Appendix 9—
The Cleinias Decree

The Cleinias Decree,^[1] formerly dated in the twenties,^[2] is now conventionally set in the early forties (c. 447) primarily because a subsequently discovered fragment discloses that the name of the man who proposed this decree was Cleinias,^[3] so that the inference is made that he is one and the same as the famous Cleinias, the father of Alcibiades, who died at the battle of Coronea in 447/6.^[4] Yet the name Cleinias is not uncommon enough to be decisive by itself.^[5] Other indications of date prove ambiguous. The letter-forms could be earlier than the twenties, but parallels for some of the letters can be found in inscriptions dated to 414/13 and 411/10.^[6] The "tone" of the decree has been judged compatible with the new date, c. 447, though the argument is based in large part on analogy with the Coinage Decree, and the date of this decree is also most uncertain.^[7]

[1] IG i 34 = ML 46 = Fornara 98; cf. SEG 26.7, 34.1726.

[2] See ML, pp. 120–21.

[3] Hill and Merrit, Hesperia 13 (1944), 1–15; see ML, p. 120.

[4] Isoc. 16.28, Plato Alc. 1 (112c); see Davies, pp. 16–17.

[5] See H. Mattingly, Historia 10 (1961), 153; Alcibiades' brother and cousin were perhaps too young (Davies, pp. 17–18; Mattingly, id., 153).

[6] According to ML, p. 121, "The only objective argument is provided by the letter-forms. Raubitschek emphasized the angle at which the loop of the rho closes against the vertical, and the curved lines of the upsilon, as signs of an early date. Similar rhos may be found into and beyond the twenties, but, with very rare exceptions indeed, curved upsilons are not found after 430"; cf. R. Meiggs, "The Dating of Fifth-Century Attic Inscriptions," JHS 86 (1966), 97 n. 43. The exceptions are IG i 272 and 253, the Parthenon inventories of those years.

[7] See Meiggs, AE, pp. 165ff., 212ff.; cf. pp. 599–601; also pp. 98ff. above.

The decisive objection to the new and early date for the Cleinias Decree follows from its sequential connection with the decree Cleonymus passed in 426. The Cleonymus Decree^[8] saw to the appointment of "tribute collectors," nationals from the tribute-paying states, who were made accountable for the amount of tribute brought to Athens. A record was to be made of those cities falling short and the names of the tribute collectors involved. The procedure in the Cleinias Decree implies the use of such tribute collectors; more important, the precautions taken against malfeasance are considerably more sophisticated than those that had contented Cleonymus. Cleonymus was satisfied to place the onus upon the collector and, through him, on the uncooperative city. According to the terms of the Cleinias Decree, however, the tribute-paying city was also to inscribe the sum sent to Athens in an account book, which was sealed, the sum being then sent off to Athens. The account book would be read out at Athens simultaneously with the paying down of the money This attempt to ensure the strictest accountability presupposes the demonstrated inadequacy of Cleonymus's more rudimentary procedure, which, of course, aimed at the same goal. It is difficult to see, therefore, how this decree can have preceded Cleonymus's by twenty years when, according to all logic, by which the simple moves to the complex, it appears to be an "improvement" on the earlier arrangement. Probably it resulted from some instance of gross mismanagement of the tribute funds whereby sums of money fell short, and everyone involved disclaimed responsibility—the Athenians, tribute collectors, and the allied states each blaming someone else for the shortfall. One thinks of the occasion when all but one of the Hellenotamiae were put to death for malfeasance in office although, as the event later proved (Antiph. 5.69), they were guiltless.

The proper context for the decree is therefore the twenties, precisely when the bureaucracy it implies had sprung into existence. For the first sentence of the decree speaks of the (Athenian) governors in the cities and the episkopoi as the persons responsible for the supervision of the tribute payments. Since no exceptions are indicated, any that existed must have been insignificant enough to be ignored. It assuredly needs no argument that Athenian ubiquity such as this is less credible in the forties than in the twenties, when the Peloponnesian War was in progress and the imposition of Athenian officers on the allied cities was a normal precaution. In this connection it is significant that when

[8] IG i 68 = ML 68 = Fornara 133; cf. SEG 34.20.

Pseudo-Xenophon speaks of the advantages accruing to the Athenians because of their custom of judging the allies at Athens, he points out (1.18) that by this means every Athenian was treated sycophantically whereas, if the trials were held in the allies' cities, the allies would honor only the Athenian generals, trierarchs, and envoys. In short, not even the revisionist view of Pericles' custody of the empire entails the thorough subjection of the allies presupposed by this decree.

The propriety of the later date is confirmed by a reference in lines 41f. to "cow and panoply." Cleinias declared that "if anyone acts improperly with regard to the bringing of the cow and panoply," he shall be indicted. "Anyone" in this context, is any allied city. Now it is known from the second decree of Thoudippos (the "Reassessment Decree")^[9] that "all" tribute-paying states assessed in 425/4 were then required to bring a cow and panoply to the Panathenaea and to take part in the procession "just as [Athenian] colonists do." If the phrase just quoted is correctly restored, the priority of the Thoudippos Decree, enacted in 425/4, to that of Cleinias is assured.^[10] For the usual explanation—that Thoudippos merely imposed a previously enacted requirement on newly assessed cities—is flatly contradicted by the terms used in the decree. "Just as [Athenian] colonists do" is the vital phrase. It indicates that this requirement had been limited, until 425/4, to Athenian settlements. In the Cleinias Decree, as here, the order is directed at tribute-paying states. The later date is mandatory.

[9] IG i 71 = ML 69 = Fornara 136.

[10] This argument, proposed by Mattingly, Historia 10 (1961), 187f., and in "Epigraphically the Twenties Are Too Late," BSA 65 (1970), 140ff., has been dismissed (cf. Meritt and Wade-Gery, JHS 82 [1962], 67–74; ML, p. 121), based on the contention that if Thoudippos's decree marked the beginning of this policy, "we should expect a longer formulation" (ML, p. 121). The formulation is long enough to achieve its purpose and no more should be required of it.