of the damage that the previous period of "chaos and irresponsible demagoguery" had produced in the economy and the state apparatus. That period would be succeeded by a "social stage" which, on the basis of the achievements of the first one, would promote distributive justice and "structural transformations." The third and final stage was the "political" one, which would produce the harmonious "amalgamation" of the new state and the "genuinely representative organizations of the community," all imbued with the value of solidarity.^[*]

These three stages corresponded to the ideology of Onganía and the paternalists. This ideology revealed a fundamental bias in its conception of politics as synonymous with disorder, fragmented interests, and demagogic promises leading to premature expectations. Politics was seen as a realm of manipulation and opportunism, offensive to the moralistic code of the paternalists. Whereas one of the paternalists' goals was to secure the stability necessary to initiate "profound" (social and economic) transformations, "politics" meant sacrificing long-term solutions. Politics was equated with the "division of the Argentines."^[†]

[*] See also Onganía's statements on the goal of promoting "participation" through the "basic organizations of the community" once such organizations had been "ordered" and "made truly representative" (La Nación, October 30, 1966, p. 1). Minister of the Interior Enrique Martínez Paz made similar remarks (La Nación, November 9, p. 8; November 11, p. 1; November 27, p. 1, 1966).

[†] To his denunciations of social factionalization and "disintegration" Onganía added, "One day political parties will have to be replaced by other organizations, equally political, based on a revitalized community, based on ideals rather than biases, and loyal to the Nation before the group" (La Nación, December 31, 1966, p. 8). Martínez Paz added that "old-style politics have definitively ended" because "political parties encouraged the division of the people and, comfortable in the pretense of a purely formal and sterile legality, established [polarized] choices as a system," aggravated by the parties' own "lack of true

The paternalists envisioned a new order in which social and spiritual integration would reign, eliminating all genuine cause for conflict. State and society would form an organic whole in which each individual member, and each of the sectors into which these members were to be integrated, would perform functions contributing to the well-being of everyone, including the less favored, to whom the rulers would dispense justice when the economic sitution permitted. Only those who stooped to unjustifiable egoism could oppose this vision, and the paternalists' policies could be tough when it came to removing the obstacles to the social integration they envisaged. Such expressions of "disorder" and "lack of cohesion" as elections, political parties, and strikes would have to be suppressed in order to achieve the overriding goal of "spiritual cohesion." This task required a strong state which, from the standpoint of this hierarchical, integrationist and corporatist ideology, was the only perspective from which to discern the general interest.

The antipolitical bias inherent in the paternalist ideology would persist even after the utopia of the "organized community" had been achieved. Political parties might eventually exist, but they would represent integrative conceptions of the common good rather than sectoral interests. Moreover, they would form but one aspect, and by no means the most important, of participation, which would center on commissions and councils composed of the functionally specialized basic organizations of the community—great bodies of workers, entrepreneurs, and professionals—that would be organically linked to the highest levels of the state apparatus. In this scheme, participation would consist of relaying information (technical in character and, owing to the diffusion throughout society of values of solidarity, transcending particularized interests) to better equip the government for decision-making.

This vision corresponded to more than a few members of the armed forces and to various groups within the Catholic Church, particularly in its upper strata. Its law-and-order implications held some potential appeal for the middle sectors, but its moralism tended to alienate this highly secularized and politically cynical sector.^[*] Neither the agro-exporters,

[*] representatives, their inauthenticity, their egoism." Argentina's political parties, according to Martínez Paz, were "the expression of special interests that did not coincide with the national interest … and constituted a struggle among factions artificially crystallized around ideological banners" (La Prensa, November 27, 1966, pp. 1, 7).

[*] The new authorities undertook "morality campaigns" and censored various publications and public events for "obscenity." Their popular appeal was not increased by the baroque protocol that surrounded their public appearances or by the closing of publications that satirized their attitudes.

with their strongly antistatist orientation, nor the local and international factions of the upper bourgeoisie, whose outlook was neither parochial nor traditionalist, were likely to be drawn to the paternalist ideology. The paternalist outlook was explicitly antiliberal, not only in its stated rejection of "formal democracy" but also in its vision of a tutelary, corporatizing state aimed at preserving a "just equilibrium" among social classes. On the other hand, the tutelary state of the paternalists was not the entrepreneurial state of the nationalists. Moreover, the paternalists tried to distance themselves from the dominant classes, aware that they had to gain their support but convinced that these classes had to be tightly controlled in order to achieve a society more balanced and more concerned with distributive justice than any the dominant classes were willing to tolerate.^[*]

The ideology of the liberals also deserves attention. While the paternalists had to compensate for their weak social bases by entrenching themselves in the state apparatus, the liberals in the armed forces reached out to the dominant classes and to society's most powerful organizations. Transnational capital, the organizations of the upper bourgeoisie, the oligopolistic fractions of urban capital, and the leading periodicals all found themselves speaking the same language as the military liberals and provided the points of departure and return for the civilian liberal técnicos who took control of the principal economic levers of the BA. This current was not hostile toward the growth of the state apparatus (a position that distinguished it from the laissez-faire ideology of some of its more traditional, agrarian-based allies), provided that such enlargement supported the expansion of the oligopolistic productive structure controlled by their main social allies. These views were at odds with both the equilibrating state envisioned by the paternalists and the entrepreneurial statism of the nationalists.

Notwithstanding these differences, there were important convergences at the beginning of this BA among paternalists, nationalists, and liberals. All saw the first task of the BA as imposing "order," and all were anxious that the BA be regarded as capable of projecting its domination for an extended period of time. These points of agreement enabled the three currents to ally in executing the coup that implanted the BA.

[*] The paternalists I interviewed clearly felt that they did not belong to the world of big business and that their goals would require the imposition of controls that the upper bourgeoisie would not accept with good grace.

4. Indecision and Confusion

I have indicated that the 1966 coup took place with widespread acquiescence. This was also true for Onganía's designation as president by the junta of commanders in chief. Onganía seemed to be an introverted and unspectacular leader, projecting the image of a future in which order and calm would prevail. The initial statements of Onganía and the Junta,^[13] which concerned order, reconciliation, and the serious and efficient management of public affairs, evoked favorable responses.^[*] It therefore came as no surprise that the first step taken by the "Argentine Revolution" (apart from baptizing itself as such) was to suppress the institutions that the new authority considered to be the main causes of the frustrations of the past. Congress and political parties were disbanded, political activity was prohibited, and, with the intention of putting it to good use, party property was diverted to public education.^[14] Nothing was said as to whether political parties would exist in the future, but even the liberals applauded the elimination of these parties.^[†] Furthermore, since the BA had been implanted to eradicate disorder and subversion, a "National System of Planning and Action for National Security"^[15] was instituted, resulting in the creation of the National Security Council (CONASE).

With the bourgeoisie enthused,^[‡] union leaders expressing their support, Perón blessing the coup, various ex-political parties offering their personnel to the new government, and the Radicals bereft of any capacity to oppose the coup, the "disorder" of the previous period seemed to have been dispelled by the image of authority that the new government assiduously projected. The universities, "politicized and plagued by leftists," were seen as the only remaining bastions of conflict. Many approved when the universities were "intervened"—the legally elected officers replaced by government appointees—on July 29, 1966, although there were some objections to the brutalities committed in the process.^[16]

[*] An example of the initial euphoria of some intellectual sectors is the collective volume entitled La "Revolución Argentina." Análisis y prospectiva (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Depalma, 1966). A more concrete indication of optimism about the future was the sharp rise in quotations on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange in the week after the coup. Economic Survey reported these gains to be the highest on record (July 5, 1966, p. 58).

[†] See the enthusiastic statements of all the media during the week of July 3–10, 1966, on the "definitive" elimination of these agents of "demagoguery" and "ineffectiveness" or even of "totalitarianism."

[‡] For expressions of support from all of the organizations of the upper bourgeoisie, see La Nación, July 14, 1966. The CGT was also happy with the new government; see La Nación, August 24, 1966, p. 5.

But they were deceived who waited for the torrent of decisions out of which would arise a "revolutionary mystique." The first cabinet was composed of self-proclaimed "moderate nationalists" who shared the president's paternalist orientation. Military liberals, like General Alsogaray, returned to their divisional commands, while prominent liberal civilians (like his brother Álvaro, who was appointed ambassador to the United States) were removed from the day-to-day conduct of government affairs. One of the most visible paternalists in the new cabinet was Interior Minister Enrique Martínez Paz. In addition to generating some qualms over the way he managed the closing-down of the universities, Martínez Paz obviously enjoyed proclaiming the "end of politics" in Argentina and denouncing the infinite evils for which he blamed the political parties. He also condemned democracy unequivocally.^[17] Another paternalist, Secretary of Government Mario Díaz Colodrero, made similar statements, although he was more cautious in his denunciations of formal democracy. For his part, Onganía insisted that the initial, economic stage of the Argentine Revolution focus on two tasks in addition to economic normalization: the implantation of "order and authority" in society and the reorganization of the state apparatus. The latter was to be made more efficient by cutting personnel, "rationalizing" the central administration and public enterprises, improving tax collection, and implementing ambitious projects to expand the physical infrastructure.^[*] Since public works projects took considerable start-up time and since the only visible fruits of "rationalization" were mountains of charts and regulations, the task attended to most rapidly was the dismissal of numerous public employees.^[18]

The prospect of a streamlined state apparatus that would focus on assuring favorable conditions for the expansion of private capital was well received by the upper bourgeoisie.^[†] But it clashed head-on with the public employees' unions and with the port workers, who began an extended strike when the "modernization" of the port of Buenos Aires

[*] The goal of reorganizing the state apparatus was stressed repeatedly by Onganía: "It is necessary to give preference to the organization of the state … to place a high priority on organizing the state such that this takes precedence over the other one that must also be organized,. which is the community" (La Nación, October 30, 1966, p. 1). Cf. also his speech in La Nación, November 8, 1966, p. 4, and Planeamiento y desarrollo de la acción de gobierno-directiva .

[†] The presidents of the UIA and the CAC responded enthusiastically to the announcement that the state apparatus was to be rationalized (La Nación, August 19, 1966, p. 1 and August 23, 1966, p. 7). Other organizations of the upper bourgeoisie also voiced their support (La Nación, November 9, 1966, p. 8). It is also worth noting that quotations on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange rose sharply immediately following this announcement.

commenced with massive layoffs and changes in the work process.^[19] Similarly, the effort to overcome the sugar monoculture of Tucumán Province, which was defined as another major modernization task, began with a series of mill closings, aggravating the poor employment situation of that region and generating numerous strikes and violent protests.^[20] The government did not take this heavy-handed approach, however, in dealing with workers in other sectors dominated by private capital. In August 1966 two important unions—the metal workers and the textile workers—began the renegotiation of their collective agreements by denouncing the "selfishness" of their employers and threatening to strike.^[21] In these cases the government intervened to achieve a "just solution" that left employers protesting that the workers had made fundamental gains at their expense.^[*]

Government officials also turned a deaf ear to demands for the repeal of the Law of Professional Associations (which was seen as the main mechanism underlying the "excessive power" of the unions) and for the establishment of "free unions. "^[†] They opted instead for policies aimed at shifting control of the CGT to union leaders who were expected to be responsive to the paternalists. This decision was an early indication of a problem that would surface repeatedly throughout the period: the paternalists did not want to atomize the unions, as the liberals and the upper bourgeoisie demanded, but to unify them under their own control.

As the CGT struggled with the ambiguities resulting from the government's differing policies toward its member unions,^[‡] the bourgeoisie was heartened by episodes that began to reveal that, in spite of the "equilibrating"

[*] Onganía was in attendance when, with great ceremony, the metal workers signed their Collective Work Agreement. The UIA complained that the government had exerted pressure on behalf of the workers in arranging both this agreement and the one signed by the textile workers. These protests cost the Undersecretary of Labor his job (La Nación, October 5, 1966, p. 1, and UIA, Memoria Anual, 1966–1967 [Buenos Aires, 1967], p. 59).

[†] The leading periodicals were the first to raise the issue of "free unions," arguing that if political parties were disbanded, "reasons of equity" demanded that a similar policy should be applied to the CGT, since it was the main organizational base of Peronism. They also asserted that existing laws that denied workers the freedom to decide whether or not to join a union and that prevented the emergence of a plurality of unions were obviously "totalitarian" vestiges of the past which would be intolerable in the era of liberty that had just been inaugurated. See La Nación, August 25, p. 6, and December 15, p. 6, 1966, and February 16, 1967; La Prensa, December 18, 1966, p. 6 and January 25, 1967, p. 6; and Economic Survey, July 19, 1966, p. 605.

[‡] In October 1966 Francisco Prado was reelected secretary general of the CGT. He and other CGT leaders immediately announced their desire to "carry on a dialogue with the government and with business" (La Nación, October 27, 1966, p. 20), and encouraged participation in the "Argentine Revolution" (La Nación, August 26, p. 11 and November 2, p. 1, 1966).

designs of the paternalists, the working class and various middle sectors were among the losers under the BA. One such episode was a speech by Onganía in which he reiterated commonplaces dear to the upper and Pampean bourgeoisies.^[*] Another, more important, signal was the sanctioning of the Law of Mandatory Arbitration, which prohibited strikes or work stoppages until the issues in conflict had been submitted to government arbitration.^[†] The paternalists viewed this law as necessary in the short run for halting the strikes that had begun to shatter the peace of the first days of the BA, and in the long run for eliminating activities incompatible with their utopia of an "organized community." Closer to the mark were the perceptions of the upper bourgeoisie and the leading periodicals, as well as of some union leaders, who realized that the Law of Mandatory Arbitration, given the already effected suppression of the electoral system, deprived the popular sector of its only remaining institutionalized means for articulating its demands. It was also quite clear that this law weakened the popular sector not only in its dealings with the state apparatus but also in its direct relations with the bourgeoisie.^[‡]

The attempts to manipulate the CGT, the sanctions imposed on

[*] La Nación, November 8, 1966, p. 1. Besides announcing a frontal attack on inflation and the fiscal deficit, Onganía stated that "it is the intention of this government that industry remain in the hands of industrialists, and not in those of the state," whose activities would be limited to energy and steel and to "resolving problems of infrastructure." Organía also criticized "foreign exchange differentials detrimental to exportation" and "a system of taxation that [undermines] the security of the [agricultural and livestock] producer," raising the hopes of the Pampean bourgeoisie—which soon would be disappointed—for favorable directions in economic policy. Onganía's speech nevertheless displayed paternalist overtones in referring to "the technical capability and responsibility of the Argentine worker, which are amply demonstrated in the environment of a well-organized enterprise whose proper functioning is assured by a balanced sense of authority and reciprocal loyalty."

[†] Law 16,936 of August 27, 1966. As in a Collective Work Agreement, the settlement arbitrated by the government would be binding for all workers and enterprises in a specified economic activity.

[‡] In spite of these implications, the leadership of the CGT (which remained determined to "carry on a dialogue") issued a mild and ambiguous commentary on this law; see the press release reprinted in Santiago Senén González, El sindicalismo después de Perón (Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1971), 101–102. More critical responses came from unions excluded from the CGT leadership. The UIA responded to the Law of Mandatory Arbitration by applauding "the advances made in the rectification of norms and customs in labor and union relations" (UIA, Memoria Anual, 1966–1967, p. 57). Later, in commenting on this law and on the subsequent freeze on salaries, the UIA remarked chastely that, although it had always defended "freedom from state intervention" in relations between employers and workers and unions (as well as in other areas), "it is appropriate to recognize that in special situations and emergencies it is legitimate to adopt measures to assure public order … in such a way as to ensure harmony with the ends pursued [through economic policy]" (UIA, Memoria Anual, 1967–1968 [Buenos Aires, 1968], pp. 33–34).

public-sector unions, the pro-labor decisions taken with regard to the contracts negotiated in the metallurgical and textile sectors, and the Law of Mandatory Arbitration were all ostensibly the work of the Ministry of Economy and Labor, headed by Jorge Salimei. Salimei was a self-made man from the food industry with no direct ties to transnational capital, and a socially conscious "Catholic entrepreneur" both in his public stands and in the paternalist approach he took to managing his own enterprises. Salimei found himself directing a heterogeneous team that included other "Catholic entrepreneurs," some liberals, and some Christian Democratic técnicos who were well to the left of their colleagues. When Ambassador Alsogaray publicized his view that Argentina should sign a Guarantee of Investments Agreement with the United States in order to attract U.S. capital, both Salimei and Onganía took the position that, despite the indispensability of foreign capital, the abdication of Argentine sovereignty entailed by the ambassador's proposition was out of the question.^[*] If this nationalist gesture did little to arouse the enthusiasm of the upper bourgeoisie, it was equally unsuccessful in helping Salimei resolve the conflicts internal to his team^[†] or discover some way out of his obvious confusion as to what to do about the economy. The year 1966 closed with zero economic growth^[‡] and a decline in the rate of investments.^[§] Furthermore, a devaluation had improved neither the precarious balance-of-payments situation^[||] nor the inflation inherited from the previous record.^[#] Still worse in the eyes of the bourgeoisie was that, in the wake of union complaints about price increases,^[22] price controls were imposed and sanctions enacted against

[*] Alsogaray even announced the signing of such an agreement (La Nación, July 26, 1966). By contrast, Onganía stated that while foreign capital would be welcomed, a Guarantee of Investments Agreement was unnecessary.

[†] Before the end of the year, Salimei forced the resignations of the Christian Democratic técnicos, including the president of the Central Bank.

[‡] During 1966 GNP rose only 0.7% above its 1965 level, equivalent to a per capita drop of -0.4% (BCRA, Sistema de cuentas de producto e ingreso de la Argentina, vol. 2, Cuadros estadísticos [Buenos Aires, 1975]).

[§] In 1966 gross fixed domestic investment fell 7.7% below its 1965 level. The net balances of short-term capital movements, long-term capital movements, and direct foreign investment were, respectively, -$105 million, -$76 million, and $2.6 million (figures in then-current U.S. dollars). See tables 7, 11, and 42 for these figures and their sources.

[||] At the close of 1966 the net reserves of the BCRA were US$176.9 million, less than the $208.9 million held in the month preceding the coup (see Table 9).

[#] The average monthly cost-of-living increase in Greater Buenos Aires in the second half of 1966 was 3.5%, which represented no improvement over either the second half of 1964 or the second half of 1965, when the monthly cost of living increase averaged 3.0% (see Table 8).

the "unscrupulous businessmen" who disregarded them.^[*] The "state interventionism" of the preceding years, which had "penalized business" while ignoring that the "real" sources of inflation and sluggish economic growth were excessive wages and salaries and the fiscal deficit, had reared its head once again.^[23]

Another notable feature of the second half of 1966 was a growing wave of student protest.^[24] Its momentum increased after a student participating in a street demonstration in Córdoba was killed by the police, an action that made a major impact in a country as yet unaccustomed to episodes of this sort.

To the bourgeoisie, certain aspects of the situation seemed satisfactory. But there were others—too many others—that did not. Above all, the government was plainly uncertain about the overall direction of its policies. It seemed as if the great opportunity provided by the June coup was on the verge of being wasted. What had been unthinkable in June was taking place four months later: rumors of military unrest were circulating, and the possibility that discontent within the armed forces might lead to another coup could not be brushed aside.^[†] Onganía could not easily be dispensed with, but the same did not hold for his collaborators. Martínez Paz and Salimei became the main targets of criticism^[‡] and, apparently to eliminate dead weight, Onganía requested their resignations. On December 30, 1966, Onganía named Guillermo Borda Minister of the Interior and Adalbert Krieger Vasena Minister of Economy. Similar pressures within the army had already led to the removal of Pistarini as commander in chief and to his replacement by Julio Alsogaray.

In the meantime, the paternalists had failed in their efforts to engineer the emergence of a CGT leadership favorable to them. Economic and

[*] For the announcement that price control legislation (passed before the coup) would be put into effect, see La Nación, August 4, 1966, p. 1. Also, a "Regulation of Supply" law (n. 17,017) was enacted on November 18, 1966, increasing the government's capacity to control prices and raising the penalties for infractions.

[†] See, for example, reports about the "unusual proliferation" of tense military meetings, in La Nación, October 9, p. 6, and December 8, p. 6, 1966. "Military unrest" was also discussed in an article entitled "Behind the Crisis" in La Nación, December 11, 1966, p. 8, and in Primera Plana, December 6, pp. 8, 12 and December 13, pp. 14, 17, 1966. My interviews with military officers confirmed these tensions.

[‡] The "corporatism" of the Minister of the Interior and his staff was criticized in La Nación, October 6, p. 6 and November 13, p. 6, 1966; Primera Plana, October 25, 1966, p. 12; and Economic Survey, January 10, 1967, p. 1. Liberals such as Roberto Alemann, José A. Martínez de Hoz, Álvaro Alsogaray, and Adalbert Krieger Vasena were proposed as candidates for Minister of Economy; cf. La Nación as early as August 14, 1966, p. 6, and Primera Plana, November 22, 1966, p. 18.

social policy in the months that followed the coup had irritated everyone. Moreover, it was evident that the government was going to push ahead with its goal of "rationalizing" the state apparatus. This plan, together with the Law of Mandatory Arbitration, drove into opposition the current that Salimei and his team had counted on as their principal ally within the unions: the 62 Organizaciones de Pie, headed by José Alonso, which in October 1966 was defeated in a bid for the top positions in the CGT. It was assumed that the unions in this current were loyal to Perón, who, wasting no time in reversing his initial position, was now sending messages urging opposition to the government.^[*] The paternalists' overtures to the 62 de Pie, despite their lack of success, pushed into opposition the latter's main rival, the 62 Organizations (or Vandorists), led by Augusto Vandor. Accordingly, it was not long before all the principal union currents were publicizing their disillusionment with the "anti-popular" policies adopted, no longer by the "Argentine Revolution," but by "the government that emerged from the June coup." The Vandorists, the 62 de Pie, and the Independents (who were at the time the other major union alignment) all came out against the above-mentioned November speech in which Onganía sought to reassure the bourgeoisie. With this convergence the union leadership, which until recently had been fraught with divisions, now seemed to have pulled itself together in opposition to a government that seemed, to the upper bourgeoisie, committed to folly: not only had it thrown away an excellent opportunity to complete the divisions within the union leadership, it had actually helped to heal them and, in so doing, had made itself the target of the newfound unity. On December 1, 1966, the CGT, even as it insisted that it was disposed to engage in "dialogue" with the government, declared a national work stoppage, under pressure from public employees' unions chafing from the effects of "rationalization," from the 62 de Pie, from Perón's exhortations to oppose the government, and from the growing unreceptiveness of many Vandorist unions to the negotiated settlements still advocated by Vandor and his associates.^[†]

[*] On Perón's change of position, Primera Plana, April 11, 1967, p. 17. Perón ordered a public demonstration to take place on Peronism's commemorative day, October 17. The demonstration was forbidden by the government and gave rise to clashes in the streets that added another element of déjà vu to the "Revolution" inaugurated with so much fanfare in June (La Nación, October 18, 1966, p. 4).

[†] The CGT combined criticism of economic policy stressing unemployment, the cost of living, low wages, and "laissez-faire minorities" with offers for "dialogue" and "participation" (La Nación, December 9, p. 1, December 18, pp. 1–18, and December 29, p. 9, 1966).

Meanwhile, most nationalist civilian groups^* had by this stage distanced themselves from what seemed to them to be a purely administrative government which, far from spearheading the "National Revolution," had adopted a "liberal" economic policy and had retained at its core persons as notoriously associated with this tendency as Ambassador Alsogaray—who, for his part, never missed a chance to criticize the economic and labor policies of his government. Less than six months after the coup, the government seemed to be cut off from society and sustained precariously by armed forces that showed unmistakable signs of unrest.

With the cabinet changes at the end of December, Onganía's government (defined in terms of whether its top positions were occupied by officials close to his person and orientations) had ended. July to December 1966 is properly viewed as an interim period, characterized principally by the confusion of many of the relevant actors as to who had actually won and lost the June 28 coup. When this period ended, the real work of the BA began.