2
Ottoman Policy and Power Relations in Mount Lebanon, 1861–1892

As early as 1850, when revising regulations governing the dual-districts regime, the Ottoman government publicly declared its policy objectives in Mount Lebanon:

As yet another sign of His Majesty's unceasing noble aspirations devoted to the gradual improvement of governmental administration, and of his judicious wishes to attend to the fulfillment of the happiness and well-being of the subjects of the Sublime State from all classes, he has bestowed a special administrative status upon the people of Mount Lebanon so that by means of its proper implementation their security and prosperity can be augmented, and so that the disputes among them can be resolved equitably, with due respect to the traditions of each community, to protect every single person from being oppressed and wronged.^[1]

In a similar vein, a preface to the 1861 Règlement announced, on behalf of Sultan Abdulmecid, the reasons behind the new regulations:

It is well known to all how I have deeply grieved over the recurrence of troubles in Mount Lebanon. Foremost among my august wishes and concerns is the security and prosperity of my subjects from all classes and parts of my Sublime State's well-guarded provinces. I therefore deem it extremely important that, with God's permission, the consequences of the reported troubles be eliminated in Mount Lebanon and its people be provided with public security and order. Since the realization of these [objectives] is considered to entail the amendment and modification of the current regulations [concerning Mount Lebanon], a new set of regulations has therefore been enacted.^[2]

These documents represent an effort to garb enactments resulting from international negotiations and treaties in language comprehensible to the Ottoman world and in keeping with Ottoman notions of legitimacy. Accordingly, enactments emerge as benign acts of the sovereign but also profess a personal relationship between him and his subjects. As the sole source of authority but responsible before God for the well-being of his subjects, the sultan was pictured as acting toward them with feelings of fatherly compassion. The same perception of government as a chain of patriarchal and personal relationships is expressed in the imperial decrees announcing the appointment of a new governor of Mount Lebanon.^[3]

Concepts recurring in these decrees can be summarized as follows: God Almighty entrusted the sultan with the task of providing the conditions necessary for every single subject of the state to live in freedom from fear and in public security so that they could enjoy the fruits of their labor and attain prosperity. Realization of this benevolent purpose was the righteous sultan's foremost concern. Consequently, he paid the utmost attention to keeping Mount Lebanon in peace and order. This particular governor was chosen because the dexterity and discernment with which he fulfilled his previous jobs had demonstrated his capacity to serve the sultan's purposes. Within the bounds of the laws and regulations, the governor should use his experience and intelligence to improve the conditions that would contribute to the peace and prosperity of the people of Mount Lebanon, and thus elicit their blessings for the sultan. If the governor tried diligently to fulfill the task entrusted to him and obtained enduring results, other honorable duties and favors would surely be bestowed upon him.^[4]

These announcements were usually read in Mount Lebanon in pompous ceremonies meant to pull the local population and leadership into the orbit of Ottoman political culture and influence.^[5] As such, their documentary value lies more in the notion of government they evoke than in the information they impart about actual Ottoman policy objectives. This patriarchal concept of government, emphasizing peace and order as a fundamental requisite of legitimacy and respectability, was familiar to the people of the area and even deeply rooted in its urban centers.^[6] The people of the Mountain had remained relatively marginal to this political culture, but not outsiders to it. They understood the message conveyed in the public announcements emanating from Istanbul: an invitation to the Lebanese to join more actively in the surrounding Ottoman world and a pledge on behalf of the central government to make such efforts rewarding for them.^[7]

How serious and consistent were the Ottomans in their pledge? What other considerations besides the prevailing concepts of governmental le-

gitimacy and respectability affected their policy concerning Mount Lebanon? These are the questions I will deal with in this and the following chapter, with due attention to changing local, regional (or Empire-wide), and international conditions, and the power configurations and constraints that influenced Ottoman policy objectives and their implementation over the fifty-odd-year history of the mutasarrifiyya . A voluminous correspondence, including secret communications, between the governors of the Mountain and the Sublime Porte and other offices in Istanbul, provides detailed answers to these questions. This material constitutes the basis of the following discussion on the Ottomans' Lebanese policy, supplemented by information from other sources that sheds light on the constraints and the changing conditions and attitudes the Ottomans encountered in handling their Lebanese problem.

The Formative Period, 1861–1873

One of Fuad Pasha's primary concerns during his special mission to Mount Lebanon after the events of 1860 was to impress upon local leaders that his efforts to heal the wounds of the civil war and make peace between belligerent parties stemmed not from the external pressure of foreign diplomats but from Ottoman concepts of justice and sovereignty.^[8] This was one of the reasons why Fuad personally presided over Davud Pasha's initiation into office as the first governor of the mutasarrifiyya . On this occasion, Grand Vizier Âli Pasha praised his close companion Fuad for having finally settled the matter "in accordance with the Sultanate's dignity and right of sovereignty," thanks to Fuad's "perseverance and sagacity."^[9]

During Davud's governorship (1861–1868), the central government earnestly backed his efforts to restore peace and establish a new order in Mount Lebanon. Indemnities were paid to victims of the civil war out of the central Treasury.^[10] Additional funds were allotted to Mount Lebanon to establish a regular law enforcement agency, called the gendarmerie, which was manned by the Lebanese according to the Règlement and organized along military lines to maintain security and order in the countryside.^[11] The Porte also made available to the Lebanese tax exemptions, special credit opportunities, and similar incentives to help repair the damage done to Mount Lebanon's economy by the civil war.^[12] Taxes levied on livestock and cereals in the western Biqa' valley, which remained within the jurisdiction of the Province of Damascus, were put under Davud's administration in order to alleviate food shortages in Mount Lebanon.^[13]

Not everyone appreciated Istanbul's efforts to restore life to normal. In the northernmost parts of the Mountain, a popular opposition began to form against Davud from the very outset of his governorship, in reaction

to his decision to collect taxes at the highest rates permitted by the Règlement and his attempts to centralize authority. Yusuf Karam, the leading notable of Ihdin, was the leader of this opposition.^[14]

Yusuf had endeared himself to the northerners by providing them with sober leadership during the disruptions of 1860. He had also won Fuad Pasha's respect for his moderation and capable administration as interim governor of the northern districts in 1860–61. In fact, Fuad had urged Davud to include Yusuf Karam in his government. Davud first offered Karam command of the security forces and then the directorship of Jazzin, but Karam rejected both offers and made common cause with the discontented in the north. Apparently he was under the impression that he might replace Davud if Davud failed in his mission and the French threw their weight in favor of a native governor. The Maronite Patriarchate seems to have fanned Karam's hopes with similar considerations, as well as in an attempt to preserve its hard-earned influence over the affairs of the Mountain against an externally established secular government. When the demonstrations in the north turned into shows of force in outright defiance of governmental authority, however, the representatives of the European powers in Beirut made it clear that they stood solidly behind Davud. Consequently Fuad Pasha, who was still in the area, persuaded Yusuf Karam to go to Istanbul with him in November 1861.

Yusuf Karam lived in other parts of the Empire on the government's payroll for the next three years. Evidently he continued to hope that he might still be appointed to the governorship of Mount Lebanon once Davud's tenure came to an end. When Davud's tenure was extended for five years in 1864, however, Yusuf Karam clandestinely returned to Ihdin. Although worried over Karam's intentions, the Porte advised caution to Davud:

Since his return [to Mount Lebanon] without even having solicited your exalted interference [on his behalf] makes him appear like a plain rebel intent on causing trouble for the government, it is entrusted to your sagacity that all the necessary precautions be taken to prevent him from disturbing the peace and order in the country and that he once again be banished from Mount Lebanon in a suitable way.^[15]

Davud tried to appease Yusuf Karam but failed, not least because of the Patriarchate's uncooperative attitude. As the returned exile began to gather armed bands around him, regular Ottoman troops from neighboring districts were deployed against his forces and also began to occupy strategic locations in the north. Even then, the Porte was concerned

to contain the threat as peacefully as possible. Instructions dispatched to Davud Pasha and to the commander of Ottoman troops put under Davud's order testify to this:

Settle the matter peacefully, if his obedience can be secured by means of negotiations and assurances. If not, the use of compulsion against him will become incumbent upon the government, in accordance with the regulations concerning Mount Lebanon. In case recourse to force becomes inevitable, however, this should be done without arousing internal or external complaints, and without exposing either the government or the imperial army to insinuations. Under all circumstances, it should be taken into consideration that local conditions and [governmental] interests require the avoidance of troublesome occurrences.^[16]

Indeed, the Ottoman troops avoided engaging Karam's bands in battle as much as possible, and the few skirmishes that did occur were almost invariably initiated by the rebels. Contrary to his expectations, Karam failed to inspire a massive revolt even among the predominantly Maronite population of Batrun. The cautious but resolute advance of the Ottoman troops brought most of the strategic locations in the north, including Ihdin, under Davud Pasha's control within a month in March 1866. The Ottoman government declared an amnesty and made arrangements for Yusuf Karam's safe passage to Beirut to embark upon a French warship, which carried him into a second exile in Algiers, France, and Italy until his death in 1889. The Ottoman government paid him a handsome monthly allowance of 5,000 piasters until October 1877, when this was discontinued because of his polemical publications against the regime in Mount Lebanon.^[17]

In both phases of the challenge posed by Yusuf Karam, the Porte's primary concern was clearly to bring northern Mount Lebanon into the fold of the new administrative order without allowing events to develop into a diplomatic crisis. Fortunately for the Ottomans, a cooperative disposition, marked by the Concert of Europe, prevailed in diplomatic relations at this juncture.^[18] Having just committed themselves to the Règlement , the major European powers had no intention of hampering Ottoman efforts toward its implementation. The Porte, in turn, was ever careful to adhere to the letter as well as the spirit of the Règlement in its efforts to contain opposition. Under the circumstances, Yusuf Karam's obstinate defiance of the new order eventually exhausted his ability to negotiate the interests of his adherents and resulted in his isolation.

Davud Pasha capitalized on Yusuf Karam's failures, not only by extending governmental authority into the northern districts but also, in ways

irreconcilable with Ottoman notions of statesmanship, by cultivating his own image as a model leader for the people of a self-sufficient and self-governing Mount Lebanon. He began to lobby for inclusion of the entire Biqa' valley and Beirut within the boundaries of the mutasarrifiyya . He accepted (if not actually instigated) petitions from residents of adjacent districts in the Province of Damascus complaining about the local administration and pleading for annexation to Mount Lebanon, or a similar administrative order. He also insisted that his office be treated on a par with the highest-ranking governnorships in Ottoman protocol. Davud's conduct pitted him against Mehmed Rasid Pasha, a leading Tanzîmât statesman sent by the Porte in 1866 to the Province of Damascus, as a governor with extraordinary powers, to reform its administration.^[19]

Perhaps Davud needed pomp and circumstance to cultivate due respect for his office in a world where, by long tradition, influence was closely associated with the assumed or real dignity of feudalistic lords, patriarchs, and episcopals surrounded by entourages and acting as graceful princes—not to mention the European general consuls in the area, who hardly missed an opportunity to display the "grandeur" of their respective states. The Porte was willing to tolerate Davud's presumptions to a certain extent. He was politely reminded to act within the limits of his authority and with due awareness of the importance of harmonious relations among the Ottoman officials in the area. Davud's evasive response to this advice prompted a stern warning from the Porte:

The fundamental duty of the servants of the state, and the sole source of moral happiness for them, is the constant accordance of their conduct with imperial orders and their endeavor to eliminate all impediments in fulfilling the requirements of official duties in an agreeable way, always in conformity with the overall interests [of the government].^[20]

This time, Davud responded by acknowledging the need to cooperate with Mehmed Rasid Pasha toward the betterment of Ottoman administration in the area, and was in return praised by the Porte for his decision to act within the Ottoman bureaucratic hierarchy and follow procedures as a servant of the state should.^[21]

Their correspondence with Davud makes clear that the Ottomans considered Mount Lebanon still an Ottoman territory, notwithstanding its internationally guaranteed special status, and its governor an Ottoman bureaucrat, despite the involvement of outsiders in his selection and the special circumstances under which he had to function. Davud appears to have accepted this designation of his role early in his governnorship. Once

he became involved in Mount Lebanon, however, he evidently began to nourish different ambitions, tending to see himself as the head of a project for the creation of a politically, administratively, and economically model autonomous enclave within the Ottoman State. Accordingly, he felt himself responsible not to the Porte alone, but to all the guarantors of the project.^[22] His stance and pretensions invited the Porte's intervention, and Davud yielded to the pressure, but only briefly. Soon he resumed his insistence on the need to expand Mount Lebanon's boundaries to make it a more viable unit, and once more he came into conflict with Mehmed Rasid]Rasid] Pasha. In April 1868 Davud tendered his resignation, less in a desire to leave his post than in the hope of acquiring additional concessions from the Porte. Fuad Pasha, who was grand vizier at the time, considered this an opportunity to make short shrift of a potentially complicated problem; he accepted Davud's resignation and appointed Franko Nasri Kusa, originally from Aleppo, in his stead.^[23]

Fuad acquired the consent of all the related ambassadors in Istanbul concerning Franko's appointment, but he tried to avoid a joint protocol to that effect. He wanted to emphasize that the governor of Mount Lebanon was an Ottoman official responsible to the Porte, even though previous protocols suggested clearance of this appointment with the representatives of the European powers. In the end, Fuad was obliged to sign an international protocol announcing Franko's appointment.^[24] Nonetheless, the new governor got the message.

Throughout his tenure, Franko remained loyal to the general policy guidelines drawn up by the Porte. Unlike Davud, he shunned direct talks and intimate consultations with the representatives of European powers in Beirut. Instead, he maintained cordial relations with them and implied that, since he took his orders from the Porte, their policy-oriented requests to him should be communicated through their ambassadors and the Porte in Istanbul. He also established a friendly and smooth working relationship with the governor of Damascus. In return, both the grand vizier and the governor of Damascus provided Franko with moral and material support as best they could. Most important in this regard were the funds transferred from the Province of Damascus to cover Mount Lebanon's budgetary deficits and finance a number of its public works.^[25]

Smooth relations with Damascus and Istanbul suggest that Ottoman sovereignty had become quite visible in Mount Lebanon during Franko's governorship. One has to take into account, however, that France, the principal external contester of Ottoman rights in the area, was bogged down in European affairs and suffered serious internal problems during

this period. France's involvement in Italian affairs, its devastating defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1870, and the consequent internal confusion and change of regime kept its attention away from Mount Lebanon, allowing the Ottomans to have their own way.

Rüstem Pasha, 1873–1883

After consolidation of the new regime in France, however, its diplomats reappeared on the stage to make their influence felt, at a time when the Ottoman government had its hands full with a series of internal and external problems. During these troubled times, Rüstem Pasha was the governor of Mount Lebanon. He was a capable official and an experienced diplomat who had served as the Ottoman ambassador to Florence and St. Petersburg.^[26] When he was proposed as a successor to Franko, who died in 1873, the French ambassador to Istanbul considered blocking his appointment in view of Rüstem's reluctance to accommodate French interests in his previous posts. But, unable to propose a better alternative, the French ultimately consented to Rüstem's appointment. Nevertheless, they saw to the organization of Francophile demonstrations in Mount Lebanon soon after Rüstem's arrival, to impress upon him the extent of French influence among the Maronites and demonstrate that a smooth administration of the affairs of the Mountain necessitated catering to French and Maronite interests.^[27]

Rüstem ignored the demonstrations. From the beginning, he based his administration on his outspoken belief that the best interests of the people of Mount Lebanon lay in their willingness to work together in peace toward a prosperous life under the auspices of their legitimate sovereign, the sultan, and in accordance with the Règlement that the sultan had agreed to bestow upon them out of his deep concern for their well-being. In line with this outlook, Rüstem made a point of establishing cordial but equidistant and formal relations with all major groups and institutions wielding influence in the Mountain, including the Maronite Church and the French Consulate.^[28] At first this helped to foster the institutionalization and respectability of the local government,^[29] but the blow inflicted on Ottoman prestige by the central government's inability to cope with the internal and external problems which mushroomed in the mid-1870s put Rüstem in a difficult position.

Among those internal problems were natural disasters that destroyed much of the agricultural crops in Anatolia in 1872–74. Government efforts to relieve the consequent famine by grain purchases at enforced prices in the Balkan provinces aggravated the tension already prevailing there. Peasant unrest fed by increasingly popular nationalistic sentiments

led to all-out rebellions against Ottoman rule. Paralyzed by successive coups d'état, the government in Istanbul lost control of events. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Treasury was crushed under the burden of interest and the sinking fund payments on the huge debt incurred in previous years. Havoc erupted among European creditors, just as the Russian threats to interfere in defense of Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire intensified.

Foreign ministers of major European powers met in Istanbul to discuss the internal and external problems of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government found the resolutions of the conference too humiliating to be acceptable, but the 1877 Russo-Ottoman War that followed brought even farther-reaching consequences. Possible dismemberment of the Empire became a common topic in diplomatic circles. This was avoided partly due to disagreements among the major European powers and partly because of the bitterly realistic policy followed by the Ottoman government under the relatively stable leadership of the new sultan, Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), and a group of conservative pashas who made common cause with him to end the confusion prevailing at the helm of government. In the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and a series of related agreements, the Ottomans surrendered large tracts of territory to other states. They also agreed to pay an enormous sum as war indemnity to Russia and to put a significant portion of government revenue under the administration of an international agency specially formed to service payment of the Ottoman public debt.^[30]

These developments had serious repercussions in Mount Lebanon. Alarmed by the intensification of religious sentiments among the Muslim population in urban centers, as the Istanbul conference failed to produce acceptable solutions and war with Russia became imminent, some Christians living in the vicinity rushed to take refuge in Mount Lebanon. According to the Porte, the Russian and French consulates and the expansionist elements in Mount Lebanon instigated the panic. The Porte ordered Rüstem Pasha and his colleague in Damascus to approach the issue in a conciliatory way, taking all measures necessary to reassure the panic-stricken Christians.^[31] Acting in close cooperation, the two pashas managed to calm the Christians. No sooner had this problem been contained than friction and sporadic clashes erupted between the Druze and the Maronite people in the Mountain itself. Rüstem promptly called in the regular troops from Damascus and deployed them in the centers of tension. Simultaneously, he did everything he could to reconcile the conflicting parties. A major crisis was prevented, and the grand vizier conveyed to Rüstem the sultan's personal praises, adding:

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan wishes you to continue the precautions taken, pay utmost attention to preventing the occurrence of events or situations which may serve as a pretext for [foreign] intervention at these critical times, and continue to foster the motives and means necessary for elimination of the traces of hostility from the minds of the people, for the sake of the complete restoration of peace and order in Mount Lebanon.^[32]

Rüstem Pasha managed to keep Mount Lebanon reasonably quiet through the Russo-Ottoman War, but he could not avoid a growing rift in his relations first with the Maronite Church and then with the French Consulate in Beirut. When defeat in the war cast the future of the Ottoman State in doubt, Butrus Bustani, the Maronite bishop of Dair al-Qamar, considered the time opportune to settle scores with the governor, whose secularist administrative policy he evidently disliked. With the help of his colleague in Beirut, Bishop Yusuf Dibs, he launched a campaign based on accusations of misconduct against Rüstem. Rüstem responded by removing Bishop Bustani to Jerusalem in June 1878, on the grounds that his activities were endangering sectarian harmony in Shuf, the most sensitive mixed district in the Mountain. At this stage, both the French chargé d'affaires and the British consul in Beirut sided with the governor, not only to defend him against undeserved accusations but also because they agreed with him on the disruptive nature of Bishop Bustani's activities. The French ambassador to Istanbul thought likewise.^[33]

In Paris, however, different considerations prevailed. Although France was guaranteed a free hand in Tunisia in compensation for the Russian, British, and Austro-Hungarian gains in the Berlin Treaty, the Quai d'Orsay was growing increasingly suspicious of the possibility of being outmaneuvered by the British in Syria and Egypt, in case the further dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire became inevitable. Bent on being ready for all possible situations, the French government decided that it could not afford to alienate the Maronite Church, the surest client of France in the area. This decision marked a shift in French priorities from a commitment to the Règlement as a means toward a viable administration in Mount Lebanon to a commitment to work in close cooperation with the Maronite Church in defense of French interests. John Spagnolo, who discusses this shift of emphasis in French policy on the basis of French documents, shows that from about 1879 onward French diplomats in the area became increasingly uncooperative in their relations with Rüstem Pasha. This was manifest in even the most obvious cases of administrative expediency, such as resolution of the mutasarrifiyya 's budgetary problems.^[34]

The British occupation of Egypt in July 1882 clearly intensified the Quai d'Orsay's anxiety about strengthening its position and connections in Mount Lebanon. The French diplomats in the area and in Istanbul were instructed to block Rüstem's reappointment six months before the termination of his tenure in April 1883 and to work toward his replacement by someone amenable to French interests.^[35] Simultaneously, a flurry of petitions complaining about Rüstem's policies began to pour into the Porte as well as the embassies of the major powers in Istanbul from various parts of Mount Lebanon. The Porte asked the governor of Damascus, Ahmed Hamdi Pasha, a former grand vizier renowned for his probity, to inquire into the complaints aired in the petitions.

Ahmed Hamdi Pasha defended Rüstem in two consecutive reports. First, he discussed the petitions in detail.^[36] Rüstem was accused of deviation from the guidelines set in the Règlement on the judicial system, for levying extraordinary duties, arbitrary dismissal of judges and other officials, and interference in the judicial process. According to Ahmed Hamdi's inquiries and observations, the first two accusations were outlandish. Alterations in the judicial system were aimed at improving its efficiency and were inspired by the recent reorganization of Ottoman courts after the French model. Extraordinary duties had been collected to build bridges and roads for the exclusive benefit of the Lebanese.^[37] Hamdi Pasha admitted that there were instances when Rüstem had interfered with the process of justice or dismissed officials, but these situations invariably involved judges and officials who had abused their authority in defense of obvious criminals, because of sectarian sympathies.^[38] Complaints from petitioners from Shuf, however, about the tolerance shown by Rüstem to their district-governor Mustafa Arslan's vindictive acts against his opponents were not baseless. All in all, Hamdi Pasha held, the petitions reflected not the general opinion of the people of the Mountain, but the determination of a militant and predominantly Maronite minority to prevent Rüstem's reappointment as governor. The Maronite clergy had spearheaded the movement, and a group of people who aspired to governmental positions under a new governor helped the clergy collect, and sometimes forge, signatures for the petitions. But the go-ahead for the campaign had come from the French consul, Patrimonio.

In his second report, Hamdi discussed the motives behind the French move:

The French view the uninterrupted intensification of their influence in Mount Lebanon as a crucial investment toward acquiring the whole of Syria as a cardinal principle of their policy in the region. The fulfillment of this [objective] depends upon the intensification of

the power and influence of the Maronite clergy, who nourish desires for independence and feel strongly attached to the French. But Rüstem Pasha, driven by his determination to guard the rights of the Sublime Sultanate and taking advantage of the eclipse of the prestige of France in the wake of its defeat by Germany, made an effort to bring the bishops' interference in government affairs to an end. His policy undermined the Church's interests and influence and thus touched the very essence of French policy. His elimination and replacement by someone amenable to the French became extremely important for the successful pursuit of their policy.^[39]

According to Hamdi Pasha, this alliance between the Maronite Church and the French Consulate was the real source of the complaints against Rüstem. Otherwise, Rüstem's efforts to improve the conditions necessary for a peaceful, stable, and just order in Mount Lebanon, and his achievements in this regard, were widely acknowledged and appreciated by its inhabitants. Moreover, he was an ardent defender of Ottoman rights and interests, distinctly more so than his predecessors. Hamdi realized that although Rüstem was the ideal governor for Mount Lebanon, the determined opposition of France would preclude his reappointment. The French were looking for pretexts to become directly involved in the administration of Mount Lebanon as a prelude to the realization of their ambitions concerning Syria. In order to thwart their plans, it was essential that the Porte manage to appoint in Rüstem's place a governor who was experienced in diplomatic relations, capable of handling the affairs of the Mountain prudently, and not the least bit sympathetic toward French designs.

Rüstem Pasha himself argued that hostility to France was far from being a guiding principle of his policy in Mount Lebanon, but as an official of the Ottoman State he could not possible tolerate the French-backed efforts of the Maronite clergy to keep the rest of the Mountain's population under their oppressive sway.^[40] Abdulhamid II wanted to keep Rüstem in his position. When this proved impossible, he vetoed a number of candidates until the Foreign Ministry was finally able to come up with one acceptable to the European powers as well as the sultan. This candidate was Vasa Efendi, counselor of the governor of Edirne. He was made a pasha and in 1883 appointed Mount Lebanon's new governor for a term of ten years.^[41]

Vasa Pasha, 1883–1892

The personality of the new governor appeared irrelevant to Patrimonio, the French consul general in Beirut, in the wake of his successful campaign

against Rüstem. As Spagnolo puts it, Patrimonio "was confident of an upsurge of French influence in the Mountain. From now on, he predicted, 'no governor will be able to administer Lebanon without us.'" Under instructions from the Quai d'Orsay, Patrimonio at first befriended Vasa. Vasa was touched, but he did not feel obliged to fulfill Patrimonio's wishes about the replacement of certain officials appointed by Rüstem. Determined to teach Vasa a lesson, Patrimonio toured the Mountain pompously, in virtual defiance of Ottoman sovereignty.^[42] Vasa pretended to be unimpressed,^[43] but he was disturbed and turned to Ahmed Hamdi Pasha for advice.

Ahmed Hamdi briefed him on the complications of the situation in the Mountain, the rivalry between the leading Druze families, intra-Maronite conflicts that involved the clergy and landed notables, interdenominational conflicts that pitted the Druze against the Maronites and the Christian sects against one another, and the position of various powers as regards these fluid confrontations. Above all, Ahmed Hamdi warned Vasa against the "intrigues" of the French Consulate and the Maronite clergy. He believed that the Maronite clergy "never ceased contriving and executing whatever action was necessary to humble and oppress other denominations in order to bring the Mountain under their unrestrained control." In this, the French assisted them. Ahmed Hamdi was for a while concerned because Vasa had adopted a friendlier disposition toward the French consul than was customary. According to Ahmed Hamdi, Vasa's inexperience and the influence of "some mischievous Maronites who were displeased by his predecessor's policies" had misled Vasa. When the French consul showed his true face, Vasa realized his mistake, for he was, Ahmed Hamdi assured the Porte, "a true Ottoman loyal to the Sultanate, and capable of running the Mountain effectively with due experience."^[44]

Vasa, like most of the statesmen of his era, had a great respect for Ahmed Hamdi Pasha, and took his advice seriously.^[45] But at this stage he was not convinced by Ahmed Hamdi's suggestions that Rüstem's course of action could serve as a model for him. An incident in December 1884 obliged Vasa to define his own position. The London Times had published reports of some petitions sent to the French government expressing the desire of the "Maronite community" to come under French protection. The Porte took this news seriously, because it coincided with intelligence reports that indicated that the French were developing plans for a military invasion of Syria.^[46] Vasa and the Ottoman ambassador to Paris were asked to report on the issue. In a frame of mind similar to Ahmed Hamdi's, the ambassador interpreted the petitions as yet another sign of France's well-known ambitions concerning geographical Syria and of the importance of

its Maronite connection for the realization of these ambitions. He added that if Vasa adhered to his predecessor's course of action, the Porte would be in a better position to contain the harmful effects of French policy. The Porte passed the ambassador's letter to Vasa, along with a note calling attention to "the need for serious precautions."^[47]

Vasa wholeheartedly admitted the necessity for a vigilant policy against French threats, but felt this should be done with due attention to the complex circumstances that prevailed in Mount Lebanon. In this regard, Vasa took issue with suggestions that advocated a categorical response to the French, the Maronite clergy, and the Maronite community, as if there were an absolute correspondence among their interests. According to Vasa, Rüstem had committed this mistake and thus had pushed the Maronite clergy and along with them many Maronites closer to France. Under the circumstances, the French consul had found ample opportunity to perpetuate his government's policy objectives and to challenge Rüstem's authority. Rüstem had turned to other sects and foreign powers for support against the French and their local allies, thereby rekindling the numerous frictions already existing among people in officially and socially responsible positions in the Mountain. "Preoccupied in slandering one another and in cultivating the support of this or that consulate in order to retain their positions or to acquire one," these people had become altogether "oblivious to the destruction of the rights of the weak and the poor." This situation had weakened the people's confidence in the government. When at length the Porte yielded to French pressure to replace Rüstem, without even insisting on the simultaneous replacement of the French consul in Beirut, Ottoman prestige vis-à-vis France had declined even further.^[48]

Vasa in December 1884 was determined to avoid what he saw to be his predecessor's mistake. He was willing to make deals with the leaders of the Maronite community, religious or otherwise, and did not believe categorically that the Maronites were a cause lost to the Ottomans. He approached the petitions issue in this vein. He told the Porte that the petitions simply expressed an appreciation for Patrimonio's services to the Maronite community. Only the Maronite patriarch and a few of the bishops had signed them, and not on their own but on Patrimonio's initiative, upon the circulation of rumors about his appointment to another post. "Certain influential Maronites settled in Beirut," however, had deliberately misinformed the Times about the content and the purpose of the petitions. Vasa suspected that these people wanted to provoke the Ottoman government into taking repressive measures against the Maronite community in general, so that more Maronites could be lured into looking to France as a savior. This was a petty calculation best ignored. Vasa had

already persuaded the patriarch and the bishops involved to unequivocally denounce the distorted news, and they had done so despite Patrimonio's pressures. The matter should be left at that, for holding responsible an entire community, which constituted the majority of the population, could hardly help forestall foreign intervention in the affairs of the Mountain. Instead, the government should concentrate its efforts on making Ottoman rule more acceptable to the population without discrimination by improving the quality of life, administration, and justice for all.^[49]

In his various letters to the Porte, Vasa elaborated on his position: He aspired to a Mount Lebanon where all segments of the population had easy access to the courts and government offices, and retained faith in the competence of these institutions to handle their disputes and problems fairly. People would travel safely and busy themselves with their work with peace of mind concerning their lives, property, and rights. The government would provide schools, roads, and other opportunities to assist the population to reach a higher level of civilization. Wealth and comfort would accrue to all from undisturbed hard work. In appreciation of the advantages of peaceful coexistence under a benign sovereign and a just government, the people of the Mountain would abandon their primitive feuds and join their hearts and efforts together as children of the same land toward furthering their collective well-being. These were the goals Vasa was working for, and that all governors of Mount Lebanon should be working for, in order to fulfill His Majesty the Sultan's decrees and instructions. Achievements in these directions, Vasa believed, would reinforce the respect of Ottoman rule in Mount Lebanon and ultimately obliterate the tendency of certain groups to solicit foreign support in pursuance of selfish interests. Once the circumstances that nourished divisive foreign influences were eliminated, Mount Lebanon would naturally become a more integral part of the Ottoman State than it was now.^[50] In short, Vasa was convinced that with good administration, justice, and due material progress, the Lebanese could be won over to Ottomanism.^[51]

Vasa's ideals changed little during his tenure, but it did not take him long to realize the limits of his and Istanbul's powers in implementing them. Establishing a working relationship with the French consuls proved to be especially difficult. Despite his determination to avoid open confrontations by tactful diplomacy, he found himself caught up in increasingly tense conflicts, first with Patrimonio and then with his successor Petiteville, over issues that involved appointment of officials, election of councillors, budgetary problems, construction of roads, and even judicial cases—as will be shown below and in other chapters. At length, Vasa became convinced that the French wanted and deliberately worked for the

failure of the mutasarrifiyya regime in an effort to prove the incapacity of the Ottomans to rule the area.^[52] By the summer of 1887, his friction with the French Consulate had reached such intensity that the leading Ottoman statesmen in Istanbul felt the need to advise caution. Grand Vizier Kâmil and Foreign Minister Said pashas, who were busy patching up differences with the French government, asked Vasa to try to ameliorate his relations with the French consul. They also indicated that the French ambassador to Istanbul would use his good offices with the consul to the same effect.^[53]

Cevdet Pasha, the minister of justice who had always been supportive of Vasa, reminded his protégé of his own criticism of Rüstem and invited him to try to remain on equally good terms with all the foreign missions. In his long response, Vasa assured Cevdet Pasha that he had always done his best to maintain cordial relations with the French consuls, "showing composure, affability, patience, and even compliance as much as possible." He found this a practically impossible feat, however, for the consuls recognized no bounds in their involvement in the Mountain's administration and in the support they gave to certain Maronite bishops who aspired to control the Mountain "despotically" in order to augment the Church's wealth and influence. Under the circumstances, Vasa sighed, he had found himself obliged to adopt a course of action similar to his predecessor's. He was as ever ready to reach a reconciliation with the French consul as long as the latter clearly acknowledged Ottoman sovereignty and abstained from activities that endangered intersectarian peace in the Mountain. Otherwise, his duties and loyalties obliged him to confront the French and their local allies.^[54]

Eventual convergence of Vasa's attitude toward the French Consulate with Rüstem's is not surprising. Both men were faithful Ottoman statesmen who served at a juncture when the French government shifted the emphasis in its Near East policy onto the consolidation of its influence in Mount Lebanon as a necessary step to bringing Syria under French control. After the Berlin Treaty, however, the Ottoman government under Abdulhamid II's leadership viewed the Syrian provinces as a key to the success of its efforts to consolidate whatever was left of the state.^[55] Consequently, thwarting French designs on Syria became a fundamental objective of Ottoman foreign policy. A corollary was to deny the French opportunities that they could use as pretexts to enhance their influence and active involvement in the affairs of Mount Lebanon. This was the task expected of Rüstem and Vasa pashas. Both governors responded to the challenge with the same enthusiasm in defending Ottoman interests. Differences in their personalities and the circumstances prevailing during their governorships led them to adopt different strategies. Rüstem was an

experienced diplomat and a principled bureaucrat keen on keeping his distance from local elements, sometimes to the point of haughtiness. He served in Mount Lebanon under especially difficult conditions when the Ottoman State was undergoing a profound crisis. By Vasa's time, the crisis had been brought under control, but the growing Ottoman sensitivity to threats directed against Syria kept the tension between the governor and the French Consulate alive, at least until the late 1880s, when the French and Ottoman governments reached a temporary compromise of sorts. Vasa concentrated his attention on winning the support of local interest groups in order to thwart French ambitions. His expertise in provincial politics, preference for negotiations and deals, and flexibility as to the means used to achieve a justifiable or desired end marked his style of government.^[56]

Vasa's relations with the Maronite Church illustrate his style. Early in his governnorship, Vasa believed he could weaken the ties between the Church and the French Consulate by assuring the clergy that under his government there would be no room for prejudice against any group because of creed or vocation. Judging by his own words, Vasa was under the impression that the Maronite clergy's hostility to the government resulted from Rüstem's "irreverent and unjust treatment" of them. Otherwise Vasa hoped they would willingly cooperate with the governor to serve the well-being of Mount Lebanon.^[57] It was partly this belief that prompted Vasa to come to the defense of the Church in the petitions incident described above. It did not take him long, however, to abandon his hopes of an institutional rapprochement between the Church and the government so long as France remained averse to it. Instead, Vasa began to concentrate his attention on individual bishops in order to win their personal support by taking advantage of interclerical rivalries over power and influence within the Church and the Maronite community. In one of his letters to the Porte, Vasa openly confessed that "since it would be politically expedient to have the religious heads of the Maronite community at loggerheads, I paid due attention to this important matter and managed to bring about a degree of discord and mutual aversion among them."^[58]

Indeed, Vasa's reports indicate that he remained well informed about even the supposedly secret meetings of the Church Council. Other evidence, not to mention his own assertions, makes clear that in his capacity as the governor of Mount Lebanon he had become a factor to be dealt with in the internal affairs of the Church, including its relations with the Vatican and the elections of a new patriarch in 1890.^[59] Vasa's influence, however, should not be exagerated, and he did not think otherwise. All he

expected as a reward for his involvement in Church affairs was the rise of relatively less Francophile bishops within the Church hierarchy, and that they should pay somewhat closer attention to being on good terms with the government in Mount Lebanon and in Istanbul, as contrasted with those who served French interests all too readily. Otherwise, Vasa had come to believe that not much could be done to rupture the Church's dependence on France, for this dependence was based on vital interests. According to him, Maronite clergy were accustomed to worldly pleasures and to partaking in worldly affairs to an extent hardly pleasing to the Vatican, their spiritual superior. France protected them against papal investigations. France also offered protection to the clergy and even to their affiliates against governmental authority, as if they were French citizens and over and beyond the guarantees allowed them, along with other clergy, by the Ottoman laws and the Règlement . The French connection thus provided the Maronite clergy with political power that they used to perpetuate their worldly interests, according to Vasa. Furthermore, the French government assisted the Church financially on a regular basis, supposedly for charitable activities but in reality to keep them obedient. Should the bishops falter in fulfilling directives, the French consul was ever in a strong position to browbeat them into submission.^[60]

Under the circumstances, Vasa thought it would be wiser to concentrate on reducing the influence of the clergy on the Maronite community rather than that of France on the clergy. This became a key item in Vasa's political agenda. In many of his letters to the Porte, he rejoiced to report incidents that, in his judgment, indicated "the disgrace of the Maronite religious leaders even in the eyes of their own flock," and he frequently expressed his hopes to see to the further "erosion of clerical prestige and influence."^[61] Vasa believed the task he set for himself was difficult: the uneducated masses felt a naive attachment to their clergy. Furthermore, the Church was in a position to provide material benefits to individuals, thanks to the funds and agricultural resources under its control and to its French connection. The Maronite community was the single most important beneficiary of the French missionary schools, hospitals, and dispensaries. According to Vasa, piety hardly disguised the political motives guiding the activities of these institutions, which enjoyed financial and political backing from the French government. Nevertheless, Vasa believed, neither the French nor the clerical influence on the Maronite community was absolute. There were many Maronites who "appreciated the privileges granted them under the mutasarrifiyya regime and realized that under the sovereignty of another state they would be deprived of

them." There were also Maronites who found the Church's dominance over the community "oppressive" and were hence eager to side with the government.^[62]

Vasa associated himself with this group to help form an alternative leadership to the clergy within the Maronite community. Vasa called this team "the government party" and supported it as best he could against "the church party" "without causing [diplomatic] problems for the [central] government." The contest between the two groups became especially tense during the Administrative Council elections, as will be discussed in detail later. Vasa connived in the crafty tactics of the candidates he backed, just as he overlooked the corruption of the officials and the councillors who were his allies.^[63] He also fanned the tension between certain notables and the Church.^[64]

In fact, many of the projects that Vasa undertook became in one way or another related to his drive against clerical influence. He fervently pursued the judicial reforms initiated by his predecessor "in order to bring the clergy's involvement in judicial affairs to an end," among other reasons.^[65] Likewise, the "negative influence" on young minds of the schools and educational programs run by the missionaries and the Church was a major concern for Vasa. In order to counterbalance this situation, he urged the Porte to provide him with funds, teachers, and diplomatic support. He wanted to build additional public schools in Mount Lebanon, introduce the study of Ottoman-Turkish in a greater number of schools, give scholarships to talented students to encourage them to continue their higher education in Istanbul, and bring private schools under the government's surveillance.^[66] Given its financial predicament, the central government was able to provide Vasa with only token support in educational matters, and virtually none in yet another project important to him, namely, road construction.

Vasa saw in road construction a remedy to the general ignorance of the people of certain regions and their consequent dependence on the clerics:

Most of the people inhabiting the northern parts of the Mountain are Maronite. Unacquainted with the pleasures of prosperity and stuck in their congenital attitudes, they remain in a state of ignorance and are easily seducible by false rumors spread among them. This [situation] is impermissible. It has become an urgent matter to construct carriage roads in this region in order to facilitate travel and communications so that its people are brought into the orbit of civilization to a certain extent and thus some progress is made in freeing them from seductions.^[67]

But Vasa had to convince the Administrative Council to raise the funds necessary to finance such projects. That was not easy, because the Church and the French Consulate opposed any project that involved the collection of funds beyond the tax limits set in the Règlement . Vasa considered this opposition a subterfuge: The bishops were afraid that "they would no longer be able to treat their flock as nonentities and ride roughshod over them once the veil of ignorance was removed from their eyes" thanks to the prosperity that would come with the roads. Since the Maronite Church was the principal tool for the implementation of French policy objectives, the French were also opposed to projects that might undermine the Church's sway over the people, according to Vasa.^[68]

Spagnolo's research based on French documents corroborates Vasa's impressions. Although early in Vasa's governorship the French consul did support the construction of a road between Bait al-Din and Beirut through funds raised locally, he opposed the plan to build another one from Antilias to Jubail soon afterward because the latter project might get the Maronites in the north more closely involved in their Ottoman environment. As Spagnolo puts it, "changes so fundamental to the economy and society of the Mountain were to be discouraged until the French themselves could be in a position to sponsor them and to derive whatever benefits or propaganda accrued," according to the consul.^[69] Despite the opposition, Vasa was able to convince the Administrative Council to back the Antilias-Jubail carriage road and a few others as well, but only after a considerable effort involving various machinations to replace or win over a sufficient number of the unsupportive councillors. By the end of Vasa's governorship, a total of 149 kilometers of roads had been built in Mount Lebanon. This appears as a significant achievement when compared with the total of 108 kilometers built under his three predecessors over a period of two decades, the more so if one takes into consideration that by far the greatest portion of the earlier roads had been constructed by central government funds.^[70] But the machinations that made Vasa's achievement possible provided his opponents with ample ammunition to attack him.

In the summer and autumn of 1887, when Vasa's relations with the French Consulate and the Maronite Church had reached their nadir over disputes related to the councillor elections of that year, the powerful Druze chief Mustafa Arslan joined the campaign against Vasa. Mustafa was clearly more interested in the affairs of his native Shuf than in who controlled the Administrative Council and how. Nevertheless, he made common cause with the Church and the Consulate to complain to the Porte about the partisanship and graft involved in Vasa's governorship. Elridge,

the British consul-general in Beirut, also expressed concern over the greed of officials, although he apparently empathized with Vasa's efforts to win the support of the Administrative Council. Already weary of the rising political tension in the Mountain, the Porte invited Vasa to reconsider his tactics, and in November 1887 ordered his son-in-law and executive secretary Kupelyan Efendi out of Mount Lebanon, for he was widely believed to be the architect of the graft and political machinations that had become an obvious dimension of Vasa's governorship.^[71]

In defense of his position and of the senior officials of his government, Vasa pointed to the hypocrisy of his critics. To him, the bitterness of the French and their local supporters resulted from the obvious decline of their oppressive influence, which they had wielded in all kinds of mischievous ways.^[72] The British consul was disturbed for similar reasons. Contrary to his expectations as shaped by past experience, the mutasarrifiyya officials under Vasa did not solicit British support as a counterforce to French influence but instead concentrated their attention on making the government the sole refuge of the people of the Mountain.^[73] As for Mustafa Arslan, he was infatuated with his desire to get back the district governorship of Shuf from which Vasa had ousted him for abuse of authority. He now worked hand in glove with the French to forge an opposition against Shuf's current district governor Nasib Junblat, unabashedly fanning the inter-Druze family rivalries in the process. His intrigues "sapped the strength of the Druze community" and thereby threatened to upset the sectarian balance in the Mountain. Vasa expressed his surprise at the support and credit given to such a person in government circles in Beirut, Damascus, and Istanbul, and pleaded for discretion lest a serious rift in Druze ranks undermine the Ottoman position in Mount Lebanon.^[74]

The Porte made clear to Vasa that although neither his own integrity nor the gist of his policy were called into question, the complaints against his style of government were substantial enough to warrant adjustments. Vasa duly complied. He turned his attention to the grievances of the Druze, short of restoring Mustafa to his former position, and adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward the Maronite Church and the French Consulate. Complaints subsided, and Vasa and his supporters were able to run the Mountain with relatively few problems until about the time of Vasa's death in June 1892.^[75]

To be sure, an opposition movement, led by Mustafa Arslan on the one hand and the Maronite bishop of Beirut, Yusuf Dibs, on the other, continued to smolder. Thus Mustafa Arslan continued to encourage the Druze in Shuf to defy Nasib Junblat's authority.^[76] Likewise, Yusuf Dibs backed the rivals of Batrun's district governor in their efforts to instigate the peas-

ants of three villages to challenge court decisions in land dispute cases.^[77] While Mustafa Arslan lobbied against Vasa in official circles, Dibs' associates, such as Yusuf Shidyaq and Philip Khazin, published pseudonymous articles in Egyptian papers to discredit Vasa and his local supporters. Vasa was greatly disturbed over the unfavorable press coverage his government received. He complained that Mount Lebanon was "a place where the fabrication of false accusations and intrigue against others were favorite pastimes for an idle elite. Personal ambitions fan[ned] this tendency, and the calumnies that circulate[d were] taken for fact by a population of naive mountaineers and peasants."^[78]

In marked contrast to his initial tolerance of journalistic excesses, as witnessed by the petitions incident described above, Vasa took Khazin and Shidyaq to court for spreading false news. The former was acquitted and the latter sentenced to a year's imprisonment before being forgiven by a special decree of the sultan himself. Vasa wanted to take legal and administrative action against Mustafa Arslan and Yusuf Dibs as well, but the Porte discouraged him from doing so. Pledges of loyalty to the Ottoman State published in Beirut papers by the accused, the careful abstention of the opposition leaders from discrediting Ottoman sovereignty in their attacks against Vasa, and their efforts to establish good contacts with Ottoman authorities in Beirut and Istanbul influenced the Porte's attitude in all these cases.^[79] Clearly, Ottoman prestige was in the ascendant in the area at this time, and the Porte was eager to encourage the trend. In this sense, Vasa's claim that, during his tenure, foreign influence in Lebanese affairs was relegated to relative insignificance, just as local confidence in and respect for Ottoman authority was boosted, does not appear to be baseless.

Yet another significant development during Vasa's tenure was the intersectarian quality that political coalitions acquired. Vasa himself was backed by a cross-sectarian alliance of the Lebanese leadership who managed to keep the affairs of the Mountain under control and the opposition literally at bay in Beirut, at least from about early 1888 to 1891–92.^[80] It was probably the effectiveness of this alliance that forced the opposition to organize along similar lines and to acknowledge the need for a new approach to politics in Mount Lebanon. Yusuf Dibs' political strategy illustrates the point. Unlike other politically oriented Maronite bishops, Dibs concentrated his efforts on forming a secular and party-like network that incorporated people from all sects and above all the Druze. Dibs was also running a preparatory school open to all sects, whose staff provided a liberal intellectual leadership. In addition, he had a print shop and a newspaper under his control. Finally, he was cautious and respectful in his relations with Ottoman authorities, trying to cultivate their good will

without rupturing his French connection. He could walk this tight rope thanks to his alliance with Mustafa Arslan and the softening of the tensions between the Ottoman and French governments from about 1887 onward.^[81]

Vasa recognized the novel aspects of Yusuf Dibs' leadership, but he interpreted them as new tactics in pursuance of old objectives. To him, Dibs would be satisfied with nothing less than restoration of the Maronite Church's dominance, first over the Maronite community and then over the rest of the Mountain's population. Vasa held that Dibs used Mustafa Arslan in order to drive a wedge through the Druze and thus render them powerless as a counterforce to the Church. He flirted with Vasa's "naive" colleagues in Beirut in an effort to cover his schemes. Dibs, according to Vasa, actually intended to effect such changes in the governmental structure of the Mountain as to render it a tool of the Maronite Church. To this end, he was busy recruiting support for a petition campaign. The petitions in preparation demanded the limitation of the governor's term to a maximum of three years and made the extension of his term incumbent upon the general approval of the people. The petitions also called for the election of the judges by the people and their religious heads. Finally, the petitions asked for the election of the councillors by a larger electorate and for a shorter term (two instead of six years), along with the extension of the Council's authority, in order to oblige the governor to seek the Council's approval in all administrative matters, above all in the appointment of senior officials. Vasa saw nothing but religious bigotry behind these requests and warned the Porte that if they were put into effect Mount Lebanon would be thrown into turmoil, with grave consequences for all the people involved. Besides, the Porte should take into consideration the circumstances in which the petitions were being prepared. Yusuf Dibs, Mustafa Arslan, and their "accomplices" forged seals, spread calumnies, and resorted to pressure and deception just to fill the petitions with signatures.^[82]

Vasa was assessing Dibs' intentions and tactics in a visibly unpropitious mood. This was only partly related to such personal matters as Dibs' unconcealed determination to prevent Vasa's reappointment. Vasa's conviction about the unchangeability of the theocratic and Francophile disposition of the Maronite religious leadership also played a role in shaping his hostility toward Dibs. Furthermore, Vasa believed in the need for a powerful governor to keep Mount Lebanon in order—and within the orbit of Ottoman sovereignty. Yusuf Dibs, on the other hand, was for a more participatory system of government, whatever his true intentions and feelings of political allegiance might be. The Ottoman statesmen in Istanbul

and Beirut evidently had a more positive view of Dibs than did Vasa and felt confident in their ability to curb the former's aspirations without alienating him or his Church. In a sense, their attitude was closer to that of Vasa early in his governorship. Nine years of service in Mount Lebanon had changed Vasa. He had become deeply involved in, and a party to, the ongoing political struggles in the Mountain.

Vasa's own accounts make amply clear that both of his major opponents, Yusuf Dibs and Mustafa Arslan, deliberately chose to act within the existing political structure and in ways that tied Mount Lebanon to Ottoman Beirut, if not also to the Ottoman capital. Vasa failed to appreciate this aspect of their opposition, although it vindicated his own position. After all, his most consistent objective had been to illustrate to the Lebanese that the Ottoman Sultanate was the sole source of authority, justice, and peaceful coexistence for all in the area.^[83] Given his rich experience in provincial politics and general tendency to prefer reconciliation to open conflicts, Vasa might have found a way to work out his differences with the opposition. But his health was failing him. He was sick and spent long stretches of time in bed. He died in June 1892, before completing his full term.^[84]