Five
Meddlesome Curiosity, Mystification, and Social Order in Late Antiquity
Surveying the imperial city around the time of the Council of Constantinople in May 381, Gregory of Nyssa observed tense mutual testing throughout (
) the town. While conducting his daily business, he was forced to his deep dismay to brave a gauntlet of people openly challenging each other, and him as well, over precise theological beliefs. His classic response, recorded in De deitate filii et spiritus sancti (On the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit), deserves repetition here:
Throughout the city everything is taken up by such discussions: the alleyways, the marketplaces, the broad avenues and city streets; the hawkers of clothing, the money-changers, those selling us food. If you ask about small change, someone would philosophize to you about the Begotten and Unbegotten. If you inquire about the price of bread, the reply comes: "The Father is greater and the Son is a dependent." If you should ask: "Is the bath prepared?" someone would reply, "The Son was created from not-being."[1]
This comic passage is customarily invoked to convey a sense of the widespread nature of theological debates in late antiquity,[2] but little note has been taken of the fact that the social categories referred to
[1] Gregory of Nyssa, De deitate filii et spiritus sancti oratorio (PG 46: 557).
[2] See, e.g., T. E. Gregory, Vox Populi: Popular Opinion and Violence in the Religious Controversies in the Fifth Century A.D. (Columbus, Ohio, 1979), 3-4.
were from the Constantinopolitan "service industry." The nummularii ,[3] among whom were the money changers, were avid participants in public theological discussions and enjoyed the dubious honor of being specifically cited in a 404 imperial edict forbidding such activities, in which the heads of the guilds and the owners of slaves were held responsible for their charges' trespasses.[4]
Aristocrats did not take kindly to a populus that failed to show the requisite deference.[5] In the charged environment of the 380s, "fighting words" were uttered not so much to declare one's membership in a particular doctrinal group as to convey a general challenge. The well-bred Gregory of Nyssa found such forward behavior on the part of the humiliores objectionable, even outrageous.[6] The popularized rivalry over theological matters manifested in public debates dearly upset the ancients' cherished ideal of social order (
).[7]
In this chapter, I explore the relationship between certain late antique notions of social order and concern over the popularization of theological discussion. I argue that the phenomenon of curiosity expressed through debate, while disturbing to some, was a diffused social praxis that could not be effectively curtailed by the ad hominem appeals discussed in Chapter 4. Instead, interested parties mobilized various ideological pressures and strategies in attempts to curb rampant dis-
[3] See RE , 17:1415-55 s.v. "nummularius "; R. Bogaert, "Changeurs et banquiers chez les Pères de l'Église," Ancient Society 4 (1973): 239-70; idem, "Les KOLL YBIS TIKAI TPAIIEZAI dans l'Égypte gréco-romaine," Anagennesis 3 (1983), 21-64.
[4] Codex Theod . 16.4.5 (Krueger, Mommsen, and Meyer, eds., 1:2, 854):
Si quis servos in hac sacratissima urbe possideat, eos a tumultuosis conventiculis faciat temperare, sciens se pro singulis servis, qui interesse conventibus interdictis fuerint conprehensi, trium librarum auri dispendio feriendum, servis videlicet puniendis. Quam formam in nummulariis ceterisque huius almae urbis corporibus volumus sub poena graviore servari, ut unumquodque corpus pro his, qui de suo numero conventus celebrare inlicitos detegentur, ad quinquaginta pondo auri solutionem multae nomine adstringatur.
In this context, it is not dear whether the nummularii mentioned were mint workers or money changers. See generally A. F. Norman, "Gradations in Later Municipal Society," JRS 48 (1958): 79-85.
[5] See R. MacMullen, "Personal Power in the Roman Empire," AJP 107 (1986): 513-24; reprinted in Changes in the Roman Empire (Princeton, 1990), 190-97, 351-54. For a discussion of the notion of deference, see Pocock, "Classical Theory of Deference," 516-23.
[6] Writing to the community in Nicomedia, Gregory (Epistula 17) asserted that the simple had no business meddling but should defer to their betters. See E. P. Thompson, "Patrician and Plebeian Society," Journal of Social History 7 (1974): 382-405, esp. 385, on the connection between the accusation of disorderly behavior and the nature of patron-client relationships. See also his Customs in Common (London, 1991), 16-96.
[7] See Socrates, Hist. eccl . 2.2 (PG 67:185-88), on the alleged social disruptions caused by widespread disputing during the Arian controversy.
puting. Such efforts, I wish to suggest, included the mystification of the divine essence (
) and a concomitant insistence on communal prayer. To illustrate these connections, I will focus on two sets of public orations delivered in the 380s by men who felt besieged by excessive theological disputing: the Constantinopolitan "Theological Orations" of Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Antiochene sermons "On the Incomprehensible Nature of God" of John Chrysostom.
A Debate Over the Logos
The appreciation of the human logos (here meaning "discourse" or "rational principle") was a central issue for those concerned with rampant discussion. Before Constantine, many Christian apologists had taken pride in the fact that even uneducated and nearly illiterate Christians were able to discuss supramundane topics, hitherto the exclusive preserve of upper-class philosophers.[8] Now the via universalis had become problematic for many Christians. What shaped the acceptability of pervasive discussion was not so much the subject matter at hand but the outlook of those threatened by such activities. Whereas in earlier days those most affected had been outsiders such as the pagan Celsus, as Christianity encompassed a larger share of the population and a wider spectrum of society, many of those troubled became fellow Christians.
In a culture that gave privileged consideration to rational speech, human logoi furnished a basis for dose mutual scrutiny through demands and counterdemands for statements of belief. Among Christians, the growing reliance on a precise technical theological vocabulary adapted from the Greek philosophical tradition meant that many were in a position to require from others a high degree of accuracy in the expression of their dogmatic views. To discrete terms and adjectives was imputed the greatest significance. In a language game that allowed for the dear articulation of nuances, people pressured each other to profess their beliefs in the middle of a controversial minefield, the features and contours of which were just beginning to be mapped.[9] With the devel-
[8] See H. J. Carpenter, "Popular Christianity and the Theologians in the Early Centuries," JTS n.s. 14 (1963): 294-310.
[9] An anxious concern to articulate the correct christological formulation figures prominently in the surviving writings of fourth-century Christians, who had to choose between the unpalatable extremes of outright dualism and complete identification of Christ with God the Father, while also harmonizing scriptures with certain tenets of philosophy. A full and useful treatment of these so-called Arian controversies and the Cappadocian contribution can be found in Hanson, Search for a Christian Doctrine of God .
oping sophistication of Christian theological speculation, there came to be less and less room for "fudging," because "the absence of ambiguity is a basic requirement for all scientific discourse."[10]
Even exalted late Roman emperors found themselves vulnerable to this exacting pressure. In an autocratic society with a state religion (after the Theodosian settlement had established an orthodox faith for the empire), it was important to assure his pious subjects that the emperor himself held the correct theological views. In the Vita sancti Danielis , the assembled citizenry demanded a clear profession of faith from Anastasius' predecessor, Zeno.[11] "Let us hear what your faith is, Emperor!" they shouted. The emperor's counselors advised him to yield, and he eventually did so for the sake of political expedience, signing a statement of orthodoxy in tradition.[12] Anastasius I (491-518) was probably the first emperor from whom a written profession of faith was demanded upon his accession.[13] This is not surprising, though, for he had been known as a Monophysite with rumored Eunomian leanings.[14]
Behind such demands for a profession of belief stood the potential threat of popular outrage and perhaps even violence, although the likelihood of high melodrama is often overemphasized in modem accounts. This aspect of late Roman social life rendered clear and forthright speech in doctrinal matters a risky proposition. In such a charged environment, guarded silence or deliberate obfuscation was often the safest course.
Basil of Caesarea was known to have deliberately refrained from publicly stating his theological position on the Holy Spirit for fear of needlessly antagonizing some and alienating others, not to mention running the risk of being driven out by detractors.[15] The prominent Meletius of Antioch at first held back from discoursing openly on doctrinal matters, preferring to devote his sermons to less problematic moral themes.[16] His tactic of theological abstinence appeared especially prudent in hindsight because, as soon as he broke silence and began to expound on issues of doctrine, he found himself in a "sticky situation," having alienated many of his listeners.
[10] See Edlow, Galen on Language and Ambiguity , 8.
[11] Vita Danielis 83, in E. Dawes and N. Baynes, Three Byzantine Saints: Contemporary Biographies of St. Daniel the Stylite, St. Theodore of Sykeon and St. John the Almsgiver (New York, 1977), 58. Greek text in H. Delehaye, ed., "Vita S. Danielis Stylitae," AB 32 (1913): 121-229, at 198.
[12] Vita Danielis 84.
[13] See J. B. Bury, Constitution of the Later Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1917), 28.
[14] PLRE 2:78-80, s.v. "Anastasius 4"; and Excerpta Valesiana, pars posterior 78 (Moreau, ed., 22): "imperator volens . . . sectam Eunomianam sequi."
[15] See Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep . 58.4-15 (Gallay, ed., 52.17-54.18).
[16] See Socrates, Hist. eccl . 2.44 (PG 67:357A).
Even the most seemingly well-meaning audience could contain spies sent by one's rivals to exploit moments of weakness, or imperial informers eager to challenge and to accuse. Gregory of Nazianzus summed up the anxiety of many late antique bishops when he exclaimed that, at a time when the entire cosmos had become a contested theological battleground, the dignity of the bishop's throne gave neither pleasure nor satisfaction.[17]
Though knowing one's audience was of supreme importance to would-be propounders of theological views, church leaders did not always have this luxury, especially when newly appointed to a post in a strange city where the mood was uncertain or openly hostile. This was the case with Cyrus Panopolites, a famed Egyptian poet, high imperial dignitary, and appointee to the episcopal seat of the small Phrygian town of Cotyaion in the 440s.[18] When he arrived at his new see, he was greeted by a suspicious crowd, which compelled him to speak because they thought he was a Hellene, that is, a pagan. The audience immediately demanded to know his theological views.[19] Cyrus reluctantly complied with their wish (which was probably expressed through acclamations), and allegedly declaimed as follows: "Brothers, let the birth of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ be honoured in silence (
), because by hearing alone he was conceived in the Holy Virgin; for he was the Word. Glory to Him through the ages. Amen!"[20]
[18] See the biographical sketches by D. J. Constantelos, "Kyros Panopolites, Re-builder of Constantinople," GRBS 12 (1971): 451-64, and Al. Cameron, "Wandering Poets: A Literary Movement in Byzantine Egypt," Historia 14 (1965): 470-509. The alleged dispatch of Cyrus to Cotyaion by Theodosius II was not so much a demotion as a potential death warrant: according to one tradition, the local populace had already lynched four previous bishops.
[19] He was removed from office by Theodosius II because he was suspected of being a "Hellene," i.e., a polytheist; see Constantelos, "Kyros Panopolites," 454ff. See discussion on this point in M. and M. Whitby, eds., Chronicon paschale 264-628 AD (Liverpool, 1989), 78 n. 261.
[20] Chronicon paschale 450 (Whitby and Whitby, eds., 78). This "sermon" also appears in Malalas, Chronographia 14.16 (Niebuhr, ed., CSHB 17 [Bonn, 1831], 362); Theophanes, Chronographia 5937 (Niebuhr, ed., CSHB 41 [Bonn, 1839], 149); and John of Nikiu, Chronicon ch. 84. Even if this report is not a verbatim record of Cyrus' speech, its illustrative value as the point of view of a redactor is significant. The speech became much more elaborate in John of Nikiu's Chronicon 84.56-57: "Know yet, my brethren, that this day is the day of the Nativity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Let us honour him as is befitting, for it was of his own will alone that he was conceived in the womb of the holy Virgin Mary; for He is the primeval Word the Creator—praise be unto Him—together with His Father (supremely) good and the Holy Lifegiving Spirit, Consubstantial Trinity for evermore." Translation from the Ethiopic by R. H. Charles, in The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu (Oxford, 1916), 97.
Following this address, Cyrus was acclaimed by a delighted crowd and was given leave to live at peace in the city.[21] The difficult situation had called for a tactful solution, and Cyrus, by resorting to apophatic obfuscation, succeeded in extricating himself from a tight corner.
Timothy Gregory has argued that this pithy sermon was not "an expression of simple, uneducated Christianity" suggesting the futility of theological speculation[22] "but a clever—one might even say wily—statement of orthodox theology."[23] Yet Gregory's subsequent reasoning assumes that the Cotyaion locals were intimately familiar with sermons preached in Constantinople by the bishops Proclus and Atticus, by which they then understood Cyrus' own address.[24] This interpretation has merits, but is unnecessary. The significance of this widely reported story lies in the fact that Cyrus managed not to strike the wrong note with his audience. He succeeded in not offending his listeners by choosing to give a brief and seemingly orthodox statement, thereby avoiding the perils of a lengthy exposition. If his address had conveyed a deeper message, it would have eluded all but a very small handful of listeners or readers, then as now. His exhortation to honor Christ in silence (
) was Cyrus' response to the pressures of an endemic theological curiosity "among the quick witted and heterogeneous populations of the East"; it was perhaps the only way to break the cultural cycle of the agon, in which "opposition to a particular line of theological teaching could only be carried through by producing a rival system."[25]
As this vigorous verbal culture thrived in the cities of the Greek east, another development was gaining momentum and would eventually re-mold significant elements of the classical tradition to its Byzantine form. By the later fifth century, Byzantine mystical theology had reached maturity in the corpus of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.[26] These works
[21] Chronicon paschale 450 and Malalas, Chronographia 14.16.
[22] T. E. Gregory, "The Remarkable Christmas Homily of Kyros Panopolites," GRBS 16 (1975): 317-24. See also Constantelos, "Kyros Panopolites," 463.
[23] Gregory, "Remarkable Christmas Homily," 323.
[24] On his Marian, see PG 65:679-92; F. X. Bauer, Proklos yon Konstantinopel: Ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte des fünften Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1919). On Atticus' sermons, see J. Lebon, "Discours d'Atticus de Constantinople 'sur la sainte Mère de Dieu,'" Le Muséon 46 (1933): 167-202; M. Brière, "Une homélie inédite d'Atticus, patriarche de Constantinople," Revue de l'Orient Chrétien 29 (1933-34): 160-80.
[25] H. J. Carpenter, "Popular Christianity and the Theologians in the Early Centuries," JTS n.s. 14 (1963): 294-310, at 308.
[26] Texts of the corpus: De caelesti hierarchia (PG 3:119-370; R. Roques, G. Heil, and M. de Gandillac, eds., Denys L'Aréopagite: La Hiérarchie Céleste SC 58 [Paris, 1958]); De ecclesiastica hierarchia (PG 3:369-584); De mystica theologia (PG 3:997-1064); De divinis no-minibus (PG 3:585-736).
had intellectual roots reaching back to Proclus and Iamblichus[27] and perhaps to Philo of Alexandria,[28] or even to the Parmenides of Plato's dialogue.[29]
Pseudo-Dionysius' mystical construct was founded on a pyramidal hierarchy of divine and human beings not unlike the steep social order of the later empire. The gradus of this structure of beings was maintained by the dear differentiation of authority and power, including the capacity for knowledge. For instance, only a higher being could grasp the nature of reality sufficiently to correctly name a lower being.[30] The necessary corollary was that lower beings could only attain limited knowledge of those above them. Intermediary signs (
) and sometimes even the agency of angelic mediators were deemed essential to securing knowledge of the divine world because the contemplation (
) of the higher order through human reason (
) alone was a fundamentally impossible proposition.[31]
Though Pseudo-Dionysius is credited with the classic formulation of Byzantine mystical theology, it is important to scrutinize the historical and social circumstances that propelled this intellectual current to the forefront of attention.[32] To do so we must examine the function of apo-
[27] The classic account is E. Norden's Agnostos Theos (Leipzig/Berlin, 1913); see discussion in E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology , 2d ed. (Oxford, 1963), 310-13. See also S. E. Gersch, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden, 1978). See now the impressively comprehensive work by Mortley, From Word to Silence , esp. 2:221-41.
[28] See H. A. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), 2:113ff. Now see L. A. Montes-Peral, Akataleptos Theos: Der unfassbare Gott (Leiden, 1987).
[29] See, e.g., Plato, Parmenides 142a, and discussion in Dodds, Proclus , 311. See also Mortley, From Word to Silence , 2:10-124, on the increasing importance of a discourse of silence; H. A. Wolfson, "The Knowability and Describability of God in Plato and Aristotle," HSCP 56/57 (1947): 233-49.
[30] See R. Roques, L'univers dionysien: Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le pseudo-Denys (Paris, 1954), 154-67, 200-244; R. F. Hathaway, Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius: A Study in the Form and Meaning of Pseudo-Dionysian Writings (The Hague, 1969).
[31] See, e.g., De mystica theologia .
[32] In Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse , Sather Classical Lectures 1986 (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), Av. Cameron refocuses scholarly attention on the relationship between mystical theology, the via negativa , and the emerging tradition of the veneration of iconic images. Some of the issues are also treated in her "New and Old in Christian Literature," in Major Papers of the 17th International Byzantine Congress (New York, 1986), 45-58. Cameron's insight into the connection between the rhetorical base of the cult of icons and the earlier Christian emphasis on the paradox of revelation shows a historical continuity between late antique and early Byzantine "thought worlds." She sees this development as an intrinsic Tendenz of Christian discourse, which she characterizes as relying heavily on paradox. Another historical dimension may be added by examining how such a discourse was used in intra-Christian disputes. Cameron herself has pointed out that this mystical theology failed to silence the logos ; I argue that the process of mystification should be seen not only in the area of ekphrasis or verbal description but also in a dialectical relationship with the continued sway of rational speech.
phatic language in the formative period of the late fourth century, when Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa gave impetus to the crystallization of an ideological scheme effectively shielding divine essence from human cognition.[33] Theirs was no mere passive reception of earlier philosophical and theological traditions.[34] At the time when these figures sought to formally delegitimize human logoi as a means for achieving certain knowledge of the divine, they were involved in serious debates among Christians over the possibility of a popular and rational theological discourse.[35] Gregory of Nyssa's "mysti-
[33] See Mortley, From Word to Silence , 2:169. Evagrius Ponticus served as one of the conduits of the Cappadocians' mystical theology; see esp. N. Gendle, "Cappadocian Elements in the Mystical Theology of Evagrius Ponticus," SP 16 (1985): 374-84. Maximus Confessor (580-682), the commentator of Pseudo-Dionysius, also drew heavily from Gregory of Nazianzus; see P. Gallay, ed., Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 27-31, Discours théolo-giques , SC 250 (Paris, 1978): 345-46. On the influence of Chrysostom and Cyril of Jerusalem, see Roques, "Pierre l'Ibérien et le 'corpus' dionysien," Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 145 (1954): 69-98, esp. 90-96.
[34] Daniélou states in J. Daniélou, A.-M. Malingrey et al., eds., Jean Chrysostome: Sur l'Incompréhensibilité de Dieu I: Homélies l-V , 2d ed., SC 28 bis (Paris, 1970): 16: "En face de cette erreur, les docteurs du IV siècle finissant vont être amenés à remettre l'accent sur le caractère incomprehensible de l'essence divine, en précisant que, même, pour l'intelligence éclairée par la grâce, elle reste mysterieuse."
cal" epistemology, for example, articulated in his Contra Eunomium , was specifically aimed at that bitter rival:
For the simplicity of the teachings of the truth assumes that God is who He is, i.e., someone who can be grasped neither by any name nor by any thought nor any other conception, remaining loftier than the grasp of not only human beings, but even angelic and every supramundane being. He is indescribable, unutterable and higher than all signification through logoi .[36]
Gregory's opponents, especially Eunomius and his supporters, regarded human language as sufficient for divine contemplation and description. In their view, the names of things were created in reference to the nature of the things themselves (
) and not just according to human convention (
). This strong nominalist epistemology theoretically grounded a rational method for divine contemplation because one could move from relationships between names to relationships between essences. This epistemological scheme rendered even the essence of the Deity perspicuous to human intellect because knowledge of the divine conformed to a logical system of words, predicates, and propositions.[37] Thus, arguing on the premiss that the adjectival epithet Agennetos (Ingenerate) was the defining attribute of God the Father, Eunomius and others contended that the relation between the Father and the Son was deducible from the causal relation of their constitutive attributes in accordance with known rules of philosophical logic.
Given that the orthodox Christians sought to circumscribe human understanding of the divine in a controversial setting, their claims cannot be read as statements of detached reflection. A fuller understanding of the historical setting is particularly necessary because the mystical theological stance was championed not just by intellectual system builders but by preaching priests and bishops. To bring this argument into sharper focus, I will examine two sets of public sermons directed not just at the intelligentsia but at general audiences,[38] and which greatly influenced the development of mystical theology: Gregory of Nazianzus' Orations 27 through 31, and five of John Chrysostom's sermons on the incomprehensibility of God.
[36] Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun . 1.683 (Jaeger, ed., 1:222).
[37] Mortley, From Word to Silence , 2:157.
[38] Daniélou, "L'incomprehensibilité de Dieu d'après saint Jean Chrysostome," RSR 37 (1950): 176-94, at 177, on Basil and Gregory of Nyssa: "Mais les deux Cappadociens s'adressaient à des théologiens. Chrysostome s'addresse au peuple chrétien. II insiste donc moins sur l'argumentation savante et davantage sur l'attitude concrète."
Gregory of Nazianzus' "Theological Orations" (Constantinople, 380)
Until the early 380s, the orthodox Christian community in New Rome had managed to survive, albeit in a precarious state, despite being eclipsed by other Christian groups. In 379, Gregory of Nazianzus, invited to lead this congregation, arrived to find a small and embattled group distinguished by its stubborn loyalty to the Nicene settlement[39] and living alongside more confident and impressive congregations, including those headed by rival Arian bishops. At the time, the Arians had established themselves in the main basilica of the capital and catholic Christians had to meet in a modest structure converted from a private house. A grander edifice was later built and dedicated on the site of the domus and named Anastasia to commemorate Gregory's tenure as the turning point for the rebirth of orthodox Christianity in Constantinople.[40] The process of "regeneration" did gain strength under Gregory, but we must not overestimate his immediate success. Although later traditions magnified the impact of his "patriarchate," Gregory's own feelings on the subject were mixed, and often colored by disillusionment and powerlessness.[41] To him, the bishop's throne represented not power or prestige but careworn anxiety.[42]
[39] See Gregory of Nazianzus, Carmen de vita sua 585-94.
[40] On the Anastasia church, see Socrates, Hist. eccl . 5.7, and Sozomen, Hist. eccl . 7.5. On the possible derivation of the name from Gregory's writings, see Carmen de vita sua 1125 (PG 37:1106). On the building and site, see R. Janin, Le siège de Constantinople et le patriarchat oecuménique , vol. 1 of La géographie ecclésiastique de l'Empire byzantin (Paris, 1953), 26-29.
[42] Gregory of Nazianzus, De se ipso et episcopis 142-43 (PG 37:1176A).
Yet this retiring man, who had assumed both priesthood and episcopate with ambivalence and who until recently had lived in the shadow of his friend Basil of Caesarea, found renewed vigor in rallying his new congregation.[43] He later reflected on these difficulties in his Carmen de vita sua .
Gregory of Nazianzus eventually became known in the Byzantine tradition as "the Theologian" (
)—the fond epithet, firmly attached to his name from the mid-fifth century,[44] was a singular honor in an age of accomplished Christian intellectuals and theologians. Gregory's claim to this title was based on his so-called "Five Theological Orations," composed in Constantinople and partly delivered there.[45]
In these sermons, the new leader forged with the fire of rhetoric a set of dogmatic views about the Trinity, a subject he claimed had previously been neglected by his congregation. More importantly, he examined afresh the very notion of theology, articulating the qualifications of a Christian theologos and defining the enterprise of philosophizing concerning God. He undertook these labors not out of a passion for philosophy but to develop a polemic against the Constantinopolitan enthusiasm for disputation over points of doctrine.
Thus from the outset his definitions of the theologian and theology were restrictive and prescriptive. He began by proposing a strict limit on the discussion of theology:
Discussion of theology (
) is not for everyone, I tell you, not for everyone—it is no such inexpensive or effortless pur-
[43] See Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep . 47-49. On the recent debate over the date of Basil's death, see P. Maraval, "La date de la mort de Basile de Césarée," REAug 34 (1988): 25-38.
[44] See Philostorgius, Hist. eccl . 8.11 (Bidez and Winkelmann, eds., 111-12); J. Plagnieux, Saint Grégoire de Nazianze théologien (Paris, 1951).
[45] The Greek text I am relying on is Gallay, ed., Grégoire de Nazianze ; English quotations from F. Norris, ed., Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen , Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 13 (Leiden, 1991). See also J. Barbel, ed., Gregor von Nazianz: Die Fünf Theologische Reden, Testimonia Band III (Düsseldorf, 1963), and the still very useful text and commentary by A. J. Mason, ed., The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus , Cambridge Patristic Texts (Cambridge, 1899). Though these orations are now collected as a set which coheres from a theological and dogmatic point of view, it is important to note that they do not all belong to an original series of delivered speeches. Or . 28 was included when the five were first published as a body; see Gallay, ed., Grégoire de Nazianze , 7-9. Or . 31 is generally thought to have been composed to refute supporters of Macedonius' position on the Holy Spirit, or perhaps the Anomoeans; see F. W. Norris, "Gregory Nazianzen's Opponents in Oration 31," in R. Gregg, ed., Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassessments (Philadelphia, 1985), 321-26. On the difficulty of dating the orations, see J.-M. Szymusiak, "Pour une chronologie des discours de S. Grégoire de Nazianze," VChr 20 (1966): 183-89, esp. 186, 189.
suit. Nor, I would add, is it for every occasion, or every audience; neither are all its aspects open to inquiry (
). It must be reserved for certain occasions, for certain audiences, and certain limits must be observed. It is not for all men, but only for those who have been tested and have found a sound footing in study, and, more importantly, have undergone, or at the very least are undergoing, purification of body and soul.[46]
The irritation evident throughout Gregory's orations is especially noticeable here. With whom was Gregory conducting this indirect debate? Most scholars have assumed that Gregory's remarks were aimed at the supporters of Aetius and Eunomius, that is, "heretics" and religious outsiders. This is a fair and reasonable assumption in light of suggestive, though inconclusive, ancient testimonia .[47] Also, the internal evidence of a number of Gregory's theological arguments may suggest such an identification.[48] Finally, the well-attested presence in Constantinople of those called Eunomians by their detractors is often noted in later histories and in a number of imperial laws in the Theodosian Code .
However, I argue that the question of the putative audience to whom Gregory addressed his admonition ought to remain an open
[46] Or. 27.3 (Norris, ed., 218; Gallay, ed., 76).
[47] At first sight, ancient testimonies appear to support this claim. Jerome, De viris illustribus 117, referred to two otherwise unknown Adversus Eunomium libri written by Gregory of Nazianzus. To Gallay (51-56), this suggests that orations 27-30 constitute the "lost" works against Eunomius. In addition, Rufinus identified Or . 27 (his De Arrianis ) as directed against maxime Arrianos in his Latin translation of Gregory of Nazianzus' works. But Jerome referred to Adversus Eunomium libri , as opposed to Adversus Eunomianos libri , the proper way to characterize Gregory's orations, as in the later tituli of Or . 27. The Adversus Eunomium libri of Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa specifically targeted Eunomius; this is not the case with Gregory's orations, which addressed neither Eunomius nor his associates. An accompanying argument about the applicability of Jerome's testimony has been his citation of a De spiritu sancto by Gregory, which presumably refers to Or . 31. Why then did Jerome not also mention a De filio , a De patre deo , and so on? Furthermore, while Jerome might actually have been present in Constantinople during Gregory's orations (see Jerome, Ep . 52; and also S. Rebenich, Hieronymus und sein Kreis: Prosopographische und sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchungen , Historia Enselschriften 72 [Stuttgart, 1992], 115-39) and could thus have been well informed concerning their audience, Rufinus (De Arrianis , Engelbrecht, ed., 265) was unlikely to know anything about the orations beyond the texts themselves. See A. Engelbrecht, ed., Tyrannii Rufini Orationum Gregorii Nazianzeni Novem Interpretatio , CSEL 46, esp. 265.
[48] The positions refuted by Gregory in many places—especially where he listed ten "objections" and then proceeded to demolish them—reflect arguments commonly identified with Eunomians and their methods of questioning. But it is unclear whether these positions were maintained by a self-styled Eunomian group. The question of how to relate dogmatic positions and community is a difficult one. In this instance, were all people who asked such "Eunomian" questions actually Eunomians?
one.[49] Nowhere in the orations do we find a direct reference to an enemy group defined by a common dogmatic position or by a religious label.[50] Instead, Gregory's target audience comprised those who delighted in public disputation of theological issues. Though Eunomius' associates may have formed part of this group, they hardly accounted for the entire category. Gregory would not have been so concerned if the group boundaries were so unambiguously delineated. I acknowledge the many connections between "Eunomians" and Constantinople in later historical works and imperial laws, but maintain that the process of labeling a "heretical" group is highly problematic. The question that instigated the controversy between Basil and Eunomius—do the names of things signify their essences?—might well be asked of doctrinal labels and social entities. Modem historians who rely overmuch on the compendious catalogues of doctrinal tags generated by heresiologists such as Epiphanius, Filastrius, and Augustine run the risk of confusing these labels with social groups.[51]
Though the associates of Aetius and Eunomius epitomized for many orthodox Christians the trait of excessive dialectical questioning in matters of the divine, they were not alone in exhibiting intellectual curiosity and posing theological questions. According to Gregory, his Oratio 27 was addressed to those whose "cleverness is in words (
[49] On the broader context of these orations, see McLynn, "Christian Controversy and Violence," 15-44. The potential multivalence of these sermons is underscored in later manuscript illuminations showing the opponents as Macedonius and Apollinaris; see L. Brubaker, "Politics, Patronage and Art in Ninth-Century Byzantium: The Homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus in Paris (B.N. Gr. 510)," DOP 39 (1985): 1-14, esp. 4-5.
[50] See the helpful discussion in Norris, ed., 85. Among the variants of the major MSS, the titulus of Or . 27 (see Gallay, ed., 70) indicated that it was written pros Eunomianous . It is, however, not known when these titles entered the manuscript tradition.
[51] Socrates Scholasticus referred to Epiphanius' Ancoratus as a popular compendium of heresies in his own time. On Filastrius, see esp. his Liber de heresibus (PL 12:1111-302). The works of both authors were used by Augustine for his own De haeresibus (PL 42:21-50).
[52] Or . 27.1 (Norris, ed., 217). MS. R of Rufinus' translation (De Arrianis 1; Engelbrecht, ed., 265) has the titulus "DE ARRIANIS QUOD NON LICET SEMPER ET PUBLICE DE DEO CONTENDERE," while MS. V has "De his qui indecenter de lege contendunt." The latter closely resembles the later title of Codex Theod . 16.4: "DE HIS QUI SUPER RE-LIGIONE CONTENDUNT."
Gregory did not call these people Eunomians or Anomoeans, or invoke any other doctrinal label. Was he simply being circumspect, or was he most concerned with their deeds and traits? These people formed a cohesive social group insofar as they participated in the distinctive praxis of disputing; they also exhibited certain common character flaws. Gregory characterized these objectionable men as eloquent and proud to the point of hubris.[53] Loquacious dialecticians,[54] they devoted their time and energy to
setting and solving conundrums. They are like the promoters of wrestling-bouts (
) in the theaters, and not even the sort of bouts which are conducted in accordance with the rules (
) of the sport and lead to the victory of one of the antagonists, but the sort which are stage-managed to give the uncritical spectators (
) visual sensations and compel their applause.[55]
Like the promoters who moved wrestling from the palaestra into the public theaters (probably as a form of mud wrestling),[56] these "questioners" showed no respect for rules and boundaries proper to the game. And like a gymnasiarch, a devoted guardian of the dignity of, the sport, Gregory railed against such activity spilling out into the streets. His fear that the social order was being upset by the improprieties of the questioners demonstrated a strong locative awareness of established boundaries:
Every square (
) in the city has to buzz with their arguments (
), every party must be made tedious by their boring nonsense . . . Even women in the drawing-room, that sanctuary of innocence, are assailed, and the flower of modesty is despoiled by this rushing into controversy (
).[57]
For Gregory, the popularity of debate opened up a Pandora's box in a city already known for the fluidity of its social boundaries, especially given the fact that the new aristocracy boasted diverse backgrounds and religious affiliations. Wanton disputing completely overturned this
[53] On Gregory's attitude toward eloquence in speech, see J.-M. Szymusiak, "Note sur l'amour des lettres au service de la foi chrétienne chez Grégoire de Nazianze," in Oikoumene (Catinia, 1964): 507-13; P. T. Camelot, "Amour des lettres et désir de Dieu chez saint Grégoire de Nazianze: les logoi au service du Logos," Littérature et religion: Mélanges J. Coppin. MSR 23 Supplementum (1966): 23-30.
[55] Or . 27.2 (Norris, ed., 217; Gallay, ed., 72).
[57] Or . 27.2 (Norris, ed., 217; Gallay, ed., 72, 74).
fragile social order, even to the point of violating the sanctity of the female quarters![58]
Thus dialectic questioning, a critical intellectual activity to some, was to others a disruption of the community's solidarity and sense of decorum.[59] Questioners lured others into arguments by phrasing their questions (
) in a way calculated to be atopoi and paradoxoi , shocking and controversial. The people who did so within a Christian context were not necessarily opposed to Gregory's orthodox theological formulations; they simply did not believe it inappropriate to discuss theology publicly using the koine of philosophical dialectic, that culturally sanctioned method of applying predicate and propositional logic.[60]
After lamenting this social trend, which he felt powerless to stop, Gregory rhetorically asked his audience: "Why do you conjure up a crop of dialecticians (
) to attack us, like the Earth-born warriors in the old stories?"[61] The analogy between the dialectical art and Cadmus' warriors was apt: once carelessly sown (
), provocative questions would, like the slain dragon's teeth, spontaneously generate fierce spartoi , mindless warriors who would fight to the death for no reason.
The bishop attempted his own analysis of the origins of this phenomenon, attributing it to idle curiosity and a spirit of meddling, and accusing the perpetrators of polupragmosune . But meddlesome curiosity was in the eye of the beholder.[62] What was he polupragmosune to one late antique Christian might have been legitimate theological inquiry to another, and historians should be wary about taking sides prematurely.
In a fiercely competitive environment that valued innovation and agonistic excellence, differing claims to knowledge were a means of structuring a dynamic community of individualists.[63] Whether one ac-
[58] On the perceived weakness and passivity of women, and the paternal protection of them in law and custom, see J. Beaucamp, Le statut de la femme à Byzance, 4-7 siècles , Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance, Monographies de Collège de France 5 (Paris, 1990): 11-16.
[60] See generally De Ghellinck, "Quelques appréciations de la dialectique"; idem, "Quelques mentions de la dialectique stoïcienne," 59-67.
[61] Or . 27.9 (Norris, ed., 223; Gallay, ed., 92).
[62] See Gregory of Nazianzus, Or . 27.8. See also Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun . 2.12 (Jaeger, ed., 1:230).
[63] See De Witt, "Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups," 205-11; Hahn, Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft , 109.
cepted or tolerated these activities depended largely on one's social position and openness to competition. Claims to knowledge, especially to knowledge about the divine world, conferred authority on those who successfully established them.[64]
In terms of method, the explananda of this complex scenario are not why so many people were discussing the nature of God in a freewheeling fashion, but rather why some were particularly troubled by it and why they addressed the situation the way they did. In examining some of the strategies Gregory adopted to curb the phenomenon, we must note that, while the short-term effectiveness of his measures is far from clear, they made significant contributions to the subsequent Byzantine evaluation of the rational logos .
Credentialism
At issue between Gregory and those he criticized were the definition and validation of the Christian paideia that entitled one to philosophize authoritatively about the divine. Gregory imagined that the people he addressed styled themselves the true possessors of paideia , and that their misplaced smugness resulted from a deluded sense of their own accomplishments. He argued that the questioners possessed no credentials of serious education, that is, true paideia ; instead they asked difficult questions, an ability easily gained through cursory study of doctrine and philosophy.
Gregory opposed those who acquired for themselves, and who also helped others to acquire, the ability to ask acute theological questions not through a systematic training in philosophy but through the use of manuals and other shortcuts. They circumvented a system of long and difficult apprenticeship that cultivated a student's sense of social responsibility. Gregory asked these questioners why they interfered so willingly in the lives of others:
Why do you then try to mold other men into holiness overnight, appoint them theologians (
),[65] and as it were, breathe learning into them (
), and thus produce ready-made any number of Councils of ignorant intellectuals? Why do
[64] See Gregory's reported comment in Jerome, Ep . 52.8.
you try to entangle your weaker brethren in your spider's webs, as if it were some brilliant feat?[66]
For Gregory, words were cheap when uttered irresponsibly. He therefore urged the adoption of bios , one's deeds or way of life, as a measuring stick for determining one's worthiness to philosophize about God. According to Gregory, the questioners were concerned only with words and cared little for the performance of "true Christian works" such as hospitality, fraternal affection, marital love, virginity, love of the poor, chanting of the Psalms, vigils, fasting, and prayer. In this regard, praxis compared favorably With vain discussions.[67]
In effect, Gregory was asserting that Christian philosophers must also be practicing ascetics. Purification of soul and body through meditation became a prerequisite for the contemplation of the divine, as they had been in the traditional training of philosophers. Because spiritual askesis or exercise required much leisure, the philosophizing of the divine fell to those who enjoyed otium or gentlemanly retirement:[68] "
."[69]
Catechesis
No matter how persuasive his orations were, Gregory could not hope to triumph over this social tendency toward disputing by preaching alone. The true test came after the services when, in Christian homes, in the agora, and in the streets, people were confronted with "small questions" and tempted to enter into debates about the divine nature.
Because Gregory could not chaperon his listeners in all situations of controversy, nor realistically hope that they Would hold on to the pistis , credal formulation, and refuse to enter into controversy, he furnished them with ready-made replies.[70] In Oratio 29, Gregory furnished his audience with precise statements, including syllogistic formulations, by which they could confound those who asked theological questions: "Yes, these are the replies one can use to put a brake upon this hasty
[66] Or . 27.9 (Norris, ed., 222-23; Gallay, ed., 92).
[67] Or . 27.1.
[68] Or . 27.3. Leisure was a precious commodity. Gregory of Nyssa chided Eunomius for not having enough leisure to produce his Apologia Apologiae until many years after Basil of Caesarea had died; see Contra Eun . 1, preface. On otium and the formation of the gentleman in antiquity, see J.-M. André, L'otium dàns la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine des origines à l'époque augustéenne (Paris, 1966).
[69] Or . 27.3 (Gallay, ed., 76).
argumentativeness (
), a hastiness that is dangerous in all matters, but especially in theological topics. To censure, of course, is a trivial task—anyone so minded can do it quite easily."[71]
Gregory took his catechetical task seriously, and exhorted his audience to comet his words to memory As Simonides of Ceos, poet and father of ancient mnemonics, had long ago pointed out, a well-ordered structure is salutary to retention;[72] thus Gregory tried to make memorization easier for his listeners by keeping his statements concise and by building in some basic mnemonic deuces: "You want brief explanations here to avoid berg swept away by their plausible arguments, and we shall group these explanations in numbered sections (
) to aid the memory (
)."[73]
Even if Gregory felt confident that he could successfully fortify his community against the subversive potential of theological debates, he nevertheless lamented the situation. He wished that his catechetical instructions had not become necessary, because true Christians ought to find no delight in logical controversy:
This is the answer we make perforce to these posers of puzzles (
). Perforce—because Christian people (
: not just Christians, but the upholders of the
) find long-winded controversy (
) disagreeable and one Adversary enough for them. . . But may he who "expounds hard questions and solves difficulties," who puts it into our minds to untie the twisted knots of their strained dogmas, may he, above all, change these men and make them believers instead of logicians, Christians instead of what they are currently called (
).[74]
Though he too made use of logical arguments, Gregory did not want to be confused with dialecticians, whom he characterized as radical, self-seeking individualists. Further he reminded his audience that their
[71] Or . 29.1 (Norris, ed., 245; Gallay, ed., 176).
[72] See Cicero, De oratore 2.87.357.
[74] Or . 29.21 (Norris, ed., 260; Gallay, ed., 222, 224). See also Or . 31.2, in which Gregory suggested that Christians oust to become bored with theological discussions and avoid them.
pistis remained their best argument and last resort: here the double valence of the noun pistis , connoting both faith and credal formula, served Gregory's point. Holding on to the pistis was particularly important because debaters were deceptive to the point of robbing the bible for proof-texts (ten of which Gregory cited and refuted).
Learning
Throughout his orations, Gregory conceded grudgingly that curiosity and debate were a part of human nature. Activities expressing en-grained human traits could not be stopped in toto, only diverted like a flood.[75] For Gregory, certain kinds of discussions were less perilous than others; to his restless Constantinopolitan audience he recommended speculating about the nature of the world, or the worlds, a relatively benign topic:
Do you continue to speak even after these charges? Can it be that nothing else matters for you, but your tongue must always rule you, and you cannot hold back words, which, once conceived, must be delivered? Well, there are plenty of other fields in which you can win fame. Direct your disease there, and you may do good. . . . [Y]ou wish to move in your own field, and fulfill your ambitions there: here also I will provide you with broad highways. Speculate about the Universe—or Universes, about Matter, the Soul, about Natures (good and evil) endowed with reason. . . . In these questions to hit the mark is not useless, to miss it is not dangerous.[76]
In Oratio 28, Gregory specifically drew a connection between the incomprehensibility of God and the natural world as an aide-mémoire prompting the beholder to praise God. In fact, the strategy of launching into an ekphrasis of the wonders of the cosmos was a deliberate diversionary strategy used to counter meddling.
It is noteworthy that Gregory drew much of his imagery in Oratio 28 from Basil's Hexaemeron , a set of sermons about the six days of creation delivered in Caesarea a few years earlier. This connection may explain why the genre of hexaemera gained popularity from the late fourth century onward.[77] The rationale for introducing sophisticated scientific discussions of elements of the visible world, including man himself, into
[75] See John Chrysostom's ideas on the power of sexual impulses and on marriage as a concession to the frailty of human nature; discussed in Brown, Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York, 1988), 308-9.
[76] Gregory of Nazianzus, Or . 27.9-10 (Norris, ed., 223).
[77] F. E. Robbins, The Hexaemeral Literature: A Study of the Greek and Latin Commentaries on Genesis (Chicago, 1912), 42ff.
the ongoing Christian discourse had much to do with the concern over polupragmosune as curiosity and debate about theology were thought to generate conflicts and divisions among Christians. The Cappadocians, pushing to restrict understanding of human capacities, insisted that if people wanted to grasp the divine nature, they must first grasp the nature of created things.[78] In a letter wrongly attributed to Basil, the author (probably his younger brother Gregory of Nyssa, who also wrote De opificio hominis ) argued against those who claimed to possess the way and method (
and 
) for gaining divine knowledge (
). Arguing that the normal progression of knowledge was from lower forms to higher, he fashioned a test for those who claimed to know the supramundane: "Now let him who boasts of having apprehended the nature of things actually existing interpret the nature of the most insignificant of phenomena. For instance, let him tell what is the nature of the ant. . . ."[79]
To know God one must first know his creation. This emphasis on scientific knowledge as a prerequisite (though not the only one) for speculation about the divine effectively curtailed debate. Elsewhere, Basil of Caesarea even more forcefully attempted to dampen curiosity concerning the divine essence:
To know God is to keep His commandments. Surely you do not mean, then, that the essence of God should be investigated thoroughly? Or supramundane things searched out? Or the invisible objects pondered over? "I know mine and mine know me." It should be enough for you to know that there is a good shepherd who gave his soul for His sheep. The knowledge of God is comprised within these limits. How big God is, what His limits are, and of what essence He is, such questions as these are dangerous on the part of the interrogator; they are as unanswerable on the part of the interrogated. Consequently they should be taken care of with silence (
).[80]
Mystification
For Gregory, polupragmosune or "meddlesome curiosity" was a moral flaw that ran the danger (
) of turning the divine musterion into a technudrion or a "little finicking profession,"[81] a flaw that he feared was
[78] See Basil, Adv. Eunomium 3.6 (PG 29:668A-B).
[79] Pseudo-Basil, Ep . 16 (Deferrari, ed., 1:114-17). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, prologue to In Hexaemeron explicatio apologetica (PG 44: 65A-B).
[80] Basil of Caesarea, Homilia 23.4 (trans. from Fedwick, The Church and the Charisma of Leadership in Basil of Caesarea , 59-60).
[81] Or . 27.2 (Mason, ed., 3n. 12); the phrase is also rendered as "mere social accomplishment" (Norris, ed., 217).
not curable by friendly persuasion.[82] Thus he represented the nature of the divine essence as a mystery ringed by taboos. Enumerating the necessary qualities of a theologian, he remarked that "for one who is not pure to lay hold of pure things is dangerous (
), just as it is for weak eyes to look at the sun's brightness."[83] Like the emperor Theodosius I, Gregory asserted that theological discussion was an activity fraught with danger:[84] failure to do justice to the exalted topic could incur divine punishment.[85]
In Oratio 28, Gregory employed the analogy of Moses' ascent of Mount Sinai to spell out the perils of divine contemplation:
I eagerly ascend the mount—or, to speak truer, ascend in eager hope matched with anxiety for my frailty—that I may enter the cloud and company with God (for such is God's bidding). Is any an Aaron? He shall come up with me. He shall stand hard by, should he be willing to wait, if need be, outside the cloud. Is any a Nadab, an Abihu, or an elder? He too shall ascend, but stand further off, his place matching his purity. Is any of the crowd, unfit as they are, for so sublime contemplation? Utterly unhallowed?—Let him not come near, it is dangerous (
).[86]
The locus of the divine was a sanctum, a place both holy and inspiring of dread. It could not be approached (
) by those who were not worthy of its glory.[87] At the center of this vortex of holiness was a cloud endowed with numinous presence,[88] the composition of which no one could presume to know.
Note also the hierarchical principle implicit in Gregory's portrayal of the ascent. In the past, the prophets and high priests had constituted the privileged few worthy to approach the sanctum; in late antiquity, the bishops and priests were the chosen elite.[89] This new priestly caste coveted the control of the access to the divine: if they themselves could not reach the heights, then neither could those less worthy.
Throughout these orations, concern about the popularity of theo-
[82] See Or . 27.5.
[83] Or . 27.3 (Norris, ed., 218; Gallay, ed., 76).
[84] Sozomen, Hist. eccl . 7.6 (Bidez, ed., 308).
[85] See Or . 27.9.
[86] Or . 28.2 (Norris, ed., 224; Gallay, ed., 102).
[88] See also Gregory of Nazianzus, Or . 28.3 (Norris, ed., 225).
[89] On the developing hierarchical order of the Christian church, see A. Faivre, Naissance d'une hiérarchie: Les premieres étapes du cursus clerical (Paris, 1977).
logical discussion overlaid Gregory's ideas about the mystery of the divine essence. He made it plain that, by outstripping the traditional apophatic claims of philosophers, he deliberately increased the odds against speaking about God:
To know God is hard, to describe him impossible (
), as a pagan philosopher taught—subtly suggesting, I think, by the word "difficult" his own apprehension, yet avoiding our test of it by claiming it was impossible to describe. No—to tell of God is not possible (
), so my argument runs, but to know him is even less possible (
).[90]
Clearly, Gregory was not immediately successful in propagating his views, although eventually his stand prevailed. He made other appeals—for instance, reminding his audience that, with the victorious and threatening Goths roaming not very far from the imperial city, Christians ought to forsake divisiveness of all kinds,[91] including freewheeling theological discussion motivated by meddlesome curiosity.[92]
The unsettled state of affairs, and the rampant theological controversies that it aggravated, saddened a man who preferred to distance himself from the center of intrigues and power struggles. After his deposition in 381, Gregory retired to Cappadocia to a simpler and friendlier world, away from a city polluted by the din of disputation. He professed to have found peace at last in a retreat safe from "evil assemblies and arguments."[93] In a letter to his successor Nectarius (dated late 382)—a polite personal commendation bearing little news—Gregory reflected
[90] Or . 28.4 (Norris, ed., 226). See Wolfson, "Knowability and Describability of God," 233-49.
[91] See Or . 33.2. On the interconnectedness between church unity and barbarian invasions, see G. F. Chestnut, "Kairos and Cosmic Sympathy in the Church Historian Socrates Scholasticus," Church History 44 (1975): 161-66.
[93] Gregory of Nazianzus, Carmen de vita sua 1780.
with satisfaction on the calm life he rediscovered outside the maelstrom of Constantinople: "Affairs with us are as usual: we are quiet without strife and disputes, since above all else we honor the privilege of silence which is without peril (
)."[94]
Gregory had come to prize quiescent silence. In words that summarized his long and bitter experience with controversy, he said, "It is better to remain silent, than to speak with malice."[95]
John Chrysostom on the Incomprehensible God (Antioch, 386/87)
Gregory's advice and bitter. experience were perhaps not lost on Nectarius, an eastern senator and Constantinople's urban prefect when he was appointed orthodox bishop in 381.[96] Nectarius' episcopate lasted considerably longer than Gregory's, ending with his death in 397. It is attractive to imagine that his longevity had to do with his much maligned "mediocrity": having said and done nothing worthy of note, he thus occasioned no controversy.
His successor John Chrysostom was not a man of few words, nor one to adopt a stance of silent neutrality. Nicknamed "the golden mouth," he had delivered sermons on the subject of the incomprehensibility of God, twelve of which are extant.[97] He had already aired some of his views on the mystical transcendence of the divine essence prior to his
[94] Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep . 91 (P. Gallay, ed., St. Grégoire de Nazianze: Lettres [Paris, 1964], 1:112). Gregory wrote on behalf of his friend Pancratius; on the network of patronage, see R. Van Dam, "Emperors, Bishops, and Friends."
[96] On Nectarius, see Hauser-Meury, Prosopographie , 126-28, s.v. "Nectarius"; and PLRE 1:621, s.v. "Nectarius 2."
[97] The sermons De incomprehensibili natura Dei are in PG 48:701-812. For the first five Antiochene sermons (PG 48:701-48), I refer to J. Daniélou et al., eds., Jean Chrysostome: Sur l'Incompréhensibilité de Dieu . Discussions of these sermons can be found in Kopecek, History of Neo-Arianism , 2:529-39; E. Amand de Mendieta, "L'incompréhensibilité de l'essence divine d'après Jean Chrysostome," in S YMP OS ION: Studies on St. John Chrysostom, Analekta Vlatadon 18 (Thessaloniki, 1973), 23-40; J. Daniélou, "L'incompréhensibilité de Dieu," 176-94; M. A. Schatkin, "John Chrysostom as Apologist: With Special Reference to the De Incomprehensibili, Quod nemo laeditur, Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt , and Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae " (Th.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1982). On the Nachleben of these sermons in the east, see F. Graffin and A.-M. Malingrey, "La tradition syriaque des homélies de Jean Chrysostome sur l'incompréhensibilité de Dieu," in J. Fontaine and C. Kannengiesser, eds., Epektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou (Paris, 1972), 603-9.
stay in Constantinople, having done so while still a priest in Antioch (he was ordained in 386). It is likely that a number of his sermons on the incomprehensibility of the divine essence were preached in the small local churches of Antioch in 386 and 387, only a few years after Gregory of Nazianzus had delivered his so-called "Theological Orations" in Constantinople.[98] Other sermons by Chrysostom on the same topic have been associated with the time of his eventful tenure as patriarch of Constantinople eleven years later.[99] It is the former, Antiochene corpus that I examine in this chapter because there the basic patterns of arguments were established.
At the beginning of the first sermon addressing the topic of divine mystery, the priest Chrysostom commended his audience repeatedly for their fine, orderly behavior (
) while their bishop was away.[100] Yet immediately after the abundant praise in the proem, he directed his address to those who speculated too freely about God's ousia . These individuals considered themselves in possession of complete gnosis ,[101] believing that they knew the divine ousia with precise exactitude (
).[102] In response, Chrysostom argued that human beings possess knowledge only in part (
).[103] Even the ancient prophets did not know God's essence meta akribeias .[104] In other words, Chrysostom urged his audience to adhere to a via media , steering dear of the extremes of complete ignorance and perfect gnosis .[105]
To whom was Chrysostom directing this diatribe? He rarely made reference in his sermons to adversaries except in rhetorical fashion: "What do you have to say? (
)"[106] If he believed the pre-
[98] See w. E. Eltester, "Die Kirchen Antiochias in IV Jahrhundert," Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 36 (1945): 251-86, esp. 272ff.; see also C. Baur, John Chrysostom and His Time , M. Gonzaga, trans. (London, 1959), 31. The dates of the sermons are inferred from the Jewish feasts (PG 48:844D) that Chrysostom referred to in his sermons against the Anomoeans; see R. L. Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews: Rhetoric and Reality in the Late Fourth Century (Berkeley, Calif., 1983), 34-35. In 386, Rosh Hashanah fell on 9-10 September.
[99] Untitled sermon "against the Anomoeans" delivered in Constantinople (PG 48: 795-802); In paralyticum et de Christi divinitate, contra Anomaeos (PG 48:801-12). See F. Van Ommeslaeghe, "Jean Chrysostome et le peuple de Constantinople," AB 99 (1981): 329-49.
[100] De incomprehens . 1.1, 9-10, 13 (Daniélou et al., eds., 92-95).
[102] See De incomprehens . 2.471, 2.487, 4.222.
[103] De incomprehens . 1.110 (Daniélou et al., eds., 106-7).
[104] See De incomprehens . 1.195-96 (Daniélou et al., eds., 116-17).
[105] See Daniélou et al., eds., 27-29.
[106] De incomprehens . 1.272 (Daniélou et al., eds., 124-25).
sumptuous individuals to be exclusively Anomoean, he was reticent to say so.[107]
Chrysostom was not addressing strangers. He revealed that those who claimed gnosis regularly attended his services because they enjoyed the oratory.[108] This flattering fact may have inclined Chrysostom to moderate his criticisms. He also said that if he were harsher and more pointed in his remarks, those whom he wished to persuade would simply stay away from church.[109] He thus avoided directly condemning them, instead underscoring the fact that he meant to inflict no harm but to heal their sick, diseased minds.[110]
Chrysostom exhorted the whole audience to exercise restraint in its dealings with the questioners, whom he proposed ought to be treated with care as if afflicted patients.[111] Right-thinking Christians might even attempt to approach their sick peers for conversation, with a view to saving them from the disease of error, like wise and competent physicians (
) who proceed with gentleness and forbearance rather than in disdain.[112] Yet Chrysostom cautioned that this exhortation applied only to those confirmed in the faith and therefore immune to contagion.[113]
The virtue of headlong flight was a constant refrain of Chrysostom's. Christians were to flee the craze of disputing: "
."[114] A Christian who was weaker (
) in his faith was to flee (
) the company of sick Christians lest he himself come to harm.[115] He must avoid any occasion for discussion with others and
[107] Only in De incomprehens . 2.1, 2.13, 2.141, 3.10, 3.18. Kopecek again argues that Chrysostom's adversaries belonged to a distinct religious group; see History of Neo-Arianism , 2: 529-31.
[108] De incomprehens . 1.334-38 (Daniélou et al., eds., 180-81). On the relationship between the preacher and his audience, see also Chrysostom, De sacerdotio 5.1-8; J. Bernardi, La prédication des pères Cappadociens: Le prédicateur et son auditoire (Paris, 1969), ch. 4.
[109] De incomprehens . 1.345-50 (Daniélou et al., eds., 132-33).
[110] De incomprehens . 1.336-37 (Daniélou et al., eds., 130-31). On the use of the metaphor of sickness for "heresy," see Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechetica preface. On danger, pollution, and the social order, see M. Douglas, Purity and Danger (London, 1966), 94-113.
[111] De incomprehens . 2.490-508, 3.346-50 (Daniélou et al., eds., 182-83, 214-17). The Anomoeans were associated with the sick because they were regarded as demonically possessed. See F. Van de Paverd, "Zur Geschichte der Messliturgie in Antiocheia und Konstantinopel gegen das Endes des vierten Jahrhunderts: Analyse der Quellen bei Johannes Chrysostomos," OCA 187 (1970): 179-83.
[112] De incomprehens . 2.497-508 (Daniélou et al., eds., 182-83).
[113] De incomprehens . 2.509-11 (Daniélou et al., eds., 182-85).
[114] De incomprehens . 1.189 (Daniélou et al., eds., 116-17).
[115] De incomprehens . 2.511-13, 522-25 (Daniélou et al., eds., 184-85).
must call upon God's mercy[116] rather than yield to the temptation of defending his beliefs. He must run away—"
, 
"[117] —even from established friendship (
).[118]
Meddling versus Faith
Like Gregory of Nazianzus, Chrysostom expressed deep concern about a widespread tendency to meddle (
) in forbidden knowledge of the divine nature.[119] For Chrysostom, pistis alone protected against such prying curiosity because it set boundaries without which an investigation could easily degenerate into an infinite regress of questions and responses:[120]
For they invent and meddle (
) in everything so that
is excluded from the understanding (
) of their listeners. . . . [W]henever God reveals something, it is necessary to accept what is said in faith (
), not to pry impetuously (
).[121]
Elsewhere, Chrysostom repeated these themes:
While (
) you would find few people anxious (
) about faith (
) and political constitution (
), most of them instead (
) are meddling (
) and investigating (
) into questions which one cannot discover and which vex God.[122]
Such unchecked curiosity angered God and brought down chastisement (
) in the same way that the disbelief of Zachariah was punished by the affliction of blindness.[123] The asking of how and why—like the use of sophistic devices, syllogistic reasoning, and the posing of zeteseis —was not conducive to advancement in the faith but rather obscured the anagogical path.[124]
Yet to advocate strict adherence to the words in the pistis was to risk the mistaken notion that merely grasping a credal formula, whether
[117] De incomprehens . 1.379-80 (Daniélou et al., eds., 134-35).
[119] See index in Daniélou et al., eds., 354-55.
[120] See Chrysostom, In Acta apostolorum 23.4 (PG 60:183).
[121] De incomprehens . 2.75-80 (Daniélou et al., eds., 148-49).
[122] De sacerdotio 4.5; A.-M. Malingrey, ed., Jean Chrysostome: Sur le Sacerdoce (dialogue et homélie ), SC 272 (Paris 1980), 260-63.
[123] See esp. De incomprehens . 2.141-48 (Daniélou et al., eds., 154-55). This issue is the main theme of the second sermon.
[124] Hom. in Epistulam ad Ephesios 24.2 (PG 62:171). On Chrysostom's view on "curiosity," see his Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt (PG 52:479-528).
orthodox or not, made one a Christian.[125] Chrysostom faulted the questioners for paying too little attention to correct living, which he thought ought to accompany the profession of the correct pistis .[126] Virtue was to be pursued by the performance of deeds (
), not by arguing:[127] exercise of reason wrought social fractiousness, whereas charity fostered harmony.[128] Chrysostom urged Christians to become "fools for the sake of Christ" (I Corinthians 4:10): "Restrain our own reasoning, and empty our mind of secular learning, in order to provide a mind swept dean for the reception of the divine words."[129]
At another place, Chrysostom explained why pistis provided a safe haven: "
."[130] Here, as in Gregory of Nazianzus' orations and elsewhere, the multivalence of the word pistis as either an attitude of holy submission or a professed creed must be kept in mind.
Chrysostom, again like Gregory of Nazianzus, was keenly aware that the value of his exhortations rested on events that were to take place beyond the walls of the church, where his listeners faced challenging questions in the course of their daily lives.[131] He too provided solutions to a number of especially popular conundrums in phrases conducive to easy memorization. And he too apologized for arguing back, explaining that the verbal weapons he provided were hurtful only to those who refused to demonstrate goodwill and were already inclined to contentiousness.[132]
The Incomprehensible God and Liturgical Worship
The priest Chrysostom tried every available means to combat rampant theological discussion. He elaborated the idea that knowledge of the
[125] See De incomprehens . 11.7 (PG 48:797).
[126] See De incomprehens . 10.57 (PG 48.793).
[128] Hom. in Epistulam ad Colossenes 5.3 (PG 62:335). On the importance of both faith and works for Chrysostom, see Hom. in Matthaeum 64.4 (PG 58:614-15); Hom. in Iohann . 63.3 (PG 59:352).
[129] See De incomprehens . 2.70-75. See also Chrysostom, Homilia in illud, vidi dominum sedentem in solio excelso 4.3 (PG 56:123) on Peter the apostle as a simple man who silenced sophisticated Greek philosophers with divine help.
[131] See Chrysostom, Hom. in Iohann . 23.1 (PG 59:137-38).>
[132] De incomprehens . 2.6-7. On the value of logos for checking "specious reasonings," see Chrysostom, De sacerdotio 4.3-5; Baur, John Chrysostom , 1:334.
mysterious divine essence was beyond the limits of human cognition.[133] Only the Son knew the Father; other divine beings (
), including angels, did not have complete knowledge of God's ousia .[134] In this present context, this statement can only be read as an attempt to deflect curiosity from the subject and to deny competence from people who might otherwise be tempted to discuss and debate the issues.[135]
Chrysostom presented a paradox to strengthen his case: while angels and other divine beings superior to human beings collectively glorified and worshiped God with fear and trembling, men below impiously tried to pry into the secrets of the divine.[136] Chrysostom painted a striking, hyperbolic contrast:
Did you see how great is the holy dread in heaven and how great the arrogant presumption (
) here below? The angels in heaven give him glory; these on earth carry on meddlesome investigations (
). In heaven they honor and praise him; on earth we find curious busybodies (
). In heaven they veil their eyes; on earth the busybodies are obstinate (
) and shamelessly try to hold their eyes fixed on his ineffable glory. Who would not groan, who would not weep for them because of this ultimate madness and folly of theirs?[137]
For Chrysostom, the only proper attitude to assume when approaching the divine presence was humility to the point of fear and trembling.[138] At a minimum, he expected an appropriate spirit of deference before God's superior holiness and wisdom.
A significant aspect of this viewpoint was the implicit comparison between the clergy and the mediating angels,[139] whose exalted status insulated them from the criticism of those below.[140] Priests, like angels,
[133] See, e.g., J. C. McLelland, God the Anonymous: A Study in Alexandrian Philosophical Theology , Patristic Monograph Series 4 (Philadelphia, 1976), 149, on John Chrysostom's emphasis on the inability of human language to capture God's essence: "Apophatic theology is used here as a weapon against the Arian revival of Eunomius."
[134] See De incomprehens . 1.302ff.
[135] See De incomprehens . 1.308-27; see 3-4 passim.
[136] See De incomprehens . 1.308-12 (Daniélou et al., eds., 126-29). The angelic imagery is also present in his homily against the Judaizers; see Adversus Judaeos 1.1. Using angelic analogy to justify Christian conduct was a common ploy of Chrysostom's. In PG 56:99., he invoked the angelic hosts to argue against people who frequently attended theatrical plays and dances; see J. Dumortier, "Une assemblée chrétienne au IV siècle," MSR 29 (1972): 15-22.
[137] De incomprehens . 1.321-27 (Daniélou et al., eds., 128-29), trans. P. Harkins, ed., St. John Chrysostom On the Incomprehensible Nature of God (Washington, D.C., 1982), 66.
[138] See De incomprehens . 3.338-52.
[139] On priests as angelic mediators, see Chrysostom, De sacerdotio 3.4-6.
[140] Chrysostom, De sacerdotio 5.5. See H. Chadwick on the silent bishop as an emulator of the Deity in "The Silence of Bishops in Ignatius," HTR 43 (1950): 169-72.
mediated between God and ordinary mortals, making possible the spiritual ascent by stages of the faithful.[141]
The dread inspired by the numinous presence was a commonplace in Chrysostom's sermons.[142] Along with other fourth-century leaders such as Cyril of Jerusalem, he gave this theme—rooted in speculation about the heavenly temple in the Jewish tradition—decisive impetus in Christian eucharistic services.[143]
In the face of the overwhelmingly unknowable divine presence, human beings were not entirely bereft of response. They could react most fittingly through common worship. Chrysostom stressed the importance of group prayer and worship, which angels and divine beings continually rendered to God, and which moreover beautifully exemplified. communal harmony. The edifying image of humble, united worship was a potent antidote to arrogant, individual questioning.
A Disciplined Logos ?
Had Gregory of Nazianzus delivered his "Theological Orations" after Theodosius I issued his edict cunctos populos to the people of Constantinople on 28 February 380, he would have received the authority to take concrete actions against his theological rivals, perhaps even to take possession of their churches with the help of the imperial soldiery.[144] But even the state's coercive powers would not have helped Gregory realize these goals[145] because the questioners were not confined to a rival group with a distinct institutional presence.[146] Gregory's complaint was addressed to an all-pervasive social practice: even rescripts against specific
[141] See Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia 4.3 (PG 3:179-82). In contrast, see the rabbinic tradition that featured angels who resisted human ascent in P. Schäfer, Rivalität zwischen Engeln und Menschen: Untersuchungen zur rabbinischen Engelsvorstellung (Berlin/ New York, 1975).
[142] See Daniélou et al., eds., 30-39.
[143] See J. Quasten, "Mysterium Tremendum: Eucharistische Frömmigkeitsauffassungen des vierten Jahrhunderts," in A. Mayer, J. Quasten, B. Neunheuser, eds., Vom christlichen Mysterium: Gesammelte Arbeiten zum Gedächtnis yon Odo Costel (Düsseldorf, 1951), 65-75; idem, "The Liturgical Mysticism of Theodore of Mopsuestia," Theological Studies 15 (1954): 431-39.
[144] Codex Theod . 16.1.2 (Krueger, Mommsen, and Meyer, eds., 1.2, 833).
[145] On the dangers and difficulties of applying coercion, see Gregory of Nazianzus, Or . 33; Carmen de vita sua 1290-1304 (PG 37:1117-18).
"heresies" obtained from well-disposed emperors were of little use in putting an end to curiosity and debate. The only maneuver he could make in this regard was to label the phenomenon as categorically and exclusively Eunomian, and hence heretical, regardless of whether all who posed questions saw themselves as Eunomians.
It is instructive to contrast the concreteness of the concern about debate with the abstract and moral—one might even say ideological—way in which the issue was argued. Ideological mystification was suited to those in a weak position to enforce their will, that is, those whose prescriptive vision was not matched by their real disposable resources.
Gregory's orations, Chrysostom's sermons, and the phenomena discussed in Chapter 4 illustrate the porosity of the boundaries that separated the so-called questioners from orthodox Christians. For some, the issue at hand was the reality of constant "defections": to secure the border regions against "attacks" and "subversion," and to shore up the gradual erosion of dogmatic solidarity, Chrysostom used the only effective means he possessed, ideological mystification. Elsewhere, he rhetorically demonized Jews and Judaism when he found himself powerless to stop his parishioners from attending synagogue services. He likewise preached against public spectacles or theoria when sermon attendance dropped because of the theater and hippodrome.
Although the Byzantine tradition later bestowed great authoritative status on Gregory and Chrysostom, their sermons initially were issued from a position of weakness. Many of the advocates of divine mystery were preaching priests and bishops engaged in the task of maintaining the day-to-day solidarity of communities against the threats of those whose claims to knowledge created a two-tiered system of elites and the masses.[147] As a form of sermo humilis , the mystification of the divine essence helped to delegitimize a brand of discursive reasoning considered socially divisive.[148] The philosopher Themistius, according to
[147] See J. Lebreton, "Le désaccord de la foi populaire et la théologie savantes dans l'Église chrétienne du III siècle," RHE 19 (1923): 481-506; 20 (1924): 5-37; P. R. L. Brown, "Pelagius and His Supporters: Aims. and Environment," JTS n.s. 19 (1968): 93-114; reprinted in Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (London, 1977), 183-207, on the spiritual elitism of the Pelagian movement and its perceived social threat.
Sozomen, expressed the matter somewhat differently.[149] In an oration before the Arian emperor Valens, he argued that the Deity had made Himself not so easily known so that people, robbed of clear understanding, would respond with pious fear and the glorification of divine greatness and providence.
Ideological inculcation was superior to physical coercion because an internalized belief need not be policed from without. A transcendent God shrouded in mystery naturally deflected meddlesome curiosity, because when people realized that they could not know Him they would stop inquiring. Such a belief also helped to preserve social solidarity and order by undermining the legitimacy of any differential claim to precise knowledge about the divine essence; as Gibbon well knew, "Where the subject lies so far beyond our reach, the difference between the highest and the lowest of human understandings may indeed be calculated as infinitely small."[150] Henceforth, claims to virtue and consideration within Christian communities were to be based on the hierarchical factors of birth and ecclesiastical rank.
By emphasizing the vertical gulf between man and his creator, human weakness could be turned into the social glue of earthly communities. The visible manifestation of this came through in liturgical worship, art, and architecture, where the contemplation or theoria of the divine was displaced by a communal theoria of the created cosmos.[151]
[149] Sozomen, Hist. eccl . 6.36.
[150] Gibbon, Decline and Fall , pt. 1: 680-81.
The Cappadocians' insistence on the value of the visible universe for divine contemplation arose from a specific controversial situation, but later led to the worship of icons, which were believed to have anagogical value, especially for the illiterate.[152]
In the high politics and theology of late antiquity, the loci of the exalted increasingly receded from the grasp of the common man. The inner sanctum of the heavenly temple was described with the same language as was applied to the innermost chambers of the palace (guarded by soldiers from the imperial scholae ) in the so-called "Vision of Dorotheus" contained in Papyrus Bodmer 29.[153] God, like Rome and the emperor himself, was presented as the object of worship and not as the object of theoretical speculation.[154] When access to God and emperor became something only granted through the condescension (
) of the powerful[155] and not through the strivings of people from below, adoratio became the only fitting response. This emphasis on communal worship as the only appropriate reaction to the incomprehensible divine presence was echoed in one of Cyril of Jerusalem's catechetical lectures:
For we explain not what God is but candidly confess that we have not exact knowledge concerning him. For in what concerns God to confess our ignorance is the best knowledge. There "magnify the Lord with me, and let us exalt His Name together (Psalm 33:4)"—all of us together, for one alone is hopeless.[156]
"All of us together, for one alone is hopeless," The congregation acted out its appointed role in the liturgical service by following and
[153] See A. H. M. Kessels and P. W. Van der Horst, "The Vision of Dorotheus (Pap. Bodmer 29)," VChr 41 (1987): 313-59; J. Bremmer, "An Imperial Palace Guard in Heaven: The Date of the Vision of Dorotheus," ZPE 75 (1988): 82-88. Bremmer convincingly argues for a date of middle to late fourth century.
[154] The lack of theorizing about emperor and empire in late antiquity is noted in connection with the political works of Themistius; see the study by G. Dagron, "L'empire romain d'orient au IV siècle et les traditions politiques de l'hellénisme: le témoignage de Thémistios," Travaux et M émoires du Centre de Recherches d'Histoire et Civilisation du Byzance 3 (Paris, 1968), 1-242.
[155] See Chrysostom, De incomprehens . 3.163-66.
[156] Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses 6.2. Cyril digested the theology of Athanasius and Basil; see H. A. Wolfson, "Philosophical Implications of the Theology of Cyril of Jerusalem," DOP 11 (1957): 3-19. Cyril's theological reputation was a mixed one; see J. Lebon, "La position de saint Cyrille de Jérusalem dans les luttes provoquées par l'arianisme," RHE 20 (1924): 181-210, 357-86; R. C. Gregg, "Cyril of Jerusalem and the Arians," in R. C. Gregg, ed., Arianism (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 85-109.
responding to the words of the celebrant, its unity of purpose manifest in its unity of action.
The intellectual or philosophical theoria by which individuals strove to grasp the divine had given way to a more edifying communal theoria . Christians rallied unreservedly behind their bishops, worshiping God in humility, together offering up prayers, chants of antiheretical doxologies, and burnt incense. Beyond the narrow walls of the church, in the broader world still ruled over by tyche rather than by divine providence, other forms of theoria flourished, resoundingly deaf to Christian protestations. There charioteers skillfully piloted their horses around the spina in the hippodrome, cheered on by energetic and devoted crowds, and the spectacles of the theater remained a staple of public life.[157] There too the rational logos lingered, marginalized, undefeated.
[157] See Chrysostom, De incomprehens . 11.1 (P6 48:796-99). The Anastasia Church stood in the center of Constantinople so that the roaring crowds of the hippodrome would have been dearly audible to the preacher and his audience, perhaps even as Chrysostom delivered his sermons on the incomprehensible God.