Paideia and Prejudice

The notion of paideia , allied with the strict moral code that traditionally accompanied inherited wealth and leisure, distinguished the well-born few from the common man.^[156] The Graeco-Roman cultural ideal created a universal linguistic and moral code for the scions of late Roman elites from Spain to Syria, but few progressed beyond rudimentary paideia to

[154] See Epiphanius, Panarion 76.3.7.

[155] See Meyer, "Dialectic and Questioning," 281-89.

[156] On the relationship between wealth, leisure, and intellectual pursuits in antiquity, see J.-M. André, L'otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine, des origines à l'époque augustéenne (Paris, 1966).

attain greater mastery and professionalism in chosen fields.^[157] A formula tethering paideia to the mores of the landed aristocracy only served to reinforce social prejudices and boundaries at a time when a greater number of careers were in theory ouvertes aux talents .^[158]

For many, paideia served as a means of exhibiting status, not a way to acquire it. The elder Iamblichus expressed a conventional view when he explained that paideia did not aim to prepare an individual for a specific goal in life.^[159] To specialize prematurely in one field for the sake of professional advancement without first securing a firm grounding in all-round education or egkuklios paideia was likely to provoke scorn.

Prosopographical studies of the later empire have shown that, in the latter part of the fourth century, a solid core of middling elites, consisting mostly of curiales and local decurions, occupied the highest rungs of the ecclesiastical positions in eastern cities.^[160] These Christians brought to their vocation the traditional social values of the upper classes and required little by way of christianization to become immediately acceptable.^[161] It is thus not surprising that Christian writers should echo the known, established prejudices of the secular elites.

It was in people's descriptions of themselves and others that these underlying views were expressed. Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, compared himself to his rival Helladius of Caesarea (who was either a curialis or a principalis ):

Should certain people view us naked and judge between us two our suitability for the priestly office, what would one possess which is superior to what the other has? Birth ()? Upbringing ()?

[157] See I. Karayannopoulos, "St. Basil's Social Activity: Principles and Praxis," in Fedwick, ed., Basil of Caesarea , 1:375-91, at 381: "We must, therefore, draw a line between the classical paideia and education that the rich gave their children, and the study of rhetoric by those who learned it in order to become professional teachers." On the relationship of training to official positions, see F. S. Pedersen, "On Professional Qualifications for Public Posts in Late Antiquity," Classica et Mediaevalia 31 (1975): 161-213.

[158] See K. Hopkins, "Social Mobility in the Later Roman Empire: The Evidence of Ausonius," CQ n.s. 11 (1961): 239-49; idem, "Elite Mobility in the Roman Empire," in M. Finley, ed., Studies in Ancient Society (London, 1974), 103-120; Ramsay MacMullen, "Social Mobility and the Theodosian Code," JRS 54 (1964): 49-53; Kaster, Guardians of Language , 32-95.

[160] A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284-602 (Oxford, 1964), 2:925-29. See the conclusions of the prosopographic studies of fourth-century bishops: F. D. Gilliard, "The Social Origins of Bishops in the Fourth Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1966); T. A. Kopecek, "The Social Class of the Cappadocian Fathers," Church History 42 (1973): 453-66, esp. 460-61; and A. Rousselle, "Aspects sociaux du recrutement ecclésiastique au IV siècle," Méanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'École Française de Rome 89 (1977): 333-70.

[161] See Van Dam, "Emperors, Bishops, and Friends."

Free association with the mighty and the famous? Knowledge of theological matters ()? All the qualities are found among us in more or less equal measure.^[162]

This juxtaposition highlights the patches of common ground on which were based the alliances of late antique ecclesiastical and secular elites.^[163] Birth to a prominent family, a proper upbringing, friends and relations in high places, a modicum of learning, even gnosis: these were the qualities that entitled a man to the consideration of his peers and the devotion of the less fortunate.

The creation of this common culture, of course, entailed acts of social exclusion. Even among pagan philosophers, the language of social prejudice was frequently mobilized against a rival with devastating effect.^[164] As is well known, using ethos as both defense and offense was a venerable part of Greek rhetorical tradition dating at least to the time of the Attic orators.^[165] Classically trained Christians like Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus, both of whom had studied under the sophist Prohaeresius in Athens, were no strangers to this tradition of ethical invective.^[166]

Gregory was thoroughly familiar with the polished rhetorical styles of the Second Sophistic and knew well how to compose a psogos , a negative biographical characterization.^[167] In a famous example, he methodically defamed a fellow countryman, George of Cappadocia, the Arian bishop of Alexandria and erstwhile mentor of Aetius. George, later lynched by an angry pagan mob in Alexandria for his attacks on temples, was unkindly described by Gregory as having been born near the border of Cappadocia (a slight to proud Cappadocians), the result of a half-servile union (i.e., like a mule's mixed progenitors), and as having risen

[162] Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep . 249.32. See M.-M. Hauser-Meury, Prosopographie zu den Schriften Gregors von Nazianz , Theophaneia 13 (Bonn, 1960), 94-95, s.v. "Helladius I"; P. Devos, "S. Grégoire de Nazianze et Hellade de Césarée en Cappadoce," AB 79 (1961), 91-101; Kopecek, "Social Class of the Cappadocian Fathers," 453-66, esp. 455, 455n. 16. In general, see E. F. Bruck, Kirchenväter und soziales Erbrecht (Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg, 1956), esp. 3, 17-18. On Gregory's family, see J. Bernardi, "Nouvlles perspectives sur la famille de Grégoire de Nazianze," VChr 38 (1984): 352-59; P. Gallay, La vie de saint Grégoire de Nazianze (Lyons/Paris, 1943), 250-51.

[163] See R. Van Dam, "Emperors, Bishops, and Friends in Late Antique Cappadocia," JTS n.s. 37 (1986): 53-76.

[164] See the delightful essay by G. E. L. Owen, "Philosophical Invective," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983): 1-25.

[165] See W. Süss, Ethos (Leipzig, 1910), 247-54.

[166] Socrates, Hist. eccl . 4.26; Sozomen, Hist. eccl . 6.17.1.

[167] See R. R. Ruether, Gregory of Nazianzus: Rhetor and Philosopher (Oxford, 1969), 111. On the psogos, see Rhetores Graeci (C. Walz, ed., 9:402-3).

from menial labor without a liberal education.^[168] Though these slights should not be accepted at face value, it is important to remember that ancient rhetors, to assassinate character most convincingly, preferred accentuating existing defects to inventing nonexistent ones.^[169]

For people with reputations as arrivistes , avarice and ambition usually featured prominently in the catalogue of their vices. Gregory of Nazianzus related with relish a rumor that George embezzled funds destined for the relief of the poor in Alexandria and used them instead for bribery in high places.^[170]

Similar ad hominem attacks were made against Aetius and Eunomius. Gregory of Nyssa coldly observed that Aetius had once been a hired manual laborer engaged in a degrading menial trade (, ).^[171] The Syrian was further upbraided by Epiphanius of Salamis for not having had the benefit of a proper education in his youth.^[172] Characterization of someone as apaideutos had implications beyond the lack of formal education; it distinguished a successful barbarian general or nouveau riche merchant from the ranks of the established aristocracy. The charge thus suggested that Aetius lacked the moral formation that was normally nurtured through early association with a grammarian.^[173]

Gregory of Nyssa stated that Eunomius was known to have once been a pedagogue, a position customarily staffed by slaves.^[174] Interestingly, at times Eunomius seemed to accept his opponents' characterization of his lowly origins. Here we see the two sides engaged in a kind of ritual dance: as the Cappadocians resorted to a language of social condescension, Eunomius willingly became the social outsider, casting him-

[168] Gregory of Nazianzus, Or . 21.16; see Kopecek, History of Neo-Arianism , 1:138-45.

[169] Cicero, De oratore 2.43.182: "Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum, animosque eorum, apud quos agetur . . . conciliantur autem animi dignitate hominis, rebus gestis, existimatione vitae, quae facilius ornari possunt, si modo sunt, quam fingi si nulla sunt. " Emphasis mine.

[170] On the wealth and power of the Alexandrian patriarchs, and the use of such resources as bribes at the imperial court, see P. Batiffol, "Les presents de saint Cyrille à la cour de Constantinople," in Études de liturgie et d'archéologie chrétienne (Paris, 1919), 154-79.

[171] Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun . 1.38 (Jaeger, ed., 1:35). Gregory could not resist making Aetius a swindler as well; see Contra Eun . 1.40-41 (Jaeger, ed., 1:36).

[173] See Kaster, Guardians of Language , 11-14. Aetius' deficiency in breeding and comportment would become more exaggerated in later traditions; see R. Vaggione, "Some Neglected Fragments of Theodore of Mopsuestia's Contra Eunomium," JTS n.s. 31 (1980): 403-70, esp. 408-19.

[174] Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun . 1.49-50 (Jaeger, ed., 1:39).

self in the role of the humble champion of truth, whose opponents stood in error regardless of their worldly wealth and rank.^[175]

It is arguable that this social gulf separated the Cappadocians and Eunomius more effectively and irreconcilably than any amount of theological and philosophical disagreement. In such matters, style was of supreme importance. Gregory of Nyssa, referring to his Contra Eunomium , requested that his readers devote special attention to the parts in which he demolished the arguments employed by Eunomius in his Apologia Apologiae to justify the trial imagery used in his Liber apologeticus ; but here substance, while important, is somewhat eclipsed by the duel between the two over the issue of prose style.^[176] Eloquence of language, an attainment emblematic of one's paideia , became part of the contest because even the educated person with little interest in theological learning appreciated the cadences of well-balanced phrases.

Although more accomplished than that of Aetius, Eunomius' prose revealed to trained eyes many belabored rhetorical devices and the tortuous style of the much-maligned Second Sophistic, though he was dearly able to compose in good Attic Greek. Eunomius' rhetorical ploy was attributed by his enemies to an excessive desire to impress his audience. His baroque presentation betrayed an obsession with scoring points () and the inability to admit defeat or show proper deference.

Using the language of a wrestling match—deliberately adopted to answer Eunomius' earlier interpretation of his appointment to the bishopric of Cyzicus as an athlos , a prize for victory—Gregory of Nyssa called Eunomius a "bad sport" for not admitting defeat in argument. An explicit analogy between athletic contest and verbal argumentation can be traced to ancient works, including Aristotle's De sophisticis elenchis :

For just as unfairness in an athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair kind of fighting, so contentious reasoning is an unfair kind of fighting in argument; for in the former case those who are bent on victory at all costs stick at nothing, so too in the latter case do contentious arguers. Those, then, who behave like this merely to win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious and quarrelsome, while those who do so to win a reputation which will help them make money are regarded as sophistical. . . . Quarrelsome people and sophists use the same arguments, but not for the same reasons; and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious but not from the same point of view. If the semblance of victory is the motive, it is contentious; if the semblance of wisdom, it is sophistical: for sophistry is an appearance of wisdom without the reality.^[177]

[175] See Eunomius, Liber apologeticus 27 (Vaggione, Eunomius , 72-73).

[176] Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun . 1.11ff. (Jaeger, ed., 1.25ff.).

[177] Aristotle, De sophisticis elenchis 11.171b (Forster and Furley, eds., 62-63).

Viewed in this light, Eunomius and those like him were at once contentious and sophistic. To a well-born male in late antiquity, this kind of unsporting behavior was to be expected only of someone who was not a gentleman. A clever person who would violate the rules of a sport could not be relied on to uphold social peace and the greater good, but instead would most likely stir up trouble for the sake of self-aggrandizement. All in all, it was far better to affect simplicity and detachment than to become too clever and obsessed with victory.

Eunomius was, to be sure, sensitive to such criticisms. He maintained that he did not advance his self-consciously controversial theological views out of ambition () or a love of rivalry (). Using the rhetoric of outsiders, he pronounced that true judgment transcended social considerations, even the powerful claims of kinship, "which so often darken the soul's power of judgement."^[178] Yet his radical subordination of philia to personal philosophical judgment certainly undermined the very basis of the authority of ecclesiastical elites, who depended on philia to knit together their privileged social worlds.^[179]

What was outrageous about Aetius, Eunomius, and their sympathizers was not so much their theology as the manner in which they sought to propagate it. According to Sozomen, Aetius was deposed from the diaconate

because he wrote in a combative manner () to demonstrate a philosophical position () which diverged from the expressed ecclesiastical position, and because he constructed arguments in a dishonorable fashion (), and because he was the cause of the uproar and factionalism in the churches ().^[180]

Thus Aetius was accused of recklessly bringing about with his dialectical art what elites in the ancient world feared most, confusion and strife, tarache and stasis . This he did because he was not properly formed in paideia . The cultivation of paideia was a process of socialization that ideally enabled a person to know how to act responsibly in public.^[181]

[178] Eunomius, Liber apotogeticus 2 (Vaggione, Eunomius , 36-37).

[179] See Van Dam, "Emperors, Bishops and Friends," 53-76.

[180] Sozomen, Hist. eccl . 4.24 (Bidez, ed., 178).

[181] An admirable description of the mores of paideia is given by Faster in Guardians of Language , 60-61, where he interprets the meaning of verecundia in Macrobius' Saturnalia :

One of the cardinal virtues, verecundia can be translated as 'modesty'; more accurately (if more cumbersomely), it names the sense of propriety deriving from a regard for the opinion of other men and an awareness of one's own position (especially one's hierarchical position) relative to others in a given context. . . . Verecundia is the virtue of knowing one's place, the virtue par excellence of the status quo , an abundantly social virtue, regulating the behavior of men in groups.

These social virtues, the fruits of prescribed moral formation, were said to be lacking in the Anomoeans, who spoke with misplaced parrhesia .^[182] Gregory of Nyssa accused them of not knowing when to speak and when to remain silent.^[183] By contrast, the philosopher Chrysanthius, who belonged to the senatorial rank, knew, according to Eunapius, what to say and what to leave unspoken ().^[184] Synesius,^[185] a leading citizen and later bishop of Cyrene, claimed that only properly educated persons knew how to act responsibly in public by adhering to the middle course; "the uneducated fellow, on the other hand, normally fell prey to one of two extremes: either to stay silent altogether or to speak aloud on matters that one customarily kept silent on ()."^[186]