VII—
New Democracy in the Communist Bases

In the preceding chapter, I have shown that the concept of New Democracy had a dual character: it stood midway between socialism and bourgeois democracy. I have also connected this dual character with Mao's struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin. At best, the concept was a statement of broad objectives for the revolution. It offered very little specification as to the substantive content of New Democracy. The concept had so much leeway, in fact, that Mao applied it to the revolution from 1917 onward. After Mao enunciated it in 1940, it remained the Party's line until 1952.^[1] Actual practice of the CCP was, therefore, influenced by factors other than the general objectives as defined by Mao in his essay. My task in this chapter is to show, first, the specific circumstances which gave rise to the reorientation in the administration of the Communist bases, which later came to be identified with New Democracy; and, second, what the new administrative programs and the accompanying reforms were designed to accomplish.

There is enough evidence to indicate that the CCP's great debate between the fall of 1939 and the summer of the following year was not confined to strategic or military questions alone. There was a parallel and equally intense debate concerning the general orientation of the Party's administrative program within its bases. It dealt with the question of the kind of revolution to be accomplished in the course of the war of resistance. Unfortunately, available data do not permit me to probe into the debate in depth. One reason that factional differences are not clearly visible, I suggest, is that practical necessities forced the

[1] In 1952 it was replaced by the "General Line of Socialist Construction." Again, the latter was applied retroactively to the period beginning in 1948.

Communist leaders to come to a consensus with respect to the orientation of rural administration. The governments of the Communist bases took a turn in the direction of "liberalization" in 1941, and they did not deviate from that course until the end of the war.

The 'Left' Deviation

New Democracy as a set of political, economic, and social institutions of rather liberal and benign character came into being in reaction to a brief period of 'Left' excesses that swept the Communist bases from the middle of 1939 through 1940. The full dimension of the excesses will perhaps never come to light. For my purposes, however, it is enough to show that they existed and presented serious problems for the stabilization of the Communist bases. The basic condition that gave rise to these excesses was the conjunction of foreign occupation and the latent civil war of class character. As direct causes and background factors for the radicalism committed in Communist bases, I will discuss (1) the changing sociological complexion of the Communist movement after it began base construction in the rural areas; (2) the impact of military friction with the Kuomintang; and (3) counter-blockades against the Japanese and premature attempts at market control.

By the end of 1939, the Communist bases in north China had extended the infrastructure down to the grass roots by co-opting and mobilizing the poorer majority. From the top down, the pre-existing structure of political and social power was undone and replaced by another, which was "democratic" in the majoritarian or plebiscitary sense. In the process, the sociological complexion of the rural bases took on a populistic character with the so-called "basic masses" in the saddle. If the previous regime of the landlords and officials was a "dictatorship" as the Communists maintain, so was its successor a "dictatorship of several revolutionary classes," as Mao put it. Both belonged to the genus of peasant authoritarianism.

In the fall of 1939, Yang Shang-k'un, the secretary of the Northern Bureau, took a trip through north China to observe the implementation of the August directive on Party consolidation. On the basis of a rough survey, he found that 60 to 80 percent of Party membership in north China was of peasant background; 5 to 10 percent of worker origin; and one-quarter were intellectuals in some places. Anywhere from 2 to 10 percent were women. Among the cadres, as many as 70 percent were from intellectual backgrounds, as in some areas of

Shansi. Yang recalled that two years earlier, when the Party entered north China in force, almost all of the cadres in the middle to upper echelons of the Party organizations came from outside. At the time of his trip, they still occupied more than half of the leading positions—except in Shantung and southern Hopei, where local cadres were in the majority.

Yang had an occasion to meet with soldiers of a Communist unit. He asked them, "What is the Communist Party?" In reply, they parroted the capsuled formula: "The Party is the supreme commander of the revolution," "It's the supreme commander." Yang had enough guile to snap back with another question, "Who is the supreme commander?" The replies disappointed him. Some said, "Chu Te is the supreme commander," while others said, "Yen Hsi-shan is the supreme commander." Yang also recalled the experience of a Communist cadre on an inspection tour of Shansi Province. His task was to observe the manner of transmitting the directives of the Sixth Plenum. When he mentioned the Plenum to a local Party member, the reaction was, "Yes, I know the Sixth Plenum. It was attended by Marx, Stalin, and Mao."^[2] Li Wei-han, a veteran Communist and a long-time critic of Mao, indicated his displeasure at the changing social composition of the Party:

Ordinary peasants always have very simple social background and are politically very pure, so to speak. These people have joined the Party in considerable number. In their minds the Communist party is "small Eighth Route," and joining the "small Eighth Route" means to "strike the local bosses and divide their land" and to "rob the rich to help the poor." On the other hand, [politically] conscious and talented men are rejected by the Party because of their complex social background. . . .^[3]

Communist expansion was made possible by the ready reserve of cadres recruited from among the educated youths of urban areas. But there was a tension between them and the old cadres of the former Red Army. Secretarianism in the army was serious enough to prompt Mao to draft a decision in December, 1939. He said, " . . . many of the army cadres are not yet alive to the importance of the intellectuals, they still regard them with some apprehension and are even inclined to discriminate against them or shut them out."^[4] This was part of the more general problem of "new and old cadres," a topic of wide dis-

[2] "Hua-pei tang chien-she-chung ti chi-ke wen-t'i," pp. 324–325.

[3] "Tsen-yang chih-hsing tang tsu-chih shang ti ching-kan cheng-ts'e ho yin-pi cheng-ts'e" [How to carry out the picked cadre policy and the concealment policy in Party organization], The Communist , No. 10, in Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 136.

[4] Selected Works , II, 301.

cussion at the time. It resulted from the cultural, class, ideological, and generational gaps that separated the two groups.

Lo Jui-ch'ing, a close follower of P'eng Te-huai, portrayed the collective traits of the Long March cadres. The old cadres, he stated, were marked by political steadiness and reliability. This they owed to the fact of having come through the prolonged and cruel "revolutionary fire." They hailed from the vast masses in the rural areas of south-central China. Their peasant–worker origin gave them a personality of honesty, sincerity, loyalty, and straightforwardness. They were well adjusted to stringent organizational life and discipline. "Individualism" or "anarchism" were altogether absent in them. On the other hand, their cultural level was low. They understood little of political ideologies and military science. "Study" was a pain for them. Burdened with "the remnant of peasant consciousness and habit," they were inadequate in handling themselves in complex situations. The lower cadres in particular lacked agility and social sensibility in dealing with united front problems. When forced to relate themselves to the world outside, they were ill at ease and clumsy.^[5]

Together, the comments by Yang Shang-k'un, Mao, and Lo Jui-ch'ing give us a glimpse into the changing sociological complexion of the Communist organizations in the rural areas by early 1940. At the top of each hierarchy was the Eighth Route Army controlled by former Red Army men. From the time of the December Ninth Movement and throughout the war, this core element was augmented by an influx of intellectuals and students from Peiping and Tientsin. Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Chen, and others, contributed to mobilization and "sending down" of urban youths who staffed the upper echelon in border region governments and mass organizations. They in turn helped train and recruit cadres of native peasant origin. Then in 1939 civil war was superimposed on the resistance. As the poor peasants gained the upper hand everywhere, border region governments shed their earlier united front character and became Communist bases in fact. The army was composed almost wholly of the natives. Its texture was coarse, and it was suspicious of alien elements. Then, too, the political tension between Mao and Wang Ming at the top must have created reverberations below. Consciously or unconsciously the Communist movement assumed an anti-urban, anti-intellectual, and anti-landlord orientation. This manifested itself in military friction with the Kuomintang forces and ostracism of urban youths.

[5] "Hsin-lao kan-pu kang chin-mi ti t'uan-chi ch'i-lai" [Further increase the unity between the new and old cadres], Cheng-chih kung-tso lun-ts'ung , pp. 89–90.

Contemporary signs that something was wrong in the Communist bases began to appear after the December Incident of 1939. In April, the Central Committee passed a decision demanding retribution for a serious error committed by a unit of the 115th Division in Shantung and transmitted that decision by radio:

In the Huhsi District (on the western side of the Weishan Lake in Shantung) in August, 1939, during the so-called anti-Trotskyite struggle, a serious political mistake was committed; instigated by the saboteur Wang Hsü-jen the methods of framing such as cruel punishment and examination by torture, demand for confession by random choice, and immediate arrest upon confession, etc. were adopted. As a result not only was the terror of random striking and random killing perpetrated but also the Huhsi District's political–military–mass work had incurred an extremely large loss; the work which had been concluded with difficulty by the local Party in the district has been completely destroyed. Loyal Party members and the masses were sacrificed without a cause. The political prestige of our Party and army has also received enormous injury. At the same time the anti-Communist elements and the Japanese bandits are exploiting the opportunity . . . to sever the relationship between our Party and army and the masses.^[6]

The 115th Division was reprimanded for not investigating the incident upon receiving a report; the chief culprit was expelled from the Party, court-martialed and imprisoned; and a funeral was ordered for the victims. In Shantung and Kiangsu where base construction got off to a late start, Kuomintang opposition was considerable. In the P'in-chiang and Chuk'ou Incidents, the Kuomintang executed CCP cadres and their families.^[7] In the course of subduing the opposition, the Communist forces were drawn into that fratricidal atrocity that marked the civil war. The tension erupted in the December Incident.

In March, 1940, Mao warned in a directive, "At the moment the 'Left' tendency of neglecting to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the more serious danger."^[8] This directive introduced the Three-thirds system. In April, the Northern Bureau

[6] Chung-yang kuan-yü Huhsi ti-ch'ü fan-T'u tou-cheng-chung piao-hsien ti yen-chung ts'uo-wu ti chüeh-ting [The Central Committee's decision concerning the serious errors which occurred in the anti-Trotskyite struggle in the Huhsi district] (April 20, 1941), in Tang ti sheng-huo , No. 4, pp. 10–11. It is conceivable that this decision was involved in the intra-Party dispute between Mao and Wang Ming. Wang Ming showed an extraordinary interest in anti-Trotskyite struggle. "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 61, January, 1971, pp. 90–94, passim . But the kind of terror described here seems to have been quite common in connection with the anti-traitor campaign, which was a veritable witch hunt. See Isabel and David Crook, Ten Mile Inn , pp. 80–88.

[7] These were the Kuomintang's raids on the New Fourth Army's organizations.

[8] "On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas," Selected Works , II, 418.

held the Lich'eng conference in the T'aihang District to "rectify the mistakes in 'Left' deviation barbarism" committed in southern Hopei and southeastern Shansi following the December Incident.^[9] The conference curbed mass mobilization. At about same time, Chang Went'ien was warning that "many comrades in the Party . . . light-heartedly take the die-hard elements to be traitors, the intermediate elements to be die-hard elements."^[10] To be branded a traitor probably entailed the same consequence as being branded a "counter-revolutionary" during the civil war. Toward the end of 1940, Mao warned again, " . . . there must not be too much killing, and no innocent person should be incriminated."^[11]

Agricultural production and exchange began to decline in north China as the war began. Severe strain and destitution began to appear toward the end of 1939: mortgaging of land increased suddenly; subsidiary productions ceased as raw materials were used up; railroad rollingstock, brokers, and peddlers stopped circulating; periodic markets and market towns were practically dead; landlords demanded rent in produce; farm laborers went begging for jobs which could not be found; and consumption of salt declined to two-thirds of the pre-war level. Japanese investigators noted that the poor peasants had reached the "limit of their lives."^[12] Guerrilla war, counter-guerrilla war, and increase in banditry were directly responsible for this state of affairs. If poverty was related to the revolution, therefore, the most massive poverty came with the revolution rather than as its precondition.^[*]

The Communist bases were no exception to the general decline in production and exchange. But serious countermeasures were not taken until the middle of 1940 because, I surmise, expenditures were met by the savings of the rich. In the meantime, the Communist governments followed economically irrational policies. There was consider-

[*] Ramon Myers' authoritative findings on Chinese agriculture are very important in this respect. He states that in Shantung and Hopei, between 1890 and 1937, the standard of living among the peasants remained constant except in times of wars and natural disasters. The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890–1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 124. I must acknowledge my debt to this book. Its refutation of the so-called "distribution theory" cleared up a large problem in my work.

[9] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 48.

[10] "K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i chan-hsien-chung ti tso-ch'ing wei-hsien," p. 454.

[11] "On Policy," Selected Works , II, 446.

[12] North China Economic Investigation Section, Research Division, South Manchurian Railway Co., Jihenka no hokushi noson^[*] : Kahoku-sho^[*] Tei-ken nai ichi noson jittai chosa^[*] hokoku^[*] [North China village in the war: investigative report of the conditions in one village in Tinghsien in Hopei Province] (1941) (hereinafter cited as Tinghsien Investigation Report ), chaps. III, IV, V, passim .

able improvisation by each border region in response to the most pressing current needs. Maintenance of the army was the greatest fiscal demand, and it was met by a haphazard confiscatory policy directed at the rich. No systematic effort was made to promote production or commerce. In attempting to increase revenue, the Communists resorted to static methods such as hunting down the "black field."^[13]

When the Japanese forces dispersed themselves for pacification campaigns in 1939, they occupied junctions of communications network and administrative–commercial centers. The Communist governments had to adjust their boundaries without regard to the ecology and structure of traditional rural markets. Furthermore, the CCP sought to undermine the significance of Japanese-controlled towns by instituting stringent trade control. A Japanese-controlled area was regarded as a "colony" or a foreign country.^[14] For example, Wujench'iao in Ankuo hsien was one of the largest market towns in central Hopei.^[15] It was linked with Tientsin by a canal, and in peace time it was a trading center for nearly one hundred villages in the surrounding countryside. In 1937 Lü Cheng-ts'ao collected his forces in the Shentze–Ankuo area and started guerrilla activities. In the fall of 1938 Ho Lung's 120th Division moved in to organize the Central Hopei Military District of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. Wujench'iao was supervised by the Eighth Special District Commissioner's office. In September, 1939 the Japanese 110th Division occupied Wujench'iao. Pacification and blockade war began.

The Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region's currency, of which 300 million yuan were issued in early 1938, appeared in Wujench'iao in the summer.^[16] When the Japanese forces moved in, they discovered that the currency of the North China United Reserve Bank (Japanese-controlled) exchanged at 20 percent discount for the border region currency.^[17] The border region bank issued its currency against a reserve in Fapi (national currency) and Chinch'ao (Shansi currency). In Communist-controlled areas, Fapi and Chinch'ao were forcibly exchanged for border region currency. Possession and use of United Reserve Bank's currency were severely punished. Those found carrying less

[13] Growth of one revolutionary base , pp. 147–151.

[14] Ibid. , p. 150.

[15] "Kahokusho^[*] ichi noson^[*] ni okeru Chukyo^[*] no tai-noson^[*] shisaku" [Chinese Communist agricultural policy in a village in Hopei Province], Chosa^[*] geppo^[*] , Vol. 1, No. 11, November, 1943, pp. 1–54. For information on the Wujench'iao area, I rely on this valuable document.

[16] Shina kosen-ryoku^[*] chosa^[*] i'inkai [Committee to investigate China's capacity to resist], Research Division, South Manchurian Railway Co., Shina kosen-ryoku^[*] chosa^[*] hokoku^[*] [Report of investigation into China's capacity to resist] (Tokyo: San'ichi shobo^[*] , 1970), p. 168.

[17] "Kahokusho ichi noson . . ., " p. 25.

than ten yuan of it had to submit to confiscation. Those who were caught having more than 100 yuan were executed.^[18] Currency control went hand in hand with trade control.

A wall went up around the Communist bases. All traffic in and out of the bases was checked rigorously as a part of anti-traitor activities. Exchange of goods was supervised by Trading Departments. In the Shangtang area of southeastern Shansi, which had a bank of its own, those who purchased goods from outside with Fapi without a permit from the government were treated as traitors.^[19] In this area a misguided trade policy of buying as much as possible from the Japanese-occupied area and refusing to sell anything in return was adopted temporarily in 1939, with the result that the excess of imports had to be paid for by Fapi.^[20] Cotton production once flourished in Hopei as an important cash crop. The Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region government banned its production in the guerrilla areas and caused serious depression in the rural economy.^[21]

In Wujench'iao the CCP's counter-blockade caused severe hardships for its inhabitants, many of whom were not peasants. They had to seek out friends and relatives in the outlying villages to buy food in secret. What was more surprising was that the CCP banned the free market in its own area of control. The purpose behind this seems to have been anti-inflationary price control. In the Shangtang area, each hsien government was empowered to determine a fair price for each item of goods. Anyone who speculated or otherwise ignored the government price could be punished.^[22] In central Hopei inter-village as well as intra-village fairs were banned. Those who needed food for consumption had to report to the manager of a cooperative. The buyer was then taken by a member of the cooperative and a broker to a seller. But because of stringent enforcement of low prices, few peasants were willing to part with their surplus. In the village of Hsipeima, near Wujench'iao, which had 238 households, an average monthly transaction of three to five piculs of grain was reported. There was a flood in Hopei in 1940, and food was in short supply in many families. When the poor peasants and hired laborers went hungry, relief was sought in "contributions" from the rich.^[23] Japanese observers in Wujench'iao noted that the period of one year from the fall of 1939 was the "most radical and most Left excessive."^[24]

[18] Ibid. , p. 27.

[19] Hoshun Investigation Report , II, 17.

[20] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 149.

[21] Tinghsien Investigation Report , pp. 71, 86, 91.

[22] Hoshun Investigation Report , II, 5.

[23] "Kahokusho^[*] ichi noson^[*]  . . . ," pp. 19–22.

[24] Ibid. , p. 19.

Three years of taxation under the "rational burden" system began to show its impact by the middle of 1940. A Communist source states:

In 1939 the enemy turned his forces on north China . . . and with destruction, burning, and killing by the enemy, the economy of the bases suffered serious losses. At that time relatively comfortable landlords, gentry, and merchants everywhere fled to Chiang Kai-shek-controlled areas or enemy-occupied areas en masse. Although the burden on the basic masses was greatly reduced, productive spirit was not raised and agricultural production drastically declined. . . .^[25]

In order to avoid paying taxes, poor and middle peasants were reluctant to be reclassified upward in tax brackets.^[26] The landlords, who had borne the cost of the Communist bases for three years, had been taxed out of existence in some places. The initial goal of the CCP in liquidating this class and winning the support of the masses had been accomplished. It was time to redistribute the burden and appease the landlords who chose not to side with the Japanese or the Kuomintang.

The virtual freeze on rural markets was undone in August, 1940. There was a parallel between this freeze—thaw cycle and the similar cycle at the end of the First Five Year Plan (1955–1956) and again during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1959). In all instances it was the effectiveness of the CCP's control over the masses which led to a kind of self-strangulation. In presenting a reform measure, Yang Shang-k'un said,

To imagine that officially managed enterprises can substitute for free enterprise is bound to lead to the result that we blockade ourselves. Within the production relationship of the society today, free trade is a necessary means of commodity distribution. Therefore all restrictions on free enterprise are mistaken.^[27]

In early 1940, a comprehensive program for liberalization in political, economic, and social spheres was being proposed in the highest councils of the CCP leadership. These reforms were no doubt debated as part of the over-all adjustment of united front relationship. The immediate result of this debate was the "Double Ten Program" (Shuang shih kang-ling , so-called because it had twenty points) or The Current Administrative Program for the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region adopted by the Northern Bureau in mid-August, just prior to the Battle of One Hundred Regiments. "The Double Ten Program" in

[25] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 150.

[26] Ibid.

[27] "Kahokusho^[*] ichi noson^[*]  . . . ," p. 19.

turn served as a model for a series of administrative programs for each border region government.^[28]

In April, 1941, the Northern Bureau issued the Proposal Concerning the Base Construction in the Chin-Chi-Yü Border Region containing fifteen points ("the Northern Bureau Fifteen Points").^[29] On May 1, the Politburo adopted The Administrative Program for the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region .^[30] This was the most important one of all and was accompanied by a directive that it be disseminated and explained in the Party–army–government hierarchies. In October, the Huaipei Su-Wan Border Region issued its program. The Huainan Su-Wan Border Region passed its own program in May, 1942. The Chin-Sui Border Region passed its program at the first session of its temporary council in October of 1942. In August, 1943, the Shantung Sub-bureau of the Northern Bureau adopted a program for the Shantung bases.^[31]

New Democracy was the label for the sum total of all the institutions which came into existence as a result of these programs. Four major traits distinguished the New Democratic regime from its predecessor. First, all of the new administrative programs established the Three-thirds system. The new program for Shen-Kan-Ning demanded not only that Communist party members should not exceed one-third of those nominated for public offices; it also stipulated that when a Communist party member was elected a chief officer of an administrative organ, at least two-thirds of other offices must be filled by non-Communist candidates. An exact share of one-third for CCP members could not be exceeded in nomination and election.^[32]

Second, a system of universal direct election was instituted in all the border regions.^[33] Voter participation in three elections—at the border region, hsien , and hsiang or at comparable township levels—

[28] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Politics , pp. 181–184. The report by Yang Shang-k'un cited above accompanied the Double Ten Program. That the Double Ten Program served as a model for other administrative programs is my own inference. P'eng Chen stated at the time that the Double Ten Program was a local implementation of the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Ten Point Program of August, 1937, but that it was not national in application. Chieh-fang , No. 119, p. 22. The Administrative Program of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region was presented as a national model, though it was identical in substance to the Double Ten Program.

[29] Growth of one revolutionary base , pp. 306–310.

[30] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , pp. 103–106.

[31] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Politics , pp. 174–187.

[32] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , p. 104.

[33] Universal direct election was in contrast to the system in use during the soviet period. At that time, ballots were weighted in favor of the voters of proletarian origin. Elections were conducted indirectly by levels. A voter cast his ballot only once to choose his delegate, who in turn voted for a higher delegate.

was required. Free election was the goal of the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Ten Points Program of August, 1937, as well as of The Administrative Program of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region of April, 1939. But popular election was never promoted with such vigor prior to 1940. There was a special reason for this, having to do with the stage of development in the Communist bases, as will be shown below.

Third, the new administrative programs signaled the transition in the taxation system from rational burden to unified progressive tax. This stood for rationalization of taxation. Shen-Kan-Ning's 1939 program already stipulated unified progressive tax. But it was very certain that most of the Communist bases were not yet ready to institute such a complicated system of taxation at an earlier stage. Stability and security of a base were prerequisite. The switch to the new taxation system took more than one year in the more advanced bases, while others made do with the rational burden system until the end of the war.

Fourth, the over-all economic design of the new programs could be characterized as controlled "liberalization." Labor discipline was tightened and work stoppage was curbed. While the tax burden was distributed more widely among the poorer masses, business and industrial enterprises were given tax privileges. The new programs continued to pay lip service to rent and interest reduction, but the emphasis after 1941 was on punctual payment of rent and interest that were due. Depression in the rural economy was reversed in order to weather the most intensive phase of Japanese pacification. Eventually the policy of "liberalization" led to the emergence of Chinese NEP men,^[*] so to speak, among the new proprietors.

The foregoing shows some of the contingent factors which shaped the New Democratic regime. There were others, and they will be dealt with as I explain the actual implementation of the programs in detail in the rest of this chapter. Voluminous statutes, regulations, and directives were passed and enforced in all border regions in pursuance of the new administrative programs. I will concentrate on only two aspects of the New Democratic regime: (1) Political intention of the CCP in instituting the Three-thirds system; and (2) Political intention and designs of the CCP behind the new economic system.

[*] Small capitalist traders that emerged in Soviet Russia in 1922–1928 when the stringent War Communism was replaced by the liberalization of the New Economic Policy.

The Three-Thirds System

There were debates in the CCP about whether to have such an institution at all and what its purpose should be. Very early in the war Mao opposed a popular representative institution in the Communist bases by castigating the idea as "parliamentarism."^[34] The Chin-Chi-Yü District, under P'eng Te-huai's control, experimented with a so-called "One-half system" (erh-i-chi ) in late 1939, though details are not known.^[35] Mark Selden notes quite correctly the affinity between the Three-thirds system and Chiang Kai-shek's order, toward the end of the first united front, to restrict the Communists in any important organ of the government and the Kuomintang to one-third.^[36] It is possible that Mao co-opted the idea from his opponents and put it to his own use. It was probably for this reason that there were disagreements about its purpose. The first known application of the Three-thirds system took place in the Suite and the Lungtung Sub-districts of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, with Mao's blessing.^[37] These areas fell to the CCP's control in the spring of 1940. Land revolution could not be carried out as in the more established part of the border region, and the landlords remained in force. The Three-thirds system was used to appease them. But there was much more to it than that. It was put to a use whose thoroughly modern character is astounding.

The system expanded democracy in the sense in which the term is understood nowadays: simple increase of participation by the masses in public affairs. Yet it increased the power of the government and the Communist party over the people at the same time. Neither mass participation nor increased government power alone can adequately explain the Three-thirds system. The two were fused together in a unique combination: democratic centralism.^[38]

It went without saying that the Three-thirds system reflected the CCP's confidence in having its way in well-consolidated bases. In this sense, the system was only a formal concession to the proclivities of

[34] Selected Works , II, 67, 73. This was in November, 1937.

[35] Li Hsüeh-feng, Ken-chü-ti chien-she yü ch'ün-chung kung-tso [Base construction and mass work] (December, 1940) (BI), p. 45. This report concerned the Chin-Chi-Yü District. It was accompanied by a brief introduction by P'eng Te-huai who extolled it as "the basic final sum-up of peasant mass work during the three years of resistance," Ibid. , p. 1. Li Hsüeh-feng's concern in the report was that the rent and interest reduction campaigns were resulting in too rapid transfer of land ownership, Ibid. , p. 3 ff.

[36] Yenan Way , p. 162.

[37] Ibid. , p. 163. See Selected Works , II, 418, for Mao's support for it.

[38] For further discussion of this interpretation of the concept of "democratic centralism," see Kataoka, "Political Theory of the Great Leap Forward," Social Research , Spring 1969, pp. 93–122.

the non-Party elements. Of the enlightened gentry and the national bourgeoisie, Mao said,

We unite with them not because they are a political force to be reckoned with nor because they are of any economic importance (their feudal landholdings should be handed over with their consent to the peasants for distribution) but because they gave us considerable help politically during the War of Resistance. . . .^[39]

In co-opting and mustering their "help"—so that they would carry out the Party's decisions "gladly and whole-heartedly"^[40] —the CCP was not unilaterally relinquishing its power but was trying to increase it. It is in this sense that the CCP's modernity stands in contrast to the Kuomintang.

The Three-thirds system served one purpose vis-à-vis the intermediate groups in the White areas and quite another vis-à-vis the border regions. In the border regions, it is again possible to draw a distinction between the functions served by border region political councils in relatively urbanized areas such as Yenan and the functions of the councils down in the villages. As it moved down into the rural areas, the Three-thirds system took on quite a revolutionary character.

Vis-à-vis the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the Three-thirds system was geared to a specific campaign after 1940. As I have noted, the Sixth Plenum of the Kuomintang's CEC decided to call the national assembly in November of 1940. But the December Incident intervened, and the convocation of the assembly was put off. In March, 1941, the Kuomintang announced that the assembly would be postponed until the end of the war.^[41] In early 1940, the CCP decided to launch a campaign to "urge constitutional government." Associations for Promotion of Constitutional Government were formed in the Communist bases.^[42] In the context of this campaign, it was timely for the CCP to carry out local and regional elections in its own areas on the basis of universal franchise. These elections were evidently designed to point up the "democratic" character of border region governments in contrast to "one-party dictatorship" in Chungking.

Border region councils were the showcase of democracy, and the CCP took care to elect to them non-Party personages of as prominent a background as possible. To have even a sprinkling of independent and progressive men of literary or civic renown added a tremendously

[39] Selected Works , IV, 209.

[40] Ibid. , II, 419.

[41] Collected Wartime Messages , II, 562.

[42] "New–Democratic Constitutional Government," Selected Works , II, 407–416. Editorial comment states, "Comrade Mao Tse-tung here exposed Chiang Kai-shek's deceit, wrested the propaganda weapon of 'constitutional government' from his hands and turned it into a weapon . . . ," Ibid. , p. 407.

benign air to the "anti-Japanese political power."^[43] The sophistication of the CCP's approach to the intermediate groups was indicated by a directive of the Propaganda Department in October. It contained carefully drawn up instructions for wooing the intellectuals to the Communist side:

We ought to realize the importance of cultural personalities and rectify the backward mentality of some comrades in the Party to belittle, loathe, and mistrust [them]. . . . We should realize that a cultural personality with considerable social position, prestige, and skill in some art and its product often has very great influence internally and externally.

We ought to use every means to guarantee the spiritual, material, and other necessary conditions for their literary production. . . .^[44]

At about the same time, another directive instructed the Party organizations to exploit the Kuomintang's "exclusionism" which left many youths frustrated. It named a dozen or so well-known civic leaders as the target of wooing. It sounded as though the CCP was feeling their pulses individually.^[45]

It was easier to postulate democratic centralism theoretically than to practice it. The working of border region councils was an uneasy compromise between democracy and centralism. Some councils acted as mere rubber stamps. For instance, from the Huaipei Su-Wan Border Region, the following "lesson" was reported:

Generally speaking, in parliamentary debate and legislation every legislator ought to compete for time and opportunity to speak. This ought to be recognized as his right. In elections, every legislator, party, and group exhaust energy in competition. . . . This right is inalienable. . . . But there are still many people who have never competed to raise their hands to this day. And why is it that some members of our council still need "mobilization" and "encouragement" before they agree to speak up and run for elections?^[46]

[43] See the series of biographical columns on the members of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region political council in Chieh-fang jih-pao , November 3–19, 1941.

[44] Chung-Kung chung-yang hsüan-ch'uan-pu kuan-yü k'e-k'ang-Jih ken-chü-ti ch'ün-chung ku-tung kung-tso shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department directive concerning mass agitation work in each anti-Japanese base] (BI).

[45] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü ch'üan-kuo chiao-yü-hui k'e-hsiao-p'ai-pieh hsiao-t'uan-t'i tui-chan t'ung-i chan-hsien kung-tso ti shih-chih [The CCP Central Committee's directive concerning the expansion of national united front work in the small factions and small organizations in the educational circle of the country], Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 476–479.

[46] Liu Tzu-chiu, "Huai-pei Su-Wan pien-ch'ü ti-erh-chieh ts'an-i-hui ti ching-yen chiao-hsün" [Experiences and lessons of the second political council of the Huaipei Su-Wan Border Region], Fuhsiao (the 4th Division, New Fourth Army), May, 1943, p. 62.

Lin Po-ch'ü, the chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, criticized some Communist members for abusing the method of "inviting" the intermediate groups to the council. They said, "The Three-thirds system is just a way of display to create a good impression on the outside. . . . Just bring in some celebrities to make up the number!" Lin warned that "putting numbers together" was "Left deviation," while conceding the need for "invitation."^[47]

It would be a mistake to assume that the political process in the councils was simply rigged from behind to disguise the CCP's dictatorship. The intent of the Party was no less than to fabricate "spontaneous" support. In pursuing this goal, it leaned over backward. At the same time, many members of border region councils were articulate and independent men. They endorsed the CCP insofar as it supported the Three People's Principles and the resistance against Japan. A summing-up report of the first Hupeh-Honan Border Region assembly (March, 1943) stated:

We ought to study the Kuomintang's statutes in detail. Many intermediate persons still regard the Kuomintang's statutes as orthodox. With respect to the important ones, such as the Compendium of Civil Laws and the Elementary People's Rights , we must improve our skill in citing the revolutionary passages in order to solve various legal disputes.^[48]

After the councilors and officers for the second council were elected in Shen-Kan-Ning in 1941, according to Lin Po-ch'ü, a dispute arose among the CCP members as to the power and competence of the council.^[49] The statute which enacted the council empowered it to be a legislative organ: it was authorized to elect the chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and the Higher Judicial Yuan; to supervise administrative officers; to pass the government budget; and to legislate.^[50] But the administration apparently had veto power.^[51] Some Communist members set forth a "two power theory" on the basis of "parallel existence of legislature and administration" (i-hsing ping-li ), or a "two and a half power theory" whereby the judiciary was to

[47] "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi ti ching-yen chi ying-kai ch'i chiu-cheng ti pien-hsiang" [Experience of the Three-thirds system in the border region and how to correct its bias] (report to the senior cadre conference in March, 1944), Ibid. , December, 1944, pp. 8–9.

[48] "O-Yü pien-ch'ü ti-i-tz'u k'e-chieh jen-min tai-piao ta-hui ti ch'ing-hsing chi ch'i tsung-chi" [The situation of the Hupeh-Honan Border Region's first people's representative assembly and its conclusion], Ibid. , April, 1943, p. 55.

[49] "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 11.

[50] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , pp. 56–57.

[51] This was the case in the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü Border Region. See Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 92.

enjoy semi-autonomy alongside the legislature and administration.^[52] Jen Pi-shih also revealed that some people advocated the "theory of uninterrupted elections" to preserve democracy. He maintained that the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region was already a democracy, yet these people felt that the Communist party was the ruler and that a real democracy in which the people are free to do as they like was far away.^[53] Such "misunderstanding," according to Lin Po-ch'ü, stemmed from the failure to distinguish the Three-thirds system from the soviet system, or bourgeois–democracy from New Democracy. He argued that the council and the administrative organs were both "organs of political power" under the formula: "unity of legislature and administration" (i-hsing ho-i ).^[54] The dispute concerning the power of the council was not settled until the senior cadre conference in Shen-Kan-Ning in 1942.^[55]

Apparently the CCP was having some discipline problems as it adopted the policy to eliminate sectarianism. Its solution was to draw a sharp distinction between the class stand of the Party and its external relations or "severity within the Party and leniency without."^[56] This was the line laid down by Mao in a major directive, "On Policy," in December of 1940.^[57]

The Three-thirds system and the general election at the hsiang level in the rural areas were not purely political reforms.^[58] They had organic connection with social and economic revolutions that had been in progress since the establishment of the Communist bases. Turning the general election into an occasion for stepping up the land revolution to the higher stage was Mao's intention. This was implied in the republication of "An Investigation of Hsinkuo" under the new title, "Rural Surveys," with a new preface and a postscript in April, 1941.^[59]

The republication of the document was apparently intended to match Wang Ming's republication of his Two Lines of 1931 under the new title, Struggle for the More Complete Bolshevization of the Chi -

[52] Lin Po-ch'ü, "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 11.

[53] "Kuan-yü chi-ke wen-t'i ti i-chien" [My opinion concerning several problems], Fuhsiao , April, 1943, p. 9.

[54] "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 17.

[55] Ibid. , p. 11.

[56] In the directive of July 7, 1940, in Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 75.

[57] Selected Works , II, 441–449.

[58] According to Lin Po-ch'ü, the "intermediate" groups were always more numerous than the "progressive" groups (i.e., the poor peasants and hired laborers) in councils of the hsien class or above, while the latter were dominant at the hsiang level. "Pien-ch'ü san-san-chi . . . ," p. 7.

[59] "'Nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a' hsü-yen"; "'Nung-ts'un tiao-chi'a' pa," Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 289–292. By this time, incidentally, Mao was looking forward to the Seventh Party Congress. See Ibid. , p. 289.

nese Communist Party , in July, 1940. Mao stressed repeatedly in the preface and the postscript that the substantive policy laid down in "Rural Surveys" was not applicable to the resistance period as a "tactical line."^[60] He thus implied that strategically there was a parallel between the land revolution of the civil war period and that of the resistance period. Mao's message seems to have been that the land revolution in the resistance period had reached the stage which corresponded to the land investigation stage in the civil war period, for which Mao wrote the original document. He was reminding his audience that the election campaign of 1941 under the Three-thirds system was comparable to the land investigation drive which preceded the Second National Soviet Congress and which created a large turnover in soviet personnel at all levels.

"The entire border region carried out a re-election from below upward," reported Lin Po-ch'ü.^[61] In keeping with democratic centralism, the election was preceded by sending down of propaganda teams into the countryside to mobilize the peasantry. One district in Shen-Kan-Ning was saturated by 115 teams and 881 workers.^[62] A voter turnout of 80 percent was secured in Shen-Kan-Ning as a whole and 95 percent in Suite, Ch'inchien, and Yench'uan.^[63] The latter figure may indicate the relative intensity of the CCP's efforts in the peripheral areas. The result, as revealed in statistics from this and the Chin-Chi-Yü District, was stunning. Two-thirds of the incumbent officials at the hsiang level were voted out and replaced by new ones. In Yenan hsien 113 were re-elected to the hsiang level administrative commissions while 185 were newly elected. Among the 61 hsiang chiefs, 41 were new faces. In Anting hsien 70 percent of hsiang and township officers were newly elected. In Suite 1,001 incumbents were voted out.^[64]

The reform in the Chin-Chi-Yü District fell behind. The "formalism" of mass organization between 1940 and 1941 is blamed today on restraints imposed by P'eng Te-huai,^[65] though the presence of the central army had as much to do with it. By 1942 in any event, the policy was reversed, and the quickened pace of social and political change was reflected in the class distribution of local officials in the T'aihang District. The Fifth Special District in She, Lin, and Tz'uwu hsien had gone through a "reorganization" in 1942. Of the 821 officials in twenty-five villages (ts'un ) after that, only 6 were landlords. (See Table 8.) Of the 598 officials in the Third Special District in Wu-

[60] Ibid. , pp. 289, 297.

[61] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , p. 88.

[62] Yenan Way , p. 165.

[63] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-chü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , p. 88.

[64] Ibid .

[65] Growth of one revolutionary base , p. 94.

hsiang, Yüshe, and Hsiangyüan hsien , only 39 were landlords. Most of the rich peasants in both cases could very well have been the so-called "new rich" (hsin-kui ) rather than former rich peasants. The landlord officials were obviously "enlightened gentry" who met the conditions set by the CCP. The former officials, who had stayed in office under watchful eyes of the CCP and mass organizations, were reduced in their economic status and finally swept out of office in the election of 1942.

Bourgeois Democracy or New Democracy?

The political change that took place in the election of 1941 in north China was a ratification of sub-political changes that had been under way since 1937. Revolution in China's countryside was predicated on redistribution of land. Under the New Democratic regime, the CCP continued to adhere to the basic policy of liquidating the landlords as a class and giving land to the peasants. However, the specific determinants of the New Democratic regime were the drastic decline in the economy of the Communist bases and an excess in class struggle. As Japanese pacification was intensified in 1941 and 1942, increase in production became the overriding goal of the Party. It is not an exaggeration to say that the political economy of New Democracy was based on an uneasy balancing of the CCP's ideological goal and its economic needs. This can be inferred from the Decision Concerning the Land Policy of the Anti-Japanese Bases , passed in January 1942, the first major document issued by the Party Center on the land question which is available. "We must recognize," it stated, "that the

peasants (including hired peasants) are the basic strength of the resistance and production."^[66] It is significant that "production" was substituted for "democracy." The Party's goal was to reduce but not to eliminate "feudal exploitation." Therefore, civil and political rights of the landlords and rich peasants, e.g., property rights, were to be protected.^[67] The decision also affirmed that the "bourgeoisie . . . is a relatively progressive social element and political force in China today."^[68] It resolved to promote "bourgeois production method" because it was an "indispensable minimum" for the resistance.^[69]

To achieve the twin goals, ideological and economic, the CCP devised a syndrome of measures having three major components which were mutually interdependent. The first two were reduction in rent and interest and the unified progressive tax system. These were a continuation of the policy in force since the beginning of the war. But excessive "democracy" was curbed, and for the first time, poor and middle peasants began to share a substantial portion of the financial burden of the bases. The third component consisted of measures such as the new tax system which sought to attract the landlord class from its rentier occupation into private industry and commerce. Altogether, they amounted to rigging together a structure of profit incentive which favored capitalist enterprises and penalized landlording. This was an ingenious policy. It made the liquidation of the landlord class compatible with regulated capitalism and economic prosperity. These three measures will be reviewed here.

Execution of these measures presupposed relative security from Japanese and Kuomintang interference as well as consolidation of the previous stage of land revolution. There was noticeable "unevenness" between different bases. Northwestern Shansi, Shantung, and north Kiangsu were very much behind. There were only two bases which carried out the most sophisticated form of unified progressive taxation: those parts of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi and the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü Border Regions which were in the T'aihang range. For a while an attempt was made to set up the sophisticated tax system in central Hopei, but as Japanese pacification was stepped up, the tax system reverted to the cruder rational burden.^[70] Eventually, tax payment stopped altogether.

A comparison of tax regulations adopted in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi and

[66] Chung-Kung chung-yang kuan-yü t'u-ti cheng-ts'e ti chüeh-ting [The CCP Central Committee's decision concerning the land policy], Kung-fei t'u-ti cheng-ts'e chung-yao wen-chien hui-pien [Collection of important documents on land policy of the Communist bandits] (Chung-lien ch'u-pan-she) (BI), p. 106.

[67] Ibid .

[68] Ibid. , pp. 106–107.

[69] Ibid. , p. 107.

[70] "Kahokusho^[*] ichi noson^[*]  . . . ," p. 40.

Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü bases shows that Nieh Jung-chen was decidedly more egalitarian than P'eng Te-huai. The Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü regulation adopted direct personal income tax. It stated, "Various properties (including landed property) are without exception exempt from tax."^[71] In contrast, in Chin-Ch'a-Chi, both property and income were liable to tax.^[72] In addition, in Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü tax rate was only nominally progressive. Progression in tax rate stopped at 100 shih tou (the shih tou equals eight kilograms) of taxable income.^[73] In Chin-Ch'a-Chi it went up to 810 shih tou .^[74]

Taxable property in Chin-Ch'a-Chi excluded investments in industry and trade, shares in cooperative societies, investments in irrigation bonds, stored grain, jewelry, loans, cash deposits in banks, stores or cooperatives, animals, investments in subsidiary home industries, etc.^[75] Thus the pressure on the landlords to get out of landlording and to invest their assets in industry and commerce was more intense in Chin-Ch'a-Chi.

Again, as in the case of rational burden, all taxpayers were put into different classes with respect to their taxable income (i.e., after personal or other exemptions were deducted). Then progressive tax rates were assigned to each class. Since the overriding purpose of taxation after 1941 was to maximize revenue for fiscal stability, it became necessary to spread the tax burden among 80 percent of the population of the bases.^[76] To do this equitably, it was necessary to carry out very thorough assessment of the tax base, usually yield per a unit of land. Under-reporting of cultivated land was punished severely. Ability of a Communist government to eliminate the "black field" was impressive. In one village near Wujench'iao in central Hopei, Japanese researchers discovered that 1,393 mou were registered by the Communist government while only 810 mou by the puppet government.^[77]

According to Michael Lindsay, actual rate of taxation in the Peiyüeh District in Chin-Ch'a-Chi for 1944 was: 52 percent of income for the landlords; 18 percent for rich peasants; 10 percent for middle peasants; and 4 to 5 percent for poor peasants.^[78] Tax burden also fluctuated over time. In Chin-Ch'a-Chi the worth of a "point" (fen ) used for reckon-

[71] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Land policy , p. 211.

[72] Michael Lindsay, "The Taxation System of the Shansi–Chahar–Hopei Border Region, 1938–1945," The China Quarterly , April–June, 1970, pp. 5–6.

[73] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Land policy , p. 234.

[74] Lindsay, p. 7.

[75] Ibid. , p. 5.

[76] P'eng Te-huai, Kuan-yü hua-pei ken-chü-ti kung-tso ti pao-kao , p. 372.

[77] "Kahokusho^[*] ichi noson^[*]  . . . ," p. 11. In this area, an under-reporting of more than ten mou was punished by confiscation.

[78] Lindsay, p. 9.

ing taxable income and property was: 1.5 shih tou in 1941; 1.25 shih tou in 1942; 0.9 shih tou in 1943; and 0.85 shih tou in 1944. Thus, tax was heaviest in 1941 and declined rapidly until 1944 when it was reduced by nearly one-half for everyone.^[79] The severity of tax burden in 1941 and 1942 was related directly to Japanese pacification. The CCP lost control of Hopei Province, a major source of revenue, and the regular army sought refuge in the T'aihang mountains. The T'aihang range itself was subjected to mopping-up campaigns involving destruction of crops and cattle.

Efficacy of the tax system to accomplish its design depended on enforcement of rent and interest reduction, as previously. In the older bases the 25 percent reduction of existing rent or "30–70 division of return" had been already enforced. After 1941, emphasis was placed on uniform enforcement of standard rent and elimination of local irregularities. This went hand in hand with enforcement of the initial 25 percent reduction or even more modest reductions in new areas. According to a regulation of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region,

A rent reduced in implementing the preceding article [25 percent reduction] or any rent contracted thereafter should not exceed 37.5 percent of the total yield of the chief produce of that cultivated land. If it is in excess, it must be reduced to 37.5 percent; if not, it can be left to [mutual] agreement. . . .^[80]

The rate of 37.5 percent was derived from an old Kuomintang land law of 1927, which had been seldom enforced.

A whole constellation of measures was adopted in all bases to favor the tenants and to squeeze landlording out of existence. If a landlord wanted to sell his land, the tenant was given the priority to buy it. If the tenant could not afford it, he had the right to remain on the land purchased by a new owner. This prevented a landlord from threatening to sell the land in order to get higher rent. A tenant was at liberty to improve the land, but his landlord was forbidden to demand increased rent as a consequence of increased output. But when a tenancy contract legally expired or dissolved, the tenant could demand compensation for the cost of improvement. If a landlord wanted to switch from a fixed rent to a variable rent, viz., a fixed proportion of output, the substance of rent was not allowed to increase. If a tenant was too poor to pay his rent, his landlord could be "persuaded" to waive a part or all of the rent. If an excessive rent was

[79] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Land policy , p. 180.

[80] Kung-fei t'u-ti cheng-ts'e chung-yao wen-hsien hui-pien , p. 112. This was passed in January, 1943.

paid, the excess had to be refunded by a landlord. But in a guerrilla district or in cases where the tenant was better off than the landlord, refund was not necessary.^[81]

Landlords tried desperately to keep from going under. They found loopholes in the existing regulations to defend their rights. These loopholes had to be closed. Some set up their tenants as dummy owners by transferring the land deed without relinquishing rent. Some deceived their tenants into paying for the property tax on land. A good many landlord families sent their sons to the Eighth Route Army in order to partake of the tax exemption privileges. Many preferred short term contracts in the hope that when a tenant proved to be too demanding he could be thrown out. That was forbidden. The definition of "use right" (shih-yung-ch'üan ) was very loose in some regulations. Under some circumstances, tenants were given perpetual lease. But then there were landlords who were taxed into bankruptcy. They had to get back the leased land for their own use. In such instances, border region governments provided "arbitration." If the landlord was still better off than the tenant, the tenant stayed. If a tenant was in hardship for reasons of sloth and laziness, a part or the whole of the leased land could be returned to the landlord for his own use.^[82] The purpose of all these measures appeared to be to see to it that everyone became roughly equal in landholding.

These regulations and directives issued in 1942 and 1943 indicated that the rural areas under Communist control were going through rapid social change which bordered on an upheaval. The whole process was just barely contained behind the facade of rent reduction and progressive tax. At the grass roots, the change depended on "political power" growing out of the "barrel of a gun." Commission of excesses seemed inevitable. In Liaohsien in the T'aihang District, poor peasants marched to the landlords' houses to eat their fill as a part of rent reduction. Such a practice would lose social sympathy, warned P'eng Te-huai.^[83] He regarded the fleecing of four landlords there, who together had owned 900 mou of land, until they had only 90 mou left, as excessive.^[84] On the other hand, he maintained,

in general the large landlord class is positively die-hard, anti-Communist, and anti-democratic; naturally they oppose rent and interest reduction. But the majority of them have been rulers in the past and have rich experiences. Usually they do not come out front to oppose [us] but adopt devious postures to fool the peasants and exploit the backward elements. . . . Take the big

[81] Ibid. , p. 128.

[82] Ibid. , pp. 113–133, passim .

[83] Kuan-yü hua-pei ken-chü-ti kung-tso ti pao-kao , p. 386.

[84] Ibid. , p. 378.

landlord in Mat'ien for an example. Many cadres and hsien magistrates were treated to dinner at his house. Accommodation was attentive indeed. Our cadres previously never spoke ill of him. . . . After the Northern Bureau conducted a thorough investigation, we learned that he was an important man in charge of the Kuomintang in that area.^[85]

As long as the big landlords were steadfast, the smaller landlords sided with them. "But when the peasants undertake an attack against the big landlords positively," said P'eng, "the middle and small landlords begin to waver without, however, falling apart." At this point, a demonstration by the Eighth Route Army and militia was suggested. The Party branch would mobilize public opinion in favor of rent reduction. While the landlords dispatched their "running dogs" to find out what was going on, rumors were floated: "Landlords violated the law, we should sue them"; "The Eighth Route Army has come, aren't they reducing [the rent] yet?"; "Peasants these days have swords and bags," etc.^[86] "But this work is difficult in the extreme," said P'eng Te-huai. "After the masses rise up, their power is limitless and they can strike down the oppressors. But if they are dissatisfied with their leaders, they can also strike down the leadership." He warned against "dumping cold water" on the masses which might cost the leadership its prestige or dissipate the mass enthusiasm; against doing everything for the masses by orders; and against the principle of "the more Left the better."^[87] He put the point differently again as follows:

Our tactics in struggling with the landlords are: one strike and one pull; to strike first and pull afterwards; to deliver a strike in the midst of pulling; and to pull while striking. Reduction in rent and interest is to weaken the feudal strength, this is strike. To guarantee landlords' civil rights, political rights, property rights, and to carry out the Three-thirds system . . . this is pull. When we mobilize the masses for struggle, we must pay attention to both sides. . . .^[88]

Reduction in interest called for a little more finesse in handling. Though no data for the pre-1941 period is available, it seems that indiscriminate reduction in interest rates created an acute shortage of private credit. After 1942, one can discern three goals pursued by the CCP with respect to the interest rate. First, it continued to eliminate exploitative, high interest consumption loans. Second, it tried to revive rural credit at more reasonable rates. Third, it tried to induce

[85] Ibid. , pp. 403–404.

[86] Ibid. , p. 404. The "bags" here seem to mean ones in which to carry the loot.

[87] Ibid. , p. 371.

[88] Ibid. , p. 385.

private capital into more productive investments by depressing interest rates in one area and removing restraints in the others. In principle, only those interest rates on loans contracted before the war were affected by government action, though how well the principle was observed in practice was another matter. The Central directive of January, 1942, stated:

As for post-war interest rates, let the people dispose of them on their own in accordance with social and economic relations of the locality. The government ought not to decide on an excessively low interest rate to cause stagnation in lending and borrowing or disadvantages to the people's livelihood.^[89]

When payment on a new loan was at default, the creditor was authorized to call in the collateral. But in cases where the payment of interest had already exceeded the principal, the interest was liquidated; where interest payment exceeded the principal by two times, the entire loan was liquidated.^[90] Since the campaign to reduce rent and interest went hand in hand, it would be safe to assume that there was just as much abuse in the latter as in the former. Still the government's intention was clear. Moreover, it offered credit at reasonable rates. That was sufficient to drive out higher interest rates. The Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, for instance, offered a credit of three million yuan in 1943.^[91] Controlled rates on old loans varied from place to place. The Party's January, 1942 directive suggested 15 percent per annum.^[92] In Chin-Ch'a-Chi 10 percent was enforced.^[93] In the Fukien–Kiangsu–Kwantung area, it was 30 percent.^[94] In Shantung it remained 30 percent until 1946.^[95]

The squeeze on the landlords and rentiers forced many of them to become destitute very rapidly. A good many of them were presumably reduced to the status of an ordinary proprietor tilling his own soil. Yet others of them with enough acumen sold their property before they were taxed into bankruptcy and invested the assets in commerce and industry.^[96] The former–landlords–turned–capitalists played an important entrepreneurial role even in semi-socialist cooperatives.^[97] Not only did they have the capital, they also monopolized literacy and business competence. They were encouraged to invest in important industries which were entirely exempt from tax. In Chin-Ch'a-Chi these were

[89] Kung-fei t'u-ti cheng-ts'e chung-yao wen-hsien hui-pien , p. 111.

[90] Ibid. , p. 117.

[91] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Land policy , p. 180.

[92] Kung-fei t'u-ti cheng-ts'e chung-yao wen-hsien hui-pien , p. 111.

[93] Ibid. , p. 117.

[94] Ibid. , p. 263.

[95] Ibid. , p. 274.

[96] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Land policy , p. 186.

[97] Isabel and David Crook, Ten Mile Inn , pp. 50–51.

paper-making, mining, iron smelting and founding, manufacture of agricultural implements, oil pressing, manufacture of salt, alum and sulphur, leather and fur industry, hand spinning and weaving, dyeing, soap manufacture, match manufacture and pottery manufacture.^[98] These former–landlords–turned–capitalists continued to contribute to the economy of the Communist areas through the civil war and the post-war period of recovery. Then in 1953, their "historic role" was ended with the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns. They were again liquidated as a class.

The rapidity with which both the peasants and the landlords changed their statuses in areas of Communist control was surprising. One cannot help suspecting that the social relationship in the rural areas had already begun to alter fundamentally before the Communist forces entered the scene as a catalyst. Social change was usually reflected first in the increased rate of mortgaging of land, then in transfer of land ownership. The impact of the first three years of the war, when two-thirds of the peasants went virtually tax free, and the continued squeeze on landlords thereafter is clearly indicated in statistics offered by Communist sources.

Foup'ing hsien was in the Peiyüeh District in the northern T'aihang range. It belonged to the Third Military Sub-district commanded by Huang Yung-sheng, and its hsien seat was the only one which remained in Communist control in the 1941–1942 period. In the eight months between January and August of 1942, eight districts in Foup'ing hsien reported 1,008 mou of land being mortgaged. Of this land, 922 mou were mortgaged to tenant farmers who were cultivating the land. These tenants evidently had enough cash to loan to the landowners. They acquired the use and produce of the land; and if the mortgager could not repay the loan, the ownership passed to the tenants. At the same time an outright sale of 620 mou was reported, of which 492 mou were purchased by tenants using the land. In twenty-four villages in the Peiyüeh District 814.57 mou were mortgaged, of which 599.04 mou or 71.8 percent were mortgaged by landlords and rich peasants.^[90] These villages were rated as "consolidated." Table 9 shows total land sales in these twenty-four villages between 1937 and 1943. One sector of the rural population was buying more than it was selling, while the other sector was selling more than it was buying. The dividing line was between the middle peasants and the rich peasants.

Social mobility of peasants in these villages can be seen in the fluctu-

[98] Lindsay, p. 8.

[99] Kung-fei fan-tung wen-chien: Land policy , pp. 181–182.

ation in the size of the rich peasant households. In 1937, 8.45 percent of the total households was rated as rich peasant. By 1941, the size of this group declined to 1.78 percent. Then it expanded again to 7.88 percent by 1942.^[100] A good number of the rich peasants in 1942 were

[100] Ibid. , p. 184.

former middle or poor peasants who rose in status. i.e., the "new rich." Some former landlord families which had declined in status were also in the group. Effects of social mobility due to the land program of the CCP are always blunted in such a presentation because it includes downward mobility due to division of inheritance (fenchia ).

Effectiveness of the taxation and rent and interest reduction is documented dramatically in Table 10, showing "class relations" in the T'aihang District, taken from a post-war Communist source. In the winter of 1944 and early spring of 1945, the T'aihang District carried out "the most thorough campaign of rent and interest reduction" for a second or even a third time in many villages.^[101] Rapid increase in the number of middle peasants and a steady decline in the number of the poor peasants are clearly noticeable.

A much slower rate of social change can be seen from the data taken from Anle hsiang in Laianhsien, some eighty kilometers northwest of Nanking in the Huainan Su-Wan Border Region. This investigation was made in late 1943. Anle was made up of five villages with a total population of 2,001 in 434 households. Its pre-war population was 1,379 in 297 households. According to the investigator, actual social change was much greater than is indicated by the table, since there were many divisions of inheritance and new migrants from Shantung after the war began. Still the continued survival of the "big landlord" is striking. Actual income of the poor peasants might have been larger than indicated as they worked on the property of landlords. (see Table 11.)

In the areas of Shen-Kan-Ning which had completed land revolution before the coming of the united front, social change was most conspicuous. According to Lin Po-ch'ü's report of November, 1941,

In the ruins of the war, the people have not only restored the destroyed houses and fields, they are slowly beginning to prosper. Two-thirds of the peasants have draft animals . . . the peasants are better off year after year. This is shown mainly in the rapid increase of middle and rich peasants. Moreover middle peasants have become the most important elements in the villages.^[102]

In the four hsiang of Anting, the rich and middle peasants increased from 7 percent before the revolution to 61 percent. In the four hsiang of Anhsi, the middle peasants increased from ten to sixty-four house-

[101] Growth of one revolutionary base , pp. 126–127.

[102] Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi , p. 94.

holds. In the five hsiang in Yenan, the class composition of peasants in late 1941 was as follows:

Lin reported that the middle peasants and the poor peasants in 1941 were better off than the rich peasants and the middle peasants, respectively, of the past.^[103]

There was one enterprising poor peasant who made the most of the opportunity provided by the new economic regime to raise himself to the status of rich peasant. His name was Wu Man-yu. He was destined to become the topic of an internal debate in the CCP concerning the direction of New Democracy. Before the land revolution came to Yenan in 1935, he was a landless bachelor working on rented land. By January of 1939, he and three other peasants rated a special mention as examples of the success of land revolution in Yenan in Lin Po-ch'ü's report. At that time, Wu Man-yu's family of five hired two agricultural laborers, and cultivated 20 shang (1 shang = 3 mou in northwest China) of land. By 1941, he owned three cows and one horse. He was well off by any standard in China.^[104] The Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region government seems never to have left him alone. He and his farm were closely watched and no doubt visited by a horde of observers from other areas. By 1942, he had five cows, two horses, one donkey, and 200 sheep. He was overseeing one long-term contract laborer, one sheep herder, and a half-time cattle tender. His land had increased to 77 shang . By 1944, he opened up some new fields. Of 149 shang of land he owned, he rented out 30 shang .^[105] He was an NEP man of China.

In January, 1943, the Liberation Daily in Yenan heralded the launching of the so-called "Wu Man-yu Campaign" with an editorial.^[106] The editorial designated Wu Man-yu and several other successful peasants as "labor heroes" to be emulated in the large-scale production campaign which had been under way since 1942. Almost immediately a certain "comrade Chao Ch'ang-yüan" queried the editor of the Liberation Daily to clarify his stand. Chao maintained that

[103] Ibid. , pp. 94–95.

[104] Ibid. , pp. 22–23.

[105] Tsu-chih ch'i-lai [Let us get organized] (The CCP, Northern Shansi Subbureau, 1944), pp. 49–52.

[106] Chieh-fang jih-pao , January 11, 1943, p. 1.

Wu Man-yu was made a labor hero simply on the basis of his subjective attitude toward labor. But, Chao asked, could his objective economic condition as a rich peasant be ignored? Furthermore, "if the direction of peasants is determined by his economic nature, can we or can we not take the direction of rich peasants as the direction for the entire peasantry in the border region this year?"^[107] The editor defended himself in an internal publication:

Unmistakably Wu Man-yu is at present a rich peasant. Wu Man-yu's recent economy is built on the foundation of his own labor and hired labor. The hired portion of labor derives from an exploitative relation. There is no question that the Wu Man-yu-style economic development is of capitalist nature, and what is strange or dreadful about that?^[108]

The editor denied categorically that the support for "Wu Man-yu-style rich peasant policy" undermined the standing commitment of the CCP to the cause of hired peasants.

In the past not a few comrades have misundertsood the Party's proposal to oppose capitalist thought inside the Party. They took this . . . to mean that there is no need to develop capitalism in the society. This is completely mistaken. Our so-called opposition to capitalist thought only refers to intra-Party [affairs]. And it refers only to the political aspect. Development of capitalist thought outside of the Party is natural and desirable. . . .^[109]

The editor rested his case for defense of "capitalism" in the border region on Mao's essay "On New Democracy" and the Party's directive of January, 1942 (concerning land policy).^[110]

In November, a rally for labor heroes of Shen-Kan-Ning was held in Yenan. Mao Tse-tung personally launched a large campaign to promote mutual aid teams and other semi-socialist forms of cooperation. "To organize the forces of the masses is one policy," he declared. "Is there a contrary policy?," he asked, and answered himself affirmatively. He openly criticized the base areas of north and central China for not paying enough heed to the matter.^[111] Wu Man-yu was given a definitely semi-socialist significance. Mao had triumphed over Wang Ming by May, 1941, and the Rectification Campaign had been initiated to tighten up discipline in the Party, army, and government. While the society and economy of the Communist bases were not im-

[107] Ken-chü-ti chien-she yü ch'ün-chung kung-tso , p. 65.

[108] Ibid. , p. 66.

[109] Ibid. , p. 67.

[110] Ibid. In early 1943, the Party Center issued a directive concerning "Wu Man-yu's direction" though I have no access to it. Fuhsiao , June, 1943, p. 41.

[111] Selected Works , III, 155.

mediately affected by Mao's internal victory, there was no doubt in which direction the CCP was committed to proceed.^[112]

This direction is apparent quite independent of our hindsight. The origins of the concept of New Democracy and the New Democratic regime were separate and distinct. The former was Mao's declaration of war on the Republic of China. The substance of the latter was dictated by the contemporary tactical needs of the Communist bases. Those needs were: (1) to moderate the political impact of social change on Chungking and foreign observers; (2) to avert the danger of the Party's isolation from the intermediate groups such as the "enlightened gentry"; (3) to restore production and revive commerce; and (4) to hold the bases against harsh Japanese pacification.

New Democracy and the Chinese Revolution

I have so far held in abeyance the question, Did Mao take a more radical stand on the social and economic aspects of the New Democratic regime which paralleled his stand on larger political issues? No definite answer can be given. I can merely offer an interpretation which seems more plausible and place it in the context of the strategic dispute.

I have shown fragmentary evidence which suggests that the moderation of the New Democratic regime originated with Mao's opponents but was embraced by Mao. This seems to have been the case with the Three-thirds system, for instance. Even after acceding to the idea, he turned it into an instrument for a rather revolutionary election campaign. There are other hints. In the original version of the essay "On New Democracy," he approved "confiscation" of the "big landlords."^[113] In revising it for later publication, Mao would have us believe that it was his intention to "confiscate the land of the landlords" in general.^[114]

One of the reasons why New Democracy as a concept has been held to be moderate is that it envisioned a two-stage revolution for China, the New Democratic stage followed by full socialism. It is true that

[112] See, for instance, the resolution passed by the Central Secretariat on January 31, 1945, and addressed to the United States, in Amerasia Papers , p. 1264. It stated in part, "On account of the fact that we inherit the orthodoxy of Marx and Engels to launch a class revolution . . . we oppose all forms of imperialism. The policy of cooperation with the United States on the part of the Party is a temporary measure to obtain national interest and to achieve victory over Japan. . . . "

[113] Mao Tse-tung-chi , VII, 167.

[114] Selected Works , II, 353. I take this to mean that he could be more articulate about his intentions in the post-war edition because of his greater independence.

Mao stated that the stage of New Democracy would last for a long time. But it is seldom realized that the two-stage theory was radical precisely because it envisioned full socialism at the end of New Democracy. On this line of interpretation, Mao's postulation of a two-stage revolution could very well have been a critique of those who sought to postpone full socialism for a considerable period of time on the ground that China and the Communist party were not ready for it. A one-stage revolution would have been a gradual change which dispensed with an October Revolution.

Three out of the fifteen sections which made up the lengthy essay were devoted to the refutation of those who advocated one-stage revolution of one sort or another. Two were refutations of "bourgeois dictatorship" and "the die-hards."^[115] A third was "Refutation of 'Left' Phrase-Mongering." Mao gives us to understand here that his two-stage theory was intended to restrain the radicals who wanted to move straightway into socialism. Actually the section consisted of an attack on the right such as Carsun Chang.^[116] All of Mao's enemies were, therefore, to the right of him and criticized his two-stage theory. Writing in August, 1940, Chang Wen-t'ien supports our interpretation:

There are still not a few comrades in our Party who cling to these old formulas. They hold that the victory of the Chinese democratic revolution must necessarily pass through two stages, i.e., the stage of national united front and the stage of land revolution. Therefore they hold that the national united front stage of today must sooner or later turn into the land revolution stage. In fact, this necessity is very problematical. On the contrary, the new circumstances and new practices have demonstrated that the Chinese democratic revolution does not by any means have to pass through these two stages to triumph. The peasant and land questions do not necessarily have to be solved in the stage of land revolution; rather the solution should be sought in gradual reform methods which carry out the revolution through the stage of the national united front.^[117]

According to this Internationalist, the radicals were precisely those who advocated a two-stage theory. I suggest that he was referring to Mao.

The term radical is misleading because it conveys the sense of fool-hardy. It is clear that, Mao's ideological banner notwithstanding, he was quite prepared to make tactical concessions from time to time. The dispute between Mao and his opponents in this context was not over the advisability of appeasing the "enlightened gentry" or the "regional power groups." The issue was, I infer, over the more distant

[115] Ibid. , pp. 354–358, 360–363.

[116] Ibid. , pp. 358–360.

[117] "K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i chan-hsien-chung ti tso-ch'ing wei-hsien," p. 453.

question of the direction of the revolution. Current tactical decisions had to be mediated by that question. Mao criticized P'eng Te-huai precisely on this point in 1943. P'eng Te-huai maintained that democracy and the Three-thirds system were to have permanent character.^[118] Mao rebuked P'eng's "talk [which] proceeds from the definition of democracy, liberty, equality, and fraternity, rather than from the political needs of the current anti-Japanese struggle ."^[119]

I must note that P'eng Te-huai was not alone in opposing the idea of a headlong leap into socialism. In fact, all of Mao's opponents since the Tsunyi Conference counseled slower speed for the revolution and were purged as "right opportunists." The list includes Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-t'ao, P'eng Te-huai (in 1959), and Liu Shao-ch'i. I have shown, however, that in the case of Wang Ming the so-called "right opportunist error" was a manifestation of his desire to restore the revolution to the cities. Hence, prior to the Seventh Comintern Congress which promised a return to the cities via a united front, he sought to return to the cities by direct assault on them. In this sense both the "second 'Left' line" of Li Li-san and the "third 'Left' line" of Wang Ming can be classed together with all of the "right opportunist errors" of the post-Tsunyi period. In other words, the underlying dimension common to all of Mao's opponents from Li Li-san to Liu Shao-ch'i is a desire to accommodate the cities in the Chinese revolution.

To do so after the defeat in Kiangsi meant to moderate, rather than to push to the extreme, the force generated by the frustration of the peasantry. In one way or another, the revolution would have been more congenial to the progressive but basically non-violent proclivities of the middle class. Mao's opponents were not alone in their inclination to accommodate the peasant's welfare with the orientation of the bourgeoisie. Just as there were "class capitulationists," "revisionists," and "running dogs of the Kuomintang" in the CCP, so there were pro-Soviet, pro-united front, and pro-peasant elements in the Kuomintang. One might say that the peculiar political circumstances of the war against Japan fulfilled their yearning to be reunited with one another.

Why then was it that the voice of those who were in the middle failed to prevail? For answer we need only note the sheer political absurdity of the platform of the Internationalists during the second

[118] "Lun min-chu chiao-yü" [On democratic education], Cheng-fu kung-tso t'ung-hsün , August 1, 1943, pp. 3–7; "Min-chu cheng-chih yü san-san cheng-ch'üan tsu-chih hsing-shih" [Democratic politics and organizational mode of three-thirds political power], Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü shih-cheng kang-ling (no date, no publisher listed) (BI), pp. 6–15; The Case of Peng Teh-huai , p. 193.

[119] Mao Tse-tung-chi , IX, 13. Emphasis added.

united front. Cooperation with the Kuomintang in an "independent, free, and happy China" after the victory over Japan was utterly unthinkable. The Communists had to push peasant insurrection as far as it would take them. After 1927, there could never be a repetition of the Wuhan government. There could only be a total victory for one side and a total defeat for the other. Preparations for the coming civil war took the highest priority in Yenan no less than in Chungking. New Democracy was no exception. In retrospect, the die was cast in 1927 when the town–country division came to be overlaid with an ideological division.